国际财务管理第四章
国际财务管理第四章
4-3
Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Governance and the Public Corporation: Key Issues
A key weakness is the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. In principle, shareholders elect a board of directors, who in turn hire and fire the managers who actually run the company. In reality, management-friendly insiders often dominate the board of directors, with relatively few outside directors who can independently monitor the management.
4-4 Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Governance and the Public Corporation: Key Issues
In the case of Enron and other dysfunctional corporations, the boards of directors grossly failed to safeguard shareholder interests. Furthermore, with diffused ownership, most shareholders have strong enough incentive to incur the costs of monitoring management themselves.
第四章国际财务管理
含义：又称汇率、汇价，是指一国货币单位 兑换成另一国货币单位的比率或比价，是 外汇买卖的折算标准。 标价方法 直接标价法
间接标价法
高级财务管理
直接标价法
含义：又称应付标价法，是以一定单位的外 国货币为标准，折算为一定金额的本国货 币的做法。
我国人民币的汇率，采用的就是直接标价法。
（三）国际企业筹资管理
1、国际企业的资金来源 2、国际企业的筹资方式 3、国际企业资本结构管理与优化 4、降低国际企业的筹资风险
1、国际企业的资金来源
国际企业的筹资方式
国际企业的筹资方式 （1）发行国际股票
国际股票是一国企业在国际金融市场或者国外金融市场上发行的股票， 通常也称为境外上市。企业利用发行国际股票筹资，能够迅速筹集到 外汇资金，提高企业信誉，有利于企业以更快的速度向国际化发展。 但是到国外发行股票，必须遵守国际惯例，遵守有关国家的金融股法 规，因此，发行的程序比较复杂，发行的费用也较高。
二、外汇风险的种类
1、交易风险 2、折算风险 3、经济风险
交易风险
（1）定义：指企业因进行跨国交易而取得外 币债权或承担外币债务时，由于交易发生 日的汇率与结算日的汇率不一致，可能使 收入或支出发生变动的风险。
（2）具体表现： 1）国际贸易信用买卖中的交易风险（表现） 2）外汇借款和投资中的交易风险（表现）
（2）决定因素： 1）公司原材料和劳动力的来源市场和产品销
售市场的市场结构； 2）公司通过调整市场结构、产品结构和资源
来减轻汇率变化影响的能力。
二、避免外汇风险的方式
1、交易风险的避险方式 2、折算风险的避险方式 3、经济风险的避险方式
1、交易风险的避险方式
（1）远期外汇交易保值 （2）外汇期权交易保值
国际财务管理知识分析及练习题参考答案
国际财务治理?练习题参考答案第1章国际财务治理导论一、名词解释1.国际企业:超越国界从事商业活动的企业，包括各种类型、各种规模的参与国际商务的企业。
国内生产、国际销售是国际企业最简单的国际业务。
跨国公司是国际企业开展的较高时期和典型代表。
2.许可经营:许可方企业向受许可方企业提供技术，包括版权、专利技术、技术诀窍或商标以换取使用费的一种经营方式。
当许可方企业与受许可方企业分不位于不同国家时，就形成了国家间的许可经营。
这种方式也能够被瞧作技术出口。
3.特许经营：是一种特殊的许可经营方式，许可方通过向被许可方提供全套专业化企业经营手段，包括商标、企业组织、销售或效劳策略和培训、技术支持等定期取得特许权使用费，被许可方那么必须同意遵守严格的规那么和程序以实现经营的标准化。
特许权使用费通常以被许可方的销售收进为根底收取。
4.分部式组织:称事业部制组织结构。
其特点是在高层治理者之下，按地区或产品设置假设干分部，实行“集中政策，分散经营〞的集中领导下的分权治理。
5.混合式组织：事实上非常少有哪家企业是单纯采纳一种结构类型的，采纳两种以上组合方式的称为混合式结构。
6.分权模式:子公司拥有充分的财务治理决策权，母公司关于其财务治理操纵以间接治理为主。
二、简答题1.国际财务治理与国内企业的财务治理内容有哪些的重要区不。
【答案】国际财务治理是指对国际企业的涉外经济活动进行的财务治理。
财务治理要紧涉及的是如何作出各种最正确的公司财务决定，比方通过适宜的投资、资产结构、股息政策以及人力资源治理，从而到达既定的公司目标〔股东财宝最大化〕。
国际财务治理与国内财务治理之间的区不要紧表达在以下几个方面：〔1〕跨国经营和财务活动受外汇风险的妨碍；〔2〕全球范围内融资，寻求最正确全球融资战略；〔3〕跨国经营中商品和资金无法自由流淌；〔4〕对外投资为股东在全球范围内分散风险。
2.试述国际财务治理体系的内容。
【答案】国际财务治理体系的内容要紧包括：〔1〕国际财务治理环境。
国际财务管理教案
课
外
作
业
及
要
求
1．什么是掉期外汇交易？掉期外汇交易有哪几种类型？从事掉期交易的动机是什么？
2．什么是即期外汇交易？即期外汇交易交割日期的确定惯例是怎样的？
3．什么是远期外汇交易？什么是择期交易？远期外汇交易有哪些作用？
后
记
安徽财经大学教案专用页
内容
分析：
1．甲公司以更具优势的固定利率借入资金5 000万美元，年利率10%，期限五年，每半年归还一次利息。乙公司则以浮动利率借入资金5 000万美元，年利率为LIBOR+0.75%，利率每半年调整一次，借款期限5年。双方均向银行提出利率交换。
2．假设银行安排本案互换应获得的收益为2.5万美元（5 000×0.05%），每年收益为0.5万美元（2.5÷5），折算为年利率0.01%（0.5÷5 000）。
《国际财务管理》教案
安徽财经大学教案专用页
内容
（标题）
第一章国际财务管理概述
课
时
4
教
学
目
的
及
要
求
使学生了解跨国公司和国际财务管理的基本概念，掌握国际财务管理的主要内容，了解国际财务管理的特定目标，了解国际财务管理的重要性。
重
点
难
点
及
其
处
理
重点：
1．国际财务管理的概念
2．跨国公司财务管理与国际财务管理的异同
课
外
作
业
及
要
求
1．试述金融期货交易的保证金制度。
2．金融期货市场有哪些功能？
3．外汇期货交易与远期外汇交易的关系如何？
国际财务管理(PPT全部) 第(4)章
2、空头套期保值（卖出对冲）
交易者预期未来将在现货市场售出某类金
融资产，而先在期货市场售出与该类资产 相同或相关的金融期货契约，到时在现货 市场售出该类资产时，再将原先已售出的 期货契约在期货市场结清。
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例：
一家美国公司6个月后有5000万日元收入，签约当日日 元的即期汇率为JP￥116.80/$，六个月日元的远期汇率 JP￥120.00/$，美国公司将面临日元贬值带来的风险。 美国公司决定签订货币期货合约，锁定汇率风险。（假 定到期时的即期汇率为JP￥125/$或JP￥105/$）。 美国公司的具体做法是在期货市场上按JP￥120.00/$的 价格出售4份6个月后交割的日元期货（5000万÷1250 万）。在6个月后合约到期时，买入日元期货合约，同 时在即期市场上卖出日元5000万。这样，不论这一期间 汇率走势如何，美国公司都能收入固定在$416 667 （JP￥120.00/$）水平上。 讨论：在两种不同情形下空头套期保值的运用结果。
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结论：
利用期货市场进行套期保值是以放弃未来
可能实现的利润为代价来避免未来可能遭
受的损失。
缺点：
公司需要负担较大的交易费用；
可能丧失汇率有利变动而产生的利润。
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（二）投机
投机者在本身目前或未来并无现货头寸的情况
下进行期货交易，从期货价格变动中获取利润。
对于走势趋强的货币做多头，买进期货合约，
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C$ 100000 ￥12500000 SFr 125000 € 125000
保证金制度
期货交易双方都要缴交保证金，通过经纪入存
入清算所。保证金金额具体由清算所和交易所 共同决定，一般为合约总值的2%以下。
International-FinancialManagement-4国际财务管理课件
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Types of Exposure
• Although exchange rates cannot be forecasted with perfect accuracy, firms can at least measure their exposure to exchange rate fluctuations.
