企业高管薪酬外文翻译文献
企业社会责任绩效、国有制与高管薪酬外文文献翻译
文献信息文献标题：Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, State Ownership and Executive Compensation: Empirical Evidence from China（企业社会责任绩效、国有制与高管薪酬：来自中国的经验证据）文献作者及出处：Rauf A, Amin K, Saleem Z. Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, State Ownership and Executive Compensation: Empirical Evidence from China[J]. Global Social Sciences Review, 2019, 4(1): 61-76.字数统计：英文3857单词，21619字符；中文7067汉字外文文献Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, State Ownership and Executive Compensation: Empirical Evidence from China Abstract This analysis focus corporate social responsibility and executive compensation in China and also tests the relationship between state possession and executive compensation in presence of CSR. The estimated results confirm our hypotheses true in the selected sample of 2011 to 2014 of China. The firms with high CSR performances positively moderate the previously negative or no relationship between state-ownership and executive compensation. Application of 2SLS and GMM guaranteed the robustness of the results to potential endogeneities.Key Words: CSR Performance; Executive Compensation; State-Ownership; Agency Theory; ChinaIntroductionThe burgeoning implications of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the modern corporate world have stimulated the researchers to probe its nexus with different mechanism of corporate governance. CSR practices and performance in itsvarying forms, such as economic, philanthropic, ethical and legal (Hill et al., 2007) are not only influenced by board characteristics, ownership structure, and governance mechanisms but also affects these distinct features of corporations. This phenomenon, thorugh different theories i.e. agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Michelon et al., 2013; Wood, 1991), has been analyzed by various sholars (Shahab and Ye, 2018; Shahab et al., 2018a, 2018b; Yu et al., 2017; Akisikand Gal, 2017; Yu and Rowe, 2017) in both developed and developing countries. As the debate over CSR and executive compensation relationship in developing countries is not mature therefore the consenses over the consequences and determinants of CSR has not built yet.In developed markets the wide spread between the executives and employees' compensations stirred a wave of concerns on ethical and economic grounds. The literature from developed countries claims that CSR engagement is a key factor of CEO compensation (Callan and Thomas, 2011) and executives engaged in CSR activities for increased compensation and personal reputation (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Mahoney and Thorn, 2006). Literature also found a reverse causal relationship among CSR practices, the compensation structure of CEO (Cai et al., 2011) and different characteristics of CEO’s demographics and CSR performance (Huang, 2013). It is evident that there exists substantial association amongst corporate governance mechanisms, CSR and executive compensation (Hong et al., 2016). These imperative aspects has not been analysed by the literature so far especially in case of country like china.Keeping in view the previous research gaps, in the present study we have attempted to bring forth exciting insights from the world’s fastest-growing economy (China). In China, the state-owned firms (SOEs) constitute around two third of the total firms (Li and Zhang, 2010 and Li et al., 2013) and various state organizations are working to convince all of the firms mainly state-owned to pursue CSR activities. In October 2006, the 6th Plenum of the 16th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee stated that “to build a harmonious society, China should increase the social responsibility of the citizens, business enterprises, and all kinds of otherorganizations." In September 2011, guidelines were issued by State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) which proposed that “sustainable development should be the core of CSR, and state-owned enterprises should be harmonious in development with society and the environment” (M arquis and Qian, 2014). Still, there is a wide gap in the CSR practices and disclosure mechanism of Chinese enterprises and that of those western enterprises.Accordingly, this study aims to present an integrative model to answer the unexplored questions from the CSR-executive compensation nexus and add to the literature in following ways. First, the impact of CSR performance, state-ownership and control variables (which include both governance and firms’ variables) on executive compensation of Chinese listed firms from the year 2011-2014 are analysed to strengthen the arguments of Khana and Palepu (1997) and Altman et al (2007) that the economic, financial and governance system between developed and developing countries vary to a great extent.Second, economy dominated by state ownership reacts to the involvement of CSR practices and activities has not been analysed yet. Literature propose that SOE has no or negative effect on executive compensation in developing economies (Firth et al., 2007; Conyon & He, 2011) they are interested in non-financial objectives (See, 2009). Therefore, drawing on agency theory this study investigate how CSR activities can modify the previously examined relationship between SOE and executive compensation. Our objective is to determine whether the firms who are actively engaged in CSR activities and have significant state ownership, present the similar negative/no effect on executive compensation. Alternatively, the presence of CSR activities in SOE firms changes that relationship into a positive one, thus acting as a beneficial tool for the nexus of state ownership and executive compensation. We analysed the moderating influence of CSR performance on the nexus of state-ownership and executive compensation. The use of CSR as an interaction term is non-existent in the literature relevant to the developing countries. Such moderation effect will help in understanding how firms with state ownership and distinct governance structure will determine the executive compensation in the presence ofCSR.Third, Mahoney and Thorne (2006) state that executive compensation has a significant impact on CSR. Therefore, we argue that there might be potential reverse causality between executive compensation and CSR performance (Cai et al., 2011) which can affect the reliability of our regression results. To tackle this issue, previous literature (Cai et al., 2011) has stressed the implementation of instrument variable technique to ascertain more robust results in the developed market. Thus, to deal with the above-suggested issue and contribute more effectively, 2SLS and GMM is used. By using agency theory, our findings will shed new insights to the existing literature and will have practical implications for the regulatory bodies, government, and firms.Literature Review and Hypotheses DevelopmentCSR Performance and Executive CompensationSome early researchers (Atkinson & Galaskiewicz, 1988; Friedman, 1962; Wright & Ferris, 1997) have employed agency theories in studies related to CSR and corporate strategies primarily related to corporate boards. Similarly, some studies (e.g. Bear et al., 2010; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Oh et al., 2011) have discussed the positive aspects of CSR concerning the monetary and non-monetary performance of the organizations. They argued that CSR initiatives are encouraged by firms with state ownership, institutional ownership, and foreign investors as such financiers are more eager to invest in responsible and environmental-friendly companies to shun the financial menaces. Contrarily, the other scholarships provide limited evidence on the association between CSR and executive return with a particular focus on developed economies and have ignored the developing economies, e.g. Flammer et al (2017) found that corporate social responsibility astringent is dominant in production-intensive businesses and has developed over time. Hubbard et al (2017) provided empirical insights into the literature by proposing that CSR practices and performances play a vital role in the nexus among CEO's career outcomes and firm's financial performance. They empirically found that greater investment in CSR in the past, result in better financial performance with a boost in CEO’s career (ultimately inmore compensation) and vice-versa. Cai et al (2011) argued that there is a shortcoming in employing an integrated theory. The proposed two hypotheses, i.e. overinvestment and conflict-resolution hypotheses. They found empirical support only for the conflict- resolution hypothesis in USA and argued that the lag of CSR negatively determine CEO compensation (both total and cash compensation).In the light of the literature review, we infer that previous studies have been focused on developed countries, and prevailing literature has not yet studied the relationship between CSR and executive compensation from a developing economy, i.e. in particular China. This study take huge data set of Chinese listed companies to fill the gap.From the above discussion one can extract the following specific hypotheses;Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between CSR performance and executive compensation in Chinese listed firms.State ownership, CSR performance, and Executive CompensationPrevious literature has discussed this relationship, e.g. Hong et al. (2016) concluded that the firms whose governance structure is more shareholder-friendly will be more inclined to compensate CEOs, subject to enhanced social performance outcomes of firms. They further claimed that executives’ motivation to enhance firm’s social performance increases with increase in incentives for CSR engagement or initiatives. It implies that corporate governance mechanism is a vital factor in determining the executive inducements for social activities and engagement in such social activities will not only increase the social performance but will also be favourable to shareholders. Faleye and Trahan (2011) claimed that corporate strategies which are labour and environmental-friendly, have been used by the managers and directors avoid the negative consequences of managerial extravagances at the board level. Callan and Thomas (2011) broadened this framework by investigating a multi-equation model of the executive compensation, CSR, and firm financial performance. They control for endogeneity and found a simultaneous relationship between financial and social performances. Their findings also showed CSR as an important determinant of the CEO reward. Kato and Long (2006) discussed that thepay to performance linkage is weaker for executives in firms. Firth et al. (2007) found that the corporate management mechanism have a substantial influence on CEO compensation and it is different in developed and developing countries which needs further exploration especially in developing countries. Welford (2007) claimed that good corporate governance leads to better CSR performance. He studied issues in corporate governance (specifically ownership and control) about CSR performance in Asia. He explained that the concentrated ownership by owners (which may be by shareholders or state) is the main reason for strong corporate governance in the Asian region as compared to the western region. Conyon and He (2012) found positive impact of both stock and accounting market performance on the CEO’s pay structure. They also revealed that board characteristics and ownership design also influence the equity benefits,such as equity ownership and equity grants enjoyed by CEO. Conyon and He (2011) studied corporate governance and executive compensation of Chinese firms, and consistent with agency theory. Comparing the executive pay of Chinese firms with U.S. firms, they found that the executive compensation (salaries and bonuses) in the U.S. is greater than Chinese firms.Nevertheless, most of the studies from China depict a negative or no affinity between state ownership and executive compensation as these executives are bureaucrats whose appointment is subject to a specific time span and fixed salaries. However, a strong evidence claim that the SOEs’ main interest is to pursue non-financial objectives which are stated in the contracts of CEOs (Bai & Xu, 2005) and such state-owned firms emphasize the executives to achieve those non-financial objectives keenly (See, 2009). Drawing on agency theory, we argue that the written description in executives’ contracts to pursue non- financial objectives can stimulate CEOs of such firms to engage in CSR practices and improve CSR performance to achieve not only those non-financial objectives of the firms but also to enhance their compensation.We propose our second hypothesis from the above argument and suggest that the better CSR performance engenders a moderating mechanism between the presence of state ownership in firms and executive compensation link where the previous negativeor no relationship between SOEs and executive compensation is changed due to the inclusion of CSR in the form of non-financial objectives. Our second hypothesis is as follow:Hypothesis 2: CSR performance moderates the association between state ownership and executive compensation in Chinese listed firms.MethodsDataIn China, the rating agencies started evaluating the CSR related performance-indicators of Chinese listed firms from 2010. Therefore, we employed an unbalanced panel data of 554 firms (i.e. 1946 firm years’ observations) listed on two stock exchanges in China, i.e. Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) from 2011 to 2014. Our initial sample includes all those firms who report CSR in the stated period. However, we used unbalanced panel due to missing observations in some particular years. China Stock Market and Accounting Research were consulted for data on executive compensation. We extract the data on CSR performance of firms from HEXUN, one of the Chinese professional financial service websites, specialized for high-end investors in China. This database evaluates all firms listed on SZSE and SSE and develops an index by ranking the CSR performance of the firms. STATA software interactive tools were used for analyzing this data, and we employed Winsorization technique to control the issues of outliers.Variables descriptionFollowing Conyon and He (2011), and Kato and Long (2006) we measured our dependent variable: executive compensation by the top three executives’ average pay which includes base salary, bonuses, and commissions in China. Like western enterprises, the data on segregated heads of CEO compensation is not available for Chinese listed firms. This variable is dealt in natural log.Corporate Social Responsibility performance: Corporate Social Responsibility performance is measured by index provided by HEXUN website (Li and Foo, 2015; Shahab et al., 2018a, 2018b). This database divides CSR into five different categories;(i) shareholder responsibility; (ii) employee responsibility; (iii) supplier; (iv) customer and consumer right responsibility; and (v) environmental responsibility and public responsibility. These five categories are further sub-divided into second (13) and third (37) class indicators. Although the typical distribution of CSR index is similar amongst the industries, each industry follows their distribution method for CSR index’s development by priority. The value of CSR index is between 1 and 100 where 1 indicates the low level of CSR and 100 means high CSR.State Ownership: Hardly a study can be found that considered the importance state- ownership variable affecting executive compensation via an interaction of these variables with CSR performance.Therefore in case of this study SOE is measured by dummy wher it is 1 for state-ownership and 0 otherwise.Control Variables: Board size (Cai et al,, 2011) taken in log, board independence (Conyon and He, 2011) measured in % age f outside directives on the board, CEO duality (Firth et al., 2007) is proxy by dummy, CEO age (He, 2008) is taken in years, firm size (Kang, 2013) is calculated by number of employees in a firm, Return on Assets (Cai et al., 2011) is the income before extraordinary items divided by total assets of the firm, firm age (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003) is calculated as the year that has been elapsed since the foundation of the firm and dividend (Bhattacharyya et al., 2004) used as a dummy variable.Econometric ModelThe data period of our study ranges from 2011 to 2014. Since there are many observations per firm in our data, therefore, unobserved heterogeneity was an issue. We checked the problem of heteroskedasticity in our data by applying Wald test suggested by Baum (2001), and we obtained a significant probability results. The autocorrelation in data was tested by Wooldridge (2002) technique, and we also got significant value. Furthermore, we also checked the within and between variation in our data. The findings showed that on average the value of between variations was greater than within variation in our variables. Cameron and Trivedi (2010, pp-607) say that if between effect values are greater than within variation then Hausman test becomes inconclusive and fixed effect results are inconsistent. Therefore, to tacklethese problems, we used panel generalized least square (GLS). We employ the following econometric model in our analysis:Where "i" shows the firm and "t" represent the period, while, the rest of the variables are described in detail in variable section and appendix (A).ResultsDescriptive StatisticsTable 1 displayed the descriptive statistics where the average value of executive compensation is 798000 with a standard deviation of 805000. It represents quite a high mean value for the CEO compensation. 37.11 is the average for CSR with 11.33 standard deviation. This suggest poor trend in CSR performance in comparison to the highest values of CSR performance in developed countries. The mean value of state ownership is 63 percent, confirming the claim of Li and Zhang (2010) by arguing that more than 60% firms in China are state-owned. Mean value of board size is almost near to 10 while board independence value shows that approximately 1/3 of the board associates in Chinese firms are independent. The values of CEO duality show that the culture of the dual role of the CEO is less evident in China, and mostly CEO and chairman of the board hold separate offices.Table 1. Descriptive StatisticsAuthor’s CalculationsTable 2 depicts the values for correlation and Variance Inflated Factors. CSR and rest of the other variables has substantial correlation with executive compensation. The values of VIF are well below the standard threshold of 10 in our study.Table 2. Correlation and VIFRegression ResultsIn the first model, we included our independent variable (CSR performance) to test the first hypothesis by checking its impact on executive compensation (See table 3). CSR performance is substantial and suggest that 1% change in CSR performance changes the executive compensation by 0.493%. It is a strong evidence in support of our first hypothesis. Our findings are in coherence with the previous literature (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Callan and Thomas, 2011; Mahoney and Thorn, 2006) which claimed that engagement in CSR practices and enhanced CSR performance increase executive compensation. In the second model, we incorporated all the other control variables including state ownership and examined the effect of CSR performance on executive compensation to test our first hypothesis in the presence of control variables. We found significant results for CSR performance here too (See Table 3).In the model 2 we found inverse relation between SOE and executive compensation (See Table 3). This negative relationship has been discussed in someprevious studies in Chinese context (Conyon & He, 2011). They argued that due to increased involvement of the state in firms, the executive compensation of CEOs is adversely affected and a negative relationship exists between SOE and executive compensation. Further, we followed Li and Zhang (2010) that more than 60% Chinese firms are state-owned, and this study found that CSR performance moderates the relationship between SOE and executive compensation. Therefore, we developed the interaction of state-owned firms and CSR in model 3 to check how the combination of these two (SOE×CSR) affects executive compensation. Model 3 depicts a positive and significant (at 1%) coefficient of 0.120 for our proposed interaction term, i.e. SOE×CSR. That shows that greater is the CSR performance more will be the association with executive compensation.Lastly, in model 2 and model 4 of table 3, we included the control variables and results support our hypothesis of their relation with executive compensation. The findings of the firm characteristics control variables (size, ROA, firm and dividend pay-out) also suggest that these variables increase executive compensation.Table 3. Generalized Least Squares (GLS) Estimates for Effect of CSR Performance, CorporateGovernance on CEO CompensationEndogeneityThe overall results are quite meaningful. However, there might be inverse causation and omitted variable biasness in the model. To test this we employed 2SLS and GMM techniques to reduce and tackle the potential problem of endogeneity. Following Cai et al., (2011); Shahab et al., (2018a, 2018b) we used industry-median CSR as an instrumental variable (IV) for CSR performance. CSR performance is different from industry to industry, (McWilliam and Siegel, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Therefore, we estimated industry-median CSR as an IV. (See Table 4). The outcome of 2SLS and GMM two-step shows that industry median CSR is positively associated with CSR index at 1% level by controlling the effect of governance and firm-specific characteristics and at 10% level of significance on total executive compensation. The validity of our instrumental variable is tested through F-stat test suggested by (Staiger and Stock, 1997) and found that the value of the instrumental variable was greater than 10 (value less than 10 represent weak instrument) which is considered as a strong instrument.Table 4. Endogeneity Results for effect of CSR performance, Corporate Governance on CEOcompensationDiscussionThe purpose of this study is to test the relationship between CSR performance, state ownership and executive compensation in China. Although, sufficient amount of literature is available in developed economies by testing the relationship between CSR and executive compensation which is largely based on two opposing theories namely agency theory and stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Li and Zhang (2010) argued that Chinese government own more than 60 percent of the firms. Firth et al. (2007) suggested that the structure of the executive compensation is quite different in China and CEO of Chinese state-owned firms are state bureaucrats who are hired for a specific time- period and are entitled to a fixed salary. Bai and Xu (2005) and See (2009) argue that SOEs in China are interested in achieving non-financial objectives and these objectives are mentioned in CEO contract. We explored and provided empirical evidence on this interesting research gap by analysing the moderating role of CSR performance on the inconclusive relationship between state ownership and executive compensation. We explored these two research questions by empirically testing our proposed hypotheses. The findings based on generalized least squares (GLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS) and GMM, all provide significant evidence for our claim by drawing on extensive data-set from Chinese firms. Both of our hypothesis were supported by data. Our findingscontribute to the existing literature by shedding new insights from the perspective of the interaction effect of CSR performance on the nexus between SOE and executive compensation.ConclusionThis study analyzed the impacts of CSR performance on compensation of CEOs by drawing on a longitudinal sample of Chinese listed firms. We develop an argument that CSR performance not only determines the executive compensations in Chinese firms but also influence the connection between state ownership and compensation structure. Chinese firms are characterized by the dominance of the state ownership over the decades due to the complex structure of controlled Chinese economy in comparison to the free economies of the western world. This study bridge the existing gap in research on the moderating role of CSR performance between the state ownership and executive compensation. Our findings are pertinent to both theory and practice. Given the motivation of increased incentives or compensation, executives will be inclined to put more efforts in activities related to CSR and social welfare. We shed new acumens to the literature by empirically proving that independent ownership of Chinese government has a negative or no effect on firm’s compensation structure, however, if CSR-performance is established as the missing link in the chain, the outcomes will be changed. In China, the role of the state is dominant in firms and CEOs are either part of the state councils or have political ties (Firth et al., 2007; You & Du, 2012). We claim that if the government puts more focus on CSR practices and directs the CEOs to enhance the CSR performance, the increased CSR level will lead to an increase in CEO compensation structure. This study has practical implications for the practitioners by proposing to introduce a CSR-performance related system, where the enhancement in financial benefits of CEOs is related with the CSR enactment of the firm.中文译文企业社会责任绩效、国有制与高管薪酬：来自中国的经验证据摘要本文以中国企业社会责任和高管薪酬为研究对象，检验了企业社会责任存在下的国有制与高管薪酬之间的关系。
薪酬管理外文文献翻译
