虚假财务报告的后果中英文对照外文翻译文献
财务造假的国内外文献综述
财务造假的国内外文献综述财务造假的国内外文献综述本文关键词：造假，综述，文献，国内外，财务财务造假的国内外文献综述本文简介：第2章文献综述 2.1国外文献综述2.1.1动因理论证券市场迅速发展越来越多的问题暴露出来,国外研究财务造假的理论成果不断增多。
主流研究集中在造假动因分析上,比较经典的动因理论主要有以下几个: （1）舞弊三角理论该理论被公认为迄今为止财务造假动机理论中最具代表性的理论。
最早研究舞弊因财务造假的国内外文献综述本文内容：第 2 章文献综述2.1 国外文献综述2.1.1 动因理论证券市场迅速发展越来越多的问题暴露出来,国外研究财务造假的理论成果不断增多。
主流研究集中在造假动因分析上,比较经典的动因理论主要有以下几个:（1）舞弊三角理论该理论被公认为迄今为止财务造假动机理论中最具代表性的理论。
最早研究舞弊因子学说的是美国内部审计之父劳伦斯.索耶先生，早在 20 世纪 50 年代就提出舞弊的产生需要三个条件：异常需求、机会和合乎情理，为后来舞弊学理论的发展奠定了基础[1]。
在 1995 年由美国注册舞弊审核师协会(ACFE)的创始人、伯明翰大学的史蒂文▪阿伯雷齐特(W.Steve Albrecht)进一步完善了舞弊学理论[2]。
该理论认为企业舞弊的产生是由压力(Exposure)、机会(Opportunity)和自我合理化(Rationalization)三要素组成，三者缺一不可。
经营受到阻碍、财务上出现困境、资金供应不足都会给企业带来压力，企业也就产生了舞弊行为的动机。
企业采取舞弊通常由于以下四种压力：工作压力、经济压力、恶癖的压力和其他压力。
这四种压力构成企业舞弊的动机。
舞弊的第二种要素--机会，是指企业进行舞弊的同时又不会被揭发或者不会受到相关处罚，主要有以下六种情况：＂缺乏发现企业舞弊行为的内部控制，无法判断工作的质量，缺乏惩罚措施，信息不对称，能力不足和审计制度不健全＂。
在具备以上两个要素以后真正的舞弊行为就差借口(自我合理化)这一要素，即企业舞弊者必须找到某个理由，使企业舞弊行为与其本人的道德观念、行为准则相吻合，无论这一解释本身是否真正合理。
美国反舞弊性财务报告委员会发起组织的报告【外文翻译】
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Committee of sponsoring organizationsof the treadway Commission 外文出处Enterprise risk management外文作者Committee of sponsoring organizations 原文：Committee of sponsoring organizations of the treadway commission Organizational overviewCOSO was formed in 1985 to sponsor the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the Treadway Commission). The Treadway Commission was originally jointly sponsored and funded by five main professional accounting associations and institutes headquartered in the United States: the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), American Accounting Association (AAA), Financial Executives International (FEI), Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) and the Institute of Management Accountants(IMA). The Treadway Commission recommended that the organizations sponsoring the Commission work together to develop integrated guidance on internal control. These five organizations formed what is now called the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.The original chairman of the Treadway Commission was James C. Treadway, Jr., Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Paine Webber Incorporated and a former Commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Hence, the popular name "Treadway Commission". Currently, David L. Landsittel replaced Larry E. Rittenberg as the COSO Chairman.HistoryDue to questionable corporate political campaign finance practices and foreigncorrupt practices in the mid -1970s, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Congress enacted campaign finance law reforms and the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act(FCPA) which criminalized transnational bribery and required companies to implement internal control programs. In response, the Treadway Commission, a private-sector initiative, was formed in 1985 to inspect, analyze, and make recommendations on fraudulent corporate financial reporting.The Treadway Commission studied the financial information reporting system over the period from October 1985 to September 1987 and issued a report of findings and recommendations in October 1987 titled Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. As a result of this initial report, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) was formed and it retained Coopers & Lybrand, a major CPA firm, to study the issues and author a report regarding an integrated framework of internal control.In September 1992, the four volume report entitled Internal Control— Integrated Framework was released by COSO and later re-published with minor amendments in 1994. This report presented a common definition of internal control and provided a framework against which internal control systems may be assessed and improved. This report is one standard that U.S. companies use to evaluate their compliance with FCPA. According to a poll by CFO Magazine released in 2006, 82% of respondents claimed t hey used COSO’s framework for internal controls. Other frameworks used by respondents included COBIT, AS2 (Auditing Standard No. 2, PCAOB), and SAS 55/78 (AICPA).Internal control - integrated frameworkKey concepts of the COSO frameworkThe COSO framework involves several key concepts:∙Internal control is a process. It is a means to an end, not an end in itself.∙Internal control is affected by people. It’s not merely policy, manuals, and forms, but people at every level of an organization.∙Internal control can be expected to provide only reasonable assurance, not absolute assurance, to an entity’s management and board.Internal control is geared to the achievement of objectives in one or more separate but overlapping categories.Use of the capability maturity modelThe capabilities of an organization in relation to the COSO model could be assessed based on universal states or plateaus that organizations typically target. The descriptions are incremental.The capability descriptions are based on evolution toward generally recognized best practices. Each organization determines which level of "maturity" would be the most appropriate in support of its business needs, priorities and availability of resources. A rating system of “0” to “5” is used. A rating of “5” does not necessarily mean “goodness”, but rather, maturity of capability. The ideal maturity rating for any area is dependent on the needs of the organization. The different and progressive plateaus are: 0 Non-existent when:The organization lacks procedures to monitor the effectiveness of internal controls. Management internal control reporting methods are absent. There is a general unawareness of IT operational security and internal control assurance. Management and employees have an overall lack of awareness of internal controls.1 Initial/Ad Hoc when:Management recognizes the need for regular IT management and control assurance. Individual expertise in assessing internal control adequacy is applied on an ad hoc basis. IT management has not formally assigned responsibility for monitoring the effectiveness of internal controls. IT internal control assessments are conducted as part of traditional financial audits, with methodologies and skill sets that do not reflect the needs of the information services function.2 Repeatable but Intuitive when:The organization uses informal control reports to initiate corrective action initiatives. Internal control assessment is dependent on the skill sets of key individuals. The organization has an increased awareness of internal control monitoring. Information service management performs monitoring over the effectiveness of what it believes are critical internal controls on a regular basis. Methodologies and tools formonitoring internal controls are starting to be used, but not based on a plan. Risk factors specific to the IT environment are identified based on the skills of individuals.3 Defined when:Management supports and institutes internal control monitoring. Policies and procedures are developed for assessing and reporting on internal control monitoring activities. An education and training program for internal control monitoring is defined. A process is defined for self-assessments and internal control assurance reviews, with roles for responsible business and IT managers. Tools are being utilized but are not necessarily integrated into all processes. IT process risk assessment policies are being used within control frameworks developed specifically for the IT organization. Process-specific risks and mitigation policies are defined.4 Managed and Measurable when:Management implements a framework for IT internal control monitoring. The organization establishes tolerance levels for the internal control monitoring process. Tools are implemented to standardize assessments and automatically detect control exceptions. A formal IT internal control function is established, with specialized and certified professionals utilizing a formal control framework endorsed by senior management. Skilled IT staff members are routinely participating in internal control assessments. A metrics knowledge base for historical information on internal control monitoring is established. Peer reviews for internal control monitoring are established.5 Optimized when:Management establishes an organization wide continuous improvement program that takes into account lessons learned and industry best practices for internal control monitoring and reporting. The organization uses integrated and updated tools, where appropriate, that allow effective assessment of critical IT controls and rapid detection of IT control monitoring incidents. Knowledge sharing specific to the information services function is formally implemented. Benchmarking against industry standards and good practices is formalized.Definition of internal control and framework objectivesThe COSO framework defines internal control as a process, effected by an entity’sboard of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide "reasonable assurance" regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: ∙Effectiveness and efficiency of operations∙Reliability of financial reporting∙Compliance with applicable laws and regulationsThe five framework componentsThe COSO internal control framework consists of five interrelated components derived from the way management runs a business. According to COSO, these components provide an effective framework for describing and analyzing the internal control system implemented in an organization as required by financial regulations (see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 240 15d-15). The five components are the following:Control environment:The control environment sets the tone of an organization, influencing the control consciousness of its people. It is the foundation for all other components of internal control, providing discipline and structure. Control environment factors include the integrity, ethical values, management's operating style, delegation of authority systems, as well as the processes for managing and developing people in the organization.Risk assessment:Every entity faces a variety of risks from external and internal sources that must be assessed. A precondition to risk assessment is establishment of objectives and thus risk assessment is the identification and analysis of relevant risks to the achievement of assigned objectives. Risk assessment is a prerequisite for determining how the risks should be managed.Control activities: Control activities are the policies and procedures that help ensure management directives are carried out. They help ensure that necessary actions are taken to address the risks that may hinder the achievement of the entity's objectives. Control activities occur throughout the organization, at all levels and in all functions. They include a range of activities as diverse as approvals, authorizations, verifications, reconciliations, reviews of operating performance, security of assets and segregation of duties.Information and communication:Information systems play a key role in internal control systems as they produce reports, including operational, financial and compliance-related information, that make it possible to run and control the business. In a broader sense, effective communication must ensure information flows down, across and up the organization. For example, formalized procedures exist for people to report suspected fraud. Effective communication should also be ensured with external parties, such as customers, suppliers, regulators and shareholders about related policy positions.Monitoring: Internal control systems need to be monitored—a process that assesses the quality of the system's performance over time. This is accomplished through ongoing monitoring activities or separate evaluations. Internal control deficiencies detected through these monitoring activities should be reported upstream and corrective actions should be taken to ensure continuous improvement of the system. LimitationsInternal control involves human action, which introduces the possibility of errors in processing or judgment. Internal control can also be overridden by collusion among employees (see separation of duties) or coercion by top management.CFO magazine reported that companies are struggling to apply the complex model provided by COSO. “One of the biggest problems: limiting internal audits to one of the three key objectives of the framework. In the COSO model, those objectives are applied to five key components (monitoring, information and communication, control activities, risk assessment, and control environment). Given the number of possible matrices, it's not surprising that the number of audits can get out of hand.” CFO magazine continued by stating, that many organization are creating their own risk-and-control matrix by taking the COSO model and altering it to focus on the components that relate directly to Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.Source：Enterprise risk management,2004.译文：美国反舞弊性财务报告委员会发起组织的报告组织概述COSO是成立于1985年的美国反虚假财务报告委员会（特雷德韦委员会）的发起组织委员会。
虚假财务报告(论文)
摘要:虚假财务报告提供的会计信息未能真实反映客观的经济活动,给决策者的相关决策带来不利影响。
近几年虚假财务报告中的会计信息失真十分严重,严重干扰了我国市场经济秩序。
通过分析虚假会计报告的成因,提出了治理会计报告中虚假会计信息的对策。
虽然治理虚假财务报告是一项极其复杂艰巨的系统工程,但我们还要努力使虚假财务报告逐步减少直至消失,使财务报告成为我们评价企业的准确依据。
虚假财务报告的治理是一个世界性的难题,也是一个世纪性的难题。
说它是一个世界性的难题,是因为虚假财务报告不仅在中国有,在美国有,在世界其他国家也有。
只要虚假财务报告可以为做假的人带来巨大的经济利益,虚假财务报告就很难被消灭。
说它是一个世纪性的难题,是因为虚假财务报告过去有,现在有,将来还会出现。
只有市场经济的游戏规则中还有创新,还有不确定性与风险,虚假财务报告的治理就很困难。
一、虚假财务报告的内涵及其治理的现实意义虚假财务报告是指未能遵循财务报告标准,无意识或有意识地采用各种方式和手段歪曲反映企业的财务状况、经营成果和现金流量,对企业的财务活动情况做出不实陈述的财务报告。
虚假财务报告将误导信息使用者的决策,增加市场交易费用,制造泡沫经济、扰乱经济秩序,失信于广大投资者,沉重打击投资者的信心,严重影响我国经过多年好不容易培育起来的资本市场的健康发展,使“三公”原则(公开、公平、公正)不能真正的体现,同时,还影响我国会计向国际会计准则趋同的进程。
虚假财务报告造成的企业会计信息失真的行为会掩盖企业真实的经营状况,增加国民经济运行中的不确定因素,欺诈广大投资者,误导国家对目前经济的判断,导致国家制定出不符合实际的经济政策,最终造成无法弥补的后果。
再加上现在企业高层在决策时以财务报告为主要依据,虚假财务报告给决策者以错误的导向,导致决策失败,给企业造成更大的损失。
伴随着国民经济全面迈向深入的步伐,以及全球经济走向一体化的必然趋势,我国金融市场系统风险日益突现的客观现实已经引起管理层的高度重视,其中的隐患之一就是会计信息披露存在质量方面的问题,在某种程度上严重损害着广大投资者的利益以及证券市场优化资源配置功能的发挥。
会计学财务报表中英文对照外文翻译文献
会计学财务报表中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文：中美财务报表的区别(1)财务报告内容构成上的区别1)美国的财务报告包括三个基本的财务报表，除此之外，典型的美国大公司财务报告还包括以下成分：股东权益、收益与综合收益、管理报告、独立审计报告、选取的5-10年数据的管理讨论与分析以及选取的季度数据。
2)我国财务报告不注重其解释，而美国在财务报告的内容、方法、多样性上都比较充分。
中国的评价部分包括会计报表和财务报表，财务报表是最主要的报表，它包括前述各项与账面不符的描述、财会政策与变化、财会评估的变化、会计差错等问题，资产负债表日期，关联方关系和交易活动等等，揭示方法是注意底部和旁注。
美国的财务范围在内容上比财务报表更加丰富，包括会计政策、技巧、添加特定项目的报告, 报告格式很难反映内容和商业环境等等，对违反一致性、可比性原则问题，评论也需要披露的，但也揭示了许多方面，比如旁注、底注、括号内、补充声明、时间表和信息分析报告。
(2)财务报表格式上的比较1)从资产负债表的格式来看，美国的资产负债表有账户类型和报告样式两项描述，而我国是使用固定的账户类型。
另外，我们的资产负债表在项目的使用上过于标准化，不能够很好的反映出特殊的商业项目或者不适用于特殊类型的企业。
而美国的资产负债表项目是多样化的，除此之外，财务会计准则也是建立在资产负债表中资产所有者投资和支出两项要素基础上的，这一点也是中国的财会准则中没有的。
2)从损益表格式的角度来看，美国采用的是多步式，损益表项目分为两部分，营业利润和非营业利润，但是意义不同。