✓MNCs may be affected in the same way because of exchange rate risk.
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Is Exchange Rate Risk Relevant?
Response from MNCs • Many MNCs have attempted to stabilize
• Historical data is used to determine the potential one-day decline in a particular currency. This decline is then applied to the net cash flows in that currency.
currency. (Example：P248)
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Transaction Exposure
• An MNC’s overall exposure can be assessed by considering each currency position together with the currency’s variability and the correlations among the currencies.
国际财务管理
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一、财务分析与会计发展
财务分析与会计技术发展
财务分析以财务报表为基础 财务报表以会计技术为基础
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会计技术的发展阶段
利用会计凭证记录交易
会计分类账记录交易
编制会计报表
财务报表解释
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课堂思考题：财务分析与财务报 表分析的关系
从一般意义而言，人们并不在意财务分析、财 务报表分析的区别，说明其分析的本质是相同 或相近的。但仔细斟酌，它们又有所区别：财 务报表分析的对象是财务报表；财务分析的对 象是财务活动。
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二、财务分析应用领域的发展
财务分析开始于银行家
投资领域的财务分析
现代财务分析领域
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三、财务分析技术的发展
比率财务分析
1919年，亚力 山大建立比率分 析的系统体系
标准比率分析
趋势百分比
现代财务分析技术
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预测分析、实证分 析、价值评估、电
算化分析
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我国财务分析体系与内容构建
见下图
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分析概论
分析理论
分析信息
分析方法
会计分析
筹资活动 投资活动 经营活动 分配活动
财务分析
偿债能力 营运能力 盈利能力 增长能力
综合分析
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第五节 财务分析的形式与要求
财务分析的形式 财务分析的条件 财务分析的要求
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《国际财务管理》章后练习题及参考答案
《国际财务管理》章后练习题及参考答案《国际财务管理》章后练习题及参考答案《国际财务管理》章后练习题及参考答案第一章绪论第一章绪论一、单选题一、单选题1. 关于国际财务管理学与财务管理学的关系表述正确的是(C)。
A. 国际财务管理是学习财务管理的基础B. 国际财务管理与财务管理是两门截然不同的学科C. 国际财务管理是财务管理的一个新的分支D. 国际财务管理研究的范围要比财务管理的窄2. 凡经济活动跨越两个或更多国家国界的企业，都可以称为( A )。
A. 国际企业 B. 跨国企业 C. 跨国公司 D. 多国企业3.企业的( C)管理与财务管理密切结合，是国际财务管理的基本特点 A.资金 B.人事 C.外汇 D成本4.国际财务管理与跨国企业财务管理两个概念( D) 。
A. 完全相同B. 截然不同C. 仅是名称不同D. 内容有所不同 4.国际财务管理的内容不应该包括( C )。
A. 国际技术转让费管理B. 外汇风险管理企业进出口外汇收支管理 C. 合并财务报表管理 D.5.“企业生产经营国际化”和“金融市场国际化”的关系是( C )。
A. 二者毫不相关 B. 二者完全相同 C. 二者相辅相成 D. 二者互相起负面影响二、多选题二、多选题1.国际企业财务管理的组织形态应考虑的因素有( )。
A.公司规模的大小 B.国际经营的投入程度C.管理经验的多少D.整个国际经营所采取的组织形式 2.国际财务管理体系的内容包括( )A.外汇风险的管理B.国际税收管理C.国际投筹资管理D.国际营运资金管 3.国际财务管理目标的特点( )。
A.稳定性B.多元性C.层次性D.复杂性4.广义的国际财务管理观包括( )。
A.世界统一财务管理观B.比较财务管理观C.跨国公司财务管理观D.国际企业财务管理观5. 我国企业的国际财务活动日益频繁，具体表现在( )。
A. 企业从内向型向外向型转化 B. 外贸专业公司有了新的发展 C. 在国内开办三资企业 D. 向国外投资办企业 E. 通过各种形式从国外筹集资金三、判断题三、判断题1.国际财务管理是对企业跨国的财务活动进行的管理。
中英合作《国际财务管理》笔记（1-3章）
第⼀篇国际财务管理基础 第⼀章总论 第⼀节国际财务管理的概念 ⼀、什么是国际财务管理？ 财务管理： ①财务活动→筹资→投资→营运资⾦→利润分配→财务预算。
②财务关系→与债权⼈、政府部门、供应商、员⼯等之间的关系。
国际财务管理→站在“国际企业”⾓度 1.国际企业：⽣产经营活动超越国境 跨国公司（是级组织形式） 国际企业的内涵＞跨国公司的内涵 跨国公司标准（P2） （1）由两个或两个以上国家的企业组成（2）通过产权联结 （3）实⾏“全球战略” 2.国际财务管理的内容（P4） （1）理财环境 （2）外汇管理风险：⼀国货币贬值有利出⼝，不利进⼝；⼀国货币升值不利出⼝，有利进⼝。
第⼀节国际财务管理的概念 2.国际财务管理的内容（P4） （1）理财环境 （2）外汇管理风险：⼀国货币贬值有利出⼝，不利进⼝；⼀国货币升值不利出⼝，有利进⼝。
（3）国际筹资管理：低风险、低成本、获取所需资⾦。
（4）国际投资管理 （5）国际营运资⾦管理：存量管理、流量管理。
流动资⾦-流动负债=营运资⾦ （6）国际税收管理：使整个企业集团税赋最低。
（7）其他内容 ⼆、国际企业利益相关者（P15） 利益相关者标准：（1）对企业有投⼊；（2）对企业有收益； （3）承担企业的风险。
1.企业所有者：（1）经营决策权（间接）；（2）享有剩余收益权； （3）承担风险。
2.企业债权⼈：（1）还本还息（税前）；（2）合同中保护性条款（维权）； （3）承担风险⽐企业的所有者⼩。
3.企业的职⼯ 4.政府：通过税收、⽆偿强制。
第⼆节国际财务管理的⽬标 三、国际财务管理的⽬标（P7） 两个⽬标： 1.股东财富化：股东利益、股票价格化。
2.企业价值化：在“全体利益相关者”的⾓度。
股东财富化： 股票价格化（P11） 优点：（1）考虑了时候价值；（2）考虑了风险价值； （3）克服了短期化；（4）直观。
缺点：（1）只适合于上市公司； （2）股市上影响股票价格的因素具有多样化；（3）只强调股东的利益。
最新《国际财务管理》复习题及答案
《第一章国际财务管理导论》1与国内财务管理相比较，国际财务管理具有何特点？包括哪些主要内容？（一）理财环境的复杂性跨国经营涉及多个国家和地区，财务管理环境相当复杂且不确定。
(二）财务风险的多重性1、经济和经营方面的风险2、政治风险（三）资金融通的多样性1.资金来源广泛2.筹资方式灵活多样3.货币软硬差别、利率高低不一（四）财务管理内容更丰富（五）理财技巧的复杂性《第二章外汇市场》直接标价汇率：以一定单位的外国货币为标准，折算成若干本国货币表示的汇率标价方法。
即表现为一定单位外币可兑换的本国货币金额。
间接标价汇率：以一定单位的本国货币为标准，折算成若干外国货币来表示的汇率标价方法。
即表现为一定单位本币可兑换的外国货币金额。
欧洲术语：报出单位美元的外币价格。
（如SFr1.1745/48/＄， J￥107.43/50＄）美国术语：报出单位外币的美元价格。
（如＄1.4560/64/￡ , ＄1.2540/45/€）套汇：利用不同外汇市场的汇率差异，同时在低价市场上买进,高价市场上卖出某种货币,以获取汇差利润。
套利：利用不同国家货币市场短期利率的差异，将资金从一国转移到另一国进行投资以赚取利率差额的外汇交易。
外汇掉期：又称时间套汇,指在买进（或卖出）某种货币的同时，卖出（或买进）同等数量但交割期限不同的同种货币。
外汇投机：通过对汇率变动趋势的预计，贱买贵卖，获取汇率变动的差价收益。
掉期汇率：又称点数报价，报出远期汇率与即期汇率差异的点数。
1什么是抵补的套利？它与非抵补的套利有何不同？实施抵补套利的意义何在？根据是否对汇率变动风险进行套期保值，套利分为：①未抵（抛）补的套利交易(uncovered interest arbitrage)非抵补套利：又称不抵补套利，指把资金从利率低的货币转向利率高的货币，从而谋取利率的差额收入。
②抵（抛）补的套利交易(covered interest arbitrage）抵补的套利是指把资金调往高利率货币国家或地区的同时，在外汇市场上卖出远期高利率货币，即在进行套利的同时做掉期交易，以避免汇率风险。
尤恩版《国际财务管理》第七版教师习题册及答案TBChap004
尤恩版《国际财务管理》第七版教师习题册及答案TBChap004Chapter 04Corporate Governance Around the World True / False Questions1.Countries with strong shareholder protection tend to have more valuable stock markets and morecompanies listed on stock exchanges per capita than countries with weak protection.True FalseMultiple Choice Questions2.Corporate governance can be defined asA. t he economic, legal, and institutional framework in which corporate control and cash flow rightsare distributed among shareholders, managers and other stakeholders of the company.B. t he general framework in which company management is selected and monitored.C. t he rules and regulations adopted by boards of directors specifying how to managecompanies.D. t he government-imposed rules and regulations affecting corporate management.3.When managerial self-dealings are excessive and left unchecked,A. t hey can have serious negative effects on share values.B. t hey can impede the proper functions of capital markets.C. t hey can impede such measures as GDP growth.D. a ll of the above4.Corporate governance structureA. v aries a great deal across countries.B. h as become homogenized following the integration of capital markets.C. h as become homogenized due to cross-listing of shares of many public corporations.D. n one of the above5.The genius of public corporations stems from their capacity to allow efficient sharing or spreadingof risk among many investors, who can buy and sell their ownership shares on liquid stockexchanges and let professional managers run the company on behalf of shareholders. This risk sharing stems fromA. t he liquidity of the shares.B. t he