The existence of an agency problem in a corporation due to the separation of ownership and control has been widely studied in literatures. This paper examines the effects of management compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions. This paper is significant because it helps to understand the relationship between them. This understandings allow the design of an optimal management compensation scheme to induce the manager to act towards the goals and best interests of the company. Grossman and Hart (1983) investigate the principal agency problem. Since the actions of the agent are unobservable and the first best course of actions can not be achieved, Grossman and Hart show that optimal management compensation scheme should be adopted to induce the manager to choose the second best course of actions. Besides management compensation schemes, other means to alleviate the agency problems are also explored. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest two ways for reducing the agency problem: competitive market mechanisms and direct contractual provisions. Manne (1965) argues that a market mechanism such as the threat of a takeover provided by the market can be used for corporate control. "Ex-post settling up" by the managerial labour market can also discipline managers and induce them to pursue the interests of shareholders. Fama (1980) shows that if managerial labour markets function properly, and if the deviation of the firm's actual performance from stockholders' optimum is settled up in managers' compensation, then the agency cost will be fully borne by the agent (manager).The theoretical arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Haugen and Senbet (1981), and empirical evidence of Amihud andLev (1981), Walking and Long (1984), Agrawal and Mandelker (1985), andBenston (1985), among others, suggest that managers' holding of common stock and stock options have an important effect on managerial incentives. For example, Benston finds that changes in the value of managers' stock holdings are larger than their annual employment income. Agrawal and Mandelker find that executive security holdings have a role in reducing agency problems. This implies that the share holdings and stock options of the managers are likely to affect the corporate investment decisions. A typical management scheme consists of flat salary, bonus payment and stock options. However, the studies, so far, only provide links between the stock options and corporate investment decisions. There are few evidences that the compensation schemes may have impacts on the corporate investment decisions. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework to study the effects of management compensation schemes on the corporate investment decisions. Assuming that the compensation schemes consist of flat salary, bonus payment, and stock options, I first examine the effects of alternative compensation schemeson corporate investment decisions under all-equity financing. Secondly, I examine the issue in a setting where a firm relies on debt financing. Briefly speaking, the findings are consistent with Amihud and Lev's results. Managers who have high shareholdings and rewarded by intensive profit sharing ratio tend to underinvest.However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the model. Section HI discusses the managerial incentives under all-equity financing. Section IV examines the managerial incentives under debt financing. Section V discusses the empirical implications and presents the conclusions of the study.I consider a three-date two-period model. At time t0, a firm is established and goes public. There are now two kinds of owners in the firm, namely, the controlling shareholder and the atomistic shareholders. The proceeds from initial public offering are invested in some risky assets which generate an intermediate earnings, I, at t,. At the beginning, the firm also decides its financial structure. A manager is also hired to operate the firm at this time. The manager is entitled to hold a fraction of the firm's common stocks and stock options, a (where 0<a<l), at the beginning of the first period. At time t,, the firm receives intermediate earnings, denoted by I, from the initial asset. At the same time, a new project investment is available to the firm. For simplicity, the model assumes that the firm needs all the intermediate earnings, I, to invest in the new project. If the project is accepted at t,, it produces a stochastic earnings Y in t2, such that Y={I+X, I-X}, with Prob[Y=I+X] = p and Prob[Y=I-X] = 1-p, respectively. The probability, p, is a uniform density function with an interval ranged from 0 to 1. Initially, the model also assumes that the net earnings, X, is less than initial investment, I. This assumption is reasonable since most of the investment can not earn a more than 100% rate of return. Later, this assumption is relaxed to investigate the effect of the extraordinarily profitable investment on the results. For simplicity, It is also assumed that there is no time value for the money and no dividend will be paid before t2. If the project is rejected at t,, the intermediate earnings, I, will be kept in the firm and its value at t2 will be equal to I. Effects of Management Compensation Schemes on Corporate Investment Decision Overinvestment versus UnderinvestmentA risk neutral investor should invest in a new project if it generates a positiexpected payoff. If the payoff is normally or symmetrically distributed, tinvestor should invest whenever the probability of making a positive earninggreater than 0.5. The minimum level of probability for making an investment the neutral investor is known as the cut-off probability. The project will generzero expected payoff at a cut-off probability. If the investor invests only in tprojects with the cut-off probability greater than 0.5, then the investor tendsinvest in the less risky projects and this is known as the underinvestment. Ifinvestor invests the projects with a cut-off probability less than 0.5, then tinvestor tends to invest in more risky projects and this is known as thoverinvestment. In the paper, it is assumed that the atomistic shareholders risk neutral, the manager and controlling shareholder are risk averse.It has been argued that risk-reduction activities are considered as managerial perquisites in the context of the agency cost model. Managers tend to engage in these risk-reduction activities to decrease their largely undiversifiable "employment risk" (Amihud and Lev 1981). The finding in this paper is consistent with Amihud and Lev's empirical result. Managers tend to underinvest when they have higher shareholdings and larger profit sharing percentage. This result is independent of the level of debt financing. Although the paper can not predict the manager's action when he has a large profit sharing percentage and the profit cashflow has high variance (X > I), it shows that the manager with high shareholding will underinvest in the project. This is inconsistent with the best interests of the atomistic shareholders. However, the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by increasing the financial leverage.The results and findings in this paper provides several testable hypotheses forfuture research. If the managers underinvest in the projects, the company willunderperform in long run. Thus the earnings can be used as a proxy forunderinvestment, and a negative relationship between earningsandmanagement shareholdings, stock options or profit sharing ratio is expected.As the underinvestment problem can be alleviated by increasing the financialleverage, a positive relationship between earnings and financial leverage isexpected.在一个公司由于所有权和控制权的分离的代理问题存在的文献中得到了广泛的研究。
上市企业经营绩效与高管薪酬激励研究外文文献翻译
上市企业经营绩效与⾼管薪酬激励研究外⽂⽂献翻译⽂献出处: Firth M. The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensation incentive [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015，12（5）41-51.原⽂The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensationincentiveFirth MAbstractExecutive compensation problems is the result of modern enterprise ownership and control separated, target inconsistency exists between the owners and executives, the problem such as asymmetric information, the complexity and uncertainty of modern enterprise operation is exacerbated by the seriousness of this problem, and through the contract signed with executive compensation performance, design and implement a good compensation plan can effectively solve the above problems. In today's knowledge economy, the competition between enterprises is actually the competition between talents, executives, especially excellent executives has become the core of enterprise resources, in view of the particularity of human capital of executives, executives how to effectively motivate, attract and promote the interests of the enterprise has become the key to enterprise development, and executive pay is playing such a role.Keywords: Executive compensation, Business performance, Listed Company1 IntroductionSeparate ownership and control is modern enterprise the most significant characteristics (Bale and Means, 1932).The shareholders of the owners in an enterprise have the final property ownership and the residual claims, but often there is no direct management control. Business management on behalf of the owner of control, but don't take the final decision. In the case of two rights separation is as the main body of the ownership as the main operational control shareholders and the enterprise management to form a layer between the principal-agent relationships. According to rational economic man hypothesis, the principal (owner) and the agent(management) have different between the objective function, at the same time, there exists a phenomenon of information asymmetry, the company's senior managers there is power and ability to implement on-the-job consumption "opportunistic behavior", which came at the expense of the interests of the owners at the expense of, is also the focus of the agency cost, reflect, it requires enterprises to establish an effective mechanism of incentive and constraint. By the implementation of these mechanisms can excite the work enthusiasms of agent, and can minimize the agency cost of the enterprise, so as to realize the "win-win" between principal and agent. Human society has begun to enter the knowledge economy era, the executives with high and new technical knowledge and skills has become the key to the development of enterprises, enterprises in the market competition is talented person's competition, in today's increasingly internationalized talent flow speed and, utmost respect talented person, is the key to enterprises in the competition occupy the initiative. Therefore, the enterprise owners how to through a set of incentive constraint mechanism to arouse the enthusiasm of executives, minimize agency costs, has become the key problem in the principal-agent relationship.2 Literature reviewIn the 90 s and 1980 s executive compensation has become an important field of academic research, the current executive compensation research literature is largely based on agency theory as the theoretical basis; it requires managers pay package design should make the interests of the managers consistent with the interests of shareholders. Multiple theory school of scholars use all kinds of data on compensation performance problems made all kinds of inspection. But neither empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions, there is conflict between each other. Such as Belkaoui and Picur (1993), Koehhar and Levitas (1998) and Gray and Canella (1997) study showed that the correlation coefficient between CEO pay and company size to 0.1 at lower, the level of 0.110 and 0.170, and Boyd (1994), Finke1SteinandB.Yd (1998) and Sander and Carpenter (1998) argues that between the correlation coefficient is 0.62, 0.50 and 0.42.The same conflict results also exist in the research about the relation between pay performance. Like Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) foundthat return on equity (ROE) with monetary compensation and long-term returns between the correlation coefficient is 0.13 and 2.03 respectively; Johnson (1982) found that the correlation coefficient of 0.003.And Belliveau, Reilly and Wade (1996) found that CEO pay with ROE correlation coefficient of 0.410.Gomez Mejia (1994), the empirical study summarized: "although the empirical study of CEO pay a dime a dozen, but we know very little about executive remuneration or. “Many causes of the difference of the results of the study: the different data sources, different statistical techniques, different samples and differentcontrol variables, etc.Most of the empirical study in the United States listed companies as samples, mainly to pay as the research object, and given priority to with big companies. In the empirical study, Jensen and Murphy (1990) widely cited in the literature, since 90, and most of the empirical research in accordance with its research paradigm. In this article has pioneering meaning in the literature, they estimated the 1295 companies between 1974 and 1986 of 10400 senior managers compensation performance sensitivity, results show that the shareholder wealth of $1000 per change, CEO of wealth will be $3.25 move together. Lippert and Moore (1994) found that the pay performance sensitivity significantly negative correlation with growth, industry control, scale, and with the internal and the institutional investors holding and the term is not relevant. LIPPert and Moore (1995) found that the pay performance sensitivity to low the company has more independent directors or stronger shareholder control. MeConaughy and Mishra (1996) found that sensitivity associated with the company's future performance. The research is on compensation performance sensitivity calculation with Jensen and Murhpy computing (1990).With Jensen and Murhpy (1990) study of pay levels are different. Other documents against U.S. companies pay structures were studied. Genhart and Milkovich (1990) analysis of the more than 200 enterprises, 14000 senior and mid-level managers' pay, found that managers' pay and performance related and wages are not related. Their results also showed that mixed compensation levels and future profitability is related. Their contribution is caused people's understanding to pay structure. Similarly, Leonard (1990) have found S0 s long-term incentive plans ofthe company than the company has a long-term incentive plans, there are a higher return on equity (ROE).Hamid Mehran (1995) on a random sample of 153 manufacturing companies in 1979-1980 executive pay the inspection support incentive compensation claims, but also shows the level of motivation rather than the form of motivation to inspire the motivation of managers to increase the value of the company. Corporate performance with management ownership and equity incentive is in proportion to the total compensation level of positive correlation. He also found that equity-based compensation in the company of outside directors more applied more widely. In the end or by outside big shareholders higher insider ownership of company Ricky is in less equity compensation applications.3 Theoretical foundation of the executive compensation3.1 The principal-agent theoryIn the early days of the private enterprise, the enterprise owners or operators of the two functions, so as long as the owners are rational economic man, he will actively work for their own enterprise profit maximization, at the same time as the enterprise risk takers, he will be careful decisions, try to avoid risk. In classical enterprises, therefore, there is no power shortage and behavior distortion problem. However, with the deepening of socialized big division of labor, the production of modern enterprise system, enterprise's ownership and operation separate, its separation and led to the emergence of the principal and agent relationship, both are driven by their own interests, as the manager of the enterprise owners want as agent of the principal researchers to their own interests targeting action in accordance with the owners. And managers also is own expected utility maximization as the goal, so that both the goal of the inconsistency.3.2 The human capital theoryFrom the Angle of economics to study the compensation problem, main is to pay as senior executives in the Labor market price. In labor economics, the compensation decision mechanism on the Labor market mainly is the human capital theory. The economic activities of listed companies in the final analysis is conducted by people, the economic efficiency of listed companies in the final analysis depends on people'senthusiasm. Economic history shows that, under different institutional arrangements, the person of ability and hard work, especially the potential and creativity is the fundamental symbol of success for an enterprise system is good or bad. Therefore, economic efficiency of listed companies, the human capital property rights problems and natural economic behavior is the foundation of can't avoid. Property rights established the significance, is to make the economic behavior of the internalization of external effects, so as to produce the stimulation of strong momentum. A property rights system, therefore, the strength of the economic incentive function, mainly with the efforts of the economic subject is associated with the proximity of remuneration. Top management is the most important role in the development of modern enterprises, executive personnel is the enterprise decision makers, leaders and commanders, is the soul of the enterprise, is a leader in the development of enterprises, therefore is also an important force in China's economic and social development. Grew up in a special environment during the transition period of our country in the top management, than the business operators in the market economy country pressure is bigger, heavier burden. Especially the burden of the senior executives of state-owned enterprises with the development of the enterprise solution and two pairs of heavy burden, they want to pay more than the number of times the energy often, previously unimaginable responsibility and risk. Therefore, should recognize the importance of enterprise senior management personnel. Establish training, selection and use of enterprise management mechanism, giving them reasonable compensation.3.3 Equity theoryProblems from the Angle of psychology to study senior managers' pay mainly will be paid as a method that can meet the demand of senior executives inner and elements, to encourage executives to work enthusiasm and initiative, to improve executive performance from the individual level. In the psychology of motivation theory, the design of compensation and compensation management is based on the theory of influential Stacy Adams equity theory. Adams fair theory, the staff would first think about the ratio of their income to pay, and then will his income pay comparing with relevant income pay others. If employees feel him with others of thesame, the ratio of thought is to the state fair. If both feel not the same, the ratio of injustice are produced, namely, they may think their income is too low or too high. After this injustice, the staff will try to correct it.3.4 Strategic compensation theoriesTo think from the perspective of management, enterprises pay problem, more attention is pay management support for the enterprise strategic goals, namely how to through the compensation system to effectively help enterprises to gain a competitive advantage. About compensation management how to support the enterprise strategic target, this is the main content of the strategic compensation system design. The so-called strategic compensation, it is to point to will pay up to the enterprise strategic level, to thinking through what kind of compensation policies and compensation management system to support enterprise competitive strategy, and help enterprises to gain competitive advantage.4 The design principle of executive compensation system4.1 Principles of pay and performanceOptimal executive compensation design is the executive compensation and its operation performance, the compensation depends on the company's operating results, the design should follow the principle of the main executive compensation scheme. This principle is the principle of balance between the interests of the owner and operator. Because follow this principle, the owner and operator revenue the stand or fall of same direction as the firm's performance. Business is business risk, managers' compensation and corporate business performance has a direct relationship. Considering the operators are people too, also want to maintain family and their own survival. Considering the uncertainties of doing business at the same time, if the executive compensation and its business performance, completely will take too much risk. As a result, the executive compensation can be divided into two parts: part of the fixed income, the amount is able to maintain their personal and family life, have insurance effect. Part is risk income, completely and enterprise performance, good management can be even more greatly than the fixed income part, make its income risk, incentive role.4.2 Effective incentive principlesModern enterprise system, the organization (shareholders) and individual (senior management) is a kind of principal-agent relationship. Incentive is to strengthen and accordance of individual behavior, organizational goals, in other words, is to guide individual behavior maximize the development to achieve organizational goals. Due to corporate executives is a special company employees, has the position of privilege, enjoy "on-the-job consumption", it brought outside the regular salary incentive to executives to meet the material benefits, this need to some extent, belongs to the fair in Adams fair theory. However, in many state-owned enterprises, on-the-job consumption often goes far beyond a reasonable level, showing a high cost of self-motivation. And stands in stark contrast to the executive pay, some executive’s on-the-job consumption optional the gender is strong, too much abuse, even in a state of out of control. Has issued relevant laws and regulations, shall be forbidden.4.3 Effective restriction principleExecutives is an enterprise's decision-making and operators directly, plays an vital role in the fate of the enterprise, if in the design of enterprise organization system, lack of necessary and effective supervision and restriction mechanism, will likely agent risk. On entrepreneur behavior with some restrictions, these constraints are usually the behavior rule, violating these rules will be punished. Constraint mechanism has defined the entrepreneur behavior, the role of maintaining the order of economic activities, for the standardization of the enterprise behavior, economic and social benign operation has an indispensable positive function.译⽂上市企业经营绩效与⾼管薪酬激励研究Firth M摘要⾼管薪酬问题的产⽣源于现代企业所有权和控制权的相互分离，所有者与公司⾼管之间存在着⽬标不⼀致、信息不对称等问题，现代企业经营的复杂性和不确定性更是加剧了这⼀问题的严重性，⽽通过与⾼管签订薪酬绩效契约，设计和执⾏⼀份良好的薪酬⽅案可以有效地解决上述问题。
2948BXXX公司的薪酬管理 外文参考文献译文及原文doc
2948BXXX公司的薪酬管理外文参考文献译文及原文doc 本科毕业设计(论文)外文参考文献译文及原文学院经济管理学院专业工商管理年级班别学号学生姓名指导教师年月日目录1 薪酬管理的涵义与内容 (1)1.1 薪酬管理的涵义 (1)1.2 薪酬管理的内容..............................................................................1 2 薪酬管理的历史考察 (3)2.1 专制阶段 (3)2.2 “温情主义”阶段 (3)2.3 科学管理阶段 (3)2.4 现代管理阶段.................................................................................4 3 薪酬管理的发展趋势 (6)3.1 企业人力成本将逐步上升 (6)3.2 薪酬制度的依据将更多地反映市场而不是工作本身的价值 (6)3.3 薪酬福利设计更富弹性并走向多轨化 (6)3.4 薪酬分配形式由货币主导型向资本主导型过渡 (6)3.5 薪酬支付方式将呈现多样化...............................................................7 1 Management salaries of the meaning and content (8)1.1 Salary Management meaning (8)1.2 Content of salary management................................................................8 2 Salary management historical inspection............................................................... . (11)2.1 Despotic stage (11)2.2 "Paternalism" stage (11)2.3 Scientific management stage (12)2.4 Modern Management stage..................................................................12 3 Salary management development tendency.. (14)3.1 The enterprise manpower cost gradually will rise (14)3.2 The salary system basis more will reflect the market but will not be works itselfvalue………………………………………….………………………………….…. .143.3 A salary welfare design richer elasticity and moves towards the multi-axles (15)3.4 Salary assignment form by currency leadership to capital leadership transition (15)3.5 The salary payment way will present the diversification (15)1 薪酬管理的涵义与内容1.1薪酬管理的涵义企业的薪酬管理，就是企业管理者对本企业员工报酬的支付标准、发放水平、要素结构进行确定、分配和调整的过程。
工商管理专业企业薪酬管理中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业薪酬管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Enterprise Salary Reward Management Salary the overall function of function and the management of human resource that rewards is consistent also for is can attract and encourage the human resource needed by enterprise from labor economy angle speak salary reward have 3 great merits can: guarantee function, encourage function and regulation function. Referring to the angle of the management of human resource salary reward should embody and play mainly it's encourage function the salary with reasonable establishment reward management system is every problem that enterprise needs solve. In recent years, as enterprise manages , mechanism change and establish modern enterprise system step by step needs, the built-in wages degree of assignment system of enterprise the self who changes enterprise into gradually from government behavior. Therefore how to meet market needs establish with modern enterprise system appearance the supplemental salary, that suits enterprise self development reward management system and distribution scheme, high limit land development enterprise human resource Ian can, become every important program of current Chinese enterprise.Salary the substance that rewarded , it is that enterprise, for employee, is the contribution done by enterprise that function and purpose salary reward , include realization Jig effect , the corresponding repayment and that effort, time, knowledge, ability, experience and creation pay that paid out or thank. Essentially, it is a kind of fair distribution principle that exchanges or trades and has embodied socialist market economy. And according to contribution distribution for implicit the meaning of the exchange of equal value of intrinsic, have reflected the law of value of the market of labor force.Salary the overall function of function and the management of human resource that rewards is consistent, it is also to be able to attract and encourage the human resource needed by enterprise. Say from labor economy angle, salary reward have 3 great merits can ─ guarantee function, encourage function and regulation function. Referring to the angle of the management of human resource salary reward should embody and play mainly it's encourage function.The existent problem of the traditional wages degree of assignment system is internal to lack fair sense, the external income degree of assignment system that lacks the traditional state-owned enterprise of competition ability major special Zhen is implement planned instruction and policy regulation, wages management system from in the restriction that gets planned economy , employee Ian can reality play will not often arouse the notice of people, so, the distribution of wages is major to wait according to standing, educational background, title and administrative rank, and overlook as every employee does , work analysis, do not more consider the discrepancy of working post and the contribution of employee.For realizing enterprise goal fully. It is very fair that this kind of system look , but actually is for working value negate , is hard to embody trunk the good dry difference of bad, horizontal difference in degree, its result can only be the "everybody eating from the same pot" of equalitarianism. Therefore under market economic condition continue this kind of practice Hour fruit is enterprise recruit do not enter person also reserve do not live person, is internal to lack fair sense , is external to lack competition ability.Salary reward is the contribution that enterprise does for employee for enterprise, include realization Jig effect, the time, knowledge, ability, experience and creation and effort that paid out are corresponding as paying to repay or thank , are a kind of fair distribution principle that exchanges or trades and has embodied socialist market economy essentially, and according to contribution distribution for implicit the meaning of the exchange of equal value of intrinsic, have reflected the law of value of the market of labor force.On knowledge with the mistake district in operation pass , the function understanding that rewarded for salary on pass frequently in quite, notice salary only the function of health protection that rewards , and have overlooked salary reward encourage function. No matter going to work , do not perform duty from time to tome , have to enterprise to make contribution, " go to work to take money" have become perfectly justified; Bonus in considerable level on have lost the meaning of award, become regular additional wages. What enterprise employee accumulates for a long period is that inertia and safe sense make salary reward and have lost, should be some to encourage function. Though along with enterprise, being thorough as reforming , the manager of human resource also begins to explore new method on salary rewards system , but when designing distribution scheme often lack for modern salary reward the knowledge of theoretical and design method, make scheme deviate from the law of value of the market of labor force.Now, in the wages system of state-owned enterprise and the most of domestic joint stock companies, do not consider that outside and the internal balance of distribution are balanced. The management of human resource replace labor personnel management not the simpledisplacement of noun, it signifies that from thought and theory, the method of arriving is basic as utilizing to change. Thus each manager must meet the development of socioeconomic culture; system accepts new management thought, theory and method, sets up the brand-new management concept of human resource.Design salary scientifically to reward the distribution scheme Japanese economic friendship association of central section encourage condition for the first big small and medium sized business to third production department carry out investigation, show as a result: In initiating vigor factor wages the only row position of 8th, and in weakening vigor factor, wages row is in the first place. It is been wages high that this explains and can not initiate vigor, and wages low definite reduction, vigor, therefore the difference in degree of pay for promote employee enthusiasm aspect influence great. Now a lot of western companies in salary reward aspect the experience of having explored some successes , share for example profit , profit share , stock option, employee holds share plan ( EOSP ) , is balanced to tally to block , key Jig effect index and group team spirit, and when establishing salary to reward policy, have considered the relation of short period, mid-term and long-term pay fully , and design for special talent " special salary reward scheme ", purpose is to make salary reward distribution scheme with encourage machine made , arouse creativity and the working enthusiasm of employee group team fully.Reward salary to fit into market economic category manage will salary reward fit into market economic category manage , from the distribution mechanism, 3 distribution management big aspects and degree of assignment system, carry out bold innovation. The degree innovation of assignment system is basic, distribution machine made innovation is crucial, management innovation is basic.Establish