我国的营业利润在范围上比美国的小，例如投资收益在美国是归类为营业利润的而在我国则不属于营业利润。
另外，我国的损益表项目较美国的更加规范和严格，美国校准损益表仅仅依赖于类别和项目。
报告收可以与销售收入及其他收入相联系，也可以和利息收益、租赁收入和单项投资收益相联系；在成本方面，并不是严格的划分为管理成本、财务成本、和市场成本，并且经常性销售费用、综合管理费用以及利息费用、净利息收益都要分别折旧。
在财务报告的责任：检测欺诈性公司外文文献翻译
文献信息：文献标题：Accountability in financial reporting:detecting fraudulent firms（在财务报告的责任：检测欺诈性公司）国外作者：Hawariah Dalnial，Amrizah Kamaluddin，Zuraidah Mohd Sanusi，Khairun Syafiza Khairuddin文献出处：Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2014, 145:61-69字数统计：英文2507单词，14114字符；中文4242汉字外文文献：Accountability in financial reporting:detecting fraudulentfirmsAbstract This paper aims to investigate whether there are any significant differences between the means of financial ratios of fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms and to identify which financial ratio is significant to detect fraudulent reporting. The sample comprises of 65 fraudulent firms and 65 samples of non-fraudulent firms of Malaysian Public Listed Firms, available between the year of 2000 and 2011. The study found that there are significant mean differences between the fraud and non-fraud firms in ratios such as total debt to total equity, account receivables to sales. In addition, Z score which measures the bankruptcy probability is significant to detect fraudulent financial reporting.Keywords：Financial Ratio; Financial Statement Analysis; Fraudulent Financial Reporting; Public Listed Companies; Malaysia1.IntroductionFraud firms are identified through offences made against the listings requirement of Bursa Malaysia. Fraud is a broad concept with two basic types of fraud seen inpractice. The first is the misappropriation of assets and the second is fraudulent financial reporting (FFR). FFR usually occurs in the form of falsification of financial statements in order to obtain some forms of benefit. Others believe that fraud involves an intentional distortion of financial statements (Ata and Syerek, 2009).Fraud detection is among the highest priorities for capital market participants and other stakeholders in the financial reporting process (e.g., Elliott, 2002; PCAOB, 2007). Market participants such as investors experienced significant financial losses when fraud occurs in publicly-traded companies such as Enron and WorldCom. Some experts suggest that the rate of fraudulent financial reporting will likely increase during the current economic recession and further reiterate the importance of continuous research into ways to flush out fraud (Mintz, 2009).Fraud detection is one of the specific tasks assigned to auditors as stated in ISA 240. Auditors commonly use tools known as analytical procedures to assist them in detecting fraud (Albrecht, Albrecht and Zimbelman, 2009). Analytical procedures refer to the analysis of significant ratios and trends as well as the resulting investigation of fluctuations and relationships that are inconsistent with other relevant information or which deviate from predicted values. Many researchers and fraud investigators recommend financial ratios as an effective tool to detect fraud (Subramanyam and Wild, 2009; Bai, Yen and Yang, 2008; Spathis, 2002; Persons, 1995).The objectives of this paper are firstly, to investigate the significant differences between the mean of financial ratios of fraud and non fraud companies. Secondly, this paper investigates which financial ratios are significant to fraudulent reporting.2.Literature ReviewFinancial distress is an important criteria to monitor when assessing the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. When a firm is doing poorly, there is a greater motivation to engage in FFR. Hamer (1983) suggests that most models predict bankruptcy with similar accuracy which implies that poor financial conditions may motivate unethical insiders to improve the appearance of the firms financial positionor perhaps to reduce the threats of loss of employment or to garner as many resources as possible.Overstating assets and revenue is a result of recording revenue prematurely or by using ficticious records. Another study classified the act of manipulating profits into broad categories which include changing accounting methods, fiddling with management estimated cost (Worthy, 1984). Reports by Spathis (2002) suggest that summing up net profit and working capital is a significant predictor of fraud. The reason is, when firms experience a lower net profit versus sales ratio, this indicates that the firm is facing a low return on assets and may attempt to manipulate the financial statement by either increasing revenue or reducing expenditure. Working capital to total assets which reflect in lower liquidity is an incentive for managers to commit fraud and eventually to manipulate the accounting records, thus firms affected by fraud tend to have low liquidity. In addition, Leksrisakul and Evans (2005), stated that firm with consistent operating losses will have shrinking current assets in relation to total assets as evidenced by studies on Thai listed companies.Regardless of the public and policy makers’concern over the management of fraudulent practices, to the best knowledge, there is little empirical research that assesses the probability of fraudulent financial reporting using published data. Few models introduced or employed internationally or locally, provide a list of indicators only meant for insiders especially the auditors and include subjective judgment as developed by Loebbecke, Einning and Willingham (1989). The authors developed a management-fraud assessment model that lists indicators related to fraud. The model involves a great deal of subjective judgment and non-public information, which is available only to the auditors, or insiders of a firm. Investors and policy makers cannot use this model to identify firms engaging in fraudulent financial reporting.Premise on the review of significant articles from previous studies, it is evident that there is still a large gap and an open question on the subject matter. A question of public interest remains as to whether the published data are readily and publicly available and can be used to identify firms engaging in fraudulent financial reporting. Following the research done by Persons (1995) and Spathis (2002), this paper followsthe same approach to detect fraudulent financial statement by using published financial data to detect manipulation of financial statement.3.Hypotheses DevelopmentFor this study, two hypotheses were developed for further testing as well as to support the research objectives. There are a few studies that identify the factors associated with fraudulent financial reporting. Persons (1995) found that financial leverage, calculated as total liabilities to total assets, is the most significant factor associated with fraudulent financial reporting. This suggests that the financial statements of fraudulent firms differ from non fraudulent firms in certain aspects such as higher financial leverage which is denoted by a high means ratio of 0.6096 for fraudulent firms and 0.4868 for non-fraudulent firms , lower capital turnover denoted by the value of 0.2486 for fraudulent firms and 0.3050 for non-fraudulent firms , and assets in fraudulent firms which consist of a higher proportion of current assets particularly inventory and account receivables. Based on the relevant studies, this study investigates the significant differences between financial ratios of fraudulent and non fraudulent public listed firms in Malaysia. With this notion, the hypothesis is as follows:H1: There is a significant difference between the means of the financial ratios between fraudulent and non- fraudulent firms.Financial statement analysis is the application of tools and techniques to financial statements and related data (Subramanyam and Wild, 2009). This is to drive estimates and inferences useful in making decisions. From the financial statement analysis, it reduces the reliance on intuition, presumption and perception that may lead to uncertainty. However, this does not reduce the need of expert judgment; rather it provides a systematic basis for analysis. Ratio analysis is among the most popular and widely used tool for financial statement analysis (Subramanyam and Wild, 2009；Spathis，2002；Persons，1995). Evidence suggests that accounting data are useful when differentiating between fraudulent firms and non fraudulent firms. Accounting data is useful to assist investors in making investment decisions as well as to enablethe auditor to assess the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting as part of auditor’s duty is to plan the investigation and search for errors or any irregularities that would have material effects on the financial statements (Persons, 1995). This suggests that there is an association between financial statement analyses and fraudulent financial reporting as reported by Bai et al., (2008). Analysing financial information can be used to identify fraudulent and non fraudulent firms via the financial data. Based on those foundations, a second hypothesis was developed:H2: Financial Ratios are significant predictors to fraudulent financial reporting.3.1.Research designThis study examined 130 samples consisting of 65 samples for fraudulent firms and 65 samples of non fraudulent firms from the Malaysian Public Listed Firms available between the year of 2000 and 2011 with financial data collected from Data Stream. Firms involving in fraudulent reporting are obtained from the Bursa Malaysia media centre. This study utilizes the secondary data obtained from published audited financial statements as the main source of information from the corporate annual reports of the public listed firms in Malaysia and also from Data Stream.3.2.Independent variables, dependent variables and control variable3.2.1.Independent variablesFor the purpose of this study, seven aspects of a firm’s financial ratios were identified. These variables are financial leverage, profitability, asset composition, liquidity, capital turnover, size and also overall financial condition. The independent variables are comprised of:(a)Financial leverageFinancial Leverage is measured by Total Debt to Total Equity (TD/TE) and also Total Debt to Total Asset (TD/TA). Higher leverage is typically associated with a higher potential for violations of loan agreements and a reduced ability to obtain additional capital through borrowing. As concluded by Christie (1990), leverage is potentially correlated with income enhancing accounting policies. If these policies are not sufficient to avoid violations of debt covenants, managers may be motivated to understate liabilities or assets. Therefore these variables should be in positive figures.This means, the higher the leverage, the higher the potential for violations and the higher the likelihood of fraud.(b)ProfitabilityProfitability is measured by Net Profit to Revenue (NP/REV). Lower profits may provide management with an incentive to overstate revenues or understate expenses. Kreudfelt and Wallace (1986) finds firms with profitability problems have significantly more errors in their financial statements than other firms. Spathis (2002) also reported that a very low value of the ratio indicates that these firms are facing difficulties of low returns in relation to assets and try to manipulate the financial statement either by increasing revenue or by reducing expenditure. Therefore the variables are expected to be negative values. This means, the lower the profit, the higher the tendency to overstate revenue or expenses and thus a higher likelihood to detect fraud.(c)Asset compositionAsset Composition is measured by Current Assets to Total Assets (CA/TA), Receivables to Revenue (REC/REV) and Inventory to Total Assets (INV/TA). Account receivables as claimed by Feroz, Park and Wetzel (1991) are more likely to be manipulated due to the subjective nature of judgment involved.The reported value ultimately relies on estimating uncollected accounts and obsolete inventory. Due to the subjective nature of the accounts, managers may use these accounts as tools for financial statement manipulation (Summers and Sweeney 1998). Investigations of fraudulent firms involved in FFR indicate that the current assets of these firms consist mostly of receivables and inventory. These findings are consistent with Feroz et al., (1991) who discovered that overstatements of receivables and inventory represent about three – fourths of all SEC enforcement cases. Pierre and Anderson (1984) also found a high frequency of lawsuits against auditors involving inventory and receivables. Loebbecke et al., (1987), Sorenson, Grove and Selto (1983) and Beasly, Carcello and Hermanson (1999) confirm that account receivables and inventory are important variables when assessing the risk of fraud and that both are common items misstated in accounts. These variables are expected to be positivevalues, which show that the higher the amount of both items, the higher the risk of overstatements in the account, which leads to an increase in the likelihood of fraud.(d)LiquidityLiquidity is measured by Working Capital to Total Assets (WC/TA). Lower liquidity may be an incentive for managers to engage in FFR. This argument is supported by Kreutzfelt and Wallace (1986) who found that firms with liquidity problems have significantly more errors in their financial statements than other firms. In addition, Spathis (2002) reports that firms productively utilizing its assets and resources are able to gene rate profits and this is often seen as an indication of a firm’s performance. In addition, firms with a very low working capital to total assets ratio indicates that they cannot meet their obligations. Thus these ratios are expected to be negative values, concluding that the lower a firm’s liquidity the more likely it is for managers to engage in FFR.(e)Capital turnoverCapital Turnover is measured by Revenue to Total Assets (REV/TA). The turnover represents the sales generating power of the firm’s assets. It also measures management’s ability to deal with competitive situations. Managers of fraudulent firms may be less competitive than that of non fraudulent firms in using the firm’s assets to generate sales. This inability to compete successfully may be an incentive for engaging in fraudulent financial reporting. These variables therefore should be negative figures. In other words, firms having difficulty in generating sales are more likely to engage in FFR.