ACCA份考试真题(P1)

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ACCA P1 Global June 2013 - questions (ACCA P1 2012年6月真题题目)

P a p e r P 1Section A –This ONE question is compulsory and MUST be attempted1Hayho is a large international company with direct investments in 65 countries. It is a manufacturer of high technology products, with each Hayho factory typically employing over 3,000 people. Hayho factories also support local supply chains employing many more people so each Hayho plant is considered a vital part of the regional economy in which it is located.Several years ago, Hayho was widely criticised for its operations in Arrland, a developing country with an oppressive and undemocratic government. Investigative journalists produced material showing the poor conditions of workers, and pollution around the Hayho factories in Arrland. They also showed evidence suggesting that Hayho had paid bribes to the Arrland government so that local opposition to the Hayho operation could be forcefully stopped. After this episode, the company became very sensitive to criticism of its operations in developing countries. A press statement at the time said that Hayho, in future, would always uphold the highest standards of integrity, human rights and environmental protection whilst at the same time ‘responsibly’ supporting developing countries by providing jobs and opportunities to enable greater social and economic development.The board of Hayho is now deciding between two possible large new investments, both directly employing about 3,000 people. Both options have a number of advantages and disadvantages and Mr Woo, Hayho’s finance director, has recently made clear that only one can be chosen at this stage. The two options are of similar investment value and are referred to as the ‘Jayland option’ and the ‘Pealand option’.The ‘Jayland option’ is to build a new large factory in Jayland and to recruit a completely new local workforce to work in it. J ayland is a developing country with few environmental and labour regulations. It has a poorly developed education and training system, and is generally considered to be undemocratic. Its president, Mr Popo, has been in office since he seized power in a military coup 30 years ago. Human rights organisations say that he maintains order by abusing the rights of the people and cruelly suppressing any dissent against him. In early exploratory talks between Hayho and the J ayland government, Hayho was given assurances that it could pursue its activities with little regulation from the government as long as the J ayland president, Mr Popo, received a personal annual ‘royalty’(effectively a bribe) for allowing Hayho to operate in his country.Finance director Mr Woo said that some stakeholders would probably criticise Hayho, perhaps in the international media, for investing in Jayland. Hayho may be accused of supporting the dictatorship of Mr Popo in that country, especially if the ‘royalty’ was ever discovered. Mr Woo calculated that the NPV (net present value) of projected pre-tax returns of the Jayland option over a ten-year period was $2 billion but that there was also a risk of potential political instability in Jayland during the lifetime of the investment.The ‘Pealand option’ is to buy an existing plant in Pealand which would then be refurbished to facilitate the manufacture of Hayho products. This would involve ‘inheriting’ the workforce of the previous owners. Pealand is a ‘new democracy’, and a transitional economy, having gained its independence ten years ago. In an attempt to purge the corrupt business practices associated with its past, the Pealand government has become very thorough in ensuring that all inward investments, including Hayho’s factory purchase, meet exacting and demanding standards of environmental protection and work conditions. Mr Woo, the finance director, said that the NPV of projected pre-tax returns over a ten-year period was $1 billion for the Pealand option but that the risk of political instability in Pealand was negligible. Both of the returns, the forecast $2 billion for Jayland and the $1 billion for Pealand, were considered to be acceptable in principle.Mr Woo also said that there were issues with the two options relating to the effectiveness of necessary internal controls. Whichever option was chosen (Jayland or Pealand), it would be necessary to establish internal controls to enable accurate and timely reporting of production and cost data back to head office. So a number of systems would need to be put in place to support the production itself. One staff member, Emily Baa, who had previously worked in Jayland for another company, gave her opinion to the board about some of the issues that Hayho might encounter if it chose the Jayland option. She said that Jayland was very under developed until relatively recently and explained how the national culture was unfamiliar with modern business practice and behaviour. She said that property security may be a problem and that there was a potential risk to assets there. She also said that, in her opinion, there was a lack of some key job skills among the potential workforce in Jayland such as quality control and accounting skills.She explained that quality control skills would be necessary to ensure product specifications were met and that accounting skills would be necessary for the provision of internal and external reporting. As a manufacturer of very technologically advanced products, a number of stringent international product standards applied to Hayho products wherever in the world they were produced.2Meanwhile, news that Hayho was considering a large investment in Jayland leaked out to the press. In response, Hayho’s chief executive, Helen Duomo received two letters. The first was from a prominent international human rights lobbying organisation called ‘Watching Business’ (WB). In the letter, the lobby group said that because of its ‘terrible track record’ in Arrland and elsewhere, Hayho was being carefully monitored for its ‘unethical business practices’. WB said its interest in Hayho’s activities had been rekindled since it had received intelligence about the possible investment in Jayland and warned Mrs Duomo not to make the investment because it would provide credibility for the ‘brutal dictatorship’ of Mr Popo.Whilst Mrs Duomo, known for her forthright manner, would normally dismiss threats from groups of this type, she knew that WB had a lot of support among senior politicians and legislators in many parts of the world. She believed that WB could achieve some power through mobilising public opinion through effective use of mass media, such as newspapers and television. WB was also respected as a research organisation and its advice was often sought by politicians and trade organisations.Mrs Duomo said she was frustrated whenever anybody got in the way of her accountability to the Hayho shareholders, but that some interests could not be ignored because of their potential to influence. WB fell into this category.The second letter she received was from the head of Quark Investments, Hayho’s single biggest institutional shareholder. The letter sought to remind Mrs Duomo that the Hayho board was employed by its shareholders and that Mrs Duomo should be determined and resolute in maximising shareholder returns. The letter encouraged the board not to be diverted by ‘well meaning but misinformed outsiders concerned with things that were actually none of their business’.Aware that she had to manage two competing demands placed on her, Mrs Duomo sought advice from Emily Baa, who had experience of life in Jayland. So she asked Emily Baa to prepare some notes for the next board meeting to clarify whom the board of Hayho was actually accountable to and how it might respond to the letter from WB.Required:(a)Explain ‘risk appetite’ and demonstrate how different risk appetites might affect the selection of investmentsbetween Jayland and Pealand.(6 marks)(b)Use the AAA (American Accounting Association) seven-step model to examine the ethical decision whetherto select the Jayland option or the Pealand option.(14 marks)(c)Describe the general purposes of an internal control system and, based on Emily Baa’s views, assess themain internal control challenges that Hayho might encounter if it chose the Jayland option.(12 marks)(d)Prepare briefing notes from Emily Baa to prepare chief executive of Hayho, Helen Duomo, for the boardmeeting as requested in the case. The notes should cover the following:(i) A discussion of the meaning of accountability at Hayho and of how the Mendelow framework can beused to predict the influence of the Watching Business pressure group;(7 marks) (ii) A brief explanation of the agency relationship between the board of Hayho and Quark Investments, and advice on why the demands from Watching Business should be carefully considered.(7 marks) Professional marks will be awarded in part (d) for the clarity, flow, persuasiveness and structure of the briefing notes.(4 marks)(50 marks)3[P.T.O.Section B –TWO questions ONLY to be attempted2J ohn Louse, the recently retired chief executive of Zogs Company, a major listed company, was giving a speech reflecting on his career and some of the aspects of governance he supported and others of which he was critical. In particular, he believed that board committees were mainly ineffective. A lot of the ineffectiveness, he said, was due to the lack of independence of many non-executive directors (NEDs). He believed that it was not enough just to have the required number of non-executive directors; they must also be ‘truly independent’ of the executive board. It was his opinion that it was not enough to have no material financial connection with a company for independence: he believed that in order to be truly independent, NEDs should come from outside the industry and have no previous contact with any of the current executive directors.In relation to risk committees, he said that in his experience, the company’s risk committee had never stopped any risk affecting the company and because of this, he questioned its value. He said that the risk committee was ‘always asking for more information, which was inconvenient’ and had such a ‘gloomy and pessimistic’ approach to its task.He asked, ‘why can’t risk committees just get on with stopping risk, and also stop making inconvenient demands on company management? Do they think middle managers have nothing else to do?’ He viewed all material risks as external risks and so the risk committee should be looking outwards and not inwards.Since retiring from Zogs, Mr Louse had taken up a non-executive directorship of SmallCo, a smaller private company in his town. In a meeting with Alan Ng, the new chief executive of Zogs, Mr Ng said that whilst risk management systems were vital in large companies like Zogs, fewer risk controls were needed in smaller companies like SmallCo.Required:(a)Define ‘independence’ in the context of corporate governance and critically evaluate Mr Louse’s commentthat greater independence of non-executive directors is important in increasing the effectiveness of board committees.(8 marks)(b)Describe the roles of a risk committee and criticise Mr Louse’s understanding of the risk committee in ZogsCompany.(9 marks)(c)Assess whether risk committees and risk mitigation systems are more important in larger companies, likeZogs, than in smaller companies like SmallCo.(8 marks)(25 marks)43Jojo Auditors is an audit practice with five partners. The five partners have worked together for several years and, as well as being work colleagues, are personal friends with each other. At Jojo it is customary for the performance of all student accountants to be appraised after their first year of a training contract using a range of criteria including examination success, technical ability and professionalism. Three levels of outcome are possible:1.‘Good’, allowing students to continue with no issues;2.‘Some concerns’, meaning students are counselled and then allowed to continue; and,3.‘Poor’, where students are dismissed from the audit practice.The appraisal committee is comprised of three people: managing partner J ack Hu, the training manager (both of whom are professional accountants) and the person responsible for human resources. The committee receives confidential reports on each student and makes decisions based on the views of relevant engagement partners and also exam results. It is normally the training manager who makes the recommendation and in most cases his appraisal is agreed and then acted upon accordingly. Because the appraisals are confidential between the student and the firm, the list of students and their appraisal categories are not publicised within the firm.When the 2010 intake was being appraised last year, one student was appraised by the training manager as ‘poor’but was not dismissed. Polly Shah was unpopular among other students because she was considered lazy and technically weak. She also failed a number of her exams. Other students who were appraised as ‘poor’ were dismissed, but Polly received a brief counselling session from Jack Hu and then returned to her duties. Polly stayed for another year and then, having failed more exams, left Jojo to pursue other career interests outside accounting.Polly’s departure triggered some discussion amongst Jojo’s partners as to why she had been retained when other poor performers had not. It later emerged that Jack Hu was a close friend of Polly’s parents and had enjoyed free holidays in the Shah family’s villa for several years. Because he was the managing partner, Mr Hu was able to insist on retaining Polly, despite the objections of the training manager and the human resources representative, although the training manager was reported to be furious at the decision to retain Polly.Required:(a)Define ‘conflict of interest’ and assess the consequences of Jack Hu’s behaviour after Polly Shah’s appraisal.(10 marks)(b)Describe four ethical safeguards that could be used in Jojo to prevent a recurrence of the events like thosedescribed in the case.(8 marks)(c)The case raises issues of the importance of senior management performance measurement. In a public company,this refers to directors, and in a privately-owned partnership like Jojo, it refers to partners. The managing partner (Mr Hu’s position) is equivalent to the role of chief executive.Required:Explain the typical criteria used in the performance measurement of individual directors and discuss the reasons why individual performance measurement of partners may be difficult to implement at Jojo.(7 marks)(25 marks)5[P.T.O.4Lum Co is a family business that has been wholly-owned and controlled by the Lum family since 1920. The current chief executive, Mr Gustav Lum, is the great grandson of the company’s founder and has himself been in post as CEO since 1998. Because the Lum family wanted to maintain a high degree of control, they operated a two-tier board structure: four members of the Lum family comprised the supervisory board and the other eight non-family directors comprised the operating board.Despite being quite a large company with 5,000 employees, Lum Co never had any non-executive directors because they were not required in privately-owned companies in the country in which Lum Co was situated.The four members of the Lum family valued the control of the supervisory board to ensure that the full Lum family’s wishes (being the only shareholders) were carried out. This also enabled decisions to be made quickly, without the need to take everything before a meeting of the full board.Starting in 2008, the two tiers of the board met in joint sessions to discuss a flotation (issuing public shares on the stock market) of 80% of the company. The issue of the family losing control was raised by the CEO’s brother, Mr Crispin Lum. He said that if the company became listed, the Lum family would lose the freedom to manage the company as they wished, including supporting their own long-held values and beliefs. These values, he said, were managing for the long term and adopting a paternalistic management style. Other directors said that the new listing rules that would apply to the board, including compliance with the stock market’s corporate governance codes of practice, would be expensive and difficult to introduce.The flotation went ahead in 2011. In order to comply with the new listing rules, Lum Co took on a number of non-executive directors (NEDs) and formed a unitary board. A number of problems arose around this time with NEDs feeling frustrated at the culture and management style in Lum Co, whilst the Lum family members found it difficult to make the transition to managing a public company with a unitary board. Gustav Lum said that it was very different from managing the company when it was privately owned by the Lum family. The human resources manager said that an effective induction programme for NEDs and some relevant continuing professional development (CPD) for existing executives might help to address the problems.Required:(a)Compare the typical governance arrangements between a family business and a listed company, and assessCrispin’s view that the Lum family will ‘lose the freedom to manage the company as they wish’ after the flotation.(10 marks)(b)Assess the benefits of introducing an induction programme for the new NEDs, and requiring continualprofessional development (CPD) for the existing executives at Lum Co after its flotation.(8 marks)(c)Distinguish between unitary and two-tier boards, and discuss the difficulties that the Lum family mightencounter when introducing a unitary board.(7 marks)(25 marks)End of Question Paper6。

