上市公司盈利能力分析外文文献

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《上市公司市盈率影响因素研究国内外文献综述2700字》

《上市公司市盈率影响因素研究国内外文献综述2700字》

上市公司市盈率影响因素研究国内外文献综述1 国外文献综述国外有关市盈率的理论研究和实证分析已经相对比较完善和全面,国外学者从各个方面对市盈率进行了相关的理论或者实证分析。

最早提出市盈率概念的是“现代证券分析奠基人”本杰明·格雷厄姆(Benjamin Graham)。

早在1934年,他与大卫·多德合著的《证券分析》一书中首次对市盈率作了表述,在他们看来,股票的价值是其当期收益的一定倍数,而这个倍数由两个方面决定,一部分由当时的人气决定,也就是投资者预期;另一部分由企业的性质和记录决定,即企业的盈利能力和模式等特点决定,而这个一定倍数正是表示市盈率的大小【1】。

在市盈率的内在含义方面,Fairfield(1994)从经济含义的角度分析了市盈率和市净率,认为市盈率是未来盈利能力预期变化函数,市净率是未来盈利能力预期水平函数。

而且,通过利用美国1970-1984 年的数据建立模型发现,从账面价值角度看,市净率与预期回报呈正相关关系,对未来超额盈余的增长率有正面的影响,市净率与市盈率合在一起对未来股价有比较强的预测能力,此外,根据市盈率与市净率进行分组的不同的组合对未来的盈利能力也会不同【2】。

Kane, Marcus 和Noh(1996)认为市盈率是十分易变的,实证研究结果表明,市场波动增加百分之一能够引起市盈率1.8%的降低,因此,任何对于市场价值的评估,如果不考虑市盈率的变动将犯根本上的错误【3】。

Sujata Behera(2020)通过对大中小盘236 家公司的股票市值,进行了相关信息含量分析。

结果表明,在正常市场收益率变化的情况下,基于经济增加值的估值模型优于需求收益率不变的基于经济增加值的估值模型【5】。

Adil Pasha等(2019)通过对13 个行业的70 家非金融类巴基斯坦证券交易所上市公司10 年的数据,进行研究发现经济增加值与股票收益率之间存在显著的关系【6】。

《企业盈利模式研究国内外文献综述2300字》

《企业盈利模式研究国内外文献综述2300字》

企业盈利模式研究国内外文献综述1 国外研究现状盈利模式的第一个概念是在1980年代的Timmers P(1998)中定义的,当时Timmers P(1998)认为公司盈利模式是一个非常复杂的过程。

Michael Rappa (2004)的观点是,盈利模式是可以为公司带来利益的一种方法和模型。

确定公司在行业价值链中的地位。

盈利模式越具有竞争力,它将在行业价值链中更具竞争力、条件更好。

亚历山大奥斯特瓦尔德(Alexander Osterwalder)和伊夫皮格诺(Yves Pigneu)(2002)认为,获利能力模型是公司对利益相关者网络做出贡献的价值,利益相关者网络可以创造,营销和传播利益相关者网络,从而产生可盈利且可持续的收入来源。

鲍勃(Bob,2000)认为,如果一家公司希望拥有良好的盈利模式,则必须证明两点。

一是盈利模式能否指导和确保公司取得稳定的剩余利润;二是盈利模式能否指导和确保公司取得稳定的盈余利润。

第二个是能否合理,及时地更新和完善收益模型。

根据之前的两个标准,提出了关于盈利模式定位的研究,并从四个方面进行了研究:关注客户选择,如何获得价值,战略控制和业务范围。

Joan Nan(2002)分析了公司利润的来源,产生和生产,并提出公司的盈利模式是一种业务结构或一种称为业务模型的系统方法,可以帮助公司在生产和业务活动中更有效地获利。

Allan and Christopher(2002)提出公司的盈利模式是一种方法,公司使用这种方法来合理地建立和使用其自身的资源。

这样,公司可以为客户提供比竞争公司更大的价值,并在此基础上获利。

Yae S Rob,William P Andrew (2002年)提出了与餐饮业盈利模式有关的区域特许经营权讨论的理论。

他们认为,加盟商与地区加盟商达成协议,允许地区加盟商在支付加盟费的前提下使用加盟商;同时,由于地区加盟商的完全授权,加盟商也失去了对整个加盟体系的控制权在特定的特许经营区域。

有关盈利能力的外文文献

有关盈利能力的外文文献

有关盈利能力的外文文献盈利能力是企业经营的核心指标之一,直接关系到企业的生存与发展。

本文将通过对多篇外文文献的综合分析,探讨盈利能力的相关因素和提升方法。

1. 文献A:《盈利能力与企业规模的关系》这篇文献研究了盈利能力与企业规模之间的关系。

研究发现,企业规模对盈利能力有重要影响。

大型企业通常拥有更多的资源和市场份额,能够更有效地利用规模经济效应,从而提升盈利能力。

同时,大型企业在市场竞争中也更具竞争优势,能够更好地应对市场变化,进一步提高盈利能力。

2. 文献B:《盈利能力的影响因素分析》该文献对盈利能力的影响因素进行了深入研究。

研究发现,市场需求、产品竞争力、成本控制和管理能力是影响盈利能力的关键因素。

市场需求决定了企业销售额的大小,产品竞争力决定了企业能否获得更高的市场份额。

成本控制和管理能力直接影响企业的成本和效率,进而影响盈利能力的提升。

3. 文献C:《盈利能力的提升策略》该文献提出了一些提升盈利能力的策略。

首先,企业应不断提高产品质量和创新能力,以提升产品竞争力,从而获得更高的市场份额和利润。

其次,企业应积极控制成本,提高经营效率,降低生产成本。

此外,合理的财务管理和资金运作也是提升盈利能力的重要手段。

最后,企业还应积极拓展市场,开拓新的销售渠道和客户群体,以扩大销售规模,实现更高的盈利能力。

4. 文献D:《行业竞争对盈利能力的影响》该文献研究了行业竞争对企业盈利能力的影响。

研究发现,行业竞争激烈度对企业盈利能力有显著影响。

在竞争激烈的行业中,企业需要更加注重产品创新和市场营销,提高产品差异化和品牌影响力,才能在竞争中占据优势,实现盈利能力的提升。

总结起来,企业的盈利能力受到多个因素的影响,包括企业规模、市场需求、产品竞争力、成本控制、管理能力以及行业竞争等。

为提升盈利能力,企业应注重提高产品质量和创新能力,积极控制成本,合理管理财务和资金运作,拓展市场,并根据行业竞争情况采取相应的策略。

上市公司股利政策外文文献翻译

上市公司股利政策外文文献翻译

上市公司股利政策外文文献翻译XXX。

The study found that 72% of these companies have a specified dividend policy。

with larger and XXX。

The study also found a positive XXX and the presence of large long-term private or industrial owners with the XXX.Corporate finance is an essential aspect of any business。

and dividend policy XXX to have a defined dividend policy in place。

The XXX.The study also found a positive XXX and the presence of large long-term private or industrial owners with the XXX。

the results of this study support the use of defined XXX.In n。

this XXX firms have a specified dividend policy。

with larger and XXX。

The study also found a positive XXX and the presence of large long-term private or industrial owners with the XXX.XXX (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968)。

numerous papers have XXX research has focused on the choice een dividends and share repurchases。

《上市公司盈余管理探究国内外文献综述2500字》

《上市公司盈余管理探究国内外文献综述2500字》

上市公司盈余管理研究国内外文献综述1国外文献LaPorta(1999)[1]是最初提出的最终控制人的概念的人,最终控制人概念是指控股的股东通过拥有不同股份公司的股份来形成股份控制链以直接或者间接控制上市企业,并且最终拥有该企业的实际控制权。

国外属于资本主义国家,所以专门研究产权性质对盈余管理的文献较少。

国有企业属于国家,所以国有企业天然就拥有政策优势。

所以从国家政策的角度来看,国有企业的盈利情况会比非国有企业好。

Jones(1991)[2]认为有控制权的股东在企业有重要地位和不对称的信息优势。

所以为了保全自己的利益,有控制权的股东更有机会和能力去采用操控盈余管理或关联交易的方式去操控上市企业的财务报表,侵害中小股东的利益。

Fan and Wong (2007)[3]发现企业拥有控制权的大股东和小股东之间拥有矛盾,企业拥有控制权的大股东会为了自身利益去掠夺小股东利益,从而降低了企业的盈余质量信息;盈余管理在股权更集中的国有企业中更显著,但从整体上来看,非国有企业也有显著调高企业盈余情况的行为。

Aharony (2000)[4]认为中国的一些上市公司在存在调整盈余管理的动机的同时也会吸引外部监管者的关注,所以他认为相对于非国有企业,国有企业得到外部监督的关注力度比较大大。

Chen 和 Yuan(2006)[5]认为,盈余管理是上市公司衡量市场信息透明度的重要指标。

信息不对称理论指出上市公司会通过操纵盈余管理的行为提高企业的盈余情况,造成企业盈余质量的虚假,而投资者通常会被上市公司的这种虚假的高盈余质量所蒙蔽,这表明上市公司需要增强企业财务报表的信息透明度和要加大对投资者的保护。

而分析师关注在资本市场上起到了信息中介的作用,分析师可以向投资者传递上市公司的有效盈余信息,所以分析师关注可以在一定程度上减少管理层的信息优势,缓和管理层与投资者之间的信息不对称。

Yu(2008)[6]认为,分析师关注能减少上市公司管理层的盈余管理行为。

房地产上市公司的盈利能力分析【文献综述】

房地产上市公司的盈利能力分析【文献综述】

房地产上市公司的盈利能力分析【文献综述】文献综述房地产上市公司的盈利能力分析在我国经济快速发展的过程中,上市公司无疑在其中扮演了重要角色。

随着证券市场的不断地完善,投资者的投资理念也越加成熟,他们不仅关注上市公司股票的涨跌,也开始关心公司偿债能力、经营能力、盈利能力、发展能力等。

其中对上市公司的盈利能力尤为关注。

近年来,对于投资者来说房地产行业是一个的敏感且颇有争议的行业,因此也给了这个行业更多的关注。

许多投资者和学者也利用各种方法,建立各种模型对房地产上市公司的盈利能力进行全方位的分析研究,如何能真实的评价和反映上市公司的盈利能力也成为研究的重中之重。

国内外学者对上司公司盈利能力的研究发现,许多因素对公司盈利能力都有影响,但由于采用的方法和选取的标准不同也就有了许多不同的观点。

1企业盈利能力评价方法的国内外研究1.1国外研究对企业盈利能力的评价是为了实现企业战略目标,运用特定的指标和标准,采用科学的评价方法,对企业盈利状况以及未来的盈利潜力做出的一种判断。

我国对企业的盈利能力的研究起步较晚而在国外从20世纪初开始就有学者企业的盈利能力进行研究了。

Frederick Winslow Taylor(1911)建立了许多成本计量指标并在《科学管理原理》中提出了科学管理理论,根据成本计量标准量与实际发生量的比较结果,对企业经营绩效进行评价。

这是通过成本费用利润率来评价企业的经营活动的绩效。

Peter.M.Drucher(1950)经过实证研究,提出企业绩效评价的八项指标,指出利润最大化虽然是企业的主要目标,但却不是唯一的目标。

从此人开始思考企业盈利评价不应仅仅停留在盈利数量上O'Glove(1978)发表了一份投资报告《收益质量》,详细提出了收益构成的分析方法,提出盈利质量必须得到重视。

至此盈利质量正式得到关注。

在之后的六七十年代大多学者开始探索用其他各项指标来评价企业盈利能力。

Melnnes(1971)对美国30家跨国公司的财务绩效分析系统进行评价,发现最常用的的评价指标是投资报酬率。

上市公司盈利能力分析 外文文献翻译

上市公司盈利能力分析 外文文献翻译

文献出处:Gnanasooriyar M S. Profitability analysis of listed manufacturing companies in Sri Lanka: An empirical investigation[J]. European Journal of Business and Management, 2014, 6(34): 358-364第一部分为译文,第二部分为原文。

默认格式:中文五号宋体,英文五号Times New Roma,行间距1.5倍。

制造业上市公司在斯里兰卡的盈利能力分析:一个实证调查摘要:本文是对2008年至2012年期间的选择10家在斯里兰卡的制造业上市公司的盈利能力,以及对四种常用的财务业绩指标分析:总利润(GR),净利润(NP),资产收益率(ROA)和净资产收益率(ROE)。

结果表明,在此期间斯里兰卡制造企业是相当多的盈利在GP和ROA,但利润较低的条件在NP和净资产收益率方面。

结果表明,制造企业的盈利能力是不太令人满意的。

皇家陶瓷有限公司的毛利率和净利率排第一,ABANS电气公司资产收益率第一,皇家陶瓷公司净资产收益率第一。

这项研究的结果对学者,政策制定者,从业人员等有借鉴意义的。

关键词:盈利能力分析,上市制造企业,斯里兰卡引言利润是收入超过相关费用过量在一段时间的活动。

凯恩斯勋爵指出,“利润是驱动企业的发动机”。

每个企业都应该获得足够的利润来生存和发展在一段较长的时间。

这是该指数在经济发展,提高国民收入和生活水平的不断提高。

利润是判断不只是经济准绳,但管理效率和社会目标也。

盈利手段,使利润从组织,公司,公司或企业的所有业务活动的能力。

它显示了如何有效地管理,可以通过使用所有市面上的资源赚取利润。

据Harward和厄普顿,“盈利是“赚其使用返回给定投资的能力。

”然而,长期的盈利能力“不是同义术语‘效率’。

利润率是效率的索引; 和被认为是效率和管理指南,更高的效率的量度。

外文翻译--加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究(节选)

外文翻译--加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究(节选)

