Quantifying the contribution of juvenile migratory phenotypes
国际财务管理课后习题答案chapter 8
CHAPTER 8 MANAGEMENT OF TRANSACTION EXPOSURE SUGGESTED ANSWERS AND SOLUTIONS TO END—OF—CHAPTER QUESTIONS ANDPROBLEMSQUESTIONS1。
How would you define transaction exposure? How is it different from economic exposure? Answer：Transaction exposure is the sensitivity of realized domestic currency values of the firm’s contractual cash flows denominated in foreign currencies to unexpected changes in exchange rates。
Unlike economic exposure, transaction exposure is well-defined and short-term。
2。
Discuss and compare hedging transaction exposure using the forward contract vs。
money market instruments。
When do the alternative hedging approaches produce the same result？Answer: Hedging transaction exposure by a forward contract is achieved by selling or buying foreign currency receivables or payables forward。
On the other hand，money market hedge is achieved by borrowing or lending the present value of foreign currency receivables or payables, thereby creating offsetting foreign currency positions. If the interest rate parity is holding， the two hedging methods are equivalent。
国际金融英文版第十五版复习资料
前言学弟学妹们,当你们看到这篇复习资料的时候, 学长已经在文档上传的当天上午参加了国际金融的考试, 本复习资料主要针对对象为成都信息工程学院(CUIT)英语系大三学生, 且立足教材也基于托马斯·A ·普格尔(Thomas A. Pugel)先生所著国际金融英文版·第15版, 其他版本或者相似教材也可作为参考, 本资料的整理除了参考维基百科,百度百科以及MBA 智库百科,当然最重要的是我们老师的课件. 为了帮助同学们顺利通过考试, 当然是拿到高分, 希望此资料能够帮助你们节省时间, 达到高效复习的效果.外国语学院2011级,陈爵歌(Louis) 2014年1月6日晚于宿舍 Chapter 2Transnationality Index (跨国化指数)(TNI ) is a means of ranking multinational corporations that is employed by economists and politicians. (反映跨国公司海外经营活动的经济强度，是衡量海外业务在公司整体业务中地位的重要指标) Foreign assets to total assets(外国资产占总资产比)Foreign sales to total sales(海外销售占总销售)Foreign employees to total employees(外籍雇员占总雇员)跨国化指数的构成联合国跨国公司与投资司使用的跨国化指数由三个指标构成：国外资产对公司总资产的百分比；国外销售对公司总销售的百分比；国外雇员人数对公司雇员总人数的百分比关于TNI 的计算公式:International Economic Integration( 国际经济一体化)International economic integration refers to the extent and strength of real -sector and financial -sector linkages among national economies.(国际经济一体化是指两个或两个以上的国家在现有生产力发展水平和国际分工的基础上，由政府间通过协商缔结条约，让渡一定的国家主权，建立两国或多国的经济联盟，从而使经济达到某种程度的结合以提高其在国际经济中的地位)Real Sector(实际经济部门): The sector of the economy engaged in the production and sale of goods and services(指物质的、精神的产品和服务的生产、流通等经济活动。
外企hr常用英语单词 HR英文单词
外企hr常用英语单词 HR英文单词导读:就爱阅读网友为您分享以下“HR英文单词”资讯，希望对您有所帮助，感谢您对的支持!1. 人力资源管理:(Human Resource Management ,HRM)人力资源经理:( human resource manager)高级管理人员:(executive)职业:(profession)道德标准:(ethics)操作工:(operative employees)专家:(specialist)人力资源认证协会:(the Human Resource Certification Institute,HRCI)2.外部环境:(external environment)内部环境:(internal environment)政策:(policy)企业文化:(corporate culture)1目标:(mission)股东:(shareholders)非正式组织:(informal organization)跨国公司:(multinational corporation,MNC)管理多样性:(managing diversity)3.工作:(job)职位:(posting)工作分析:(job analysis)工作说明:(job description)工作规范:(job specification)工作分析计划表:(job analysis schedule,JAS)职位分析问卷调查法:(Management Position Description Questionnaire,MPDQ) 行政秘书:(executive secretary) 地区服务经理助理:(assistant district service manager)4.人力资源计划:(Human Resource Planning,HRP)战略规划:(strategic planning)长期趋势:(long term trend)要求预测:(requirement forecast)供给预测:(availability forecast)管理人力储备:(management inventory)裁减:(downsizing)人力资源信息系统:(Human Resource Information2System,HRIS)5.招聘:(recruitment)员工申请表:(employee requisition)招聘方法:(recruitment methods)内部提升:(Promotion From Within ,PFW)工作公告:(job posting)广告:(advertising)职业介绍所:(employment agency)特殊事件:(special events)实习:(internship)6.选择:(selection)选择率:(selection rate)简历:(resume)标准化:(standardization)有效性:(validity)客观性:(objectivity)规范:(norm)录用分数线:(cutoff score)准确度:(aiming)业务知识测试:(job knowledge tests)求职面试:(employment interview)非结构化面试:(unstructured interview)3结构化面试:(structured interview)小组面试:(group interview)职业兴趣测试:(vocational interest tests)会议型面试:(board interview)7.组织变化与人力资源开发人力资源开发:(Human Resource Development,HRD) 培训:(training) 开发:(development)定位:(orientation)训练:(coaching)辅导:(mentoring)经营管理策略:(business games)案例研究:(case study)会议方法:(conference method)角色扮演:(role playing)工作轮换:(job rotating)在职培训:(on-the-job training ,OJT)媒介:(media)8.企业文化与组织发展企业文化:(corporate culture)组织发展:(organization development,OD) 调查反馈:(survey feedback)4质量圈:(quality circles)目标管理:(management by objective,MBO)全面质量管理:(Total Quality Management,TQM) 团队建设:(team building) 9.职业计划与发展职业:(career)职业计划:(career planning)职业道路:(career path)职业发展:(career development)自我评价:(self-assessment)职业动机:(career anchors)10.绩效评价绩效评价:(Performance Appraisal,PA) 小组评价:(group appraisal)业绩评定表:(rating scales method)关键事件法:(critical incident method)排列法:(ranking method)平行比较法:(paired comparison)硬性分布法:(forced distribution method) 晕圈错误:(halo error)宽松:(leniency)严格:(strictness)53600反馈:(360-degree feedback)叙述法:(essay method)集中趋势:(central tendency)11.报酬与福利报酬:(compensation)直接经济报酬:(direct financial compensation) 间接经济报酬:(indirect financial compensation) 非经济报酬:(no financial compensation) 公平:(equity)外部公平:(external equity)内部公平:(internal equity)员工公平:(employee equity)小组公平:(team equity)工资水平领先者:(pay leaders)现行工资率:(going rate)工资水平居后者:(pay followers)劳动力市场:(labor market)工作评价:(job evaluation)排列法:(ranking method)分类法:(classification method)因素比较法:(factor comparison method)评分法:(point method)海氏指示图表个人能力分析法:(Hay Guide Chart-profile6Method) 工作定价:(job pricing)工资等级:(pay grade)工资曲线:(wage curve)工资幅度:(pay range)12.福利和其它报酬问题福利(间接经济补偿)员工股权计划:(employee stock ownership plan,ESOP) 值班津贴:(shift differential)奖金:(incentive compensation)分红制:(profit sharing)13.安全与健康的工作环境安全:(safety)健康:(health)频率:(frequency rate)紧张:(stress)角色冲突:(role conflict)催眠法:(hypnosis)酗酒:(alcoholism)14.员工和劳动关系工会:(union)地方工会:(local union)行业工会:(craft union)7产业工会:(industrial union)全国工会:(national union)谈判组:(bargaining union)劳资谈判:(collective bargaining)仲裁:(arbitration)罢工:(strike)内部员工关系:(internal employee relations) 纪律:(discipline)纪律处分:(disciplinary action)申诉:(grievance)降职:(demotion)调动:(transfer)晋升:(promotion)AAction learning:行动学习Alternation ranking method:交替排序法Annual bonus:年终分红Application forms:工作申请表Appraisal interview:评价面试Aptitudes:资质Arbitration:仲裁Attendance incentive plan:参与式激励计划8Authority:职权BBehavior modeling:行为模拟Behaviorally anchored rating scale (bars):行为锚定等级评价法Benchmark job:基准职位Benefits:福利Bias:个人偏见Boycott:联合抵制Bumping/layoff procedures:工作替换/临时解雇程序Burnout:耗竭CCandidate-order error:候选人次序错误Capital accumulation program:资本积累方案Career anchors:职业锚Career cycle:职业周期Career planning and development:职业规划与职业发展 Case study method:案例研究方法Central tendency:居中趋势Citations:传讯Civil Rights Act:民权法Classes:类Classification (or grading) method:归类(或分级)法9Collective bargaining:集体谈判Comparable worth:可比价值Compensable factor:报酬因素Computerized forecast:计算机化预测Content validity:内容效度Criterion validity:效标效度Critical incident method:关键事件法DDavis-Bacon Act (DBA):戴维斯?佩根法案Day-to-day-collective bargaining:日常集体谈判Decline stage:下降阶段Deferred profit-sharing plan:延期利润分享计划Defined benefit:固定福利Defined contribution:固定缴款Department of Labor job analysis:劳工部工作分析法Discipline:纪律Dismissal:解雇;开除Downsizing:精简EEarly retirement window:提前退休窗口Economic strike:经济罢工Edgar Schein:艾德加?施恩10Employee compensation:职员报酬Employee orientation:雇员上岗引导Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) :雇员退休收入保障法案 Employee services benefits:雇员服务福利Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) :雇员持股计划Equal Pay Act:公平工资法Establishment stage:确立阶段Exit interviews:离职面谈Expectancy chart:期望图表Experimentation:实验Exploration stage:探索阶段FFact-finder:调查Fair day”s work:公平日工作Fair Labor Standards Act:公平劳动标准法案Flexible benefits programs:弹性福利计划Flex place:弹性工作地点Flextime:弹性工作时间Forced distribution method:强制分布法Four-day workweek:每周4天工作制Frederick Taylor:弗雷德里克?泰罗11Functional control:职能控制Functional job analysis:功能性工作分析法GGeneral economic conditions:一般经济状况Golden offerings:高龄给付Good faith bargaining:真诚的谈判Grade description:等级说明书Grades:等级Graphic rating scale:图尺度评价法Grid training:方格训练Grievance:抱怨Grievance procedure:抱怨程序Group life insurance:团体人寿保险Group pension plan:团体退休金计划Growth stage:成长阶段Guarantee corporation:担保公司Guaranteed fair treatment:有保证的公平对待Guaranteed piecework plan:有保障的计件工资制 Gain sharing:收益分享HHalo effect:晕轮效应Health maintenance organization (HMO) :健康维持组织12IIllegal bargaining:非法谈判项目Impasse:僵持Implied authority:隐含职权Incentive plan:激励计划Individual retirement account (IRA) :个人退休账户 In-house development center:企业内部开发中心 Insubordination:不服从13。
薪酬管理外文文献翻译
薪酬管理外文文献翻译The existence of an agency problem in a corporation due to the separation of ownership and control has been widely studied in literatures. This paper examines the effects of management compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions. This paper is significant because it helps to understand the relationship between them. This understandings allow the design of an optimal management compensation scheme to induce the manager to act towards the goals and best interests of the company. Grossman and Hart (1983) investigate the principal agency problem. Since the actions of the agent are unobservable and the first best course of actions can not be achieved, Grossman and Hart show that optimal management compensation scheme should be adopted to induce the manager to choose the second best course of actions. Besides management compensation schemes, other means to alleviate the agency problems are also explored. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest two ways for reducing the agency problem: competitive market mechanisms and direct contractual provisions. Manne (1965) argues that a market mechanism such as the threat of a takeover provided by the market can be used for corporate control. "Ex-post settling up" by the managerial labour market can also discipline managers and induce them to pursue the interests of shareholders. Fama (1980) shows that if managerial labour markets function properly, and if the deviation of the firm's actual performancefrom stockholders' optimum is settled up in managers' compensation, then the agency cost will be fully borne by the agent (manager).The theoretical arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Haugen and Senbet (1981), and empirical evidence of Amihud andLev (1981), Walking and Long (1984), Agrawal and Mandelker (1985), andBenston (1985), among others, suggest that managers' holding of common stock and stock options have an important effect on managerial incentives. For example, Benston finds that changes in the value of managers' stock holdings are larger than their annual employment income. Agrawal and Mandelker find that executive security holdings have a role in reducing agency problems. This implies that the share holdings and stock options of the managers are likely to affect the corporate investment decisions. A typical management scheme consists of flat salary, bonus payment and stock options. However, the studies, so far, only provide links between the stock options and corporate investment decisions. There are few evidences that the compensation schemes may have impacts on thecorporate investment decisions. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework to study the effects of management compensation schemes on the corporate investment decisions. Assuming that the compensation schemes consist of flat salary, bonus payment, and stock options, I first examine the effects of alternative compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions under all-equity financing. Secondly, I examine the issue in a setting where a firm relies on debt financing. Briefly speaking, the findings are consistent with Amihud and Lev's results.Managers who have high shareholdings and rewarded by intensive profit sharing ratio tend to underinvest.However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the model. Section HI discusses the managerial incentives under all-equity financing. Section IV examines the managerial incentives under debt financing. Section V discusses the empirical implications and presents the conclusions of the study.I consider a three-date two-period model. At time t0, a firm is established and goes public. There are now two kinds of owners in the firm, namely, the controlling shareholder and the atomistic shareholders. The proceeds from initial public offering are invested in some risky assets which generate an intermediate earnings, I, at t,. At the beginning, the firm also decides its financial structure. A manager is also hired to operate the firm at this time. The manager is entitled to hold a fraction of the firm's common stocks and stock options, a (where0<a<l), at the beginning of the first period. At time t,, the firm receives intermediate earnings, denoted by I, from the initial asset. At the same time, a new project investment is available to the firm. For simplicity, the model assumes that the firm needs all the intermediate earnings, I, to invest in the new project. If the project is accepted at t,, it produces a stochastic earnings Y in t2, such that Y={I+X, I-X}, with Prob[Y=I+X] = p and Prob[Y=I-X] = 1-p, respectively. The probability, p, is a uniform density function with an interval rangedfrom 0 to 1. Initially, the model also assumes that the net earnings, X, is less than initial investment, I. This assumption is reasonable since most of the investment can not earn a more than 100% rate of return. Later, this assumption is relaxed to investigate the effect of the extraordinarily profitable investment on the results. For simplicity, It is also assumed that there is no time value for the money and no dividend will be paid before t2. If the project is rejected at t,, the intermediate earnings, I, will be kept in the firm and its value at t2 will be equal to I. Effects of Management Compensation Schemes on Corporate Investment Decision Overinvestment versus UnderinvestmentA risk neutral investor should invest in a new project if it generates a positiexpected payoff. If the payoff is normally or symmetrically distributed, tinvestor should invest whenever the probability of making a positive earninggreater than 0.5. The minimum level of probability for making an investment the neutral investor is known as the cut-off probability. The project will generzero expected payoff at a cut-off probability. If the investor invests only in tprojects with the cut-off probability greater than 0.5, then the investor tendsinvest in the less risky projects and this is known as the underinvestment. Ifinvestor invests the projects with a cut-off probability less than 0.5, then tinvestor tends to invest in more risky projects and this is known as thoverinvestment. In the paper, it is assumed that the atomistic shareholders risk neutral, the manager and controlling shareholder are risk averse.It has been argued that risk-reduction activities are considered as managerial perquisites in the context of the agency cost model. Managers tend to engage in these risk-reduction activities to decrease their largely undiversifiable "employment risk" (Amihud and Lev 1981). The finding in this paper is consistent with Amihud and Lev's empirical result. Managers tend to underinvest when they have higher shareholdings and larger profit sharing percentage. This result is independent of the level of debt financing. Although the paper can not predict themanager's action when he has a large profit sharing percentage and the profit cashflow has high variance (X > I), it shows that the manager with high shareholding will underinvest in the project. This is inconsistent with the best interests of the atomistic shareholders. However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage.The results and findings in this paper provides several testable hypotheses forfuture research. If the managers underinvest in the projects, the company willunderperform in long run. Thus the earnings can be used as a proxy forunderinvestment, and a negative relationship between earningsandmanagement shareholdings, stock options or profit sharing ratiois expected.As theunderinvestment problem can be alleviated by increasing the financialleverage, a positiverelationship between earnings and financial leverage isexpected.在一个公司由于所有权和控制权的分离的代理问题存在的文献中得到了广泛的研究。
拉马努金恒等式的证明
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jouhet@math.univ-lyon1.fr, http://math.univ-lyon1.fr/~jouhet
3Universit´e de Lyon, Universit´e Lyon 1, UMR 5208 du CNRS, Institut Camille Jordan, F-69622, Villeurbanne Cedex, France
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盈余质量的定量分析【外文翻译】
外文文献翻译一、外文原文原文：Quantitative analysis of earning quality Earnings quality analysis has long been known as the qualitative investment manager’s best defense against low quality financial reporting. While not widely known, recent academic and proprietary research shows that earnings quality metrics are also useful in generating alpha in the context of quantitative investment and trading strategies.The Gradient Analytics Earnings Quality Model (EQM) is the first quantitative factor that objectively measures earnings quality across a broad spectrum of companies for both longer-term (3-12 month) and shorter-term (1-3 month) holding periods. The model was developed using rigorous statistical methods to ensure a robust factor that generates excess returns on a standalone basis while also capturing a unique dimension of returns not captured by other quantitative factors. The end product is a highly unique factor with exceptional returns and low correlation in relation to other commonly used factors such as those derived from estimate revisions, earnings momentum, price momentum, cash flow, corporate insider, growth and value.The U.S. accounting profession and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) have worked diligently through the years to develop the most rigorous system of accounting procedures in the world. Nevertheless, there is still a significant gap (appropriately called the expectations gap) between what investors and creditors expect and what the accounting profession can deliver.The expectations gap exists in part because publicly traded companies have a great deal of discretion in choosing accounting principles and in making estimates that impact their reported financial results. Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), the amount of discretion that a company has in preparing financial statements is controlled by two fundamental principles of accounting: conservatism and objectivity. However, in reality these two guiding principles are often stretched to the limit or ignored.When Conservatism or Objectivity is Impaired, Earnings Quality is CompromisedWhile, in theory, a firm’s accounting staff should employ procedures that are objective and conservative, in practice, management has many competing motivations that drive their choice of accounting policies and influence their periodic estimates. Because of these competing motivations, many companies manipulate accounting numbers in order to facilitate the financial reporting goals established by management. In this regard, virtually all firms working within the bounds of GAAP use minor accounting “gimmicks” to present financial results in a particular light (i.e., overstate or understate their true profitability or financial condition). Micro Strategy, Inc., for example, (1999-2000) was using an aggressive revenue recognition policy that, while not in violation of GAAP, tended to overstate the company’s true profitability. However, it wasn’t until the SEC mandated a change in the way that technology companies account for contract revenue that the market ascertained the extent of the overstatement (although access to earnings quality analysis –qualitative or quantitative –would have revealed the deception prior to the change in accounting rules). After the SEC mandated change, Micro Strategy was twice forced to restate its earnings and its shares fell over 98% in the ensuing 12-month period.While Micro Strategy’s treatment of contract revenues was very aggressive, arguably it was operating in a gray area of GAAP. In more extreme cases, however, some companies go so far as to commit fraudulent acts that materially misstate their financial statements in ways that do not conform to GAAP. For example, Enron used an extremely aggressive scheme of off-balance-sheet financing in order to hide mounting losses. The end result was arguably one of the most spectacular financial reporting disasters in history. Those unlucky enough to hold Enron shares during this period lost close to 100% of the value of their investment.Finally, while intentional manipulation of accounting numbers is common, earnings quality problems are not always the result of intentional acts by management. For example, the quality of inventories at Lucent Technologies (as reported in their first quarter 10Q filed May 2000) suggested an apparent backlog of inventory that indicated a possible slowdown on the horizon. In all likelihood, this was (at least initially) a case of earnings quality problems resulting from unintentional acts (slow sales). Nevertheless, Lucent’s earnings continu ed to disappoint and the stock was down more than 85% in the ensuing twelve months. (Subsequent evidence suggeststhat there may also have been some intentional misstatements on the part of lucent management in order to hide the magnitude of the sales slowdown.)How do companies manipulate earnings?Despite the efforts of the accounting profession to ensure objectivity and conservatism, it is still relatively easy to manipulate accounting numbers through either unethical (but not necessarily illegal) and/or fraudulent means. The list presented below provides a high level overview of how Management can manipulate accounting numbers.1. Recording fictitious transactions or amounts2. Recording transactions incorrectly3. Recording transactions early4. Recording transactions late5. Misstating percentages or amounts involved in a transaction6. Misstating the amounts of assets or liabilities7. Changing accounting methods or estimates for no substantive reason8. Using related party transactions to alter reported profitsAcademic Research on Earnings Quality and Future ReturnsIn addition to the anecdotal evidence provided by qualitative earnings quality services (i.e., those that use subjective evaluations of financial statements to render an earnings quality grade), academic research also supports the notion that quantitative models of earnings quality can be used to earn excess returns. The following brief review of the academic literature highlights some of the most important factors that form the basis for G radient’s approach to quantitatively modeling earnings quality and forecasting related excess returns.The very first studies to investigate issues related to earnings quality were conducted by G. Peter Wilson of Harvard University (1986, 1987) using an event study methodology. Wilson’s key conclusions are that operating cash flows and total accruals (i.e., changes in current accruals plus non current accruals) are differentially valued and that both are value relevant. That is, the market appears to react to the disclosure of detailed cash flow and accrual data (value relevance) and that cash flowsare more highly valued than accruals (differential valuation). Wilson’s basic findings are also supported by a number of studies that use an association methodology7, including Rayburn (1986), Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley (1987), Chariton and Katz (1990), Levant and Zeroing (1990), Vickers (1993), Ali (1994), Pfeiffer et al. (1998), and Vickers, Vickers and Betties (2000).The fact that the market values a dollar of cash flow more than a dollar of current or non current accruals implies that higher levels of accruals are indicative of lower quality of earnings. In other words, the degree to which a company must rely on accruals to boost net income results in lower quality earnings. Nevertheless, it is possible that the market “sees through” the deception and appropriately values companies based on some notion of baseline or sustainable earnings. However, the first studies to investigate this issue (Sloan, 1996 and Swanson and Vickers, 1997) find that, contrary to the efficient markets hypothesis, disaggregating earnings into cash flow and accrual components is useful in identifying securities that are likely to outperform (or under- perform) in the future. Thus, the results of these studies imply that security prices do not fully reflect the information contained in the cash flow and accrual components of earnings.Following in the path of Sloan (1996) and Swanson and Vickers (1997), academic researchers are currently focusing on the development of simple empirical models that objectively assess earnings quality in order to predict future return performance. (See, for example, Sloan, Solomon and Tuna, 2001; Chan, Chan, Legatees and Lakonishok, 2001; and Penman and Zang, 2001.) Table 1 below summarizes the results of recent academic working papers that focus on the predictive ability of simple earnings quality models. As shown in the table, these studies find that companies with relatively high (low) levels of accruals tend to under-perform (outperform) for periods of 12-36 months after the disclosure of detailed financial data. Specifically, the return spread between stocks with the highest level of accruals (lowest earnings quality) and the lowest level of accruals (highest earnings quality) ranges from 8.8% to 21.7%, depending on the approach used by the authors in forming portfolios. The implication is that measures of earnings quality can be used informing