(f)Overall financial positionFinancial distress may be a motivation for FFR (Stice，1991). A lower Z-score reflects a higher degree of financial distress, which may be a motive for management fraud (Persons, 1995). Hamer (1993) suggests that most models predict bankruptcy with a similar ability. Poor financial conditions may motivate unethical insiders to take steps intended to improve the appearance of the firm’s financial position. This aspect is measured by the Z-Score. This score measures the rate of bankruptcy of firms. The elements of this Z-Score with their associated weighting are as follows:Z = 1.2 (working capital/total assets) + 1.4 (retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3 (earnings before interest and taxes/ total assets) + 0.06 (market value of equity/book value of total debt) + 1.0 (sales/total assets)Although certain variables mentioned in the Z score are also included in the variables to be tested, an addition of the Z score in the model estimation stage enables us to measure the relative role of the Z score compared to individual variables comprising of the Z score alone. These variables are expected to be negative figures as firms with poorer financial conditions (smaller Z score) are more likely to engage in FFR.3.2.2.Dependant variableThe dependent variable comprises fraud firms and non fraud firms. The lists of fraud firms are obtained from Bursa Malaysia Media Centre. Each fraudulent firm is matched with a corresponding non fraudulent firm on the basis of industry, size and also time period. Firms in the same industry are subject to the similar business environment as well as similar accounting and reporting requirements (Pierre and Anderson, 1984).3.2.3.Control variableSize is measured by the Natural Logarithm of book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year (SIZE). Feroz et al., (1991) found that most of the firms being closely monitored by the SEC are relatively smaller ones. This variable aims to control total assets to confirm the method of selection.3.3.Regression modelThe following logic model was estimated using the financial ratios from the firms to determine which of the ratios were related to FFR. By including the data set of fraudulent and non fraudulent firms, we may discover what factors significantly influence them:where:SIZE = SizeTD/TE = Total debt/Total equityTD/TA = Total debt/Total AssetNP/REV= Net Profit/RevenueCA/TA = Current Assets/Total Asset REC/REV= Receivable/RevenueINV/TA = Inventories/Total Assets WC/TA = Working Capital/Total Assets REV/TA= Revenue/Total AssetsZ = Z- score中文译文：在财务报告的责任：检测欺诈性公司摘要本文旨在探讨公司欺诈行为与非欺诈行为的财务比率间存在的差别，并确定哪些财务比率是显著的虚假报告。
财务造假 financial fraud
财务造假financial fraudThe China Securities Regulatory Commission said on Friday it will crack down on "increasing" illegal trading activities including financial fraud, stock price manipulation, insider trading and so on.中国证监会4月24日表示，将严打不断增加的违法违规行为包括财务造假、股价操纵、内幕交易等。
“财务造假”可以用financial fraud来表示，也可以用financial cheating表示，指在财务报表中蓄意报错、漏报，制造虚假会计信息的行为。
fraud这里指欺诈，舞弊，如证券欺诈（security fraud）造假就是一种欺诈性的行为。
我们常说的学术造假，可以用academic cheating表示。
证监会新闻发言人表示将重点打击五类案件，包括上市公司（listed companies）并购重组（mergers and acquisitions）中的财务造假；市值管理为名义的操纵股价（stock price manipulation / price rigging）行为；内幕交易（insider trading）行为（insider常用来指“了解内幕的人”，源于形容词inside，内线的，潜伏作奸细的，如：inside facts / story （内幕，内情）；inside man（内线）；各类金融机构利用未公开信息（non-public information）交易的行为；以及集中资金操纵期货交易价格（futures market manipulation）行为。
在此次最新打击行动之前，因有人猜测政府将提高印花税（stamp tax），证监会否认了此的传闻，将依法查处散布虚假消息者。
上市公司虚假财务报告危害
上市公司虚假财务报告危害上市公司虚假财务报告是指上市公司在编制和公布财务报告过程中，故意隐瞒或歪曲真实财务信息，以达到欺骗投资者或融资渠道的目的。
这种行为对投资者、社会经济以及金融市场都会造成严重的危害。
首先，虚假财务报告会直接损害投资者的利益。
投资者根据上市公司的财务报告来做出投资决策，如果公司提供的报告信息虚假，投资者就无法准确评估公司的价值和风险。
他们可能会基于错误的信息做出投资决策，导致资金损失。
特别是一些小投资者，他们通常没有足够的专业知识和信息渠道来判断财务报告的真实性，更容易受到欺骗。
其次，虚假财务报告严重损害市场信心。
金融市场的稳定和发展需要一个公正、公平和透明的环境。
如果上市公司频繁发布虚假财务报告，投资者对金融市场的信心将受到严重打击，导致资本流动和投资热情的减弱，影响市场的健康发展。
投资者将变得谨慎、保守，可能会撤资或转向其他更可靠的市场，造成市场流动性不足，严重制约经济的发展。
第三，虚假财务报告会使市场资源配置失灵。
投资者根据财务报告来决定将资金投入到哪个公司，通过以投资为媒介将资源从低效率的领域转向高效率的领域。
如果财务报告虚假，投资者将无法判断哪些领域或公司是值得投资的，导致资源无法合理配置。
一些优秀企业可能因为缺乏融资而无法扩张业务，而一些糟糕的企业可能因为虚假财务报告获得融资，无法退出市场，造成了市场资源的浪费。
此外，虚假财务报告还有可能引发金融风险。
虚假财务报告意味着公司操控了其经营和财务状况的真实面目，这无疑是与市场实际情况不符合的。
一旦市场发现虚假，投资者的恐慌可能会引发流动性危机和市场崩盘。
例如，像“鸿海科技”当年之所以暴跌，就是由于其披露逾140亿元假帐，引发了广泛的连锁反应。
最后，虚假财务报告对社会经济发展也会带来负面影响。
在一个市场经济体系中，上市公司承载着很大一部分经济活动，如果公司主动发布虚假财务报告，将会扰乱整个经济秩序。
虚假财务报告会抑制创新，企业可能会将更多时间和精力花费在欺骗上，而不是去专注于产品研发和服务提升。
对财务报表舞弊的思考【外文翻译】
外文文献翻译原文：Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit Description and Characteristics of FraudFraud is a broad legal concept and auditors do not make legal determinations of whether fraud has occurred. Rather, the auditor's interest specifically relates to acts that result in a material misstatement of the financial statements. The primary factor that distinguishes fraud from error is whether the underlying action that results in the misstatement of the financial statements is intentional or unintentional. For purposes of the Statement, fraud is an intentional act that results in a material misstatement in financial statements that are the subject of an audit.Intent is often difficult to determine, particularly in matters involving accounting estimates and the application of accounting principles. For example, unreasonable accounting estimates may be unintentional or may be the result of an intentional attempt to misstate the financial statements. Although an audit is not designed to determine intent, the auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether the misstatement is intentional or not.Two types of misstatements are relevant to the auditor's consideration of fraud —misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting and misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets.1、Misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements designed to deceive financial statement users where the effect causes the financial statements not to be presented, in all material respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Fraudulent financial reporting may be accomplished by the following:（1）Manipulation, falsification, or alteration of accounting records or supportingdocuments from which financial statements are prepared（2）Misrepresentation in or intentional omission from the financial statements of events, transactions, or other significant information（3）Intentional misapplication of accounting principles relating to amounts, classification, manner of presentation, or disclosureFraudulent financial reporting need not be the result of a grand plan or conspiracy. It may be that management representatives rationalize the appropriateness of a material misstatement, for example, as an aggressive rather than indefensible interpretation of complex accounting rules, or as a temporary misstatement of financial statements, including interim statements, expected to be corrected later when operational results improve.2、Misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets (sometimes referred to as theft or defalcation) involve the theft of an entity's assets where the effect of the theft causes the financial statements not to be presented, in all material respects, in conformity with GAAP. Misappropriation of assets can be accomplished in various ways, including embezzling receipts, stealing assets, or causing an entity to pay for goods or services that have not been received. Misappropriation of assets may be accompanied by false or misleading records or documents, possibly created by circumventing controls. The scope of this Statement includes only those misappropriations of assets for which the effect of the misappropriation causes the financial statements not to be fairly presented, in all material respects, in conformity with GAAP.Three conditions generally are present when fraud occurs. First, management or other employees have an incentive or are under pressure, which provides a reason to commit fraud. Second, circumstances exist — for example, the absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the ability of management to override controls — that provide an opportunity for a fraud to be perpetrated. Third, those involved are able to rationalize committing a fraudulent act. Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set of ethical values that allow them to knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act. However, even otherwise honest individuals can commitfraud in an environment that imposes sufficient pressure on them. The greater the incentive or pressure, the more likely an individual will be able to rationalize the acceptability of committing fraud.Management has a unique ability to perpetrate fraud because it frequently is in a position to directly or indirectly manipulate accounting records and present fraudulent financial information. Fraudulent financial reporting often involves management override of controls that otherwise may appear to be operating effectively.6 Management can either direct employees to perpetrate fraud or solicit their help in carrying it out. In addition, management personnel at a component of the entity may be in a position to manipulate the accounting records of the component in a manner that causes a material misstatement in the consolidated financial statements of the entity. Management override of controls can occur in unpredictable ways.Frauds have been committed by management override of existing controls using such techniques as (a) recording fictitious journal entries, particularly those recorded close to the end of an accounting period to manipulate operating results, (b) intentionally biasing assumptions and judgments used to estimate account balances, and (c) altering records and terms related to significant and unusual transactions.Typically, management and employees engaged in fraud will take steps to conceal the fraud from the auditors and others within and outside the organization. Fraud may be concealed by withholding evidence or misrepresenting information in response to inquiries or by falsifying documentation. For example, management that engages in fraudulent financial reporting might alter shipping documents. Employees or members of management who misappropriate cash might try to conceal their thefts by forging signatures or falsifying electronic approvals on disbursement authorizations. An audit conducted in accordance with GAAS rarely involves the authentication of such documentation, nor are auditors trained as or expected to be experts in such authentication. In addition, an auditor may not discover the existence of a modification of documentation through a side agreement that management or a third party has not disclosed.Fraud also may be concealed through collusion among management, employees,or third parties. Collusion may cause the auditor who has properly performed the audit to conclude that evidence provided is persuasive when it is, in fact, false. For example, through collusion, false evidence that controls have been operating effectively may be presented to the auditor, or consistent misleading explanations may be given to the auditor by more than one individual within the entity to explain an unexpected result of an analytical procedure. As another example, the auditor may receive a false confirmation from a third party that is in collusion with management.Although fraud usually is concea led and management’s intent is difficult to determine, the presence of certain conditions may suggest to the auditor the possibility that fraud may exist. For example, an important contract may be missing, a subsidiary ledger may not be satisfactorily reconciled to its control account, or the results of an analytical procedure performed during the audit may not be consistent with expectations. However, these conditions may be the result of circumstances other than fraud. Documents may legitimately have been lost or misfiled；the subsidiary ledger may be out of balance with its control account because of an unintentional accounting error；and unexpected analytical relationships may be the result of unanticipated changes in underlying economic factors. Even reports of alleged fraud may not always be reliable because an employee or outsider may be mistaken or may be motivated for unknown reasons to make a false allegation.As indicated in paragraph 1, the auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error. However, absolute assurance is not attainable and thus even a properly planned and performed audit may not detect a material misstatement resulting from fraud. A material misstatement may not be detected because of the nature of audit evidence or because the characteristics of fraud as discussed above may cause the auditor to rely unknowingly on audit evidence that appears to be valid, but is, in fact, false and fraudulent. Furthermore, audit procedures that are effective for detecting an error may be ineffective for detecting fraud.The Importance of Exercising Professional SkepticismDue professional care requires the auditor to exercise professional skepticism. See SAS No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230.07–.09, “Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work”). Because of the characteristics of fraud, the auditor’s exercise of professional skepticism is important when considering the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. Professional skepticism is an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence. The auditor should conduct the engagement with a mindset that recognizes the possibility that a material misstatement due to fraud could be present, regardless of any past experience with the entity and regardless of the auditor’s belief about management’s h onesty and integrity. Furthermore, professional skepticism requires an ongoing questioning of whether the information and evidence obtained suggests that a material misstatement due to fraud has occurred. In exercising professional skepticism in gathering and evaluating evidence, the auditor should not be satisfied with less-than-persuasive evidence because of a belief that management is honest.Considering Fraud Risk FactorsBecause fraud is usually concealed, material misstatements due to fraud are difficult to detect. Nevertheless, the auditor may identify events or conditions that indicate incentives/pressures to perpetrate fraud, opportunities to carry out the fraud, or attitudes/rationalizations to justify a fraudulent action. Such events or conditions are referred to as “fraud risk factors.” Fraud risk factors do not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud；however, they often are present in circumstances where fraud exists.When obtaining information about the entity and its environment, the auditor should consider whether the information indicates that one or more fraud risk factors are present. The auditor should use professional judgment in determining whether a risk factor is present and should be considered in identifying and assessing the risks of material misstatement due to fraud.Examples of fraud risk factors related to fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets are presented in the Appendix . These illustrative risk factors are classified based on the three conditions generally present when fraud exists: incentive/pressure to perpetrate fraud, an opportunity to carry out the fraud, and attitude/rationalization to justify the fraudulent action. Although the risk factors cover a broad range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider additional or different risk factors. Not all of these examples are relevant in all circumstances, and some may be of greater or lesser significance in entities of different size or with different ownership characteristics or circumstances. Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not intended to reflect their relative importance or frequency of occurrence.Overall Responses to the Risk of Material MisstatementJudgments about the risk of material misstatement due to fraud have an overall effect on how the audit is conducted in the following ways:Assignment of personnel and supervision. The knowledge, skill, and ability of personnel assigned significant engagement responsibilities should be commensurate with the auditor's assessment of the risks of material misstatement due to fraud for the engagement. For example, the auditor may respond to an identified risk of material misstatement due to fraud by assigning additional persons with specialized skill and knowledge, such as forensic and information technology (IT) specialists, or by assigning more experienced personnel to the engagement. In addition, the extent of supervision should reflect the risks of material misstatement due to fraud (see SAS No. 22, AU sec. 311.11).Accounting principles. The auditor should consider management’s selection and application of significant accounting principles, particularly those related to subjective measurements and complex transactions. In this respect, the auditor may have a greater concern about whether the accounting principles selected and policies adopted are being applied in an inappropriate manner to create a material misstatement of the financial statements. In developing judgments about the quality of such principles (seeSAS No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 380.11]), the auditor should consider whether their collective application indicates a bias that may create such a material misstatement of thefinancial statements.source：American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.Consideration Of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit[J]. Accounting Research Manager, 2002,5:24—30.译文：对财务报表舞弊的思考（一）舞弊的特征舞弊是一个广泛的法律概念，审计师无法准确判断是否发生了舞弊行为。
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译Corporate accounting fraud has been on the rise in recent times。
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虚假财务报告成因的分析毕业论文
目录摘要 (1)1前言 (1)2虚假财务报告的概念界定 (1)3上市公司提供虚假财务报告的现状 (2)4上市公司提供虚假财务报告的危害 (2)5虚假财务报告的成因分析 (3)5.1会计信息需求主体利益冲突 (3)5.2内外监管约束机制不完善和不到位 (4)5.3上市公司利益驱动和环境因素 (5)6虚假财务报告的防范措施及对策 (5)6.1针对利益主体提供会计信息 (5)6.2 完善企业自我约束机制 (5)6.3重视诚信道德规范的重建 (6)6.4建立健全证券监管机制加强会计法制建设 (6)参考文献 (6)致谢 (1)虚假财务报告成因的分析摘要：虚假财务报告是目前全世界经济市场上比较关注的问题，随之不断的发展，有的企业为了谋取自身的利益，通过违法的手段，编制虚假的财务报告。
这种违法的行为在严重影响企业自身形象的同时，也破坏了我国的市场经济的发展秩序。
本文首先提出虚假财务报告的概念，到底怎么样的财务报告是虚假的，进一步描写其危害，影响的范围。
就此分析了企业提供虚假财务报告的成因，包括有会计信息需求的利益冲突、内外监管机制不完善、不到位等，以及解决的方案和防范此措施及对策，如建立健全公司内部会计监督制度、完善企业自我约束机制、重视诚信道德规范的重建、建立健全证券监管机制加强会计法制建设等。
可以使企业财务报告在规范市场行为、提高会计信息质量等方面发挥更大的作用。
关键词：虚假财务报告，市场经济，利益1前言财务会计报告，是指企业对外提供的反映企业某一特定日期财务状况，会计期间经营活动情况信息的一种载体，其包括数据信息化和非数据化信息，财务报告也是债权人、股东、政府部门和潜在投资者等获取企业信息的主要载体，是有关各方面进行投资决策的基础。
近些年来，国际国内虚假财务报告案件时有发生，一方面使得经济发展遭受重大损失，另一方面造成了恶劣的社会影响，其中利用虚假财务报告与财务财务报告粉饰手段造假是虚假财务报告发生的重要原因。
上市公司虚假财务报告危害
上市公司虚假财务报告危害上市公司虚假财务报告危害引言上市公司作为市场经济中重要的参与者，其财务报告的真实性和准确性对于投资者和整个市场的稳定运行至关重要。
然而，一些不诚信的上市公司会故意发布虚假财务报告，给投资者带来严重的危害。
本文将探讨虚假财务报告对上市公司、投资者和整个市场的危害，并提出相关解决方案。
虚假财务报告的定义虚假财务报告指的是上市公司在编制财务报告过程中故意进行虚假记账、隐瞒真实财务情况或故意误导投资者的行为。
虚假财务报告通常以夸大公司经营业绩、减少负债风险、掩盖经营问题等方式进行欺骗。
危害1. 对上市公司的影响虚假财务报告给上市公司自身带来严重的经营风险。
首先，虚假财务报告会导致公司信誉受损，使公司在市场中失去投资者的信任，进而影响公司的股价，并可能导致公司股票被暂停交易或退市。
其次，虚假财务报告会误导公司管理层对公司真实财务状况的判断，导致管理层在决策和资源配置上犯错，进一步加剧公司的经营问题。
2. 对投资者的影响虚假财务报告给投资者带来巨大的经济损失。
当投资者根据虚假财务报告做出投资决策时，往往会错误估计上市公司的价值和风险。
一旦虚假财务报告被揭露，投资者可能会面临股票价格暴跌或财产损失。
虚假财务报告也会破坏投资者对市场的信心，降低他们对其他上市公司的信任程度，进而影响资本市场的正常运行。
3. 对整个市场的影响虚假财务报告的存在会破坏市场的公平性和透明度。
投资者基于财务报告进行投资决策，如果财务报告不真实，那么市场的价格发现机制就会失效，投资者无法准确评估上市公司的价值和风险。
虚假财务报告还会扰乱市场秩序，引发市场恐慌和投资者的恐慌性抛售，进一步加剧市场的波动性。
解决方案1. 加强监管力度政府和监管机构应加强对上市公司的监管力度，提高对财务报告的审查和审核准入门槛。
加强对上市公司内部控制和财务报告编制过程的监督，及时发现和惩治虚假财务报告的行为，提高市场的信心和稳定性。
2. 强化公司治理上市公司应加强公司治理，建立健全的内部控制制度和风险管理机制。
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Badawi I M.Global corporate accounting frauds and action for reforms[J].Review of Business,2005,:26(:2).英文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt.John’s UniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulent financial reporting has prompted global actions for reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting,by governments and accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies in the U.S.and internationally,including the European Commission;the International Federation of Accountants;the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development;and others,in order to restore investor confidence in financial reporting,the accounting profession and global financial markets.IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S.,similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries.Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than onecountry,and most of these entities are also listed on U.S.stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of2002,reforms were also initiated worldwide.The primary purpose of this paper is twofold:(1)to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed;and(2)to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting,the public accounting profession and global capital markets.Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S.is extensive,and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities.Exhibit1identifies a sample of panies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people who commit financial statement frauds.They range from senior management(CEO and CFO); mid-and lower-level management;and organizational criminals[6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true business performance,to preserve personal status and control and to maintain personal income and wealth.Mid-and lower-level employees falsifyfinancial statements related to their area of responsibility(subsidiary, division or other unit)to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based anizational criminals falsify financial statements to obtain loans or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a “pump-and-dump”scheme.Methods of financial statement schemes range from fictitious or fabricated revenues;altering the times at which revenues are recognized;improper asset valuations and reporting; concealing liabilities and expenses;and improper financial statement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsIn response to corporate and accounting scandals,the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S.economy,and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market,wmakers,in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002.President Bush signed this Act into law(Public Law107-204)on July30,2002.The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S.and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S.stock exchanges, requiring executives,boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability,responsibility and transparency of financial reporting.The statutes of the Act,and the new SEC initiatives that followed[1,4,8,12,15],are considered the mostsignificant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since1933.Other U.S.regulatory bodies such as NYSE,NASDAQ and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act(SOA)is expressly applicable to any pany registered on U.S.exchanges under either the Securities Act of1933or the Security Exchange Act of1934,regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile.Furthermore,external auditors of such registrants,regardless of their nationality or place of business,are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board(PCAOB)and to the statutory requirements of the SOA.The United States’SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants(IFAC);the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD);the European Commission(UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.International Federation of Accountants(IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants.It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest,strengthening theworldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards[9].The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission.It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which,among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants[14].The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world’s most influential international organizations in economic and financial spheres,including global Financial Stability Forum(FSF),the International Organization of Securities Commissions(IOSCO),the World Bank and,most significantly,the EC.In October2002,IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure.Its report,“Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting:An International Perspective,”includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance,and raising the regulating standards of issuers.Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are:1.All public interest entities should have an independent auditcommittee or similar body.2.The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information,internal controls or the audit.3.The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively.4.Audit committees should have core responsibilities,including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting,financial controls,the internal audit function,as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5.Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have“substantial financial experience.”They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6.Audit committees should have regular private“executive sessions”with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department.These executive sessions should not include members of management.There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer and other key financial executives,but without other members of management.7.Audit committee members should be independent of management.8.There should be a principles-based approach to definingindependence on an international panies should disclose committee members’credentials,remuneration and shareholdings.9.Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company.The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan.10.The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules.It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services.Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11.All fees,for audit and non-audit services,should be disclosed to shareholders.12.Key audit team members,including the engagement and independent review partners,should serve no longer than seven years on the audit.13.Two years should pass before a key audit team member can takea position at the company as a director or any other important management positionOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)is a quasi-think tank made up of30member countries,includingthe United States and United Kingdom,and it has working relationships with more than70other countries.In2004,the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its“Principles of Corporate Governance”that had originally been adopted by its member governments(including the U.S. and UK)in1999.Although they are nonbinding,the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation,as well as guidance for stock exchanges,investors,corporations and other parties[11,13].The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers,investors,corporations and other stakeholders worldwide.They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The2004updated version of“Principles of Corporate Governance”includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards,the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and the shareholders.The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance,such as:1.Granting investors the right to nominate company directors,as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2.Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives,and giving these stockholders theability to submit questions to auditors.3.Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions,such as voting4.Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency.5.Directing rating agencies,brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest,and how those conflicts are being managed.6.Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions,and protecting socalled“whistle blowers”by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact.U.S.-EU Cooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially,the European Union resented applicability of U.S.Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms to European companies and accounting firms operating in the U.S.However, after a series of negotiations,the U.S.and EU authorities have agreed to cooperate and decided to develop a compatible set of regulations.The regulatory bodies on both continents have undertaken a two-way cooperative approach based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight authorities.Furthermore,member states of the European Union have proposed a code of conduct on the independent auditors whichincludes a five-year auditor rotation requirement.Furthermore,the national governments of the individual European countries have proposed reforms of their corporate laws.For example,in July2002,the British government released a white paper proposing changes to the Company Law,which included harsher penalties for misleading auditors;redefining the roles of the directors;and creating standards for boards in accounting supervision and other disclosure issues.The British government is also reviewing the roles of non-executive directors and is considering the regulation of audit committees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣·巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革，政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构，包括欧盟委员会，国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告，会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译备课讲稿