limited liability of shareholders.C. t he limited liability of bondholders.D. t he limited ability of shareholders.6.In a public company with diffused ownership, the board of directors is entrusted withA. m onitoring the auditors and safeguarding the interests of shareholders.B. m onitoring the shareholders and safeguarding the interests of management.C. m onitoring the management and safeguarding the interests of shareholders.D. n one of the above7.The key weakness of the public corporation isA. t oo many shareholders, which makes it difficult to make corporate decision.B. r elatively high corporate income tax rates.C. c onflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.D. c onflicts of interests between shareholders and bondholders.8.When company ownership is diffuse,A. a "free rider" problem discourages shareholder activism.B. t he large number of shareholders ensures strong monitoring of managerial behavior because with a large enough group, there's almost always someone who will to incur the costs of monitoring management.C. f ew shareholders have a strong enough incentive to incur the costs of monitoring management.D. b oth a and c are correct9.In many countries with concentrated ownershipA. t he conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are worse than in countries with diffuse ownership of firms.B. t he conflicts of interest are greater between large controlling shareholders and small outside shareholders than between managers and shareholders.C. t he conflicts of interest are greater between managers and shareholders than between large controlling shareholders and small outside shareholders.D. c orporate forms of business organization with concentrated ownership are rare.10.In what country do the three largest shareholders control, on average, about 60 percent of the shares of a public company?A. U nited StatesB. C anadaC. G reat BritainD. I taly11.The public corporationA. i s jointly owned by a (potentially) large number of shareholders.B. o ffers shareholders limited liability.C. s eparates the ownership and control of a firms assets.D. a ll of the above12.The key strengths of the public corporation is/areA. t heir capacity to allow efficient risk sharing among many investors.B. t heir capacity to raise large amounts of funds at relatively low cost.C. t heir capacity to consolidate decision-making.D. a ll of the above13.The central issue of corporate governance isA. h ow to protect creditors from managers and controlling shareholders.B. h ow to protect outside investors from the controlling insiders.C. h ow to alleviate the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.D. h ow to alleviate the conflicts of interest between shareholders and bondholders.14.In theory,A. m anagers are hired by the shareholders at the annual stockholders meeting. If the managersturn in a bad year, new ones get hired.B. s hareholders hire the managers to oversee the board of directors.C. m anagers are hired by the board of directors; the board is accountable to the shareholders.D. n one of the above15.In the reality of corporate governance at the turn of this century,A. b oards of directors are often dominated by management-friendly insiders.B. a typical board of directors often has relatively few outside directors who can independentlyand objectively monitor the management.C. m anagers of one firm often sit on the boards of other firms, whose managers are on the boardof the first firm. Due to the interlocking nature of these boards, there can exist a culture of "I'll overlook your problems if you overlook mine."D. a ll of the above have been true to a greater or lesser extent in the recent past.16.The strongest protection for investors is provided byA. E nglish common law countries, such as Canada, the United States, and the U.K.B. F rench civil law countries, such as Belgium, Italy, and Mexico.C. a weak board of directors.D. s ocialized firms.17.The public corporation has a key weakness:A. t he conflicts of interest between bondholders and shareholders.B. t he conflicts of interest between managers and bondholders.C. t he conflicts of interest between stakeholders and shareholders.D. t he conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.18.The separation of the company's ownership and control,A. i s especially prevalent in such countries as the United States and the United Kingdom, wherecorporate ownership is highly diffused.B. i s especially prevalent in such countries as the Italy and Mexico, where corporate ownership is highly concentrated.C. i s a rational response to the agency problem.D. n one of the above19.In the United States, managers are legally bound by the "duty of loyalty" toA. t he board of directors.B. t he shareholders.C. t he bondholders.D. t he government.20.In the United States, managers are bound by the "duty of loyalty" to serve the shareholders.A. T his is an ethical, not legal, obligation.B. T his is a legal obligation.C. T his is only a moral obligation; there are no penalties.21.Outside the United States and the United Kingdom,A. c oncentrated ownership of the company is more the exception than the rule.B. d iffused ownership of the company is more the exception than the rule.C. p artnerships are more important than corporations.D. n one of the above22.A complete contract between shareholders and managersA. w ould specify exactly what the manager will do under each of all possible future contingencies.B. w ould be an expensive contract to write and a very expensive contract to monitor.C. w ould eliminate any conflicts of interest (and managerial discretion).D. a ll of the above23.Why is it rational to make shareholders "weak" by giving control to the managers of the firm?A. T his may be rational when shareholders may be neither qualified nor interested in making business decisions.B. T his may be rational since many shareholders find it easier to sell their shares in an underperforming firm than to monitor the management.C. T his may be