中文3150字,2100单词,10800英文字符出处:Abor J. The effect of capital structure on profitability: an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana[J]. Journal of Risk Finance, 2005, 6(November):438-445.外文翻译The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in GhanaAuthor:Joshua AborIntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax benefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded that the variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positiverelationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies.A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of the cross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1)ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2)ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZEi ,tis the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SGi ,tis sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi ,tis the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) i nvested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital.The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts arerelatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R² 0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究作者:乔舒亚阿博尔论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。

上市公司盈利能力分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

上市公司盈利能力分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firmsAbstractExtant empirical evidence indicates that the proportion of firms going public prior to achieving profitability has been increasing over time. This phenomenon is largely driven by an increase in the proportion of technology firms going public. Since there is considerable uncertainty regarding the long-term economic viability of these firms at the time of going public, identifying factors that influence their ability to attain key post-IPO milestones such as achieving profitability represents an important area of research. We employ a theoretical framework built around agency and signaling considerations to identify factors that influence the probability and timing of post-IPO profitability of Internet IPO firms. We estimate Cox Proportional Hazards models to test whether factors identified by our theoretical framework significantly impact the probability of post-IPO profitability as a function of time. We find that the probability of post- IPO profitability increases with pre-IPO investor demand and change in ownership at the IPO of the top officers and directors. On the other hand, the probability ofpost-IPO profitability decreases with the venture capital participation, proportion of outsiders on the board, and pre-market valuation uncertainty.Keywords: Initial public offerings, Internet firms, Path-to-profitability, Hazard models, Survival1. Executive summaryThere has been an increasing tendency for firms to go public on the basis of a promise of profitability rather than actual profitability. Further, this phenomenon is largely driven by the increase in the proportion of technology firms going public. The risk of post-IPO failure is particularly high for unprofitable firms as shifts in investor sentiment leading to negative market perceptions regarding their prospects or unfavorable financing environments could lead to a shutdown of external financing sources thereby imperiling firm survival. Therefore, the actual accomplishment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the company's evolution since it signals the long-term economic viability of the firm. While the extant research in entrepreneurship has focused on factors influencing the ability of entrepreneurial firms to attain important milestones prior to or at the time of going public, relatively little is known regarding the timing or ability of firms to achieve critical post-IPO milestones. In this study, we construct a theoretical framework anchored on agency and signaling theories to understand the impact of pre-IPO factors such as governance and ownership structure, management quality, institutional investor demand, and third party certification on firms' post-IPO path-to-profitability. We attempt to validate the testable implications arising from our theoretical framework using the Internet industry as our setting. Achieving post-issue profitability in a timely manner is of particular interest for Internet IPO firms since they are predominantly unprofitable at the time of going public and are typically characterized by high cash burn rates thereby raising questions regarding their long-term economic viability. Since there is a repeated tendency for high technology firms in various emerging sectors of the economy to go public in waves amid investor optimism followed by disappointing performance, insights gained from a study of factors that influence the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms will help increase our understanding of the development path and long-term economic viability of entrepreneurial firms in emerging, high technology industries.2. IntroductionThe past few decades have witnessed the formation and development of several vitallyimportant technologically oriented emerging industries such as disk drive, biotechnology, and most recently the Internet industry. Entrepreneurial firms in such knowledge intensive industries are increasingly going public earlier in their life cycle while there is still a great deal of uncertainty and information asymmetry regarding their future prospects (Janey and Folta, 2006). A natural consequence of the rapid transition from founding stage firms to public corporations is an increasing tendency for firms to go public on the basis of a promise of profitability rather than actual profitability.3 Although sustained profitability is no longer a requirement for firms in order to go public, actual accomplishment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the firm's evolution since it reduces uncertainty regarding the long-term economic viability of the firm. In this paper, we focus on identifying observable factors at the time of going public that have the ability to influence the likelihood and timing of attaining post-IPO profitability by Internet firms. We restrict our study to the Internet industry since it represents a natural setting to study the long-term economic viability of an emerging industry where firms tend to go public when they are predominantly unprofitable and where there is considerably uncertainty and information asymmetry regarding their future prospects.4The attainment of post-IPO profitability assumes significance since the IPO event does not provide the same level of legitimizing differentiation that it did in the past as sustained profitability is no longer a prerequisite to go public particularly in periods where the market is favorably inclined towards investments rather than demonstration of profitability (Stuartet al., 1999; Janey and Folta, 2006). During the Internet boom, investors readily accepted the mantra of “growth at all costs” and enthusiastically bid up the post-IPO offering prices to irrational levels (Lange et al., 2001). In fact, investor focus on the promise of growth rather than profitability resulted in Internet start-ups being viewed differently from typical new ventures in that they were able to marshal substantial resources virtually independent of performance benchmarks (Mudambi and Treichel, 2005).Since the Internet bubble burst in April 2000, venture capital funds dried up and many firms that had successful IPOs went bankrupt or faced severe liquidity problems (Chang, 2004). Consequently, investors' attention shifted from their previously singular focus on growth prospects to the question of profitability with their new mantrabeing “path-to- profitability.” As such, market participants focused on not just whe ther the IPO firm wouldbe able to achieve profitability but also “when” or “how soon.” IPO firms unable to credibly demonstrate a clear path-to-profitability were swiftly punished with steeply lower valuations and consequently faced significantly higher financing constraints. Since cash flow negative firms are not yet self sufficient and, therefore, dependent on external financing to continue to operate, the inability to raise additional capital results in a vicious cycle of events that can quickly lead to delisting and even bankruptcy.5 Therefore, the actual attainment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the evolution of an IPO firm providing it with legitimacy and signaling its ability to remain economically viable through the ups and downs associated with changing capital market conditions. The theoretical framework supporting our analysis draws from signaling and agency theories as they relate to IPO firms. In our study, signaling theory provides the theoretical basis to evaluate the signaling impact of factors such as management quality, third party certification, institutional investor demand, and pre-IPO valuation uncertainty on the path-to-profitability. Similarly, agency theory provides the theoretical foundations to allow us to examine the impact of governance structure and change in top management ownership at the time of going public on the probability of achieving the post-IPO profitability milestone. Our empirical analysis is based on the hazard analysis methodology to identify the determinants of the probability of becoming profitable as a function of time for a sample of 160 Internet IPOs issued during the period 1996–2000.Our study makes several contributions. First, we construct a theoretical framework based on agency and signaling theories to identify factors that may influence the path-to- profitability of IPO firms. Second, we provide empirical evidence on the economic viability of newly public firms (path-to-profitability and firm survival) in the Internet industry. Third, we add to the theoretical and empirical entrepreneurship literature that has focused on factors influencing the ability of entrepreneurial firms to achieve critical milestones during the transition from private to public ownership. While previous studies have focused on milestones during the private phase of firm development such as receipt of VC funding and successful completion of a public offering (Chang, 2004; Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Beckman et al., 2007), our study extends this literature by focusing on post-IPOmilestones. Finally, extant empirical evidence indicates that the phenomenon of young, early stage firms belonging to relatively new industries being taken public amid a wave of investor optimism fueled by the promise of growth rather than profitability tends to repeat itself over time.6 However, profitability tends to remain elusive and takes much longer than anticipated which results in investor disillusionment and consequently high failure rate among firms in such sectors. 7 Therefore, our study is likely to provide useful lessons to investors when applying valuations to IPO firms when this phenomenon starts to repeat itself.This articles proceeds as follows. First, using agency and signaling theories, we develop our hypotheses. Second, we describe our sample selection procedures and present descriptive statistics. Third, we describe our research methods and present our results. Finally, we discuss our results and end the article with our concluding remarks.3. Theory and hypothesesSignaling models and agency theory have been extensively applied in the financial economics, management, and strategy literatures to analyze a wide range of economic phenomena that revolve around problems associated with information asymmetry, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Signaling theory in particular has been widely applied in the IPO market as a framework to analyze mechanisms that are potentially effective in resolving the adverse selection problem that arises as a result of information asymmetry between various market participants (Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986; Welch, 1989). In this study, signaling theory provides the framework to evaluate the impact of pre-IPO factors such as management quality, third party certification, and institutional investor demand on the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.The IPO market provides a particularly fertile setting to explore the consequences of separation of ownership and control and potential remedies for the resulting agency problems since the interests of pre-IPO and post-IPO shareholders can diverge. In the context of the IPO market, agency and signaling effects are also related to the extent that insider actions such as increasing the percentage of the firm sold at the IPO, percentage of management stock holdings liquidated at the IPO, or percentage of VC holdings liquidated at the IPO can accentuate agency problems with outside investors and, as a consequence, signal poorperformance (Mudambi and Treichel, 2005). We, therefore, apply agency theory to evaluate the impact of board structure and the change in pre-to-post IPO ownership of top management on the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.3.1. Governance structureIn the context of IPO firms, there are at least two different agency problems (Mudambi and Treichel, 2005). The first problem arises as a result of opportunistic behavior of agents to increase their share of the wealth at the expense of principals. The introduction of effective monitoring and control systems can help mitigate or eliminate this type of behavior and its negative impact on post-issue performance. The extant corporate governance literature has argued that the effectiveness of monitoring and control functions depends to a large extent on the composition of the board of directors. We, therefore, examine the relationship between board composition and the likelihood and timing of post-IPO profitability.The second type of agency problem that arises in the IPO market is due to uncertainty regarding whether insiders seek to use the IPO as an exit mechanism to cash out or whether they use the IPO to raise capital to invest in positive NPV projects. The extent of insider selling their shares at the time of the IPO can provide an effective signal regarding which of the above two motivations is the likely reason for the IPO. We, therefore, examine the impact of the change in ownership of officers and directors around the IPO on the likelihood and timing of attaining post-issue profitability.3.2. Management qualityAn extensive body of research has examined the impact of to management team (TMT) characteristics on firm outcomes for established firms as well as for new ventures by drawing from human capital and demography theories. For instance, researchers drawing from human capital theories study the impact of characteristics such as type and amount of experience of TMTs on performance (Cooper et al., 1994; Gimeno et al., 1997; Burton et al., 2002; Baum and Silverman, 2004). Additionally, Beckman et al. (2007) argue that demographic arguments are distinct from human capital arguments in that they examine team composition and diversity in addition to experience. The authors consequently examine the impact of characteristics such as background affiliation, composition, and turnover of TMT members on thelikelihood of firms completing an IPO. Overall, researchers have generally found evidence to support arguments that human capital and demographic characteristics of TMT members influence firm outcomes.Drawing from signaling theory, we argue that the quality of the TMT of IPO firms can serve as a signal of the ability of a firm to attain post-IPO profitability. Since management quality is costly to acquire, signaling theory implies that by hiring higher quality management, high value firms can signal their superior prospects and separate themselves from low value firms with less capable managers. The beneficial impact of management quality in the IPO market includes the ability to attract more prestigious investment bankers, generate stronger institutional investor demand, raise capital more effectively, lower underwriting expenses, attract stronger analyst following, make better investment and financing decisions, and consequently influence the short and long-run post-IPO operating and stock performance(Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). Thus, agency theory, in turn, would argue that higher quality management is more likely to earn their marginal productivity of labor and thus have a lower incentive to shirk, thereby also leading to more favorable post-IPO outcomes.8We focus our analyses on the signaling impact of CEO and CFO quality on post-IPO performance. We focus on these two members of the TMT of IPO firms since they are particularly influential in establishing beneficial networks, providing legitimacy to the organization, and are instrumental in designing, communicating, and implementing the various strategic choices and standard operating procedures that are likely to influence post- IPO performance.3.3. Third party certificationThe extant literature has widely recognized the potential for third party certification as a solution to the information asymmetry problem in the IPO market (Beatty, 1989; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini, 1995, 1999b; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). The theoretical basis for third party certification is drawn from the signaling models which argue that intermediaries such as investment bankers, venture capitalists, and auditors have the ability to mitigate the problem of information asymmetry by virtue of their reputation capital (Booth and Smith, 1986; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini,1995, Carter et al., 1998). In addition to certification at the IPO, intermediaries, through their continued involvement,monitoring, and advising role have the ability to enhance performance after the IPO. In the discussion below, we focus on the signaling impact of venture capitalists involvement and investment bank prestige on post-IPO outcomes3.4. Institutional investor demandPrior to marketing the issue to investors, the issuing firm and their investment bankers are required to file an estimated price range in the registration statement. The final pricing of the IPO firm is typically done on the day before the IPO based upon the perceived demand from potential investors. Further, the final offer price is determined after investment bankers ave conducted road shows and obtained indications of interest from institutional investors. Therefore, the initial price range relative to the final IPO offer price is a measure of institutional investor uncertainty regarding the value of the firm. Since institutional investors typically conduct sophisticated valuation analyses prior to providing their indications of demand, divergence of opinion on valuation amongst them is a reflection of the risk and uncertainty associated with the prospects of the IPO firm during the post-IPO phase. Consistent with this view, Houge et al. (2001) find empirical evidence to indicate that greater divergence of opinion and investor uncertainty about an IPO can generate short- run overvaluation and long-run underperformance. Therefore, higher divergence of opinion among institutional investors is likely to be negatively related to the probability of post-IPO profitability and positively related to time-to-profitability.A related issue is the extent of pre-market demand by institutional investors for allocation of shares in the IPO firm. Higher pre-issue demand represents a favorable consensus of sophisticated institutional investors regarding the prospects of the issuing firm. Institutional investor consensus as well as their higher holdings in the post-IPO firm is likely to be an informative signal regarding the post-IPO prospects of the firm.4. Sample description and variable measurementOur initial sample of 325 Internet IPOs over the period January 1996 to February 2000 was obtained from the Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Internet Research Report dated February 17,2000. The unavailability of IPO offering prospectuses and exclusion of foreign firms reduces the sample size to 205 firms. Further, to be included in our sample, we require that financial and accountinginformation for sample firms is available on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat files and IPO offering related information is accessible from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Global New Issues database. As a result of these additional data requirements, our final sample consists of 160 Internet IPO firms. Information on corporate governance variables (ownership, board composition, past experience of the CEO and CFO), and number of risk factors is collected from the offering prospectuses.Our final sample of Internet IPO firms has the following attributes. The mean offer price for our sample of IPO firms is $16.12. The average firm in our sample raised $99.48 million. The gross underwriting fee spread is around seven percent. About 79% of the firms in our sample had venture capital backing. Both the mean and median returns on assets for firms in our sample at the time of going public are significantly negative. For example, the average operating return on assets for our sample of firms is − 56.3%. The average number of employees for the firms in our sample is 287. The average board size is 6.57 for our sample. In about 7.5% of our sample, the CEO and CFO came from the same firm. In addition, we find that 59 firms representing 37% of the sample attained profitability during the post-IPO period with the median time-to-profitability being three quarters from the IPO date.5. Discussion of results and concluding remarksThe development path of various emerging industries tend to be similar in that they are characterized by high firm founding rates, rapid growth rates, substantial investments in R&D and capital expenditures, potential for product/process breakthroughs, investor exuberance, huge demand for capital, large number of firms going public while relatively young, and a struggle for survival during the post-IPO phase as profitability and growth targets remain elusive and shifts in investor sentiment substantially raise financing constraints. Recently, the Internet has rapidly emerged as a vitally important industry that has fundamentally impacted the global economy with start-up firms in the industry attracting $108 billion of investment capital during the period 1995–2000。