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Badawi I M. Global corporate accounting frauds and action for reforms[J]. Review of Business, 2005, :26(:2).英文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt. John’s UniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulent financial reporting has prompted global actions for reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting, by governments and accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies in the U.S. and internationally, including the European Commission; the International Federation of Accountants; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and others, in order to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, the accounting profession and global financial markets.IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than onecountry, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people who commit financial statement frauds. They range from senior management (CEO and CFO); mid- and lower-level management; and organizational criminals [6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true business performance, to preserve personal status and control and to maintain personal income and wealth. Mid- and lower-level employees falsifyfinancial statements related to their area of responsibility (subsidiary, division or other unit) to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based bonuses. Organizational criminals falsify financial statements to obtain loans or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a “pump-and-dump” scheme. Methods o f financial statement schemes range from fictitious or fabricated revenues; altering the times at which revenues are recognized; improper asset valuations and reporting; concealing liabilities and expenses; and improper financial statement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsIn response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the Act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed [1,4,8,12,15], are considered the mostsignificant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as NYSE, NASDAQ and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA.The United States’ SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening theworldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards [9]. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants [14]. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world’s most influential interna tional organizations in economic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the EC. In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, “Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective,” includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are:1. All public interest entities should have an independent auditcommittee or similar body.2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit.3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively.4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have “substantial financial experience.” They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private “executive sessions” with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management.8. There should be a principles-based approach to definingindependence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members’ credentials, remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan. 10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independent review partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit.13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can takea position at the company as a director or any other important management positionOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, includingthe United States and United Kingdom, and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its “Principles of Corporate Governance” that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are nonbinding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties [11,13]. The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of “Principles of Corporate Governance” includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and the shareholders. The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as:1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders theability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency.5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed.6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting soca lled “whistle blowers” by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact.U.S.-EU Cooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially, the European Union resented applicability of U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms to European companies and accounting firms operating in the U.S. However, after a series of negotiations, the U.S. and EU authorities have agreed to cooperate and decided to develop a compatible set of regulations. The regulatory bodies on both continents have undertaken a two-way cooperative approach based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight authorities. Furthermore, member states of the European Union have proposed a code of conduct on the independent auditors whichincludes a five-year auditor rotation requirement. Furthermore, the national governments of the individual European countries have proposed reforms of their corporate laws. For example, in July 2002, the British government released a white paper proposing changes to the Company Law, which included harsher penalties for misleading auditors; redefining the roles of the directors; and creating standards for boards in accounting supervision and other disclosure issues. The British government is also reviewing the roles of non-executive directors and is considering the regulation of audit committees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣·巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革，政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构，包括欧盟委员会，国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告，会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译教学提纲
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文) 文献出处：Badawi I M. Global corporate accounting frauds and action for reforms[J]. Review of Business, 2005, :26(:2). 英文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt. John ' s UniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulent financial reporting has prompted global actions for reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting, by governments and accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies in the U.S. and internationally, including the European Commission; the International Federation of Accountants; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and others, in order to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, the accounting profession and global financial markets.IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than one country, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxleyAct of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people who commit financial statement frauds. They range from senior management (CEO and CFO); mid- and lower-level management;and organizational criminals [6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true business performance, to preserve personal status and control and to maintain personal income and wealth. Mid- and lower-level employees falsify financial statements related to their area of responsibility (subsidiary, division or other unit) to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based bonuses. Organizational criminals falsify financial statements to obtain loans or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a “ pum-pand-dump” scheme. Methods of financial statement schemes range from fictitious orfabricated revenues; altering the times at which revenues are recognized; improper asset valuations and reporting; concealing liabilities and expenses; and improper financial statement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsIn response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. andnon-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measuresto implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the Act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed [1,4,8,12,15], are considered the most significant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as NYSE, NASDAQ and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation orcorporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA.The United States ' SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening the worldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards [9]. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants [14]. The IFAC has recently secured adegree of support for its endeavors from some of the world 'ms ost influential international organizations in economic and financial spheres,including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the EC. In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, “ Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective, in”cludes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are:1. All public interest entities should have an independent audit committee or similar body.2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit.3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively.4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have “ substantiaflinancial experience. T”hey should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private “ executive sessionsw”ith the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management.There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management.8. There should be a principles-based approach to defining independence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members ' credentials, remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan. 10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independencerules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independentreview partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit.13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can take a position at the company as a director or any other important management positionOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, including the United States and United Kingdom, and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its “ Principlesof Corporate Governance ”that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are nonbinding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges,investors, corporations and other parties [11,13]. The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of “ Principles of Corporate Governance includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and the shareholders.The updated version also sets moredemanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as:1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholderswith a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders theability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency.5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed.6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting socalled “whistleblowers ”by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact.U.S.-EU Cooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially, the European Union resented applicability of U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms to European companies and accounting firms operating in the U.S. However, after a series of negotiations, the U.S. and EU authorities have agreed to cooperate and decidedto develop a compatible set of regulations. The regulatory bodies on both continents have undertaken a two-way cooperative approach based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight authorities. Furthermore, member states of the European Union have proposed a code of conduct on the independent auditors which includes a five-year auditor rotation requirement. Furthermore, the national governments of the individual European countries have proposed reforms of their corporate laws. For example, in July 2002, the British government released a white paper proposing changesto the Company Law, which included harsher penalties for misleading auditors; redefining the roles of the directors; and creating standards for boards in accounting supervision and other disclosure issues. The British government is also reviewing the roles of non-executive directors and is considering the regulation of audit committees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣•巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革，政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构，包括欧盟委员会，国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告，会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。
企业财务舞弊的英文作文
企业财务舞弊的英文作文英文：Financial fraud in enterprises is a serious issue that can have far-reaching consequences. It can damage the reputation of the company, lead to legal consequences, and ultimately harm the livelihoods of employees and stakeholders. There are various forms of financial fraud, such as embezzlement, falsifying financial statements, and insider trading.One example of financial fraud is the case of Enron, a well-known energy company that went bankrupt in 2001 due to widespread accounting fraud. The company's executives manipulated financial statements to hide the company's debts and inflate its profits. This led to billions of dollars in losses for investors and employees who held Enron stock.Financial fraud can also occur in smaller businesses.For instance, a local restaurant owner might engage in skimming, where they underreport their income to avoid paying taxes. While this may seem like a victimless crime, it ultimately hurts the community by depriving it of tax revenue that could be used for public services.As a result, it is crucial for businesses to have strong internal controls and ethical standards to prevent financial fraud. This includes regular audits, segregation of duties, and promoting a culture of transparency and accountability. Employees should feel empowered to report any suspicious behavior without fear of retaliation.In conclusion, financial fraud in enterprises can have devastating effects on all stakeholders involved. It is essential for businesses to take proactive measures to prevent and detect fraud, and for individuals to speak up when they suspect fraudulent activity.中文：企业财务舞弊是一个严重的问题，可能会产生深远的后果。
论上市公司虚假财务报告的危害—以大连万达集团股份有限公司为例
上市公司虚假财务报告的危害——以大连万达集团股份有限公司为例摘要：企业通过财务报告舞弊的方式来对其财务报告中的相关内容进行造假，以此来对企业的财务数据以及财务数据评价指标的数值进行提升，使得投资者以及其他的财务报告信息使用者无法对企业的经营状态作出准确的判断。