rational to the extent that managers are answerable to the board of directors.D. A ll of the above are explanations for the separation of ownership and control.24.Free cash flow refers toA. a firm's cash reserve in excess of tax obligation.B. a firm's funds in excess of what's needed for undertaking all profitable projects.C. a firm's cash reserve in excess of interest and tax payments.D. a firm's income tax refund that is due to interest payments on borrowing.25.The investors supply funds to the company but are not involved in the company's daily decisionmaking. As a result, many public companies come to haveA. s trong shareholders and weak managers.B. s trong managers and weak shareholders.C. s trong managers and strong shareholders.D. w eak managers and weak shareholders.26.The agency problem refers to the possible conflicts of interest betweenA. s elf-interested managers as principals and shareholders of the firm who are the agents.B. a ltruistic managers as agents and shareholders of the firm who are the principals.C. s elf-interested managers as agents and shareholders of the firm who are the principals.D. d utiful managers as principals and shareholders of the firm who are the agents.27.Self-interested managers may be tempted toA. i ndulge in expensive perquisites at company expense.B. a dopt anti-takeover measures for their company to ensure their personal job security.C. w aste company funds by undertaking unprofitable projects that benefit themselves but notshareholders.D. a ll of the above are potential abuses that self-interested managers may be tempted to visitupon shareholders.28.Suppose in order to defraud the shareholders, a manager sets up an independent company thathe owns sells the main company's output to this company. He would be tempted to set the transfer priceA. b elow market prices.B. a bove market prices.C. a t the market price.D. i n accordance with GAAP.29.Suppose in order to defraud the shareholders, a manager sets up an independent company thathe owns buys one of the main company's inputs of production from this company. He would be tempted to set the transfer priceA. b elow market prices.B. a bove market prices.C. a t the market price.D. i n accordance with GAAP.30.Why do managers tend to retain free cash flow?A. M anagers are in the best position to decide the best use of those funds.B. T hese funds are needed for undertaking profitable projects and the issue costs are less thannew issues of stocks or bonds.C. M anagers may not be acting in the shareholders best interest, and for a variety of reasons, want to use the free cash flow.D. N one of the above31.Managerial entrenchment efforts are clear signs of the agency problem. They includeA. a nti-takeover defenses.B. p oison pills.C. c hanges in the voting procedures to make it more difficult for the firm to be taken over.D. a ll of the above32.In high-growth industries where companies' internally generated funds fall short of profitable investment opportunities,A. m anagers are less likely to waste funds in unprofitable projects.B. m anagers are more likely to waste funds in unprofitable projects.33.The agency problem tendsA. t o be more serious in firms with free cash flows.B. t o be more serious in firms with excessive amounts of excess cash.C. t o be less serious in firms with few numbers of shareholders.D. a ll of the above34.In the graph at right, X, Y, and Z representA. e ntrenchment, alignment, entrenchment.B. a lignment, entrenchment, alignment.C. m isalignment and alignment.D. a gency costs of debt and equity.35.In the graph at right, for Fortune 500 companies, X, Y areA. 5% and 25%.B. 15% and 50%.C. 50% and 75%.D. N one of the above36.Which of the following is true regarding leveraged buy-outs (LBOs)?A. L BOs involve managers or buyout partners acquiring controlling interests in public companies, usually financed by heavy borrowing.B. C oncentrated ownership and high level of debt associated with LBOs are the mechanism for solving the agency problem.C. L BOs improve a company's free cash flow and this is the mechanism by which they can solvethe agency problem.D. B oth a and b37.Tobin's Q isA. t he ratio of the market value of company assets to the replacement costs of the assets.B. a means to find overvalued stocks: if Q is high it means that the cost to replace a firm's assets is greater than the value of its stock.C. t he same as the price-to-book ratio.D. B oth a and b are correct38.It is important for society as a whole to solve the agency problem, since the agency problemA. l eads to waste of scarce resources.B. h ampers capital market functions.C. r etards economic growth.D. a ll of the above39.In the U.S., the chief role of the board of directors isA. t o hire the management team.B. t o decide on the annual capital budget.C. t o design an effective incentive compatible compensation scheme for themselves.D. n one of the above40.In the United Kingdom, the majority of public companiesA. v oluntarily abide by the Code of Best Practice on corporate governance.B. a re compelled by law to abide by the Code of Best Practice on corporate governance.C. d o not abide by the Code of Best Practice on corporate governance.41.In Germany the corporate board isA. l egally charged with representing the interests of shareholders exclusively.B. l egally charged with looking after the interests of stakeholders (e.g., workers, creditors, etc.) in general, not just shareholders.C. l egally charged as a supervisory board only.D. l egally charged as a management board only.42.In the United StatesA. b oards of directors are legally responsible for representing the interests of the shareholders.B. d ue to the diffused ownership structure of the public company, management often gets to choose board members who are likely to be friendly to management.C. t here is a correlation between underperforming firms and boards of directors who are not fully independent.D. a ll of the above are true, in the United States.43.In