2009年ACCAP1-P3真题答案

2009年ACCA P1-P3真题答案Professional Level – Essentials Module, Paper P1 Professional Accountant December 2009 Answers 1 (a) Seven-step (AAA) modelStep 1: What are the facts of the case?The facts are that the Mary Jane, one of the company’s ships, has sunk and that one contributory cause of the disaster was that the ship had not received the necessary modifications for operating in the rougher seas between Eastport and Northport. Had the recommended structural changes been made, the Mary Jane would not have sunk.Step 2: What are the ethical issues in the case?The ethical issues are whether to disclose the information publicly, thereby providing bereaved families with a better explanation of why their loved ones died (and potentially opening the company up to greater liability), or to conceal the information, thereby limiting the value of any punitive damages and protecting shareholder value, at least in the short term.Step 3: What are the norms, principles and values relevant to the case?The company is bound by the norms and expectations of its stock exchange and it has voluntarily claimed to have ‘the highest standards of corporate ethics’, particularly valuing its reputation for ‘outstanding customer care’. This means that it owes an implicit and explicit duty of care to both its customers and its shareholders. As a company that seemingly values its reputation as a well-governed organisation, it is also bound by the underlying principles of corporate governance that include integrity, probity and transparency. Health and safety issues are also very important in all shipping operations and Sea Ships should ensure that all of its ferries are compliant with the highest health and safety standards.Step 4: What are the alternative courses of action?Alternative 1 is to disclose the information about the advice on structural work to the Mary Jane to the media, the government and the bereaved families. Alternative 2 is to seek to suppress the information within the company and hope that there is no leak.Step 5: What course of action is most consistent with the norms, values and principles identified in step 3?The information is material to a number of parties’ better understanding of why the Mary Jane sank. The bereaved families, maritime accident investigators, the government, the ship’s insurers and other shipping companies would all benefit from having the information. Disclosure would seem to be the most appropriate course of action notwithstanding the potentially unfortunate consequences for Sea Ships Company of this information leaking out. However, disclosure may result in greater penalties which will be harmful to shareholder value.Step 6: What are the consequences of each possible course of action?If the company makes the disclosure, there is a risk that the punitive damages (not yet agreed by the court) would be higher. The case says that ‘the size of [the punitive damages] would ... reflect the scale of Sea Ships’ negligence in contributing to the disaster’. A large enough fine would threaten future cash flows and hence future shareholder value. It would also threaten employees’ jobs and the ability of the company to continue to provide the existing level of service to customers. Disclosure would potentially invalidate any insurance policy they had to deal with such a disaster, further harming shareholder value.If the company were to suppress the information, then each person in possession of the knowledge would not only have to examine his or her own responsibilities in the matter but each would also have potentially damaging information if they were to leave Sea Ships or become disillusioned with it. The consultant who recommended the upgrade will also be a potentially major risk in the leaking of the information.Step 7: What is the decision?Alternative 1 is that the company should make a full and detailed disclosure, probably with an acceptance of full responsibility for the failure to make the necessary amendments to the ship. This would be a very costly choice but would be consistent with the company’s claimed ethical values and also with the important core values of corporate governance (integrity, transparency, etc).Alternative 2 is to suppress the information and take all necessary measures to ensure that it is not revealed. This would be a very risky option as the cost to the company and to the directors personally, if the information was ever to emerge, would be very serious. It would also be against the letter and spirit of the core values of corporate governance. It would be unlikely to protect shareholder value in the longer term, is the least ethical of the options and so should be avoided. [Tutorial note: it is possible to argue for suppression of the report in the short term protection of shareholder value. Allow some marks for logic of reasoning process if coherently argued but alignment with the stated values of the company does not allow for suppression as a final decision.] (b) Identify and analyse the internal control failures at Sea Ships Company and on the Mary Jane The case describes internal control failures both on the Mary Jane herself and also at Sea Ships’head office.The company ignored important advice about necessary structural changes needed to the Mary Jane to make her seaworthy for the Northport route. If there was an internal procedure for processing advice, presumably as a part of an economic evaluation of transferring the Mary Jane to the Northport route, then it was clearly ineffective. The document identified a major risk, but had been suppressed within the company and not brought to the attention of any party who could have authorised this to go ahead.At head office, an ‘oversight in the company’s legal department’ resulted in the full value of the Mary Jane’s liabilities not being insured. Presumably a human error, this created uninsured liabilities for Sea Ships after the Mary Jane sank. All insurance policies should be reviewed annually and major changes in cover or changes of terms be recommended to the board so that issues like this do not arise. All insurance policies should be reviewed annually and major changes in cover or changes of terms be recommended to the board so that issues like this do not arise. On the Mary Jane herself, lax internal controls produced four internal control problems. There should be a ‘safety first’ culture on board all ships in which safety considerations outweigh all commercial issues such as meeting schedules.First, a system put in place to ensure that each department head signalled readiness for sea departure was abandoned. This is an example of a ‘reporting by exception’ system being wrongly assumed to be appropriate. Internal control reporting systems are there because they are important and the fact that they may be inconvenient should not be a reason for abandoning them.Second, there was a ‘mistake’ in loading vehicles onto the car deck. A sound internal control system would have ensured that such a mistake could not have happened, possibly using physical ‘fit’ issues of loading ramps, appropriate signage, staff training, or similar mechanisms toensure compliance. The result of the ‘mistake’ was that it created time pressure to leave the port and this contributed to the oversight of the rear doors not being secured and, possibly, the excess speed after leaving port.The third internal control problem on the Mary Jane was the confusion over responsibility for ensuring that the rear doors were closed – a key safety procedure for any ferry. It is baffling that two people were, seemingly simultaneously, responsible for this and is a problem created by the poor design of internal reporting systems. According to the case, both had assumed that the other person was checking the doors.The fourth problem was that the Mary Jane was going too fast and exceeding the maritime rules about speed in that section of sea. This created swell and caused turbulence at the back of the ship. This, in turn, caused water to enter the ship that wouldn’t have been the case at lower speed. This was a failure to observe regulatory speed restrictions on the part of senior ship officers.(c) Contribution that NEDs might make The board of Sea Ships appears to be in need of help on a number of issues, some of which may be addressed by the use of non-executive directors.Mrs Chan’s conclusions noted that the board lacked independent scrutiny. One of the most important purposes of any non-executive appointment is to bring an outside perspective (sometimes acting as a ‘corporate conscience’) on what can at times be an insular executive culture. In the case of Sea Ships, a number of important internal control issues went unchallenged and a strong non-executive presence could have helped that.Also mentioned by Mrs Chan was the fact that the board lacked nautical and technical expertise. This is a disturbing finding as some detailed knowledge of a company’s products or operations is very important in guiding discussions about those parts of the business. The non-executive appointment of serving or retired senior ferry operating personnel from other companies would rectify this and bring the requisite level of expertise.The Combined Code in the UK (based on the Smith Report) and other statutory and advisory codes of corporate governance, specify that every listed company should have an audit committee made up entirely of non-executive directors. The functions of the committee, according to the Combined Code, include reviewing ‘the company’s internal control and risk management systems’ and monitoring and reviewing ‘the effectiveness of the company’s internal audit function’. Both of these are deficient at Sea Ships and so an effective audit committee would be a major contribution. We are not told if the company currently has one but we can assume that if it has, it is ineffective. There are legal compliance issues at Sea Ships, including a failure to enforce the observation of maritime speed limits among its senior ships’ officers. One of the advantages of any independent non-executive presence is the enforcement of regulatory and legal rules on company boards with the knowledge that all directors, including non-executives, can be held legally accountable for non-compliance.(d) Memo(i) Importance of information on operational internal controls and risks From: Wim Bock (CEO) To: all Sea Ships senior officers Date: 14 December 2009 Re: information on internal control and risks following the loss of the Mary Jane Colleagues,I know you all share with me and the other directors our heartfelt sorrow at the sinking of the Mary Jane with so many lives being lost. Our deepest sympathies go out to the families and friends of all those involved. In the light of the tragic loss, the board felt it vital to write to youall at this time to remind you all of a number of crucial aspects of internal control and risk. First, I wanted to make clear to you all why the flow of information upwards to the board on matters of internal control and risk is so important. We feel that one contributory factor in the loss of the Mary Jane was a lack of information flow on relevant issues hence my writing to you about this at this time.In the first instance, the information provided enables the board to monitor the performance of the company on the crucial issues in question. This includes compliance, performance against targets and the effectiveness of existing controls. We, the board, need to know, for example, if there are issues with internal controls on board our ships, in ports or in any other area of ships’ operations. By being made aware of the key risks and internal control issues at the operational level, we can work with you to address them in the most appropriate way.We also need to be aware of the business impact of operational controls and risks to enable us at board level to make informed business decisions at the strategic level. If we are receiving incomplete, defective or partial information then we will not be in full possession of the necessary facts to allocate resources in the most effective and efficient way possible.You will be aware that at board level we have the responsibility to provide information about risks and internal controls to external audiences. Best practice reporting means that we have to provide information to shareholders and others, about our systems, controls, targets, levels of compliance and improvement measures and we need quality information to enable us to do this. This brings me to the second purpose of this memo.(ii) Qualitative characteristics of information neededSecondly, I want to write to you about the most helpful ways in which to convey this crucial information to us. The information we receive on risks and internal controls should be high quality information. This means that it enables the full information content to be conveyed to the board in a manner that is clear and has nothing in it that would make any part of it difficult to understand. In particular I would ask that you consider that your communications should be reliable, relevant and understandable. They should also be complete.By reliable I refer to the trustworthiness of the information: the assumption that it is ‘hard’information, that it is correct, that it is impartial, unbiased and accurate. In the event that you must convey bad news such as some of the issues raised by the loss of the Mary Jane, we expect you to do so with as much truthfulness and clarity as if you were conveying good news.By relevant I mean not only that due reports should be complete and delivered promptly, but also that anything that you feel should be brought to the board’s attention, such as maritime safety issues, emergent risks, issues with ports, etc. should be brought to our attention while there is still time for us to do something about it. In the case of the Mary Jane there were technical issues with the fit of the ship with her berth at Eastport that were important and we should be made aware of such problems as soon as possible.Not all directors of Sea Ships possess the technical and nautical knowledge of senior operating personnel on board the ferries. It is therefore particularly important that information you convey to us is understandable. This means that it should contain a minimum of technical terms that have obvious meaning to you on board ships, but may not be understandable to a non-marine specialist. All communication should therefore be as plain as possible within the constraints of reliability and completeness. This brings me to my final point.By complete, I mean that all information that we need to know and which you have access to, shouldbe included. Particularly with relevance to on-board accidents or risks, you must convey all relevant information to us regardless of the inconvenience that it may cause to one or more colleagues. As we have learned at the highest cost to those involved in the loss of the Mary Jane and to ourselves commercially, the flow of information on controls and risks is of vital importance to us. Timely receipt of, and appropriate response to, high quality information is not only important to the safe operation of the ships but also to the company itself.Thank you very much for your understanding and full co-operation on behalf of Sea Ships.Wim BockChief executive[Tutorial note: candidates may express similar information qualities in different ways in part (ii).]2 (a) Director’s induction programme The overall purpose of induction is to minimise the amount of time taken for the new director to become effective in his or her new job. There are four major aspects of a director’s induction.To convey to the new starter, the organisation’s norms, values and culture. This is especially important when the new employee is from a different type of culture. Because Sam moved from a different country to join Ding Company, he had to adjust to a new national culture as well as a new corporate culture. There is evidence from the case that he misunderstood some of the cultural norms in that it was alleged that he made what he considered normal but what was perceived as an inappropriate remark to a young female employee. An induction programme including content on culture and norms may have prevented this situation from occurring.To communicate practical procedural duties to the new director including company policies relevant to a new employee. In Sam’s case this would involve his orientation with his place in the structure, his reporting lines (up and down), the way in which work is organised in the department and practical matters. In the case scenario, Sam made a simple error in the positioning of his office furniture. Again, this is an entirely avoidable situation had the induction programme provided him with appropriate content on company policy in this area.To convey an understanding of the nature of the company, its operations, strategy, key stakeholders and external relationships. For a new director, an early understanding of strategy is essential and a sound knowledge of how the company ‘works’ will also ensure that he or she adapts more quickly to the new role. In the case of a financial controller such as Sam, key external relationships will be with the company’s auditors and banks. If Sam is involved in reporting, the auditor relationship will be important and if he is involved in financing, the banks and other capital providers will be more important.To establish and develop the new director’s relationships with colleagues, especially those with whom he or she will interact on a regular basis. The importance of building good relationships early on in a director’s job is very important as early misunderstandings can be costly in terms of the time needed to repair the relationship. It is likely that Sam and Annette will need to work together to repair an unfortunate start to their working relationship as it seems that one of her first dealings with him was to point out his early misunderstandings (which were arguably due to her failure to provide him with an appropriate induction programme).(b) Critically evaluate Annette’s belief Countries differ in their employment of various types of board structure. Companies in the UK and US have tended towards unitary structures while Japanese companies and some European countries have preferred two–tier or even multi-tier boards. Thedistinction refers to the ways in which decision-making and responsibility is divided between directors. In a unitary structure, all of the directors have a nominally equal role in board discussions but they also jointly share responsibility (including legal responsibility) for the outcome of those discussions. On a two tier board, the senior board acts as a ‘kitchen cabinet’in which decisions are concentrated whilst other directors, typically departmental managers, will be on the ‘operating board’ and brought into board discussions where the senior (upper tier) board deem it appropriate.There are some arguments in favour of the adoption of a two-tier structure in turbulent environments. As the case implies, turbulent and dynamic environments change often and strategic leadership is partly about continually adjusting strategy to optimise the company’s fit with its environment.A smaller board can act quick and decisively in a way that larger and more cumbersome boards cannot. This is because meetings of larger numbers of people require excessive consultation, discussion and debate before a decision can be reached. When a decision needs to be taken quickly, this can be inconvenient. The meeting of a small number of people is therefore easier, cheaper and quicker to arrange because there are fewer diaries to match. As these arguments focus on both the efficiency and effectiveness of strategic decision-making, Annette has a strong case for supporting two-tier boards.The arguments against two-tier boards are as follows. In any complex situation where finely balanced judgments are made, such as making strategic decisions in turbulent environmental conditions, input from more people is likely to provide more views upon which to make the decision. Where, say, technical, detailed financial or operational details would be of benefit to the decision then a larger board would be likely to provide more feedback into the decision making process. The second reason is that decisions taken by a corporate board with little or no consultation with the operating board may not enjoy the full support of those key departmental directors who will be required to implement the decision. This, in turn, may cause friction, discord and resentment that will hinder good relations and thus impede the implementation of the strategy. Additionally, without a full understanding of operations, an inappropriate decision may be taken by the corporate board and unworkable procedures implemented. Finally, Annette is quite an autocratic personality and the two-tier board may be little more than a device to grant her excessive powers over company strategies and activities.(c) Arif Zaman’s understanding of his role The first observation to make is that overall, Arif Zaman has a poor understanding of his role as chairman and poorly represents the interests of Ding’s shareholders. He doesn’t seem to understand his role as intended by Cadbury, Sarbanes Oxley and other influential codes on corporate governance.It appears from the case that he cedes too much power to Annette. One of the purposes of having a separate chairman is to avoid allowing the chief executive to operate without recourse to the chairman. The chairman, along with the non-executive directors, should hold the chief executive to account.Arif allowed Annette’s views to take effect on matters such as board structure. Arif is legally head of the board and not Annette. Ding’s shareholders have a reasonable expectation that Arif will personally ensure that the strategic oversight of the board will be a matter for the chairman who is, notionally at least, an independent non-executive director.Being old friends with Annette threatens Arif’s independence as chairman. Is he acting as a representative of the shareholders or as Annette’s friend? He seems to be doing the job as afavour to Annette and seems to see no intrinsic value in his role in terms of acting to provide checks and balances on the activities of the executive board and the chief executive in particular. Arif seems to view the chairing of board meetings as optional. He said that he saw his role as ‘mainly ceremonial’ and that he ‘chaired some board meetings when he was available’. Both of these attitudes are inappropriate and demonstrate an underestimation of the importance of the chairman in leading the company and its strategy.3(a) This question asks candidates to analyse the business analysis certification training industry (BACTI) in Erewhon using Porter’s five forces framework. This is the preferred approach of Xenon, the company commissioned to undertake the study. In this context it seems a reasonable model to use. The forces ultimately determine the profit potential of the industry and ABCL will be keen to invest in an industry where there is long-term return on its investment. The framework also helps identify how a potential new entrant (such as ABCL) might position itself in the industry. The five forces driving industry competition are the threat of entrants, the threat of substitute products or services, the bargaining power of suppliers, the bargaining power of buyers and the competitive rivalry between existing firms in the industry. Looking at each of these in turn: The threat of entryNew entrants to an industry bring new capacity. Existing suppliers stand to lose market share and have their profitability eroded. In the context of ABCL, the threat of entry is a particularly significant issue because they are, themselves, threatening to enter the industry. Consequently they need to understand the barriers to entry to see if they are sufficient to deter or delay their potential entrance. Furthermore, an understanding of these barriers will give them an understanding of how likely it is that other companies will consider entering the industry. If barriers are high then the threat of entry is low.In the context of the scenario, the main barriers appear to be:Access to supply channels. The industry is dominated by three established providers who know the industry very well and have established relationships with key suppliers of expertise; the lecturing staff. In two instances, CATalyst and Batrain, lecturers are full-time employees with attractive salary packages, share options and generous benefits. In the case of Ecoba Ltd, the company promotes the images and expertise of the high-profile presenters that it uses. Although these presenters are on sub-contract, they feel secure about the arrangement. As one of them commented ‘students are attracted to the company because they know I will be teaching a certain module. I suppose I could be substituted by a cheaper resource, but the students would soon complain that they had been misled.’The fees of 60% of all students are paid for by their employer. The three established suppliers have good relationships with the major corporate customers and, in some cases, have set up infrastructure (dedicated training sessions, personalised websites) to support these contracts.Although corporate customers do switch provider (see later), it might be difficult, in the short term, for ABCL to gain corporate clients.Expected retaliation is an accepted barrier to entry. The industry in Erewhon has a history of vigorous retaliation to entrants. The scenario mentions that ABCL has commissioned the study from Xenon because of the well documented experience of another Arcadian company, Megatrain. Megatrain’s proposed entry into this market place was met by price-cutting and promotional campaigns from the established suppliers. This was supported by a campaign to discredit the CEO of Megatrain and to highlight its foreign ownership. Porter makes the point that there is a strong likelihood of retaliation where there are established firms with great commitment to the industry and who are relatively illiquid. This is supported by evidence from Ecoba’s balance sheet where goodwill and property are both significant assets.The cost and time taken to achieve gold level certification may also deter ABCL from entering the industry. All three main providers currently have EIoBA’s gold standard. To be a creditable alternative, ABCL has to achieve this level of certification. Evidence from the case study suggests that it takes at least one year to achieve this certification. In the meantime ABCL will be trading at a disadvantage.The three providers dominating the industry have well-established brands, supported by extensive marketing. ABCL will have to invest heavily to overcome existing customer loyalties and to build up a brand that appears to be a credible player in the industry. This will require time, and investment in building a brand name is particularly risky since, as Porter explicitly recognised ‘it has no salvage value if entry fails’. However, there are only 15 major corporate customers. ABCL could target these to gain market share. It is possible that ABCL already works with these customers in Arcadia, and they may also be attracted by ABCL’s e-learning expertise.Threat of substitutesThe threat of substitutes is again important to ABCL because it would not want to invest in an industry where the product or service is under threat. Substitution reduces demand and might, in extreme cases, lead to the product or service becoming obsolete.The threat of substitutes appears to be constant in this industry. There is no legislative or certification requirement to study for the examinations with an accredited provider. Evidence from the case study suggests that a large proportion of students do not attend formal classes but prefer to study on their own.The case study also mentions that one of the smaller providers has gained some success by providing ‘blended’ learning solutions where tutors provide some support, but students are expected to complete e-learning modules. In effect, these students are substituting face-to-face tuition with。

ACCA份考试真题(P1)