上市公司股利政策研究外文文献

上市公司股利政策研究外文文献

Growth and the Valuation of SharesLintnerListed companies in the dividend distribution policy to some extent direct impact on the operation of funds of listed companies. The company paid to its shareholders the remaining surplus of retained earnings in the enterprise, there Cixiaobizhang relationship. Therefore, the dividend distribution policy is decided how much dividend distribution to shareholders, has decided to stay in the number of enterprises. Reduce the dividend distribution, which will increase corporate retained earnings, reducing the external financing needs. So dividend policy is also financing the internal decision-making enterprises. In this paper, often used to make a dividend distribution policy briefly discussed.Dividend in the actual operation, the choice of dividend distribution policy has the following four:First, the remaining dividend distribution policyDividend and the company's capital structure related to investment and capital structure, in turn, constitute the necessary funds, the dividend distribution policy should in fact be the cost of capital and investment opportunities in the double impact. The remaining dividend distribution policy is that the company has good investment opportunities, in accordance with the objectives of certain capital structure (the optimal capital structure), to calculate the required equity capital investment, the first of retained earnings, and then the remaining surplus as a dividend to be Distribution. If there is no surplus, not dividends. Use the remaining dividend distribution policy to be followed by five steps: (1)identification of investment projects, looking for profitable investment opportunities. (2)target capital structure, which is identified with the debt equity capital ratio of capital to the weighted average cost of capital (integrated cost of capital rate) reached the lowest level as the standard. (3) target capital structure of the equity investment required amount.(4)maximize the use of the company's retained earnings to meet the investment programmes of the equity capital required amount. (5)investment programme for equity capital have been met if the remaining surplus, and then as dividends paid to shareholders.Choice of the remaining dividend distribution policy, will mean that only the remaining surplus for dividend payment. The model is based on the stock price has nothing to do with the distribution of dividends, investors in the dividend and capital gains do not have a preferred, but will investors get dividends on the secondary position, its fundamental purpose is to maintain the ideal capital structure, the weighted average cost of capital Minimum, thus realizing the company to maximize profits.Second, the continued growth of fixed or dividend distribution policyThe continued growth of fixed or dividend distribution policy is to distribute the annual dividend fixed at a specific level, and in the longer period of time regardlessof how the company's profitability, the financial situation of how the distribution of the dividend remains unchanged. Only when the company that future earnings will be significant, and irreversible growth, will be able to maintain the amount of dividends paid to a higher level, will increase the annual dividend payment amount. However, inflation in the circumstances, most companies will then raise the surplus, and the majority of investors want companies to provide more than offset the adverse effects of inflation dividends, long-term inflation in the years should also increase the amount of dividend payment .Sustained growth of fixed or dividend distribution policy is aimed at avoid because of poor management and reduction of dividend. To take such dividend distribution policy of the reasons is: First, a stable dividend for the company to market convey the normal development of the information, to establish a good image of the company, enhance the confidence of investors in the company, stable stock prices. Second, the stability of the amount of dividends to investors for dividend income and expenditure, especially for those who are dependent on dividends shareholders especially. Mandrax Mandrax high dividends and low stocks, will not be welcomed by these shareholders, the stock price will drop. Third, the stability of the dividend distribution policy may be inconsistent with the remaining dividend theory, but taking into account the stock market will be a variety of factors, including the psychological state of shareholders and other requirements, in order to maintain a stable dividend level, Even if some deferred investment programme or temporarily deviate from target capital structure, may also reduce the dividend or lower than the dividend growth rate of more favorable.In view of this, the company only used or continued growth in the fixed dividend distribution policy in order to maximize the company shares in order to achieve the maximization of the company's financial goals. The dividend distribution policy is that the shortcomings of the dividends paid out of touch with the surplus. When the lower earnings still support a fixed dividend, it might lead to a shortage of funds, financial situation worsened, not the same as the surplus into the dividend distribution policy as to maintain a lower cost of capital.Third, to pay a fixed dividend rate policyDividend policy to pay a fixed rate, the company set a dividend amount of the surplus ratio (dividend payment rate), this ratio of long-term policy to pay dividends. In this dividend distribution policy, the dividends for investors as the company's net profit after tax changes and fluctuations, when the company increased net profit, the stock dividend for investors has increased, but decreased. The higher rate of pay fixed dividends, the company retained surplus is less. Fixed rate of dividend payment distribution model first consider the distribution of dividends, before considering the retained earnings, with the remaining dividend distribution model contrary to the order. In the policy, the dividend payment rate, once established, generally are not allowed to randomly change, the company's profit after tax is determined by calculation, the distribution of the dividend will accordingly identified.Fixed rate of dividend payment policy is based on investor risk aversion, like the reality of the proceeds to determine the distribution of dividends to meet theaspirations of investors, and the distribution of dividends and stock price are relevant and meet the aspirations of the investors, will support the company Shares in a higher position, shares will maximize the realization of the company's financial goals to maximize. But in this policy under the annual dividend for the larger changes, the company easily create the impression of instability, adverse to stabilize stock prices.Third, to pay a fixed dividend rate policy Dividend policy to pay a fixed rateThe company set a dividend amount of the surplus ratio (dividend payment rate), this ratio of long-term policy to pay dividends. In this dividend distribution policy, the dividends for investors as the company's net profit after tax changes and fluctuations, when the company increased net profit, the stock dividend for investors has increased, but decreased. The higher rate of pay fixed dividends, the company retained surplus is less. Fixed rate of dividend payment distribution model first consider the distribution of dividends, before considering the retained earnings, with the remaining dividend distribution model contrary to the order. In the policy, the dividend payment rate, once established, generally are not allowed to randomly change, the company's profit after tax is determined by calculation, the distribution of the dividend will accordingly identified.Fixed rate of dividend payment policy is based on investor risk aversion, like the reality of the proceeds to determine the distribution of dividends to meet the aspirations of investors, and the distribution of dividends and stock price are relevant and meet the aspirations of the investors, will support the company Shares in a higher position, shares will maximize the realization of the company's financial goals to maximize. But in this policy under the annual dividend for the larger changes, the company easily create the impression of instability, adverse to stabilize stock prices.The last,Yurika additional shares normal low dividend policyYurika additional shares normal low dividend policy, a company in normal circumstances only pay a fixed annual amount of the dividend lower in corporate earnings more and better financial situation of the year, according to the actual situation further release of additional dividends to shareholders. However, additional dividends is not fixed, does not mean that the company permanently raise the required rate of dividend payment. Stock real goods or services provided to the customer business entity. The delivery of these goods and services customers time may also influence the cash flow. Articles in the excessive inventory becomes expensive, because they are more easily damaged, or can become obsolete. Although there is now way, the company can reduce the loss of goods allowed to cancel out, commercial enterprises have set up sales of goods and services, without their product is out of date. The company needs a responsible person to understand what is inventory, and this information must be effectively communicated to the sales force. An effective sales force training can use this information to the understanding of what the pricing model, in order to recruit. At the same time, the sales manager can use this information to the foundation and development unit.Adopt this policy was mainly due to: first, such dividend distribution policy so that companies with greater flexibility, when compared with fewer or more of thecapital investment required, to maintain a lower but set the normal dividend The level of dividends, shareholders will not have dividends fell flu, to maintain the existing stock prices and achieve its goals. When companies have a more substantial increase in earnings and surplus cash, the issuance of additional dividend may be appropriate. The company's dividend will be distributed additional information to stock investors so that they enhance the company's confidence is conducive to the stability and stock prices rose. Second, the dividend distribution policy that will enable those who rely on the shareholder dividend to live at least a year could be lower though, but relatively stable dividend income, which attracted this part of the shareholders.Several more dividend distribution policy claims, the company in dividend distribution, we should learn from its basic ideological decision-making, to suit their own specific reality of the dividend distribution policy, enabling the company to maintain stability, sustained growth, Shareholders can receive more benefits in order to achieve the company's financial goals to maximize.。

公司盈利能力分析英语作文

公司盈利能力分析英语作文

公司盈利能力分析英语作文Title: Analysis of Company Profitability。

In the competitive landscape of business, assessing a company's profitability is crucial for its sustainability and growth. This essay will delve into the key aspects of analyzing a company's profitability, focusing on financial ratios, industry benchmarks, and strategic considerations.Financial ratios are essential tools for evaluating a company's profitability. One widely used ratio is the gross profit margin, which indicates the percentage of revenue that exceeds the cost of goods sold. A higher gross profit margin suggests better cost management and pricing strategies. Similarly, net profit margin, calculated by dividing net income by revenue, reflects the company's overall profitability after accounting for all expenses. Analyzing trends in these ratios over time can reveal the company's operational efficiency and financial health.Comparing a company's financial ratios to industry benchmarks provides valuable insights into its competitive position. For instance, if a company's gross profit margin is below the industry average, it may indicateinefficiencies in production or pricing strategies. On the other hand, outperforming industry benchmarks inprofitability ratios can signify a competitive advantage or superior management practices.Profitability analysis should also consider non-financial factors such as market dynamics, technological disruptions, and regulatory changes. For instance, a company operating in a rapidly growing market may achieve higher profitability due to increased demand and pricing power. Conversely, industries facing regulatory challenges or disruptive innovations may experience margin pressures, requiring strategic adaptations to maintain profitability.Furthermore, strategic decisions play a pivotal role in shaping a company's profitability. For instance, expanding into new markets or product lines can drive revenue growth but may initially impact profitability due to higherexpenses. Evaluating the long-term profitability impact of such strategic initiatives is essential for informed decision-making.Moreover, cost management strategies such as lean operations, supply chain optimization, and efficient resource allocation can significantly enhance profitability. By identifying cost drivers and implementing targeted cost-saving measures, companies can improve their bottom line without compromising quality or customer satisfaction.In conclusion, analyzing a company's profitability involves a comprehensive assessment of financial ratios, industry benchmarks, strategic considerations, and cost management strategies. By understanding these key factors and their interplay, businesses can make informed decisions to enhance profitability, drive sustainable growth, and create long-term value for stakeholders.。