因此，针对于我国企业财务报告舞弊行为的研究已经成为了当前一项十分重要的研究课题。
而本文主要研究内容就是围绕着这一课题所开展的，而且论文当中还引用了大连万达财务报告舞弊案例来作为研究对象，以此来对论文研究内容的真实性以及研究结论的有效性做出了保证，通过对大连万达财务报告舞弊行为进行分析，整理出其具体的舞弊手段，对财务报告舞弊行为产生的主要原因进行了深入的分析，并以此为基础制定出了相应的优化措施来帮助对大连万达的财务报告舞弊行为进行处理，降低类型财务报告舞弊行为产生的概率。
关键词：财务报告舞弊;财务报告;舞弊手段;防舞弊行为;引言虚假财务报告这一行为扰乱了市场的正常秩序，诱发了一连串的经济犯罪行为甚至更严重的系统风险。
同时，虚假会计信息的泛滥也导致投资者决策失误、利益受损，由此造成资本市场诚信缺失，严重影响了金融市场的良性发展。
本文主要是围绕着大连万达的虚假财务报告为例，展开对上市公司财务报表的虚报与识别，通过对大连万达财务报表粉饰这一真实案例进行研究，对大连万达的财务报告粉饰手段进行了识别分析。
对于大连万达这一类进行财务造假的企业，应该综合运用行政处罚、刑事追责、民事赔偿以及诚信记录等立体追责体系，提升违法违规的成本，加强有关部门的精准监管，推动审计等中介机构归位尽责，让其他上市公司引以为戒，提高自身素质，加强诚信道德建设，进而才会吸引更多的投资者，才能提高自身在资本市场的尊严和地位，企业同时要强化信息披露制度，对于投资者要认真分析并联系市场总体情况探究如何正确识别、防范此类财务报表粉饰，以保护相关者的利益不受损失，营造出一个良好的市场环境。
外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策
Reasons and countermeasures of listed companies ' financial fraudPick to: financial fraud accompanied by China's reform and opening process and continuous development, bring social harm is more and more apparent, whether to financial fraud effective management by the people's widespread concern. On the listed company's financial fraud concepts and methods were summarized, from the interest drive, corporate governance, accounting personnel occupation moral standards, accounting and auditing system, in-depth analysis of the causes of financial fraud, and in view of the above reasons put forward the corresponding control measuresKey words: financial fraud; reasons; control countermeasures; listed companyIntroductionSince the beginning of Enron in late 2001, cases of financial fraud in listed companies at home and abroad frequently burst out. In early 2006, the Shanghai national accounting Institute Research Center for financial fraud (snaiFFRC) disclosed to "kelong" headed by the "2005 top ten most fraudulent financial companies of the listed companies" means is more amazing the financial fraud of "smart". Self, circulating trading, trading of yin and Yang, the packing channels, always accounting errors, large bath, mergers and acquisitions, restructuring, concealed stocks, the report cash traps, this is a top ten listing companies financial fraud trick.One, the concept of financial fraud and wayFinancial fraud is the subject of false financial information processing in accounting and reporting process, to obtain undue economic interests, used deceptive means to intentionally lied about the importance and financial facts of violations of laws and substantive violations. Financial fraud has four characteristics: unlawful, intentional sexuality, danger, and concealment. Specific means of financial fraud can be said to be endless, but the core is intact. Income fraud including fictitious earnings and revenue across periods; cost of fraud including cross-phase meter cost less and adjustment costs as well as costs of capital; corrupt cash fraud, should be the project assets, such as fraud, less provision for impairment; liabilities are generally less-total liabilities of fraud.Financial fraud means basically has the following several aspects:1.the use of improper accounting policies and accounting fraud. Management typically useintertemporal amortization class accounts for many share, share more, less or less cost to adjust profit. (1) the selection of inappropriate borrowing costs accounting method. In practice, many listed company through misuse of borrowing costs accounting, in build a project completed and not the final. (2) improper selection of equity investment accounting methods. Principles of enterprise accounting regulations: investment enterprises of joint control or significant influence, should adopt equity method; instead, it uses the cost method.But many companies use, when the investee company profit, should not use the equity method investment using the equity method of accounting; when the investee company loss, the equity method to the cost method .(3) improper selection of merging policy. (4) the improper selection of depreciation method.Extended depreciation, by accelerating method is changed into the straight line method, inpractice it is often seen. (5) the improper selection of income, cost confirmation method.Advance or delay the confirmation of income or expense is also listed companies generally adopt cheating. (6) the improper selection of the impairment provision method.2. use of enterprise internal control system defects and the weak link of fraud. As the cashier personnel use enterprise blank check, financial dedicated seal, legal person seal does not separate keeping malpractice, privately issued checks, misappropriation of public funds. Cozy with his duties incompatible staff collude with a fraud.3.related party transaction fraud. The related party transaction fraud, refers to the management using the related party transaction to hide losses, fictitious profits, and not in the statements and notes in accordance with the provisions as appropriate, full disclosure, the resulting information will have on the users of financial statements misleading a fraud method. Typically, Chinese listed companies using the purchase and sale of related fraud, fraud, entrusted with the operation of funds embezzlement, fraud and other four kinds of cost sharing related transactions by way of fictitious profit.4. the assets of fraud. Asset restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, debt restructuring, asset replacement form, occurring between the related parties. Assets reorganization of corrupt corrupt corrupt major mergers and acquisitions and debt restructuring in two ways.5. cover up fraud transaction or fact. Hide transaction or fact of fraud is through the use of accounting statements to hide transactions of listed companies or the truth, or has not been fully disclosed in the notes to the report deals truth an fraud methods.Second, the causes of listed companies ' financial malpracticeListed companies ' financial malpractice caused several of the following reasons:1. financial return far greater than the cost of fraud. To meet listing standards at some companies desperate to find ways to make financial fraud, and fraud, to meet the policy requirements. In addition, because the share price is times the income and earnings per share, and high stock market price/earnings ratio of deformity in China, so the main purpose of listed company's financial fraud is false profits. False profits of $ 1, the circulation market value of listed companies will increase 10 times times times. Relative to the fraud fraud income, cost is too low, from a certain extent, it is too low a fraud cost contributed some fraud.2. corporate governance structure is not perfect. Corporate governance structure is in fact about between owners, the Board of Directors and senior executive officers rights assigned and the arrangement of a system of checks and balances, the reality in China, led directly to the equity structure of listed companies malformations include the general meeting of shareholders, Board of Directors, Board of supervisors, which distort the relationship between corporate governance structure of checks and balances, which has provided an opportunity for financial fraud in listed companies. This is mainly manifested in the following aspects: (1) the ownership structure is not reasonable. As of the second half of 2006, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market, shares of over50 listed companies only 185, largest shareholder holding ratio of no more than 25 and only 219, 60~70 listed companies have invaded and occupied by large shareholders of listed company's funds. In the case of high concentration of ownership, possibilities of treatment failure of listed companies increased, listed companies, the greater possibility of financial fraud. (2) the independence of the Board is not strong, internal control is a serious problem. China listed company Director served as Senior Manager of the phenomenon is more prevalent, Director serves as the Senior Manager (internal control) more than 50 per cent of the sample company 32, more than 30 per cent of a sample of 65 companies. In this case, the operation of the Board is usually "Insider" or shareholder control, rather than based on the collective interest. This has led to the phenomenon of frequent corporate financial fraud. (3) the Supervisory Board weakening the oversight function, financial report difficulty in discharging its oversight functions. Based on analysis of listed company financial reporting fraud, Board of supervisors system in suppression of financial fraud in China did not play a role of Directors and managers of monitoring. Listed companies are required by law to set up a supervisory board, Board of supervisors actually are in a very awkward position, lower right or upper right of vulnerable rights of supervision or stronger right.3. accounting staff lack of professional ethics. Finance and accounting personnel who are directly involved in financial fraud, from the macro perspective, is mainly long term and not enough on accounting ethics education, lack of accounting professional standards; micro-perspective, strong sense of company accountants law, in order to meet company leaders of unhealthy psychological, thus violating the ethics of being practical and realistic, objective and fair. In addition, individuals driven by economic interests, has also led to some accountants deliberately forged, altered, hiding and destroyed the accounting information, taking advantage of his position of financial fraud.4. accounting and audit system is not sound. In recent years, although China is making a lot of accounting and auditing legislation, but from the practical point of view are not perfect and sound. Poor operability of some provisions, resulting in accounting fraud an opportunity. New accounting law "legal responsibility" chapter referred to "serious", "criminal", "significant losses" are not quantified, has no specific explanation. 2006 implementation of new accounting standards, provided more accounting options for management, which provides management with more profit opportunities. In addition, lack of punishment measures, social supervision is not strong, quality performance evaluation of accounting does not work, no ability to detect fraud, also can lead to occurrence of listed companies ' financial malpractice.Third, the governance of listed companies’financial fraud countermeasures1. coordinating the relationship between benefits and costs of financial fraud. We should increase the penalties for financial fraud, financial fraud costs more than it gains, so you can basically stop financial fraud. At the same time, in charge of financial malpractice should bear unlimited joint and several financial responsibility, which can to a large extent, inhibit their impulses of illegal counterfeiting. For those who dare to report the accounting officer shall provide ample rewards, so that its behavior is greater than the loss of income to report financial fraud. In this way, financial malpractice liability and they will take the initiative to give up the idea of financial fraud.2. perfect the corporate governance structure. Improve the internal governance structure of thecompany, is to prevent financial fraud, improve the quality of accounting information. (1) to improve the company's ownership structure, can solve the status of minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder is not symmetric. (2) the perfection of listed company's Board. In the establishment of external independent directors on the Board of the company, and provides that a certain proportion of the external independent directors, and established a number of specialized committees, raise the level of professionalization of the Board, to play the role of the Board. (3) improvement Board of supervisors of listed companies. As the Board of supervisors a mere formality, only to stand in the governance structure of the company, to further improve the system of Board of supervisors.3. raising the level of professional ethics of accountants. State management and accounting departments, should continuously strengthen the ideological education of accountants and accounting staff levels continue to improve, making it able to consciously resist financial malpractice, gradually establishing accounting integrity and fair image.4. accounting and auditing systems. Accounting standards and the flexibility of the system is the important basis for financial fraud to achieve. First of all, according to China's actual conditions, principles of system of accounting standards and make appropriate adjustments, in general lack of ethical culture in China now, improving the reliability of the accounting report is the key. Second, correctly handle the relationship between consistency and flexibility, reducing the options available to the company within the scope of accounting system as much as possible, especially when it comes to income and expenses recognized measuring principle, the depreciation of fixed assets, eight-asset impairment provision ratio and maximum detailed provisions should be made. Introduce specific implementation details will be quantitative and specific legal responsibility to explain, this has the advantage of parties a clear financial consequences of fraud, also in favour of the relevant departments to determine the financial fraud and punishable by appropriate penalties. Finally, give full play to the role of public opinion and the media. As the perfection of the securities market, market supervision is not limited to certified public accountants and the Government, the general public and the media has also been involved in the regulatory process.The endAt present, China is in an early stage of market economy, all kinds of deceptive behaviors emerge, accounting activity as a measure of economic activity, inevitably financial fraud. Financial fraud is not only an economic phenomenon, is also a visualization of the deep moral conviction. So, on the governance of financial fraud is a systems engineering, business, community and government supervision of Trinity system is required in all departments and make concerted efforts, coordinate with each other. Only an integrated approach to governance, to create good information environment for China's economic development.Reference.[1] Hou Yanlei, Zhai Yingmin. The financial fraud of listed companies analysis [J]. Economy and management,2006, (7):71-73.[2] Huang Xinjian . Chinese listed company's financial fraud and the Countermeasures Research [J]. Economic survey,2006, (4):77-79.[3] Wang Jianxin. The financial fraud of listed companies : motives and management [J ]. Market modernization,2008, (2):346-347.[4] Yang Yunshu . The financial fraud of listed companies analysis [J ]. Accounting research,2006,(5):62-63.[5]You Xiaofeng. Chinese Research on financial governance of Listed Companies [ M]. Beijing: Economic Science Press,2005: 144-145.[6] Zhang Aimin. The combination of internal and external, prevention of financial fraud of Listed Companies [ J]. Contemporary economy,2006, (2):18-19.[7]Hong Ge. Fraud in financial reports of listed companies governance approach [J]. Economic review,2005, (9):117-137.[8]Wang Haixia. Internal governance structure in listed companies and the prevention of financial fraud [J]. Auditing & Finance,2005, (7):23-24.上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策摘要：财务舞弊行为伴随着中国改革开放的进程而不断演进发展，带给社会的危害也愈来愈明显，能否对财务舞弊行为进行切实有效地治理受到人们的普遍关注。