profitable investing and trading strategies.Gradient An alytics’ Earnings Quality ModelThe latest academic research demonstrates that the market does not fully impound information about earnings quality at the time that detailed financial statement data are released. That is, a statistically-based approach to analyzing earnings quality can yield profitable investment and trading strategies. Thus, the next step was to develop a robust model that is designed to optimize the excess returns that can be realized from an earnings quality strategy. The Gradient Analytics Earnings Quality Model (EQM) has been developed to achieve this goal.The Gradient EQM is the first quantitative factor that measures earnings quality across a broad spectrum of companies. The EQM provides two weekly scores ranging from 1 (strong sell) to 8 (strong buy) for each of the top 5000 companies ranked by market capitalization. The Long-Term Score provides a 1-8 ranking based on a stock’s expected future performance over a 3-12 month holding period. The Short-Term Score ranks each stock based on its expected future performance over a 1-3 month holding period.In contrast to competing, commercially-available earnings quality services, the output from the EQM is derived objectively –not subjectively –through statistical analysis of accrual and cash flow components of earnings. The model was developed using rigorous statistical methods to ensure a robust factor that generates excess returns on a standalone basis while also capturing a unique dimension of returns not captured by other quantitative factors. More specifically, the model was constructed using a multiple regression approach (including repressors from academic research and our own theoretically sound proprietary earnings quality constructs) estimated in pooled time series, cross section for 13 sector categories.8 Each separate sector model incorporates the most important dimensions of earnings quality for that segment of the market.9 When considered together, these dimensions or “sub-factors” provide a means of reliably ranking firms monotonically according to both their expected mean and median excess returns. The end product is a highly unique factor with exceptional returns and low correlation in relation to other commonly used factors.All Gradient models are developed using a disciplined scientific approach. Our approach can be characterized as follows:Variable Specification – We begin by carefully specifying each variable to ensureproper measurement and scaling. When more than one specification is defensible, we choose the simplest specification on the theory that simplicity will yield more generalizable results.Modeling Techniques –Each model is estimated using relatively simple linear and nonlinear regression techniques. Again, we believe that simplicity is the key to generalizability.Sensitivity Analyses –All models are subjected to sensitivity analyses to determine whether or not our results are impacted by outliers, changes in regimes, alternative variable specifications and modeling techniques, and so on.Proper Use of In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Periods – Each model is estimated using data from a strict in-sample period. The model is then tested (for generalizabity, stability, and so on) in an out-of-sample period.Control for Potential Threats to Internal and External Validity –Our research efforts are designs to control for common threats to internal and external validity in financial engineering studies (such as survivorship bias, hindsight bias, selection bias, and so on).ConclusionEarnings quality analysis is often regarded as the qualitative investment manager’s best defense against low quality financial reporting. The latest academic research also demonstrates that the market does not fully impound information about earnings quality at the time that detailed financial statement data are released. That is, a statistically-based approach to analyzing earnings quality can yield profitable investment and trading strategies. The Gradient Earnings Quality Model (EQM) has been developed to achieve this goal.The EQM is the first quantitative factor that objectively measures earnings quality for the purpose of forecasting future returns. The model was developed using rigorous statistical methods to ensure a robust factor that generates excess returns on a standalone basis while also capturing a unique dimension of returns not captured by other quantitative factors. The end product is a highly unique factor with exceptional returns and low correlation with other commonly used factors.The Earnings Quality Model has been extensively back-tested across a variety of stock universes and time periods in order to ensure optimal, generalizable results. The results presented in this white paper provide extremely strong evidence on the usefulness of the EQM. As shown in the results section of this document, the modelproduces highly significant excess returns, performs extremely well both in- and out-of-sample, and has a low correlation with other commonly used quantitative factors. And, in contrast to competing, commercially-available earnings quality services, the output from the EQM is derived objectively – not subjectively – through statistical analysis of accrual and cash flow components of earnings.Source: gradient analytics, 2005. “Quantitative analysis of earning quality”.［EB/OL］ – website. March, pp.23-25.二、翻译文章译文：盈余质量的定量分析盈余质量分析长时间被认为是定性投资经理针对低质量财务报告的最佳防卫。
Productivity and Undesirable Outputs
230
A directional distance function approach
or Fa ¨ re et al. (1993) one could estimate a shadow price. One possible solution is to use a productivity index that does not require information on prices of effluents, for example, the Malmquist index; see Fa ¨ re and Grosskopf (1996). However, in the presence of undesirable outputs, this index may not be computable. Here we propose a new index, which we call the Malmquist–Luenberger productivity index which overcomes the shortcomings of the original Malmquist index. This index readily allows for inclusion of undesirable outputs without requiring information on shadow prices. It also explicitly credits firms or industries for reductions in undesirable outputs, providing a measure of productivity which will tell managers whether their “true” productivity has improved over time. This index also tells managers if there has been technical progress (a shift in the best practice frontier) and whether they are catching up to the frontier. Since the index is computed using a data envelopment analysis type approach, information concerning benchmark firms and technical efficiency is also generated for individual firms. In order to illustrate the applicability of this index, we compute productivity for data from the Swedish paper and pulp industry. We begin with a discussion of the way in which we model technology, and then turn to our measure of productivity based on this model. Section 4 includes a discussion of our data and results. Section 5 provides a brief conclusion. 2. Modelling technology with good and bad outputs The basic pollution problem is that production of “good” outputs, such as paper or electricity, is typically accompanied by the joint production of undesirable by-products, such as suspended solids or SO2. The fact that goods and bads are jointly produced means that reduction of bads will be “costly”: either resources must be diverted to “clean-up” (e.g. scrubbers), production must be cut back, or fines must be paid. M I More formally, if we denote good outputs by yvR+ , bad outputs by bvR+ , and inputs N by xvR+, then we can describe technology in a very general way via the output sets P(x)={( y, b): x can produce ( y, b)}. (2.1)
【供应链金融风险研究国内外文献综述2300字】
供应链金融风险研究国内外文献综述1 国外研究现状从上世纪八十年代开始供应链金融的定义逐步被人们关注，国外涉及到供应链金融的思想观点与实践的应用相对成熟，对其定义的内涵外延比国内更为广泛，包括基于债券、股票等金融衍生商品这类动产质押业务风险研究、供应链金融的契约设计等方面。
M．Theodore，Paul D.Hutchison（2002）提出了供应链风险及其管理的相关概念，现金流管控是供应链金融领域十分关键的内容，供应链风控中的核心就是成功的现金流管控。
Cossin and Hricko（2003）基于企业违约概率与质押物价值，研究了具有价格风险商品作为质押的风险工具，质押物有助于进一步缓释银行信贷风险的作用。
Jimenez and Saurina（2004）研究了资产支持信贷中风险的影响因素包括质押物、银行（借款人）类型以及银行企业的关系等，合理的质押率有效缓释风险暴露，减少银行信贷损失。
Menkhoff，Neuberger and Suwanaporn（2006）的研究表明在不同国家，质押物对风险缓释的作用不同，质押物缓释风险的作用在发展中国家比发达国家显得更为重要。
Martin R（2007）系统分析了供应链资金流管控成本和危机、提升资金流效益的具体情况，指出根据供应链金融可让资金管理更加高效，但要严苛控制相应风险。
Lai and Debo（2009）对有资金局限的供应链存货中的相应问题进行了分析，通过库存契约设计能有效识别供应链上下游风险因子，从而提高供应链库存风险评价的准确性。
Hamadi和Matoussi（2010）根据剖析Logistic模型BP技术评估供应链金融风险的具体状况，表面三层BP神经网络模型在对上市房地产公司风险评价方面具有更好的准确性。
Qin and Ding（2011）分析了供应链金融领域里的风险变化现象，根据相应的风险迁徙模型，基于符合供应链金融条件，降低了借贷与信贷的风险。
corporate ownership around the world
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AROUND THE WORLDRafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer*October 1998Abstract.We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions or other widely held corporations is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.* Harvard University. We are grateful to Alexander Aganin, Carlos Berdejo-Izquierdo, David Grossman, Bernardo Lopez-Morton, Tatiana Nenova, Ekaterina Trizlova and David Witkin for help with assembling the data, to Lucian Bebchuk, Marco Becht, Mihir Desai, Oliver Hart, Louis Kaplow, René Stulz, Robert Vishny, Luigi Zingales, and two anonymous referees for advice, and to the NSF for financial support.In their 1932 classic, “The Modern Corporation and Private Property,” Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means called attention to the prevalence of widely held corporations in the United States, in which ownership of capital was dispersed between small shareholders, yet control was concentrated in the hands of managers. For at least two generations, their book fixed the image of the modern corporation as one run by professional managers unaccountable to shareholders. The book stimulated an enormous “managerialist” literature on the objectives of such managers, including the important work of Baumol (1959), Marris (1964), Penrose (1959), and Williamson (1964), as well as Galbraith’s (1967) popular and influential account. More recently, the modern field of corporate finance has developed around the same image of a widely held corporation, as can be seen in the central contributions of Jensen and Meckling (1976) or Grossman and Hart (1980). The Berle and Means image has clearly stuck.In recent years, several studies have begun to question the empirical validity of this image. Eisenberg (1976), Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) have shown that, even among the largest American firms, there is a modest concentration of ownership. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) have found several hundred publicly-traded firms with majority (greater than 51 percent) shareholders in the United States. Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1998) have moreover found that management ownership in the United States today is higher than it was when Berle and Means wrote their study.Studies of other rich countries discovered more significant concentration of ownership in Germany (Franks and Mayer (1994), Gorton and Schmid (1996)), Japan (Prowse (1992), Berglof and Perotti (1994)), Italy (Barca (1995)), and seven OECD countries (European CorporateGovernance Network (1997)). In developing economies, ownership is also heavily concentrated (La Porta et al. (1998a)). This research suggests not only that, in many countries, large corporations have large shareholders, but also that these shareholders are active in corporate governance (e.g., Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Yafeh and Yosha (1996)), in contrast to the Berle and Means idea that managers are unaccountable.1Thanks to this research, the Berle and Means image of the modern corporation has begun to show some wear. Still, we have relatively little systematic evidence on the ownership patterns of large publicly traded firms in different countries, and lack a comparative perspective on the relevance of the Berle and Means description of the firm. This paper attempts to provide some such evidence. Specifically, we look at the ownership structures of the twenty largest publicly traded firms in each of the 27 (generally richest) economies, as well as of some smaller firms so that we can keep size constant across countries. We focus on the largest firms in the richest economies precisely because, for these firms, the likelihood of widely-dispersed ownership is the greatest (this is indeed the case). Our principal contribution is to find wherever possible the identities of the ultimate owners of capital and of voting rights in firms, so when shares in a firm are owned by another company, we examine the ownership