in order to press Lao distribution is main part. According to the salary the distribution of factor of production reward distribution structure establishment press Lao distribution with press factor of production distribution combination get up salary reward the degree of assignment system, it is the inevitable requirement of the development of socialist market economy, therefore modern enterprise salary reward distribution structure should be with press Lao distribution is main part , press Lao distribution with press factor of production the basic general layout distribution. Part is the income degree of assignment system in the row in cost, part is in tax Hour the degree of essential factor of assignment system of row in profit, make salary reward the technical, knowledge capital profit of distribution scheme design and employee labor income and employee appearance suit.Lead into market distribution mechanism, make the market and price of labor force conform the market price of labor force is the market labor rate that forms through marketcompetition, is decided by the supply demand relations of labor force. Therefore when designing salary to reward distribution scheme, will consider the market price of labor force, establish the price system of labor force of different post, post and related enterprise, regard it as the basic salary of enterprise inside to reward San shine standard, with the fully embodiment value of labor force, guide the reasonably floating and optimization disposition of labor force.Consider both enterprise benefit, establish the high benefit capital of senior engineer, the distribution idea of low being it low wages press Lao distribution must be the benefit distribution that created according to labor, if a product that worker offers (service) the needs that can not satisfy society, that Me him can not get the labor pay that reflects with market price, therefore must consider both the economic benefits of enterprise.According to employee working ability and accomplishment, pull open distribution gap reasonably, hang pay and contribution ability finger working complete level, through the goal reached or the effect realized, the latent ability that reflects and has denotes knowledge with ability synthesize to gr asp level as well as experience accumulation level. Salary the role that rewards for is will encourage employee all abilities of having self play, but these abilities must be level and the knowledge of place post first needs. Work accomplishmentwork Jig the size of effect, from the difference in ability can difference. Therefore the pay that worker gets should not be also identical. It is for enterprise, what is beneficial to it really is that the actual labor accomplishment of worker, therefore contribute big have to serve move should get higher pay.Establishment the salary " found on people " reward the system Japanese Hamburg shop of McDonald’s can give employee family members every year always the bonus of a considerable number; When they pass birthday, can send person to send last fresh flower. American chain hospital company in salary reward payment in much a extra bonus ─ " have oxygen sport challenge plan ", employee must reach every month minimum standard as jog 30 miles, play wall ball for 15 hours above etc., can be just qualified bonus. Haier in salary reward the system design of payment aspect is difference " the horse in 1000 the competitive platform " it is not same to put up and have built " ", as ordinary employee carries out , " 3 works coexist , development conversion " ─ excellent worker, qualified worker and trial worker, enter factory worker all recently have certain probation period , expire acceptable turn for qualified worker, otherwise, excellent worker turns probably because of working fault, is qualified worker or trial worker. It is 4 level development checks that according to excellent middle-level administrator, what Haier carry out is taking regularly check result as basis, it is " give your a ship, advance or retreat to float Sheen lean self " to design for the base salary ofbrainpower, according to the commission of economic benefits that new product gets in the market, get salary to reward.It is identical that the effect of leading work depends on the campaign in subordinate mainly, but each subordinate does not let in the aspects such as ability and wishes. Therefore leader must so implement different leading way as subordinate is going to analyze and find out discrepancy carefully , then can get the leading effect of the best. It is also such toreward systematic design for salad rye, employee demand has discrepancy, different employee or same employee in not at the same time wait demand possible difference. Forlow wages crowd, the role of bonus is very important; For taking in higher crowd especially knowledge share is with management cadre , promote post , respect personality, appointment title and encouragement the freely degree etc. of innovation and work look more important; For being engage in , it is heavy, dangerous. The physical labor with bad environment staff, the possibilities such as labor protection, labor condition and post subsidy are effective. Therefore to make salary reward system to develop larger effect, first want the needs for employee have ample understanding. If leader wants to make encouraging level for subordinate reach the biggest demand that melts and must value them, knows the variation of demand and makes positive reaction, embody really found on people thought.企业薪酬管理薪酬管理的功能和人力资源管理的功能总体来说是一致的。
薪酬管理体系中英文对照外文翻译文献
薪酬管理体系中英文对照外文翻译文献XXX people。
XXX enterprise management。
as it has a XXX attract。
retain。
and motivate employees。
particularly key talent。
As such。
it has XXX。
retain。
objective。
XXX on the design of salary XXX.2 The Importance of Salary System DesignThe design of a salary system is XXX's success。
An effective salary system can help attract and retain employees。
XXX。
XXX them to perform at their best。
In contrast。
a poorly designed salary system can lead to employee n and XXX。
which can XXX.To design an effective salary system。
XXX factors。
including the industry。
the enterprise's size and stage of development。
and the specific needs and goals of the XXX。
XXX.3 XXXXXX。
XXX incentives can help align the XXX with those of the enterprise and its shareholders。
XXX to perform at their best.When designing equity incentives。
外文翻译--董事会结构,高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文二：Board Composition, Executive Remuneration,And CorporatePerformance: The Case Of ReitsIntroductionStockholders in modern corporations are the residual risk bearers. As they don't have the expertise to run their firms, stockholders must rely on the firm'smanagement team. Jensen and Ruback (1983) defined the management team as the top managers as well as the board of directors of the firm. The separation between ownership and control in the modern corporation creates the incentives for managers to pursue their self-interest goals and not to maximize the shareholders’ wealth in what is termed in the literature as the agency conflict.Researchers have suggested many mechanismsby which managers are curbed from maximizingsolely their own utilities.These mechanisms (seeAgarwal and Knoeber 1996) can be either externalones, such as market for corporate control or internalones, such as the board of directors. The board ofdirectors is a basic element of corporate governance.The main functions of corporate boards are evaluating and approving strategies formulated by managers, providing an appropriate vehicle for stock holders desiring representation in company boards, and performing vigorous monitoring of managers’ actions to make sure that d ecisions by top managers come in line with shareholders’ interests. The literature is rich with studies that have shown the positive effect of the outside board members on firm value .The theory says that the way a board of directors is formed is intended to minimize the agency conflict costs. Also, some studies have shown how the size of the board affects corporate value (Yermack 1996; Zahra et al. 1989; Eisenberg et al. 1998). Consequently, the board of directors is an important governance mechanism that ensures that the interests ofshareholders and management are closely aligned, which would have its effects on corporate performance.In addition to the internal mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts, managerial remuneration is an important device that can be used effectively to align the interests of stockholders and managers. The extent to which the remuneration package can achieve that alignment of interests is an empirical question. From a theoretical point of view, managerial remuneration should correlate weakly with corporate performance. The annual bonus usually is given in good as well as bad performance times. Good performance pushes the bonus up while bad performance does not depress the bonus. However, empirically, the relationship between management remuneration and corporate performance was detected and shown to exist. Generally, studies have found that there is a positive relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance (Hamid 1995; Davis et al. 1994; Finnerty et al. 1993). Managerial remuneration and corporate performanceThe issue of managerial incentives has been heavily researched in financial economics. Managerial incentives, at least from a theoretical point of view, have an energetic effect on mitigating the moral hazard problem inherited in individual contracts. This would have a major impact upon firm's financial performance. Hamid (1995) examined the relationship between CEO compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. He mainly focused upon the equity type of compensation not the cash compensation. His results confirmed a significant positive relationship between CEO equity compensation and firm Performance.Other types of compensation also have a positive effect on corporate performance even after considering some control variables. Davis and Shelor (1995) also documented a significant relationship between executive total compensation, firm size, and firm performance. Cannon and V ogt (1995) used Jensen’s measure to proxy for REITs financial performance and examined how severe the agency costs in REITs are. They find that advisor REITs with lowdirector ownership tend to underperform and pay higher advisor payments than do their counterparts with high ownership. They find no such relationship for self-administered REITs. These results show thatself-administered REITs make better use of marketbased performance compensation than do advisor REITs. Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum (1992) found that there is a significant relationship between managerial compensation and firm economic performance. Their results confirmed that compensation packages are designed to mitigate the agency conflict costs. In most previous studies, the relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance was examined and shown to be positive when using total remuneration package, which includes usually (1) base cash remuneration, (2) incentive cash remuneration, (3) stock options, and (4) relative performance remuneration. This study, however, is concerned only with cash remuneration since it represents about 80% of total remuneration package.Board composition and financial performanceThe issue of board composition has deep roots in financial economics literature. Whether the way board of directors is formed can affect the economic value and performance of a firm has been investigated by a lot of researchers.The empirical evidence not solidly convincing regarding this issue when considering the entire literature, although many empirical studies support a positive relationship between boards dominated by outside directors and corporate performance. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) documented evidence showing the positive effect of the outside directors on corporate performance as they found that shareholders’ gains fro m tender offers would be greater for targets with independent board members than for other targets. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) examined the wealth effects when an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another corporation. They find that the nonfinancial sending firms experience negative returns while the receiving firms do not gain from these appointments. This suggests that when executives join boards of other corporations, they become distracted from shareholders wealth maximization objective. The financial sending firms experience positive returns when sending their officers to other firms. Barnhart et al. (1994) investigated the effect of board composition on company performance. When they do not control for variables that have effects on company performance, the relationship between corporate performance, proxied by market-to-book ratio of equity, and board composition issignificant. When they account for managerial ownership and variation across industries, board composition is found to be related to market-to-book ratio in a nonlinear fashion. Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) revealed the effectiveness of the board of directors in enhancing firm performance by showing that stock prices of firms whose boards are dominated by independent directors are associated with larger abnormal returns than those of companies whose boards are dominated by less independent directors. Byrd and Hickman (1992) reviewed the literature and supported the conjecture of the positive relationship between corporate profitability and boards dominated by outside independent directors. Gilson (1990) also confirmed the idea that board composition is related to financial performance of firms as he documented an evidense that after company default, board composition is altered significantly by creditors who tend to appoint their representatives to the board. Byrd and Hickman (1990) showed that the stocks of firms whose at least 50% of their board members are independent are associated with higher returns for stockholders in case of acquisitions. They noted, however, that these results are sensitive to the method used to classify directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) also showed that the addition of an outside director increased corporate value. In a theoretical paper, Zahra and Pearce (1989) developed a theoretical integrative model which specifies important relationships between board variables and company performance. They noted that these relationships depend on several internal (industry factors, legal aspects, etc.) and external (ownership structure, company life cycle, complexity of operation, etc.) contingencies identified in their model. All these attributes play an important role in determining directors’ success in executing their contro l and monitoring roles, which is a prerequisite for a glamourous company performance.Molz’s (1988) findings do not support the association between firm performance and the managerial dominated boards.Weisbach (1988) shows that companies with outside-dominated boards are more likely to replace a CEO based on performance than companies with insider-dominated boards. The bulk of the previous literature shows a positive relationship between outside directors and corporate performance. The premise that is brought up by this study is that effective monitoring does notcome from all outside directors as hypothesized by some previous studies in the literature, but it comes only from that group of directors that is able to ask the hard questions. Previous literature in corporate governance classifies outside directors into two categories: gray outsiders and pure (independent) outsiders. The gray outsiders have some type of affiliation with the company on whose board they sit, which could limit their capability to exercise effective monitoring on management. These affiliations include legal, banking, consultancy, and other relationships. Pure outside directors, on the other hand, have no relationship with the company other than their directorship and, hence, bear no costs from challenging managers. Byrd and Hichman (1990) showed that the method of classifying board of directors causes the relationship between board composition and corporate performance to change. Board size and corporate performanceTheoretically, it is expected that coordination and communication will be more effective and decisionmaking problems will be less in relatively small boards, which might positively affect board performance. On the other hand, large boards have the tendency to include directors with diverse expertise and skills. These two contradicted premises deserve more inspection in the REITs industry due to their different control system. On top of that, there is a scarcity in the literature regarding studies of the relation between board size and corporate performance. This study conjectures that, in general, the ideal board size varies with firm size. Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) used accounting figures to measure firm performance. They found evidence that small boards had positive effects on corporate performance. Yermack (1996) adopted the point of view of a negative association between board size and performance. He founds an inverse relationship between the two variables. This suggests that the small size of a board of directors helps to improve the efficiency of the decision making process and, hence, promotes shareholders, interests. Brown and Maloney (1992) also found that smaller boards of directors are associated with better firm performance. Given that the previous studies have cross-sectionally examined many industries, the documented relationship might be altered when studying one industry with unique features regarding the control system.Performance measureThe literature is filled with different types of financial performance measures. All these measures can be categorized as either accounting-based measures or market-oriented measures. Usually, accounting measures that are constructed from financial statements data are highly criticized in the finance community. Also, these measures usually do not account for differences in systematic risk; hence, they diverge from the economic market value of firms (see Benston 1985). That is why financial analysts sometimes reclassify some balance sheet items in order to judge the precise liquidity of a firm.On the other hand, the market-based performance measures are determined solely and collectively by the market participants who interpret managers’ signals correctly, assuming efficient financial markets, and usually firm managers have no discretion over these measures. Based upon that, and because the sample firms are publicly owned companies and hence their securities are priced in financial markets, this study will use a market-based financial performance measure to measure REI Ts’ financial performance. Tobin’s Q, as a market-based performance measure, represents a sharp measure of corporate value. Since it incorporates the value of all assets, it is supposed to reflect both the quality of monitoring practiced by pure directors and the degree to which shareholders’ interests and those of managers are aligned, assuming that REITs’ securities are priced in efficient capital markets. Tobin’s Q can be defined as the ratio of the firm value to its assets replacement costs. The literature is filled with different versions of Tobin’s Q. Since no consensus is reached as to the best Tobin’s Q ratio, three different ratios of Tobin’s Q will be used in this study. This procedure serves two purposes. The first is to test the sensitivity of the results to different definitions of corporate performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. Second, the effect of employing different versions of Tobin’s Q on the results of many different studies in the literature is partly resolved. The three versions of Tobin’s Q employed in this study are as follows:Q1=(MVE+TA-EQ1)/TAwhere MVE is the product of stock price (year close) by the common stocksoutstanding .TA is total asset, and EQ is the book value of equity.Q2=(MVE/ book value of Net Assets)^2Q3=((MVE+LTD+STE+ PSALV)/TA)^3Where LTD is the book value of long term debt.STD is the book value of the short-term debt, and PSALV is the preferred stock at liquidation value. For the sake of illustration, the correlation among the three versions of Tobin’s Q was calculat ed and was shown to be very high. Therefore, it is expected to have similar results as far as our analysis is concerned.ConclusionThis study has investigated the effect of the composition of the board of directors (a monitoring mechanism) and managerial remuneration (bonding mechanism) on the corporate performance of REITs. The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between cash managerial remuneration and firm performance. Also, unlike some previous studies, this paper shows that only pure directors are able to practice effective monitoring and gray directors have no significant effect on firm performance. The outside directors, both gray and pure, have no impact upon finance performance in the REITs industry. Moreover, this paper tackled the board size effect investigated previously in the literature. The findings of this study confirm a nonlinear relationship between board size and firm performance. The relationship is negative when board size is small, and it turns positive when board size grows.Source:Turki Alshimmiri,2004.“Board Composition, Executive Remuneration, And Corporate Performance: The Case Of Reits”.Corporate Ownership & Control August.pp.104-112.译文：董事会结构，高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例简介股东是现代公司的的剩余风险承担者。
上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效外文文献翻译最新
文献出处：Mehran H. The study on the correlation of Senior Executive Compensation and corporate performance in listed companies [J]. Journal of financial economics, 2016, 2(3): 161-174.原文The study on the correlation of Senior Executive Compensation and corporateperformance in listed companiesMehran HAbstractDue to information asymmetry between owners and executives, led to the moral risk and adverse selection problems. How to make the executive is satisfying the interests of the white body at the same time maximize the enterprise value ultimately achieve a win-win situation, become a great concern of many scholars.This paper from two aspects of theory and the literature reviewed the executive compensation and corporate performance of the related content. Then the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance empirical research. This article mainly from two aspects to analyze the correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance, is a longitudinal descriptive statistical analysis, samples are divided into general descriptive statistical analysis and descriptive statistical analysis, the second is to collect data, respectively, the university and multivariate linear regression analysis, selection of the top three executive pay means the natural logarithm of executive compensation, return on equity and earnings per share measure of enterprise performance, and to join the company size, financial leverage, ownership concentration, executives shareholding, the proportion of state-owned shares, the proportion of independent directors, the chairman and general manager of situation eight control variables, the size of the board of supervisors.Keywords: the listed company, executive compensation and corporate performanceIntroductionModern enterprise mostly adopts share-holding system operation, the emergence of the joint-stock company, led to the separate ownership with the agency. Shareholders as the owner of the enterprise property eventually, but not to participate in enterprise management and decision-making, but the entrusted agent for the management and operation enterprises, formed "by a proxy" relationship. Agent instead of shareholders as the authorized agent of the enterprise, its status or senior management of the enterprise. Considering the agent's risk factor, such as level of morality, ability, together with information asymmetry between shareholders and executives, can produce the agency cost.Executives as the human capital of enterprise is the most important and scarce, because its mastery of the enterprise management decision-making, the height of the enterprise control rights virtually increased the likelihood they use right to violate the interests of the shareholders. In order to solve this contradiction, shareholders adopted both constraints and incentive mechanism to balance the principal-agent relationship, can excite the work enthusiasms of executives unceasingly, can maximum limit to maximize shareholder wealth. Whether to stand in the Angle of the shareholders or executives, the company's performance is the important measure of executive pay. So, study on executive compensation and corporate performance correlation for an enterprise to formulate salary incentive mechanism and solve the problem of agency costs, it is very necessary.Literature reviewThe correlation of executive compensation and corporate performance Murphy (1985) 1964-1981 using the company data, chose the 73 largest manufacturing enterprises of the data of 500 managers as the research sample, using empirical method to test the stock yield, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate earnings growth, the conclusion is: the elasticity value cash incentives for the value of the company is near to 0.11, measured with returns to shareholders of company performance pay was significantly positively related to relationship with the manager. The conclusion and Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) of the two scholars research conclusion.Carpenter and Sanders (2002) through the study concluded that: the senior management team and for board members incentives related relationship, motivation of the senior management team can more effectively improve the business performance.Phillip and Cyril (2004) by using linear regression and curve correlation analysis method of combining the, general manager of relationship between pay and performance indicators for empirical research, the conclusion is: the general manager, general manager of wages, and payment of remuneration bonuses both are positively correlated with corporate performance.Kevin (2011) by 2006-2009, 280 companies listed on the nose study draws the following conclusions: executive compensation and corporate performance (measured by return on equity as index) was significantly positive correlation; Affect the executive compensation level of the most significant variable is the size of the company.The influential factors of executive payCores, j., Holthausen, R.W. and Larkers, D.F (2005) in corporate governance structure as the breakthrough point to study the relationship between general manager compensation and corporate performance, the results show that if the company governance structure is imperfect, the condition of the compensation is the general manager will appear on the high side; General manager compensation and negatively related stake, was positively correlated with the size of the board.Kin Wai Lee (2005), Pieter Duffhues etc. (2008) after analyzing the influence factors of the company's executive compensation get the following conclusion: the board of directors of the company locates the geographical position, industry, and the size is about pay will have an impact factor; Whether they are of good corporate governance structure will largely affect the corporate performance.Kim and Hwang (2009) argue that directors only without actual contact with the enterprise are in the true sense of independence. The two scholars to fortune 100 companies in 2005 data from 1996-2005 as a sample for empirical research, get the following conclusion: director independence negatively related with executive pay,with pay performance sensitivity and in accordance with the performance was a positive correlation decision term chance.Research hypothesisExecutive compensation and corporate performance"The ownership and operation separate" on the one hand, make the enterprise economic efficiency was improved, but on the other hand also brought "by a proxy" problem. The principal and agent are in the pursuit of self-interest maximization, but due to the differences between the interests of both the demand, but on the market and the existence of information asymmetry phenomenon, in this case, the agent can make the behavior of the damage the interests of the principal for your own benefit, "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" problem such as will as, thus appeared the agency cost. In order to balance the principal-agent relationship, in turn, reduce agency cost; the owner will need to sign a compensation contract and operators. Compensation