考试真题（P1）Section A - This ONE question is compulsory and MUST be attempted1 In the 2009 results presentation to analysts,the chief executive of ZPT,a global internet communications company,announced an excellent set of results to the waiting audience.Chief executive Clive Xu announced that, compared to 2008,sales had increased by 50%,profi ts by 100% and total assets by 80%.The dividend was to be doubled from the previous year.He also announced that based on their outstanding performance,the executive directors would be paid large bonuses in line with their contracts.His own bonus as chief executive would be $20 million.When one of the analysts asked if the bonus was excessive,Mr Xu reminded the audience that the share price had risen 45% over the course of the year because of his efforts in skilfully guiding the company.He said that he expected the share price to rise further on the results announcement,which it duly did. Because the results exceeded market expectation,the share price rose another 25% to $52.Three months later,Clive Xu called a press conference to announce a restatement of the 2009 results.This was necessary,he said,because of some 'regrettable accounting errors'.This followed a meeting between ZPT and the legal authorities who were investigating a possible fraud at ZPT.He disclosed that in fact the fi gures for 2009 were increases of 10% for sales,20% for profi ts and 15% for total assets which were all signifi cantly below market expectations.The proposed dividend would now only be a modest 10% more than last year.He said that he expected a market reaction to the restatement but hoped that it would only be a short-term effect.The first questioner from the audience asked why the auditors had not spotted and corrected the fundamental accounting errors and the second questioner asked whether such a disparity between initial and restated results was due to fraud rather than'accounting errors'.When a journalist asked Clive Xu if he intended to pay back the $20 million bonus that had been based on the previous results,Mr Xu said he did not.The share price fell dramatically upon the restatement announcement and,because ZPT was such a large company,it made headlines in the business pages in many countries.Later that month,the company announced that following an internal investigation,there would be further restatements,all dramatically downwards,for the years 2006 and 2007.This caused another mass selling of ZPT shares resulting in a fi nal share value the following day of $1.This represented a loss of shareholder value of $12 billion from the peak share price.Clive Xu resigned and the government regulator for businessordered an investigation into what had happened at ZPT.The shares were suspended by the stock exchange.A month later, having failed to gain protection from its creditors in the courts,ZPT was declared bankrupt. Nothing was paid out to shareholders whilst suppliers received a fraction of the amounts due to them. Some non-current assets were acquired by competitors but all of ZPT‘s 54,000 employees lost their jobs,mostly with little or no termination payment.Because the ZPT employees’ pension fund was not protected from creditors,the value of that was also severely reduced to pay debts which meant that employees with many years of service would have a greatly reduced pension to rely on in old age.ced to pay debts which meant that employees with many years of service would have a greatly reduced pension to rely on in old age.ced to pay debts which meant that employees with many years of service would have a greatly reduced pension to rely on in old age.ced to pay debts which meant that employees with many years of service would have a greatly reduced pension to rely on in old age.The government investigation found that ZPT had been maintaining false accounting records for several years. This was done by developing an overly-complicated company structure that contained a network of international branches and a business model that was diffi cult to understand.Whereas ZPT had begun as a simple telecommunications company,Clive Xu had increased the complexity of the company so that he could 'hide' losses and mis-report profi ts. In the company‘s reporting,he also substantially overestimated the value of future customer supply contracts.The investigation also found a number of signifi cant internal control defi ciencies including no effective management oversight of the external reporting process and a disregard of the relevant accounting standards.In addition to Mr Xu,several other directors were complicit in the activities although Shazia Lo,a senior qualifi ed accountant working for the fi nancial director,had been unhappy about the situation for some time.She had approached the fi nance director with her concerns but having failed to get the answers she felt she needed,had threatened to tell the press that future customer supply contract values had been intentionally and materially overstated（the change in fair value would have had a profi t impact）。

2023年ACCA考试真题精选

2023年ACCA考试真题精选第一题：财务会计假设您是一家制造业公司的财务经理。

您被要求准备财务报表，并解释公司2019年与2020年间发生的财务变化。

请根据以下数据和信息回答问题。

2019年数据：- 销售收入：500万美元- 销售成本：400万美元- 管理费用：50万美元- 借款利息：10万美元2020年数据：- 销售收入：600万美元- 销售成本：450万美元- 管理费用：55万美元- 借款利息：12万美元问题1：请计算2019年的净利润和净利润率，并与2020年进行比较。

解释净利润和净利润率的变化。

根据上述数据，2019年的净利润可通过以下公式计算：净利润=销售收入-销售成本-管理费用-借款利息净利润=500万美元-400万美元-50万美元-10万美元净利润=40万美元净利润率可通过以下公式计算：净利润率=(净利润/销售收入)×100%净利润率=(40万美元/500万美元)×100%净利润率=8%同样的方式，我们可以计算2020年的净利润和净利润率：净利润=600万美元-450万美元-55万美元-12万美元净利润=83万美元净利润率=(83万美元/600万美元)×100%净利润率=13.83%通过比较2019年和2020年的净利润和净利润率，我们可以得出以下结论：- 净利润从40万美元增加到83万美元。

这表明公司的盈利能力有所提高。

- 净利润率从8%增加到13.83%。

这说明公司在销售收入中的盈利比例增加了。

问题2：请根据净利润和净利润率的变化，分析公司在2019年与2020年间可能采取的经营策略。

根据净利润和净利润率的变化，我们可以推断公司可能采取了以下经营策略：1. 成本控制：销售成本从400万美元减少到450万美元，管理费用从50万美元增加到55万美元。

这表明公司在成本控制方面取得了一定的成效。

2. 销售增长：销售收入从500万美元增加到600万美元。

公司可能采取了一些措施，如市场拓展或产品创新，以增加销售额。

2011年ACCAP1-P3真题

2011年ACCA P1-P3真题Section A – This ONE question is compulsory and MUST be attempted1.Coastal Oil is one of the world’s largest petrochemical companies. It is based in Deeland and is responsible alone for 10% of Deeland’s total stock market value. It employs 120,000 people in many countries and has an especially strong presence in Effland because of Effland’s very large consumption of oil and gas products and its large oil reserves. Coastal Oil is organised, like most petrochemical companies, into three vertically integrated business units: the exploration and extraction division; the processing and refining division; and the distribution and retailing division.Because of the risks and the capital investment demands, Coastal Oil has joint venture (JV) agreements in place for many of its extraction operations (i.e. its oil and gas rigs), especially those in the deep-water seas. A joint venture is a shared equity arrangement for a particular project where control is shared between the JV partners. In each of its JVs, Coastal Oil is the largest partner, although operations on each rig are divided between the JV member companies and the benefits are distributed according to the share of the JV.As a highly visible company, Coastal Oil has long prided itself on its safety record and its ethical reputation. It believes both to be essential in supporting shareholder value. Its corporate code of ethics, published some years ago, pledges its commitment to the ‘highest standards’ of ethical performance in the following areas: full compliance with regulation in all jurisdictions; safety and care of employees; transparency and communication with stakeholders; social contribution; and environmental responsibility. In addition, Coastal Oil has usually provided a lot of voluntary disclosure in its annual report and on its website. It says that it has a wide range of stakeholders and so needs to provide a great deal of information.One of the consequences of dividing up the different responsibilities and operations on an oil or gas rig is that Coastal Oil does not have direct influence over some important operational controls. The contractual arrangements on any given oil rig can be very complex and there have often been disagreements between JV partners on some individual legal agreements and responsibilities for health and safety controls. Given that Coastal Oil has JV interests in hundreds of deep-water oil and gas rigs all over the world, some observers have said that this could be a problem should an accident ever occur.This issue was tragically highlighted when one of its deep-water rigs, the Effland Coastal Deep Rig, had an explosion earlier this year. It was caused by the failure of a valve at the ‘well-head’on the sea floor. The valve was the responsibility of Well Services, a minor partner in the JV. Eight workers were killed on the rig from the high pressure released after the valve failure, and oil gushed into the sea from the well-head, a situation that should have been prevented had the valve been fully operational. It was soon established that Well Services’ staff failed to inspect the valve before placing it at the well-head at the time of installation, as was required by the company’s normal control systems. In addition, the valve was attached to a connecting part that did not meet the required technical specification for the water depth at which it was operating. The sea bed was 1,000 metres deep and the connecting part was intended for use to a depth of up to 300 metres. There was a suggestion that the need to keep costs down was a key reason for the use of the connecting part with the inferior specification.Reports in the media on the following day said that the accident had happened on a rig ‘belonging to Coastal Oil’ when in fact, Coastal Oil was technically only a major partner in the joint venture. Furthermore, there was no mention that the accident had been caused by a part belonging to Well Services. A journalist did discover, however, that both companies had operated a more lax safety culture on the deep-water rigs than was the case at facilities on land (the ‘land-side’). He said there was a culture of ‘out of sight, out of mind’ on some offshore facilities and that this meant that several other controls were inoperative in addition to the ones that led to the accident. Information systems reporting back to the ‘land-side’ were in place but it was the responsibility of management on each individual rig to enforce all internal controls and the ‘land-side’ would only be informed of a problem if it was judged to be ‘an exceptional risk’by the rig’s manager.The accident triggered a large internal argument between Coastal Oil and Well Services about liability and this meant that there was no public statement from Coastal Oil for seven days while the arguments continued. Lawyers on both sides pointed out that liability was contractually ambiguous because the documentation on responsibilities was far too complex and unclear. And in any case, nobody expected anything to go wrong. In the absence of any official statement from Coastal Oil for those seven days, the media had no doubts who was to blame: Coastal Oil was strongly criticised in Effland with the criticism growing stronger as oil from the ruptured valve was shown spilling directly into the sea off the Effland coast. With no contingency plan for a deep-water well-head rupture in place, the ruptured valve took several months to repair, meaning that many thousands of tonnes of crude oil polluted the sea off Effland. Images of seabirds covered in crude oil were frequently broadcast on television and thousands of businesses on the coast reported that the polluted water would disrupt their business over the vital tourist season. Public statements from Coastal Oil that it was not responsible for the ruptured valve were seemingly not believedby the Effland public. Senior legislators in Effland said that the accident happened on ‘a rig belonging to Coastal Oil’ so it must be Coastal Oil’s fault.A review by the Coastal Oil board highlighted several areas where risk management systems might be tightened to reduce the possibility of a similar accident happening again. Finance director, Tanya Tun, suggested that the company should disclose this new information to shareholders as it would be value-relevant to them. In particular, she said that a far more detailed voluntary statement on environmental risk would be material to the shareholders. The annual report would, she believed, be a suitable vehicle for this disclosure.Because of the high media profile of the event, politicians from Effland involved themselves in the situation. Senator Jones’s constituency on the coast nearest the rig was badly affected by the oil spill and many of his constituents suffered economic loss as a result. He angrily retorted in a newspaper interview that Coastal Oil’s CEO, Susan Ahmed, ‘should have known this was going to happen’, such was the poor state of some of the internal controls on the Effland Coastal Deep Rig.As the oil spill continued and the media interest in the events intensified, CEO Mrs Ahmed was summoned to appear before a special committee of the Effland national legislature ‘to explain herself to the citizens of Effland’. The Coastal Oil board agreed that this would be a good opportunity for Mrs Ahmed to address a number of issues in detail and attempt to repair some of the company’s damaged reputation. The board agreed that Mrs Ahmed should provide as full a statement as possible on the internal control failures to the special committee.Required:(a) Describe the general purposes of a corporate code of ethics and evaluate Coastal Oil’s performance against its own stated ethical aims as set out in its code of ethics. (10 marks) (b) Explain, using examples, the difference between voluntary and mandatory disclosure, and assess Tanya Tun’s proposition that additional voluntary disclosure on environmental risk management would be material to the shareholders. (10 marks)(c) In preparing to appear before the special committee of the Effland national legislature, CEO Mrs Ahmed has been informed that she will be asked to explain the causes of the accident and to establish whether she can give assurances that an accident of this type will not re-occur. Required:Prepare a statement for Mrs Ahmed to present before the committee that explains the following: (i) The internal control failures that gave rise to the accident; (10 marks)(ii) The difference between subjective and objective risk assessment (using examples). Argue against Senator Jones’s view that Mrs Ahmed ‘should have known this was going to happen’; (8 marks)(iii) ‘Health and safety’ risk and the factors that can increase this risk in an organisation;(4 marks)(iv) Why Coastal Oil cannot guarantee the prevention of further health and safety failures, using the ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) principle; (4 marks)Professional marks will be awarded in part (c) for logical flow, persuasiveness, format and tone of the answers. (4 marks) (50 marks)Section A – THIS ONE question is compulsory and MUST be attemptedSection B – TWO questions ONLY to be attempted2.Traveler, a public limited company, operates in the manufacturing sector. The draft statements of financial position are as follows at 30 November 2011:Traveler Data Captive $m $m $mAssets: Non-current assets Property, plant and equipment 439 810 620 Investments in subsidiaries Data 820 Captive 541 Financial assets 108 10 201,908 820 640 Defined benefit asset 72Current assets 995 781 350 –––––– –––––– –––––Total