财务报表舞弊：从学术的角度分析【外文翻译】
外文文献翻译原文：Financial Statement Fraud: Insights from theAcademic LiteratureFactors Affecting Financial Fraud At An OrganizationStatement on Auditing Standards (SAS)No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, states that three conditions are generally present when fraud occurs. First, there is an incentive or a pressure to commit fraud. Second, circumstances provide an opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated weak controls or ability of management to override controls. Finally, there is an attitude or rationalization for committing fraud. These conditions collectively are known as the fraud triangle. We reviewed the academic findings related to the presence of these conditions in cases of financial statement fraud. This helps prov ide a basis for understanding the development of the questionnaires and checklists in SAS No. 82 and SAS No. 99. The following is a detailed description of these three elements：Incentives/PressuresThe incentive to misstate earnings can arise due to press ure to meet analysts’ forecasts, compensation and incentive structures, the need for external financing, or poor performance. Dechow et al. (1996), using a sample of 92 firms subject to accounting enforcement releases during the period 1982–1992, find that an important motivation to manipulate earnings is the desire to attract external financing at low cost. .Erickson et al.(2006) investigate whether executive equity incentives are associated with accounting fraud. They examine a sample of firms accused of fraud during the 1996–2003 period and do not find any relation between equity incentives and the likelihood of the firm reporting fraudulent financial information.. In contrast, Efendi et al. (2007),using a sample of firms that restated their financial statements, find the likelihood of a misstatedfinancial statement increases when the CEO has a sizable amount of stock options “in-the-money.” Theyalso find that misstatements are more likely for firms constrained by debt covenants, firms raising new debt or eq uity capital, or firms that have a CEO who serves as the chairman of the board. Beneish (1999a) finds that, for a group of firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the SEC, managers are more likely to sell equity holdings and exercise stock appreciation rights in periods when earnings are inflated, suggesting insider trading behavior may be informative about earnings overstatements. Summers and Sweeney (1998) find similar results for the relationship between insider trading and fraud. More recently, th ere is evidence that hundreds of firms were involved in intentional backdating of stock options (Lie 2005), which again provides evidence that stock option compensation provides incentives for fraudulent behavior.A Glass Lewis & Co. (2006) report states that about half of the companies implicated in backdating their stock options have restated their financial statements.With regard to poorly performing firms, Rosner (2003) examines whether failing firms are more likely to engage in income-increasing manipulation, and whether auditors detect the over- statements in firms they perceive to be failing. Her findings suggest that the behavior of failing firms that do not appear distressed on the basis of accrual data, but nonetheless show significant decreased cash flows, is consistent with material earnings overstatements in non-going-concern years that are followed by overstatement reversals in going-concern years. The accrual behavior of these firms resembles that of firms sanctioned by the Securities and Exchange Commis sion (SEC) for fraud.OpportunitiesStatement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (AU Section 316) provides examples of risk factors that may increase the opportunity to commit financial statement fraud (AICPA 2002).These risk factors include the nature of the ind ustry or the entity’s operations such as significant complex or related party transactions, ineffective monitoring of management, a complex organizational structure such as one that involves several legal entities, and ineffective controls due to a lack of monitoring of controls or circumvention of controls. . Albrecht and Albrecht (2003) also discussfactors increasing the opportunity to commit fraud and note that having an effective control structure is probably the single most important step to eliminate (or minimize) opportunity to commit fraudulent acts.Several studies have shown that ineffective monitoring of management in the form of weak corporate governance is associated with a higher likelihood of fraud. Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms manipulat ing earnings are more likely to have less independent boards, more likely to have a unitary structure for chairman and CEO, more likely to have a CEO who is also the firm’s founder, less likely to have an audit committee and less likely to have an outside blockholder. Beasley (1996) also finds that the proportion of independent members on the board of directors islower for firms experiencing financial fraud compared to no-fraud firms.Similarly, Farber (2005) finds that fraud firms have poor governance relative to no-fraud firms (fewer independent board members, fewer audit committee meetings, fewer financial experts on the audit committee, a smaller percentage of Big 4 auditing firms, and a higher percentage of CEOs who are also chairman of the board). The results are consistent with independent corporate governance mechanisms being more effective in the monitoring function.Because of their ability to detect and, in some cases, investigate fraudulent financial reporting, external auditors also act as a s ignificant deterrent by reducing the opportunity to commit fraud. Most of the studies examining the auditor’s role in constraining managers’ attempts to manage earnings examine discretionary accruals. High discretionary accruals are not necessarily indicative of fraud, but possibly are indicative of aggressive and opportunistic reporting.Researchers have argued that Big N auditors constrain managers’ attempts to manage earnings through accruals and document evidence consistent with higher discretionary accr uals for firms audited by non-Big N auditors (Becker et al. 1998；Francis et al. 1999).Carcello and Nagy (2002) examine the relation between auditor industry specialization and financial fraud and find a negative relation. Knapp and Knapp (2001) examine the effects of audit experience on the effectiveness of analytical procedures in detecting financial statement fraud and find that auditmanagers are more effective than audit seniors in assessing the risk of fraud with analytical procedures. Similarly, Bernardi (1994) finds that managers outperform seniors in a fraud detection case when they are exposed to an initial evaluation of client integrity and competence；however, this finding is attributable to managers with a high level of moral development.Academic studies have also investigated whether the length of the client-auditor relationship is likely to impact the quality of the audit. Findings generally suggest that longer auditor tenure is associated with greater earnings quality (Iyer and Rama 2004；Myers et al. 2003). Specifically related to the frequency of financial statement fraud, Carcello and Nagy (2004) compare firms cited for fraudulent financial reporting from 1990 through 2001 to a set of control firms and other nonfraud firms and find that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur in the first three years of the auditor-client relationship.Attitudes/RationalizationsAccounting standards can contribute to reducing both the opportunity and attitude toward fraudulent financial reporting. Nelson et al. (2002) find that the precision of accounting standards influences managers’ attempts to manage earnings. They find that when accounting standards are precise, managers are more likely to attempt earnings management with transaction structuring (such as structuring a lease in a particular way to avoid a capital lease classification or by opportunistically timing sales of available-for-sale securities), and auditors are less likely to adjust those attempts. Managers were more likely to make attempts that decrease income withunstructured transactions (such as increasing or decreasing estimates involving judgment) when standards were imprecise. Managers are more likely to make attempts to increase earnings, but auditors are more likely to require adjustment in those cases, particularly if the amount is material.Hernandez and Groot (2007a) use a sample of audit partner risk assessments made as part of client acceptance or continuance decisions for a Big 4 audit firm in theNetherlands and find that manager integrity, honesty, and ethics are considered to be the most important factors in fraud risk assessments, followed by concerns about aggressive revenue recognition and accounting estimates. Gillett and Uddin (2005) find the attitude of the CFO toward the behavior of fraudulent reporting to be a major influence on intention to misreport；however, compensation structure was not found to be a good indicator of intentions to report fraudulently.In summary, academic research documents evidence of a relation between many of the incentives, opportunities, and attitudes identified in the auditing standards and the existence of fraud. This would suggest that the use of checklists identifying the existence or absence of these incentives and/or opportunities for particular clients would be helpful in an auditing setting. As discussed in the next section, however, the findings on the benefits of checklists in identifying fraud are mixed.Procedures And Ability Of Auditors To Detect FraudCurrent professional standards and authoritative guidance require auditors to provide reasonable assurance that financial statements are free from material misstatements, whether caused by errors or fraud. What constitutes “reasonable assurance” has been extensively and inc onclusively debated in the literature and within the accounting profession (PCAOB 2005；Rezaee 2004；Har-rington 2003).The lack of a commonly accepted definition of reasonable assurance coupled with limitations of audit methods in identifying fraud, cost constraints of audits, and high expectations by investors have widened the expectation gap regarding auditor responsibility for detecting financial statement fraud. The CEOs of the six largest International Audit Networks believe that there should be a constructive dialog among investors of global companies and capital markets, auditors, and regulators to narrow the “expectation gap” (International Audit Networks 2006).Symptoms of fraud are often referred to as “red flags.” SAS No. 99 identifies “red flags” as risk factors and further categorizes those risk factors in the three areas included in the fraud triangle: pressures/incentive, opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Albrecht and Albrecht(2003) categorize the symptomsof fraud into six types: (1) accounting anomalies；(2) internal control weaknesses；(3) analytical anomalies；(4) extravagant lifestyles；(5) unusual behaviors；and (6) tips and complaints. One of the major challenges in identifying fraud is that while symptoms of fraud (“red flags”) are observed frequently, the presence of such issues is not necessarily indicative of fraud (Albrecht and Romney 1986) and investigation of such anomalies usually results in a conclusion that fraud was not the underlying cause. It is also difficult to co mbine and weight fraud risk factors to assess overall fraud risk and formulate an audit plan (Patterson and Noel 2003). Further, due to attempts by perpetrators to conceal their acts, “red flags” may be relatively few in frequency and minor in amount, at le ast in the early stages of fraudulent financial reporting.Studies examining the use of questionnaires or checklists in assessing fraud risk have found mixed results. In one of the first studies in this area, Pincus (1989) examines the efficacy of a “redflags” questionnaire for assessing the risk of material fraud of a client using 137 auditors as subjects. Her findings suggest that the use of a questionnaire was dysfunctional for the fraud case, i.e., questionnaire users assessed the risk of fraud to be lower than nonusers. Similarly, Asare and Wright (2004) study the impact of alternative risk assessment methods (risk checklist versus no checklist) and audit program development (standard program versus no program) on the quality of audit procedures chosen and the propensity to consult fraud experts, with data based on a case from an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). The authors find that auditors given the standard audit program designed a relatively less effective audit program than those without the standard program (relative to a benchmark program from a panel of experts), and auditors using a standard checklist made lower risk assessments than those without a checklist. However, they did find a higher fraud risk assessment was as sociated with a propensity to seek consultation of fraud experts.Source：Chris E. Hogan and Uma K. Velury. Financial Statement Fraud:Insights from theAcademic Literature[J]. Journal of Practice & Theory, 2008,11：231—252.译文：财务报表舞弊：从学术的角度分析（一）财务舞弊的动因——组织的影响因素SAS第99号审计准则对舞弊财务报告的思考得出：构成财务报告舞弊的因素有以下三点：首先，因激励或压力而进行舞弊；其次，环境提供了一个机会，诱使舞弊行为的发生，例如，控制或管理能力薄弱的环境更容易引发舞弊。
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虚假财务报告的后果中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)虚假财务报告的后果1.欺诈和欺诈性财务报告从广义上讲，欺诈可能被定义为故意以不正当行为或非法手段获得的增益以及优势。
这可能包括：（鲁宾G . A .，2007）财务报告舞弊；挪用资产（在内部或外部的系统中做出，如：贪污，工资欺诈和盗窃等行为）；获得非法资产或进行不道德的活动（如：利用过度的客户结算或欺诈性的销售行为）；用于非法目的的费用（商业和公共贿赂以及其他不正当支付系统）；欺瞒获得的收入或有意回避成本（在系统实体中对员工或第三方欺诈，或当一个实体通过一定手段故意避免成本，如收入税和销售税）；对公司的欺诈行为（例如假冒生产者故意侵犯知识产权）。
可以通过对该部门机构的制度的完整性的认识来调查它的欺诈行为。
它在调查了世界银行集团和银行的融资项目后，指控了他们的欺诈和腐败行为，认定了哪些行为可以被认为行为是在银行系统中的欺诈或腐败行为：（Banca银行,蒙迪艾尔.2009）拍卖欺诈，在拍卖中理解所有的参与者，在合同执行中的欺诈，避免对合同执行的审计，做出不适当的价格和伙伴关系，让审计人员误判合同中的成本和工作，并对审计人员进行贿赂，错误地使用世界银行的资金或自己的立场，这就是在运动，偷窃和欺骗的情况下的欺诈。