contracts, executive compensation and corporate performance, executive compensation determined by business performance, to link executive compensation and corporate performance effectively. In this case, the executive in order to improve their own reward will try my best to company management and company performance can be improved.Hypothesis 1: executive compensation and corporate performance are related Executive pay and company sizeThe size of the company has a large influence on executive pay. Compared with the smaller companies, the company size, the greater the division of the thinner, the more people, the more the more complex organization structure, operation and management problems, which makes operators face a greater risk of management and pressure, the ability and quality of senior executives put forward higher requirements. In this case, in order to good operation and management company, senior executives must pay more time and energy, and few businesses to be able to do this kind of ability, therefore, senior executives for more pay and logical.Hypothesis 2: executive pay scale is related with the companyExecutive compensation and the asset-liability ratioCompensation incentive of listed company's purpose is to reduce agency costs, ownership and operation separate, and keep the reasonable capital structure can reduce agency costs, thereby increasing the interests of the shareholders.Jesen and Michael (1986) put forward the free cash flow, said he thought the enterprises need to pay interest and principal on debt financing, so that the company's free cash flow is reduced, executives waste of corporate resources and reduce the chance of a successful, at the same time, through the debt contract, creditors have the supervision of executive behavior motivation, this agency problem between executives and shareholders and ease. When the company debt levels continue to improve, the creditor supervision executive behavior motive is also a corresponding increase. On the margin, as creditors supervision of external supervision and internal salary incentive mechanism can be substituted, therefore, when the enterprise debt level enhances unceasingly, the external supervision be enhanced, so that you can properly reduce the level of salary incentive, thus make executive pay in a certain extent, be suppressed.Hypothesis 3: executive compensation is negatively related to the asset-liability ratioExecutive pay and ownership concentrationIn general, if the company's ownership concentration is high, the big shareholder control of the executive ability of the stronger the will, they will be susceptible to the stimulation of interests for executives to implement effective supervision, prevent using executive position to improve their pay too much to damage the interests of the shareholders. On the contrary, when the company's equity dispersion, due to the constraints of the supervisory cost and especially when the benefits of less supervision cost, small and medium-sized shareholders motivation will gradually disappear, the supervision of such executives will have larger power, thus they would use the position to raise their pay.Demsetz and Leh (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1986) through the study found that in the practical work, because shareholders to supervise the management of the cost is high, in fact only the big shareholders have the ability to effectively supervise. When the company the more dispersed ownership, especiallywhen the benefits of less supervision cost, small shareholder supervision and motivation will be weakens even disappears completely, it will make managers to easily get more power, so that they can in advantage position in negotiations with shareholders to pay for their higher pay.Hypothesis 4: executive compensation is negatively related to the ownership concentrationExecutive compensation and executive shareholding"The ownership and operation separate" bring the problem of "entrust - agent”. The principal and the agent is "rational economic man", they are all in the pursuit of self-interest maximization, but due to the differences between the interests of both the demand and the market exists the phenomenon of information asymmetry, agents may make the behavior of the damage the interests of the principal for your own benefit, thus formed the agency cost. One of the effective ways to solve the principal-agent problem is equity incentive to executives, let executives holding shares of the company. Executive stock holding company, the more the interests of executives and the company's interests more closely, so both have common interests, enterprise value maximization. Executives in order to realize their own interests will inevitably to do all the management of the company, improve the efficiency of the enterprise, so that executives can get higher pay.Hypothesis 5: executive compensation and executive shareholding is related Research prospectFirst, in terms of executive pay, in addition to consider the disclosure of financial report of listed companies of monetary income, can also consider the effect of non-monetary income and hidden income. Secondly, in terms of business performance, due to the stock market is not mature, share price volatility, stock prices it is difficult to accurately reflect the operating performance of enterprises, this article only selected the return on equity, earnings per share both accounting profit index to measure business performance. With the continuous development of the securities market and perfect, in a follow-up study can use market value indicators (such as Thbins. Q value, economic value added, etc.) To measure business performance. Finally, the influenceof the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance factors can also, from the perspective of the other external factors and internal factors on executive compensation and corporate performance relationship of further research.译文上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性研究Mehran H摘要由于所有者与公司高管之间存在信息不对称,导致了风险道德、逆向选择等问题。
企业薪酬体系设计外文文献翻译中文字数3000多字
企业薪酬体系设计外文文献翻译中文字数3000多字The success of any management strategy is dependent on the people who make up an XXX any enterprise。
and the XXX。
It is essential for an XXX can attract。
retain。
and motivate employees。
XXX enterprises。
and the design of a n system is not only an effective way to XXX on the design and performance XXX'ssalary system。
with a particular XXX.2 The Importance of a Well-Designed Salary SystemA well-designed salary system XXX。
It can help attract and retain top talent。
XXX。
and increase productivity。
Moreover。
a salary system that is XXX。
it XXX to design a salary system that aligns with their business objectives and values。
while also meeting the XXX.3 XXXEquity incentives are an essential component of a well-designed salary system。
especially for XXX incentives。
such as stock ns and restricted stock units。
高管薪酬状况外文文献翻译中英文
外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Y azan Damiri; The State of Executive Compensation[D]; University of Tennessee-Knoxville ; 5-2006英文原文The State of Executive CompensationY azan DamiriUniversity of Tennessee-KnoxvilleCompanies use different methods to compensate executives. An ideal compensation package aligns executive incentives with shareholder interests to minimize agency problems. These methods often include a combination of: salary, bonus, stock options, stock grants, and pensions. Since the use of stock options has recently been a subject of great controversy, they will be discussed in greater detail since corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom have been linked to stock option grants (Hall-Murphy). However, the first component of compensation that will be discussed is one that the average employee can relate to-salary.SalarySalary is a fixed amount of a compensation package and does not vary in the short run (Balsam 35). However, salary can vary in the long run depending on performance. Normally, companies include clauses in compensation contracts allowing for raises that are contingent onperformance and duration. Since salary is the most risk-free component of a compensation package it is very important in attracting executive talent, especially if that individual is risk-averse (Balsam 312).BonusA large portion of companies pay their executives a bonus based on performance. A bonus is a form of compensation that is conditioned upon the performance of one or more measures. According to Balsam's book, "An Introduction to Executive Compensation," these measures can be implicit or explicit, objective or subjective, or financial or non-financial. Usually, the maximum bonus is expressed as a percentage of salary; as an employee moves up in the corporate ladder, the percentage of salary that can be earned as bonus usually increases (Balsam 314). It is not uncommon for a CEO's bonus to be 100% of salary. In 2005, Wall Street bonuses set a new record of $21.5 billion; the last record of $19.5 billion was during the bull market of 2000 (). Wall Street bonuses increased 15.5% over their levels in 2004 ().Stock OptionsStock options allow the person who receives them to purchase stock at a certain price usually over a certain period of time. Sometimes the grantee has to wait until the vesting period is over before the options can be exercised. A vesting period is a specified amount of time that the grantee must wait before exercising the options. Typically, grants areexercisable by allowing the grantee to exercise a certain percentage of the entire grant over the vesting period. An example is allowing the executive to exercise 25% of the grant in the first year of a four year vesting period and the rest at the end of the period. The use of stock options increased significantly during the 90's and has declined amid recent controversy (Hall-Murphy). Options allowed companies to align their incentives with those of managers and provided a form of compensation that did not require an initial cash outlay. For many of the high tech startup firms of the 90's this form of compensation seemed optimal. Stock options have been the most controversial form of compensation due to several events and misuses. The majority of Michael Eisner's compensation came in the form of stock options, and some of the most prominent corporate scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, have been linked to the excessive use of options (Hall-Murphy). One of the biggest issues surrounding the use of options is how companies should account for them. The rules that govern the accounting for stock options are established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Accounting Principles Board (APB), which existed before FASB. The pronouncement that is concerned with the expensing of stock options is APB Opinion 25, issued in 1972, which states that the accounting charge for stock options is the difference between the market price of the stock and the exercise price on the date that the options are granted (Hall-Murphy). As a result there is nocharge for options that have an exercise price that is at or above market price on the date the options are granted. However, in 1995 FASB released FAS 123 which recommended that companies expense the fair market value of options using an option pricing model, most prominently the Black-Scholes model (Hall-Murphy). The pronouncement still allowed companies to continue reporting options under APB Opinion 25, however if they chose to do so they would also be required to disclose the value of the option grant in a footnote to the financial statements. As late as 2002, only a few companies were reporting stock options using FAS 123; although, amid corporate scandal in 2003 more than a 100 companies began to report using FAS 123 (Hall-Murphy). The reason that so many companies choose not to expense the estimated fair market value of the options is that it could significantly hurt their bottom line. Furthermore, many startup companies use a tremendous amount of stock options to attract talent to the firm because they do not have the resources to pay high salaries or bonuses.Stock GrantsStock grants are shares of the company's stock that are given to employees as compensation. They are valued at the market value of the company's stock and have no exercise price (Balsam 38). Stock grants are either classified as restricted or unrestricted; restricted grants cannot be sold until the employee has been with the company for a certain amountof time, whereas unrestricted shares can be sold at any time (Balsam 38). The stock grants method of compensation is not as popular as stock options because they are more expensive and they are not as effective in aligning the interests of the executives with those of the company.PensionsA pension is a form of senior management who receives deferred compensation after he/she retires from the company. After retirement, executives receive payment or quantity. The amount may be based on a pension plan or a cumulative amount of money that the executive may have in a particular pension account. Therefore, pensions can be divided into fixed benefit plans and fixed contribution plans. A fixed benefit plan pays the employee based on a predetermined benefit formula, and the employer contribution in the fixed contribution plan is defined as the plan and the employee can give it an increase. Recently, the reduction of employee pensions by major companies has become the focus of public attention. As previously mentioned, Michael Eisner still receives an annual pension of 297,779 US dollars from Disney (Plitch). However, compared to paying $6518,459 a year to Pfizer chief executive officer Henry McKinnell, this doesn't seem like a thing (The Corporate Library). Recently, similar to Eisner, Mckinnell, the Pfizer shareholders have held a "No V ote" campaign, supporting up to 22% of the board members of Mckinnell's board members hiding their support (Masters). In addition tonormal pensions, companies have even established a special retirement plan for key executives called the "Top Hat" plan to avoid tax consequences (AFL-CIO).trendIn 2005, the salaries and bonuses of senior executives rose by 7.1%, following a 14.5% increase in 2004 and a 7.2% increase in 2003 (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). An increase of more than 3.6% for executives' increased wages and bonuses was paid to white-collar workers (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). However, the increase in the median total pay for executives,Including wages, bonuses, and option exercise income, other long-term incentive bonuses and value-recovery of restricted shares rose by 15.8% from 2004 to US$6,049,504 (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). This may seem like a big leap, but it is actually 40.9% more than the $5.9 million in 2004. It is actually quite modest (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). In 2005, 192 executives exercised a median option income of 3,493,440 U.S. dollars. In 2004, 197 executives exercised a median option stock option return of 3,229,072 U.S. dollars (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). The expansion of inflation is not a valid reason, because it is clear that the rate of increase in executive compensation has far outpaced the inflation rate, creating an increasingly large salary gap between executives and employees. Currently, a CEO pays 431 times the average worker's salary.As executive compensation continues to grow, employee compensation remains relatively stagnant, and this ratio continues to grow. This can be directly observed from the increase in executive compensation and employee compensation drawn in Figure 1.The chart shows that employee compensation has been relatively stable, and executive compensation has experienced significant growth. By observing the relationship between the employee's salary CPI, in recent years, the employee's salary has not even kept pace with inflation. It can also be observed that executive compensation is directly proportional to corporate profits, but not very drastic. This can be attributed to the variable compensation components of executive compensation packages such as bonuses, stock options and stock awards. However, some experts question whether making variable compensation such as stock options can really bring benefits to the company. Recent research has found that there is a correlation (Norris) between using CEO stock options and accounting for other financial statements. Proponents of this view believe that stock options hold senior executives “false accounts”. As we can see in Figure 1, the balance of executive compensation has increased with the proportion of corporate profits, we can draw a contrary view. This raises the question of who is responsible for determining executive pay plans. Some people replied that they are the executives who control the amount of compensation.Another trend of executive compensation is corporate governance. A c ompany’s board of directors is responsible for compensating executives.However, the problem is that in many cases the company’s CEO is also the chairman. Earlier this issue appeared in the Eisner case. In fact, the American Federation of Labor-Industrial Union estimates that in two-thirds of the companies, the CEO is also the chairman (AFL-CIO). This situation can lead to agency problems that make executives get "economic rent." The economic rent is equivalent to a monopoly profit owned by investors (Labour Union-CIO). This phenomenon triggers agency costs and expenses for shareholders. However, the relevant laws and regulations have recently been specifically formulated to safeguard the interests of shareholders.Trial RegulationsOn January 17th, 2006, members of the Securities and Exchange Commission put forward a bill that could cause a dramatic change in the disclosure of executive compensation since 1992 (AP). The plan accepts a 60-day public comment period that will not take effect until the spring of next year (AP). Under the new legislation, the company will be required to provide its annual report and display the total annual remuneration of the company's chairman, chief financial officer, and the highest-paying executive in the next three years (AP). Its regulations stipulate that the level of administrative benefits should be reduced from $50,000 to$10,000, and that the retirement benefits of managers and remuneration of board members must be disclosed in detail (AP). In addition, non-independent pay committee members must disclose (). Finally, the company will be asked to explain the goals behind executive compensation. In the face of booming executive compensation, in order to restore investor confidence, new regulations have been proposed. Future executive compensationRecent scandals and excessive abuse of company resources have caused the public to strongly oppose high executive compensation. However, we must first define what is the problem of over-exposure. Executives take over the com pany’s power and make decisions that determine the company’s lifeline. It seems sensible that a CEO who leads a multinational company to get high pay because of his efforts. However, there are three major problems in the current executive compensation issues: performance, information disclosure, and corporate governance. We should take some measures to evaluate the CEO's performance and pay the CEO's compensation based on performance. These measures should include long-term and short-term goals. This can prevent executives from sacrificing the company's long-term interests to achieve short-term financial goals in order to obtain incentive compensation. A bad or mediocre CEO should not get paid more than his value. There is no doubt that CEOs like Jack Welch who increase their shareholder'swealth significantly outweigh the compensation they receive. Therefore, I believe that the first question is whether or not the CEO pays a match with what he gets compared to the growth of executive pay in general. The view that the CEOs’ salary is too high is partly appropriate. It is partly due to the company’s constant scandals and misuse of public trust that leads to public resentment of the company. According to Figure 1, the ratio of executive compensation increases with the increase in corporate profits. increase. If the company's profits decline and executive compensation increases, then it can well verify that executive compensation is too high. Another major issue is the disclosure of information, which is currently being handled by the US Securities Regulatory Commission.To ensure investor confidence, executive compensation must be disclosed to the maximum extent, especially after the recent corporate scandal. Stock options should be included in current profit or loss based on their open market value. Obviously, they are valuable when they are given value, otherwise they are not part of the compensation package. Disclosure of executive benefits seems to be reasonable because essentially the shareholders pay them, and shareholders have the right to know. To ensure that the board of directors can focus on the interests of the company, it must strengthen corporate governance issues.The company’s CEO should not be allowed to be the chairman of theboard because it causes agency problems and leads to possible conflicts of interest. According to current legislation, all remuneration committee members are not independently disclosed (). However, this bill is not enough. Senior executives should not be allowed to hold the position of chairman of the board of directors. In the corporate governance structure, there should be a system of checks and balances between the separation of powers and the inspection of systems. Although issues such as how corporate governance and agency issues will be handled are not clear, one thing is clear and the public is no longer illusions about the current system. In order to maintain public trust, major changes must be made in the responsibilities and disclosures within the scope of executive compensation.中文译文高管薪酬状况研究雅赞·达米里田纳西大学诺克斯维尔分校公司使用不同的方案来补偿高管。
外文翻译--企业高管高薪是应得的还是对企业的窃取
外文题目：E xorbi tant CEO compensation: just reward or grand theft 出处：Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008作者：David O. Friedrichs原文：Exorbitant CEO compensation: just reward or grand theft The failure of society to criminalize policies and practices of powerful organizations and individuals that are demonstrably harmful has been a central theme of the white collar crime literature since Sutherland. In recent years muchcommentary and criticism has been directed at vastly exorbitant compensationpackages awarded to CEOs of major corporations and other major institutions.Although some criminal prosecutions have been pursued on the basis of allegations of fraud in relation to CEO compensation (e.g., the Dennis Kozlowski/Tyco case andthe Conrad Black/Hollinger case), and some civil lawsuits demanding repayment of unjustifiably large CEO compensation have been initiated (e.g., the Richard Grasso/New York StockExchange case), most typically exorbitant CEO compensation packages result in neither criminal indictments nor civil lawsuits. This article explores the status of exorbitant CEO compensation as a criminological phenomenon, beginning with a typology of different views on such compensation. The contemporary scope of disproportionate compensation is reviewed, with the exponential increase in the gaps between the compensation of CEOs and those below them documented. Someof the different mechanisms along a continuum of legal to illegal for providing exorbitant CEO compensation are identified. Why is the awarding of exorbitant CEO compensation typically legal? What specific forms of harm arise from awarding exorbitant CEO compensation? Why do Corporate Board Compensation Committees award exorbitant CEO compensation? Indeed, what are the specifically criminogenic dimensions of Corporate Board decision-making that contribute to this process? Whatarguments can be advanced in favor of criminalizing exorbitant CEO compensation and againstdoing so? What specific practical constraints would have to be overcome to criminalize the awarding of exorbitant CEO compensation? If exorbitant CEO compensation has not been addressed traditionally as a form of white collar crime,what arguments can be advanced in favor and against doing so now? This article promotes attention to the exorbitant CEO compensation issue by white collar crime scholars, with a provisional addressing of the questions raised above。
企业薪酬管理 外文文献翻译
文献出处：Khan R I, Aslam H D, Lodhi I. Compensation Management: A strategic conduit towards achieving employee retention and Job Satisfaction in Banking Sector of Pakistan[J]. International journal of human resource studies, 2011, 1(1): 89-97.翻译后中文字数：5814第一部分为译文，第二部分为原文。
默认格式：中文五号宋体，英文五号Times New Roma，行间距1.5倍。
薪酬管理：巴基斯坦银行部门实现留住员工和工作满意度的战略渠道摘要：薪酬管理是人力资源管理的一个重要方面，本文探讨了薪酬管理的概念以及对巴基斯坦银行业的员工工作满意度和忠诚度的影响，旨在为巴基斯坦银行部门的薪酬管理工作增添一些建议。
本文采用案例研究的手段，探讨了巴基斯坦银行薪酬政策的满意度主要影响因素、问题和挑战。
本研究采用问卷调查和深度访谈的方法，对案例研究型银行的450名员工进行了抽样调查，形成数据并进行分析。
研究揭示了员工从财务奖励到非财务奖励的变化趋势。
除了银行留住员工的各种成功因素之外，结果显示，工作超负荷、缺乏切实可行的培训方法和以资历为导向的奖励计划，是一些需要政府立即关注的主要问题。
关键词：薪酬，奖励和福利，银行，激励，满意度。
1.引言人力资源是任何机构最宝贵的资产，是一个工作场所的基石。
他们开展日常业务，包括客户交易，管理现金流，决策，下属的咨询，以及包括机构的许多其他重要职能。
美国实业家亨利·福特指出人力资源的重要性，他说：“抢我的生意，烧了我的房子，但给我我想要的人，我将再次建立属于我的业务。
”毫无疑问，这些员工能够以艰苦的工作和决心而机构起来，如果他们的需求没有得到确定和满足，他们也可以领导一个机构走向衰落。
上市公司高管股权激励外文文献翻译