assets 2,975 1,601 990 –––––– –––––– –––––Equity and liabilities: Share capital 1,120 600 390 Retained earnings 1,066 442 169 Other components of equity 60 37 45Total equity 2,246 1,079 604 –––––– –––––– –––––Non-current liabilities 455 323 73Current liabilities 274 199 313 –––––– –––––– –––––Total liabilities 729 522 386 –––––– –––––– –––––Total equity and liabilities 2,975 1,601 990 –––––– –––––– –––––The following information is relevant to the preparation of the group financial statements:1 On 1 December 2010, Traveler acquired 60% of the equity interests of Data, a public limited company. The purchase consideration comprised cash of $600 million. At acquisition, the fair value of the non-controlling interest in Data was $395 million. Traveler wishes to use the ‘full goodwill’method. On 1 December 2010, the fair value of the identifiable net assets acquired was $935 million and retained earnings of Data were $299 million and other components of equity were $26 million. The excess in fair value is due to non-depreciable land.On 30 November 2011, Traveler acquired a further 20% interest in Data for a cash consideration of $220 million.2 On 1 December 2010, Traveler acquired 80% of the equity interests of Captive for a considerationof $541 million. The consideration comprised cash of $477 million and the transfer of non-depreciable land with a fair value of $64 million. The carrying amount of the land at the acquisition date was $56 million. At the year end, this asset was still included in the non-current assets of Traveler and the sale proceeds had been credited to profit or loss.At the date of acquisition, the identifiable net assets of Captive had a fair value of $526 million, retained earnings were $90 million and other components of equity were $24 million. The excess in fair value is due to non-depreciable land. This acquisition was accounted for using the partial goodwill method in accordance with IFRS 3 (Revised) Business Combinations.3 Goodwill was impairment tested after the additional acquisition in Data on 30 November 2011. The recoverable amount of Data was $1,099 million and that of Captive was $700 million.4 Included in the financial assets of Traveler is a ten-year 7% loan. At 30 November 2011, the borrower was in financial difficulties and its credit rating had been downgraded. Traveler has adopted IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and the loan asset is currently held at amortised cost of $29 million. Traveler now wishes to value the loan at fair value using current market interest rates. Traveler has agreed for the loan to be restructured; there will only be three more annual payments of $8 million starting in one year’s time. Current market interest rates are 8%, the original effective interest rate is 6·7% and the effective interest rate under the revised payment schedule is 6·3%.5 Traveler acquired a new factory on 1 December 2010. The cost of the factory was $50 million and it has a residual value of $2 million. The factory has a flat roof, which needs replacing every five years. The cost of the roof was $5 million. The useful economic life of the factory is 25 years. No depreciation has been charged for the year. Traveler wishes to account for the factory and roof as a single asset and depreciate the whole factory over its economic life. Traveler uses straight-line depreciation.6 The actuarial value of Traveler’s pension plan showed a surplus at 1 December 2010 of $72 million, represented by the fair value of the assets of $250 million, the present value of the defined benefit obligation of $200 million and net unrecognised actuarial losses of $22 million. The average remaining working lives of the employees is 10 years. Traveler uses the corridor approach for recognising actuarial gains and losses. The aggregate of the current service cost, interest cost and expected return on assets amounted to a cost of $55 million for the year. After consulting with the actuaries, the company decided to reduce its contributions for the year to $45 million. The contributions were paid on7 December 2011. No entries had been made in the financial statements for the above amounts. At the year end, the unrecognised actuarial losses were $20 million and the present value of available future refunds and reductions in future contributions was $18 million.Required:(a) Prepare a consolidated statement of financial position for the Traveler Group for the year ended 30 November 2011. (35 marks)(b) Traveler has three distinct business segments. The management has calculated the net assets, turnover and profit before common costs, which are to be allocated to these segments. However, they are unsure as to how they should allocate certain common costs and whether they can exercise judgement in the allocation process. They wish to allocate head office management expenses; pension expense; the cost of managing properties and interest and related interest bearing assets. They also are uncertain as to whether the allocation of costs has to be in conformity with the accounting policies used in the financial statements.Required:Advise the management of Traveler on the points raised in the above paragraph. (7 marks)(c) Segmental information reported externally is more useful if it conforms to information used by management in making decisions. The information can differ from that reported in the financial statements. Although reconciliations are required, these can be complex and difficult to understand. Additionally, there are other standards where subjectivity is involved and often the profit motive determines which accounting practice to follow. The directors have a responsibility to shareholders in disclosing information to enhance corporate value but this may conflict with their corporate social responsibility.Required:Discuss how the ethics of corporate social responsibility disclosure are difficult to reconcile with shareholder expectations. (6 marks)Professional marks will be awarded in part (c) for clarity and expression of your discussion.(2 marks) (50 marks)Section B – TWO questions ONLY to be attempted3.Section A – This ONE question is compulsory and MUST be attemptedIntroductionRudos is a densely populated, industrialised country with an extensive railway network developed in the nineteenth century. This railway network (totalling 6,000 kilometres), together with the trains that ran on it, was nationalised in 1968 and so became wholly owned by the government. By 2004, RudosRail, the government-owned rail company, was one of the ten largest employers in the country. However, in that year, the general election was won by the Party for National Reconstruction (PNR) with a manifesto that promised the privatisation of many of the largepublicly-owned organisations, including RudosRail. The PNR argued that there had been a lack of investment in the railway under public ownership and that the absence of competition had meant that ticket prices and costs (particularly labour costs) were too high for the taxpayer to continue subsidising it. The combination of high ticket prices and large public subsidies was very unpopular. As a result the government split the railway network into eight sections (or franchises) and invited private sector bids for each of these eight franchises. Each franchise was for ten years and was for the trains, tracks and infrastructure of each section. Each franchise would be awarded to the highest bidder.The East Rudos franchise, one of the eight franchises, was awarded to Great Eastern Trains (GET), a company specifically set up to bid for the franchise by former members of RudosRail’s management. It was the only independent company to win a franchise. The other seven franchises were awarded to companies who were subsidiaries of global transport groups and, initially, were largely financed through investment from the parent companies. In contrast, GET was primarily financed through loans from the government-owned Bank of Rudos. The ten-year franchise started in 2006. GET is an unquoted company, owned by its management team.GET – the early yearsThe first three years of the GET franchise were extremely successful, both in terms of profits and passenger satisfaction. This was partly due to government subsidies to help ease the transition of the network from public to private ownership. However, it was also due to the skill and knowledge of the management team. This team already had significant operating experience (gained with RudosRail) and they adapted quickly to the new private sector model. GET was the most profitable of the new franchises and it was held up as an example of successful privatisation. Its investment in new trains and excellent reliability record meant that it quickly built up a well-respected image and brand. GET uses a series of television advertisements to promote its services. These feature an old lady arriving at various stations and texting her family that she has ‘arrived safe & on time!’ In a recent consumer survey these advertisements were rated as both memorable and effective.In the newly privatised rail system many passenger journeys crossed franchise boundaries, so that a journey often involved the use of two or more franchise operators. GET developed an innovative booking and payment system that also automatically reallocated revenue from fares between franchise holders. It also allowed Internet booking and gave discounts for early booking. This system was so successful that GET now uses the system to process the bookings of three of the other franchise operators. GET is paid on a transaction basis for the bookings that it processes on behalf of these other franchisees.The fourth and fifth years of GET’s operation were not as successful. No government subsidies were paid in those years and economic problems in the country led to a fall in passenger numbers. Financial information for GET for 2010 is provided in Figure 1. Figure 2 provides data for the rail industry as a whole in Rudos.Figure 1: Selected information for GET in 2010Extract from the statement of financial position: All financial figures in $mExtract from the statement of comprehensive income All financial figures in $mRevenue 320 Cost of sales (210) Gross profit 110 Administrative expenses (40) Profit before tax and interest 70 Finance cost (60) Profit before tax 10 Tax expense (1) Profit for the year 9 Extract from the annual reportNumber of employees 3,010 Number of rail kilometres 920Figure 2: Financial information for the Rudos rail industry as a wholeDespite the apparent success of GET, there has been considerable criticism of the overall privatisation of the railway. Much of this criticism is concentrated in two of the geographical areas where the franchisees have struggled to provide an efficient and economic service. The government has appointed auditors who are reviewing the operation of these two franchises and a government minister has stated that ‘terminating the franchise and opening it up to re-bidding has not been ruled out as an option’. A major rail accident in Rudos (with many fatalities) has also led to concerns about safety and led to new legislation being enacted. Further safety legislation is expected concerning the relaying of track and all franchisees will be expected to implement the requirements immediately.In 2009, the PNR was returned to power, but with a reduced majority. The leader of the main opposition Measure National rail industryaverageROCE 4·50%Operating profit margin10·00% Gross profit margin 22·00%Current ratio 2·1Acid test ratio 1·2Gearing ratio 48%Revenue/employee per year$85,000Number of employees per rail kilometre4·1Current positionparty originally suggested that the railways might be re-nationalised if he were to gain power. However, he has since moderated his view, although he suggests that ‘they should return a significant percentage of their profits to the taxpayer’. Road transport has also suffered under the PNR government, with many of the roads in the country heavily congested. Fuel costs have increased to reflect increasing scarcity, causing many companies to face spiralling transport and storage costs. For the first time in the country’s history, an ecology (green) party has won seats in government, capitalising on the growth of the ‘green consumer’, particularly in urban areas. International rail developmentsThe pioneering privatisation initiatives in Rudos have been observed by other countries and many have adopted similar policies. Recently, the Republic of Raziackstan announced that it intended to privatise its railway network. Raziackstan is approximately five hours’ flying time from Rudos and is part of the former eastern trading bloc. It is a country where there is currently very little health and safety legislation. Although there is also little employment legislation, public service jobs are traditionally viewed as safe, and employees perceive that a ‘railway job is a job for life’. At present the railway network, which is 1,500 kilometres long, employs 8,000 employees generating revenues of $180,000,000. The country itself still has a limited technological and financial infrastructure, with only an estimated 20% of the population having access to the Internet. However, all political parties are united in their desire to privatise the railways so that money can be invested elsewhere in the country, for example, for providing better health care.Because of the poor condition of the railway, the proposal is to retain and upgrade the rail tracks under public ownership. However, the trains and infrastructure, such as stations, will be privatised. The government is looking for letters of intent from private companies who are willing to take over the complete network (excluding the tracks).A stipulation of the contract is that the bidder should have a significant industrial presence in the country. For some time GET has been interested in acquiring the company that undertakes most of the track and train maintenance in Raziackstan. This company SOFR (SOciety Fabrication de Raziackstan) was established in 1919 and has a long tradition of engineering. GET has used the company to refurbish some of its equipment and they have been delighted with the results. The board of GET now senses a great opportunity. It would like to combine the speedy acquisition of SOFR with a bid to run the rail network in Raziackstan. In fact, early informal indications from the Raziackstan government suggest that the bid will be successful if SOFR has been acquired by GET as no other prospective bidders for the network have yet come forward.Required:(a) Using appropriate models and frameworks, analyse GET’s current strategic position from both an internal and external perspective. (20 marks)(b) GET’s proposed strategy is firstly to acquire SOFR and then the franchise to run the rail network of Raziackstan. You have been asked to provide an independent assessment of this proposed strategy.Write a report evaluating GET’s proposed strategy. (16 marks)Professional marks will be awarded in part (b) for appropriate structure, style and fluency of the report. (4 marks)(c) Critical Success Factors (CSFs) and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are important business concepts in the context of franchising rail services.Explain and discuss these concepts in the context of GET and the rail industry. (10 marks) (50 marks)参与ACCA考试的考生可按照复习计划有效进行，另外高顿网校官网ACCA考试辅导高清课程已经开通，还可索取ACCA考试通关宝典，针对性地讲解、训练、答疑、模考，对学习过程进行全程跟踪、分析、指导，可以帮助考生全面提升复习备考效果。