企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Measuring the quality of earnings1. IntroductionGenerally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) offer some flexibility in preparing the financial statements and give the financial managers some freedom to select among accounting policies and alternatives. Earning management uses the flexibility in financial reporting to alter the financial results of the firm (Ortega and Grant, 2003).In other words, earnings management is manipulating the earning to achieve a企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献predetermined target set by the management. It is a purposeful intervention in the external reporting process with the intent of obtaining some private gain (Schipper, 1989).Levit (1998) defines earning management as a gray area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are cutting corners; and, where earnings reports reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying financial performance of the company.The popular press lists several instances of companies engaging in earnings management. Sensormatic Electronics, which stamped shipping dates and times on sold merchandise, stopped its clocks on the last day of a quarter until customer shipments reached its sales goal. Certain business units of Cendant Corporation inflated revenues nearly $500 million just prior to a merger; subsequently, Cendant restated revenuesand agreed with the SEC to change revenue recognition practices. AOL restated earnings for $385 million in improperly deferred marketing expenses. In 1994, the Wall Street Journal detailed the many ways in which General Electric smoothed earnings, including the careful timing of capital gains and the use of restructuring charges and reserves, in response to the article, General Electric reportedly received calls from other corporations questioning why such common practices were“front-page〞 news.Earning management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy and Whalen, 1999).Magrath and Weld (2002) indicate that abusive earnings management and fraudulent practices begins by engaging in earnings management schemes designed primarily to “smooth〞 earnings to meet internally or externally imposed earnings forecasts and analysts’ expectations. Even if earnings management does not explicitly violate accounting rules, it is an ethically questionable practice. An organization that manages its earnings sends a企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献message to its employees that bending the truth is an acceptable practice. Executives who partake of this practice risk creating an ethical climate in which other questionable activities may occur. A manager who asks the sales staff to help sales one day forfeits the moral authority to criticize questionable sales tactics another day.Earnings management can also become a very slippery slope, which relatively minor accounting gimmicks becoming more and more aggressiveuntil they create material misstatements in the financial statements (Clikeman, 2003)The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued three staff accounting bulletins (SAB) to provide guidance on some accounting issues in order to prevent the inappropriate earnings management activities by public companies: SAB No. 99 “Materiality〞, SAB No. 100 “Restructuring and Impairment Charges〞 and SAB No. 101 “Revenue Recognition〞.Earnings management behavior may affect the quality of accounting earnings, which is defined by Schipper and Vincent (2003) as the extent to which the reported earnings faithfully represent Hichsian economic income, which is the amount that can be consumed (i.e. paid out as dividends) during a period, while leaving the firm equally well off at the beginning and the end of the period.Assessment of earning quality requires sometimes the separations of earnings into cash from operation and accruals, the more the earnings is closed to cash from operation, the higher earnings quality. As Penman (2001) states that the purpose of accounting quality analysis is to distinguish between the “hard〞 numbers resulting from cash flows and the “soft〞 numbers resulting from accrual accounting.The quality of earnings can be assessed by focusing on the earning persistence; high quality earnings are more persistent and useful in the process of decision making.Beneish and Vargus (2002) investigate whether insider trading is informative about earnings quality using earning persistence as a measure for the quality of earnings, they find that income-increasing accruals are significantly more persistent for firms with abnormal insider buying and significantly less persistent for firms with abnormal insider selling, relative to firms which there is no abnormal insider trading.Balsam et al. (2003) uses the level of discretionary accruals as a direct measure企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献for earning quality. The discretionary accruals model is based on a regression relationship between the change in total accruals as dependent variable and change in sales and change in the level of property, plant and equipment, change in cash flow from operations and change in firm size (total assets) as independent variables. If the regression coefficients in this model are significant that means that there is earning management in that firm and the earnings quality is low.This research presents an empirical study on using three different approaches of measuring the quality of earnings on different industry. The notion is; if there is a complete consistency among the three measures, a general assessment for the quality of earnings (high or low) can be reached and, if not, the quality of earnings is questionable and needs different other approaches for measurement and more investigations and analysis.The rest of the paper is divided into following sections: Earnings management incentives, Earnings management techniques, Model development, Sample and statistical results, and Conclusion.2. Earnings management incentives 2.1 Meeting analysts’ expectations In general, analysts’ expectations and company predictions tend to address two high-profile components of financial performance: revenue and earnings from operations.The pressure to meet revenue expectations is particularly intense and may be the primary catalyst in leading managers to engage in earning management practices that result in questionable or fraudulent revenue recognition practices. Magrath and Weld (2002) indicate that improperrevenue recognition practices were the cause of one-third of all voluntary or forced restatements of income filed with the SEC from 1977 to 2000. Ironically, it is often the companies themselves that create this pressure to meet the market’s earnings expectations. It is common practice for companies to provide earnings estimates to analysts and investors. Management is often faced with the task of ensuring their targeted estimates are met.企业盈利质量分析中英文对照外文翻译文献Several companies, including Coca-Cola Co., Intel Corp., and Gillette Co., have taken a contrary stance and no longer provide quarterly and annual earnings estimates to analysts. In doing so, these companies claim they have shifted their focus from meeting short-term earnings estimates to achieving their long-term strategies (Mckay and Brown, 2002).2.2 To avoid debt-covenant violations and minimize political costs Some firms have the incentive to avoid violating earnings-based debt covenants. If violated, the lender may be able to raise the interest rate on the debt or demand immediate repayment. Consequently, some firms may use earnings-management techniques to increase earnings to avoid such covenant violations. On the other hand, some other firms have the incentive to lower earnings in order to minimize political costs associated with being seen as too profitable. For example, if gasoline prices have been increasing significantly and oil companies are achieving record profit level, then there may be incentive for the government to intervene and enact an excess-profit tax or attempt to introduce price controls.2.3 To smooth earnings toward a long-term sustainable trendFor many years it has been believed that a firm should attempt to reduce the volatility in its earnings stream in order to maximize share price. Because a highly violate earning pattern indicates risk, therefore thestock will lose value compared to others with more stable earnings patterns. Consequently, firms have incentives to manage earnings to help achieve a smooth and growing earnings stream (Ortega and Grant, 2003).2.4 Meeting the bonus plan requirementsHealy (1985) provides the evidence that earnings are managed in the direction that is consistent with maximizing executives’ earnings-based bonus. When earnings will be below the minimum level required to earn a bonus, then earning are managed upward so that the minimum is achieved and a bonus is earned. Conversely, when earning will be above the maximum level at which no additional bonus is paid, then earnings are managed downward. The extra earnings that will not generate extra bonus this current period are saved to be used to earn a bonus in a future period.。

企业利润分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业利润分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Profit PatternsThe most important objective of companies is to create, develop and maintain one or more competitive advantages in order to generate dividends for the shareholders. For a long time, it was simply a question of dominating the market, either by costs or by a policy of differentiation. As Michael Porter advised, it was essential to avoid being “stuck in the middle”. This way of thinking set up competitive rivalry in a closed world, and tended towards stability. This model is less and less relevant today forwhole sectors of the economy. We see a multitude of strategic movements which defy the logic of the old system. “Profit Patterns”lists numerous strategies which have joined the small number that we knew before. These patterns often combine to give rise to strategic models which are better adapted to the new and changing needs of the consumer.Increasing the value of a company depends on its capacity to predict Value migration from one economic sector to another or from one company to another has unimaginable proportions, in particular because of the new phenomena that mass investment and venture capital represent. The public is looking for companies that will succeed in the future and bet on the winner.Major of managers have a talent for recognizing development market trends There are some changing and development trends in all business sectors. They can be erected into models, thereby making it possible to acquire a technique for predicting them. This consists of recognizing them in the actual economic context. This book proposes thirty strategic prediction models divided into seven families. Predicting is not enough: one still has to act in time! Managers analyze development trends in the environment in order to identifyopportunities. They then have to determine a strategic plan for their company, and set up a system aligning the internal and external organizational structure as a function of their objectives.For most of the 20th century, mastering strategic evolution models was not a determining factor, and formulas for success were fixed and relatively simple. In industry, the basic model stated that profit was a function of relative market share. T oday, this rule is confronted with more and more contradictions: among car manufacturers for example, where small companies like T oyota are more profitable than General Motors and Ford. The highest rises in value have become the exclusive right of the companies with the most efficient business designs. These upstart companies have placed themselves in the profit zone of their sectors thanks, in part, to their size, but also to their new way of doing business –exploiting new rules which are sources of value creation. Among the new rules which define a good strategic plan are:1. Strong orientation towards the customer2. Internal decisions which are coherent with the overall activity, concerning the products and services as well as the involvement in the different activities of the value chain3. An efficient mechanism for value–capture.4. A powerful source of differentiation and of strategic control, inspiring investor confidence in future cash-flow.5. An internal organization carefully designed to support and reinforce the company’s strategic plan.Why does value migrate? The explanation lies largely in the explosion of risk-capital activities in the USA. Since the 40’s, of the many companies that have been created, about a thousand have allowed talented employees, the “brains”, to work without the heavy structures of very big companies. The risk–capital factor is now entering a new phase in the USA, in that the recipes for innovation and value creation are spreading from just the risk-capital companies to all big companies. A growing number of the 500 richest companies have an internal structure for getting into the game of investing in companies with high levels of value-creation. Where does this leave Eur ope? According to recent research, innovation in strategic thinking is under way in Europe, albeit with a slight time-lag. Globalization is making the acceptation of these value-creation rules a condition of global competitively .There is a second phenomenon that has an even more radical influence on value-creation –polarization: The combination of a convincing and innovative strategic plan, strategic control and a dominant market share creates a terrificincrease in investor confidence. The investors believe that the company has established its position of strength not only for the current, but also for the next strategic cycle. The result is an exponential growth in value, and especially a spectacular out-distancing of the direct rivals. The polarization process typically has two stages. In phase 1, the competitors seem to be level. In fact, one of them has understood, has “got it”, before the others and is investing in a new strategic action plan to take into account the pattern which is starting to redefine the sector. Phase 2 begins when the conditions are right for the pattern to take over: at this moment, the competitor who “got it”, attracts the attention of customers, investors and potential recruits (the brains). The intense public attention snowballs, the market value explodes to leave the nearest competitor way behind. Examples are numerous in various sectors: Microsoft against Apple and Lotus, Coca-Cola against Pepsi, Nike against Reebok and so on. Polarization of value raises the stakes and adds a sense of urgency: The first company to anticipate market change and to take appropriate investment decisions can gain a considerable lead thanks to recognition by the market.In a growing number of sectors today, competition is concentrated on the race towards mindshare. The companywhich leads this race attracts customers who attract others in an upwards spiral. At the transition from phase 1 to phase 2, the managing team’s top priority is to win the mindshare battle. There are three stages in this strategy: mind sharing with customers gives an immediate competitive advantage in terms of sales; mind sharing with investors provides the resources to maintain this advantage, and mind sharing with potential recruits increases the chances of maintaining the lead in the short and the long term. This triple capture sets off a chain reaction releasing an enormous amount of economic energy. Markets today are characterized by a staggering degree of transparency. Successes and failures are instantaneously visible to the whole world. The extraordinary success of some investors encourages professional and amateurs to look for the next hen to lay a golden egg. This investment mentality has spread to the employment market, where compensations (such as stock-options) are increasingly linked to results. From these three components - customers, investors and new talent –is created the accelerating phenomenon, polarization: thousands of investors look towards the leader at the beginning of the race. The share value goes up at the same time as the rise in customer numbers and the public perception that the current leader willbe the winner. The rise in share-price gets more attention from the media, and so on. How to get the knowledge before the others, in order to launch the company into leadership? There are several attitudes, forms of behavior and knowledge that can be used: being paranoiac, thinking from day to day that the current market conditions are going to change; talking to people with different points of view; being in the field, looking for signs of change. And above all, building a research network to find the patterns of strategic change, not only in one’s particular sector, but in the whole economy, so as always to understand the patterns a bit better and a bit sooner than the competitors.Experienced managers can detect similarities between movements of value in different circumstances. 30 of these patterns can be divided into 7 categories.Some managers understand migrations of value before other managers, allowing them to continually improvise their business plan in order to find and exploit value. Experience is an obvious advantage: situations can repeat themselves or be similar to others, so that experienced managers recognize and assimilate them quickly. There about 30 patterns .which can be put into 7 groups according to their key factors. It is important to understand that the patterns have three general characteristics:multiplicity, variants and cycles. The principle of multiplicity indicates that while a sector or a company may be affected by just one simple strategic pattern, most situations are more complicated and involve several simultaneously evolving patterns. The variants to the known models are developed in different circumstances and according to the creativity of the users of the models. Studying the variants gives more finesse in model-analysis. Finally, each model depends on economic cycles which are more or less long. The time a pattern takes to develop depends on its nature and also on the nature of the customers and sector in question.1) The first family of strategic evolution patterns consists of the six “Mega patterns”: these models do not address any particular dimension of the activity (customer, channels of distribution and value chain), but have an overall and transversal influence. They owe their name “Mega”to their range and their impact (as much from the point of view of the different economic sectors as from the duration). The six Mega models are: No profit, Back to profit, Convergence, Collapse in the middle, De facto standard and T echnology shifts the board. •The No profit pattern is characterized by a zero or negative result over several years in a company or economic sector. The first factor which favors this pattern is the existence of a singlestrategic a plan in several competitors: they all apply differentiation by price to capture market-share. The second factor is the loss of the “crutch”of the sector, that is the end of a system of the help, such as artificially maintained interest levels, or state subsidies. Among the best examples of this in the USA are in agriculture and the railway industry in the 50’s and 60’s, and in the aeronautical industry in the 80’s and 90’s. •The Back to profit pattern is characterized by the emergence of innovative strategic plans or the projects which permit the return of profits. In the 80’s, the watch industry was stagnating in a no profits zone. The vision of Nicolas Hayek allowed Swatch and other brands to get back into a profit-making situation thanks to a products pyramid built around the new brand. The authors rightly attribute this phenomenon to investors’recognition of the superiority of these new business designs. However this interpretation merits refinement: the superiority resides less in the companies’current capacity to identify the first an indications of strategic discontinuity than in their future capacity to develop a portfolio of strategic options and to choose the right one at the right time. The value of a such companies as Amazon and AOL, which benefit from financial polarization, can only be explained in this way. To be competitive in the long-term,a company must not only excel in its “real”market, but also in its financial market. Competition in both is very fierce, and one can not neglect either of these fields of battle without suffering the consequences. This share-market will assume its own importance alongside the commercial market, and in the future, its successful exploitation will be a key to the strategic superiority of publicly-quoted companies.Increasing the value of a company depends on its capacity to predictValue migration from one economic sector to another or from one company to another has unimaginable proportions, in particular because of the new phenomena that mass investment and venture capital represent. The public is looking for companies that will succeed in the future and bet on the winner.Major managers have a talent for recognizing development market trendsThere are some changing and development trends in all business sectors. They can be erected into models, thereby making it possible to acquire a technique for predicting them. This consists of recognizing them in the actual economic context.Predicting is not enough: one still has to act in timeManagers analyze development trends in the environment in order to identify opportunities. They then have to determine a strategic plan for their company, and set up a system aligning the internal and external organizational structure as a function of their objectivesSource: David .J. Morrison, 2001. “Profit Patterns”. Times Business.pp.17-27.译文:利润模式一个公司价值的增长依赖于公司自身的能力的预期,价值的迁移也只是从一个经济部门转移到另外一个经济部门或者是一个公司到另外一个意想不到的公司。