the United States, it is not uncommon for the same person to serve as both CEO and chairman of the board.A. T his situation must not have much conflict of interest since it is common.B. T his situation has a built-in conflict of interest.C. T his is only legal if that individual owns a controlling number of shares in the firm.D. N one of the above44.Suppose you are the CEO of company A, and you serve on the board of company B, while the CEO of B is on your board.A. T his is a potential conflict of interest for both parties.B. T his is normal and even a desirable situation since it allows for efficient information sharing between the firms.C. T here is a potential conflict for the shareholders of the two firms.D. A ll of the above are true.45.In the United States, it is well documented thatA. b oards dominated by their chief executives are prone to trouble.B. p ublic scrutiny can help improve corporate governance.C. a s public firms improve their corporate governance, the stock price goes up.D. a ll of the above46.The board of directors may grant stock options to managers. These areA. c all options.B. p ut options.C. n one of the above47.If an incentive contract specifies certain accounting performanceA. t hat accounting number will likely be the focus of managers.B. m anagers will set aside the accounting goal if it conflicts with the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.C. m anagers will be unable to manipulate the GAAP, so shareholders can be confident of having their wealth maximized.48.The board of directors may grant stock options to managers in order toA. s ave executive compensation costs.B. u se as a substitute for bonus.C. a lign the interest of managers with that of shareholders.D. n one of the above49.When designing an incentive contract,A. i t is important for the board of directors to set up an independent compensation committee thatcan carefully design the contract and diligently monitor manager's actions.B. s enior executives can be trusted to not abuse incentive contracts by artificially manipulating accounting numbers since the auditors should look in to that.C. t he presence of any incentive is enough, whether it is accounting based or stock-price based.D. t he board of directors should always give the managers a "heads I win, tails you lose" type of option.50.Concentrated ownership of a public companyA. i s normal in the United States, following the well-publicized scandals of recent years.B. i s relatively rare in the United States and common in many other parts of the world.C. l eads to a free-rider problem with the minority shareholders relying on the majority shareholders to assume an undue burden in monitoring the management.D. i s the norm in Great Britain.51.Concentrated ownership of a public companyA. c an be an effective way to alleviate the agency problem between shareholders and managers.B. i s the norm in Great Britain.C. t ends to be an ineffective way to alleviate conflicts of interest between groups of shareholders.D. n one of the above52.The goal of a greater accounting transparencyA. i s to impose more rules and harsher penalties for their violation.B. i s to reduce the information asymmetry between corporate insiders and the public.C. i s to discourage managerial self-dealings.D. a nswers b and c53.Accounting TransparencyA. c an only be achieved when managers commit to serving on their own audit committee.B. o ccurs when the accounting department has translucent cubicles for their workers.C. p romises to reduce the information asymmetry between corporate insiders and the public.D. n one of the above54.While debt can reduce agency costs between shareholders and management,A. d ebt can create its own agency costs.B. t his only happens at extreme levels of debt.C. t his does not work for firms in mature industries with large cash reserves.D. n one of the above is true55.While debt can reduce agency costs between shareholders and management,A. e xcessive debt may also induce the risk-averse managers to forgo profitable but risky investment projects, causing an underinvestment problem.B. w ith debt financing companies can misuse debt to finance corporate empire building.C. b oth a and bD. n one of the above。
国际财务管理课后习题答案
国际财务管理
第四章 外汇汇率预测
• 1、
St 5
1 8%
1 5% • 2、 iA =（1+6%）×（1+5%）－1≈11.3% iB =（1+6%）×（1+8%）－1≈14.48%
SF 5 1 14 . 48 % 1 11 . 3 % 5 . 1429
108
1
110
1
9月1日，98 100 0 . 010204 0 . 01 0 . 000204 由此造成收益为：6250×（0.000204-0.0001683）≈0.23万美元
5、
卖出应收款100万英镑应收美元数
执行汇率 应收款到期日的 期权协 即期汇率 定价格 （汇率） 1英镑=1.58美元 1英镑=1.60美元 1英镑=1.63美元 1英镑=1.65美元 1英镑=1.67美元 1.63美元 1.63美元 1.63美元 1.63美元 1.63美元 1.63美元 1.63美元 1.63美元 1.65美元 1.67美元
第六章 外汇风险管理的策略 与方法
外汇现货市场
外汇期货市场
3月1日，
6250 110 56 . 82 万美元 62 . 5 万美元
3月1日，
9月1日，
6250 108
57 . 87 万美元
9月1日，
6250 100
6250 98
63 . 78 万美元
损失：62.5－56.82=5.68万美 收益：63.78－ 57.87－0.5 元 =5.41万美元 • 现货市场的损失没有全部被期货市场的收益所抵补，相差 0.27万美元，其原因是： （1）支付外汇期货交易佣金0.5万美元 （2）期汇市场与现汇市场的汇率变动幅度不一致 3月1日，1 1 0 . 0092592 0 . 0090099 0 . 0001683
《国际财务管理》课件
优缺点比较
国际直接融资具有自主性、长期 性和成本低等优点，但风险较高； 国际间接融资相对较为安全，但 成本较高、灵活性较差。
国际融资方式与选择
国际借贷融资
国际债券融资
通过发行外国债券和欧洲债券进 行融资，具有金额大、成本低等 特点。
包括国际商业银行贷款和国际金 融机构贷款，具有借贷便利、成 本较低等特点。
外汇风险管理策略
企业可以通过采用货币匹配、分散投资、对冲等策略来降低外汇风险。
汇率预测与外汇交易策略
汇率预测方法
汇率预测是指对未来汇率走势的预测，常用的方法包括基本因素 分析法、技术分析法和统计模型法。
外汇交易策略
外汇交易策略是指在进行外汇交易时所采用的方法和技巧，包括套 利交易、套期保值和投机交易等。
国际财务管理的目标与任务
总结词
国际财务管理的目标与任务
详细描述
国际财务管理的目标是实现企业价值的最大化，提高企业的国际竞争力。其任务 包括制定国际财务管理战略、优化资源配置、降低成本、提高资金使用效率、防 范风险等。
国际财务管理的发展历程
总结词
国际财务管理的发展历程
详细描述
国际财务管理的发展历程可以追溯到20世纪50年代，随着全球化进程的不断加速和跨国公司的迅猛发展，国际财 务管理逐渐成为一门独立的学科。其发展经历了从传统财务管理向现代国际财务管理的转变，如今已经形成了较 为完善的理论体系和实践规范。
跨国并购的风险
包括政治风险、文化差异风险、法律风险等。
跨国并购的案例分析
选取几个典型的跨国并购案例，分析其成功 或失败的原因。
国际企业财务规划与控制
国际企业财务战略规划
根据企业战略目标，制定相应的财务战 略，包括投资策略、融资策略等。
国际财务管理课本单词