ACCA P1 Global June 2012 - answers (ACCA P1 2012年6月真题答案)

Professional Level – Essentials Module, Paper P1Governance, Risk and Ethics June 2012 Answers 1(a)Risk appetiteExplanationRisk appetite describes the willingness of an entity to become exposed to an unrealised loss (risk). It is usually understood to mean the position taken with regard to two notional preferences: risk aversion and risk seeking. Both preferences are associated with different levels of returns: those that are risk-seeking favour higher risks and higher returns with the converse being true for the risk averse.Risk-averse entities will tend to be cautious about accepting risk, preferring to avoid risk, to share it or to reduce it. In exchange, they are willing to accept a lower level of return. Those with an appetite for risk will tend to accept and seek out risk, recognising risk to be associated with higher net returns.Risk appetite and selectionThe Jayland option has a higher political risk, a threat to the integrity of the company (by paying the bribe) and an element of reputation risk. There is also a risk arising from the lack of business culture in Jayland and a possibility that it will be more difficult to maintain normal operations there than in Pealand. Offset against these risks is the potential return of $2 billion over ten years, which is twice that of the Pealand option.The Pealand option has negligible political risk but a slightly higher risk that internal controls will be difficult to implement. It has a much lower likelihood of reputation risk and there is no risk connected with bribery. The return is half that of the Jayland option (for an approximately equal investment value).The two options offer two different risk and return profiles: the Jayland option offers a higher return but a higher risk profile and the Pealand option offers a lower return but also a lower risk profile. If the company has a higher risk appetite it is more likely to choose Jayland and if it has a lower risk appetite it is likely to select the Pealand option.(b)AAA seven-step model1.What are the facts of the case?The facts of the case are that there are two investment options and each has a different ethical and risk profile althoughthe AAA model is mainly concerned with the ethical aspects. The ability to operate the necessary internal controls forHayho manufacturing also differs between the two options. Only one option can be pursued and both are capable ofmaking an acceptable level of return.2.What are the ethical issues?The ethical issues are over the potential complicity of Hayho in supporting a corrupt regime in Jayland, in paying whatappears to be a bribe to Mr Popo under the Jayland option and in operating under less stringent regulatory conditionsin Jayland compared to Pealand. Another issue to consider is that it is alleged the president of Jayland maintains orderby abusing the rights of the people. The company is very sensitive to allegations of human rights abuses after criticismsof Hayho were made in Arrland recently and it is reluctant to expose itself to similar criticisms again.A further ethical issue is whether there is a corporate social obligation for companies to invest in developing ortransitional economies to help stimulate these economies. However, these disadvantages have to be weighed againstthe likelihood of making twice the return for shareholders in Jayland against the option of operating sustainably in amore stable Pealand. In Pealand, there may be ethical issues concerning taking over an existing workforce and changingworking terms and conditions, perhaps in terms of changed expectations, contractual issues and redundancies.3.What are the norms and principles that apply?The norms and principles that apply in this situation are that business investment decisions should be taken on a soundcommercial basis with risk, return and ethical considerations fully taken into account.The case says that the company seeks to ‘always uphold the highest standards of integrity, human rights andenvironmental protection whilst at the same time ‘responsibly’ supporting developing countries by providing jobs andopportunities to enable greater social and economic development.’This would tend to favour decisions that do not involve bribery (against integrity), human rights abuses (perhaps throughsupporting corrupt governments), but at the same time seeking, where possible, to use investments to support localeconomic development (perhaps by investing in developing countries, all other things being equal).4.What are the alternatives?The first alternative is to invest in Jayland, where a ‘new-build’ factory would enable Hayho to implant its culture andsystems but where there is a poorly developed education system, a potentially unstable political environment and anabsence of internal control and corporate governance regulations.The other alternative is the Pealand option, to take over an existing plant and an inherited workforce in a more highlyregulated business environment.5.Which option is most consistent with norms and principles?Both options have strengths and weaknesses, depending upon how the different factors are evaluated. The J aylandoption would meet the criteria for financial acceptability and would be favourable through supporting economic growthand by providing net additional employment in a developing country.The option most consistent with stated norms and principles is the Pealand option. This option has the benefit of inheriting a trained and competent workforce and avoids the reputation risk of providing credibility for the Popo regime and of being exposed, perhaps by a whilstleblower, for paying the ‘royalty’ (which is effectively a bribe to Mr Popo). The Jayland option would provide a greater financial return and provide net additional employment in a developing country.But it also would violate the principle of sound risk management because investing in an unstable and potentially hostile political environment could expose Hayho to unacceptable levels of long-term operational, financial and reputational risk.6.What are the consequences of each option?In J ayland, as opposed to Pealand, a completely new factory would be built providing new additional employment, although there could be an issue with sourcing the appropriate staff, given the poor levels of education and training. The Jayland option would provide a higher potential return to shareholders, but at a greater risk. It would make implementing the internal controls potentially easier but would risk reputation-damaging allegations of supporting Mr Popo’s regime.Were the ‘royalty’ to be made public, it would have severe consequences for the trustworthiness of the Hayho board, having given the reassurances it did after the Arrland incident.The Pealand option would make a smaller return and involve lower risk, but could introduce potential problems with implementing the necessary internal controls. This option would be more ethically acceptable. Hayho would be severely criticised for supporting a corrupt regime if it invested in Jayland. But if it invested in Pealand, no bribery would be necessary and it could publicise the fact that it chose to invest in Pealand over Jayland because it is seeking to honour its commitments made after the previous Arrland incident.7.What is the decision?The decision most aligned to the company’s stated norms and principles is the Pealand option. Other powerful countervailing factors would also have an influence, however, as risk and internal control considerations would also be taken into account.[Tutorial note:reward answers arguing for Jayland if shown to be based on reasoning from step 6](c)General purposes of internal control systems and main challenges.General purposesThe first general purpose of internal control is to achieve the orderly conduct of business by facilitating effective and efficient operation of an organisation’s activities. In doing this, it must be able to respond appropriately to relevant risks and to configure activities to be able to achieve the organisation’s strategic objectives. This includes safeguarding the assets of the organisation from external and internal threats and to ensure that all actual and potential liabilities and sources of loss are identified and controlled. The protection of value is important in underpinning confidence in internal controls and in providing the capacity for future value adding.Internal controls are essential in ensuring the robustness, quality and timeliness of both internal and external financial reporting. The provision of this information is important in managing internal systems (e.g. budgetary controls) and in maintaining and cultivating confidence among shareholders and capital markets. This involves maintaining accurate records and processes capable of generating and processing the relevant information.Internal control is necessary to ensure compliance with any external laws, standards or regulations that apply. These could arise from companies’ legislation, listing rules or, in some industries, regulations imposed by sector-specific regulators.Main challengesJayland was very under developed until relatively recently and the national culture is, according to Emily Baa, unfamiliar with modern business practice and behaviour. Achieving effective and efficient operation of the business would be an early priority for the Hayho investment and this limitation would necessitate substantial initial training and cultural-familiarisation.If these cultural values (e.g. time-keeping, work commitment, honesty of workers, etc) cannot be taken for granted in a national culture then it represents a major obstacle in achieving normal plant operation.Emily reported an unknown security situation in the region with regard to the safeguarding of assets. Being able to ensure that non-current assets owned by Hayho are secure and being used for the intended purpose is an essential element of internal control. The value of Hayho belongs to its shareholders and it would be irresponsible of the board (as agents) to invest in assets in J ayland unless reasonable assurances could be given that they will be safe from sabotage, damage, theft, deterioration or inefficient utilisation.Emily’s third point was about the level of necessary skills in the local labour pool. She mentioned the state of quality control and accounting skills and both of these are necessary for a sound system of internal control.Appropriate quality control staff are necessary to ensure that the product complies with the stringent international product standards that apply to Hayho’s products. Where technical skills such as these are difficult to obtain in local labour markets, unskilled people may need to undergo training, or expatriates may need to be persuaded to move to the Jayland facility.Guaranteeing that outputs from the Jayland plant were fully compliant with all applicable standards would be an important early priority for customers and investors and so this issue is likely to be of great importance.Accounting skills are necessary for guaranteeing accurate and complete accounting records and for reliable financial information. Gathering required data and reporting to management at head office is required, for example on metrics such as variance against agreed targets. For a new investment such as those being considered by the Hayho board, the provision of accurate and timely information is essential in controlling activities under either of the options.(d)(i)Meaning of accountability and Mendelow.Briefing notes for board meeting.Prepared for Helen Duomo, chief executive.By Emily BaaWednesday 20 June, 2012.Accountability of the Hayho boardThe two letters received raise important issues of accountability, and specifically, the issue of to whom the board of Hayho is accountable. In reflecting on how to deal with this and how to frame our response, it may be helpful to consider the accountability situation we face as a board.Accountability is a k ey relationship between two or more parties. It implies that one party is accountable to, or answerable to, another. This means that the accountable entity can reasonably be called upon to explain his, her or its actions and policies.This means that the accountable party can be held to account and may be required to actually give an account. This has the potential to influence the behaviour of the accountable party, in this case Hayho, because of the knowledge that they will have to answer for it when they give that account.Whilst it is clear that the board is accountable to the shareholders as stewards of their investment, it may be the case, nevertheless, that the board may need to account to WB because of its influence among politicians and in wider society, as outlined below.Influence of Watching BusinessThe Mendelow framework is a way of mapping stakeholders with regard to the two variables of interest and power. The combination of these is a measure of any given stak eholder’s lik ely influence over an entity such as Hayho. The framework is dynamic in that stakeholders move around the map as their power and interest rise and fall with events.WB has a moderate degree of power and a variable degree of interest. Because its interest (in Hayho) has recently increased, its overall influence has risen. Our response to WB must be responsive to this.WB’s power derives from its ability to conduct research and mobilise opinion, including among policymakers and trade organisations, against businesses like Hayho. We do not need to agree with its agenda to appreciate its power. Its power is expressed as influence when its interest is also increased.It was news of our possible investment in Jayland that increased WB’s interest in Hayho. This, combined with its evident power, increases its net influence over Hayho. This makes WB difficult to ignore in our decision over whether to invest in Jayland or Pealand.(ii)Agency and demands from WBResponsibilities to shareholdersThe board of Hayho exists in an agency relationship with its shareholders, who collectively own the company and have the legal and moral right to determine objectives. As agents of our shareholders and appointed by them, we have a fiduciary duty to seek to manage the company’s resources for their overall economic benefit. In the case of Hayho, as with most business organisations, this involves maximising returns consistent with our complying with relevant laws, regulations and norms. Quark Investments, as one of our major shareholders, has every right to remind us of this duty and we should take its reminder very seriously.Lobby group demandsWhilst being well-meaning, the lobby group WB is against one of the investment options we have at this time. It claims that an investment in Jayland would be damaging to human rights in that country. Without commenting on the accuracy or validity of that claim, we should remind colleagues why we might think carefully about the investment, as it would bring us into conflict with WB.First, WB is respected and its views are trusted by many people. In terms of reputation, it has highlighted our problems in Arrland and, as a result of that, has been monitoring our activities. We may need to consider public opinion before going ahead with a potential Jayland investment as we need the general support of society to operate.Second, WB has influence among politicians and policymakers both in this country and abroad. We risk the censure of influential people and increase the pressure for increased regulation if we disregard or act against the lobby group’s demands. Our reputation in international markets is one of our strategic assets and it may compromise our commitment, given the Arrland incident, if we were not to uphold the highest standards of integrity, human rights and environmental protection from now on.Third, WB is very adept at mobilising public opinion through the media. This means that it can stimulate interest in conditions in Jayland and we would be likely to be heavily scrutinised on an ongoing basis were this investment to be made. This could attract public anger and risk disruptions, such as boycotts of our products.Because of these issues, it would seem prudent to consider these issues as a part of our investment appraisal between the Jayland and Pealand options.2(a)Independence and NEDs.Define independenceIndependence is a quality possessed by individuals and refers to the avoidance of being unduly influenced by a vested interest. This freedom enables a more objective position to be taken on issues compared to those who consider vested interests or other loyalties.Independence can be threatened by over-familiarity with the executive board, which is why many corporate governance codes have measures in place to prevent this. These include restrictions on share option schemes for NEDs, time-limited appointments and bans on cross-directorships. Other restrictions, depending on jurisdiction and code, include salaries being set at an appropriate level for NEDs, a compulsory number of years after retirement from a company before being eligible fora NED role (if ever), and no close personal relationships between executives and non-executives.Benefits of greater independenceIn the case of the independence of non-executive directors, Mr Louse is arguing that those with no previous contact with the other members of the board and who come from outside the industry that Zogs is in, will be more independent than those who may have some form of vested interest. In this he is only partly accurate: whilst succession to a NED role from an executive position in the same company is likely to threaten independence, appointments to NED positions from other companies within the same sector are quite common and still provide industry knowledge to a board.The first benefit of greater independence is that independent people brought in as NEDs are less likely to have prior vested interests in terms of material business relationships that might influence judgments or opinions. Such vested interests may involve friendships with other board members or past professional relationships. Past or current equity holdings in companies within the industry may encourage unhelpful loyalties (many CG codes restrict NEDs from holding shares or share options in companies they are on the boards of).Second, they are likely to have fewer prejudices for or against certain policies or individuals as working relationships will not have been built up over a number of years. Accordingly, they are likely to start from the ‘ground up’ in seeking clarifications and explanations for each area of discussion. Previous rivalries, alliances or embedded ideas would not frustrate discussions and this may allow for more objective discussions.Third, independent non-executive directors are more likely to challenge the established beliefs of less independent people (such as executive directors). This is a more effective way of scrutinising the work of board committees and of increasing their effectiveness. This has the advantage of challenging orthodoxy and bringing fresh perspectives to committee discussions.Disadvantages of greater independenceSome NEDs are appointed because of their connections with the existing board, either through prior industry involvement, prior executive membership or prior service on another board with one or more other directors. These are considered by Mr Louse to be less independent.There are, however, a number of advantages when NEDs have some familiarity with a company and board they are joining.A key non-executive role, including in board committees, is providing strategic advice. This can often arise from a thoroughknowledge of the strategic issues in a company or industry. Retired executive directors, like Mr Louse, sometimes serve as NEDs in the same company and are thus able to bring their experience of that industry and company to bear on committee discussions (although in some countries, there are time restrictions on executives becoming NEDs in the same company).Some level of prior connection is advantageous when some level of technical knowledge is required. Therefore, Mr Louse’s comments about independence depending upon NEDs’ needing to be from a different industry background or sector is not quite appropriate. When serving on an appointments committee, for example, knowledge of the industry and the technical aspects of a company’s operations will increase effectiveness. This might apply in electronics, chemicals, accounting services and financial services, for example. When serving on a risk committee in, for example, a bank, a technical knowledge of key risks specific to that particular industry can be very important.The contacts and personal network s that a NED with industry experience can bring may be of advantage, especially for informal discussions when serving on a nominations committee, for example.(b)Risk committee and criticise Mr Louse’s understanding.RolesThere are five general roles of a risk committee. The first is agreeing and approving the organisation’s risk management strategy, including strategies for strategic risks. This is likely to be drawn up in discussion with other parts of the organisation, including the main board.Second, the risk committee reviews reports on key risks prepared by departments on operational risks. These might be reports from operations (e.g. production), finance or technical departments on risks that specifically may affect them.Third, it monitors overall risk exposure and ensures it remains within the limits established by the main board. Exposure is generally defined as the totality of losses that could occur and the acceptable exposure will vary according to the risk strategy.Some organisations accept a higher exposure than others because of their varying risk appetites.Fourth, the risk committee assesses the effectiveness of risk management systems and policies. This is usually based on past data, where a risk has materialised, or ‘stress testing’ of systems where the risk has not yet materialised.Fifth, the risk committee approves and agrees any statements or disclosures made to internal or external audiences, such as risk reporting to analysts or in the annual report. Shareholders have the right to expect accurate and relevant reports on the risks in their investments, and so any reports issued outside the company need to be approved by the risk committee.Criticise Mr Louse’s understandingMr Louse has a weak understanding of the roles and purposes of a risk committee.First, ‘stopping risks affecting’ companies is not within the remit of a risk committee.Some risks affect everybody including businesses; others apply because of industry membership, geographical location, business activity, strategic positioning or business strategy. The role of a risk committee is to identify, review and construct a strategy for managing those risks.Second, he complained that the risk committee was ‘always asking for more information, which was inconvenient’. Gathering information is a crucial part of a risk committee’s role and it is in the company’s overall interest to ensure that information supplied to the risk committee is accurate, current and complete.Third, he misunderstands the nature of the committee’s role if he perceives it to be ‘gloomy and pessimistic’.This is an understandable but unfair criticism. Risks are, by their nature, things that might go wrong or potential liabilities, but the reason why risks need to be understood is to ensure the ongoing success and prosperity of Zogs Company, and that is a very positive thing.Finally, he wrongly believed that all material risks were external risks and so the risk committee should be looking outwards and not inwards. Risks can be internal or external to the company and many internal risks can be highly material such as financial risks, liquidity risks, operational risks, etc.(c)Risk monitoring more important in larger companies than in smaller companies?Small companies exist in different strategic environments to large companies and because of this, a number of differences apply when it comes to corporate governance systems. There are a number of compliance issues, for example, where large companies are required to comply with provisions that smaller companies are not. Some of the differences in regulation and shareholder expectations are driven by differences in the legal status of the organisation (e.g. whether incorporated, whether listed, where domiciled, etc).In the case of risk management systems in smaller companies, there will be a lower overall (aggregate) loss to shareholders than in a large company in the event of a major risk being realised. In larger companies, especially listed companies, a major event can affect markets around the world and this can affect the value of many funds including pension funds, etc. This is unlikely to be the case in any given smaller company.Many smaller companies, including SmallCo, are privately owned and they are therefore not subject to listing rules and, in some cases, other legal regulations. In many smaller companies, any loss of value when a risk is realised is a personal loss to owners and does not affect a high number of relatively ‘disconnected’ shareholders as would be the case in a large public company.Risk probability and impact is often correlated with size. Smaller companies have fewer risks because of their lower profiles, fewer stakeholders and less complex systems than larger organisations. Accordingly, the elaborate risk management systems are less necessary in smaller companies and could be a disproportionate use of funds. This is not to say that smaller companies do not face risks, of course, but that the impacts, say to shareholders or society, are less with a smaller rather than a larger company because of the totality of the losses incurred.The costs of risk monitoring and control may often outweigh the impacts of losses being incurred from risks, if not in a single financial period then maybe over a period of years. There are substantial set-up fixed costs in establishing some risk management systems and, in some cases, variable costs also (e.g. linked to production output). With fewer total risks, there could be less value for money in having risk controls.In summary, risk committees and risk mitigation systems are more important in larger companies than in smaller companies.However it is good practice for all companies, however small, to carry out some form of risk monitoring in order to remain competitive in their environment.3(a)Conflict of interest and discuss the consequences.Conflict of interestA conflict of interest occurs when a person’s freedom of choice or action is constrained by a countervailing interest, whichmeans that the most objectively correct course of action cannot be taken. The discretion to act correctly is fettered by the need to protect a related but contradictory interest. In the case of Jojo Auditors, Jack Hu experienced a conflict of interest between carrying out the agreed policy of dismissing all students assessed as ‘poor’ (such as Polly Shah) and his familiarity with the Shah family and his making a personal gain from the family in the form of free holidays.ConsequencesMr Hu acted against the best interests of the firm including his fellow partners. In his role as managing partner, he owes it to the other partners, and to the employees and clients of the firm, to act responsibly and always in the best interests of the firm. His conflict of interest prevented this from happening.In acting as he did, Mr Hu compromised the other committee members and made them compromise their own professional values. Both the training manager and the representative from human resources are engaged in order to maximise their benefit。