文献出处：Wayne Guay. "The study of executive equity incentive in listed company." Journal of accounting and economics (2015): 151-184.原文The study of executive equity incentive in listed companyWayne GuayAbstractEquity incentive system in the 50 s last century, which mainly focuses on the background of solution for the benefits of principal-agent conflict, it is the fundamental starting point will be unified management and shareholder interests, incentive management pay more attention to the long-term development of the enterprise, reduce its short-term behavior. Company executive’s equity incentive core goal is to solve the objective function between executives and shareholders of listed companies, the contradiction of principal-agent promote benefit community formed between company executives and shareholders, motivate executives to create more value for shareholders and society. Its biggest advantage is that in stock appreciation of spreads as the remuneration of senior management personnel will serve as a representative of the interests of the senior managers of a company's value increasing function, promote the consistency of the operators and shareholders realize channel. In recent years, the equity incentive management's opportunistic behavior such as negative effect, gradually attention by regulators, theory and practice.Keywords: the listed company, incentive mechanism, equity incentive, senior executivesIntroductionCan know from the most basic economic man hypothesis of economics, management is not natural to carry out their duties diligently and there is no greed, they satisfy the pursuit of personal interests, the main purpose of their work is to obtain the economic remuneration; At the same time they hold positions of powerholds the important power, resources and information, so it's possible self-interest behavior to harm the interests of investors. Especially as the separation of the ownership of a modern corporate control and the management members became the "actual controller" of the company, and ownership of the owner of the large shareholders to members of the company's management for effective supervision, this gives the management using the master control of the implementation of opportunism behavior of the space.Equity incentive is to point to in the business operators, the core staff by contract, on the basis of management and implement the responsibility system for assets, by giving the business operators, the core employee shares and options such as corporate equity share, make it to the identity of the shareholders in the corporate decision-making, share the profits and risks. Equity incentive mechanism to make enterprises senior talents of individual interests and overall interests closely relates in together, is a kind of effective incentives to reduce agency costs. In mature markets such as Europe and the United States, equity incentive is regarded as the important ways to solve the modern enterprise to entrust an agency relationship, and promote the company executives and shareholders is the effective means to form a community of interests.Literature ReviewHolmstrom (1979) 2 think, if the company's shareholders to observe, identify the operator's operation and management activities, and the corresponding business performance, then pay a fixed salary and to punish the operator's default behavior way, can ensure that the operator work hard, for the correct operation and management decision-making, create the biggest value for shareholders. However, due to the separation of ownership and control of modern company system has characteristics of agency problem between shareholders and managers, in general, shareholders cannot supervise operator's action, also don't know whether the operator's effort level is optimal.Jensen and Meckling (1976), the study found that enterprise's performance as a company manager increase with the increase of the stake.Mehran (1995) for themanufacturing enterprises of 1979 and 1980 in the United States after data for empirical research Gui that managers' shareholding is significant positive correlation with corporate performance.Morck Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argues that management group interest convergence and defense of these two effects.Interest convergence, refers to the company's market value and is closely relative to the number of managers' shareholding; Defense effect, refers to when managers shareholding reaches a certain range, the company's market value is negative correlation with the number of managers' shareholding. Therefore, when the proportion of enterprise management changes, the interests of the convergence and defense of these two kinds of effect, thus determines the volatility of the enterprise value changes.McConnell and Serves (1990) 'in the extension Morck Shleifer and Vishny (1988), on the basis of research Gui, examine the managers shareholding and institutional investors holding its influence on the value of the company. They found that the value of the company and managers shareholding inverted U type nonlinear relationship, critical stake is about 40 to 50%.Hemalin and Weishach (1991), the study found that when the managers' shareholding ratio from 0% to 1%, 1% and 5%, 5% to 20% and 5% more than four interval, the company's performance is negatively related to the ownership respectively were positively correlated, and the change trend of positive correlation, negative correlation. In addition, Mr Singh and Davidson (2003). Research has shown that, in the listed companies in the United States, managers shareholding can better put the interests of managers and shareholders together, reduces the agency cost of administrators.The implementation of the senior executive’s equity incentive process Most composed of independent directors of equity incentive commission rules of procedure by the shareholders' meeting, and led by the board of directors of the company. The comprehensive implementation of the committee responsible for planning and design and implementation of equity incentive plans make written rules. The committee shall have the right to decide the annual equity incentive beneficiary, given amount, given time, when emergencies to explain of equity incentive plan, andto pany in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of the state, according to the actual situation of the company stock source, equity incentive plan.Reasonable choice reserved shares, issuing new shares, stock repurchase (2), or by the original big shareholders transfer part of equity for equity incentive plan and way of solving the stock sources.Senior executives often is the main awarded equity incentive and incentive object.In the early stages of the development of equity incentive, the beneficiary of the equity incentive is mainly enterprise executives, the executives get the benefits of equity incentive, and brought benefits to the company.Equity incentive of the other type of object is the company's directors, including employees, directors and non-employee directors.But the director given equity incentive in number is far lower than the CEO.At present, the international big company equity incentive plan to object has a rising trend, from the original award CEO a few key positions, such as development so far, including senior managers, directors, middle managers, the tech sector, and even ordinary employees, foreign experts, consultants, or lawyers participation main body diversification.The number of equity incentive granted by the stock value, the total number of equity, the relevant laws and regulations, wage ratio, position, years of work and other personal factors and the influence of such factors as the company's performance.There are three kinds of international determine the number of options granted methods: one is according to the desired goals determine the amount of equity;Second, using the empirical formula by calculating the value of equity retracing equity.In granting equity incentive grant agreement should illustrate the validity of corresponding equity incentive.Equity incentive will be implemented in this period, this period is also known as equity life span.The validity of the stock option for stock options commonly discussion after signed a book of 10 years, the force will remain open for 3 一5 years.Be motivating if super power not valid for line power, will be deemed abandoned automatically equity incentive.Equity incentive holder line right after the press line right enjoys the dividend income shares.Due to the different tax law, in view of the executive authority of the proceeds of the stock yield whether to pay tax and tax rates, depending on the specific provisions of the tax law countries.Conformto the legal equity of income can pay tax at a reduced rate on capital gains tax, enjoy the preferential tax.Equity incentive may be due to the failure of the equity incentive plan, the authorized person and company terminates, the employment relationship between licensor due to various personal reasons can't exercise suspended or cancelled.Because each are not identical, the termination of the equity incentive approach also have very big difference.Executives, for example, in the office during the period of death, then the stock options can be used as a heritage to the heir hands;Senior executives to resign, or fired, companies tend to cancel all executives equity incentive;Did not get a right or has not done, to be given the right of equity incentive will failure due to senior executives quit and so on.SuggestionOn equity incentive mode in our country, the problems and obstacles, this paper argues that, from the following several aspects to pave the way for the implementation of equity incentive.Set up perfect and effective managers market.Professional, high-quality team of professional managers to promote healthy development of the enterprise management upgrade and plays an important role.Mature, manager of the talent market is the necessary condition of manager selection mechanism and qualified company manager is the focus of the incentive equity incentive system object.Manager market equity incentive, usually first professional manager market opposite the equity incentive, but in our country has not yet set up professional manager market.To ensure the healthy development of the equity incentive, you must set up professional manager market as soon as possible.Managers resource configuration, only through market to play its best utility, mature, manager of the talent market to give managers a reasonable market price, so as to solve problems such as management personnel to fold.To establish scientific performance appraisal system.Any one don't combine with performance of equity incentive plan is invalid, all kinds of business operators how to determine the performance appraisal system, specific how to calculate, how linked to motivation and a series of problems to be further discussed.Scientific performance evaluation standards for the implementation of equity incentive mechanism to providea measurement scale.First of all, should have an objective and fair performance evaluation standard and operational characteristics.Second, determine the content of evaluation index system should include, namely company performance which is created by an operator, such as enterprise profit growth, return on equity, asset value, debt paying ability and so on.Again, the comprehensive evaluation of the performance of the enterprise operator, in addition to consider financial indicators, but also non-financial indicators, for example, the degree of professional executives, employee's satisfaction and recognition in the company executives, etc should be included in the evaluation index system.Finally, you need to independent and impartial intermediary companies to participate, build a set of more scientific and perfect performance evaluation system, to objectively evaluate the operating performance, record companies.Perfect the corporate governance structure.The governance structure of listed companies is the microeconomic foundation equity incentive, and in the development of capital market in our country appear all sorts of problems and contradictions are pointing to the corporate governance is the most basic, also is the core part.The corporate governance structure including the incentive mechanism, constraint mechanism and operator selection mechanism, a complete system.The modern corporate governance is not only that the distribution of control and supervision, more important is the distribution of residual claims and residual control.The essence of the equity incentive is to make the company executives have some residual claims and the corresponding risk.Sound corporate governance structure, ensures that managers work get reasonable compensation, but also can prevent the short-term behavior of managers, truly protect both managers a reasonable income, and protect the interests of the principal.Scientific and reasonable to determine the equity incentive scheme.For executives of listed companies equity incentive, must hold good degrees, neither lack of incentives, also cannot too much incentive.Inadequate incentives to lead to the short-term behavior of enterprise management, is not conducive to the long-term development of the enterprise, incentive will damage the rights and interests of theowner.In the process of equity incentive plan formulation, it must be reasonable for the number of equity incentive, by reference to determine incentives, such as scientific theory of option pricing revenue model.Estimate the value of options, and long-term performance, with the enterprise implement stock option, the unification of the profits, owners' equity ing scientific method to the equity incentive plan is helpful to prevent malicious hype and abnormal fluctuations impact on equity incentive.译文上市公司高管股权激励研究Wayne Guay摘要股权激励制度于上个世纪五十年代出现，其产生的背景主要是着眼于解决因委托代理带来的利益矛盾,它的根本出发点在于将管理层与股东利益统一,激励管理层更加关注企业的长远发展,减少其短期行为。
上市公司高管股权激励计划外文翻译文献
上市公司高管股权激励计划外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Investor pricing of CEO equity incentivesJeff P. Boone Inder K. Khurana K. K. RamanAbstractThe main purpose of this paper is to explore CEO compensation in the form of stock and options.The objective of CEO compensation is to better align CEO-shareholder interests by inducing CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions. However, recent research suggests that these incentives have a significant down-side (i.e., they motivate executives to manipulate reported earnings and lower information quality). Given the conflict between the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional information quality effect, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. We examine whether CEO equity incentives are priced in the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium over the 1992–2007 time period. Our analysis controls for two potential structural changes over this time period. The first is the 1995 Delaware Supreme Court ruling which increased protection from takeovers (and decreased risk)for Delaware incorporated firms. The second is the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act which impacted corporate risk taking, equity incentives, and earnings management. Collectively, our findings suggest that CEO equity incentives, despite being associated with lower information quality, increase firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.Keywords：CEO equity incentives，Information quality，Cost of equity capitalIntroductionIn this study, we investigate investor pricing of CEO equity incentives for a large sample of US firms over the period 1992–2007.Because incentives embedded in CEO compensation contracts may be expected to influence policy choices at the firm level, our objective is to examine whether CEO equity incentives influence firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.Prior research (e.g., Jensen et al. 2004; Jensen and Murphy 1990) suggests that equity- based compensation, i.e., CEO compensation in the form of stock and options, provides the CEO a powerful inducement to take actions to increase shareholder value (by investing in more risky but positive net present value projects). Put differently, equity incentives are expected to help mitigate agency costs by aligning the interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders, and otherwise help communicate to investors the important idea that the firm’s objective is to maximize shareholder wealth (Hall and Murphy 2003).However, recent research contends that equity incentives also have a perverse or dysfunctional downside. In particular, equity-based compensation makes managers more sensitive to the firm’s stock price, and increases their incentive to manipulate reported earnings—i.e., to create the appearance of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (such as analysts’ forecasts)—in an attempt to bolster the stock price and their personal wealth invested in the firm’s stock and options (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Cheng and Warfield 2005). Stated in another way, CEO equity incentives can have an adverse effect on the quality of reported accounting information. As noted by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Jensen et al. (2004), by promoting perverse financial reporting incentives and lowering the quality of accounting information, equity-based compensation can be a source of, rather than a solution for, the agency problem.Despite these arguments about the putative ill effects of equity incentives, equity-based compensation continues to be a salient component of the total pay packages for CEOs. Still, given the conflict between the positive incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional effect of lower information quality, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. To our knowledge, prior research provides mixed evidence on this issue. For example, Mehran (1995) examines 1979–1980 compensation data and finds that equity-based compensation is positively related to the firm’s Tobin’s Q. By contrast, Aboody (1996) examines compensation data for a sample of firms for years 1980 through 1990, and finds a negative correlation between the value of outstanding options and the firm’s share price, suggesting that the dilution effect dominates the options’ incentive alignment effect. Moreover, both these studies are based on dated (i.e., pre-1991) data.In our study, we examine whether CEO equity incentives are related to the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium, i.e., the exc ess of the firm’s ex ante cost of equity capital over the risk-free interest rate (a metric discussed by Dhaliwal et al. 2006).Consistent with Core and Guay (2002), we measure CEO equity incentives as the sensitivity of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio to a 1 percent change in the stock price. Based on a sample of 16,502 firm-year observations over a 16 year period (1992–2007), we find CEO equity incentives to be negatively related to the firm’s ex ante equity risk premium, suggesting that th e positive incentive alignment effect dominates the dysfunctional effect of lower information quality.In other analysis, we attempt to control for two regulatory (structural) changes that occurred during the 1992–2007 time period of our study.As pointed out by Daines (2001), regulatory changes can have an impact on firm values and returns as well as the structure of executive compensation. First, Low (2009) finds that following the 95 Delaware Supreme Court ruling that resulted in greater takeover protection, managers reduced firm risk by turning down risk-increasing (albeit positive NPV) projects. In response, firms increased CEO equity incentives to mitigate the risk aversion. Potentially, the impact of the Delaware ruling on managers’ risk aversio n and the follow-up increase in equity incentives (to mitigate the increase in managers’ risk aversion following the ruling) may have resulted in a structural change in our sample at least for firms incorporated in Delaware. To control for this potential structural impact, we perform our analysis for Delaware incorporated firms for 1996–2007 separately. Our results suggest that the favorable effect of CEO equity incentives on firm value (asreflected in the lower ex ante equity risk premium) is similar for Delaware firms and other firms.Second, a number of studies (e.g., Cohen et al. 2007, 2008; Li et al. 2008) indicate that the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) lowered equity incentives (i.e., reduced the proportion of equity incentives to total compensation post-SOX), reduced managerial risk taking, decreased spending on R&D and capital expenditures, and reduced accruals-based earnings management while increasing real earnings management. Since real earnings management is potentially more difficult for investors to detect than accruals-based earnings management, a possible consequence of SOX could be an increase in agency costs since 2002. To control for the potential structural changes imposed by SOX both in terms of expected returns and the level of equity incentives, we perform our analysis for the pre-SOX and post-SOX time periods separately. For each of the two time periods, our results suggest a favorable effect of CEO equity incentives on firm value (as reflected in the lower ex ante equity risk premium), although the effect appears to be stronger in the post-SOX period.Our study contributes to the literature on the valuation of equity incentives. We provide (to our knowledge) first-time evidence on the relation between CEO equity incentives and the ex ante cost of equity capital. Prior research has focused by and large on the consequences of managerial equity incentives for firm performance (Mehran 1995; Hanlon et al.2003) and risk taking (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Hanlon et al. 2004) rather than on valuation per se. As noted previously, to our knowledge only two prior studies (Aboody1996 and Mehran 1995, both based on pre-1991 data) have examined the pricing of managerial equity incentives, with mixed results.In our study, we provide evidence on the valuation effects of CEO equity incentives based on more recent (1992–2007) data. By focusing on more recent data, our findings relate to a growing line of research on the association between equity-based compensation and accounting information quality. Specifically, Coffee (2004) suggests that the $1 million limit on the tax deductibility of cash compensation for senior executives imposed by Congress in 1993 motivated firms to make greater use of equity compensation which, in turn, increased the sensitivity of managers to the firm’s stock price. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) provide evidence which suggests that equity incentives are positively related to the magnitudeof accruals-based earnings management. Similarly, Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) report CEO equity incentives to be positively related to accounting irregularities and the subsequent restatement of previously issued financial statements. Thus, prior research suggests that equity-based compensation has a negative effect on the quality of earnings reported by firms. Consistent with several published empirical studies that support the notion that lower information quality is priced in a higher cost of equity capital (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005), CEO equity incentives could potentially lower firm value by increasing the firm-specific equity risk premium.As noted previously, we document that CEO equity incentives (despite the associated lower informat ion quality) are related negatively to the firm’s ex ante equity risk premium, implying that equity incentives increase firm value by lowering the firm’s cost of equity capital.Thus, our findings suggest that the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect associated with equity incentives dominates the dysfunctional information quality effect.Since 1992, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has mandated the public disclosure of executive compensation data to promote informed decision making by investors. Our findings provide further evidence that these disclosures increase the informativeness of stock prices in competitive securities markets. Collectively, given that CEO compensation is a topic of ongoing interest (Jensen et al. 2004; Reich 2007), our findings indicate that CEO equity incentives influence firm value favorably through a cost of equity capital channel.Concluding remarksPrior research (e.g., Goldman and Slezak 2006; Jensen et al. 2004) suggests that CEO equity incentives can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, these incentives can mitigate the agency problem by aligning the interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders (i.e., by inducing CEOs to prefer more optimal, albeit risky, investment choices). On the other hand, these incentives can lead to excessive sensitivity to share price performance and induce executives to manipulate reported earnings with an eye on the stock price. In other words, by promoting perverse reporting incentives and lowering the quality of accounting information pertinent to investor pricing decisions, CEO equity incentives can potentially be a part of, not a remedy for, the agency problem. However, to our knowledge there is little to no prior evidence to suggestwhich effect—the positive incentive alignment effect or the perverse information quality effect—dominates.We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we show that CEO equity incentives are negatively related to the firm-specific equity risk premium, i.e., the positive incentive alignment effect associated with these incentives dominates the dysfunctional information quality effect in the pricing of the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium. Second, since equity incentives are intended to induce CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions, the effect of these incentives on shareholder wealth in the post-SOX time period is of particular interest. Our results suggest that the economic significance of these incentives (i.e., the payoff for shareholders in terms of a lower ex ante equity risk premium and a higher firm value) was in fact higher in the post-SOX time period. Finally, our findings provide further evidence that the SEC mandated disclosures (since 1992) of executive compensation data increases the informativeness of stock prices with respect to the potential implications of CEO equity incentives for the cost of equity capital and firm value. At this time, CEO compensation is a topic of ongoing interest for regulators and investors (Jensen et al. 2004; Reich 2007). Collectively, our findings complement and extend prior research on equity incentives. They are potentially useful in better informing regulators and investors faced with questions about the possible consequences of CEO equity incentives for shareholder wealth.译文：总裁股权激励的投资者定价Jeff P. Boone Inder K. Khurana K. K. Raman摘要本论文的主要目的是探讨首席执行官以股票和期权形式的报酬问题。
薪酬管理毕业论文外文翻译资料
薪酬管理毕业论文外文翻译资料篇一：薪酬管理体系中英文对照外文翻译文献中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Enterprises salary system design andperformance evaluationAbstractAny effective way of management must rely on a basis: people, all the staff of enterprises. Compensation system as an important aspect of enterprise management system, for an enterprise to attract, retain and motivate employees have a significant impact, attract, retain and motivate key talent, has become the core of the enterprise recognized goal. The compensation system design is not only an effective way to realize the core objective, is also an important content of modern enterprise development.Key words: salary system and equity incentive, senior executives, design1 IntroductionHuman capital to the enterprise wealth maximization, the greatest degree of retaining key talent, attract potential talent, the basic principals and successful is perfect competitive compensation system. With the concept of human capital is more and more people Heart, attract, retain and motivate key talent, has become the core of enterprise determine target, compensation system for enterprises An important aspect of the system, to attract talents play an important role. Compensation system design is an effective way to reality is the core objective, but also an important content of the development of the enterprise to modernization, so the height weight by enterprises Depending on the.2 Literature reviewEarly in the traditional compensation phase, the employers always minimize workers to cut costs as much as possible, and through this method make the Labor of workers have to work harder in order to get paid enough to make a living. William. First, Quesnay’s minimum wage theory is that wages and other commodities, there is a natural value, namely maintain staff minimum standard of living life information value，the minimum wage for workers does not depend on the enterprise or the employer s subjective desire, but the result of the competition in the market. The classical economists Muller believed that certain conditions, the total capital in the enterprise salary depends on the labor force and for the purchase of labor relationship between capital and other capital; For the payment of capital wage fund is difficult to change in the short term. Wages fund quantity depends on two factors: one is a worker, directly or indirectly, in the production of products and services production efficiency; the other one is in the process of production of these goods directly or indirectly employ labor quantity. With the development of era, the simple forms of employment have already can t satisfy the demand of the workers, so some interests to share views was put forward to motivate workers. On this basis, the Gantt invented the complete tasks rewarded system to perfect the incentive measures. Represented by Americaneconomist Becker’s theory of human capital school of thought argues that human capital is determined by the human capital investment, is present in the human body to the content of knowledge, skills, etc. Martin Weizmann share of economic theory that wages should be linked to corporate profits. Increase in profits, employee wages fund, increased profits, and employee wages fund. Between enterprises and employees is the key of the labor contract is not in a fixed wage of how many, but in the division of labor both sides share proportion. In modern compensation phase, thecontents of the compensation has been changed, increased a lot of different compensation models, and more and more pay attention to employee s personal feelings and development, employees can even according to individual condition choose different salary portfolio model. Employees can be paid off on surface of the material and spiritual.3 Pay system overviewIn the past the traditional pay system, usually are business owners value orientation as the guide to carry on the design. With the continuous development of the overall market environment, in the modern enterprise management concept has also changed. They are aware of the established compensation system should adapt to the employee benefit as a starting point, the self-interest pursuit and employee demand together, to establish a set of enterprises and employees to maximize the interests of the two-way, so as to achieve win-win situation. Since the 90 s, the westerndeveloped economies in the enterprise owners and managers try to change the traditional form of compensation, relocation compensation system, the importance of also constantly try to innovate salary system of design and diversification.Performance pay system is established in accordance with the enterprise organization structure based on the results of the individual or team performance appraisal for salary distribution system. Total compensation is generally associated with individual or team performance. Now the enterprise model is used to combine individual performance and team performance. At the same time will be long term incentive and short-term incentive flexible model. In this kind of pay structure, contains a variety of forms of performance pay.Skill-based pay system on the basis of employees skill determine employee wages level, and to the improvement of skills as their employeesprogress criteria. The compensation model can encourage employees