第二章exchange rate汇率 mergers并购 restructuring重组 monetary policy货币政策 exchange rate policy汇率政策 debt crisis债务危机European Monetary Union欧洲货币联盟fiscal union财政联盟 citizens referendum全民公投第四章全球各地的公司治理 corporate governance around the world公司治理 corporate governance股东财富最大化 Shareholder wealth maximization忠诚职责 duty of loyalty公司治理机制 corporate governance system股东 shareholder管理人员managers利益相关者 stakeholders上市公司 the public corporation利益冲突 the conflicts of interest代理问题 agency problem 自由现金流 free cash flows董事会 board of directors外部董事 outside directors激励合约 incentive contracts所有权集中 concentrated ownership利益联盟效应 alignment管理防御效应entrenchment透明度 accounting transparenc敌意收购 no stile takeover法律和公司治理 law and corporate governance英国普通法 English common law法国大陆法French civil law德国大路法 german civil law斯堪的纳维亚大陆法Scandinavian civil law用脚投票 voting by foot用手投票 voting by hand华尔街 the wall street 第五章American terms 美式标价 European terms 欧式标价Cross-exchange rate 套算汇率 spot rate 即期汇率 Forward rate 远期汇率 Foreign exchange market 外汇市场Interbank market 银行间同业市场 Spot market 即期市场Forward market 远期市场 retail market 零售市场Wholesale market 批发市场OTC 场外市场Client market客户市场 ask price卖出报价 Bid price买入报价 currency against currency 货币对货币互换Direct quotation 直接标价 indirect quotation 间接标价Forward premium /discount 远期升水/贴水Triangular arbitrage三角套利Correspondent banking relationships 通汇关系Appreciate 升值depreciate 贬值第六章套利 arbitrage 套利组合arbitrage portfolio 抵补套利covered interest arbitrage 市场假说efficient market hypothesis 费雪效应fisher effect 远期预期平价Forward expected parity 实际汇率Real exchange rate 利率平价 interest rate parity 国际费雪效应international fisher effect 一介定律law of one price 基本分析法fundamental approach 不可贸易商品Non-tradable Goods购买力平价purchasing power parity 货币数量理论 Quantity theory of money 技术分析法technical approach 非抵补利率平价 uncovered interest rate parity 自我筹资self-financing 汇率决定exchange rate determination 汇率预测forecasting exchange rate 随机漫步假说random walk hypothesis 第七章American option 美式期权 Exercise price/Striking price 执行European option 欧式期权 At-the-money 平价Settlement price 结算价格In-the-money 价内 Long 多头Out-of-money 价外Short 空头Call option看涨期权 Writer 开立者Put option 看跌期权 Open interest 未平仓合约 Futures 期货 Option 期权 Hedgers 套期保值者 speculators 投机者Contract size 合约规模 standardized 标准化Derivative security 衍生证券 premium 期权费第九章销售额 sales 变动成本 variable costs固定制造费用 fixed overhead costs 折旧额 depreciation allowances税前净利润 net profit before tax 所得税 income tax税后利润 profit after tax 加回折旧add back depreciation以英镑计算的经营现金流量 operating cash flow亿美元计算的经营现金流量 in pounds/dollars第十章利润表：income statement销售收入：sales revenue折旧费用: depreciation净营业利润：net operating income所得税： income tax税后利润：profit after tax外汇损益：foreign exchange gain(loss)净利润：net income股利：dividends留存收益增加额: addition to retained earings现金流量表 cash flow statement资产负责表 balance sheet现金 cash应收账款 accounts receivable存货 inventory固定资产净额 net fixed assets总资产 total assets应付账款 accounts payable应付票据 notes payable流动负债 current liabilities长期负债 long-term debt普通股 common stock留存收益 retained earnings累计换算调整 CTA(cumulative translation adjustment)利润表 INCOME STATEMENT产品销售净额Net sales of products减：产品销售税金Less：Sales tax产品销售成本 Cost of sales产品销售毛利 Gross profit on sales减：销售费用 Less：Selling expenses管理费用General and administrative expenses财务费用Financial expenses汇兑损失(减汇兑收益) Exchange losses (minus exchange gains)产品销售利润Profit on sales加：其他业务利润Add：profit from other operations营业利润Operating profit加：投资收益Add：Income on investment加：营业外收入Add：Non-operating income减：营业外支出Less：Non-operating expenses加：以前年度损益调整Add：adjustment of loss and gain for previous years利润总额 Total profit减：所得税 Less：Income tax净利润 Net profit资产负债表 Balance Sheet项目 ITEM 项目 ITEM货币资金 Cash 短期借款 Short-term loans短期投资 Short term investments 应付票款 Notes payable应收票据 Notes receivable 应付帐款 Accounts payab1e应收股利 Dividend receivable 预收帐款 Advances from customers应收利息 Interest receivable 应付工资 Accrued payro1l应收帐款 Accounts receivable 应付福利费 Welfare payable其他应收款 Other receivables 应付利润(股利) Profits payab1e预付帐款 Accounts prepaid 应交税金 Taxes payable期货保证金 Future guarantee 其他应交款 Other payable to government应收补贴款 Allowance receivable 其他应付款 Other creditors应收出口退税 Export drawback receivable 预提费用 Provision for expenses存货 Inventories 预计负债 Accrued liabilities其中：原材料 Including:Raw materials 一年内到期的长期负债 Long term liabilities due within one year 产成品(库存商品) Finished goods 其他流动负债 Other current liabilities待摊费用 Prepaid and deferred expenses 流动负债合计 Total current liabilities待处理流动资产净损失 Unsettled G/L on current assets 长期借款 Long-term loans payable一年内到期的长期债权投资 Long-term debenture investment falling due in a yaear 应付债券 Bonds payable其他流动资产 Other current assets 长期应付款 long-term accounts payable流动资产合计 Total current assets 专项应付款 Special accounts payable长期投资： Long-term investment：其他长期负债 Other long-term liabilities其中:长期股权投资 Including long term equity investment 其中:特准储备资金 Including:Special reserve fund长期债权投资 Long term securities investment 长期负债合计 Total long term liabilities*合并价差 Incorporating price difference 递延税款贷项 Deferred taxation credit长期投资合计 Total long-term investment 负债合计 Total liabilities固定资产原价 Fixed assets-cost减：累计折旧 Less:Accumulated Dpreciation * 少数股东权益 Minority interests固定资产净值 Fixed assets-net value 实收资本(股本) Subscribed Capital减：固定资产减值准备 Less:Impairment of fixed assets 国家资本 National capital固定资产净额 Net value of fixed assets 集体资本 Collective capital固定资产清理 Disposal of fixed assets 法人资本 Legal person"s capital工程物资 Project material 其中:国有法人资本 Including:State-owned legal person"s capital在建工程 Construction in Progress 集体法人资本 Collective legal person"s capital待处理固定资产净损失 Unsettled G/L on fixed assets 个人资本 Personal capital固定资产合计 Total tangible assets 外商资本 Foreign businessmen"s capital无形资产 Intangible assets 资本公积 Capital surplus其中:土地使用权 Including and use rights 盈余公积 surplus reserve递延资产（长期待摊费用）Deferred assets 其中:法定盈余公积 Including:statutory surplus reserve其中:固定资产修理 Including:Fixed assets repair 公益金 public welfare fund固定资产改良支出 Improvement expenditure of fixed assets 补充流动资本 Supplermentary current capital其他长期资产 Other long term assets * 未确认的投资损失（以“-”号填列） Unaffirmed investment loss普通股 Ordinary shares 累计换算调整 Cumulative translation adjustments其中:特准储备物资 Among it:Specially approved reserving materials 留存收益 Retained earnings无形及其他资产合计 Total intangible assets and other assets 外币报表折算差额 Converted difference in Foreign Currency Statements递延税款借项 Deferred assets debits 所有者权益合计 Total shareholder"s equity资产总计 Total Assets 负债及所有者权益总计 Total Liabilities & Equity第十一章International