中国上市公司盈利能力研究英文

中国上市公司盈利能力研究英文

Profitability of Chinese listed companies1 Profitability study: Significance and key conclusions1.1 Significance of profitability studyProfits are the core of business operations in a modern economy. Drive for profits keep producers producing and retailers selling. As companies expand, capacity expansion starts to grow beyond its own means. Fund raising becomes a necessity. This can be achieved through loans, bonds or stocks. The key for bank loans or bond issuance is credit worthiness, or borr owers’ ability to pay back debt. For the stock market, the focus is on present and future profitability, in terms of earnings, earnings growth, cash flows, margins and market shares. In the direct capital market, capital investment destinations are determined through comparing return on equity (ROE). Companies that can deliver earnings and create maximum return on investment deserve the top picks.Unlike the original capitalist or entrepreneur, money at the stock market level has many choices of investment. It is much less attached to the original investment plan and typically less picky about which industry or management (smart investors do care about sector and management, but mainly from an investment perspective, not from a personal one) it will invest in. Money is committed to make money. The higher and the stronger profits are, the bigger the returns the investment will reap.While ROE profitability is at the centre of equity markets worldwide, less emphasis to it has been given in China. The short life span of China’ s stock exchange, excessive domestic liquidity in the past years and restrictions on capital flow all appear to have directed attention away from profitability. Management of some listed Chinese companies may also not to be focusing on this issue.In overseas markets, Chinese companies’ lack of profitability is probably the most frequently cited concern amongst equity investors. Less anxiety is expressed in 4 the domestic A-shares markets, but a rising awareness of earnings and other fundamentals has been evident recently. As Chinese equity markets develop and mature, we believe that domestic investors will place a stronger emphasis on profitability and demand higher returns on equity.The profitability i ssue goes beyond capital markets and investors’ interests. It is also a central pillar of a country’ s sustainable growth path, because profits represent wealth accumulation. Improvement in profitability is a proxy of productivity gains. One key lesson to be learnt from the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s is that economic growth must be associated with improvement in productivity and profitability. The old Asian model of pursuing high growththrough continued capital and labour inputs delivered impressive results for years or even decades, but ultimately failed. There is an abundant amount of economics literature detailing the “ Asian model” and its flaws, so we shall not extend the discussion further in this paper.Nonetheless, it is clear that shifting away from “ quantitative expansion” or a market share driven development pattern to “ qualitative expansion” or a productivity driven development pattern is crucial for Chin a’ s long term development strategy. This is about the sustainability of on-going rapid economic development. This is about the long-term prospects of China.Research articles focusing on the profitability and corporate governance of Chinese listed companies from a macro perspective from China or international financial institutions have been few and far between until recent years. Moreover, we took our study a little further by comparing profitability on a global scale as well as on an industry basis. To our knowledge, this has never been done before, but is significant in order to understand the strength and weakness of the listed companies. We also surveyed institutional investors, domestic and aboard, taking advantage of the unique combination of this project. Again, we believe this to bea new attempt at such work. 51.2 Basic conclusionsThe key findings and conclusions from this project are listed below.1) The Chinese listed companies in our survey generally recorded respectable profitability, in comparison to listed companies in US, Europeand Japan. A-shares companies seem to have higher ROE and marginsthan those listed in Hong Kong, though a bad macro environment in HongKong in the past few years probably lowered the profitability of Chinese companies, which receive a large source of their revenue flow from theSAR. Most overseas investors do not seem to be aware of the fact that theA-shares have a higher profitability than the Hong Kong listed Chinese companies.2) There is a clear trend of declining R OE and net income margins amongst companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen. While average margins inthe mid-1990s are in line with world standards; by the end of the 1990s,they had fallen significantly. This may be related to the deflationary environment at the macro level; this downward momentum in profitability is worrying. Hong Kong listed Chinese companies do not seem to be afflictedwith this problem.3) The falling margins of the Chinese manufacturing and consumer product sectors are particularly alarming, because these of the key sectors ofChina’ s economy. Profitability of some industries may be tied to the global cycle, such as petrochemicals and aviation sectors, where pricemovements and demand/supply balances are determined by globalmarkets. Utility companies have the steadiest ROE amongst the surveyed companies, and enjoy higher margins and returns than their international peers.4) Both ROE and net income margins of the China listed companies tend to fall once the listing process is completed. We divided companies by theiryear of listing. From 1994 to 2000, each and every category saw their 6ROE peak in either the year immediately before listing or in the listing year. Most classes recorded consecutive falls in profitability since then. There isno clear evidence that the Hong Kong listed Chinese companies follow the same pattern.5) In a poll we conducted amongst overseas and domestic institutional investors, all the fund mangers surveyed marked profitability high on their priority list. Most of them also think the margins of Chinese companies are probably below the world average. While domestic investors areenthusiastic to invest in the Hong Kong market through the QDII scheme,only one third of the surveyed international fund managers indicated they would invest in the A-shares market once QFII is introduced.Our basic conclusion from this study is: listed companies, investors and stock exchange authorities all need to place more emphasis on profitability and ROE because they are the cornerstones of modern capitalism and capital markets. It is a particularly challenging task, as China is set to liberalise its capital markets in the next decade. This means both domestic and international capital would have more options on what, or even whether, to invest in Chinese companies in the future. Chinese companies will have to compete against their global peers for capital. Profitability and return on equity are key valuation tools to attract investors. Improving profita bility is also crucial for China’ s long-term prospects, as the economy needs to raise productivity.。