of that company, and so on.2 For most countries, this is the only way to understand the relationship between ownership and control. These data enable us to address, in a comparative perspective, four broad questions related to the Berle and Means thesis.First, how common are widely held firms in different countries, as opposed to firms that have owners with significant voting rights? Second, to the extent that firms have significant owners, who are they? Are they families, the government, financial institutions, or other --possibly widely held -- firms? How often do banks control companies -- a big issue in corporate finance in light of the extensive discussion of the German corporate governance model? Third, how do these owners maintain their power? Do they use shares with superior voting rights that enable them to exercise control with only limited ownership of capital? Alternatively, do they create complicated cross-ownership patterns to reduce the threat to their control? Or do they build pyramids, whereby they control firms through a chain of companies -- another form of separating ownership of capital and control? By answering these questions empirically, we hope to provide a comprehensive description of ownership patterns of large firms in rich countries.The fourth question we address is: what explains the differences between countries in their ownership patterns? Why, for example, is the Berle and Means image of a widely held firm so much more descriptive of the United States than of Mexico or Italy? Our earlier work (La Porta et al. (1997, 1998a)) suggests that the widely held Berle and Means corporation should be more common in countries with good legal protection of minority shareholders (which are often rich common law countries). In these countries, controlling shareholders have less fear of being expropriated themselves in the event that they ever lose control through a takeover or a market accumulation of shares by a raider, and so might be willing to cut their ownership of voting rights by selling shares to raise funds or to diversify. In contrast, in countries with poor protection of minorities, losing control involuntarily and thus becoming a minority shareholder may be such a costly proposition in terms of surrendering the private benefits of control that the controlling shareholders would do everything to keep control. They would hold more voting rights themselves, and have less interest is selling shares in the market.3 In view of this analysis, we assess the relationship between ownership concentration and minority shareholder protection interms of the voting rights of the principal shareholders rather than their cash flow rights.4 Relatedly, we evaluate the relationship between shareholder protection and the incidence of various control arrangements, including cross-shareholdings, differential voting rights and pyramids. The theory in this area is not completely developed, but some articles do help us think about the data. Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) suggest that deviations from one-share-one-vote should be larger when private benefits of control are higher, which must be the case in countries with poorer shareholder protection. Wolfenzon (1998) argues that pyramids should also be more common in countries with poor shareholder protection, because it is easier for controlling shareholders there to make minority shareholders in existing firms pay for starting up new firms as partial subsidiaries without fully sharing with these minorities the benefits of a new venture. Pyramids and multiple classes of stock are of course two different ways of separating cash flow and control rights in firms.The controlling shareholders face strong incentives to monitor managers and maximize profits when they retain substantial cash flow rights in addition to control. These incentives, emphasized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), also restrain the diversion of corporate resources by the controlling shareholders, and enhance the value of minority shares.In our empirical work, we find that the Berle and Means corporation is far from universal, and is quite rare for some definitions of control. Similarly, the so-called German model of bank control through equity is uncommon. Instead, controlling shareholders -- usually the State or families -- are present in most large companies. These shareholders have control rights in firms in excess of their cash flow rights, largely through the use of pyramids, but they also participate inmanagement. The power of these controlling shareholders is evidently not checked by other large shareholders. The results suggest that the theory of corporate finance relevant for most countries should focus on the incentives and opportunities of controlling shareholders to both benefit and expropriate the minority shareholders.The next section of the paper describes our data, and presents a number of examples of ownership patterns in particular companies. Section II presents the basic results on the incidence of various ownership structures around the world. Section III concludes.I. Data.A. Construction of the DatabaseThis paper is based on a new database of ownership structures of companies from 27 countries. As we detail below, the data on corporate ownership are often difficult to assemble, and this limitation determines many of the choices we make. We generally use the richest countries based on 1993 per capita income, but exclude a number of them that do not have significant stock markets (e.g., Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia).5 For each country, we collect two samples of firms. The first sample consists of the top 20 firms ranked by market capitalization of common equity at the end of 1995 (with some exceptions detailed below). This sample runs into the objection that the largest companies in some countries are much larger than the largest companies in other countries. This is a particularly serious issue for a study of ownership because larger companies presumably have less concentrated ownership, and hence we should be careful that our measures of block ownership do not simply proxy for size. Accordingly, the second sample collects, whenever possible, the smallest 10 firms in each countrywith market capitalization of common equity of at least $500 million at the end of 1995. We call the first sample “large firms” and the second sample “medium firms.” For countries with small stock markets, the two samples intersect. Moreover, for six countries (Argentina, Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, Greece, and Portugal) we do not have 10 publicly traded firms with capitalizations above $500 million. Overall, we have 540 large firms in the large firm sample, and a total of 691 different firms (out of a possible maximum of 810).6There are a few further restrictions on these samples of companies. First, for both samples, we exclude all affiliates of foreign firms. A firm is defined as an affiliate of a foreign company if at least 50 percent of its votes are directly controlled by a single foreign corporate owner. In addition, we exclude banks and utilities from the sample of medium firms, to prevent the domination of this sample by these two industries. Finally, by construction, neither sample includes companies that are owned either wholly privately or wholly by the government, and therefore are not listed. This restriction biases our results toward finding fewer firms with significant government and family ownership than actually exist.As a rule, our companies come from WorldScope database. In four countries for which WorldScope coverage is limited (Argentina, Israel, Mexico, and the Netherlands), we use other sources (see Appendix A for data sources). We generally rely on annual reports, 20-F filings for companies with American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), proxy statements, and -- for several countries -- country-specific books that detail ownership structures of their companies. We also found the INTERNET to be very useful because many individual companies (e.g., in Scandinavia), as well as institutions (e.g., the Paris Bourse and The Financial Times) have Websites that contain information on ownership structures. Virtually all of our data are for 1995and 1996, though we have a few observations where the data come from the earlier years, and a few from 1997. Since ownership patterns tend to be relatively stable, the fact that the ownership data do not all come from the same year is not a big problem.For several countries, our standard procedures do not work because disclosure is so limited. For Greece and Mexico, we can not work with the 20 largest firms because we do not have enough ownership data. For Greece, we take the 20 largest corporations for which we could find ownership data (mostly in Bloomberg). For Mexico, we take the 20 largest firms that have ADRs. For Israel, we rely almost entirely on Lexis/Nexis and INTERNET sources. For Korea, different sources offer conflicting information on corporate ownership structures of chaebols. We were advised by Korean scholars that the best source for chaebols contains information as of 1984, so we use the more stale but reliable data.To describe control of companies, we generally look for all shareholders who control over 10 percent of the votes. The cutoff of 10 percent is used because (1) it provides a significant threshold of votes; and (2) most countries mandate disclosure of 10 percent, and usually even lower, ownership stakes. For most countries and companies, we have some information on smaller shareholdings, but focus only on shareholders who control over 10 percent of the votes. In many cases, the principal shareholders in our firms are themselves corporate entities and financial institutions. We then try to find the major shareholders in these entities, then the major shareholders in the major shareholders, and so on, until we find the ultimate controllers of the votes. In some cases, the ultimate controller is the State, a widely held financial institution, or a widely held corporation. In other cases, it is an individual or a family. We do not attempt to get inside families, and assume that every family owns and votes its shares collectively.B. Definitions of VariablesWe ask whether firms have substantial owners. We do not try to measure ownership concentration, because a theoretically appropriate measure requires a model of the interactions between large shareholders, which we do not have. Rather, we try to define owners in a variety of ways, summarized in Table I and discussed in this subsection. In the following subsection, we illustrate these definitions using several companies from our sample.Our definitions of ownership rely on voting rights rather than cash flow rights. Recall that Berle and Means want to know who controls the modern corporation: shareholders or managers. We too want to know whether corporations have shareholders with substantial voting rights, either directly or through a chain of holdings. This idea motivates our definitions.We divide firms into those that are widely held and those with ultimate owners. We allow for five types of ultimate owners: 1) a family or an individual, 2) the State, 3) a widely held financial institution such as a bank or an insurance company, 4) a widely held corporation, or 5) miscellaneous, such as a cooperative, a voting trust, or a group with no single controlling investor. State control is a separate category because it is a form of concentrated ownership in which the State uses firms to pursue political objectives, while the public pays for the losses (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). We also give widely held corporations and widely held financial institutions separate categories as owners because it is unclear whether the firms they control should be thought of as widely held or having an ultimate owner. A firm controlled by a widely held corporation or financial institution can be thought of either as widely held since the management of the controlling entity is not itself accountable to an ultimate owner, or as controlled by that management. For these reasons (and because bank ownership is of independentinterest), we keep these categories separate.As a first cut, we say that a corporation has a controlling shareholder (ultimate owner) if this shareholder’s direct and indirect voting rights in the firm exceed 20 percent. A shareholder has x percent indirect control over firm A if: (1) it directly controls firm B which, in turn, directly controls x percent of the votes in firm A; or (2) it directly controls firm C which