2010年ACCAP1-P3真题答案

2010年ACCA P1-P3真题答案Professional Level – Essentials Module, Paper P1 Professional Accountant December 2010 Answers 1 (a) (i) Institutional investor intervention Six reasons are typically cited as potential grounds for investor intervention. Whilst it would be rare to act on the basis of one factor (unless it was particularly unfavourable), an accumulation of factors may have such an effect. Furthermore, institutional investors have a moral duty to use their power to monitor the companies they invest in for the good of all investors, as recognised in most codes of corporate governance. Institutional investors have the expertise at their disposal to understand the complexities of managing large corporations. As such, they can take a slightly detached view of the business and offer advice where appropriate. The typical reasons for intervention are cited below.Concerns about strategy, especially when, in terms of long-term investor value, the strategy is likely to be excessively risky or, conversely, unambitious in terms of return on investment. The strategy determines the long-term value of an investment and so is very important to shareholders. Poor or deteriorating performance, usually over a period of time, although a severe deterioration over a shorter period might also trigger intervention, especially if the reasons for the poor performance have not been adequately explained in the company’s reporting.Poor non-executive performance. It is particularly concerning when non-executives do not, for whatever reason, balance the executive board and provide the input necessary to reassure markets. Their contributions should always be seen to be effective. This is especially important when investors feel that the executive board needs to be carefully monitored or constrained, perhaps because one or another of the factors mentioned in this answer has become an issue.Major internal control failures. These are a clear sign of the loss of control by senior management over the operation of the business. These might refer, for example, to health and safety, quality, budgetary control or IT projects. In the case of ZPT, there were clear issues over the control of IC systems for generating ﬁnancial reporting data.Compliance failures, especially with statutory regulations or corporate governance codes. Legal non-compliance is always a serious matter and under comply-or-explain, all matters of code non-compliance must also be explained. Such explanations may or may not be acceptable to shareholders.Excessive directors’ remuneration or defective remuneration policy. Often an indicator of executive greed, excessive board salaries are also likely to be an indicator of an ineffective remunerations committee which is usually a non-executive issue. Whilst the absolute monetary value of executive rewards are important, it is usually more important to ensure that they are highly aligned withshareholder interests (to minimise agency costs).Poor CSR or ethical performance, or lack of social responsibility. Showing a lack of CSR can be important in terms of the company’s long-term reputation and also its vulnerability to certain social and environmental risks.[Tutorial note: the study texts approach this slightly differently.](ii) Case for interventionAfter the ﬁrst restatement, it was evident that three of the reasons for interventions were already present. Whilst one of these perhaps need not have triggered an intervention alone, the number of factors makes a strong case for an urgent meeting between the major investors and the ZPT board, especially Mr Xu.Poor performance. The restated results were ‘all signiﬁcantly below market expectations’. Whilst this need not in itself have triggered an institutional investor intervention, the fact that the real results were only made public after an initial results announcement is unfortunate. The obvious question to ask the ZPT board is why the initial results were mis-stated and why they had to be corrected as this points to a complete lack of controls within the business. A set of results well below market expectations always needs to be explained to shareholders.Internal control and potential compliance failures. There is ample evidence to suggest that internal controls in ZPT were very deﬁcient, especially (and crucially) those internal controls over external ﬁnancial reporting. The case mentions, ‘no effective management oversight of the external reporting process and a disregard of the relevant accounting standards’, both of which are very serious allegations. Linked to this, the investors need an urgent clariﬁcation of the legal allegations of fraud, especially in the light of the downward restatement of the results. Any suggestion of compliance failure is concerning but fraud (down to intent rather than incompetence) is always serious as far as investors are concerned.Excessive remuneration in the form of the $20 million bonus. It is likely that this bonus was excessive even had the initial results been accurate, but after the restatement, the scale of the bonus was evidently indefensible as it was based on false ﬁgures. The fact that the chief executive is refusing to repay the bonus implies a lack of integrity, adding weight to the belief that there may be some underlying dishonesty. Furthermore, although the investors thought it excessive, the case describes this as within the terms of Mr Xu’s contract. A closer scrutiny of remunerations policy (and therefore non-executive effectiveness) would be appropriate. (b) Absolutist and relativist perspectives Absolutism and relativismAn absolutist ethical stance is when it is assumed that there is an unchanging set of ethical principles which should always be obeyed regardless of the situation or any other pressures orfactors that may be present. Typically described in universalist ways, absolutist ethics tends to be expressed in terms such as ‘it is always right to . . . ’, ‘it is never right to . . . ’or ‘it is always wrong to ... ’Relativist ethical assumptions are those that assume that real ethical situations are more complicated than absolutists allow for. It is the view that there are a variety of acceptable ethical beliefs and practices and that the right and most appropriate belief depends on the situation. The best outcome is arrived at by examining the situation and making ethical assessments based on the best outcomes in that situation.Evaluation of Shazia Lo’s behaviour – absolutist ethicsFirstly, Shazia Lo was correct to be concerned about the over-valuation of contracts at ZPT. As a qualiﬁed accountant, she should never be complicit in the knowing mis-statement of accounts or the misrepresentation of contract values. For a qualiﬁed accountant bound by very high ethical and professional standards, she was right to be absolutist in her instincts even if not in her eventual behaviour.Secondly, she was also right to raise the issue with the ﬁnance director. This was her only legitimate course of action in the ﬁrst instance and it would have been wrong, in an absolutist sense, to remain silent. Given that she was intimidated and threatened upon raising the issue, she was being absolutist in threatening to take the issue to the press (i.e. whistleblowing). It would be incompatible with her status as a professional accountant to be complicit in false accounting as she owed it to the ZPT shareholders, to her professional body and to the general public (the public interest) never to process accounting data she knows to be inaccurate. An effective internal audit process would be a source of information for this action.Evaluation of Shazia Lo’s behaviour – relativist ethicsIt is clear from Shazia Lo’s behaviour that despite having absolutist instincts, other factors caused her to assume a relativist ethic in practice.Her mother’s serious illness was evidently the major factor in overriding her absolutist principles with regard to complicity in the fraudulent accounting ﬁgures. It is likely she weighed her mother’s painful suffering against the need to be absolutist with regard to the mis-statement of contract values. In relativist situations, it is usually the case that one ‘good’ is weighed against another ‘good’. Clearly it is good (an absolute) to show compassion and sympathy toward her mother but this should not have caused her to accept the payment (effectively a bribe to keep silent). She may have reasoned that the continued suffering of her mother was a worse ethical outcome than the mis-statement of ZPT accounts and the fact that she received no personal income from the money (it all went to support her mother) would suggest that she acted with reasonablemotives even though her decision as a professional accountant was deﬁnitely inappropriate. Given that accepting bribes is a clear breach of professional codes of ethics for accountants and other professionals, there is no legitimate defence of her decision and her behaviour was therefore wrong.(c) (i) Speech on importance of good corporate governance and consequences of failure Introduction Ladies and Gentlemen, I begin my remarks today by noting that we meet at an unfortunate time for business in this country. In the wake of the catastrophic collapse of ZPT, one of the largest telecommunications companies, we have also had to suffer the loss of one of our larger audit ﬁrms, JJC. This series of events has heightened in all of us an awareness of the vulnerability of business organisations to management incompetence and corruption.The consequences of corporate governance failures at ZPT.I would therefore like to remind you all why corporate governance is important and I will do this by referring to the failures in this unfortunate case. Corporate governance failures affect many groups and individuals and as legislators, we owe it to all of them to ensure that the highest standards of corporate governance are observed.Firstly and probably most obviously, effective corporate governance protects the value of shareholders’ investment in a company. We should not forget that the majority of shareholders are not ‘fat cats’ who may be able to afford large losses. Rather, they are individual pension fund members, small investors and members of mutual funds. The hard-working voters who save for the future have their efforts undermined by selﬁsh and arrogant executives who deplete the value of those investments. This unfairness is allowed to happen because of a lack of regulation of corporate governance in this country.The second group of people to lose out after the collapse of ZPT were the employees. It is no fault of theirs that their directors were so misguided and yet it is they who bear a great deal of the cost. I should stress, of course, that jobs were lost at JJC as well as at ZPT. Unemployment, even when temporary and frictional, is a personal misery for the families affected and it can also increase costs to the taxpayer when state beneﬁts are considered.Thirdly, because of the collapse of ZPT, creditors have gone unpaid and customers have remained unserviced. Again, we should not assume that suppliers can afford to lose their receivables in ZPT and for many smaller suppliers, their exposure to ZPT could well threaten their own survival. Where the value of net assets is inadequate to repay the full value of payables, let alone share capital, there has been a failure in company direction and in corporate governance so I hope you will agree with me that effective management and sound corporate governance are vital.The loss of two such important businesses, ZPT and JJC, has caused great disturbance in thetelecommunications and audit industries. As JJC lost its legitimacy to provide audit services and its clients moved to other auditors, the structure of the industry changed. Other auditors will eventually be able to absorb the work previously undertaken by JJC but clearly this will cause short-to-medium term capacity issues for those ﬁrms as they redeploy resources to make good on those new contracts. This was, I should remind you, both unnecessary and entirely avoidable. Linked to this point, I would remind colleagues that it is important for business in general and auditing in particular to be respected in society. The loss of auditors’ reputation caused by these events is very unfortunate as auditing underpins our collective conﬁdence in business reporting. It would be wholly inappropriate for other auditors to be affected by the behaviour of JJC or for businesses in general to be less trusted because of the events at ZPT. I very much hope that such losses of reputation and in public conﬁdence will not occur.Finally, we have all been dismayed by the case of Shazia Lo that was reported in the press. A lack of sound corporate governance practice places employees such as Ms Lo in impossible positions. Were she to act as whistleblower she would, by all accounts, have been victimised by her employers. Her acceptance of what was effectively a bribe to remain silent brings shame both on Ms Lo and on those who offered the money. An effective audit committee at ZPT would have offered a potential outlet for Ms Lo’s concerns and also provided a means of reviewing external audit and other professional services at ZPT. This whole situation could, and would have been, avoided had the directors of ZPT managed the company under an effective framework of corporate governance. (ii) The case for the mandatory external reporting of internal controls and risksI now turn to the issue of the mandatory external reporting of internal controls and risks. My reason for raising this as an issue is because this was one of the key causes of ZPT’s failure. My ﬁrst point in this regard is that disclosure allows for accountability. Had investors been aware of the internal control failures and business probity risks earlier, it may have been possible to replace the existing board before events deteriorated to the extent that they sadly did. In addition, however, the need to generate a report on internal controls annually will bring very welcome increased scrutiny from shareholders and others. It is only when things are made more transparent that effective scrutiny is possible.Secondly, I am ﬁrmly of the belief that more information on internal controls would enhance shareholder conﬁdence and satisfaction. It is vital that investors have conﬁdence in the internal controls of companies they invest in and increased knowledge will encourage this. It was, I would remind you, a lack of conﬁdence in ZPT’s internal controls and the strong suspicion of fraud that caused the share price to collapse and the company to ultimately fail.Furthermore, compulsory external reporting on internal controls will encourage good practice insidethe company. The knowledge that their work will be externally reported upon and scrutinised by investors will encourage greater rigour in the IC function and in the audit committee. This will further increase investor conﬁdence.To those who might suggest that we should opt for a comply-or-explain approach to this issue, I would argue that this is simply too important an issue to allow companies to decide for themselves or to interpret non-mandatory guidelines. It must be legislated for because otherwise those with poor internal controls will be able to avoid reporting on them. By specifying what should be disclosed on an annual basis, companies will need to make the audit of internal controls an integral and ongoing part of their operations. It is to the contents of an internal control report that I now turn.(iii) Content of external report on internal controlsI am unable, in a speech such as this, to go into the detail of what I would like to see in an external report on internal controls, but in common with corporate governance codes elsewhere, there are four broad themes that such a report should contain.Firstly, the report should contain a statement of acknowledgement by the board that it is responsible for the company’s system of internal control and for reviewing its effectiveness. This might seem obvious but it has been shown to be an important starting point in recognising responsibility. It is only when the board accepts and acknowledges this responsibility that the impetus for the collection of data and the authority for changing internal systems is provided. The ‘tone from the top’ is very important in the development of my proposed reporting changes and so this is a very necessary component of the report.Secondly, the report should summarise the processes the board (or where applicable, through its committees) has applied in reviewing the effectiveness of the system of internal control. These may or may not satisfy shareholders, of course, and weak systems and processes would be a matter of discussion at AGMs for non-executives to strengthen.Thirdly, the report should provide meaningful, high level information that does not give a misleading impression. Clearly, internal auditing would greatly increase the reliability of this information but a robust and effective audit committee would also be very helpful.Finally, the report should contain information about any weaknesses in internal control that have resulted in error or material losses. This would have been a highly material disclosure in the case of ZPT and the costs of non-disclosure of this was a major cause of the eventual collapse of the companyI very much hope that these brief remarks have been helpful in persuading colleagues to consider the need for increased corporate governance legislation. Thank you for listening. [Tutorial note:ull speech not required to gain full professional marks as the question asks for ‘sections’ of the speech.] 2.(a) Jocatt Group Statement of Cash flows for the year ended 30 November 2010 Therefore goodwill is impaired by $68m plus $11·5m minus $48m i.e. $31·5m(ii) Purchase of subsidiary The purchase of the subsidiary is adjusted for in the statement of cash flows by eliminating the assets acquired, as they were not included in the opening balances. The effect of the purchase is as follows:The receipt from the rights issue is a cash inflow into the group and should be shown as a financing activity. Therefore the dividend paid will be $13 million and the cash from the rights issues will be $2 million. (vi) PPEOpening balance at 1 December 2009 254 Revaluation loss (7) Plant in exchange transaction 4 Sale of land (10) Depreciation (27) On acquisition of Tigret 15 Current year additions (cash) 98–––– Closing balance at 30 November 2010 327 ––––The profit on the sale of the land is $15m plus $4 million minus carrying value $10 million i.e. $9 million (vii) Defined benefit schemeOpening balance at 1 December 2009 22 Current service costs 10 Past service costs ($6m/3) 2 Expected return on assets (8) –––Charge to income statement 4Actuarial losses 6Contributions paid (7)––– Closing balance at 30 November 2010 25 –––(viii) Investment propertyOpening balance at 1 December 2009 6 Acquisition 1 Disposal (0·5) Gain 1·5–––– Closing balance at 30 November 2010 8 ––––(ix) Intangible assetsOpening balance at 1 December 2009 72 Acquisitions (8 + 4) 12 Tigret 18 Amortisation (17)––– Closing balance at 30 November 2010 85 –––(x) Available for sale financial assets Opening balance at 1 December 2009 90 Acquisitions (cash) 5 Tigret (4) Gain (including tax) 3––– Closing balance at 30 November 2010 94 –––(xi) Share capitalOpening balance at 1 December 2009 275 Acquisition of Tigret 15–––– Closing balance at 30 November 2010 290 ––––(b)(i) The vast majority of companies use the indirect method for the preparation of statements of cash flow. Most companies justify this on the grounds that the direct method is too costly.The direct method presents separate categories of cash inflows and outflows whereas the indirect method is essentially a reconciliation of the net income reported in the statement of financial position with the cash flow from operations. The adjustments include non-cash items in the statement of comprehensive income plus operating cash flows that were not included in profit or loss. The direct method shows net cash from operations made up from individual operating cash flows. Users often prefer the direct method because it shows the major categories of cash flows. The complicated adjustments required by the indirect method are difficult to understand and provide entities with more leeway for manipulation of cash flows. The adjustments made to reconcile net profit before tax to cash from operations are confusing to users. In many cases these cannot be reconciled to observed changes in the statement of financial position. Thus users will only be able to understand the size of the difference between net profit before tax and cash from operations. The direct method allows for reporting operating cash flows by understandable categories as they can see the amount of cash collected from customers, cash paid to suppliers,(iv) interchange of managerial personnel; or(v) provision of essential technical information.The shareholders’ agreement allows Greenie to participate in some decisions. It needs to be determined whether these include financial and operating policy decisions of Manair, although this is very likely. The representation on the board of directors combined with the additional rights Greenie had under the shareholders’ agreement, give Greenie the power to participate in some policy decisions. Additionally, Greenie had sent a team of management experts to give business advice to the board of Manair.In addition, there is evidence of material transactions between the investor and the investee and indications that Greenie provided Manair with maintenance and technical services. Both these facts are examples of how significant influence might be evidenced.Based on an assessment of all the facts, it appears that Greenie has significant influence over Manair and that Manair should be considered an associate and accounted for using the equity method of accounting.Finally as it is likely that Manair is an associated undertaking of Greenie the transactions themselves would be deemed related party transactions. Greenie would need to disclose within its own financial statements the relationship, an outline of the transactions including their total value, outstanding balances including any debts deemed irrecoverable or doubtful (IAS 24 para17).(c) The franchise right should be recognised using the principles in IFRS 2 ‘Share based payment’. The asset should be recognised at the fair value of the rights acquired and the existence of exchangetransactions and prices for similar franchise rights means that a fair value can be established. The franchise right should therefore be recorded at $2·3 million. If the fair value had not been reliably measurable then the franchise right would have been recorded at the fair value of the equity instruments issued i.e. $2·5 million.Normally irredeemable preference shares would be classified as equity. The contractual obligation to pay the fixed cash dividend creates a liability component and the right to participate in ordinary dividends creates an equity component. If Greenie were to comply with IAS 32 ‘Financial instruments: Presentation’, it would require the preference shares to be treated as compound financial instruments with both an equity and liability component. The value of the equity component is the residual amount after deducting the separately determined liability component from the fair value of the instrument as a whole.Under IAS 32, it would seem that substantially all of the carrying value of Greenie’s preference shares would be allocated to the liability component because of the dividend elements and the fixed net cash dividend would be treated as a finance cost.IAS 1 ‘Presentation of financial statements’ requires departure from a requirement of a standard only in the extremely rare circumstances where management conclude that compliance would be so misleading that it would conflict with the objective of financial statements set out in the Framework. Greenie’s argument that the presentation of the preference shares in accordance with IAS 32 would be misleading, is not acceptable.The fact that it would not reflect the nature of the instruments as having characteristics of permanent capital providing participation in future profits is not a valid argument. IAS 1 requires additional disclosures when compliance with the specific requirements in IFRS is insufficient to enable a user to understand the impact of particular transactions or conditions on financial position and financial performance. A fair presentation would be achieved by complying with IAS 32 and providing additional disclosures to explain the characteristics of the preference shares.Professional Level – Essentials Module, Paper P3 Business Analysis December 2010 Answers3.(a)ShoalFish A PESTEL analysis of ShoalFish would focus on the fact that it is ﬁshing in an area where ﬁsh stocks are rapidly declining (environmental) and it is increasingly exposed to government intervention and restrictions (political). It is a relatively small player (12% market share) in a large, but declining market place (5% over two years). Proﬁ ts are declining, although ShoalFish appear to have arrested the decline in the proﬁ t margin. The 2009 gross proﬁ t margin (4·9%) shows an increase over the 2008 ﬁure (4·7%). This may mean that the company has been able to bring operating costs in line with the declining turnover.In terms of the Boston Box, it has the characteristics of a dog, a company with a small market share in a declining market. However, Shoal plc perceives that there are important synergies between ShoalFish and the other companies in the Shoal plc portfolio. For example, it helps secure a signi ﬁant proportion of the raw materials required by ShoalPro. ShoalPro is also ShoalFish’s main customer, accounting for 40% of the company’s catch. ShoalFish also has an intended role following the purchase of the Captain Haddock group of restaurants. Shoal plc would like ShoalFish to directly supply the Captain Haddock restaurants and so potentially reduce raw material costs at Captain Haddock.Shoal plc needs to look carefully at the viability of maintaining this ﬂet. They are operating in an area where owner-skippers are very common (almost half of the boats in the western oceans are owned and operated by the boat’s captain). There may be an opportunity for ShoalFish to sell, lease or rent their ships, perhaps to individual owners, with the promise of guaranteed sales to ShoalPro (and potentially Captain Haddock). Alternatively, they could tolerate declining performance from this part of the portfolio, in the knowledge that it forms an important part of the supply chain for other companies in the portfolio.ShoalProShoalPro is a proﬁable and expanding organisation. A signiﬁant percentage of its raw ﬁh supply is currently provided by ShoalFish, but this percentage is declining as it increasingly processes ﬁh for other companies. It is in a mature, but still expanding (+2% from 2007 to 2009) market-place where it holds a signiﬁant (40%) and slightly increasing market share. Gross proﬁ margins are improving slightly (from 10% in 2007 to 10·6% in 2009), suggesting that costs are increasing at a slower rate than revenues.Its consistent proﬁability would classify this business, using Boston Box terminology, as a cash cow. A company with a signiﬁant market share in a low growth market.A PESTEL analysis would focus on the fact that ShoalPro factories are in a region which attracts national grants due to high local unemployment (political and economic). This reduces operating costs and the persistence of high unemployment suggests that a local skilled workforce is still accessible to ShoalPro (socio-cultural). Analysis suggests that ShoalPro is an important part of the Shoal plc portfolio and should be retained and maintained.ShoalFarmShoalFarm is a relatively new acquisition. It currently has a relatively low market share (10%) in an expanding market-place. ShoalFarm is itself growing (+12% from 2007 to 2009), but not as fast as its market (+20% in the same period). A PESTEL analysis would reveal a market-place that is perceived as ethically acceptable, stressing the conservation of ﬁh supplies (socio-cultural).。