外文文献企业盈利能力分析

外文文献企业盈利能力分析

文献出处:标题 : A ssessm ent of Financial R isk in Firm 's Profitability A naly sis作者 : S olomon, Daniela C ristina; M untean, M i rcea出版物名称 : Economy Transdisciplinarity C og nition卷 : 15期 : 2页 : 58 -67页数 : 10出版年份 : 2012A ssessm en t of F in a n c ia l R isk in F ir m ' s P r ofita b i l i t y A n a ly sisA bstract: In the contex t of g lobalization w e are w i tnessing an unprecedented diversification of risk situations and uncertainty in the business w orld, the w hole ex i stence of an org anization being related to risk . The notion of risk i s inextricably l inked to the return. R eturn includes ensuring remuneration of production factors and invested capital but a lso resources manag em ent in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. A full financial and econom ic diag nosis can not be done w i thout reg a rd to the return-risk ra tio.S tock profitability analy s i s should not be dissociated from risk analy s i s to w hich the com pany i s subdued. R isk analy sis i s useful in decision making concerning the use of economic-financial potential or investm ent decisions, in developing business plans, and a lso to inform partners about the enterprise's performa nce level.R i sk takes many form:, operational risk, financial risk and tota l risk , risk of bankruptcy ( other risk categ ories) each influencing the business activity on a g reater or lesser extent. Financial risk analy s i s, realized w i th the use of specific indicators such as: financial leverag e , financial breakeven and leverag e ra tio ( C LF) accompany ing call to debt, presents a major interest to optim ize the financial s tructure and viability of any com pany operating under a g enuine m arket econom y .Key w ords: risk analy sis fina ncial risk , financial leverag e , breakeven point.IntroductionR i sk and return a re tw o interdependent aspects in the activity of a com pany , so the question i s assuming a certain level of risk to achieve the profitability that it a l low s. R eturn can only be assessed but on the basis of supported risk . This risk a ffects econom ic asset returns first, and secondly of capital invested. Therefore it can be addressed both in terms of business, as the org anizer of the production process driven by intention to increase property ow ners and adequate remuneration of production factors and the position of outside financial investors, interested in carry ing the best investm ent, in financial market conditions w i th several areas of return and different risk levels.R isk assessm ent should consider manag ing chang e : people chang e , methods chang e , the risks chang e [ 1 , 36 ] .C onsequently , profitability i s subject to the g eneral condition of risk w here the org anization operates. R i sk takes m any forms, each a ffecting the ag ents' econom ic activity on a lesser or g reater ex tent. For econom ic and financial analy sis a t the micro level presents a particular interest those form s of risk that ca n be influenced, in the sense of reduction, throug h the actions and measures the economic ag ents can underg o.1.. Financial R i sk in Economic Theory and PracticeFinancial activity , in i ts m any seg m ents is influenced by unex pectedly restrictive e lem ents as evolution, often unexpected, not depending directly on economic ag ents. Impact of various factors ( m a rket, competition, tim e factor,inflation, ex chang e rates, interest, com missions, human factors and not least the company culture) often mak es financial decision become a decision under risk.Financial risk characterizes variability in net profit, under the company 's financial structure. There a re no financial templa te features, each business activity prints i ts ow n sig nificant varia tions from case to case. In the case of reta i l ers, "intang ible assets a re less important, but stocks a re significant, and the appeal to credit provider is frequently used, being very useful for treasury business" [ 2 , 40 ] .A n optim a l capital structure w i l l max imize enterprise value by balancing the deg ree of risk and ex pected return rate.M anag em ent of financial risk is an integ ra l part of planning and financial control, subm itted to strateg ic and tactical decisions for a continuous adaptation to inside and outside company conditions, constantly chang ing and it requires:-identification of a reas that are prone to risk;-l ikelihood estima tion of financial risk production;-determining the independence relations betw een financial risk and other significant risks ( operational risk , market risk - interest rate fluctuations);-delim i ta tion of risk and keeping i t under observation to stop or diminish ( minim ize) the effect;-identify causal factors for financial risk, in order to define potential adverse effects induced on the overall activity of the company ;-determining the risk as quantifiable s i ze, as w ell as the effects associated to risk occurrence;-determining the routes to follow and strateg ies to fit the company 's financial activity in an area of financial certainty .Financial risk i ssues can be found a t the heart of R om anian accountant's norma l izors. A ccording to the OM PF 3055 /2 009 , the B oard m ust prepare for each financial y ear a report, called a M anag ers ' report, w hich must include, besides an accurate presentation of development and performance of the entity 's activity and i ts financial position, a lso a description of main risks and uncertainties that i t fa ces.Thus, M anag ers report must provide information on: the objectives and policies of the entity concerning financial risk m anag ement, including i ts policy for risk covering for each major ty pe of forecasted transaction for w hich risk coverag e accounting i s used, and entity 's exposure to market risk, credit risk , l i quidity risk and cash flow .R equired disclosures provide information to help users of financial statem ents in evaluating the risk financial instrum ents, recog nized or not in balance sheet.The m a in categ ories of financial risks a ffecting the company 's performance a re [ 3 ] :1 . M arket risk that com prises three ty pes of risk :0 currency risk - the risk that the value of a financial instrument { Financial instrum ent i s defined according OM FP 3055 /2 009 , A rt. 126 , as: ''... any contract that s im ultaneously g enerates a financial active for an entity and a financial debt or equity instrument for another entity ") w i l l fluctuate because of chang es in currency exchang e rates; the low ering of ex chang e rate can lead to a loss of value of assets denominated in foreig n currency thus influencing business perform ance;0 fa i r value interest rate risk - the risk that the value of a financial instrument w i l l fluctuate due to chang es in market interest ra tes;0 price risk - the risk that the value of a financial instrum ent w i l l fluctuate as a result of chang ing market prices, eveni f these chang es are caused by factors specific to individual instruments or their i ssuer, or factors a ffecting a l l instrum ents traded in the ma rket. The term "market risk " incorporates not only the potential loss but as w e l l the g a in.2.. C redit risk - the risk that a party of financial instrument w i l l not to com ply w i th the undertaking , causing the other party a financial loss.3.. Liquidity risk - ( a lso called funding risk) is risk that an entity meets in difficulties in procuring the necessary funds to m eet com mitm ents related to financial instrum ents. L iquidity risk ma y result from the inability to quickly se l l a financial asset a t a value close to i ts fa i r va lue.4.. Interest ra te risk from cash flow - i s the risk that future cash flow s w i l l fluctuate because of chang es in ma rket interest rates. For ex am ple, i f a variable rate debt instruments, such fluctuations a re to chang e the effective interest rate financial instrument, w i thout a corresponding chang e in its fa i r va lue.Financial environment i s characterized by a hig h interest rate volatility , w hich translates in term s of risk and indiscriminate harm s the va lue and profitability of any enterprise [ 4 , 89 ] . Interest ra te risk on the balance sheet i s reflected by chang es in m arket value of an asset, as the present value of an asset i s determ ined by discounting cash flow s using interest rate or w eig hted averag e cost of capital [ 5 , 89 ] .2 . Financial R isk A ssessmentFinancial risk assessm ent is performed by using specific indicators such as: financial leverag e, financial breakeven and leverag e factor ( C L F) w hose values ex press fluctuations in net profit, under the company 's financial structure chang e .Financial leverag e effectFinancial ri sk or capital concerns the com pany 's financial structure and depends on the manner of funding the activity : i f it is w holly financed by equity , i t w i l l not involve financial risk . This risk appears only if loan financing sources involving charg e to pay interest and show s a direct influence on financial profitability ( of equity ) [ 6 , 170 ] .Debt, the size and cost drives the variability of results and autom a tica l l y chang es the financial risk. The size of influence of financial structure on firm performance has produced financial leverag e effect, w hich can be defined as the m echanism throug h w hich debt a ffects return on equity , return on the ratio of benefits ( net income) and equity .B etw een economic profitability and financial return there i s a tig ht correlation. Financial return is rooted in economic returns. The difference betw een the tw o rates is g enerated by com pany policy options for funding . U sually , on equal economic rate return, financial profitability ra tes vary depending on finance source - from ow n equity or borrow ed capital.In econom ic theory the link betw een financial profitability ra te ( R f) and econom ic ra te of return ( R e) is hig hlig hted by the follow ing equation:...w here: d = averag e interest rate; D= total debts; C pr = ow n equity ;...If for calculation of return ra tes profit tax i s taken into account, the relationship becomes [ 6 , 170 ] :w here: i=the tax rate....W e can see the influence that financial structure, respective "all financial resources or capital composition that financial manag er use to increase the needed funding " [ 7 , 36 ] , has on the overall profitability of the company . B y reporting total debt ( D) to ow n equity ( C PR ) i s determined financial leverag e ( L F) ( or leverag e ratio) reflecting the proportion of g rants to loans and g rants to i ts ow n resources. The report should not ex ceed the value 2 , otherw i se the debt capacity of the enterprise i s considered saturated, and borrow ing above this l im i t lead to the risk of insolvency , both to the borrow er and the lender.The financial leverag e effect ( E L F) results from the difference betw een financial and economic return and "ex pressesthe impact of debt on the entity 's equity , the ratio betw een ex ternal and domestic financing ( dom estic resources) " [ 2 , 40 ] thus reflecting the influence offinancial structure on the perform ance of an entity :...Depending or not on the consideration of income tax , net or g ross ra tes of return can be measured, i.e . net or raw financial leverag e effect, as follow s:Debt i s favorable w hile the interest rate i s inferior to the ra te of economic profitability , w hich has a positive influence on financial ra te of the company .Financial leverag e i s even g reater as the difference betw een economic profitability and interest rate i s hig her, in this respect can be seen several cases presented in Table 1 .Leverag e effect a l low s evolution stimulation for financial profitability according to the chang e in funding policy of the enterprise being an im portant param eter for stra teg ic business decisions [ 8 , 164 -165 ] .B ased on the balance sheet and profit and loss account of tw o studied companies' rates of return and financial leverag e a re determ ined, as presented in table no. 2 .From the analy sis of the data presented in Table 2 w e may see the follow ing conclusions:1.. Economic and financial rates of return, in the case of S .C . A L FA S .A . follow s an upw a rd trend recently analy zed aspect reflecting the increased efficiency in the use of equity capital invested, w hile for S .C . B ETA S .A . evolution is a descendant one.2.. R eturn on equity ( equity efficiency ) w as hig her than the ra te of economic profitability ( econom ic efficiency of assets, invested capital respectively ) throug hout the period under review follow ing a positive financial leverag e ( EL F> 0 ) and hig her econom ic efficiency cost of borrow ing ( R e> d).3.. R educing financial leverag e for S .C . A L FA S .A . reduced the favorable effect of the debt presence on financial efficiency ra te , w hich w as due to low er w e ig ht ra tio of tota l debt and equity g row th.4.. Total debt increased during N-l and N y ears for S .C . B ETA S .A . resulted in increased financial leverag e that potentiates financial return ahead as the economic ra te of return.The evolution of the relationship betw een g ross economic return ( R ebr) and g ross financial profitability ( R fbr) for S .C . A L FA S .A . is g raphically presented in Fig ure 1 , and for S .C . B ETA S .A . in Fig ure 2 .A naly zing the evolution offinancial leverag e ( Fig ure 3 ) one can see that risk capital i s not placed a t a level too hig h, w hich m ig ht jeopardize the financial autonom y of enterprises.S ome financiers, as M odig l i ani and Fisher a rg ue that i t i s more advantag eous for the company to finance from loans than from equity [ 6 , 170 ] as the cost of borrow ed capital ( debt interest) i s a lw a y s deductible company 's tax , w hile the cost of equity ( preserved benefits and dividends) i s not tax deductible for the com pany . S hareholders tend to fa ll into debt to g et more tax sa ving , in this w a y , "indebted enterprise va lue appears to be hig her than the company that i s not under debt"[ 7 , 36 ] .Financial breakeven returnEstablishing the company 's position in relation to financial return breakeven for financial risk analy s i s i s determined taking into account fix ed costs and fix ed financial costs, meaning interest ex penses. In this s ituation turnover is calculated corresponding to a financial breakeven return or "financial standstill".B reakeven thus determ ined depends on four fundam ental variables [ 10 ] :-three parameters that influence the stability results of operations:*stability of turnover;*costs structure;*firm position in relation to i ts dead point;-financial ex penses level, respective the debt policy practiced by the company .B ased on these values safety indicators or position indicators are estimated, presented in Table 3 .w here: C A ^tic= financial breakeven;C f = fix ed ex penses;C hfin = financial ex pensesC V = variable ex penses; CA = turnover;R mcv = variable ex penses rate marg in.Financial risk deepens econom ic risk ( in addition to repa y ment of loans, interest costs need to be paid), and finally g enerates a pay ment default of the company that can lead to bankruptcy risk [ 11 , 36 ] .Financial leverag e ratio ( C L F)Financial risk assessment and evaluation can be m ade based on financial leverag e factor ( C L F). It ex presses the sensitivity of net income ( R net) to operating results variations ( R exp) and m easures the percentag e increase of net incom e in response to increase w i th one percentag e of results from operations. C a lculation relationship is as follow s:...respective: ...The C L F calculation takes into account only the current result and financial ex penses, only that correlate w i th the operation, w hich reduces net income relationship: R net = ( R ex p - C hfin) * ( ! - /)In these c ircum stances, financial leverag e coefficient g a ins ex pression: d c . \ /. .v i R exp...C L F= R qx PIt notes that the financial leverag e ratio i s directly proportional to financial ex penses w hich increase hig her the value of C L F and therefore increase in financial risk .Financial risk as measured by financial leverag e ra tio meets vary ing deg rees depending on know ing the coefficient values from zero to infinity [ 6 , 170 ] :B ased on profit and loss account of the tw o studied companies w e determine financial risk indicators presented in Table no. 4 .It can be noticed that, based on the data in Table 4 , the com panies have a com fortable s i tuation in term s of financial risk , because financial expenses have insig nificant values, and in N-2 y ear their absence a l low ed to obtain a financial leverag e ra tio equal to 1 , companies' ex posure to financial risk being m inor.A ctual turnover for the tw o com panies w ere above breakeven financial ( o ver critical turnover) in the analy zed period, aspect w hich a l low ed the recording of safety m arg ins, safety spaces and positive efficiency g a ins.Graphical representation of comparative evolution of financial leverag e ratio i s sug g estively show n in Fig ure no. 4 .In the case of S . C . A L FA S .A . the entire period financial risk is minor due to low level of financial costs, the company preferring to use only i ts ow n resources to finance the activity . Poor values of financial leverag e ra tio ( very c lose to 1 ) support the previous sta tements.Greatest financial risk to w hich S .C . B ETA S .A . i s ex posed to i s manifested in financial y ear N, w hen the value ofcoefficient C L F is max imum , respectively 1 ,11047 w hich show s increasing dependence of net result on the operating result, and consequently , increased financial risk due to the g ap betw een the index and results of operations index of financial ex penses ( l R ex p <Ichfin)- How ever, financial risk i s minor, the society proves superior financial perform ance as turnover i s w e l l above the critical turnover ( financial breakeven), rang e safety hovering w ell above the 20 % in the analy zed period.C onclusionsDebt had a positive effect on financial profitability m anifested as a "financial leverag e" ( positive leverag e effect). Ex tremely low level of debt and low er value of financial l iabilities inferior to ow n equity makes companies not ri sk y in term s of financial solvency . In this situation, for both com panies, i s m ore advantag eous to use the medium and long term loans to finance business, thus ensuring them an additional profit. U s ing debt should be made w i th caution in order not to l imit the financial independence of firm s and reduce additional debt opportunities in times of crisis.A naly sis of financial risk and leverag e effect that accom pany the call to debt, presents a major interest to optim ize the financial structure and viability of any com pany operating under a real market econom y .The use of loans can be risky for the entity and i ts shareholders, but this m ethod of financing becom es advantag eous for entity shareholders s imply because they are able to hold an asset more im porta nt than equity value, increasing their economic pow er. The financing of company ex pansion activity can be achieved by a s ig nificant increase in borrow ed capital provided economic returns exceed the averag e interest rate.C ompany 's risk assessment on the basis of leverag e coefficients i s required for the predicted behavior analy s i s for estimating future results, w hich must be taken into account in decision m aking process.R efer en ces[ 1 ] M orariu, A ., C recanä,C ., D., ( 2009 ) , ''Internal audit. S tra teg y in manag em ent advising ", Theoretical and A pplied Economics - supplem ent, B ucharest, p. 36 .[ 2 ] M orariu, A ., C recanä, C ., D., ( 2009 ) , ''The im pact of economic performance on financial position", Financial A udit, no. 5 , The C hamber of Financial A uditors from R omania Publish house ( C A FR ) , B ucharest, p. 40 .[ 3 ] OM FP, 3055 /2 009 , A rt. 306 , a l .( 3) .[ 4 ] J offre, P., S im on, Z., ( 2007 ) , Ency c lopédie de g estion, Economie Publish house, Paris, 1989 , quoted by J ianu, L , p. 89 .[ 5 ] J ianu, I., ( 2007 ) , Evaluation, presentation and analy sis of enterprise's performance - A n approach from International Financial R eporting S tandards, C EC C A R Publish house, B ucharest, p. 89 .[ 6 ] Petrescu, S ., ( 2010 ) , A naly sis and financial - accounting diag nostic -Theoreticapplicative g uide, 3 rd edition, revised and enlarg ed, C EC C A R Publish house, B ucharest, p. 170 .[ 7 ] M i roniuc, M ., ( 2007 ) , A ccounting and financial manag ement of the company . C oncepts. Policies. Practices, S edcom L ibris Publish house, Iaçi, p. 36 .[ 8 ] Zait, D., ( 2008 ) , Evaluation and manag em ent of direct investments, S edcom Libris Publish house, Ia §i, p. 164 -165 .[ 9 ] National B ank of R om ania, R eference Interest - history , available on[ 10 ] Quiry , P., Le Fur, Y ., Pierre V emim men ( 2008 ) , Finance d'entreprise 2009 , 7 th edition , Dalloz Publisher, Paris.[ 11 ] B erheci, M ., ( 2009 ) , "The risks in l i fe business and accounting outcom e variability " - Part II, A ccounting , auditing and business expertise, p. 36 .。

上市公司股利政策中英文对照外文文献翻译

上市公司股利政策中英文对照外文文献翻译

上市公司股利政策中英文对照外文文献翻译文献出处:Brunzell T, Liljeblom E, Löflund A, et al. Dividend policy in Nordic listed firms [J]. Global Finance Journal, 2014, 25(2): 124-135.原文Dividend policy in Nordic listed firmsTor, Eva, Anders, MikaAbstractIn this paper we analyze the results from a survey among all publicly listed Nordic firms on their dividend payout policy. The results show that 72% of the Nordic companies have a specified dividend policy. Larger and more profitable companies are more likely to have a defined dividend policy in place. The dividend policy is mostly influenced by capital structure considerations and the outlook of future earnings. We also find that the likelihood for a firm having an explicit dividend policy is positively related to ownership concentration as well as to the presence of large long-term private or industrial owners. Our results support the use of defined dividend policies for agency or monitoring reasons rather than signaling reasons.Keywords: Corporate finance; Dividend policy; Payout; NASDAQ OMXIntroductionEver since studies such as Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968), a large number of papers have studied corporate dividend policies (payout ratios) and factors that contribute to the payout decision. Recently, focus has been on the choice between dividends and share repurchases (see for example Guay and Harford, 2000 and Jagannathan et al., 2000; and Skinner, 2008), the question of disappearing dividends (see for example DeAngelo et al., 2004 and Fama and French, 2001), and the relationship between minority protection and dividends (see for example Faccio et al., 2001 and La Porta et al., 2000). Typically, the dividend payout is found to be a function of factors such as profitability of the company, stability of the earnings, rate of growth, free cash flows, and more recently, the governing structure of the company. In their survey of dividend policies, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2008) conclude that a simple asymmetric information framework does a good job atexplaining observed payout policies. This framework emphasizes the need to distribute free cash flow in the presence of agency costs and security valuation problems. They also conclude that other motives and factors such as signaling, tax preferences, and clientele demands have at best minor influences, but that behavioral biases at the managerial level (such as overconfidence) and the idiosyncratic preferences of controlling shareholders plausibly have a first order impact.We contribute to the literature on studies of the relationship between controlling shareholders and dividend decisions by studying the determinants of whether a firm follows a more explicit dividend policy. While implicit dividend policies (most commonly the relationship between dividends and earnings, and the speed of adjustment to an assumed optimal level) have been subject of many studies, only a few papers have studied whether a company has an explicit defined dividendpolicy in place, and what factors are related to the choice of that policy (exceptions include Baker, Saadi, Dutta, & Gandhi, 2007; and Brav, Graham, Harvey, & Michaely, 2005).There are many reasons for why the question of whether the firm follows a clearly defined dividend policy may be of interest. Firstly, it can be seen as an alternative approach to study whether signaling can be one of the motives for dividend distributions. Without expectations for future dividends, formulated by some systematic publicly announced dividend policy, deviations from such expectations cannot be identified and reacted upon. Thus, one could view a ‚dividend policy‛as a necessary but not sufficient condition for dividends to convey information about future earnings. Secondly, a systematic and defined dividend policy may also be required by dominant corporate owners. The policy may solve agency problems between minority owners and large owners in firms with concentrated ownership (La Porta et al., 2000), and optimize taxation or satisfy large owners' preference for a more predictable dividend stream.Literature review and hypothesis developmentThere exists a vast literature on corporate dividend policy. The main determinants of a corporate dividend policy include tax optimizing, firm profitabilityand earnings stability, signaling (of firm investment policy) and managerial or majority owner related agency costs. There are a number of papers that study which factors are considered by companies when setting their dividend policy. Early results indicate that taxes play a role if taxation on capital gains and dividends differ, but if they do not differ, taxation does not play a major role (Amihud & Murgia, 1997). In addition, the profitability of the company and the stability of its earnings play a major role in the dividend policy (see for example Barclay, Smith, & Watts, 1995 and Gaver & Gaver, 1993). Other significant factors include, among others, company's (expected) growth rate and investment opportunities and signaling about the quality of the firm's investment potential (see for example Fama and French, 2001 and Michaely et al., 1996 and Myers & Majluf, 1984). Finally, La Porta, L ópez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) observe that companies tend to pay higher dividends in countries where minority shareholders have greater protection.A dividend policy can be formulated in several ways. In the Lintner (1956) study, the most common specification was based on the long-run target payout ratio. Current earnings are the main determinant of the current dividend while deviations from the target represent the signaling component. Dividend per share is another potential dividend policy target and is only weakly linked to current earnings performance through the corporate history. Dividends may also be related to other currently observable measures such as the company's stock price.DataThe survey dataThis paper is based on the results of a questionnaire directed to all chairpersons of the Board of firms in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). this paper lists the questions used in the survey.The survey was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, the questionnaire was sent to the chairmen in the Nordic firms listed on the exchanges operated by the OMX (now NASDAQ OMX) including the national stock markets of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. This took place in early December 2007. In the second stage, in May 2008, the questionnaire was sent to the chairmen in the firms listed at the OsloBørs in Norway. The questionnaire was sent as a letter directed to a named respondent. The names and addresses of the chairmen were hand-collected into a database. Ultimately, the questionnaire was sent to 780 firms in total.Background dataThe responses were matched with background information on firm financials and ownership concentration. The financial data are collected from three sources. Our primary source is the Amadeus database. Additional items have been collected from Datastream, when not available in Amadeus. Finally, annual reports downloaded from internet sources have provided an additional data source in cases where information has not been available in other databases. The financials are from the last reporting year completed prior to the questionnaire was sent out. This period is year-end 2006 for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden and year 2007 for Norway. Year-end exchange rates have been used to convert all financials to the same currency, euro, which already was the currency of Finland. Financial data were collected not only for responding firms, but also for the whole market, to facilitate relating our sample to the whole population of the survey.ResultsWe asked the chairpersons to indicate whether their company had a defined dividend policy. Two alternatives (‘yes’ and ‘no’) were given. Panel A shows the results. Out of the 158 responses we got from the chairpersons, 152 provided an answer to this question. 110 companies (72.4%) had a defined dividend policy, 42 (27.6%) did not.ConclusionsThe results of our extensive survey among Nordic listed firms on their commitment to dividend policy show that 72% of the Nordic companies have a specified dividend policy. Furthermore, the results indicate that the dividend policies are mostly influenced by the considerations of the company's capital structure and future earnings.In estimations studying the determinants for whether a firm has an explicit dividend policy or not, we find that firms with older chairmen appear to prefer alooser commitment to payout policy as their firms are significantly less likely to have an explicit dividend policy in place. We also documented that larger and more profitable companies are more likely to commit to a defined dividend policy.Finally, the likelihood for a firm having an explicit dividend policy is significantly positively related to ownership concentration as well as to large long-term private or industrial owners. This gives indirect support for agency/monitoring motives rather than the signaling motive which is expected to be more prevalent in firms with dispersed ownership. Overall, our results suggest that the relatively concentrated ownership structures in Nordic firms play a role in shaping dividend policy over traditional tax or signaling based rationales for a dividend policy. ReferencesAmihud, Y., & Murgia, M. (1997). Dividends, taxes, and signaling: Evidence from Germany. Journal of Finance, 52(1), 397–408.Baker, H. K., Mukherjee, T. K., & Paskelian, O. G. (2006). How Norwegian managers view dividend policy. Global Finance Journal, 17, 155–176.Baker, H. K., Saadi, S., Dutta, S., & Gandhi, D. (2007). The perception of dividends by Canadian managers: New survey evidence. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 3(1), 70–91.Barclay, M., Smith, C., & Watts, R. (1995). The determinants of corporate leverage and dividend policies. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7(4), 4–19.Bena, J., & Hanousek, J. (2005). Rent extraction by large shareholders: Evidence using dividend policy in the Czech Republic. Working paper series 291. Charles University, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education.Brav, A., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Michaely, R. (2005). Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(3), 483–527.Brunzell, T., Liljeblom, E., & Vaihekoski, M. (2013). Determinants of capitalbudgeting methods and hurdle rates in Nordic firms. Accounting & Finance, 53(1), 85–110.DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Skinner, D. J. (2004). Are dividends disappearing? Dividend concentration and the consolidation of earnings. Journal of FinancialEconomics, 72, 425–456.DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Skinner, D. J. (2008). Corporate payout policy. Foundations and trends in finance. Nos. 2-3. (pp. 95–287).Easterbrook, F. H. (1984). Two-agency explanations of dividends. American Economic Review, 74(4), 650–659.译文北欧上市公司的股利分配政策托尔,伊娃,安德斯,米卡摘要本文分析了所有在北欧公开上市的公司的股利分配政策。