in turn controls firm B (or a sequence of firms leading to firm B each of which has control over the next one, i.e., they form a control chain), which directly controls x percent of the votes in firm A. Table I provides a more precise definition. The idea behind using 20 percent of the votes is that this is usually enough to have effective control of a firm. Indeed, below we present evidence that, in the majority of cases, our ultimate owners are also part of the management of the firm.In the simplest case, each sample firm would have an ultimate owner of the above five types. There may, alternatively, be a legal entity that has over 20 percent voting rights in our sample firm, which itself has a shareholder with over 20 percent of the votes, and so on. We classify all firms that do not have such a 20 percent chain of voting rights as widely held, and firms with such a chain as having owners. On this definition, if company B has 23 percent of the votes in company A, and individual C has 19 percent of the votes in B, we still call A controlled by a widely held corporation (unless C has additional indirect control in A -- see the discussion of Korea below). In addition to the definition of ultimate owners using this 20 percent of votes rule, we consider a second definition that relies on a chain of over 10 percent of voting rights.The above definitions give us a reasonably conservative way to answer the question: do firms have shareholders with a substantial amount of control, or ultimate owners? But this is not the only interesting aspect of ownership. To evaluate the potential for agency problems betweenultimate owners and minority shareholders, we also want to know whether the cash flow ownership rights of the controlling shareholders are substantially different from their voting rights. One way in which the ultimate owners can reduce their ownership below their control rights is by using shares with superior voting rights; another way is to organize the ownership structure of the firm in a pyramid. Finally, the ultimate owners might wish to solidify their control through cross-shareholdings: having the firm own shares in its shareholders.We describe the role of multiple classes of shares in the simplest possible way. For each firm in the sample, we ask what is the minimum percentage of its capital at par value that the immediate shareholder (who might be different from the ultimate owner) needs to own to have 20 percent of the voting rights under the existing structure of share types of that firm (as opposed to what might be allowed by law). For example, if a firm has 50 percent of its capital in the form of shares that have 100 percent of voting rights, and 50 percent in the form of non-voting shares, we would say that a shareholder must own at least 10 percent of capital (in the form of the first kind of shares) to have 20 percent of the votes. Note that we are only computing this measure for the firms in the sample; we do not capture a deviation from one-share-one-vote if a publicly held corporate shareholder in our sample firm itself has multiple classes of stock.We say that a firm’s ownership structure is a pyramid (on the 20 percent definition) if: (1) it has an ultimate owner, and (2) there is at least one publicly traded company between it and the ultimate owner in the chain of 20 percent voting rights. Thus if a publicly traded firm B has 43 percent of the votes in a sample firm A, and an individual C has 27 percent of the votes in firm B, we would say that C controls A, and that the ownership structure is a pyramid. But if B is 100 percent owned by C, we would still call C the ultimate owner, but would not call the ownershipstructure a pyramid. Pyramids require publicly traded intermediate companies. We also use a parallel definition of pyramids with 10 rather than 20 percent of voting rights.We say that there is cross-shareholding by sample firm A in its control chain if A owns any shares in its controlling shareholder or in the companies along that chain of control. So, if firm B has 20 percent of the votes in A, a publicly held firm C owns 20 percent of the votes in B, and A owns two percent of the votes in C, we would say that C is the ultimate owner of A, that A is owned through a pyramid, and that there is a cross-shareholding by A. On the other hand, if, instead of A owning two percent in C, it were the case that B owned two percent in C, we would not call this a cross-shareholding by A because B is not a firm in our sample. We do not look for cross-shareholdings by firm A in firms outside its control chain because of data limitations.We use some further measures of ownership, which are summarized in Table I, but introduce them later as we present our findings in Section II. First, we present some examples.C. Examples of Ownership StructuresTo describe the database and to illustrate our variables, we present several cases of ownership structures of individual companies, in roughly increasing order of complexity.Begin with the United States. The three most valuable firms in the US at the end of 1995, General Electric, AT & T, and Exxon, are all widely held. The fourth most valuable, Microsoft, has three large shareholders (Figure 1): the co-founders Bill Gates (with 23.7 percent of the votes as well as shares) and Paul Allen (with 9 percent), and Steven Ballmer (with 5 percent). We say that Microsoft has an ultimate owner on the 20 percent (as well as on the 10 percent) definition, namely Bill Gates, and is a family-owned firm. It is obviously not a pyramid, does not have cross-shareholdings, and it takes 20 percent of the capital to amass 20 percent of the votes.The fourth most valuable company in Canada is Barrick Gold, and it has a more complex ownership structure (Figure 2). Its founder, Chairman, and CEO is Peter Munk, who is also Chairman and CEO of a holding company called Horsham, that owns 16.3 percent of votes and capital in Barrick Gold. Mr. Munk controls the publicly-traded Horsham with 79.7 percent of its votes, but only 7.3 percent of capital. Even though Munk evidently controls Barrick, we say that Barrick Gold is widely held on the 20 percent definition of control, since Horsham only has 16.3 percent of the votes. On the 10 percent definition, Barrick Gold, has an ultimate owner, a family. Since Horsham is publicly traded, we call Barrick’s ownership structure a pyramid on the 10, but not the 20, percent definition. Finally, even though Horsham has multiple classes of stock, it takes 20 percent of Barrick’s capital to have 20 percent of the votes, and so the company has a one-share-one-vote structure.7The next example is Hutchison Whampoa, the third most valuable company in Hong Kong (Figure 3). It is 43.9 percent controlled by Cheung Kong Holdings, which happens to be the fifth largest publicly traded company in Hong Kong and is therefore also in our sample. In turn, the Li Ka Shing family owns 35 percent of Cheung Kong. Hutchison Whampoa and Cheung Kong are thus both family controlled companies, except the former is owned through a pyramid but the latter is not. Note that Li Ka Shing controls three of the 20 largest companies in Hong Kong (also the 11th largest Hong Kong Electric Holdings), a number that we keep track of. After the State-controlled NT & T, Toyota Motor is the most valuable company in Japan (Figure 4). Toyota has several non-trivial shareholders, but none of them is very large. Four of these shareholders (Sakura Bank, Mitsui Fire and Marine, Mitsui T & B, and Mitsui Life) are part ofthe Mitsui Group and together control 12.1 percent of both capital and votes in Toyota. This is a common situation in Japan, and we say that Toyota is widely held on the 20 percent definition, but “miscellaneous” on the 10 percent definition, because that is where we put business groups as well as voting trusts. There are no pyramids or deviations from one-share-one-vote here, but Toyota has cross-shareholdings in firms in the Mitsui Group.8Ownership in Japanese companies is straightforward relative to that in Korean ones, as the example of Korea’s second largest firm, Samsung Electronics (Figure 5), illustrates. Samsung’s founder, Lee Kun-Hee controls 8.3 percent of Samsung Electronics directly. But he also controls 15 percent of Samsung Life, which controls 8.7 percent of Samsung Electronics, as well as 14.1 percent of Cheil Jedang, which controls 3.2 percent of Samsung Electronics directly but also 11.5 percent of Samsung Life. Lee Kun-Hee has additional indirect stakes in Samsung Electronics as well. Because there are no 20 percent ownership chains, we call Samsung Electronics widely held on the 20 percent definition. But because between his direct holdings and holdings in Samsung Life Lee Kun-Hee controls over 10 percent of the votes in Samsung Electronics, it is a family-controlled firm on the 10 percent definition. It is also controlled through a pyramid on that definition because, for example, Samsung Life is publicly traded.Finally, to illustrate the really complicated cases, we consider ownership structure of five companies from Continental Europe. We begin with Germany, where the most valuable company is Allianz Insurance (Figure 6). Allianz is a one-share-one-vote company with several large shareholders, of whom the largest, with a 25 percent stake, is Munich Reinsurance, the third most valuable company in Germany. However, Allianz has cross-shareholdings in most of its large shareholders, including a 25 percent stake in Munich Reinsurance (Allianz also has a 22.5 percentstake in Dresdner Bank, which has a 10 percent stake in Munich Reinsurance). Allianz presents a difficult case: one could argue that it is widely held because it controls its controlling shareholder, that it is controlled by a widely held financial institution, or that it belongs in the “miscellaneous”category. We allocate it to the first category, while (happily) recognizing that there are only four such controversial cases in the sample, including Munich Reinsurance itself.The fourth largest company in Germany is Daimler Benz (Figure 7). It is 24.4 percent owned by Deutsche Bank, so its ultimate owner is a widely held financial institution (the largest shareholder in Deutsche Bank is Allianz, with five percent). Other shareholders of Daimler Benz form an enormous pyramid, but we would not call its ownership structure a pyramid because it does not involve publicly traded firms in the control chain and does not lead to the ultimate owner. While there are other over 10 percent shareholders, and chains of shareholders, in Daimler Benz, for the purposes of most of our analysis we only look at the largest shareholder, namely Deutsche Bank. Also, by looking only at the banks’ own equity ownership, we ignore the voting arrangements which enable Deutsche Bank and other German banks to vote the shares they hold in custody for their brokerage clients, thereby biasing our results in favor of Berle and Means.The fourth most valuable company in Sweden is ABB (Figure 8). Like five of the top ten most valuable companies in Sweden, ABB is controlled by the Wallenberg family, characteristically through a pyramid of companies that have shares with differential cash flow and voting rights. Incentive, the 17th most valuable company in Sweden, owns 24.3 percent of capital and has 32.8 percent of the votes in ABB. The Wallenberg Group owns 32.8 percent of the capital, but has 43.1 percent of the votes in Incentive. The Wallenberg Group is a voting。
利率外文翻译--量化银行利率风险：假设至关重要