to continuously learn new knowledge, to keep up with The Times, is the industry leader, when technology and equipment upgrades to the fastest response time to complete the change, and is helpful to form the learning corporate culture. If for flat organization structure, management jobs and opportunities for advancement are less, the compensation system can be very skillful professionals to make up for in terms of compensation. But with technical compensation system with the篇二：薪酬外文文献毕业论文材料：英文文献及译文课题名称：薪酬体系专业工商管理学生姓名班级 B 工商 072学号指导教师专业系主任完成日期二零一一年三月The Changing Pattern of Pay and BenefitsTudor, Thomas R, Trumble, Robert RJournal of Compensation Benefits/May/2008Today, many companies still base their reward systems on the 1950s compensation model made popular during the brief period when U.S. companies dominated the world. With todays increasingly competitive environment, however, companies must look more closely at thecost-benefit of rewards, instead of just using them in an attempt to reduce employee dissatisfaction. Companies must provide short-term motivation and encourage employees to develop long-term skills that will aid the company. Most importantly, companies must also attract and retain highperformers, instead of alienating them with pay systems that give everyone pay increases without regard to levels of performance. For example, such new compensation approaches may include skill-based pay, gainsharing plans, and flexible benefits systems.Traditional compensation approaches are still often modeled on the centralization-based organizational model, in which decisions were made at the top and management rigidly defined tasks. However, with global competition becoming an increasingly prominent issue, companies need reward systems that match their movement to decentralized structures. Larger numbers of companies are also becoming very aware that they cannot just pass additional compensation costs onto future customers. Today, our pay systems must move in step with the participative-management trend by becoming more flexible instead of remaining fixed. This adjustment involves many factors including shorter product life cycles, a need to be more flexible, a need for workers to continually gain additional skills, and for them to think more on the job.In today s most successful companies, employee rewards and benefits are increasingly incorporated into an organization s strategic planning. Why? The rationale is that employee compensation has a substantial impact on the long-term financial position of a firm. Compensation structures should consider an organization s strategic requirements and should match organizational goals. Compensation strategic planning shouldinvolve:consideration of the internal and external environment; and creation of an organization s compensation statement, compensation goals, and the development of compensation policies.Today, one strategic compensation trend is the use of pay incentives instead of the traditional, annual “everybody gets” pay increase. The rationale is to control costs and to more closely tie performance to compensation. We can group the changing pattern of compensation into twogeneral areas: Pay Method Trends and Benefits Trends. Human Resources managers should familiarize themselves with these changing trends and determine the plan that is most suitable for their organization.PAY METHOD TRENDSThere are a number of pay methods available for use by employers, including general pay increases, cost-of-living increases, merit pay, bonuses, skill-based pay, competence-based pay, CEO compensation, gainsharing, and various types of incentive pay.General Pay IncreaseA general pay increase is a pay increase given to everyone in a company. It can be a lump-sum payment, but it is more likely to be a percentage increase in base salary. The employer s rationale for the pay increase may have been the result of a market survey, job evaluation, or just a profitable year. The trend, however, is for general increases to decline as pay-for-performance systems become increasingly dominant. In addition, giving everyone the same raise sometimes decreases morale becausehigh-performing employees see poor performers getting the same reward. Cost-of-Living IncreaseCost-of-living increases are general pay increases triggered by a rise in an inflation-sensitive index, such as the consumer price index or the producer price index. As with general pay increases, the use ofcost-of-living pay increases is decreasing among companies. The rationale for this decrease is that with lower inflation (thus little change in prices), incomes are more stable and the need for inflation adjustments is not as great as it was in the past. In addition, collective bargaining agreements are now less likely to include provisions for cost-of-living increases, so nonunion firms are not under as much pressure to provide them in an attempt to match union-negotiated compensation. Their declinecan also be attributed to the fact that employers are moving away from pay systems that are nonperformance related.Merit PayMerit pay is another generic term in which pay incentives are given for overall job performance.2 Some problems frequently encountered with merit pay plans include:? the use of subjective criteria when measuring employee performance; ? a lack of uniform standards for rating individual employees;? differences among managers in how to make individual ratings.Merit pay was the first attempt by firms to create apay-for-performance system. However, due to employer (and employee) dissatisfaction with merit pay plans, the trend is to eliminate them and instead use pay-for-performance plans that are more objective (such as bonus plans), and that use specific performance measuring criteria that aid in the performance appraisal process.3 This trend includes both the private and public sectors, because the merit pay system in the federal sector has also been inadequate.BonusA bonus is a generic term involving a type of pay-for-performance plan. Managers can give a bonus for individual or group performance, and for meeting objectives such as MBO (management by objectives). Researchers and practitioners have given these plans high marks for motivating employees, for creating loyalty, and for meeting performance objectives. In addition, bonuses reduce the turnover of high-performing employees and increase the turnover of low performers, who do not get bonuses. If the bonus system is well-designed, they also create internal equity. As such, bonus systems (pay-for-performance) are the current trend in compensation.Skill-Based PaySkill-based pay emphasizes a company s desire to increase the skills and knowledge of its workforce. It may involve classes, voluntary job rotation, or tests. Itsbenefits are many, including having trained people available to do a job if someone is absent. Skill-based pay also works well with quality circles because:? it provides employees with a better understanding of the jobs their coworkers perform;? it reduces resistance to restructuring or other needed changes; ? it leads to a more flexibleworkforce that can better adapt to new technologies or processes; and it encourages a learning environment.It does, however, require a large investment in training which can be expensive.Competence-Based PayCompetence-based pay (the grid system) is very new and does vary from plan-to-plan. The idea is not only to reward employees for how well they do a job, but for how they do the job. For example, a competence-based pay plan can be used to persuade workers to use the computers that are sitting on their desks, or to adapt to other changes that come along. The rationale behind a competence-based pay plan is to keep employee skills current.CEO CompensationThe compensation of CEOs (and other top executives) has also been changing, and now includes more pay incentives—such as stock options —to better link performance with compensation. Plans linking executive pay with performance may include stock options, cash bonuses, phantom stock, or deferred compensation, all of which are ways of making top management more accountable for company performance. Today, performance considerations are a larger part of executive compensation. TheSecurities and Exchange Commission also requires corporations to explain the rationale behind their executive compensation programs to shareholders.GainsharingGainsharing is a pay-for-performance plan in which “gains” are shared with employees for improvements in profitability orproductivity.Gainsharing plans are designed to create a partnership with employees so that both management and labor are working toward the same goals and that both groups are benefiting from the results. Gainsharing is a growing trend, and it fits well with other trends, such as participatory management, worker empowerment, and teamwork. It is also being used in many service businesses, such as banking and insurance. Gainsharing encourages employee involvement and acceptance of change, and aligns employee goals with company goals.Five Types of Pay IncentivesWhile all pay incentives can be generically coined as “gainsharing,”we will briefly mention five types:1. ESOPs. Employee Stock Ownership Plans allow the sharing of gains throughdividends and any increase in the value of company stock. ESOPs do create ownership in the company for employees that may result in additional motivation, but they do not necessarily have aparticipative-management component.2. Profit-Sharing Plans. Profit-sharing plans allow employees to share in the revenue they helped generate. This sharing can be either deferred or immediate. Some observers argue that associating rewards and performance is difficult if managersonly give rewards annually, and that perhaps employees should not share in the profits because they do not share in the risks. However, companiessuch as Lincoln Electric and Ford feel that profit sharing is a strong inducement to increase performance. The current rate of growth of these plans is significant. For best motivational results, companies should use a system that is based on some criteria that employees understand, instead of just an arbitrary amount. The advantage of profitsharing plans is that employers do not have to pay a large sum of money if the profit target is not met.3. Scanlon Plans. Scanlon plans allow employees to share in any savings in laborcost (using a ratio) that is due to their increased performance. The rationale for ScanIon plans is to help employees identify with and participate in the company. Employees participating in such plans may have access to suggestion programs, brainstorming sessions, or committees to solve production problems. The employer and the employees then share in the savings that result.4. Rucker Plans. Rucker plans allow employees to share in any improvement in theratio of employee costs to the valued added in manufacturing. This is the most complex gainsharing plan, because it deals with four variables: labor costs, sales value of production (changes in equipment, or work methods, for example), purchases of outside services such as subcontracting, or utilities, and purchases of outside materials, involving “inventory, theft, and so on”. Rucker plans are designed to give employees a stake in areas such as reducing labor costs, using raw materials, and outsourcing decisions. As such, everyone shares in the savings.5. Improshare Plans. Improshare plans allow employees to share in productivitygains that occur because of their efforts.[sup5] Following the Improshare approach, managers give bonuses when the actual hours for a specific amount of productivity are less than the standard that they created using a formula. The savings are split between the company and the workers, in a ratio such as 50?50. CHANGES IN BENEFIT PLANSChanges in benefit plans have occurred as a result of efforts to keep up with trends, to contain costs, and to meet government regulations. Employees often view benefits as an entitlement, and their cost—which has steadily increased—now averages 36 percent of total wages. The trend is to get the most out of benefits, while keeping costs down. For example, employers do not want to pay for any overlap of coverage, or to pay too much for coverage. As their costs continue to go up, employers are now starting to question how much employees value their benefits. For example: ? Do they support recruitment, motivate, and retain good employees? ? Do they support the strategic mission of the firm?? Do proposed benefits support the company s retention goals and the demographics of potential recruits?? Do they support the company culture or the culture the company now wants to promote? A movement now exists among employers for measuring benefit results and continuously evaluating benefits. A focus on Total Quality Management makes the internal employee the customer of HR departments who have the product of “benefits.” HR departments want to satisfy the篇三：企业薪酬管理外文翻译文献企业薪酬管理外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)翻译：宽带薪酬体系——薪酬模式的创新视野摘要：最近，有关“企业人力资源管理中的有效激励”的问题吸引了许多产业界和学术界的学者的关注。
薪酬管理英文文献翻译及参考文献
1) The Management of Broadbanding Salary浅谈宽带薪酬管理2) Talking about the Salary Management薪酬管理浅谈3) Salary payment is managed宽带薪酬理论例句>>4) Broadbanding salary宽带薪酬1.Application of a fuzzy comprehensive evaluation model to the broadbanding salary performance evalution;模糊综合评判模型在宽带薪酬绩效评估中的应用2.The broadbanding salary system is one that can be used in horizontal organized enterprises that have good conscious of management,innovation and performance.文章指出,宽带薪酬制度适用于管理基础扎实、制度化和规范化管理较强的企业、扁平化的组织结构、团队化管理的组织和具有创新和绩效文化的企业。
3.The article presents the meaning of broadbanding salary,analyzes the characteristics and advantages of broadbanding salary,expoundsing the processes of designing broadbanding salary and points out the problems for enterprises which implement broadbanding salary.针对传统薪酬结构的弊端,提出宽带薪酬是一种适用于技术型、创新型的高科技企业的新型薪酬体系。
人力资源管理薪酬管理外文翻译论文外文文献
The Fatal Flaw in Pay for PerformanceMany corporate boards, responding to shareholder and public pressure, are designing pay-for-performance plans to hold CEOs accountable. But there is often a crucial flaw in such schemes: They don’t pay for performance with integrity.The omission—evident from compensation committee reports in top companies’ proxy statements—is striking. Corporations, after all, face unceasing pressures to make the numbers by bending the rules, and an integrity miss can have catastrophic consequences, including indictments, fines, dismissals, and collapse of market capitalization. Furthermore, performance with integrity creates the fundamental trust—inside and outside the company—on which corporate power is based.A board should explicitly base a defined portion of the CEO’s cash compensation and equity grants on his or her success in handling the foundational task of fusing high performance with high integrity at all levels of the company. Why don’t boards do that They may be uncertain about the meaning of integrity and how to assess its integration into financial performance.Step one, then, in designing pay for performance with integrity is using the following definition: Integrity is a uniform corporate culture with three elements—robust adherence to formal rules; adoption of ethical standards that are in the company’s long-term enlightened self-interest; and employee commitment to honesty, candor, fairness, trustworthiness, and reliability. Step two is for the board to assess whether the CEO has infused high performance with high integrity. The board can do that by answering the following questions, using hard analytics as well as the board members’ own ju dgment.Has the CEO established company-wide performance-with-integrity principles for which the firm’s leaders are responsible and accountable Examples of these include demonstrating committed and consistent integrityleadership; managing performance with integrity as a business process; using early-warning systems to stay ahead of global trends; providing timely, risk-assessed training; and giving employees a voice.Have the CEO and top managers implemented these principles through robust practices If leaders don’t invest time, effort, and resources in embedding key integrity practices in business processes, “tone at the top” is just window dre ssing. For examples, see the sidebar “The Practice of Performance with Integrity.”Has integrity permeated every aspect of the corporate culture One vital tool for assessing that is an annual, anonymous employee survey across all businesses and regions that asks, “Is integrity compromised by business pressures” and “Are the leaders’ verbal commitments to integrity reflected in action” The board can also have outside HR experts periodically conduct 360-degree assessments of the CEO and top executives that explore such questions.Has the CEO met annual performance-with-integrity objectives set by the board One example might be effectively handling a major miss or crisis—an environmental accident, a bribery case, or a financial restatement—and remedying the problem systematically after a candid analysis of its causes. Another objective might be hiring leaders in emerging markets such as China, Russia, and India who are skilled in integrating performance and integrity.How do business divisions rate comparatively The board should look at how integrity practices differ among divisions and how the CEO deals with laggards. It should also look at how the units rank against external peers. This may require data from news or government reports or a comparative audit by, say, a former regulatory official.The board’s standards for assessing pay for performance with integrity should also define a new set of “specs” in the company’s CEO succession planning. In evaluating candidates, the board should ask: Do they possess the knowledge, experience, and skills to drive a robust performance-with-integrity culture deep into the company’s global operations The same specsshould be used to evaluate the compensation of senior executives and set goals for leadership development programs. That’s the best way to ensure that, over the long term, the company’s top ranks are filled with managers who live by the principles and practices of performance with integrity—and thus help the company avoid debilitating risks and secure the trust that is vital to doing business.Here’s a sample list of ques tions greatly shortened because of space limits that will help boards assess a CEO’s performance-with-integrity practices. They can be answered using tools like process reviews and substantive audits and external outcomes such as environmental violations or customer complaints.LeadershipDoes the CEO...communicate to the organization that integrity must never be compromised to make the numbersdiscipline generals, not just troops, for integrity lapsesaddress difficult integrity issues regularly at staff meetingsBusiness processesDoes the CEO...build a strong integrity infrastructure—processes for preventing, detecting, and responding to lapses in all businesses and regions—and put A players in charge of itassess integrity needs realistically and provide adequate funding for those activitiesrespond promptly to early warnings on trends in legal, ethical, and country risksGiving employees a voiceDoes the CEO...encourage reporting of financial, legal, and ethical concerns through a system that prevents retaliationensure that concerns are investigated fairly and promptly, that trends are tracked, and that remedial action is taken if neededFrom the point of view of productivity, it is production or other economic activities of human labor input the monetary funds manifestations, is the final cost of the product components. In the conditions of market economy, enterprises mainly through paid to the accounting or measuring production and other economic activities of human labor consumption. Due to the pressure of competition, enterprises must consider cutting labor costs.From the point of view of the relations of production, compensation for the income distribution reflects the outcome of the staff was theallocation of shares. Under the current social system of our country, compensation is the main sources to the means of subsistence consumption of workers. It have a major impact on the level of consumption and the consumption structure , and consumption actually is the process of reproduction labor, reproduction of labor also has an important influencein the next phase of production. Therefore, the compensation’s level has great significance for sustained and stable increase production or promote other economic activities.Such a dual character of compensation, it decided that the compensation management is actually reduce expenditure and income distribution on production costs and that continued to improve pay levels of this contradiction and make an adjustment.2The function of compensationThe function of compensation may from the enterprises, workers and social aspects to inspect:①From the point of view of the enterpr ises, compensation has the following functions: First, the increment functions. Compensation is not only the costs of purchase labor by enterprises, as well as the investment of live working , it will give employers greater than expected cost benefits. The existence of such benefit, provided the impetus mechanism of labor employment and investment labor for the enterprises. Second, the promoting functions. Compensation is a evaluation of workers and operators’ performance, reflect the quality and quantity conditions of work. Therefore, the compensation can promote staff constantly improvetheir work efficiency and enthusiasm. Third, the coordination functions. While the movement of compensation, put the organization's goals and intentions of managers to employees, correspond the relationship between staff and enterprises, and promote the consistent of staff’ action and enterprises correspond. On the other hand, the reasonable of compensation’ differentials and structure can effectively mediate the conflict between the employees, and harmony the human relationships.②From the point of view of the employee, compensation has thefollowing functions: First, the reproduction of labor ensure functions. Staff through the labor and services exchange for compensation, so that they could meet the need of food, clothing, shelter, withthe basic needs of life, thereby achieving a reproduction of labor force. Second is to achieve functional value. Compensation is an evaluation for enterprises to pay for their employees, also is the recognition of staff capability and level, is the returns of the implement of individuals value, and the signal of successful promotion, it reflects the employees’ relative position and function in enterprises, it can make the staff have a sense of achievement and satisfaction, and thus inspire greater enthusiasm for the work.Third,reasonable compensation will be strong the trust of enterprise by staff ,buildup the expected increase risk of psychological sense ofsecurity and a sense of security for the staff.③From the point of view of the social, compensation has the relocate function of labor force resources for the social. Most people will bewilling to the higher compensation regions, departments and the post. As a manager can use the difference compensation to guide human resources reasonable flow, promote the effective distribution for human resources, implement the human resources development and maximize efficiency. In addition, compensation also can apply the occupational value and types of work by people, compensation level to a certain extent reflect the types of work or social values, thereby adjust the people's occupational aspirations and the flows of obtain employment.Compensation has always been an attention task, it is not merelyrelated to each person's personal interests, is involved in every organization, the whole community, and even the entire country's socio-economic development. Therefore, compensation is that foreign scholars have always been an important research subject.The Motivation theory of compensation is the basis of the compensation management theory. Motivation is the most important and most basicfunctions in compensation. How to use the compensation to motivate the staff’ efficiency and enthusiasm, is the core content of compensation study, design and compensation management. Reasonable, fair and competitive compensation is the most important factors to encourage the employees to work hard. Reasonable, and effective compensation management mechanism between prompting is a benign interaction. Effective compensation mechanism must motivate the staff use higher quantity and quality to completed tasks, and higher quantity and quality of work must bring higher compensation.Motivation is a psychology concept, in its essence, it is said that some motivation by the reasons, some occurred motive acts is produced. For example, the same person, why do their sometimes work actively, and sometimes flagging spirit and no mood to work, or even negative go slow Now, put the motivation concept into management practice, endow a new meaning. That is motivation is a spiritual power or state, the staff has stepped up, inspire and promote the role and instruction or guidance staff conduct atthe organization's goals. Therefore, not only to study some kind of motivation how is, more crucial to examine how to promote the management of a particular object have the motivation how to guide them with their full force to achieve a particular goal. Today's society, more and more motivation by many managers in the implementation guidance and leadershipis seen as an important method thus effectively integrate human, using technology to achieve reunification of all employees ,it will also make the personal ease of mind, the achievement of organizational objectives.In the understanding the basis of human, and many scholars research the needs and conduct of human, But it has the same purpose of the study, namely : how to inspire motivation, how to analyze needs, how to determine action, adopted to meet the needs of the people to achieve their basic objective, so as to achieve an effective motivation.At present, domestic and foreign scholars have recognized the main motivation theory: Hierarchy of Needs Theory, Two-factor theory, Equity Theory, Expectancy theory of motivation. This text simply introduce Hierarchy of Needs Theory and Expectancy theory of motivation.Maslow put forward the hierarchy of needs theory, it thinks that the needs of human is arisen with the arrangement form, from the junior programs need to begin to move upwards to senior needs. Maslow thinks thatit generally has five levels of needs in social life by people:physiological needs, security needs and society needs, respect needs andself-actualization needs.Maslow also considers that when a need to be met, and a higher level of need will occupy the dominant position, the individual needs of the layerto rise. From the point of motivation, no a need will be fully met, However, as long as the meeting is part of the individual will to pursue other aspects of their needs. According to Maslow's view, if we want to inspire someone, it is imperative to understand which hierarchy of needs by the person, then focused on meeting the needs of this level or above this level needs. Maslow's theory gained all-pervading recognition, especially gained the recogniztion from practice by many managers. This is mainly due to thetheory simple and clear, easy to understand the inherent logic. Its maximize usefulness lies in the fact that it points out the need for every person. As managers, in order to effectively it is necessary to understand their subordinates what is need to meet.Expectancy theory of motivation is proposed by FulumuV. H. Vroom who is the United States psychologists. The basic viewpoints of Expectancy theory of motivation is: People expect their actions will help to achieve acertain target circumstances, will be incentive to do certain things together to achieve our goals. Performance is the three function of perceived: expectations, relevance and potency.In the reform process of state-owned enterprise, the internal reform of the compensation system is always the summit concerned by all the levels of managers. The reform of enterprises compensation system throughout the entire process of state-owned enterprises reform. While managers at all levels pay great attention to design and pay system reform in China but the majority of businesses pay system still faced with many problems and shortcomings at present, and many enterprises’ employees is not high satisfaction of the compensation system, the compensation system of enterprises has failed to play the role of incentive, didn’t become the norm to workers. Like other state-owned enterprises. When the E&Y factory carry through the compensation management, also not fully understand that the compensation system of enterprises must