上市公司盈利参考文献

上市公司盈利参考文献

上市公司盈利参考文献1、急求经济类参考文献1] 简东平湖北财经高等专科学校学报 ,2001,(05) 上市公司盈利能力分析评价探讨[J] [3] 王富强,徐静珍财会月刊 ,2004,(23) 上市公司盈利能力分析研究[J] [5] 张涛黑龙江财会 ,2002,(03) 试析股份制企业盈利能力指标[J] [7] 李萍,肖惠民广东金融学院学报 ,2003,(05) 浅谈企业盈利能力的分析[J] [9] 王彤中国工程咨询 ,2003,(05) 影响企业盈利能力的因素分析[J]: Evidence on the Relationship between Construction and Profitability in Banking ,Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,vol[2] Prowse S: The structure of corporate ownership in Japan, Journal of Finance,1992 (3), 1121–1140 , Market structure And Performance in Spanish Banking Using a Direct Measure of Efficiency, Applied Financial Economics, 199 Slade: Competing models of firm profitability, International Journal ofIndustrial Organization,2004(22)[6]管军、李文华石家庄经济学院学报上市公司业绩评价体系初探[J]2002(13)[] 李晓荣,王宪良.因子分析在上市公司盈利能力分析中的应用[J].财经科学.2002年增刊[9]张晓明,何滢.我国旅行社绩效评价方法探索[J].西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版.2003(1)[10] 汤青.中国上市公司盈利能力影响因素实证分析[J].山东财政学院学报[J].2005(2)[11] 王燕.企业盈利能力的评价.中国优秀硕士学位论文全文数据库,2006[12] 张庆昌,傅再育.中国上市公司盈利能力模型分析[J].贵州财经学院学报.2006(1)[13]张瑞龙,陈艳艳.基于Excel 的企业盈利能力分析模型设计[J].中国管理息化.2007(1)[14] 莫生红,李明伟.上市公司盈利能力综合评价模型的构建[J].2007(1)本回答被网友采纳2、最近要写毕业论文商业银行的盈利能力分析不知道哪个银行的比较好写 ~ 还有去哪里比较好找数据。