中文2125字外文文献翻译原文（节选）：European Financial Management, V ol. 15, No. 5, 2009, 1001–1018Quantifying the Interest Rate Risk of Banks: Assumptions Do MatterOliver Entrop,Marco Wilkens,Alexander ZeislerAbstractThis paper analyses the robustness of the standardised framework proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004b) to quantify the interest rate risk of banks. We generalise this framework and study the change in the estimated level of interest rate risk if the strict assumptions of the standardised framework are violated. Using data on the German universal banking system, we find that estimates of the interest rate risk are very sensitive to the framework’s assumptio ns. We conclude that the results obtained using the standardised framework in its current specification should be treated with caution when used for supervisory and risk management purposes.Keywords:interest rate risk, Basel Capital Accord, banking supervision, standard- ised interest rate shockInterest rate risk, along with credit risk, is one of the crucial risks banks face. It naturally arises in the banking book from the basic banking business when banks act as asset transformers, i.e., they lend out long-term and refinance short-term. This causes a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, closely related to a repricing mismatch, and results in a duration gap that makes the economic value of banks sensitive to changes in the yield curve (see, e.g., Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993).1 The US Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, where more than 550 of the approximately 4,000 savings and loan institutions failed, is a well-known example where interest rate risk played an integral role (see, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1997)Since it is a systematic risk, interest rate risk is especially important to the stability of the financial system. The new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004a) aims to strengthen the stability of the financial system and establishes detailed minimum mandatory capital requirements for credit risk and operational risk. However, there are no mandatory capital requirements for interest rate risk in the banking book. Instead, it is supervised under pillar 2 (‘supervisory review process’) of Basel II. In this context, the Basel Committee published principles for the management and supervision of interest rate risk (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004b). Banking supervisors are advised to be especially attentive to those banks –called ‘outlier banks’ –whose economic value in relation to regulatory capital declines by more than 20% if a ‘standardised interest rate shock’ occurs.2 The Basel Committee on Banking Su pervision (2004b) stresses that ‘banks’ internal measurement systems should, wherever possible, form the foundation of the supervisory authorities’ measurement of, and response to, the level of interest rate risk’. Acknowledging that not all banksare able to adequately quantify their interest rate risk with advanced internal models, the Basel Committee provides a standardised framework as a possible model to obtain information on the interest rate risk in the banking book.3 This standardised framework has been implemented in the supervisory legislation in many countries, such as Germany (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, 2007).This paper aims to evaluate whether the Basel Committee’s standardised framework is adequate and robust enough to assess the interest rate risk of banks. Although it is clear that a simple model will always lead to somewhat incorrect results, the issue is still critical to both banking supervisors and banks. If assumptions of the standardised framework turn out to be inadequate or too simplistic, banking supervisors might severely misjudge a bank’s interest rate risk and thus react inappropriately. Additionally, this may give rise to poor bank-internal risk management decisions, as internal risk measurement systems are often based on ideas similar to the Committee’s proposal. Hence, it is crucial for banking supervisors and banks to understand to what extent the underlying assumptions can affect the model-implied level of interest rate risk. To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first robustness analysis for this kind of approachFor this purpose, we develop and apply a generalisation of the Basel Committee’s model to analyse the effects of different economically sensible assumptions on the number and boundaries of the time bands, the distribution of maturities within the time bands, amortisation rates, coupons, and the economic maturity of non-maturing deposits. To base our analysis on a realistic setting, we consider the interest rate risk of the aggregated German universal banking system, that is, a hypothetical bank that can be interpreted as an ‘average German universal bank’. We make use of data provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank that is not publicly available. These contain regulatory data on on-balance-sheet positions of German banks; however, detailed information on the use of derivatives is not available.5 We find that estimates of the interest rate risk vary substantially depending on the model’s assumptions. Banks such as the ‘average German universal bank’ can be easily identified as either a very risky outlier bank or a low-risk bank. We find certain assumptions to be more relevant than others. Furthermore, the influence of the assumptions depends on a bank’s business model. For example, the ass umption regarding the economic maturity of non-maturing deposits is of great relevance for the ‘average German universal bank’, and is generally more relevant for savings and cooperative banks than for private commercial banks. All in all, our analysis hig hlights the great dependence of the Basel Committee’s framework on the model assumptions. Therefore, the results obtained using the standardised framework in its current specification should be treated with caution if employed for supervisory and risk management purposes.The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the Basel Com- mittee’s standardised framework and generalises the model by relaxing the assumptions. Section 3 describes the data sources for our analysis. In Section 4 we estimate interest rate risk according to the suggestions of the Basel Committee. In Section 5 we apply the generalised model to analyse the impact of differenteconomically relevant assumptions on the estimates to gain insight into the robustness of the Basel Committee’s approach. Section 6 summarises the findings and offers conclusions.1 Other sources of interest rate risk for banks are given by embedded options and different interest rate pass-through policies for asset and liability positions (basis risk), even if there is no repricing mismatch (e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004b).2 See Section 2.1 for details.3 Basel II’s treatment of interest rate risk in the banking book is clearly in the spirit of the rules for credit risk in which standardised and bank-internal (ratings-based) approaches also exist.4 Similar approaches have been applied for many years by national supervisory institutions such as the Federal Reserve (e.g., Houpt and Embersit, 1991).5 As a by-product of our analysis, by incorporating these data we also shed some light on the structure of interest rate risk of the German universal banking system ex derivatives. Although little is yet known about the interest rate risk in the German banking system, there are indications that the level of interest rate risk is comparatively high (e.g., Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006a). Entrop et al. (2008) analyse the determinants of the interest risk on the individual bank level. Note that disregarding derivatives in our analysis does not substantially affect our primary results. Incorporating derivatives would affect the estimated level of interest rate risk but the sensitivities to the assumptions on the on-balance-positions would remain essentially unchanged译文：量化银行利率风险：假设至关重要Oliver·Entrop、 Marco·Wilkens、 Alexander·Zeisler1.引言利率风险和信用风险，都是银行所面临的最严峻风险。
曼昆微观经济学第十二章税制的设计
THE DESIGN OF THE TAX SYSTEM
结论：平等与效率之间的权衡取舍
平等与效率之间经常矛盾：比如：总额税是最不平等的，但最有效率政治领导人之间对这种权衡取舍有不同的看法经济学：能帮助我们更好的理解这种权衡取舍能帮助我们避免那些牺牲了效率却没有增加公平的政策
0
内容提要
在美国，最重要的联邦收入来源是个人所得税，用于社会保障的工薪税以及公司所得税。州和地方政府最重要的税是销售税和财产税税制的效率是指它给纳税人带来的成本。除了资源从纳税人向政府的转移税收还有两种成本：第一种是由于税收改变了激励，扭曲了资源配置而带来的无谓损失；第二种是遵从税法的管理负担
0
THE DESIGN OF THE TAX SYSTEM
介绍
从前面章节中学到的关于税收的知识：对一种物品征税减少了那种物品的销售量税收负担由买者与卖者分摊，具体的分摊比例取决于供给弹性与需求弹性税收引起了无谓损失
0
THE DESIGN OF THE TAX SYSTEM
美国政府的财政概况
首先，我们考查：税收收入占国民收入的比例随着时间是如何变化的税收收入占国民收入的比重随时间是如何变化的美国税收收入占国民收入的比例与其他国家相比联邦政府，州与地方政府税收收入中最重要的来源
0
THE DESIGN OF THE TAX SYSTEM
所得税与消费税
消费税类似于美国税法对个人退休账户的处理：人们可以把一定数量的储蓄存到这个账户中这部分资金不会被征税，直到退休时取出这些钱欧洲的增值税也与消费税类似
0
THE DESIGN OF THE TAX SYSTEM
管理负担
包括人们为遵照税法纳税时花费的时间与金钱鼓励人们将资源用在合法避税上面比如，雇佣会计师寻找税制的漏洞来减少税收负担是无谓损失的一种通过简化税法可以减少税制的管理负担，但这种消除漏洞的税法在政治上是困难的
如何衡量实证文章的理论贡献（共五则）
如何衡量实证文章的理论贡献（共五则）第一篇：如何衡量实证文章的理论贡献如何衡量实证文章的理论贡献Colquitt 和Zapata-Phelan（2007）在AMJ上发表了“Trends in theory building and theory testing: a five-decade study of the 'Academy of Management Journal'”一文，创建了一个分类用来于衡量许多实证方面研究文章的理论贡献。
这种分类主要包括两个维度：（1）一篇文章在多大程度上建立了新的理论（building new theory）；（2）一篇文章在多大程度上检验了现有理论（testing existing theory）。
因此，实证研究性文章欲建立理论贡献主要有两种方式。
其中一种就是通过构建理论，另一种方式就是通过检验现有理论。
图一中介绍了结合实证研究型文章的理论贡献的双重组件的分类：理论构建和理论检验。
1.理论构建在建立新的理论（building new theory）这一维度上，Colquit & Zapata-phelan将其分为五个等级：第一等级为重复之前已经证实的效果，即对以往解释过的效应进行重复研究；第二等级为验证属于以往理论的效应，即考察早期理论构建过程主体的影响；第三等级为已存在的关系或过程介绍一种新的中介变量或调节变量；第四等级为验证以往未探讨的关系或过程，即对先前尚未探寻的关系或过程的研究；第五等级为引入新的构念，或显著地重新构建了现有构念。
所属的等级越高，那么文献在建立新的理论这一方面的贡献也就越大。
2.理论检验在证实现有理论（testing existing theory）这一维度上，Colquit & Zapata-phelan也将其分为五个等级：第一等级为归纳的或基于逻辑推断的预测；第二等级为运用以往产生结论的文献为基础进行预测，第三等级为基于现有概念表述的预测；第四等级为基于现有模型、图示的预测；第五等级为基于既有理论的预测。
新制度经济学讲义
新制度经济学讲义新制度经济学讲义第⼀章⼊门知识⼀、新制度经济学的研究对象新制度经济学是1960年代以来发展起来的⼀门新兴经济学分⽀。
以制度作为其研究对象的经济理论。
诺思认为，“制度经济学的⽬标是研究制度演进背景下⼈们如何在现实世界中作出决定和这些决定⼜如何改变世界。
”（[美]道格拉斯·C·诺思：《经济史中的结构与变迁》，上海三联书店1991年版，第2页）当代制度经济学应从⼈的实际出发研究⼈，实际的⼈在由现实制度所赋予的制约条件中活动（科斯，1990，中译本）。
⾃亚当斯密以来，德国历史学派、美国的早期制度学派（以凡勃伦、康芒斯为代表），以及现代制度学派（加尔布雷斯为代表）the neo-institutional school of economics，均以经济组织和制度结构为研究主题。
the NIE和以前的经济学理论最⼤的不同在于运⽤边际分析⽅法研究制度的内⽣化及其对经济绩效的影响。
沿⽤和承袭了新古典经济学的核⼼假定、稳定偏好和均衡分析。
也就是说，现代制度经济学运⽤新古典经济理论来解释制度安排的运⾏和演化。
扩展价格理论，使之⼀般化，并将其应⽤于经济与政治制度研究。
拓宽了微观经济学的适⽤范围，提⾼了其预测能⼒。
新古典模型建⽴在零交易费⽤、完全个⼈理性和外⽣的给定制度结构的假定上。
新古典经济学的脆弱性体现在制度中性分析⽅法上，没有严格地考虑制度约束和交易费⽤。
因此，只能在⾼度抽象的意义上⽤来分析资源配置问题。
由于制度是不重要的，或者制度可以被⽆成本的⽣产与选择，因此，不需要专门的制度理论。
To distinguish it from the “old” institutional economists such as Thorsten Veblen, John R. Commons, Wesley Mitchell, and Clarence AyresThe old institutional economics was economics with institutions but without theory; standard neoclassical economics is economic with theory without institutions; and the NIE is attempting to provide economics with both theory and institutions。
公共部门经济学(双语)教案
《公共部门经济学（双语）》（07115020）课程教案甘行琼、胡洪曙一、授课对象本课程适用于财政学专业、税收专业的大三以上学生学习，在学习本课程之前应先学习大学英语、西方经济学、财政学等课程。
课时方面应设置3学分51课时。
三、教材使用情况《Public Finance: A Contemporary Application of Theory to Policy》（第八版），David N. Hyman著，北京大学出版社，2005年7月。
四、教学手段主要采取讲授与案例教学，全部课程采用多媒体。
五、参考资料1．《Public Finance》(第七版)，Harvey S. Rosen著，清华大学出版社，2005年8月。
2．《Public Finance in Theory and Practice》，Holley H. Ulbrich著，清华大学出版社，2004年3月。
六、教学内容安排Chapter 1 Individuals and Government教学目标：After studying this chapter, the students should be able to:1. Use a production-possibility curve to explain the trade- off between private goods and services and government goods and services.2. Describe how the provision of government goods and services through political institutions differs from market provision of goods and services and how government affects the circular flow of income and expenditure in a mixed economy.3. Discuss the various categories of federal, state, and local government expenditures in the United States and the way those expenditures are financed.内容提要：Public finance is the field of economics that studies government activities and alternative means of financing government expenditures. Modern public finance emphasizes the relationships between citizens and governments. Government goods and services are supplied through political institutions, which employ rules and procedures that have evolved in different societies for arriving at collective choices. Government goods and services are usually made available without charge for their use, and they are financed by compulsory payments (mainly taxes) levied on citizens and their activities. A major goal in the study of public finance is to analyze the economic role of government and the costs and benefits of allocating resources to government use as opposed to allowing private enterprise and households to use those resources.重点难点：The allocation of resources between government and private use; The structure of state and local government expenditure; Market failure and the functions of government: how much government is enough? Government transfer payments; Nonmarket rationing.有关提示：这一部分是公共部门经济学的引言部分，应让学生明白公共部门和私人部门的区别，以及他们各自是如何配置资源的，另外也要熟悉美国政府支出的增长情况。
《企业并购的动因和绩效研究国内外文献综述及理论基础6100字》
企业并购的动因和绩效研究国内外文献综述及理论基础目录企业并购的动因和绩效研究国内外文献综述 (1)1.2国内外文献综述 (1)1.2.1国外文献综述 (1)1.2.2国内文献综述 (2)第二章企业并购动因理论及企业并购相关概念 (4)2.1 并购的含义及分类 (4)2.1.1 并购的含义 (4)2.1.2并购的分类 (4)2.2 企业并购的动因理论 (5)2.2.1 协同效应理论 (5)2.2.2 多元化理论 (5)2.2.3委托代理理论 (6)2.2.4市场势力理论 (6)2.2.5价值低估理论 (6)2.2.6 估值套利理论 (6)2.3 企业并购绩效评价方法 (7)2.3.1 事件研究法 (7)2.3.2 财务指标法 (7)2.3.3 非财务指标分析法 (7)参考文献 (7)1.2国内外文献综述1.2.1国外文献综述（1）企业并购动因的国外文献综述在国外，并购活动很早之前就开始进行了。
但是经过研究，学者们发现企业并购动因的影响因素多种多样，难以归纳成一个确定概念。
就算是一家企业，在不同时间进行并购的目的也是有差异的。
Halil Kiymazh和TarunK.Mukherjee(2000)[1]通过对并购公司进行问卷调查，结果显示大部分公司为获得正的协同效应，增加股东利益而选择并购。
Kode,Ford等(2003)[2]认为企业发起并购也可能是想降低风险。
由于并购后被并购方的投资机会及融资由外转内，企业的融资成本风险会减小。