support and services to the enterprise's strategic goals. Greater extent on the existence of compensation to compensation, distribute the Equity and reasonable into the reform and development process as a goal and not what kind of compensation system will be favorable to corporate strategy and the implement of human resource strategy, E&Y factory do not from their own strategies and the overall human resources strategy starting to reform and improve the compensation system, and do not foothold in the enterprise business strategy and human resources strategy, according to labor market, Finally formed enterprises compensation management system. Enterprises lack of management experience in professional human resources management sector in the medium and long term development strategy of Research and decompositionto the enterprise, according to the external market and the development of enterprises and work out development strategies that suit the salary management system, lack of study on compensation management. Although enterprises also pay a certain of reform for compensation system in recent years, but these reforms are not from the height of corporate strategy and the enterprise fails to reflect the strategic objectives and positioning.Due to the inference of traditional structure and the traditional concept, the existing compensation structure of enterprise is relatively average, no reasonable began gap, the price of enterprises compensation and labor market detached from the price of labor market, key positions in the compensation level below the external market compensation level and without external competition; And non-key positions in the compensation higher than the market level. The compensation of ordinary workers is higher than the market price. From the exterior, non-key positions ordinary workers of enterprise whose compensation their salary level higher than the average level in society, one side it increases the cost of human and waste the limited financial of enterprises, as ordinary employees in the labor market, especially in the large population of urban areas is a serious oversupply. There is absolutely no need to pay their high compensation, even paid high wages to stimulate all their enthusiasm, but is not worth from the inputand output view of the relative efficiency , form the internal, non-critical positions in higher compensation levels, contrast, key positionson the low compensation levels, it will increase the sense of unfairness in key positions, in the important positions of workersThe staff of some key posts and important positions of the enterprise, their compensation were lower than the prices of market compensation. As we all know, the compensation level of enterprises in the talent market, and even the whole society should certainly attractive, In order to attract and retain talent, it can be overcome competitors. For first-rate talent should be given first-class return. If the key employees and the core staff income lower than the standards of social level, external competitiveness will be relatively weak, it will make the enterprises fail to hold the human, and led to serious unreasonable human resource structure in the enterprise.From the circumstances of investigation by us, on the one hand, many employees discontent the existing compensation system in the reflected rewards; On the other hand, there are many staff can not correctly deal with the compensation gap. Staff on the compensation gap issue of love and hate, this bring a big resistance to the reform of compensation, even though the good idea is hardly to implement.As enterprise managers, are not to break the original pattern, the result is to make the large contribution of staff and Core staff lost their jobs initiative and creativity, even cause the missing of talent in the enterprises.Through the design of compensation in E&Y factory, which broke the original pattern of the compensation system, re-designing the compensation structure, recycling a compensation, under a new establishment of the guidance of modern theory of incentives, enterprise operations and staff compensation levels closely fall together, combine the income of employees and work performance closely, It will be able to maximize the mobilization of staff enthusiasm, initiative and creativity, strengthen the staff of responsibility and urgency, improve work efficiency, increase performance, make greatest contribution to meet the development goals of enterprise, to adapt the changes in the internal and external environment, protect the long-term stable and healthy development of the new compensation system.During the process of design of compensation system, and strive to achieve the following objectives: Providing a basic ideas and framework for the compensation of distribution to the enterprises, reasonable structure, strong maneuverability; give priority to efficiency and give consideration to fairness; adhere to equal compensation for equal work, embodied rewards; at the same time, appropriate increasing the total compensation, reasonable widening income gaps.绩效薪酬的致命缺陷小本杰明·海涅曼迫于股东和公众压力,许多公司董事会都在努力建立与业绩挂钩的薪酬体系,以期CEO们恪尽职守;但是,此类薪酬体系往往存在一个致命缺陷：仅关注业绩,而忽略了操守;从顶级公司股东委托书所附的薪酬委员会报告可以看出,这种忽略是显而易见的;毕竟,上市公司始终面临着完成业绩目标的巨大压力;为此,它们不惜违规违纪;然而,这种职业操守的缺失将导致各种灾难性后果,包括起诉纠纷、罚款赔付、解雇免职以及市值暴跌;殊不知,操守与业绩并重,才能在公司内外赢得最基本的信任,而公司力量也只是建立在信任的基础之上;在公司各个层面上将高尚操守和卓越业绩相融合是CEO的基本任务,董事会应该在CEO的现金和股权报酬中划出一定比例,专门与CEO在上述任务上的表现挂钩;但董事会为何没有这样做呢这可能是因为他们自己对操守的含义也并不确定,更不知道该如何考核职业操守与财务业绩的融合了;那么,董事会要设计重操守的绩效薪酬制,第一步要做的就是引入操守概念：操守是全公司的统一文化,有三个要素组成——坚决遵守正式的规章制度；采用符合公司长远利益同时又不损害他人利益的伦理标准；员工要承诺做到诚实坦率、公平公正、可信可靠;第二步,董事会需运用一些复杂的分析工具,当然也要运用他们的个人判断力,来考核CEO是否已经把高尚操守和卓越业绩相融合;董事会可根据以下问题判断：CEO是否在全公司范围内制定了操守和业绩并重的薪酬制度,且由公司领导层对此负责举例而言,CEO应该做到：领导层始终如一地恪守职业操守,把操守和业绩的结合当作一项业务流程来管理,运用预警系统抢先把握全球商业规范趋势,及时提供道德风险评估培训,并保证员工的发言权;CEO和高管们是否在实践中贯彻了这些原则如果领导层没有投入足够的时间、精力和资源,将关键的操守原则落实到公司的业务流程中,那么所谓的“高层主张”就只不过是空口白话而已;操守原则是否已渗透到公司文化的每个层面一个重要的评估工具就是覆盖公司所有业务及地区的员工匿名年度调查表,其中包括这些问题：“操守原则是否会向商业压力让步”“在恪守职业操守方面,领导是否言行一致”董事会还可以定期邀请外部的人力资源管理专家,同样就此类问题对CEO和高管进行360度评估;CEO是否完成了董事会设定的操守和业绩并重的年度目标比如说,这个目标是：CEO有效处理严重失误或危机如环境事故、贿赂案,或者财务造假,并且在对事件起因进行坦诚分析后,有条不紊地解决问题;又比如：在新兴市场如中国、俄罗斯和印度聘用善于兼顾操守与业绩的领导者;公司各事业部在职业操守方面的相对表现如何董事会要观察各事业部之间的操守差异,以及CEO是如何处理那些落后分部的;同时,董事会还要将这些事业部与公司外部的同行进行比较;这可能需要从新闻报道、政府报告或前监管机构官员的的比较审计资料中收集数据董事会在明确上述考核标准时,还应制定一套新的CEO继任“规范”;在考量候选人时,董事会应该问：他们的知识、经验、能力是否有利于推动操守和业绩并重的健康企业文化,使之深入公司在全球的每一个经营机构另外,这套规范还应当运用在高管薪酬评估,以及领导人培养项目的目标设定中;长期来看这也是确保公司高层坚持操守和业绩并重原则的最佳方式,有助于公司规避风险,获取商界成功所必需的信任;操守与业绩并重的管理实践下面列出的一份问题清单样本限于篇幅,问题数量已经大大缩减,对董事会评估CEO兼顾操守与业绩的实际行为会有所帮助;要找到这些问题的答案,可以借助流程评估、独立审计和外部影响如环境损害或客户投诉等手段;领导力CEO是否……告知组织上下,操守原则决不向像业绩目标让步不仅仅规范普通员工的操守,同时也约束高层领导的行为定期在员工会议上处理有关操守的棘手问题业务流程CEO是否……为员工恪守职业操守创造必要的基础条件——设计流程用以防范、发现并处理公司各业务、各地区内的不端行为,并安排明星员工负责此项工作现实地评估操守需求,并拨出足够的经费予以支持对法律风险、伦理风险和国家风险的变化提出预警,并及时应对让员工有发言权CEO是否……鼓励员工通过正式系统来报告财务问题、法律问题以及伦理问题,同时防止员工因此遭受打击报复确保及时公正地研究问题,跟踪问题的发展趋势,并在必要时采取补救措施从生产力角度看,它是企业生产或其他经济活动中投入的活劳动的货币资金表现形式,是产品最终成本的构成要素;在市场经济条件下,企业主要通过薪酬来核算或计量生产与其他经济活动中活劳动的消耗;由于竞争的压力,企业必须考虑不断降低活劳动的成本;从生产关系角度看,薪酬体现为收入分配的结果,是员工所获得的分配份额;在我国现行社会制度下,薪酬是劳动者获取生活资料进行消费的主要来源;它对消费水平和消费结构都有重要的影响,而消费实际上是劳动力再生产的过程,劳动力的再生产又对下一步生产具有重要影响;因此,薪酬水平的持续稳定提高对于推动生产或其他经济活动具有十分重要的意义;薪酬的这种两面性,决定了薪酬管理实际上就是对生产成本上不断降低薪酬支出与收入分配上不断提高薪酬水平的这一矛盾而作出的一种调节;①从企业方面看,薪酬具有以下功能:一是增值功能;薪酬既是企业购买劳动力的成本,也是用来交换劳动者活劳动的手段,同时还是一种对活劳动的投资,它能够给雇主带来预期大于成本的收益;这种收益的存在,为企业主雇佣劳动力、投资劳动力提供了动力机制;二是激励功能;薪酬是对劳动者和经营者工作绩效的一种评价,反映着其工作的数量和质量状况;因此,薪酬可以激励员工不断提高工作效率和工作积极性;三是协调功能;一方面薪酬额的变动,将组织的目标和管理者的意图传递给员工,协调员工与企业之间的关系,促使员工行为与企业目标相一致;另一方面,合理的薪酬差别和结构,能有效地调解雇员之间的矛盾,从而协调好人际关系;②从员工方面看,薪酬具有以下功能：一是劳动力再生产保障功能;员工通过劳动和服务行为换取薪酬,从而能满足本人及家庭的吃、穿、住、用等基本生活需求,进而实现着劳动力的再生产;二是价值实现功能;薪酬是企业对员工工作付出的一个评价,是对员工工作能力和水平的承认,也是对个人价值实现的回报,是晋升和成功的信号,它反映了员工在企业中的相对地位和作用,能使员工产生满足感和成就感,并进而激发出更大的工作热情;三是合理的薪酬能加强员工对企业的信任感,增强员工对预期风险的心理保障意识和安全感;③从社会方面看,薪酬对社会具有劳动力资源的再配置功能;人们一般都会愿意到薪酬较高的地区、部门和岗位工作,作为管理者可以利用薪酬差别可以引导人力资源的合理流向,促进人力资源的有效配置,实现人力资源开发和利用效率的最大化;另外,薪酬也调节着人们对职业和工种的评价,薪酬水平从某种程度上反映着该职业或工种的社会价值,从而调节着人们职业的愿望和就业的流向;薪酬历来都是一个倍受关注的课题,它不仅仅关系到每个人的切身利益,更是牵涉到每个组织,整个社会,乃至整个国家的社会经济发展;所以,薪酬也历来是国内外学者研究的重要课题;激励理论是薪酬管理理论的基础;激励是薪酬众多功能中最重要、最基本的功能之一;如何通过薪酬来激励员工的工作积极性和工作效率,是进行薪酬研究、设计和薪酬管理的核心内容;合理、公平和富有竞争力的薪酬是激励员工努力工作的最重要因素之一;合理、有效的薪酬管理机制与激励之间是一个良性的互动过程;有效的薪酬机制必然激励员工以更高的数量和质量完成工作任务,而更高数量和质量的工作也必然带来更高的薪酬;激励原本是一个心理学的概念,就其本质而言,它是表示某种动机所产生的原因,即发生某种行为的动机是如何产生的;例如,同样一个人,为何有时工作积极,有时却精神萎靡不振,无心做事,甚至消极怠工现在,把激励这个概念引入到管理实践中,就赋予了新的含义;也就是说激励是一种精神力量或状态,对员工起加强、激发和推动作用,并指导或引导员工行为指向组织的目标;因此,不仅要研究某种动机是如何产生的,关键更要研究如何促使被管理对象产生某种特定的动机,如何引导他们拿出自己的全部力量来为实现某一目标而努力;当今社会,激励已经越来越被许多管理者在实施指导与领导工作中被视为重要的方法,从而有效地结合人力,运用技术,达到统一全体员工的意志,又使个人心情舒畅,实现组织的目标;在对人的认识的基础上,许多学者对人的需求、行为进行了研究,但研究的目的都有一个是相同点,即:如何激发动机,如何分析需求,如何判定行为,通过人们需要的满足达到自己的基本目标,从而实现有效激励;目前国内外学者所公认的激励理论主要有:需求层次理论、双因素理论、公平理论、期望理论等;下面本文简单地对需求层次理论、期望理论作一个介绍;马斯洛提出了需要层次理论,认为人类的需要是以层次的形式出现的,由低级的需要开始逐级向上发展到高级的需要;马斯洛认为人们在社会生活中一般有五个层次的需要:生理需要、安全需要、社会需要、尊重需要、自我实现的需要;马斯洛还认为,当一种需要得到满足后,另一种更高层次的需要就会占据主导地位,个体的需要是逐层上升的;从激励的角度看,没有一种需要会得到完全满足,但只要其得到部分的满足个体就会转向追求其它方面的需要了;按照马斯洛的观点,如果希望激励某人,就必须了解此人目前所处的需要层次,然后着重满足这一层次或在此层次之上的需要;马斯洛的理论得到了普遍的认可,特别是得到了广大实践中的管理者的认可;这主要归功于该理论简单明了、易于理解、具有内在的逻辑性;其最大的用处在于它指出了每个人均有需要;身为主管人员,为了有效地激励下属,就必须要了解其下属需要满足的是什么;期望理论是美国心理学家弗鲁姆提出的;期望理论的基本观点是:人们在预期他们的行动将会有助于达到某个目标的情况下,才会被激励起来去做某些事情以达到目标;绩效是三大知觉的函数:期望、关联性和效价;从心理学的角度来考察,期望理论包含三种特定的心理联系:首先是努力付出与业绩联系,即指个人所感知的通过努力能够实现预期业绩日标的可能性;其次是业绩与薪酬的关系,它是个人对通过一定水平的努力能够取得预期薪酬的认定程度;最后是结果或薪酬的吸引力,表明实现预期结果或所获得的薪酬对个人来说重要性有多大;在国有企业改革的进程中,企业内部薪酬制度的改革一直是各级管理者普遍关注的热点;企业薪酬制度的改革贯穿于国有企业改革的全过程;虽然各级管理非常重视薪酬设计与薪酬制度的改革但是目前我国的绝大多数企业的薪酬制度还是面临着诸多的问题和不足,许多企业的员工对薪酬制度的满意度总是不高,企业的薪酬制度并没有能发挥出应有的激励作用,没有变成职工行为的规范;和其他国有企业一样;进行薪酬管理时,还没有充分地认识到企业的薪酬制度一定要支持和服务于企业的战略目标的重要性;在较大程度上存在着就薪酬论薪酬,把公平、合理地分配薪酬本身当成一种目的而不是关注什么样的薪酬制度会在企业改革与发展过程中有利于企业战略和人力资源战略的实现,没有从自身的总体战略和人力资源战略出发来改革和完善薪酬制度,并没有立足于企业的经营战略和人力资源战略,以劳动力市场为依据,最后形成企业的薪酬管理系统;企业在薪酬管理方面缺乏有经验的专业人力资源管理部门来对企业的中长期的发展战。
高管薪酬和激励[文献翻译]
![高管薪酬和激励[文献翻译]](https://img.taocdn.com/s3/m/93d0f0b8de80d4d8d05a4f3f.png)
高管薪酬和激励［文献翻译］夕卜文题 LI Executive Compensation And Incentives外文出处 Acodemy of Management Perspectives, 2006(2) :p25-40 外文作者Martin J. Conyon原文：Executive Compensation And IncentivesMartin J・ ConyonExecutive compensation is a complex and controversial subject・ For many years, academics, policymakers, and the media have drawn attention to the high levels of pay awarded to U.S. chief executive officers (CEOs), questioning whether they are consistent with shareholder interests・ Some academics have further argued that flaws in CEO pay arrangements and deviations from shareholders? interests are widespread and considerable・For example, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried provide a lucid account of the managerial power view and accompanying evidence・ Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan too provide an analysis of the ,,skimming view? of CEO pay. In contrast, John Core et al・ present an economic contracting approach to executive pay and incentives, assessing whether CEOs receive inefficient pay without performance・ In this paper, we show what has happened to CEO pay in the United States・ We do not claim to distinguish between the contracting and managerial power views of executive pay. Instead, we document the pattern of executive pay andincentives in the United States, investigating whether this pattern is consistent with economic theory.The Context: Who Sets Executive Pay?Before examining the empirical evidence presented in this paper, it is important to consider the pay-setting process and who sets executive pay. The standard economic theory of executive compensation is the principal-agent mode1・ The theory maintains that firms seek to design the most efficient compensation packages possible in order to attract, retain, and motivate CEOs, executives, and managers・ In the agency model, shareholders set pay. In practice, however, the compensation committee of the board determines pay on behalf of shareholders・ A principal (shareholder) designs a contract and makes an offer to an agent (CEO/ manager)・ Executive compensation ameliorates a moral hazard problem (i. e・,manager opportunism) arising from low firm ownership・ By using stock options, restricted stock, and long-term contracts, shareholdersmotivate the CEO to maximize firm value・ In other words, shareholderstry to design optimal compensation packages to provide CEOs with incentives to align their mutual interests・ This is the contract approach to executive pay. Following Core, Guay, and Larcker, an efficient (or optimal) contract is one u that maximizes the net expectedeconomic value to shareholders after transaction costs (such as contracting costs) and payments to employees・ An equivalent way of saying this is that ・・・ contracts minimize agency costs・”Several important ideas flow from this definition. First, the contract reduces manager opportunism and motivates CEO effort by providing incentives through risky compensation such as stock options・ Second, the optimal contract does not imply a u perfectcontract, only that the firm designs the best contract it can in order to avoid opportunism and malfeasance by the manager, given the contracting constraints it faces・ Third, in this arrangement, the firm does not necessarily eliminate agency costs, but instead evaluates the (marginal) benefits of implementing the contract relative to the (marginal) costs of doing so. Improvements in regulation or corporate governance can possibly alter these costs and benefits, making different contracts desirable・ Moreover, what is efficient at one point in time may not be at another・ Improvements in board governance, for example by adding independent directors, may lead to different patterns of compensation, stock, and option contracts that are desirable for one firmbut not another・An alternative theory is that CEOs set pay. This is the managerial power view, exemplified recently by Bebchuk and Fried・ In this theory, the board and compensation committee cooperate with the CEO and agree on excessive compensation, settling on contracts that are not in shareholders? interests ・ This excesspay constitutes an economic rent, an amount greater than necessary to get the CEO to work in the firm. The constraints the CEOs face arereputation loss and embarrassment if caught extracting rents, what Bebchuk and Fried call u outragecosts・n Outrage matters because it can impose on CEOs both market penalties (such as devaluation of a manager?s reputation) and social costs—the social costs come on topof the standard market costs・ They argue that market constraints and the social costscoming from excessively favorable pay arrangements are not sufficient in preventing considerable deviations from optimal contracting・Executive CompensationThere is substantial disclosure about U・ S・ executive compensation.The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expanded and enhanced disclosure rules for U. S・ executives in 1992・ As a result, the proxy statements of firms contain considerable detail on stock ownership, stock options, and all components of compensation for the top five corporate executives・ There are four basic components to executive pay, eachhaving been the subject of much research・ First, executives receive a base salary, which is generally benchmarked against peer firms・ Second, they enjoy an annual bonus plan, usually based on accounting performance measures ・ Third, executives receive stock options, which represent a right, but not the obligation, to purchase shares in the future at some pre-specified exercise price・ Lastly, pay includes additional compensation such as restricted stock, long-term incentive plans, and retirement plans・Executive IncentivesWe now turn to executive incentives and the link between pay and firm performance・ The evidence demonstrates that executive compensation and the fraction of pay accounted for by option grants increased during the 1990s・Principal-agent theory predicts that a firm designs contracts in order to yield optimal incentives, therefore motivating the CEO to maximize shareholder value・ In designing the contract, the firm recognizes the CEO is risk averse・ Thus, imposing greater incentives requires more pay to compensate the agent for increased risk・ In the previous section, the paper demonstrated that CEO pay has increased・ Next, we examine what has happened to CEO incentives・ The analysis shows that executives have considerable equity incentives that create a strong and increasing link between CEO wealth and firm performance・ This finding seems at odds with the notion that executive pay and performance are decoupled・ It is, however, consistent with other economic evidence, showing that the link between pay and performance has been increasing in the United States・Executives receive incentives from several sources・ They receivefinancial incentives from salary and bonus, as well as new grants of options and restricted stock, which together measure flow compensation. They also receive incentives from changes in their aggregate holdings of stock and options in the firm, as described in detail below. Finally, the probability of termination because of poor performance gives the CEO an incentive to pursue strategies that maximize firm value・ In this case, if terminated, an executive suffers reputation loss and human capital devaluation in the managerial labor market・ However, this paper— consistent with other recentresearch in financial economics—focuses on compensation and equity incentives,leaving aside career concerns and the labor market for managerial talent ・ In other words, it restricts attention to financial incentives・The key to understanding financial incentives is recognizing that they arise from the entire portfolio of equity holdings and not simply from current pay. Equity incentives, then, are the incentives to increase the stock price arising from the managers? ownership of financial securities in the firm・ For example, a CEO may receive 100, 000 options this year, which might add to 400, 000 options granted in previous years, for a total of 500, 000 options held・ If the stock price decreases, then the value of the 100, 000 options granted this year declines— but so does the value of the options accumulated from previous years・ Since the CEO will care about the whole stock of 500, 000 options, not simply this year?s 100, 000, executive compensation received in any given year provides only a partial picture of CEO wealth and incentives・ To understand CEO incentives fully, it is important to focus on the aggregate amount ofshares, restricted stock, and stock options that the CEO owns in the firm.The evidence shows that CEOs have plenty of financial incentives, arising primarily from CEO ownership of stock and options in their firms. Again, we would stress that such financial incentives are only one factor motivating executives・ Agents are as likely to be motivated by intrinsic factors of the job, career concerns, social norms, tournaments, and the like・ One problem with stock options and other forms of incentive pay is not that they provide too few incentives, but that they may lead tounintended consequences・ It is well known that incentives can bring about behavior by the agent that was unanticipated by the principa1. In a classic paper, Steven Kerr highlighted the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B・ In short, he articulated the notion that one gets what one pays for・If one rewards activity A and not B, then people will exert effort on A, while de-emphasizing B・ Kerr illustrates his point with an array of examples from politics, industry, and human resource management. In general, this is a problem of providing appropriate incentives to agents engaging in multiple tasks・ More recently, Robert Gibbons has discussed the design of incentive programs recognizing such problems・Another problem with incentive compensation is that it may encourage opportunistic behavior by managers, manipulation of performance measures, or cheating・ The powerful and often unanticipated effects of financial incentives on economic outcomes have been documented in diverse contexts such as classroom teaching, real estate markets, vehicle inspection markets, and the behavior of physicians・ In the corporate context, David Yermackdemonstrates that CEOs opportunistically time the award of option grants around earnings announcements in order to increase their compensation. Other studies find that private information is used by executives to engineer abnormally large option exercises and hence the payouts from those options・In addition, studies show that firms with more incentives are associated with greater earnings manipulation. Recent studies show that the likelihood of a firm being the target of fraud allegations is positively correlated with option incentives・ In short, options and incentive pay may motivate managerial behavior that is not always anticipated or idea1. When designing compensation plans, boards must be aware of the unwanted as well asbeneficial effects of incentives・ ConclusionsExecutive compensation is a controversial and complex subject that continues to attract the attention of the media, policymakers, and academics ・ Contract theory predicts that shareholders use pay to provide incentives for the CEO to focus on maximizing long-term firm value・ Since CEOs have relatively low ownership of firm shares, they might otherwise behave opportunistical1y. An alternative theoreticalperspective, the managerial power view, is that CEOs control the pay-setting process and set their own pay. This theory predicts that compliant compensation committees and boards provide CEOs with excess pay (or compensation "rents” ) and thatcontracts are suboptimal from the shareholders? perspective・Distinguishing betweenthese two theories is an important challenge for future research・This paper provides evidence on what has happened to CEO pay between1993 and 2003・ It shows that total compensation increased significantly over this period・ Grants of stock options to CEOs and executives are the main driver of CEO pay gains・ The paper also documents that CEOs have important financial incentives・ These arise from the portfolio of firm stock and options owned by the CEO. The important point is that, if the stock price declines significantly, the value of the CEOs? assets falls・Analogously, if asset prices increase, so does CEO wealth・ In consequence, the wealth of the CEO varies with the stock price performance of the firm・ An important research challenge is to fully understand the potentially unintended consequences of providing greater incentives to agents ・In practice, CEO compensation contracts are determined by compensation committees that may have conflicting incentives to align with the CEO (leading to suboptimal contracts and excess pay) or with shareholders (leading to optimal contractsand appropriate pay)・ The analysis in this paper illustrates thatU・ S・ boards and compensation committees are becoming more independent (measured by fewer insider directors and a greater number of outside directors)・ The evidence shows that the presence of affiliated directors on the compensation committee (an instance where greater managerial power is expected） does not lead to greater CEO pay or fewer CEO incentives・In summary, high pay itself is not evidence of inefficient contracts but may simply reflect the market for CEOs and the pay necessary to attract,retain, and motivate talented individuals・ Boards of directors need to design compensation contracts to align the interests of owners with managers ・ One test of whether the corporate governance system is working appropriately, including executive compensationarrangements, is to evaluate economic performance・ Holmstrom and Kaplan investigate the state of U・ S・ corporate governance in the wake of corporate scandals・ They conclude that the U・ S・ economy has performed well, both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries over about two decades・ Importantly, the economy has been robust even after the scandals were revealed・ This is not to deny that improvements in governance arrangements may be beneficia1. Furnishing CEOs with appropriate compensation and incentives is desirable for a healthy economy. However, ensuring that the contracting process is not corrupted is an important goal for corporate governance・（extracts）译文：高管薪酬和激励Martin J・ Conyon高管薪酬是一种既复杂乂有争议的话题。
论文文献翻译-薪酬相关外文翻译--改善薪酬提高绩效-中英文对照文献翻译
中文4480字薪酬相关外文翻译--改善薪酬提高绩效一、外文原文原文：To Improve Performance, Revise Your PayCloutier，GeorgeCompensation is that the staff turn towards the organizations to provide labor or services and access to various forms of reward or return, is organization paid to their employees of all labor remuneration.Compensation management is the process of enterprise managers refers to the remuneration paid standards of staff, the level of the elements to determine thestructure, distribution and adjustment. The respect of traditional compensation management is material reward, with little consideration on the behavioral characteristics of manager; Moreover modern compensation management shifted the focus to the development of human resources and use, it takes the process of material reward of management and encouraging staff closely fall together ,turn into a unified organic whole.Modern compensation management researchers found that the impact of the compensation management have a lot of factors, which can be primarily summed up in the four fol.lowing factors.1.External environment factorsImpacting compensation management to the external environment factors including: Economic environment. Macroeconomic situation and development trend will affect the human resources policy formulation and adjustment.Social environment. The change of social values will lead to the organization's staff mentality changed: With the staff's level of education and skills enhancement, the compensation system of enterprises must make out the appropriate adjustments foremployees of these social changes.Political environment. Human resources management is always a certain social and political conditions for the environment, must reflect the spirit of country(enterprises) according to law.Technological environment. Technology environment including the whole process from raw materials and products to the market. In the process from raw materials to the products, any technological breakthroughs and improvements, and the staff of enterprises will all have a tremendous impact,therefore, enterprises must continuously reform the compensation system, to mobilize the enthusiasm of key personnel, the introduction of technology and retain the key personnel, encourage technological innovation, in order to gain the competitive advantages of technology, talent and innovation for enterprises.anization internal factorsInfluence the organizations of compensation management specific internal factors include : the compensation management of financial capability, human resources and remuneration policies, the scale of enterprises, the culture of enterprises, the structure of enterprises (or flat-level type), and faced life cycle of the specific stages.3.Work factorsThe influence of work factors of compensation management specific including: work environment, labor intensity, and complexity of the initiative, and challenges and so on.4.Individual factorsThe impact of individual actors of compensation management including: the laborers’ personal ability, perso nality, character traits and values, seniority, performance, experience, education, the development potential.In summary, the pay is an integrated with the four elements harmony of management, environment, organizations, and individuals, and continuously the process of effective use, in this process, employees gained the satisfaction and a sense of achievement on labor reward and job, and organizations will complete its goals.Compensation is a complex economic and social phenomenon from differentangles can perform various classifications. According to the mechanism of compensation, it can divide into internal and external compensation.Internal compensation means the staff by virtue of their own hard work to get honor, success and liability. Internal compensation include : participation in the decision-making rights, individuals to play the potential job opportunities, independence and freedom to arrange their working hours, more terms, more interested in the work, personal development opportunities, diversification of activities.External compensation means enterprises according to the staff for the size of contribution they made and that paid the various forms of income to the staff. Its specific manifestations are varied, including wages, bonuses, benefits, allowances and other specific forms:Wages .employees as long as works in enterprises, we will be able to get a regular fixed amount of labor remuneration. The narrow wages paid to workers refer to the monetary reward. From the meaning of generalized wages, including laborers monetary and all the remuneration of non-monetary forms. It is now commonly referred to wages, generally refers to generalized wages. As the wages of staff basic compensation, the basic amount fixed, it provides a more stable source