Banking And Money Market国际银行与货币市场International Debt Crisis国际债务危机Debt-for-Equity Swaps 债权转股权LDC (less-developed countries) "欠发达国家"MNCs(Multinational Company) 跨国公司Equity investor权益投资者LDC central bank欠发达国家中央银行Export-oriented industries出口导向型产业High-technology industries 高科技产业CFO(Chief Financial Officer )首席财务官Global Government Bonds国际政府债券第十二章外国债券 foreign bonds欧洲债券 Eurobonds记名债券 registration bonds 不记名债券 bearer bonds 全球债券 global bonds 固定利率债券 straight fixed-rate bond 欧洲中期债券 Euro-medium-term notes 浮动利率票据 floating-rate notes、可转换债券 convertible bonds 附认股权证的债券 bonds with equity warrants双重货币债券 dual-currency bonds一级市场 primary market二级市场 secondary market卖出价 ask price 买入价 bid price主承销商 lead manager Yankee bonds 扬基债第十四章Swap Bank互换银行quality spread 质量Eurobond欧元债券currency swap货币互换Market completeness 完备市场Comparative advantage 比较优势Currency swap货币互换Counter parties交易双方Parent company母公司 Subsidiary子公司Producers 生产商 Financing needs 融资需求Swap market price 互换市场报价第十五章Portfolio risk diversification证券组合的风险分散 Sharpe Performance measure夏普绩效值Correlation coefficient相关系数Efficient set有效集Systematic risk系统风险 Risk-free rate无风险利率hedge fund对冲基金Risk —Return风险—收益第十六章Country risk 国家风险 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions 跨国并购Foreign direct investments（FDI）flows 对外直接投资流量Foreign direct investments （FDI）stocks 对外直接投资存量Greenfield investments绿地投资Intangible assets 无形资产Internalization Theory 内部化理论 Overseas Private Investment Corporation 海外私人投资公司Political risk 政治风险Product life-cycle theory 产品生命周期理论Synergisitic gains 利润增长值效应第十七章资本结构-capital structure 资本成本-cost of capital 加权平均资本成本-weighted average cost of capital 资本资产定价模型-capital asset pricing model,CAPM市场投资组合-market portfolio 系统风险-systematic risk 国际资产定价模型-international asset pricing model,IAPM 可国际交易资产-internationally tradable assets 可国际间交易资产-internationally notradable assets 完全分割资本市场-completely segmented capital market 国家的系统风险-country systematic risk 完全一体化的世界资本市场-fully integrated world capital markets 世界系统风险-world systematic risk部分一体化世界金融市场-partially integrated world financial markets定价的举出效应-pricing spillover effect 间接世界系统风险—indirect world systematic risk 市场双重定价现象-price-to-market,PTM phenomenon 净外国市场风险-pure foreign market risk投资组合-subsitution portfolio。
国际财务管理第4章
REER＝（ER×CPI*）/ CPI
其中：
01
按国际货币制度的演变为标准可划分为:固定汇率(Fixed Exchange Rate):指一国货币同另一国货币的兑换比率基本固定的汇率。
开盘汇率:又叫开盘价，是外汇银行在一个营业日刚开始营业时进行外汇买卖使用的汇率。
01
收盘汇率:又称收盘价，是外汇银行在一个营业日的外汇交易终了时使用的汇率。
02
按银行营业时间划分:
和其他商品一样，某种货币的价格由该种货币的供求关系所决定。供求变化导致均衡汇率的变化，影响货币供求关系的因素会相应影响汇率变化:
名义有效汇率（Nominal Effective Exchange Rate):是对所有双边汇率按照贸易金额进行加权平均计算出来的汇率。
实际有效汇率（Real Effective Exchange Rate REER）:是在名义有效汇率的基础上，对双边的通胀水平予以剔除。
01
02
人民币实际汇率的具体计算公式如下：
03
国货币作为主要对比对象，该货币称之为
04
关键货币。
05
套算汇率:(Cross Change Rate)。是指根据
06
货币A、货币B分别基于第三种货币的相对价
07
值计算得出的货币A、B间的汇率，通常指各
08
国按照对美元的基本汇率套算出的直接反映
09
其他货币之间价值比率的汇率。
按衡量货币价值的角度为标准可划分为:
第4章 外汇市场及外汇交易
(完整word版)国际财务管理课后习题答案chapter4
CHAPTER 4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLDSUGGESTED ANSWERS AND SOLUTIONS TO END-OF-CHAPTERQUESTIONS AND PROBLEMSQuestions1.The majority of major corporations are franchised as public corporations. Discuss the key strengthand weakness of the ‘public corporation’. When do you think the public corporation as an organizational form is unsuitable?Answer: The key strength of the public corporation lies in that it allows for efficient risk sharing among investors. As a result, the public corporation may raise a large sum of capital at a relatively low cost. The main weakness of the public corporation stems from the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.2.The public corporation is owned by multitude of shareholders but managed by professional managers.Managers can take self-interested actions at the expense of shareholders. Discuss the conditions under which the so-called agency problem arises.Answer: The agency problem arises when managers have control rights but insignificant cash flow rights. This wedge between control and cash flow rights motivates managers to engage in self-dealings at the expense of shareholders.3.Following corporate scandals and failures in the U.S. and abroad, there is a growingdemand for corporate governance reform. What should be the key objectives ofcorporate governance reform? What kind of obstacles can there be thwarting reformefforts?Answer: The key objectives of corporate governance reform should be to strengthen shareholder rights and protect shareholders from expropriation by corporate insiders, whether managers or large shareholders. Controlling shareholders or managers do not wish to lose their control rights and thus resist reform efforts.4.Studies show that the legal protection of shareholder rights varies a great deal acrosscountries. Discuss the possible reasons why the English common law traditionprovides the strongest and the French civil law tradition the weakest protection ofinvestors.Answer: In civil law countries, the state historically has played an active role in regulating economic activities and has been less protective of property rights. In England, control of the court passed from the crown to the parliament and property owners in seventeenth century. English common law thus became more protective of property owners, and this protection was extended to investors over time.5.Explain ‘the wedge’ between the control and cash flow rights and discuss its implications forcorporate governance.Answer: When there is a separation of ownership and control, managers have control rights with insignificant cash flow rights, whereas shareholders have cash flow rights but no control rights. This wedge gives rise to the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. The wedge is the source of the agency problem.6.Discuss different ways that dominant investors use to establish and maintain the control of thecompany with relatively small investments.Answer: Dominant investors may use: (i) shares with superior voting rights, (ii) pyramidal ownership structure, and (iii) inter-firm cross-holdings.7.The Cadbury Code of the Best