而Capron(1999)[3]通过研究得到了另一种结论，他们认为企业并购的动因在于取长补短，进而提高企业价值，也使企业在市场中的份额及地位提高。
Heaton(2002)[4]使用了一个简单模型，分析指出：当公司的决策者过于自信，会认为资本市场对本公司的股价低估了，或者高估项目的收益。
在情况一下，当必须用发行股票来进行融资，决策者会放弃净现值为正的投资项目。
在情况二下，会导致决策者其投资于净现值为负的项目。
英文文献翻译
International Trade and Income Distribution: Reconsidering theEvidenceSébastien JeanSUMMARYWhether trade liberalization is associated with narrowing or widening income disparities within countries is still a matter of controversy.According to the standard factor proportions theory,openness should exert an equalizing effect in poor countries and raise income inequality in rich countries (if the skilled to unskilled relative wage is to be considered as a good proxy for income inequality).But this prediction is not systematically borne out by the data.While increased trade openness in several East Asian economies paralleled lowered inequalities,it is well documented that Latin American countries experienced a deterioration of their income distribution following liberalization.The publication in 1996 of a comprehensive data set on income inequality paved the way for more systematic empirical investigations than previously.However,the studies failed to deliver a convincing answer as to the link between openness and inequality.Empirical results are mixed:depending upon the sample,the econometric method or the estimation period,it is shown that openness has either no impact on inequality,or has an equalizing effect, or worsens the income distribution.In addition, the conclusions do not fit the underlying theoretical models.This study reconsiders the evidence concerning the influence of internationa l trade on income distribution,motivated by serious concerns about data consistency,empirical specification,as well as theoretical framework.The theoretical model used as a background for the analysis is fairly general and mainly based on the assumption of general equilibrium under perfect competition on product and factor markets. The number of goods and factors is not specified and no assumption is made about the rest of the world. In particular,we do not make the restrictive assumption that the impact of trade liberalization on income distribution is only conditional on factor endowments.The model shows that factor price changes are correlated with an indicator of the factor content of net export changes,relative to the country factor endowments.In order to derive from this model a testable relationship between foreign trade and income inequality,we then restrict the model to the case where three production factors are considered,namely two types of labor (non-educated workers and other workers), in addition to physical capital. Non-educated workers are assumed to be employed only in the non-tradable sector, because producinggoods well suited for the export sector requires matching relatively high standards of quality, which call for a certain level of skill.We then show that the change in income distribution is related to the change in the factor content of net exports, relative to the country’s factor endowments.This relationship,which is the base for subsequent econometric estimates, turns out to be conditional on the share of households drawing their income from non-educated labor.The empirical implementation acknowledges country specificities in production technologies, and puts special emphasis on data consistency requirements for inequality index.Our estimations concern the impact of international trade change on the change in income distribution, instead of the relationship in levels generally estimated in the literature so far.Indeed, the interesting issue is not whether countries with different degrees of openness exhibit different levels of inequality, but rather whether an increase in a country’s trade openness is associated with an increase or a decrease of inequality.Our main empirical finding is that the factor content of net export changes, expressed relatively to the country's factor endowment, does have a significant impact on income distribution and the sign of this impact is conditional on country’s income level or on the share of non-educated in the population over 15. An increase in the labor content (relatively to capital) of exports thus decrease inequalities for rich enough countries (or countries with high enough education level), but it will increase inequalities in the poorest countries. Indeed, such increased exports are likely to be reflected in higher wages, but this only concerns workers endowed with the basic education required to be employed in the export- oriented manufacturing sector. While such workers, with at least basic education, represent the bulk of low-income households in many countries, this is not the case for countries where education is scarce.Moreover, the resulting impact of international integration on inequality depends on the sign and magnitude of the factor content of net export changes. On average, the factor- content of trade increased in poor countries (i.e. with a PPP GDP per capita approximately below $5,000) and decreased in middle-income and rich countries, thus resulting in both cases in a widening of income inequality. When middle- and high-income countries are considered separately (by arbitrarily setting $15,000 PPP GDP per capita as the cut point between these two categories), the impact of trade is still found to be increased inequalities in rich countries, but the reverse is true for middle-income countries.It is worth emphasizing that our results are to be interpreted with caution, as ouranalysis does not look for a systematic impact of trade liberalization on income distribution. The change in the factor content of trade is not only related to trade policies but also to technology or consumer taste changes. The interpretation is more suited the other way round: trade liberalization is likely to affect the factor content of net exports, and this is the indicator to look at in order to gain valuable insights about the induced impact on income distribution. This shows that the way trade liberalization is handled may have significant repercussions for income distribution. While inequalities are better tackled with direct policy instruments, in particular fiscal redistribution, in poor countries the implementation of such policies is far from being an easy task. Our results also recalls the vital role of basic education, which is often a necessary condition for workers to benefit, directly or indirectly, from the gains associated with new trade opportunities.1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONWhether trade liberalization is associated with narrowing or widening income disparities within countries is still a matter of controversy. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin- Samuelson (HOS) theoretical framework (with two types of labor), poor countries tend to specialize in unskill-intensive goods, because they are relatively well endowed with unskilled labor. As a result, openness should exert an equalizing effect in poor countries,and raise income inequality in rich countries.But this prediction is not systematically borne out by the data. While increased trade openness in several East Asian economies paralleled lowered inequalities, it is well documented that Latin American countries experienced a widening of their income distribution following liberalization .Evidence on the impact of trade liberalization on inequality has until recently been seriously hindered by data limitations. However, the publication in 1996 by K. Deininger and L. Squire of a comprehensive data set on income inequality paved the way for more systematic empirical investigations. Roughly speaking, studies can be divided into two categories.The first approach consists of simply evaluating whether openness reduces or strengthens inequality.The corresponding works generally do not rely explicitly on a given theoretical framework. Rather, the HOS theory is referred to in order to justify the test for different effects in developed and developing countries. Results are mixed.Depending upon the sample, the econometric method or the estimation period, it is shown that openness has either no impact on inequality, or has an equalizing effect, or worsens the income distribution.The second set of studies is more in line with international trade theory, in the sense that a country’s relative factor endowment i s set to be a determinant of the impact of trade openness on inequality. Fisher’s motivation to renounce to HOS is that this theoretical approach is inconsistent with the fact that trade liberalization affects LDC’s differentially.Furthermore, two drawbacks are worth mentioning. The first one has to do with the consistency of data on inequality. Due to data limitations, Gini coefficients based on different income definitions(income/expenditure,gross/net…)and different recipient units (individual/household…) are used, as in most cross-country studies on inequality. Even when some adjustment is done to improve data comparability, these differences result in serious data inconsistency, as shown by Knowles (2001) about the link between growth and inequality. The second drawback concerns the econometric specification adopted in Spilimbergo et al. work, which is expressed in levels instead of changes in inequality. Trying to explain cross-country differences in levels of inequality is a challenging task, since a number of idiosyncratic factors cannot be properly taken into account. Fiscal redistribution, labor market devices or distribution of factor ownership, for instance, are not well documented for most countries. As a consequence, econometric estimates are likely to be flawed with omitted variable bias. In addition, the interesting issue from a policy perspective is not whether countries with different degrees of openness exhibit different levels of inequality, but rather whether an increase in a country’s tr ade openness is associated with an increase or a decrease in inequality. Even from a theoretical perspective, the predictions from the HOS framework do not refer to cross-country comparison of levels of inequality, but rather to their changes as countries open up to trade.In order to test for the sensitivity of results with regards to these issues of data consistency and econometric specification,we run the same estimation as Spilimbergo et al., introducing two changes: we specified the econometric model in changes instead of levels; we imposed additional data consistency requirements, by using only changes computed as the difference between two Gini indices based on the same income concept and the same recipient unit.Hence, while these studies appeared promising, they failed to deliver a4convincing answer as to the link between openness and inequality: in addition to the gap between results and underlying theoretical models, robustness is in both cases challenged. This calls for an alternative approach. Our motivation for reconsidering this evidence is consequently to bring up improvement in three respects: theoretical approach, data consistency and econometric specification.As to the theoretical framework, we argue that the standard HOS model is too restrictive, in several ways.The assumption that the impact of liberalization on income distribution is only conditional on factor endowments implicitly or explicitly stems from the direct link between factor content of trade and factor endowment, as described by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek relationship.Since Trefler (1995) emphasized the "case of the missing trade", a long way has been traveled toward making clear the conditions under which Vanek’s prediction is borne out by the data (see e.g. Davis and Weinstein, 2003, for a survey, and Trefler and Zhu, 2005, for a recent important contribution). Among these conditions are in particular the assumption of consumption similarity across countries, and the absence of any transaction cost (either linked to transportation or to border protection). Since we want to use a more general framework, and in particular acknowledge the potential influence of trade policy, we do not want to make such assumptions. This is why we do not assume the HOV relationship to hold. As a consequence, we cannot rely on factor endowments only to study the impact of foreign trade on income distribution.Another concern with the theoretical framework is dimensionality.As already convincingly emphasized for instance by Wood (1994), we argue that three production factors are required, at least, to gain valuable insights about the distributional impact of trade in developing countries. Indeed, a large part of the labor force in poor countries does not have any education, even