of income to the employees, and meet the minimum needs of life to staff.Incentives. Incentives refers to the organization to provide staff with the efforts beyond the normal labor or labor and compensation paid to employees, including its dividend, profit sharing and usually refer to the bonus content.Welfare. Welfare also has broad and narrow, the broad welfare includes wages. The narrow welfare refers paid to the staff in addition to wages or salaries and other forms of remuneration, and more to pay in Physical or the form of services, such as social insurance (life insurance, unemployment , endowment insurance, etc.) the free and discounted of work meal, preferential housing, the provision of free or low-priced canteens bathhouse, clubs, and so on.Subsidy. Subsidies refers to the wage or salary of enterprises difficult to complete, accurately reflect the situation or the special working conditions of staff and jobcharacteristics and the specific conditions of the additional pay and the cost of living paid staff compensation. These circumstances are: the working environment is detrimental to staff health; The work cause possibility of larger harm to staff; employees involved in the community in some seemingly decent work and so on. People usually associated with the allowance as compensation, and the compensation linked to life as subsidies.According to the compensation defined as the fundamental basis of the compensation classification, the pay can be divided into time, piece-work pay and outstanding achievement compensation. In addition, according to the compensation whether the monetary form can be obtained directly, divided into monetary and non-monetary remuneration.Pay is the same as commodity money contact to a ing the two angles as following to define the quality of compensation.From the point of view of productivity, it is production or other economic activities of human labor input the monetaryfunds manifestations, is the final cost of the product components. In the conditions of market economy, enterprises mainly through paid to the accounting or measuring production and other economic activities of human labor consumption. Due to the pressure of competition, enterprises must consider cutting labor costs.From the point of view of the relations of production, compensation for the income distribution reflects the outcome of the staff was the allocation of shares. Under the current social system of our country, compensation is the main sources to the means of subsistence consumption of workers. It have a major impact on the level of consumption and the consumption structure , and consumption actually is the process of reproduction labor, reproduction of labor also has an important influence in the next phase of production. Therefore, the compensation’s level has great significance for sustained and stable increase production or promote other economic activities.Such a dual character of compensation, it decided that the compensation management is actually reduce expenditure and income distribution on production costs and thatcontinued toimprove pay levels of this contradiction and make an adjustment.The function of compensation may from the enterprises, workers and social aspects to inspect:From the point of view of the enterprises, compensation has the following functions: First, the increment functions. Compensation is not only the costs of purchase labor by enterprises, as well as the investment of live working , it will give employers greater than expected cost benefits. The existence of such benefit, provided the impetus mechanism of labor employment and investment labor for the enterprises. Second, the promoting functions. Compensation is a evaluation of workers and operators’ performance, reflect the quality and quantity conditions of work. Therefore, the compensation can promote staff constantly improve their work efficiency and enthusiasm. Third, the coordination functions. While the movement of compensation, put the organization's goals and intentions of managers to employees, correspond the relationship between staff and enterprises, and promote the consistent of staff’ action and enterprises correspond. On the other hand, the reasonable of compensation’ differentials andstructure can effectively mediate the conflict between the employees, and harmony the human relationships.From the point of view of the employee, compensation has the following functions: First, the reproduction of labor ensure functions. Staff through the labor and services exchange for compensation, so that they could meet the need of food, clothing, shelter, with the basic needs of life, thereby achieving a reproduction of labor force. Second is to achieve functional value. Compensation is an evaluation for enterprises to pay for their employees, also is the recognition of staff capability and level, is the returns of the implement of individuals value, and the signal of successful promotion, it reflects the employees’ relative position and function in enterprises, it can make the staff have a sense of achievement and satisfaction, and thus inspire greater enthusiasm for the work. Third，reasonable compensation will be strong the trust of enterprise by staff ,buildup the expected increase risk of psychological sense of security and a sense of security for the staff.From the point of view of the social, compensation has the relocate function of laborforce resources for the social. Most people will be willing to the higher compensation regions,departments and the post. As a manager can use the difference compensation to guide human resources reasonable flow, promote the effective distribution for human resources, implement the human resources development and maximize efficiency. In addition, compensation also can apply the occupational value and types of work by people, compensation level to a certain extent reflect the types of work or social values, thereby adjust the people's occupational aspirations and the flows of obtain employment.Compensation has always been an attention task, it is not merely related to each person's personal interests, is involved in every organization, the whole community, and even the entire country's socio-economic development. Therefore, compensation is that foreign scholars have always been an important research subject.The Motivation theory of compensation is the basis of the compensation management theory. Motivation is the most important and most basic functions in compensation. How to use the compensation to motivate the staff’ efficiency and enthusiasm, is the core content of compensation study, design and compensation management. Reasonable, fair and competitive compensation is the most important factors to encourage theemployees to work hard. Reasonable, and effective compensation management mechanism between prompting is a benign interaction. Effective compensation mechanism must motivate the staff use higher quantity and quality to completed tasks, and higher quantity and quality of work must bring higher compensation.Motivation is a psychology concept, in its essence, it is said that some motivation by the reasons, some occurred motive acts is produced. For example, the same person, why do their sometimes work actively, and sometimes flagging spirit and no mood to work, or even negative go slow? Now, put the motivation concept into management practice, endow a new meaning. That is motivation is a spiritual power or state, the staff has stepped up, inspire and promote the role and instruction or guidance staff conduct at the organization's goals. Therefore, not only to study some kind of motivation how is, more crucial to examine how to promote the management of aparticular object have the motivation how to guide them with their full force to achieve a particular goal. Today's society, more and more motivation by many managers in the implementation guidance and leadership is seen as an important method thus effectively integrate human, using technology to achieve reunification of all employees ,itwill also make the personal ease of mind, the achievement of organizational objectives.In the understanding the basis of human, and many scholars research the needs and conduct of human, But it has the same purpose of the study, namely : how to inspire motivation, how to analyze needs, how to determine action, adopted to meet the needs of the people to achieve their basic objective, so as to achieve an effective motivation.At present, domestic and foreign scholars have recognized the main motivation theory: Hierarchy of Needs Theory,Two-factor theory, Equity Theory, Expectancy theory of motivation. This text simply introduce Hierarchy of Needs Theory and Expectancy theory of motivation.Maslow put forward the hierarchy of needs theory, it thinks that the needs of human is arisen with the arrangement form, from the junior programs need to begin to move upwards to senior needs. Maslow thinks that it generally has five levels of needs in social life by people: physiological needs, security needs and society needs, respect needs and self-actualization needs.Maslow also considers that when a need to be met, and a higher level of need will occupy the dominant position, the individual needs of the layer to rise. From the point ofmotivation, no a need will be fully met, However, as long as the meeting is part of the individual will to pursue other aspects of their needs. According to Maslow's view, if we want to inspire someone, it is imperative to understand which hierarchy of needs by the person, then focused on meeting the needs of this level or above this level needs. Maslow's theory gained all-pervading recognition, especially gained the recogniztion from practice by many managers. This is mainly due to the theory simple and clear, easy to understand the inherent logic. Its maximize usefulness lies in the fact that it points out the need for every person. As managers, in order to effectivelyinspire subordinates, it is necessary to understand their subordinates what is need to meet.In the reform process of state-owned enterprise, the internal reform of the compensation system is always the summit concerned by all the levels of managers. The reform of enterprises compensation system throughout the entire process of state-owned enterprises reform. While managers at all levels pay great attention to design and pay system reform in China but the majority of businesses pay system still faced with many problems and shortcomings at present, and many enterprises’ employees is not high satisfaction of the compensation system,the compensation system of enterprises has failed to play the role of in centive, didn’t become the norm to workers. Like other state-owned enterprises. When the Nanjing DE valve factory carry through the compensation management, also not fully understand that the compensation system of enterprises must support and services to the enterprise's strategic goals. Greater extent on the existence of compensation to compensation, distribute the Equity and reasonable into the reform and development process as a goal and not what kind of compensation system will be favorable to corporate strategy and the implement of human resource strategy, Nanjing DE valve factory do not from their own strategies and the overall human resources strategy starting to reform and improve the compensation system, and do not foothold in the enterprise business strategy and human resources strategy, according to labor market, Finally formed enterprises compensation management system. Enterprises lack of management experience in professional human resources management sector in the medium and long term development strategy of Research and decomposition to the enterprise, according to the external market and the development of enterprises and work out development strategies that suit the salary management system, lack of study oncompensation management. Although enterprises also pay a certain of reform for compensation system in recent years, but these reforms are not from the height of corporate strategy and the enterprise fails to reflect the strategic objectives and positioning.Due to the inference of traditional structure and the traditional concept, theexisting compensation structure of enterprise is relatively average, no reasonable began gap, the price of enterprises compensation and labor market detached from the price of labor market, key positions in the compensation level below the external market compensation level and without external competition; And non-key positions in the compensation higher than the market level. The compensation of ordinary workers is higher than the market price. From the exterior, non-key positions ordinary workers of enterprise whose compensation their salary level higher than the average level in society, one side it increases the cost of human and waste the limited financial of enterprises, as ordinary employees in the labor market, especially in the large population of urban areas is a serious oversupply. There is absolutely no need to pay their high compensation, even paid high wages to stimulate all their enthusiasm, but is not worthfrom the input and output view of the relative efficiency , form the internal, non-critical positions in higher compensation levels, contrast, key positions on the low compensation levels, it will increase the sense of unfairness in key positions, in the important positions of workersThe staff of some key posts and important positions of the enterprise, their compensation were lower than the prices of market compensation. As we all know, the compensation level of enterprises in the talent market, and even the whole society should certainly attractive, In order to attract and retain talent, it can be overcome competitors. For first-rate talent should be given first-class return. If the key employees and the core staff income lower than the standards of social level, external competitiveness will be relatively weak, it will make the enterprises fail to hold the human, and led to serious unreasonable human resource structure in the enterprise. From the circumstances of investigation by us, on the one hand, many employees discontent the existing compensation system in the enterprises, demanding change, hope that the pay compensation opened for pay truly reflect the quality of workers and the contribution reflected rewards; On the other hand, there are many staff can not correctly deal with the compensation gap.Staff on the compensation gap issue of love and hate, this bring a big resistance to the reform of compensation, even though the good idea is hardly to implement.As enterprise managers, are not to break the original pattern, the result is to make the large contribution of staff and Core staff lost their jobs initiative and creativity, even cause the missing of talent in the enterprises.资料来源：Business Week Online.2009(05):P12.二、翻译文章译文：改善薪酬,提高绩效Cloutier，George薪酬是员工因向其所在组织提供劳动或劳务而获得的各种形式的酬劳或答谢，是组织支付给其员工的所有劳动报酬。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
企业高管薪酬外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)翻译:管理者薪酬和企业债务期限结构摘要：高管薪酬通过组合敏感性股价变动与股票报酬波动影响管理风险偏好。
股票价格不支持管理风险，而股票报酬波动鼓励冒险。
理论表明，短期债务通过控制管理风险偏好减轻债务代理成本。
我们断定，找到首席执行官组合和短期到期债务之间关系的证据。
我们还发现，短期到期债务减轻对债券收益率激励机制的影响。
总的来说，我们的经验证据表明，短期债务减轻了从风险补偿所产生的债务代理成本。
使用股票及期权为基础做为高管薪酬的现象在过去的几十年里急剧增加。
首席执行官财富的暴露使股票价格在1980年到1994年间增加了两倍，然后1994年到2000年间又增加了一倍。
高管薪酬的这种变化对经理所承受的风险有直接的影响，从而改变双方的激励机制和行为。
卡彭特和兰伯特探讨了对管理者激励补偿两方面的影响。
一个影响是通过补偿股票价格的敏感性造成的。
第二个影响是通过补偿股票报酬波动的敏感性造成的。
对股票价格补偿方案的灵敏度越高，经理人的风险偏好就越弱。
相比之下，对股票收益波动率补偿方案的敏感性越高，经理人的风险偏好就越大。
通过改变管理风险偏好，基于股票的补偿也影响那些风险偏好的第三方看法。
本研究的主要目的是探讨短期债务在减少来自高管激励合同所产生的债务代理成本的作用。
具体来说，我们研究了这两种组合敏感度对公司债务期限结构的影响。
此外，我们分析债务到期对投资组合灵敏度和债券收益率之间的关系。
实证结果提供了一个一致的意见，短期债务减少了与薪酬激励相关的债务代理成本。
传统的代理理论提出了股东和债权人之间的利益冲突。
在他们的开创性研究中，法玛、米勒、詹森和麦克林认为，股东有动机减少债券持有人财富通过代入高风险的投资，这种现象通常被称为资产替代。
股权报酬对管理人员去资产替代提供一个潜在的强大动力。
债权人了解这些风险的激励机制和合理定价他们。
例如，信用评级机构的报告显示CEO 薪酬和管理风险偏好之间有显而易见的联系。
2007年的穆迪投资服务公司特别说明“高管薪酬纳入穆迪信用分析的发行人评估，因为补偿是管理行为的决定因素，间接影响信贷质量”。
这个报告后来解释说“分析薪酬的主要目的是深入了解关于激励的结构，规模和奖励重点”。
穆迪也公布其在2005年进行的一项内部研究报告，题为“CEO报酬与信用风险”。
这项研究的结论是“支付方案对股票价格和经营业绩是高度敏感的，可能会诱发管理者更大的冒险行为，或许与股东保持一致的目标，但不一定债券持有人的目标”。
我们发现在普尔对于CEO的激励和信用分析的报告中有类似的研究，报告认为，短期债务可以减少管理的激励机制，以增加风险。
此外，利兰和托夫特（1996）声称，短期债务可以减少甚至消除与资产置换有关的代理成本。
斯图尔兹（2000）的一个重要观点是，短期债务的债权人提供了“一个非常强大的工具来监控管理”。
同样，拉詹和通泰（1995）认为，短期债务的债权人用最小的努力提供了额外的灵活性以监测管理者.在本文中使用了两项措施来源于管理者的薪酬待遇，我们测试短期债务在减轻资产置换所产生的债务代理成本的作用。
具体来说，我们断定，短期债务增加CEO的薪酬风险。
经理人的风险偏好的措施之一是对标的股票价格的敏感度补偿方案。
债权人认识到，降低这种敏感性，更像是经理人决定风险增加的策略。
因此，我们预期，经理人对股票价格的敏感度越低，短期债务在公司资本结构中的比重就越大。
与此相反，经理人偏好增加股票报酬波动的敏感性风险。
因此，我们预期，管理者的股票报酬波动灵敏度越高，短期债务在公司的资本结构中的比重就越大。
此前的研究认为，找到一些证据表明，债务成本增加在于企业经营者风险报酬。
如果短期内到期，约束管理风险寻求，那么我们预计短期债务将减弱补偿风险对债务成本的影响。
我们以1992年至2005年14年间6825个公司为观测样本，研究CEO薪酬激励与公司债务期限之间的因果关系。
我们采用短期债务的替代定义，遵循科尔和格威（2002）的估算选择敏感度理论，应用多种实验方法并且选择新债发行的样品进行分析预测关系。
与假设相同，我们发现一个消极的显著关系在公司首席执行官股票价格和短期债务之间。
也与预期一致，我们发现公司首席CEO组合股票报酬波动和短期债务之间的积极的显著关系。
总之，这些研究结果表明，短期债务是用来减少企业经营者报酬风险代理成本。
我们的实证结果是全面的控制首席执行官股权，杠杆率，资产期限，成长机会，企业规模，期限结构，债券评级，以及发行人的其他特性。
接下来，我们使用268400个债券观察样本，其为114个不同的企业在1994年至2005年期间的观察，研究短期到期债务是否减轻了对债务成本管理激励机制的影响。
与过往的研究（例如，丹尼尔等（2004），肖尔（2007），和比利，莫尔，和张（2009）），我们发现，股票报酬波动率越高，引起的借贷成本就较低。
更重要的是，我们发现短期债务减弱债券收益率和股票价格之间的负（正）的关系。
股票管理和期权补偿在管理风险寻求行为中表现为两个相反的影响。
一个影响来自经理人的投资组合对股票价格的灵敏度，另外一个影响来自对股票报酬波动的灵敏度。
其他方面相同，较高灵敏度的股票价格以及经理人薪酬会降低冒险行为，而经理人的补偿方案，以较高灵敏度的股票收益波动率将鼓励冒险行为。
债权人了解这些激励措施和合理的价格补偿引起的风险。
此前的研究表明，短期债务可以降低与资产置换有关的代理成本，提高监管放贷机构的效率。
在本文中，我们分析出短期债务产生的债务代理成本的减轻得益于CEO组合的敏感性度作用。
我们的第一个假设是，短期债务对CEO的投资组合的股票收益波动率的敏感性是正相关的，和CEO的投资组合的股票价格（增量）的敏感度呈负相关。
我们的第二个假说是，利用短期债务减少股票和债务成本之间的正（负）关系。
为了测试第一个假设，我们组建了一个模型，从1992年到2005年14个年间6825个公司年度观测样本，用短期债务的替代定义，采用科尔和格威（2002）的理论建立评估的敏感性模型，并采用多种计量经济学方法来分析预测关系。
我们发现，在补偿方案的灵敏度和股价和短期债之一直是负相关统计学关系。
我们还发现，股票收益波动率和短期债务的补偿方案的灵敏度之间时刻保持正相关统计学显著关系。
实证研究结果已经证明我们在控制诸多影响债务到期因素是成功的。
为了进一步减轻内生性问题，我们采用新的债务问题的样本重新检验我们的主要假设。
我们的研究结果证实，当CEO的股票价格高时债权人多（少）可能借短期资金。
我们还检测管理激励、短期到期债务以及公司债券收益率之间的关系。
与过往文献中相比，我们发现，债券收益率正在增加股票价格和减少股票价格波动。
更重要的是，我们分析了债券收益率期限结构和管理激励机制之间的相互作用。
我们发现，短期到期债务减弱股票价格对债券收益率的影响，同时也加强了对股票报酬波动对债券收益率的影响。
这些结果表明，短期到期债务约束管理风险偏好并减轻资产替代成本的问题。
总体而言，本研究扩展了几个方面的深度，像行政赔偿，债务代理成本和债务期限的决定因素。
我们提供的新证据表明，企业经营者报酬这个组合的敏感性影响公司债务期限，而且他们用完全不同的方式。
我们的研究结果无论是在文献上、统计学上还是经济学上都表明，股票报酬波动和股票价格是影响债务期限的决定因素。
我们的研究还发现，一方面是债权人评估高管薪酬和风险寻求行为之间的因果关系，而另一方面，是寻求债务风险行为与代理成本之间的关系。
最重要的是，我们的实证结果强调短期债务减轻债务代理成本的作用。
原文:Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure ofCorporate DebtPAUL BROCKMAN, XIUMIN MARTIN, and EMRE UNLUTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2010(3):1123-1127Abstract: Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. Theory suggests that short-maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short-maturity debt. We also find that short-maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega- and delta-relate incentives on bond yields. Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short-term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk.The use of stock and option-based executive compensation has increased dramatically during the past few decades. The median exposure of CEO wealth to stock prices tripled between 1980 and 1994,and then doubled again between 1994 and 2000 .Such changes in executive compensation have a direct impact on the manager’s exposure to risk, thus altering bothincentives and behavior. Carpenter and Lambert discuss two effects of compensation on managerial incentives. One effect is caused by the sensitivity of compensation to stock prices. A second effect is caused by the sensitivity of compensation to stock return volatility . The higher the compensation package’s sensitivity to stock prices, the weaker will be the manager’s appetite for risk. In contrast,the higher the compensation package’s se nsitivity to stock return volatility,the stronger will be the manager’s appetite for risk.By altering managerial risk preferences,stock-based compensation also influences third-party perceptions of those risk preferences. The primary objective of this study is to investigate the role of short-term debt in reducing agency costs of debt arising from executive incentive contracts. Specifically, we examine the effect of the two portfolio sensitivities on the maturity structure of corporate debt. In addition, we analyze the effect of debt maturity on the relation between portfolio sensitivities and bond yields. The empirical results provide a consistent picture that short-term debt reduces agency costs of debt associated with compensation incentives.Traditional agency theory posits a conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors. In their seminal studies, Fama and Miller and Jensen and Meckling show that shareholders have an incentive to expropriate bondholder wealth by substituting into riskier investments, a phenomenon commonly referred to as asset substitution. Equity-basedcompensation provides managers with a potentially stronger motive for asset substitution. Creditors understand these risk incentives and rationally price them. For example, credit rating agency reports show an awareness of the link between CEO compensation and managerial risk appetites. A 2007 Moody’s Investors Service Special Comment states that “Executive pay is incorporated into Moody’s credit analysis of rated issuers because compensation is a determinant of management behavior that affects indirectly credit quality” .The report later explains that the “primary interest in analyzing pay is to gain insight into the compensation committee’s intent regarding the structure, size and focus of incentives” Moody’s has also published the results of an internal study conducted in 2005 entitled “CEO Compensation and Credit Risk.” This study concludes that “pay packages that are highly sensitive to stock price and/or operating performance may induce greater risk taking by managers, perhaps consistent with stockholders’ objectives, but not necessarily bondholders’ objectives ” .We find similar statements regarding CEO incentives and credit analysis in Standard & Poor’s reports argue that short er-term debt can reduce managerial incentives to increase risk.Further, Leland and Toft (1996) claim that short-term debt can reduce or even eliminate agency costs associated with asset substitution.An important insight from Stulz (2000) is that short-term debt provides creditors with “an extremely powerful tool to monitor management.” Similarly, Rajanand Winton (1995) argue that short-term debt provides creditors with additional flexibility to monitor managers with minimum ing two measures of risk preference derived from managerial compensation packages in this paper, we test the role of short-term debt in mitigating agency costs of debt arising from asset substitution. Specifically, we posit that the proportion of short-term debt increases in CEO compensation risk. One measure of the manager’s appetite for risk is the sensitivity of the compensation package to underlying stock prices. Creditors recognize that the lower this sensitivity, the more likely the manager is to engage in risk-increasing strategies. We therefore expect that the lower the manager’s sensitivity to stock prices, the larger the proportion of short-term debt in the firm’s capital structure. In contrast, the manager’s appetite for risk increases with the sensitivity of the compensation package to stock return volatility. We therefore expect that the higher the manager’s sensitivity to stock return volatility, the larger the proportion of short-term debt in the firm’s capital structure. Prior studies argue and find some evidence that the cost of debt increases in managerial compensation risk. If short maturities restrain managerial risk-seeking, then we expect that short-term debt will attenuate the effect of compensation risk on the cost of debt.We study the causal link between CEO incentive compensation and corporate debt maturity using a sample of 6,825 firm-year observations during the 14 year period from 1992 to 2005. We employ alternativedefinitions of short-term debt, follow Core and Guay’s (2002) method for estimating option sensitivities and apply several empirical methodologies and an alternative new debt issuance sample to analyze the predicted relations. As hypothesized, we find a negative and significant relation between CEO portfolio deltas and short-term debt. Also consistent with expectations, we find a positive and significant relation between CEO portfolio vegas and short-term debt. Taken together, these findings suggest that short-term debt is used to reduce agency costs associated with high managerial compensation risk. Our empirical results are robust to controlling for CEO stock ownership, leverage, asset maturity, growth opportunities, firm size, term structure,bond rating, and other issuer characteristics.Next, we use a sample of 268,400 bond-day observations for 114 unique firms during the 1994 to 2005 period to examine whether short-maturity debt mitigates the impact of managerial incentives on the cost of debt. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Daniel et al. (2004), Shaw (2007), and Billett, Mauer,and Zhang (2009)), we find that higher deltas (vegas) lead to lower (higher) borrowing costs. More importantly, we show that short-term debt attenuates the negative (positive) relation between bond yields and deltas (vegas).Managerial stock and option compensation exerts two opposing forces on managerial risk-seeking behavior. One effect arises from the sensitivityof the manager’s portfolio to stock prices (delta), and the other effect arises from the sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). All else equal, higher sensitivity of the manager’s compensation package to stock prices will discourage risk-taking behavior whereas higher sensitivity of the manager’s compensation package to stock return volatility will encourage risk-taking behavior.Creditors understand these incentives and rationally price the compensation-induced risks. Prior research suggests that short-term debt can reduce agency costs associated with asset substitution and improve the efficiency of monitoring by lenders. In this paper, we analyze the role of short-term debt in mitigating agency costs of debt arising from CEO portfolio sensitivities. Our first hypothesis is that short-term debt is positively related to the sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio to stock return volatility (vega), an d negatively related to the sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio to stock prices (delta). Our second hypoth-esis is that the use of short-term debt reduces the positive (negative) relation between vega (delta) and the cost of debt.To test the first hypothesis, we construct a sample of 6,825 firm-year observations during the 14-year period from 1992 to 2005, use alternative definitions of short-term debt, implement Core and Guay’s (2002) method for estimating option sensitivities, and employ several econometric techniques to analyze the predicted relations. We find a consistently negativeand statistically significant relation between the compensation package’s sensitivity to stock prices and short-term debt. We also find a consistently positive and statistically significant relation between the compensation package’s sensitivity to stock return volatility and short-term debt. Our empirical findings are robust to controls for numerous factors that have been shown to affect debt maturity.To further mitigate endogeneity concerns, we retest our main hypotheses using a sample of new debt issues. Our results confirm that creditors are more (less) likely to lend short-term funds when CEOs have high vega (high delta) incentive packages.We also examine the relation between managerial incentives, short-maturity debt, and corporate bond yields. Consistent with prior literature, we find that bond yields are increasing in vega and decreasing in delta. More importantly, we analyze the interaction between maturity structure and managerial incentives on bond yields. We show that short-maturity debt attenuates the impact of vega on bond yields while it reinforces the impact of delta on bond yields.These results suggest that short-maturity debt constrains managerial risk preferences and mitigates asset substitution problems.Overall, this study extends the literature in several areas, including executive compensation, agency costs of debt, and the determinants of debt maturity.We provide new evidence that the two portfolio sensitivities in managerial compensation affect corporate debt maturity, and that they do soin quite different ways. Our results add to the literature on the determinants of debt maturity by showing that executive portfolio deltas and vegas are significant determinants,both statistically and economically. Our study also sheds light on the creditor’s assessment of the causal connections between executive compensation and risk-seeking behavior on the one hand, and between risk-seeking behavior and agency costs of debt on the other hand. Perhaps most importantly, our empirical results highlight the role of short-term debt in mitigating agency costs of debt.。