2008年ACCA P1-P3真题答案

2008年ACCA P1-P3真题答案Professional Level – Essentials Module, Paper P1 Professional Accountant December 2008 Answers 1 (a) Tucker’s frameworkIs the decision:Profitable? For SHC, the answer to this question is yes. Profits would potentially be substantially increased by the loss of all of its competitors and the emergence of SHC, in the short to medium term at least, as a near monopolist.Legal? The secrecy option poses no legal problems as it is a part of normal competitive behaviour in industries. In some jurisdictions, legislation forbids monopolies existing in some industries but there is no indication from the case that this restriction applies to Swan Hill Company. Fair? The fairness of the secrecy option is a moral judgment. It is probably fair when judged from the perspective of SHC’s shareholders but the question is the extent to which it is fair to the employees and shareholders of SHC’s competitors.Right? Again, a question of ethical perspective. Is it right to pursue the subjugation of competitors and the domination of an industry regardless of the consequences to competitors? The secrecy option may be of the most benefit to the local community of Swan Hill that the company has traditionally valued.Sustainable or environmentally sound? The case says that the sink method emits at a lower rate per unit of output than the existing process but this has little to do with the secrecy option as the rates of emissions would apply if SHC licensed the process. This is also an argument for the licensing option, however, as environmental emissions would be lower if other competitors switched to the sink method as well. There may be environmental implications in decommissioning the old plant to make way for the new sink method investment.(b) Strategic and operational risksStrategic risks These arise from the overall strategic positioning of the company in its environment. Some strategic positions give rise to greater risk exposures than others. Because strategic issues typically affect the whole of an organisation and not just one or more of its parts, strategic risks can potentially concern very high stakes – they can have very high hazards and high returns. Because of this, they are managed at board level in an organisation and form a key part of strategic management.Operational risks Operational risks refer to potential losses arising from the normal business operations. Accordingly, they affect the day-to-day running of operations and business systems in contrast to strategic risks that arise from the organisation’s strategic positioning. Operationalrisks are managed at risk management level (not necessarily board level) and can be managed and mitigated by internal control systems.The secrecy option would be a strategic risk for the following reasons.It would radically change the environment that SHC is in by reducing competition. This would radically change SHC’s strategic fit with its competitive environment. In particular, it would change its ‘five forces’ positioning which would change its risk profile.It would involve the largest investment programme in the company’s history with new debt substantially changing the company’s financial structure and making it more vulnerable to short term liquidity problems and monetary pressure (interest rates).It would change the way that stakeholders view SHC, for better or worse. It is a ‘crisis issue’, certain to polarise opinion either way.It will change the economics of the industry thereby radically affecting future cost, revenue and profit forecasts.There may be retaliatory behaviour by SHC’s close competitor on 25% of the market.[Tutorial note: similar reasons if relevant and well argued will attract marks](c) (i) For the secrecy optionImportant developments at SHC This is an exciting time for the management and shareholders of Swan Hill Company. The research and development staff at SHC have made a groundbreaking discovery (called the ‘sink method’) that will enable your company to produce its major product at lower cost, in higher volumes and at a much higher quality than our competitors will be able to using, as they do, the existing production technology. The sink process also produces at a lower rate of environmental emissions which, as I’m sure shareholders will agree, is a very welcome development. When considering the options following the discovery, your board decided that we should press ahead with the investment needed to transform the production facilities without offering the use of the technology to competitors under a licensing arrangement. This means that once the new sink production comes on stream, SHC shareholders can, your board believes, look forward to a significant strengthening of our competitive position.The business case for this option is overwhelming. By pushing ahead with the investment needed to implement the sink method, the possibility exists to gain a substantial competitive advantage over all of SHC’s competitors. It will place SHC in a near monopolist position in the short term and in a dominant position long term. This will, in turn, give the company pricing power in the industry and the likelihood of superior profits for many years to come. We would expect SHC to experience substantial ‘overnight’ growth and the returns from this will reward shareholders’loyalty and significantly increase the value of the company. Existing shareholders can reasonablyexpect a significant increase in the value of their holdings over the very short term and also over the longer term.Ethical implications of the secrecy option In addition to the overwhelming business case, however, there is a strong ethical case for the secrecy option. SHC recognises that it is the moral purpose of SHC to make profits in order to reward those who have risked their own money to support it over many years. Whilst some companies pursue costly programmes intended to serve multiple stakeholder interests, SHC recognises that it is required to comply with the demands of its legal owners, its shareholders, and not to dilute those demands with other concerns that will reduce shareholder returns. This is an important part of the agency relationship: the SHC board will always serve the best economic interests of its shareholders: its legal owners. The SHC board believes that any action taken that renders shareholder returns suboptimal is a threat to shareholder value and an abuse of the agency position. Your board will always seek to maximise shareholder wealth; hence our decision to pursue the secrecy option in this case. The secrecy option offers the possibility of optimal shareholder value and because shareholders invest in SHC to maximise returns, that is the only ethical action for the board to pursue. Happily, this option will also protect the employees’ welfare in SHC’s hometown of Swan Hill and demonstrate its commitment to the locality. This, in turn, will help to manage two of the key value-adding resources in the company, its employees and its reputation. This will help in local recruitment and staff retention in future years.(ii) For the licensing optionImportant developments at SHC Your board was recently faced with a very difficult business and ethical decision. After the discovery by SHC scientists of the groundbreaking sink production method, we had a choice of keeping the new production technology secret or sharing the breakthrough under a licensing arrangement with our competitors. After a lengthy discussion, your board decided that we should pursue the licensing option and I would like to explain our reasons for this on both business and ethical grounds.In terms of the business case for licensing, I would like shareholders to understand that although the secrecy option may have offered SHC the possibility of an unassailable competitive advantage, in reality, it would have incurred a number of risks. Because of the speed with which we would have needed to have acted, it would have necessitated a large increase in our borrowing, bringing about a substantial change in our financial structure. This would, in turn, increase liquidity pressures and make us more vulnerable to rising interest rates. A second risk with the secrecy option would involve the security of the sink technology ‘secret’. If the sink process was leaked or discovered by competitors and subsequently copied, our lack of a legally binding patent wouldmean we would have no legal way to stop them proceeding with their own version of the sink process. As well as avoiding the risks, however, the licensing option offers a number of specific business advantages. The royalties from the licences granted to competitors are expected to be very large indeed. These will be used over the coming years to extend our existing competitive advantage in the future. Finally, the ‘improvement sharing’ clause in the licensing contract will ensure that the sink process will be improved and perfected with several manufacturers using the technology at the same time. SHC’s sink production may, in consequence, improve at a faster rate than would have been the case were we to have pursued the secrecy option.Ethical implications of the licensing option In addition to the business case, there is also a powerful ethical case for the decision we have taken. As a good, responsible corporate citizen, Swan Hill Company acknowledges its many stakeholders and recognises the impacts that a business decision has on others. Your board recognises that in addition to external stakeholders having influence over our operations, our decisions can also affect others. In this case, we have carefully considered the likelihood that keeping the new technology a secret from our competitors would radically reshape the industry. The superior environmental performance of the sink process over existing methods will also mean that when fully adopted, the environmental emissions of the entire industry will be reduced. SHC is very proud of this contribution to this reduction in overall environmental impact.There seems little doubt that the secrecy option would have had far-reaching and unfortunate effects upon our industry and our competitors. The licensing option will allow competitors, and their employees and shareholders, to survive. It is a compassionate act on our part and shows mercy to the other competitors in the industry. It recognises the number of impacts that a business decision has and would be the fairest (and most just) option given the number of people affected.(d) (i) Mandatory and voluntary disclosuresMandatory disclosures These are components of the annual report mandated by law, regulation or accounting standard.Examples include (in most jurisdictions) statement of comprehensive income (income or profit and loss statement), statement of financial position (balance sheet), cash flow statement, statement of changes in equity, operating segmental information, auditors’ report, corporate governance disclosure such as remuneration report and some items in the directors’ report (e.g. summary of operating position). In the UK, the business review is compulsory.Voluntary disclosures These are components of the annual report not mandated in law or regulation but disclosed nevertheless. They are typically mainly narrative rather than numerical in nature. Examples include (in most jurisdictions) risk information, operating review, social andenvironmental information, and the chief executive’s review.(ii) Accountability to equity investorsVoluntary disclosures are an effective way of redressing the information asymmetry that exists between management and investors. In adding to mandatory content, voluntary disclosures give a fuller picture of the state of the company.More information helps investors decide whether the company matches their risk, strategic and ethical criteria, and expectations.Makes the annual report more forward looking (predictive) whereas the majority of the numerical content is backward facing on what has been.Helps transparency in communicating more fully thereby better meeting the agency accountability to investors, particularly shareholders.There is a considerable amount of qualitative information that cannot be conveyed using statutory numbers (such as strategy, ethical content, social reporting, etc).Voluntary disclosure gives a more rounded and more complete view of the company, its activities, strategies, purposes and values.Voluntary disclosure enables the company to address specific shareholder concerns as they arise (such as responding to negative publicity).[Tutorial note: other valid points will attract marks]2 (a) Typical roles of a risk management committeeThe typical roles of a risk management committee are as follows:To agree and approve the risk management strategy and policies. The design of risk policy will take into account the environment, the strategic posture towards risk, the product type and a range of other relevant factors.Receiving and reviewing risk reports from affected departments. Some departments will file regular reports on key risks (such as liquidity assessments from the accounting department, legal risks from the company secretariat or product risks from the sales manager).Monitoring overall exposure and specific risks. If the risk policy places limits on the total risk exposure for a given risk then this role ensures that limits are adhered to. In the case of certain strategic risks, monitoring could occur on a very frequent basis whereas for more operational risks, monitoring will more typically occur to coincide with risk management committee meetings.Assessing the effectiveness of risk management systems. This involves getting feedback from departments and the internal audit function on the workings of current management and risk mitigationsystems.Providing general and explicit guidance to the main board on emerging risks and to report on existing risks. This will involve preparing reports on apparent risks and assessing their probability of being realised and their potential impact if they do.To work with the audit committee on designing and monitoring internal controls for the management and mitigation of risks. If the risk committee is part of the executive structure, it will likely have an advisory role in respect of its input into the audit committee. If it is non-executive, its input may be more directly influential.[Tutorial note: other roles may be suggested that, if relevant, will be rewarded](b) Risk management strategies and Chen ProductsRisk transference strategy This would involve the company accepting a portion of the risk and seeking to transfer a part to a third party. Although an unlikely possibility given the state of existing claims, insurance against future claims would serve to limit Chen’s potential losses and place a limit on its losses. Outsourcing manufacture may be a way of transferring risk if the ourtsourcee can be persuaded to accept some of the product liability.Risk avoidance strategy An avoidance strategy involves discontinuing the activity that is exposing the company to risk. In the case of Chen this would involve ceasing production of Product 2. This would be pursued if the impact (hazard) and probability of incurring an acceptable level of liability were both considered to be unacceptably high and there were no options for transference or reduction. Risk reduction strategy A risk reduction strategy involves seeking to retain a component of the risk (in order to enjoy the return assumed to be associated with that risk) but to reduce it and thereby limit its ability to create liability. Chen produces four products and it could reconfigure its production capacity to produce proportionately more of Products 1, 3 and 4 and proportionately less of Product 2. This would reduce Product 2 in the overall portfolio and therefore Chen’s exposure to its risks. This would need to be associated with instructions to other departments (e.g. sales and marketing) to similarly reconfigure activities to sell more of the other products and less of Product 2.Risk acceptance strategy A risk acceptance strategy involves taking limited or no action to reduce the exposure to risk and would be taken if the returns expected from bearing the risk were expected to be greater than the potential liabilities. The case mentions that Product 2 is highly profitable and it may be that the returns attainable by maintaining and even increasing Product 2’s sales are worth the liabilities incurred by compensation claims. This is a risk acceptance strategy.(c) Risk committee members can be either executive on non-executive.(i) Distinguish between executive and non-executive directorsExecutive directors are full time members of staff, have management positions in the organisation, are part of the executive structure and typically have industry or activity-relevant knowledge or expertise, which is the basis of their value to the organisation.Non-executive directors are engaged part time by the organisation, bring relevant independent, external input and scrutiny to the board, and typically occupy positions in the committee structure. (ii) Advantages and disadvantages of being non-executive rather than executiveThe UK Combined Code, for example, allows for risk committees to be made up of either executive or non-executive members.Advantages of non-executive membershipSeparation and detachment from the content being discussed is more likely to bring independent scrutiny.Sensitive issues relating to one or more areas of executive oversight can be aired without vested interests being present.Non-executive directors often bring specific expertise that will be more relevant to a risk problem than more operationally-minded executive directors will have.Chen’s four members, being from different backgrounds, are likely to bring a range of perspectives and suggested strategies which may enrich the options open to the committee when considering specific risks.Disadvantages of non-executive membership (advantages of executive membership) Direct input and relevant information would be available from executives working directly with the products, systems and procedures being discussed if they were on the committee. Non-executives are less likely to have specialist knowledge of products, systems and procedures being discussed and will therefore be less likely to be able to comment intelligently during meetings.The membership, of four people, none of whom ‘had direct experience of Chen’s industry or products’could produce decisions taken without relevant information that an executive member could provide. Non-executive directors will need to report their findings to the executive board. This reporting stage slows down the process, thus requiring more time before actions can be implemented, and introducing the possibility of some misunderstanding.3 (a) (i) FIVE general objectives of internal controlAn internal control system comprises the whole network of systems established in an organisation to provide reasonable assurance that organisational objectives will be achieved. Specifically, the general objectives of internal control are as follows:To ensure the orderly and efficient conduct of business in respect of systems being in place andfully implemented. Controls mean that business processes and transactions take place without disruption with less risk or disturbance and this, in turn, adds value and creates shareholder value.To safeguard the assets of the business. Assets include tangibles and intangibles, and controls are necessary to ensure they are optimally utilised and protected from misuse, fraud, misappropriation or theft.To prevent and detect fraud. Controls are necessary to show up any operational or financial disagreements that might be the result of theft or fraud. This might include off-balance sheet financing or the use of unauthorised accounting policies, inventory controls, use of company property and similar.To ensure the completeness and accuracy of accounting records. Ensuring that all accounting transactions are fully and accurately recorded, that assets and liabilities are correctly identified and valued, and that all costs and revenues can be fully accounted for.To ensure the timely preparation of financial information which applies to statutory reporting (of year end accounts, for example) and also management accounts, if appropriate, for the facilitation of effective management decision-making.[Tutorial note: candidates may address these general objectives using different wordings based on analyses of different study manuals. Allow latitude]Contents of a corporate code of ethicsThe typical contents of a corporate code of ethics are as follows:Values of the company. This might include notes on the strategic purpose of the organisation and any underlying beliefs, values, assumptions or principles. Values may be expressed in terms of social and environmental perspectives, and expressions of intent regarding compliance with best practice, etc.Shareholders and suppliers of finance. In particular, how the company views the importance of sources of finances, how it intends to communicate with them and any indications of how they will be treated in terms of transparency, truthfulness and honesty.Employees. Policies towards employees, which might include equal opportunities policies, training and development, recruitment, retention and removal of staff. In the case of HPC, the policy on child labour will be covered by this part of the code of ethics.Customers. How the company intends to treat its customers, typically in terms of policy of customer satisfaction, product mix, product quality, product information and complaints procedure. Supply chain/suppliers. This is becoming an increasingly important part of ethical behaviour as stakeholders scrutinise where and how companies source their products (e.g. farming practice,GM foods, fair trade issues, etc). Ethical policy on supply chain might include undertakings to buy from certain approved suppliers only, to buy only above a certain level of quality, to engage constructively with suppliers (e.g. for product development purposes) or not to buy from suppliers who do not meet with their own ethical standards.Community and wider society. This section concerns the manner in which the company aims to relate to a range of stakeholders with whom it does not have a direct economic relationship (e.g. neighbours, opinion formers, pressure groups, etc). It might include undertakings on consultation, ‘listening’, seeking consent, partnership arrangements (e.g. in community relationships with local schools) and similar.[Tutorial note: up to six points to be identified and described but similar valid general contents are acceptable](b) Code of ethics and strategic positioningStrategic positioning is about the way that a whole company is placed in its environment as opposed to the operational level, which considers the individual parts of the organisation.Ethical reputation and practice can be a key part of environmental ‘fit’, along with other strategic issues such as generic strategy, quality and product range.The ‘fit’ enables the company to more fully meet the expectations, needs and demands of its relevant stakeholders – in this case, European customers.The ‘quality’ of the strategic ‘fit’ is one of the major determinants of business performance and so is vital to the success of the business.HPC has carefully manoeuvred itself to have the strategic position of being the highest ethical performer locally and has won orders on that basis.It sees its strategic position as being the ethical ‘benchmark’ in its industry locally and protects this position against its parent company seeking to impose a new code of ethics.The ethical principles are highly internalised in Mr Hogg and in the company generally, which is essential for effective strategic implementation.(c) Mr Hogg’s belief that employing child labour is ‘always ethically wrong’Deontological perspective: In the case scenario, Mr Hogg is demonstrating a deontological position on child labour by saying that it is ‘always’ wrong. He is adopting an absolutist rather than a relativist or situational stance in arguing that there are no situations in which child labour might be ethically acceptable. The deontological view is that an act is right or wrong in itself and does not depend upon any other considerations (such as economic necessity or the extent of the child’s willingness to work). If child labour is wrong in one situation, it follows that it is wrong in all situations because of the Kantian principle of generalisability (in thecategorical imperative). Because child labour is wrong and potentially exploitative in some situations, the deontological position says that it must be assumed to be wrong in all situations. The fact that it may cause favourable outcomes in some situations does not make it ethically right, because the deontological position is not situational and the quality of the outcome is not taken into account.Teleological perspective: According to the teleological perspective, an act is right or wrong depending on the favourableness of the outcome. It is sometimes called the consequentialist perspective because the consequences of the action are considered more important than the act itself.In the teleological perspective, ethics is situational and not absolute. Therefore child labour is morally justified if the outcome is favourable. The economic support of a child’s family by provision of wages for family support might be considered to be a favourable outcome that justifies child labour. There is an ethical trade-off between the importance of the family income from child labour and the need to avoid exploitation and interfere with the child’s education. Education is clearly important but family financial support might be a more favourable outcome, at least in the short term, and if so, this would justify the child working rather than being in school. For HPC, child labour is likely to be cheaper than adult labour but will alienate European buyers and be in breach of its code of ethics. Child labour may be ethically acceptable if the negative consequences can be addressed and overcome.[Tutorial note: other, equally relevant points made in evaluating Mr Hogg’s opinion will be valid. The texts discuss teleology in terms of utilitarianism and egoism. Although this distinction is not relevant to the question, candidates should not be penalised for introducing the distinction if the other points raised are relevant].Professional Level – Essentials Module, Paper P1 Professional Accountant December 2008 Marking Scheme1 (a) 1 mark for evidence of understanding of each of Tucker’s criteria 1 mark for application of each to case. 1 mark for conclusion or summary of assessment (Up to maximum of 10 marks) (10 marks)(b) 1 mark for each relevant point demonstrating understanding of operational risk up to a maximum of 3 marks 1 mark for each relevant point demonstrating understanding of strategic risk up to a maximum of 3 marks 1 mark for each reason explaining why the secrecy option is a strategic risk up to a maximum of 4 marks (10 marks)(c) (i) 1 mark for each relevant point making the business case up to a maximum of 4 1 mark for each relevant point making the stockholder (shareholder) moral case up to a maximum of 5 (Maximum财经网络教育领导品牌_________________________________________________________________ of 8 marks)(ii) 1 mark for each relevant point making the business case up to a maximum of 4 1 mark for each relevant point making the stakeholder moral case up to a maximum of 5 (Maximum of 8 marks) Professional marks: up to 2 marks per part (4 marks) (20 marks)(d) (i) 1 mark for definition of each (mandatory and voluntary) Half mark for each example up to a max of 2 marks per category (allow latitude for jurisdictional differences). (6 marks) (ii) 1 mark for each relevant point made and briefly explained (half mark for mention only) (4 marks) (10 marks)参与ACCA考试的考生可按照复习计划有效进行，另外高顿网校官网ACCA考试辅导高清课程已经开通，还可索取ACCA考试通关宝典，针对性地讲解、训练、答疑、模考，对学习过程进行全程跟踪、分析、指导，可以帮助考生全面提升复习备考效果。