Practice adopted in the United Kingdom led to a successful reform ofcorporate governance in the country. Explain the key requirements of the Code and discuss how it may have contributed to the success of reform.Answer: The Code requires that chairman of the board and CEO be held by two different individuals, and that there should be at least three outside board members. The recommended board structure helped to strengthen the monitoring function of the board and reduce the agency problem.8.Many companies grant stocks or stock options to the managers. Discuss the benefitsand possible costs of using this kind of incentive compensation scheme.Answer: Stock options can be useful for aligning the interest of managers with that of shareholders and reduce the wedge between managerial control rights and cash flow rights. But at the same time, stock options may induce managers to distort investment decisions and manipulate financial statements so that they can maximize their benefits in the short run.9.It has been shown that foreign companies listed in the U.S. stock exchanges are valued more thanthose from the same countries that are not listed in the U.S. Explain the reasons why U.S.-listed foreign firms are valued more than those which are not. Also explain why not every foreign firm wants to list stocks in the United States.Answer: Foreign companies domiciled in countries with weak investor protection can bond themselves credibly to better investor protection by listing their stocks in U.S. exchanges that are known to provide a strong investor protection. Managers of some companies may not wish to list shares in U.S. exchanges, subjecting themselves to stringent disclosure and monitoring, for fear of losing their control rights and private benefits.。
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Fourth Edition EUN / RESNICK
4-0
Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Corporate Governance Around the World
The problem is this: Where did the executives' loyalties lie? Are they trying to negotiate the best deal for the company that employs them and the shareholders who own the company, or the best deal for the partnership where they had an ownership stake?
4-8 Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
The Agency Problem at Enron
The board of directors claimed that these partnerships with executive ownership allowed the firm to speed up contracting. To protect itself in dealings with these partnerships, the company says that it set up safeguards that required top company officers and the board to review and approve deals between Enron and the partnerships. Clearly these safeguards were insufficient.
In Germany the board is not legally charged with representing the interests of shareholders, but is rather charged with representing the interests of stakeholders (e.g. workers, creditors, etc.) as well as shareholders.
Shareholders allocate decision-making authority to the managers. That’s why they are hired in the first place. Many shareholders are not qualified to make complex business decisions. A shareholder with a diversified portfolio would not have the time to devote to making the numerous decisions at each of his many companies anyway.
4-9 Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Remedies for the Agency Problem
In the U.S., shareholders have the right to elect the board of directors. If the board remains independent of management, it can serve as an effective mechanism for curbing the agency problem.
4-7 Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
The Agency Problem at Enron
Enron had about 3,500 subsidiaries and affiliates Many of these were run and partly owned by Enron executives. In retrospect, conflict of interest should have been an obvious concern.
Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
4-1
Chapter Outline
Governance and the Public Corporation: Key Issues The Agency Problem Remedies for the Agency Problem Law and Corporate Governance Consequences of Law Corporate Governance Reform
4-2 Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Governance and the Public Corporation: Key Issues
The public corporation, which is jointly owned by a multitude of shareholders protected with limited liability, is a major organizational innovation of vast economic consequences. It is an efficient risk sharing mechanism that allows corporations to raise large amounts of capital.
The partnerships did hundreds of millions of dollars of transactions with Enron itself, in some cases buying assets from the company or selling assets to it.
4-11Βιβλιοθήκη Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Corporate Boards
The structure and legal charge of corporate boards vary greatly across counties.
It’s easier to just sell your shares a.k.a. “The Wall Street Walk”.
4-5 Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
The Agency Problem
4-3
Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Governance and the Public Corporation: Key Issues
A key weakness is the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. In principle, shareholders elect a board of directors, who in turn hire and fire the managers who actually run the company. In reality, management-friendly insiders often dominate the board of directors, with relatively few outside directors who can independently monitor the management.
4-6 Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
The Agency Problem
Having the short-term control of the firm’s assets, managers might be tempted to act in the manager’s short-term best interest instead of the shareholder’s long-term best interest.
4-4 Copyright © 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Governance and the Public Corporation: Key Issues
In the case of Enron and other dysfunctional corporations, the boards of directors grossly failed to safeguard shareholder interests. Furthermore, with diffused ownership, most shareholders have strong enough incentive to incur the costs of monitoring management themselves.