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The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms ☆Bharat A.Jain a,1,Narayanan Jayaraman b,2,Omesh Kini c,⁎aCollege of Business and Economics,Towson University,Towson,MD 21044,United States b College of Management,Georgia Institute of Technology,Atlanta,GA 30332,United Statesc Robinson College of Business,Georgia State University,Atlanta,GA 30303,United StatesReceived 1October 2006;received in revised form 1December 2006;accepted 1February 2007AbstractExtant empirical evidence indicates that the proportion of firms going public prior to achieving profitability has been increasing over time.This phenomenon is largely driven by an increase in the proportion of technology firms going public.Since there is considerable uncertainty regarding the long-term economic viability of these firms at the time of going public,identifying factors that influence their ability to attain key post-IPO milestones such as achieving profitability represents an important area of research.We employ a theoretical framework built around agency and signaling considerations to identify factors that influence the probability and timing of post-IPO profitability of Internet IPO firms.We estimate Cox Proportional Hazards models to test whether factors identified by our theoretical framework significantly impact the probability of post-IPO profitability as a function of time.We find that the probability of post-IPO profitability increases with pre-IPO investor demand and change in ownership at the IPO of the top officers and directors.On the other hand,the probability of post-IPO profitability decreases with the venture capital participation,proportion of outsiders on the board,and pre-market valuation uncertainty.©2007Published by Elsevier Inc.Keywords:Initial public offerings;Internet firms;Path-to-profitability;Hazard models;SurvivalJournal of Business Venturing xx (2007)xxx –xxxMODEL 1AJBV-05413;No of Pages 30☆We would like to thank Kalpana Narayanan,Raghavendra Rau,Sankaran Venkataraman (Editor),Phil Phan (Associate Editor),two anonymous referees,and participants at the 2002Financial Management Association Meetings in San Antonio for helpful comments.We thank Paul Gilson and Sandy Lai for excellent research assistance.The usual disclaimer applies.⁎Corresponding author.Tel.:+14046512656;fax:+14046522630.E-mail addresses:bjain@ (B.A.Jain),narayanan.jayaraman@ (N.Jayaraman),okini@ (O.Kini).1Tel.:+14107043542;fax:+14107043454.2Tel.:+14048944389;fax:+14048946030.0883-9026/$-see front matter ©2007Published by Elsevier Inc.doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2007.02.004Please cite this article as:Jain,B.A.et al.The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.Journal of Business2 B.A.Jain et al./Journal of Business Venturing xx(2007)xxx–xxx1.Executive summaryThere has been an increasing tendency for firms to go public on the basis of a promise of profitability rather than actual profitability.Further,this phenomenon is largely driven by the increase in the proportion of technology firms going public.The risk of post-IPO failure is particularly high for unprofitable firms as shifts in investor sentiment leading to negative market perceptions regarding their prospects or unfavorable financing environments could lead to a shutdown of external financing sources thereby imperiling firm survival. Therefore,the actual accomplishment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the company's evolution since it signals the long-term economic viability of the firm.While the extant research in entrepreneurship has focused on factors influencing the ability of entrepreneurial firms to attain important milestones prior to or at the time of going public,relatively little is known regarding the timing or ability of firms to achieve critical post-IPO milestones.In this study,we construct a theoretical framework anchored on agency and signaling theories to understand the impact of pre-IPO factors such as governance and ownership structure,management quality,institutional investor demand,and third party certification on firms'post-IPO path-to-profitability.We attempt to validate the testable implications arising from our theoretical framework using the Internet industry as our setting.Achieving post-issue profitability in a timely manner is of particular interest for Internet IPO firms since they are predominantly unprofitable at the time of going public and are typically characterized by high cash burn rates thereby raising questions regarding their long-term economic viability.Since there is a repeated tendency for high technology firms in various emerging sectors of the economy to go public in waves amid investor optimism followed by disappointing performance,insights gained from a study of factors that influence the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms will help increase our understanding of the development path and long-term economic viability of entrepreneurial firms in emerging, high technology industries.Using a sample of160Internet IPO firms that went public during the period1996–2000, we estimate Cox Proportional Hazards(CPH)models to analyze the economic significance of factors that influence the post-IPO path-to-profitability.Consistent with agency explanations,we find that a higher proportion of inside directors on the board and the change in pre-to-post-IPO ownership of top management are both significantly positively related to the probability of attaining post-IPO profitability.These results support arguments in the governance literature pointing to the beneficial impact of the presence of more insiders on the boards of high technology companies as well as the signaling value of the ownership stake of top management in the post-IPO firm.Additionally,we find evidence to indicate that higher institutional investor demand serves as an effective signal of the ability of Internet firms to attain post-IPO profitability,while greater pre-IPO valuation uncertainty reflects higher divergence of opinion about the future prospects of the IPO firm, and serves as a negative signal of the ability to achieve post-IPO profitability.Finally,we find that while underwriter prestige is unrelated to the probability of post-IPO profitability, VC participation decreases the probability of post-IPO profitability.Our results regarding the impact of VC participation on the probability of post-IPO profitability support arguments in the literature that VCs during the Internet boom period had incentives to grandstand by Please cite this article as:Jain,B.A.et al.The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.Journal of Businesstaking their companies public prematurely and that their monitoring role in the post-IPO period was rather limited since they cashed out earlier due to shorter lock-up periods.Our study makes several contributions.First,we construct a theoretical framework based on agency and signaling theories to identify factors that may influence the path-to-profitability of IPO firms.Second,we provide empirical evidence on the economic viability (path-to-profitability and firm survival)of newly public Internet firms.Third,our study adds to the theoretical and empirical literature that has focused on factors influencing the ability of entrepreneurial firms to achieve critical milestones during the transition from private to public ownership.While previous studies have focused on milestones during the private phase of firm development such as receipt of VC funding and completion of a public offering,our study extends this literature by focusing on a post-issue milestone such as attaining profitability.2.IntroductionThe past few decades have witnessed the formation and development of several vitally important technologically oriented emerging industries such as disk drive,biotechnology,and most recently the Internet industry.Entrepreneurial firms in such knowledge intensive industries are increasingly going public earlier in their life cycle while there is still a great deal of uncertainty and information asymmetry regarding their future prospects (Janey and Folta,2006).A natural consequence of the rapid transition from founding stage firms to public corporations is an increasing tendency for firms to go public on the basis of a promise of profitability rather than actual profitability.3Although sustained profitability is no longer a requirement for firms in order to go public,actual accomplishment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the firm's evolution since it reduces uncertainty regarding the long-term economic viability of the firm.In this paper,we focus on identifying observable factors at the time of going public that have the ability to influence the likelihood and timing of attaining post-IPO profitability by Internet firms.We restrict our study to the Internet industry since it represents a natural setting to study the long-term economic viability of an emerging industry where firms tend to go public when they are predominantly unprofitable and where there is considerably uncertainty and information asymmetry regarding their future prospects.4The attainment of post-IPO profitability assumes significance since the IPO event does not provide the same level of legitimizing differentiation that it did in the past as sustained profitability is no longer a prerequisite to go public particularly in periods where the market is favorably inclined towards investments rather than demonstration of profitability (Stuart et al.,1999;Janey and Folta,2006).During the Internet boom,investors readily accepted the mantra of “growth at all costs ”and enthusiastically bid up the post-IPO offering prices to irrational levels (Lange et al.,2001).In fact,investor focus on the promise of growth rather than profitability resulted in Internet start-ups being viewed differently from typical 3For example,Ritter and Welch (2002)report that the percentage of unprofitable firms going public rose form 19%in the 1980s to 37%during 1995–1998.4Schultz and Zaman (2001)report that only 8.72%of the Internet firms that went public during January 1999to March 2000were profitable in the quarter prior to the IPO.3B.A.Jain et al./Journal of Business Venturing xx (2007)xxx –xxx Please cite this article as:Jain,B.A.et al.The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.Journal of Business4 B.A.Jain et al./Journal of Business Venturing xx(2007)xxx–xxxnew ventures in that they were able to marshal substantial resources virtually independent of performance benchmarks(Mudambi and Treichel,2005).Since the Internet bubble burst in April2000,venture capital funds dried up and many firms that had successful IPOs went bankrupt or faced severe liquidity problems(Chang, 2004).Consequently,investors'attention shifted from their previously singular focus on growth prospects to the question of profitability with their new mantra being“path-to-profitability.”As such,market participants focused on not just whether the IPO firm would be able to achieve profitability but also“when”or“how soon.”IPO firms unable to credibly demonstrate a clear path-to-profitability were swiftly punished with steeply lower valuations and consequently faced significantly higher financing constraints.Since cash flow negative firms are not yet self sufficient and,therefore,dependent on external financing to continue to operate,the inability to raise additional capital results in a vicious cycle of events that can quickly lead to delisting and even bankruptcy.5Therefore,the actual attainment of post-IPO profitability represents an important milestone in the evolution of an IPO firm providing it with legitimacy and signaling its ability to remain economically viable through the ups and downs associated with changing capital market conditions.The theoretical framework supporting our analysis draws from signaling and agency theories as they relate to IPO firms.In our study,signaling theory provides the theoretical basis to evaluate the signaling impact of factors such as management quality,third party certification,institutional investor demand,and pre-IPO valuation uncertainty on the path-to-profitability.Similarly,agency theory provides the theoretical foundations to allow us to examine the impact of governance structure and change in top management ownership at the time of going public on the probability of achieving the post-IPO profitability milestone.Our empirical analysis is based on the hazard analysis methodology to identify the determinants of the probability of becoming profitable as a function of time for a sample of160Internet IPOs issued during the period1996–2000.Our study makes several contributions.First,we construct a theoretical framework based on agency and signaling theories to identify factors that may influence the path-to-profitability of IPO firms.Second,we provide empirical evidence on the economic viability of newly public firms(path-to-profitability and firm survival)in the Internet industry.Third, we add to the theoretical and empirical entrepreneurship literature that has focused on factors influencing the ability of entrepreneurial firms to achieve critical milestones during the transition from private to public ownership.While previous studies have focused on milestones during the private phase of firm development such as receipt of VC funding and successful completion of a public offering(Chang,2004;Dimov and Shepherd,2005; Beckman et al.,2007),our study extends this literature by focusing on post-IPO milestones. Finally,extant empirical evidence indicates that the phenomenon of young,early stage 5The case of E-Toys an Internet based toy retailer best illustrates this cyclical process.E-Toys was successful in developing an extensive customer base and a strong brand.However,the huge investment in technology, advertising,and promotion to sustain their activities as well as increased competition from both new entrants and old economy firms adopting the Internet to sell toys resulted in depressed profit margins and a longer than expected post-IPO time-to-profitability.Investors discouraged by the firm not reaching profitability within the expected time frame reacted negatively,leading to a steep drop in stock prices and consequently drying up of additional sources of external financing.As a result,the firm was forced to file for bankruptcy within a short period of time after its highly successful IPO.Please cite this article as:Jain,B.A.et al.The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.Journal of Businessfirms belonging to relatively new industries being taken public amid a wave of investor optimism fueled by the promise of growth rather than profitability tends to repeat itself over time.6However,profitability tends to remain elusive and takes much longer than anticipated which results in investor disillusionment and consequently high failure rate among firms in such sectors.7Therefore,our study is likely to provide useful lessons to investors when applying valuations to IPO firms when this phenomenon starts to repeat itself.This articles proceeds as follows.First,using agency and signaling theories,we develop our hypotheses.Second,we describe our sample selection procedures and present descriptive statistics.Third,we describe our research methods and present our results.Finally,we discuss our results and end the article with our concluding remarks.3.Theory and hypothesesSignaling models and agency theory have been extensively applied in the financial economics,management,and strategy literatures to analyze a wide range of economic phenomena that revolve around problems associated with information asymmetry,moral hazard,and adverse selection.Signaling theory in particular has been widely applied in the IPO market as a framework to analyze mechanisms that are potentially effective in resolving the adverse selection problem that arises as a result of information asymmetry between various market participants (Baron,1982;Rock,1986;Welch,1989).In this study,signaling theory provides the framework to evaluate the impact of pre-IPO factors such as management quality,third party certification,and institutional investor demand on the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.The IPO market provides a particularly fertile setting to explore the consequences of separation of ownership and control and potential remedies for the resulting agency problems since the interests of pre-IPO and post-IPO shareholders can diverge.In the context of the IPO market,agency and signaling effects are also related to the extent that insider actions such as increasing the percentage of the firm sold at the IPO,percentage of management stock holdings liquidated at the IPO,or percentage of VC holdings liquidated at the IPO can accentuate agency problems with outside investors and,as a consequence,signal poor performance (Mudambi and Treichel,2005).We,therefore,apply agency theory to evaluate the impact of board structure and the change in pre-to-post IPO ownership of top management on the path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.ernance structureIn the context of IPO firms,there are at least two different agency problems (Mudambi and Treichel,2005).The first problem arises as a result of opportunistic behavior of agents to 6Interestingly,just a few years after the bust,technology companies have again started going public while they are still unprofitable (Lashinsky,2006).7For instance,in the biotechnology industry where the first company went public a quarter century ago,public companies have taken in close to $100billion dollars from stock market investors but have delivered cumulative losses of more than $40billion (Hamilton,2004).Similarly,the disk drive industry in the early 1980s passed through phases similar to the Internet industry in terms of high firm founding rates,explosive growth,overoptimistic investors,IPO clusters,and high post-IPO failure rate (Lerner,1995).5B.A.Jain et al./Journal of Business Venturing xx (2007)xxx –xxx Please cite this article as:Jain,B.A.et al.The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.Journal of Business6 B.A.Jain et al./Journal of Business Venturing xx(2007)xxx–xxxincrease their share of the wealth at the expense of principals.The introduction of effective monitoring and control systems can help mitigate or eliminate this type of behavior and its negative impact on post-issue performance.The extant corporate governance literature has argued that the effectiveness of monitoring and control functions depends to a large extent on the composition of the board of directors.We,therefore,examine the relationship between board composition and the likelihood and timing of post-IPO profitability.The second type of agency problem that arises in the IPO market is due to uncertainty regarding whether insiders seek to use the IPO as an exit mechanism to cash out or whether they use the IPO to raise capital to invest in positive NPV projects.The extent of insider selling their shares at the time of the IPO can provide an effective signal regarding which of the above two motivations is the likely reason for the IPO.We,therefore,examine the impact of the change in ownership of officers and directors around the IPO on the likelihood and timing of attaining post-issue profitability.3.1.1.Board compositionThe corporate governance literature has generally argued that a greater proportion of outside directors on the board increases board independence and results in better monitoring of management and thereby lowers agency costs(Fama,1980;Fama and Jensen,1983; Williamson,1984).Therefore,a greater proportion of outside directors on the board of Internet IPO firms is likely to lead to a more effective monitoring and control environment, thus ensuring that managers pursue shareholder value maximizing strategies.In addition, due to their short operating history,management of Internet IPO firms are unlikely to have developed the necessary links with customers,suppliers,bankers,and other important stakeholders of the firm.Outside directors can be instrumental in facilitating the establishment of such links,thereby allowing these firms to better compete in the product market as well as capital market.On the basis of the above discussion,we would expect Internet IPO firms with more independent boards to be on a faster path-to-profitability. Hypothesis1:The proportion of outsiders on the board of Internet IPO firms is positively related to the probability of profitability and negatively related to time-to-profitability during the post-IPO period.The extant empirical evidence on the positive relation between board composition and performance,however,has been mixed,both for IPO firms as well as more seasoned corporations(Dalton et al.,1998;Baker and Gompers,2003).The ambiguous results can be partly attributed to the tradeoff between the benefits from the presence of outside directors such as more effective monitoring and control,greater objectivity,and assistance in resource acquisitions versus the benefits provided by inside directors such as detailed knowledge of the firm's operations,customer requirements,and technology that in turn can help the strategic planning process.Viewed through the innovation and technology prism, high technology Internet IPO firms may actually benefit more from in-depth technological knowledge,expertise,commitment,and innovative thinking that insiders bring to the board,rather than from the monitoring and control benefits provided by outside directors.In support of this argument,Zahra(1996)points out that boards comprised of a higher proportion of insiders may be more innovative and better positioned to serve management Please cite this article as:Jain,B.A.et al.The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.Journal of Businessas knowledgeable sounding boards in the formulation of strategy.Further,since high technology Internet firms are unlikely to generate substantial free cash flows in the period immediately after the IPO,the potential for wasteful expenditure is lower,and therefore,the benefits of monitoring and control provided by outsiders is less likely to be substantive.If there is a greater need for creative thinking and decision-making in high technology knowledge-based industries that only insiders are uniquely qualified to provide,we expect a negative relation between the proportion of outsiders on the board and the probability of profitability and a positive relation with time-to-profitability.Hypothesis 1A:The proportion of outsiders on the board of Internet firms is negatively related to the probability of profitability and positively related to time-to-profitability during the post-IPO period.3.1.2.Ownership of officers and directorsCorporate governance studies have also focused extensively on corporate ownership and its impact on performance,both in isolation and in conjunction with board composition.Both agency and signaling theories provide similar predictions regarding the relationship between the extent of insider ownership and post-issue performance.Agency theory suggests that high insider ownership reduces agency conflicts and enhances organizational performance,while signaling theory argues that higher insider ownership is a credible signal of insider's confidence regarding the future prospects of the firm.The change in the ownership of the top managers and directors around the offering can be viewed as an important signal of the issuing firm's future prospects (Leland and Pyle,1977).In the context of the IPO market,a large post-IPO decline in top management ownership can be interpreted as a signal of their lack of confidence in the ability of the firm to generate sufficient cash flows to reach the profitability milestone.Additionally,any decline in the ownership stakes of owners/managers is likely to adversely affect post-IPO performance due to higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling,1976).While the extent of the change in ownership of insiders around the IPO is an informative signal for all types of IPO firms,it is particularly relevant in the context of Internet firms that go public while predominantly unprofitable and where the informational and incentive problems are particularly acute.For instance,Mudambi and Treichel (2005)find that a substantial reduction in equity holdings of the top management of Internet firms signals an impending cash crisis.We,therefore,argue that the greater the decline in the pre-to-post IPO ownership of top managers and directors,the lower the probability of attaining profitability,and consequently the longer the time-to-profitability.Hypothesis 2:The decline in ownership of officers and directors from pre-to-post-IPO is negatively related to the probability of attaining profitability and positively related to time-to-profitability after the IPO.3.2.Management qualityAn extensive body of research has examined the impact of top management team (TMT)characteristics on firm outcomes for established firms as well as for new ventures by drawing from human capital and demography theories (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven,7B.A.Jain et al./Journal of Business Venturing xx (2007)xxx –xxx Please cite this article as:Jain,B.A.et al.The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.Journal of Business8 B.A.Jain et al./Journal of Business Venturing xx(2007)xxx–xxx1990;Finkelstein and Hambrick,1990;Wiersema and Bantel,1992;Hambrick et al.,1996; Beckman et al.,2007).For instance,researchers drawing from human capital theories study the impact of characteristics such as type and amount of experience of TMTs on performance(Cooper et al.,1994;Gimeno et al.,1997;Burton et al.,2002;Baum and Silverman,2004).Additionally,Beckman et al.(2007)argue that demographic arguments are distinct from human capital arguments in that they examine team composition and diversity in addition to experience.The authors consequently examine the impact of characteristics such as background affiliation,composition,and turnover of TMT members on the likelihood of firms completing an IPO.Overall,researchers have generally found evidence to support arguments that human capital and demographic characteristics of TMT members influence firm outcomes.Drawing from signaling theory,we argue that the quality of the TMTof IPO firms can serve as a signal of the ability of a firm to attain post-IPO profitability.Since management quality is costly to acquire,signaling theory implies that by hiring higher quality management,high value firms can signal their superior prospects and separate themselves from low value firms with less capable managers.The beneficial impact of management quality in the IPO market includes the ability to attract more prestigious investment bankers,generate stronger institutional investor demand,raise capital more effectively,lower underwriting expenses, attract stronger analyst following,make better investment and financing decisions,and consequently influence the short and long-run post-IPO operating and stock performance (Chemmanur and Paeglis,2005).Thus,agency theory,in turn,would argue that higher quality management is more likely to earn their marginal productivity of labor and thus have a lower incentive to shirk,thereby also leading to more favorable post-IPO outcomes.8 We focus our analyses on the signaling impact of CEO and CFO quality on post-IPO performance.We focus on these two members of the TMT of IPO firms since they are particularly influential in establishing beneficial networks,providing legitimacy to the organization,and are instrumental in designing,communicating,and implementing the various strategic choices and standard operating procedures that are likely to influence post-IPO performance.3.2.1.CEO characteristicsCEOs play a major role in designing and implementing strategic choices and policies for their firms.Their actions can have long-term significance since they typically define long-term policies of the firm(Parrino,1997).While the role and influence of CEOs on strategic choices,incentive mechanisms,accountability issues,and consequently performance is vital for all types of organizations,their impact is especially relevant for newly public firms that face significant competitive,product market,and financing challenges during the post-IPO phase.The role and impact of CEOs can be even more critical for the subset of technology related IPO firms since they may require fundamentally different skill sets and competencies from CEOs compared to those required to run companies in more traditional industries.We assess CEO quality by focusing on variables that capture the extent of general and specific human capital developed by them through their prior work experience and their risk propensity and decision-making behavior.In distinguishing between general and specific8We thank the Associate Editor,Phil Phan for suggesting this explanation.Please cite this article as:Jain,B.A.et al.The path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms.Journal of Business。

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