basic, and is employed in the traditional or craft sector. It is strongly questionable whether their output corresponds to tradable goods, as far as manufacturing industries are concerned. Moreover their mobility toward the “modern”sector is hindered by the lack of basic education. Even in an economy where the export-oriented manufacturing sector is intensive in low-skilled labor, such non-educated workers are thus unlikely to receive any direct benefit from the development of the export sector or from an5increase in the price of exports. The positive impact on the relative price of unskilled labor, admittedly considered as the abundant factor for developing countries, might thus be restricted, in practice, to a fraction of unskilled workers only, namely those enjoying at least basic education, and likely to work in the “modern” sector. As soon as the share of non-educated labor in the labor force is large enough, the alleged positive impact of trade openness on unskilled (but somewhat educated) labor does not reduce inequalities. On the contrary, the deterioration of the relative position of non-educated workers would increase income inequalities. Of course, such effect is not expected to hold in more developed countries, where the share of non-educated workers is relatively small and in poor countries only specialized in agriculture.In order to address these different issues, we adopt a general theoretical framework in which the number of goods and factors is not specified, and in which no assumption is made about the rest of the world. In particular, no assumption is made about factor price equalization. Mainly based on the assumption of general equilibrium under perfect competition on product and factor markets, the model shows that factor price changes are correlated with an indicator of net export changes. Although this indicator can be termed a specific definition of the factor content of trade, it should be clear that this only comes out from the analysis of the link between foreign trade and relative wages. Our purpose is not to elaborate upon the validity of Vanek prediction on the link between factor endowments and the factor content of trade.In order to derive from this model a testable relationship between foreign trade and income inequality, we then restrict the model to the case where three production factors are considered, namely two types of labor (non-educated workers and other workers), in addition to physical capital. Assuming that non-educated workers are only employed in non-tradable goods production, we show that the change in income distribution is related to the change in an indicator of the factor content of net exports, relative to the country’s factor endowments. This relationship, which is the base for subsequent econometric estimates, turns out to be conditional on the share of non-educated workers.Our model compares two equilibria of a given economy, across which6technology and consumer preferences are held constant. The nature of the shock considered is not specified explicitly, but the analysis applies to trade policy changes. As the factor content of net export changes embodies, among other things, the impact of possible trade policy changes, these trade policy changes need not be explicitly added as determinants of factor prices. The difficulty of properly measuring each country’s trade policy is thus sidestepped in the empirical analysis.This means that the results should be interpreted with much care. The impact of our indicator of factor content of net export changes does not only reflect the impact of trade policies. But our approach suggests that the impact of trade policy on income distribution can be studied through its impact on the factor content of net export changes.Our theoretical and empirical approach does not make any restrictive assumption on cross- country differences in preferences, technology nor choice of technique, which have been shown to be of special relevance by recent works (Davis and Weinstein, 2003; Trefler and Zhu, 2005). The counterpart of such an approach is that it is very data demanding. In particular, we make use of a country-specific technology coefficient matrix. For countries where data on capital stock at the industry level is missing, we assume capital intensity at the sector level to be the same as in countries found to be similar in terms of capital abundance and technology in a clustering analysis. Our empirical implementation brings up improvement in two other respects. We put special emphasis on data consistency requirements for inequality index and we analyze the impact of international trade change on the change in income distribution (instead of differences in levels of income inequality across countries due to differences in degrees of openness).Our main empirical finding is that the factor content of net export changes, expressed relatively to the country's factor endowment, does have a significant impact on income distribution, but this impact is conditional on country’s income level or to the share of non- educated in the population over 15. Taking into account the sign and magnitude of the factor content of net export changes, we find that on average international trade led to a widening of income inequality both in poor and rich countries, and to a reduction in middle-income countries. While for poor countries7this result runs counter to the prediction of standard trade theory, it is in accordance with the theoretical model developed here. Furthermore, it is consistent with recent empirical findings obtained in slightly different contexts (Milanovic, 2002; Barro, 2000; Lundberg and Squire, 1999; see Table 1), but, contrary to these studies, it relies on a theoretical foundation explaining how trade can lead to an increase in inequality in low-income countries.2. A MODEL OF OPENNESS AND INEQUALITYWe begin with a fairly general setup, in which the changes between two equilibria of an economy are described. The point is to relate net export changes to factor price changes. A more specific case is then considered, with three production factors. Finally, the link with income distribution is established.3.CONCLUDING REMARKSIn this paper, we reconsider the evidence concerning the influence of international trade on income distribution, motivated by serious concerns about data consistency, empirical specification, as well as theoretical framework. Our approach differs substantially from the ones used so far in the literature.Our main empirical finding is that the factor content of net export changes, expressed relatively to the country's factor endowments, does have a significant impact on income distribution, but the sign of this impact is conditional on country’s income level or to the share of non-educated in the population over 15.The resulting impact of international trade on inequality depends on the sign and magnitude of the factor content of net export changes. On average, trade led to a widening of income inequality both in poor and rich countries but to a reduction in middle-income countries. Such results are to be interpreted with caution. Firstly, they only reflect average results, and the contribution of the factor content of net export changes can be of opposite sign in countries belonging to the same group. Secondly, the factor content of net export changes is not an indicator of liberalization, nor even of trade openness. The interpretation is more suited the other way round: trade liberalization is likely to affect the factor content of net exports, and this is the indicator to look at in order to gain valuable insights about the induced impact on income distribution. Still, this shows that the way liberalization is handled may have significant repercussions for income distribution. While inequalities are better tackled with direct policy instruments, in particular fiscal redistrib ution, in poor countries the implementation of such policies is far from being an easy task. Our results also recalls the vital role of basic education, which is often a necessary condition for workers to benefit, directly or indirectly,from the gains associated with new trade opportunities.8国际贸易与收入分配：反思证据塞巴斯蒂安·吉恩综述无论是贸易自由化还是收入差距的缩小或扩大在国家内仍然是一个有争议的问题。
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Extensive agricultural land use conversion and water been suggested that individuals remain in freshwater
development within California’s Central Valley (USA) portions of the Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta
need to recapture individuals (Campana 1999, Cam- FL (Fig. 2g–h). The movement patterns of these emi-
pana & Thorrold 2001).
grant size classes are not well described, but it has
*Email: ler@
© Inter-Research 2010 ·
228
Mar Ecol Prog Ser 408: 227–240, 2010
logistic and interpretive limitations. Chemical and natal streams in February–March, whereas larger
alternative approach to generating empirical data on In some river systems, there is a smaller pulse of emi-
the contribution of migratory phenotypes without the grants of intermedi to 75 mm
(Fig. 1) have impacted the region’s fall Chinook sal- until they attain sizes > 70 mm FL, at which point they
mon (Moyle 2002), which are listed as a species of con- enter the ocean (MacFarlane & Norton 2002). Addi-
ABSTRACT: Chinook salmon is an anadromous species that varies in size at freshwater emigration, which is hypothesized to increase population resiliency under variable environmental regimes. In California’s Central Valley (USA), the majority of naturally spawned juveniles emigrate in 2 pulses: small juveniles (referred to as fry), typically ≤55 mm fork length (FL), emigrate from natal streams in February–March, whereas larger juveniles (smolts), typically > 75 mm FL, emigrate in mid-April– May. In some river systems, there is a smaller pulse of emigrants of intermediate size (parr), typically 56 to 75 mm FL. Although the relative contribution of these migratory phenotypes to the adult population is unknown, management activities focus on survival of larger emigrants and most artificially produced fish (98%) are released from hatcheries at parr and smolt sizes. We reconstructed individual length at freshwater emigration for a sample of adult Central Valley Chinook salmon from 2 emigration years using chemical (Sr:Ca and Ba:Ca) and structural otolith analyses. The adult sample was comprised of individuals that emigrated as parr (mean = 48%), followed by smolts (32%) and fry (20%). Fry-sized emigrants likely represent natural production because fish ≤55 mm FL comprise < 2% of the hatchery production. The distribution of migratory phenotypes represented in the adult sample was similar in both years despite apparent interannual variation in juvenile production, providing evidence for the contribution of diverse migratory phenotypes to the adult population. The contribution of all 3 migratory phenotypes to the adult population indicates that management and recovery efforts should focus on maintenance of life-history variation rather than the promotion of a particular phenotype.
Vol. 408: 227–240, 2010 doi: 10.3354/meps08613
MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES Mar Ecol Prog Ser
Published June 3
Quantifying the contribution of juvenile migratory phenotypes in a population of Chinook salmon Oncorhynchus tshawytscha
structural analyses of fish otoliths, which hold a record juveniles (smolts), typically > 75 mm FL, emigrate in
of aspects of an individual’s environment, provide an mid-April–May (Brandes & McLain 2001) (Fig. 2a–f).
Jessica A. Miller1,*, Ayesha Gray2, Joseph Merz3, 4
1Coastal Oregon Marine Experiment Station, Hatfield Marine Science Center, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, Oregon State University, 2030 SE Marine Science Drive, Newport, Oregon 97365, USA 2Cramer Fish Sciences, 2245 Clark St., North Bend, Oregon 97459, USA
Many diadromous fishes display variation in juvenile migratory behavior. Individuals with distinct migratory phenotypes may experience differential survival and thus contribute to a population’s resiliency, defined as its ability to persist following disturbances across variable environmental conditions (Holling 1973, Stearns 1992, Hilborn et al. 2003, Secor 2007, Bottom et al. 2009). Chinook salmon Oncorhynchus tshawytscha is
KEY WORDS: Chinook salmon · Migratory phenotype · Otolith chemistry
Resale or republication not permitted without written consent of the publisher
INTRODUCTION
3Institute of Marine Sciences, University of California Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, California 95064, USA 4Cramer Fish Sciences, 636 Hedburg Way #22, Oakdale, California 95361, USA