ACCA考试《专业会计师P1》复习详解1

ACCA考试《专业会计师P1》复习详解1本文由高顿ACCA整理发布，转载请注明出处Part A - Governance and ResponsibilityPrinciples-based vs. Rules-basedPrinciples-based approach（1）Principles-based approach requires the company to adhere to thespirit rather than the letter of code.（2）The approaches focus on objectives rather than the mechanisms bywhich these objectives will be achieved.（3）The approaches can lay stress on those elements of corporategovernance to which rules cannot easily be applied.（4）The approaches can applied across different legal jurisdictionsrather being founded in the legal regulations of one country.（5）The approaches avoid inflexible legislation and allows companies todevelop their own approaches to corporate governance.（6）The approaches are too board to be used as a guide to bestcorporate governance practice.（7）There may be confusion over what is compulsory and what isn’t.Rules-based approach（1）Rules-based approach places more definite achievement and provideclarity in terms of what you must do. The rules are legal requirement.（2）The approaches allow no leeway. The key is whether or not you havecomplied with the rules.（3）It should in theory be easy to see whether there has beencompliance with the rules. But that depends on whether the rules areunambiguous.（4）It is rigid and difficult to deal with questionable situation thatare not covered sufficiently in the rulebook.Influence of ownership: Family firms vs. Joint-stockcompaniesInsider systemsInsider system is where companies are ownedand controlled by a small number of major shareholders, which may be members ofthe company’s founding family.（Advantages）（1）It is easier to establish ties between owners and managers. Theagency problem is reduced in the case of that the owners are involved inmanagement.（2）It is easier to influence company management even if the owners arenot involved in management.（3）A smaller base of shareholders may be more able to take a long-termview. Long-term growth is a bigger issue for such families.（Disadvantages）（1）There may be discrimination against minority shareholders and lackof minority shareholders protections.（2）Insider systems tend not to be monitored effectively and may bereluctant to employ outsiders in influential position.（3）Insider systems often don’t develop more formal governancestructures.（4）Insider systems may be more prone to opaque financial transactionsand misuse of fund.Outsider systemsOutsider systems are companies whereshareholding is more widely dispersed, and there is the manager-ownershipseparation.（Advantages）（1）The separation of ownership and management has provided an impetusfor the development of more robust governance to protect shareholders.（2）Shareholders have voting rights that they can use to exercisecontrol.（3）Hostile takeovers become far more frequent and this kind of threatsact as a disciplining mechanism on company management.（Disadvantages）（1）Companies are more likely to have an agency problem and significantcosts of agency.（2）Larger shareholders have often had short-term priorities.Stakeholders in corporate governance（1）Stakeholders are any entity （person, group or non-human entity）that can affect or be affected by the actions or policies of an organization. Itis a bi-directional relationship.（2）Stakeholder theory indicates that large companies have significantimpact on society so that they cannot only be responsible to theirshareholders, but have accountability to a broad range of stakeholders.（3）Companies should concentrate on employees, creditors and governmentas well as behave ethically and have regard for the environment and society asa whole.Instrumental view vs. Normativeviews（Instrumentalview）（1）From the point of instrumental view, the motivation of companies tofulfill the responsibilities towards stakeholders is that they believe that it wouldhave an impact on maximizing company’s profits if not to do so.（2）The companies don’t have any moral standpoint of its own, thereforeis devoid of any moral obligation.（Normativeview）（1）From the point of normative view, themotivation of companies to fulfill the responsibilities towards stakeholder isthat they have consciousness of accepting moral duty towards others.（2）The companies is altruistic, and haveethical, philanthropic responsibilities in addition to economic, legalresponsibilities.更多ACCA资讯请关注高顿ACCA官网：。

acca考试题目

acca考试题目ACCA考试题目分为两个阶段：基本阶段和应用阶段。

基本阶段的考试科目包括《管理会计与财务管理》、《审计与保证》等，涵盖了会计和财务管理的基本理论和实践。

应用阶段的考试科目更加深入和综合，包括《财务报告与会计基准》、《企业税务》等，考察考生在实际工作中应用会计知识和技能的能力。

ACCA考试题目类型包括选择题和主观题。

选择题包括单选题和多选题，主观题要求考生进行论述和分析。

在选择题中，通常会给出多个选项，要求考生从中选择正确的答案。

主观题则要求考生根据给定的情境或问题进行分析、解释或提出解决方案。

以下是一个ACCA考试科目的样题：题目：A公司是一家制造企业，生产多种产品。

为了计算盈亏平衡点，需要哪些数据？请列举所需数据并解释其用途。

答案：为了计算盈亏平衡点，需要以下数据：1. 固定成本数据：固定成本是指在一定时期内不随产量变化而变化的成本。

这些成本通常包括租金、工资、保险费等。

固定成本数据将用于计算盈亏平衡点时的总成本。

2. 变动成本数据：变动成本是指随着产量变化而变化的成本。

这些成本通常包括直接材料、直接人工和与产量直接相关的费用。

变动成本数据将用于计算每单位产品的成本。

3. 销售价格数据：销售价格是指每单位产品的售价。

销售价格数据将用于计算销售收入。

4. 预计销售量数据：预计销售量是指企业在一定时期内预测的产品销售数量。

预计销售量数据将用于计算销售收入和总成本。

通过以上数据，我们可以计算盈亏平衡点。

盈亏平衡点是指企业在一定时期内所获得的总收益与总成本相等时的状态。

计算盈亏平衡点可以帮助企业了解在什么情况下能够盈利或亏损，从而制定相应的经营策略。

2016年3月份ACCA考试真题P1复原

2016年3月份ACCA考试真题P1复原【ACCA P1真题复原】Q1 案例：高利贷公司，电话销售，按单计算佣金，社会反响不好；政府出台新政约束，设利息上限两倍，并要求核查贷款人信用背景。

公司營收受損股价下跌打算改商業模式，加强内控。

请了个在公司做了30年会计的员工做内审，这人努力学习内审知识，但要向财务总监汇报。

公司有审计委员会，但形同虚设。

业务部门反抗激烈，说内审烦人。

a) 新法规对SKH的影响：员工，股东，客户；b)解释Internal audit function和面临的挑战；c)解释Independence和建议改善内审独立性；d) Statement of BOD to Shareholders: i) 解释Non-executive Committees和重要性；ii) Effective risk assessment process重要性；iii) Risk & IC reporting重要性Q2 案例：CEO很牛，公司很成功，退休前攒很多股票期权。

股东担心后继无人，CEO想用新业务推高股价然后套现退休。

但新业务会把公司利息偿还倍数拉低，而违反银行贷款协议。

于是CEO想歪招，要调高存货操纵利润，同时说公司外审是以前马仔可以搞定。

a)解释Conflict of interest；结合案例指出COI；b)解释Agency relationship；Accountability怎么加强双方信任降低代理成本；c)解释Probity；批判CEO行为Q3 案例：军火商想上市:1）美國；2) 亞洲发展中国家（Principle-based）a) Pros& cons of rules-based approach和案例公司。

ACCA考试P1模拟试题(2)

ACCA考试P1模拟试题（2）本文由高顿ACCA整理发布，转载请注明出处At the EGM，Mrs Keefer made a statement on behalf of the Global-bank board. In it she said that Mineta had been a rogue trader who had wilfully disregarded the company’s internal controls and was，in breaking the comp any’s trading rules，criminally responsible for the theft of company assets. She denied that the main Global-bank board had any responsibility for the loss and said that it was a ‘genuinely unforeseeable’ situation.(a) Kohlberg’s theory of the developm ent of moral reasoning contains three levels，with each level containing two stages or ‘planes’。

It is a useful framework for understanding the ways in which people think about ethical issues.Required：(i) Explain the three levels of Kohlberg‘s th eory. (6 marks)(ii) Identify the level that Mr Mineta operated at and justify your choice using evidence from the case. (4 marks)(iii) Identify，with reasons，the stage (or ‘plane’) of Kohlberg‘s moral development most appropriate for a professional bank employee such as Mr Mineta as he undertakes his trading duties. (2 marks)(b) Explain FIVE typical causes of internal control failure and assess the internal control performance of Global-bank in the case scenario. (10 marks)(c) Analyse the agency relationship that exists between the board of Global-bank and the trustees of the Shalala Pension Fund. (4 marks)(d) Distinguish between narrow and wide stakeholders and identify three narrow stakeholders in Global-bank (based on Evan & Free man’s definition) from information in the case. Assess the potential impact of the events described on each narrow stakeholder identified. (10 marks)(e) You have been asked to draft a letter from Millau Haber，chairman of the Shalala trustees，to Mrs Keefer as a result of concerns over the events described in the case. The letter should explain the roles and responsibilities of the chief executive in internal control，and criticise Mrs Keefer’s performance in that role. (10 marks)Professional marks are available in part (e) for the structure，content，style and layout of the letter. (4 marks)(50 marks)更多ACCA资讯请关注高顿ACCA官网：。

ACCAP1考试试题及答案

「ACCA」P1考试试题及答案1. BackgroundPerformance-related elements have caused the most controversy in recent years with some directors being awarded a bonus even though their firms have underperformed (and in some cases made substantial losses) or failed to meet or exceed the sector average.A balance between short- and long-term bonus schemes should be found. The ICGN recommends a minimum bonus period of one year (and not, for example, quarterly) and that bonuses should be based on a percentage of basic salary (or subject to a fixed "cap").A danger of bonus schemes is the directors' ability to manipulate the target results on which bonuses are based (e.g. revenue, profits). Achieving sales targets, in particular, may result in questionable, unethical practices by directors and employees.2. Best-Practice GuidelinesThe remuneration committee should consider whether directors are eligible for:•Annual bonuses. If so, performance conditions should be relevant, challenging and designed to enhance shareholder value.•Benefits under long-term incentive schemes.*Upper limits should be set and disclosed. There may be a casefor part payment in shares to be held for a significant period.In normal circumstances, shares granted or other forms of deferred remuneration should not vest, and options should not be exercisable, in fewer than three years.Directors should be encouraged to hold their shares for afurther period after vesting or exercise (subject to the need to finance any purchase costs and associated tax liabilities).Proposals for new long-term incentive schemes should be approved by shareholders and preferably replace existing schemes. Total potential rewards should not be excessive.Payouts or grants under all incentive schemes should be subject to "challenging performance criteria" reflecting the firm's objectives.Challenging performance criteria should:•relate to overall corporate performance;•demonstrate that demanding levels of financial performance have been achieved in the context of the firm's prospects and the prevailing economic environment;•be measured relative to an appropriate, defined peer group or other relevant benchmark; and•be disclosed and transparent.Criteria which reflect the firm's performance relative to comparable companies (e.g. shareholder return) should be considered."Sliding scales" generally provide a better motivator for improving corporate performance than a "single hurdle" by encouraging exceptional performance.Rewards under executive share option plans (ESOPs) and other long-term incentive schemes should normally be phased over a set period.In general, only basic salary should be pensionable.Consequences of basic salary increases (e.g. on pension costs) should be considered, especially for directors close to retirement.。

2021年ACCA考试《P1-P3》模拟试题及答案

2021年ACCA考试《P1-P3》模拟试题及答案In terms of the disclosure, JK is attempting to show a better moral stance than TY. In other words, disclosure was in the public interest because customers of TY and JK were being overcharged. However, only a limited number of "members of society" would benefit from the disclosure-that is customers of TY and JK. If public interest disclosure means that all members of society must benefit,this argument cannot be used by JK. However, the argument that disclosure has benefited some members of society and has not harmed anyone else would mean disclosure was in the public interest. (c) Evaluation of remuneration Spilt of remuneration-basic and performance related Remuneration for directors is normally based on two elements; · Firstly a basic annual salary to compensate directors for their normal work in attending board meeting and running the company, and · Secondly, a performance related component to provide compensation for good decision making in ensuring that the company is successful and profitable. This means that whatever remuneration package is determined, it is essential to ensure that the directors have a stake in doing a good jobfor the shareholder. Each element of a remuneration package should therefore be designed to ensure that the director remains focused on the company and motivated to improve performance. A balance must be struck between offering a package: that is too small and hence demotivating and leading to potential underachievement, and that is too easily earned. This implies that there is a mix of salary and performance related pay as noted above. Corporate governance guidelines do not provide a precise "mix" but indicate that the performance related element should be substantial. In terms of TY and JK, there is a performance related element of remuneration. At 40% and 30% it could be argued that the fixed salary percentage is too below-thereis a risk that directors will not be sufficiently well compensated if their company does not perform well. A company needs to attract and retain directors with sufficient knowledge and skill to run the company and 30% specifically may be too low an amount to meet this objective. Marks & Spencer, for example, have 55% of remuneration from fixed salary etc. Role of remuneration committee Remuneration will be set by the remuneration committee taking into account the amount ofcompensation being paid by comparable companies. No information is provided in the scenario regarding other companied; however, it is not clear whether the board of TY are actually meeting governance regulations in this area. The directors appear to be discussing methods of increasing their remuneration following the fall in profits with the fine. This decision should be taken by the remuneration committee, ensuring that no director is also responsiblefor setting their own remuneration. The committee removes any conflict of interest in this area. Performance-related elements of remuneration Performance related remuneration is defined as those elements of remuneration dependent on the achievement of some form of performance-measurement criteria.Care must be taken in determining the elements of performance related remuneration.For example,if the market goes down as a whole, then this could potentially penalise directors for an outcome that has nothing to do with their performance. In other words, the performance related element should be linked to the performance of the company and not to the stock markets as a whole. TY and JK have chosen different methods of doing this. TY Company-proportion of profit Part ofremuneration is based on the profit for the year. At 40%, this is a relatively high amount as it tends to focus the directors on achieving a high profit in absolute terms, and could lead to attempts to amend the financial statements to increase profit. The imposition of the fine on TY has had the immediate effect of making the directors try and amend their remuneration package, again indicating that reliance on profit may be too high.。

acca设计考试科目一模拟试题及答案

acca设计考试科目一模拟试题及答案ACCA设计考试科目一模拟试题及答案一、选择题（每题1分，共20分）1. 根据ACCA准则，以下哪项不是会计信息质量要求？A. 可靠性B. 相关性C. 及时性D. 可比性答案：C2. 在财务报表中，以下哪项属于非流动资产？A. 存货B. 应收账款C. 固定资产D. 现金及现金等价物答案：C3. 以下哪项不是财务报表的组成部分？A. 资产负债表B. 利润表C. 现金流量表D. 预算表答案：D4. 根据权责发生制原则，以下哪项交易应该在发生时确认？A. 收到现金B. 销售商品C. 支付工资D. 收到发票答案：B5. 以下哪项不是财务报表分析的目的？A. 评估企业的盈利能力B. 评估企业的流动性C. 评估企业的市场价值D. 评估企业的长期偿债能力答案：C...（此处省略其他选择题）二、简答题（每题5分，共30分）1. 解释什么是会计政策，并给出两个例子。

答案：会计政策是指企业在编制财务报表时所采用的具体会计原则和方法。

例如，存货的计价方法（先进先出或加权平均法）和固定资产的折旧方法（直线法或双倍余额递减法）。

2. 什么是现金流量表？它在财务分析中的作用是什么？答案：现金流量表是一份记录企业在一定时期内现金和现金等价物流入和流出情况的财务报表。

它的作用在于帮助分析者了解企业的现金流动性、偿债能力和财务健康状况。

...（此处省略其他简答题）三、计算题（每题10分，共30分）1. 假设某公司本年度的营业收入为500,000元，营业成本为300,000元，销售和管理费用为100,000元，利息费用为20,000元，税收为50,000元。

请计算该公司的净利润。

答案：净利润 = 营业收入 - 营业成本 - 销售和管理费用 - 利息费用 - 税收 = 500,000 - 300,000 - 100,000 - 20,000 - 50,000 = 30,000元。

2. 如果上述公司有100,000元的应收账款和50,000元的存货，计算其流动资产总额。

2015年ACCA考试P1测试题

2015年ACCA考试P1测试题本文由高顿ACCA整理发布，转载请注明出处3 Mary Hobbes joined the board of Rosh and Company，a large retailer，as finance director earlier this year. Whilst she was glad to have finally been given the chance to become finance director after several years as a financial accountant，she also quickly realised that the new appointment would offer her a lot of challenges. In the first board meeting，she realised that not only was she the only woman but she was also the youngest by many years.Rosh was established almost 100 years ago. Members of the Rosh family have occupied senior board positions since the outset and even after the company’s flotation 20 years ago a member of the Rosh family has either been executive chairman or chief executive. The current longstanding chairman，Timothy Rosh，has already prepared his slightly younger brother，Geoffrey (also a longstanding member of the board)to succeed him in two years’time when he plans to retire. The Rosh family，who still own 40% of the shares，consider it their right to occupy the most senior positions in the company so have never been very active in external recruitment. They only appointed Mary because they felt they needed a qualified accountant on the board to deal with changes in international financial reporting standards.Several former executive members have been recruited as non-executives immediately after they retired from full-time service. A recent death，however，has reduced the number of non-executive directors to two. These sit alongside an executive board of seven that，apart from Mary，have all been in post for over ten years.更多ACCA资讯请关注高顿ACCA官网：。

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