虽然所有类别的欺诈都可以说是主要的和值得辩论，但是只有财务报告舞弊才是影响最大的和最值得研究的。
（鲁宾G . A .，2007）在财务报告中欺诈行为的基础是肇事者（董事，审计人员，员工等）错误地提出了现实的自觉意图。
但错误地提出现实的自觉意图的原因可能是欺诈财务报告中任何一项不当资产的回收。
因此，“欺诈性报告仅指故意歪曲，包括遗漏大量财务信息旨在误导财务报表的使用者”也可译为（波帕一人，铝。
罗斯·，2009）：操纵，伪造，伪造或更改文件或证明文件，错误或遗漏的事件、交易或信息，故意滥用会计原则与价值、分类、方式介绍或信息传递，虚拟条目记录（年底）操纵结果或达到其他目标，调整不正确的假设和判断来估计帐户余额，遗漏、发展或拖延承认事件或交易发生在报告所述期间，隐瞒或保密的事实可能影响的数量记录在财务报表，在改变记录或条件的重大交易中；进行复杂的交易旨在歪曲实体的财务状况或性能。
关注不当资产回收，反对虚假财务报告包括（Popa I., Man Al. Rus A., 2009）：过去为收回收入（收入来自无担保债权人）；盗窃实物资产或产权，用没有进入会计账户的商品或服务支付给虚拟供应商；使用个人资产（包括个人贷款担保），假记录来弥补亏损。
这些行为往往是次要的，通常是由员工虽然有时，经理人自己参与此类活动。
侵占资产也可能包括的费用用于非法目的，在形式上的贿赂，是判断是否是为商业或公务目的。
虽然不当取得资产往往是不显着的财务报表，。
它可能继续造成组织的重大损失。
（苏丹湾，2008）2.提高财务报告舞弊的因素根据国家委员会进行的研究报告指出金融欺诈者（或特雷德韦委员会）的财务报告舞弊的发生通常存在者某些环境和机遇，机构或个人的力量。
这些力量的消涨增加企业的财务压力和扰乱了企业的奖励措施，鼓励了个人和公司从事欺诈性财务报告。
当正确的力量对比达成时，它已经让企业产生了虚假的财务报告（虚假财务报告全国委员会的报告，1987）。
从1950起，教授唐纳德·克雷西就开始研究导致企业犯下欺诈行为的三因素。
根据他的研究，他得出当欺诈行为的发生，有三个因素共同行动：意图（预谋），机会和压力，称为欺诈三角的结论。
”（见图1）。
虽然以上因素形成的“欺诈三角”，这些因素是足够表达一个发生在任何时间的欺诈。
但是这些因素却并不能说明他们对于欺诈行为的作用顺序是怎样的，从而达到了解欺诈行为的发生。
（苏丹湾，2008）机会或压力是第一影响因素，个人发生欺诈行为是一般是因为过度的压力，实现财务目标的奖励的诱导下，为了实现财务目标，把不切实际的乐观消息发布在年度报告。
此外，一个公司可能受到威胁和压力，因为激烈的竞争，因为市场饱和或突然的变化，因为企业的并购（兼并），从而需要进行融资或使得企业的现金流出现问题。
从而产生了甚至让诚实的人都会进行诈骗的环境中。
机会是指那些使得欺诈更加的容易发生，而且让他做出欺诈的决定所面临的困难更少（Hooper J. M., Forneli C. M, 2010）。
因此，无效的控制或无控制主张欺诈意图。
这些因素可以直接相关的监管不力的管理或无效的董事会和审计委员会监督报告和内部控制。
态度或预谋是触发欺诈行为的重要因素，它是指行为人必须具有一个将要进行诈骗行为的心态。
检测危险因素决定董事会成员，管理，员工倾向于这样的意图可能是相当困难的。
所以当一个公司监控和过程阻止和发现欺诈行为，它必须遵循三方面，因为欺诈涉及奖励或压力犯下欺诈行为，认为这样做的机会，和一些推理（苏丹B .，2008）。
3.是谁编制的虚假财务报告以及如何编制虚假财务报告据报道美国国家委员会所研究的大多数的虚假财务报告中，公司的管理者，如行政总裁，总裁和首席财务官，都是虚假财务报告编制的参与者，都可以被称为欺诈者。
因为在一般情况下，他们都能够发现企业是否故意虚假披露会计文件和伪造的记录。
此外，委员会的研究还表明，虽然虚假财务报告的作者在作虚假财务报告时都采用了不同的方式，但是他们行动的目的都总是为了夸大公司其资产或高估或平滑收益。
此外，虚假财务报告并不总是在一开始就公开扭曲财务报表，并且能够让人一下辨认出来。
在许多情况下，财务报告舞弊行为发生的峰值点都是在一些旨在解决经营困难的财务指标上。
最初，财务报告在峰值点只是可能成为虚假财务报告的问题点，但他们让可能成为虚假财务报告的问题点成为了现实，特别是在企业的管理当局允许或鼓励这种欺诈活动时，这就使得欺诈性财务报告产生了。
因此，我们可以说，参与欺诈性财务报告潜在罪犯的人员基本上集中于高级管理层和员工之间的中层人员。
在描述如何在犯下欺诈行为的虚假财务报表的一本书中(Zabihollah R., 2005)）使用的一个专业术语。
财务报告舞弊特征或称为”盈余管理”（阮光，2008）。
然而“盈余管理”并不一定就指的是非法行动。
根据会计政策（美国公认会计准则）或其他会计准则（国际财务报告准则）作出的关于如何区别合法和非法收益的相关规定。
在他们的财务报表中所提交的财务信息是真实的，并且其处理是按照适用的会计准则所做的，我们就认为企业从事的是合法的盈余管理。
同时我们也可以说，盈余管理是一个在虚假财务报告中，“涉及不当收益所产生的收入，资产高估或低估负债”（ Zabihollah R., 2005）以达到操纵盈余的目的，管理人员使用不同的激进会计技术，已经成为影响人为地增加或减少的收入，利润，或每股盈余。
他们使用这些策略，以应付压力，市场上。
一般来说，公司是最经常所感到压力中，其一是从事证券分析的人士期望他们公布尽可能多的财务信息，其二是股东的期望，期望根据企业的投资，能在在很短的时间内为股东赢得更大的利润。
如果投资者未能获得预期的股息时，因此企业的每股收益可能会无法满足投资者，从而导致公司的股票下跌。
因此。
盈余管理的动机可能是来自企业的各种压力以及投资者利益最大化的愿望。
然而，管理者也不总是进行以高估收益为手段的舞弊。
他们也有可能会在相反的情况下，减少这些收益，其这样做的目的是逃避支付费用。
一个涉嫌欺诈财务报表实际案例中一种被叫做“时间化”的技术（亚力山大，2007）。
这项技术是指管理人员通过一定的财务报表编制方法，将业绩不好的一段时间的财务信息隐藏起来。
这种方法是通过操纵盈余，使得财务报告显示出企业的盈余有一个随着时间的推移稳步增加的趋势。
由于投资者对于企业盈利的降低会有消极的反应，会让他们认为这样的企业是不安全和危险的。
因此企业的财务报告显示企业盈余随时间的推移稳步增加的情况，才会让投资者最终满意，并让企业股票保持在较高的价格上。
另一种形式的欺诈行为被称为“大坑”（Hooper J. M., Forneli C. M, 2010），就是在编制虚假财务报告时，企业通过操纵损益，使得企业在国家形势非常好的情况下，让企业的收益显得比实际情况要糟。
使得投资者会认为企业遭到了重大损失，他们就会认为国家的大好形势会提高企业的收益。
由于这一造假，会使得企业财务报告未来的成本降低和利润增加更加的自然。
换句话说，公司需要一个坑洞。
“在一年就可以表明，未来利润必然是会增加的。
”Zabihollah Rezaee研究表明（2005）了最常见的欺诈性财务报表编制所使用的方法，80%的财务报表舞弊都是通过一定的方法造成资产的夸大收入，而剩下的20%则是由于低估了负债和费用。
4.欺诈性财务报告的受害者财务报表的编制至少一年一次的目的是满足一些潜在用户的共同的信息需求。
对于许多的投资者来说，财务报表是作为企业财务信息的主要来源，因此对于投资者的决策具有极大的影响。
（参见图2）投资者当然是虚假财务报告第一个受害者。
如果公司盈利被夸大了，使得投资者购买该企业的股票，那就可以算是被欺诈了，如果公司的收益是被低估了，那么投资者的利益就是被公司隐瞒而失去的。
然而，他们并不是唯一被虚假财务报告影响的。
受害者还包括其他依赖公司的财务报告信息的公司，如：银行和其他提供资金给该公司的金融机构，对于会因为公司业绩影响的供应商和客户，合作伙伴，提供投资咨询有关信息的金融分析师和证券发行人，律师和可能因为发布在保险公司的索赔。
为了避免因为受害者地位的而使得受害者受到虚假财务报告的影响。
任何用户，无论是金融家，借款人，保险公司，投资者或股东，都可以观看企业的总的财务报告让大家可以仔细分析企业的财务报告从而发现企业的财务报告欺诈，或者确定下列可以被视为欺诈的情形（Weir J.,2009）：公司报告利润却不是很好，现金流量很大，毛利水平仍然很高，即使该公司面临来自稳定物价的市场压力；债务水平上升，而销售则是不变或下降；本公司是接近或违背银行的协定；有一个明显的年末调整；存在大量的对于高管的奖金。
结论虽然实现财务报告所谓的“欺诈行为”是指短期成果“盈余”，但是通过他们作用我们可以得出以下后果：虚假财务报告会破坏信誉，质量，透明度和完整的财务报告程序；危害审计职业特别是审计和审计事务所的完整性和客观性；削弱了资本市场的信心，以及和财务信息的可靠性；降低了资本市场效率；不利影响经济增长；产生了巨大的诉讼费用；破坏人的职业参与欺诈财务报表；他们因为破产或重大经济损失涉及公司财务报表欺诈；削弱了公众的信心和信任，。
THE CONSEQUENCES OF FRAUDULENT FINANCIALREPORTINGLecturer PhD. Mariana VLADFaculty of Economics and Public Administration, .tefan cel Mare” University of Suceava, RomaniaAssociate Professor PhD. Mihaela TULVINSCHIFaculty of Economic s and Public Administration, .tefan cel Mare” University of Suceava, RomaniaAssistant PhD. Student Irina CHIRI..Faculty of Economics and Public Administration, .tefan cel Mare” University of Suceava, Romania1. FRAUD AND FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL STATEMENTSBroadly speaking, fraud may be defined as an intentional act to gain an advantage by an unfair or unlawful gain. It may include: (Rubin G. A., 2007) fraudulent financial reporting; misappropriation of assets (inside or outside the system, such as: embezzlement, payroll fraud and theft); revenue or assets acquired from illegal or unethical activities (excessive customer billing or fraudulent sales practices); costs for illicit purposes (commercial and public bribery as well as other improper payment systems); income received fraudulently or intentionally avoided costs (systems in which an entity commits fraud against its employees or to third parties, or when an entity intentionally avoided costs such as income taxes and sales taxes); fraud against the company (e.g. counterfeit producers knowingly violates intellectual property rights). The Department for Institutional Integrity, which investigates allegations of fraud and corruption within the World Bank Group and the Bank’s financed projects, specifies the actions that might be considered fraud or corruption in the banking system: (Banca Mondial., 2009) auction fraud, understandings among participants in the auction, fraud during the execution of the contract, audit avoidance, setting inappropriate prices andpartnerships, miscalculation of costs and work, acceptance of gifts or bribes, soliciting or receiving bribes, incorrectly using the World Bank funds or its positions, fraud in the case of movements, theft and deception. Although all categories of fraud are major and worthy to be debated, only fraudulent financial reporting is handled in the following sections. (Rubin G. A., 2007)Fraud in financial reporting is based on conscious intent of the perpetrator (directors, auditors, employees, etc.) to wrongfully present the reality. But the intended act to wrongfully presenting the reality may be the cause of either fraudulent financial reporting either of undue assets reclaims. Therefore, “fraudulent reporting only refers to intentional misrepresentation, including omissions of amounts designed to mislead the users of the financial statements” can be translated as (Popa I., Man Al. Rus A., 2009): manipulation, forgery, counterfeit or alteration of records or supporting documentation, misstatements/omissions regarding events/transactions/information, intentional misapplication of accounting principles related to values/classification/manner of presentation/delivery of information, fictitious entries records (towards the end of the year) tomanipulate operating results or achieve other objectives, improper adjustments of the assumptions and changing in judgments used to estimate account balances, omissions/advances/delays in recognition of events/transactions that occurred during the reporting period, concealment or nondisclosure of facts that could affect the amounts recorded in the financial statements, engaging in complex transactions designed to distort the entity's financial position or performance; changing the records or conditions of significant transactions. Opposed to fraudulent financial reporting, an undue asset reclaims concern (Popa I., Man Al. Rus A., 2009): revenue dilapidation (revenue coming from unwarranted claims / diverting income), theft of physical assets or intellectual property, payments to fictitious suppliers, without the entry of goods / services, use of assets in personal interest (including also personal loan guarantees), false records to cover the deficit. These abuses are often minor and are usually committed by employees, although sometimes, the managers themselves are involved in such activities. Misappropriation of assets may also include expenses incurred for illicit purposes, in the form of bribery, whether for commercial or official purposes. Although improperly acquiring assets often is not significant for financial statements, .it may continue to result in substantial losses for the organization. (Soltani B., 2008)2. FACTORS THAT ENHANCED FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTINGAccording to studies conducted by the National Commission on Reporting Financial Fraudster in America (or Treadway Commission) fraudulent financial reporting usuallyoccurs as a result of certain environmental forces and opportunities, institutional or individual. These forces and opportunities add pressures and incentives that encourage individuals and companies to engage in fraudulent financial reporting. When the right mix of forces and opportunities is reached, it can produce fraudulent financial reporting (Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987). Ever since 1950, Professor Donald R. Cressey, has studied the factors that lead to committing fraudulent acts. According to his studies, he concluded that when fraud does occur, there are three factors that act together: intent (premeditation), opportunity and pressure, known as the .fraud triangle” (see Figure 1).Although the factors above are forming the "fraud triangle", it’s sufficient that one to take place at a time, for fraud to occur. The sequence steps in order to exercise the act of fraud are recounted below (Soltani B., 2008)Incentives or pressures are the first factors that influence individuals to commit fraud and it refers to excessive pressure to achieve financial targets, to induce optimistic and unrealistic messages in annual reports. In addition, a firm may be threatened and pressured also by intense competition, by market saturation or sudden changes, acquisitions (mergers), the financing need or cash flow problems. Even otherwise honest individuals can commit fraud in an environment that imposes such threats.Opportunity refers to those factors that enable "fraud to be more easily committed and detection less probable (Hooper J. M., Forneli C. M, 2010).Therefore, ineffective controls or absence of control favors fraud intentions. These factors can be relateddirectly to inadequate monitoring by management or the ineffectiveness of the board of directors or of the audit committee to oversee the reporting and the internal control.Attitude or premeditation is the trigger factor of the fraud act and refers to the fact that the perpetrator must have a mindset that would justify or premeditate the act of fraud. Detection of risk factors that determine board members, management, employees to be predisposed to such intent may be quite difficult. So when a company monitors people and processes to discourage and detect fraud, it must follow the three aspects, because fraud involves incentives or pressure to commit a fraudulent act, a perceived opportunity to do so, and some reasoning.(Soltani B., 2008)3. WHO AND HOW COMMITS FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL STATEMENTSAccording to the Report of the USA National Commission on Fraudster Financial Reporting in the majority of the studied cases, the company’s management, such as chief executive, president and chief financial officer, were the fraudulent perpetrators. In some cases, it was found that there were made intentional false disclosures from the accountant throughout falsified documents and records Furthermore, the committee studies have shown that while the authors of fraudulent financial reporting have used different means, the effect of their actions is almost always consist of overestimating or smoothing earnings in order to exaggerate the company or its assets. In addition, fraudulent financial reporting does not always begin with an openly recognizable act of distortion of the financial statements. In many cases, fraudulent financial reporting is the peak point of a number of acts intended to address operational difficulties. Initially, the activities may not be fraudulent, but in time they may become probable, especially when the tone set by management permits or encourages such activities in order to have fraudulent financial reporting. Thus, we can say that potential criminals involved in fraudulent financial reporting can be both in senior management and among mid-level employees, but we can think also on organized criminal organizations for this purpose. To describe ways in which fraud is committed on the financial statements, the literature (Zabihollah R., 2005) uses the term .fraudulent financial reporting schemes” or .earnings management” (Nguyen K., 2008). However the term “earnings management" does not always refer to an illegitimate action. The accounting policies (U.S. GAAP) or other accounting standards (IFRS) make the difference between legitimate and illegitimate gains. When companies engage in legitimate administration of earnings management within their financial statements, they are submitted as true and are treated in accordance with applicable accounting standards. We can say that earnings management is a fraud when it “involves gains arising from improper revenue recognition, overstatingof assets or undervaluation of liabilities” (Zabihollah R., 2005). In orde r to manipulate the earnings, managers use different aggressive accounting techniques, which have as effect the artificially increase or decrease in revenues, profits, or earnings per share. They use these tactics, hoping to cope with the pressures that are on the market. In general, companies that are traded most often feel the pressure, either from securities analysts who expect them to disclose as much information as possible, either from shareholders who expect, based on their investments, for companies to obtain bigger profits in a short period of time. Failure to obtain expected dividends by investors and hence earnings per share can cause a significant decline in the capitalization of a company.Therefore .earnings management” may be motivated by the pressure or the desire to maximize performance based payments. However, managers do not always aim for the purpose of overestimating management earnings. They are also interested in the opposite situation, to reduce these gains, especially when the intention is that of evading the payment of fees.A practical case of committing fraud in financial statements is .time uniformization of revenue”(Alexander D., 2007). This technique is used by managers to hide some bad periods and involve a manipulation of earnings to show that there was a steady increase over time, although not stated by facts. Given the fact that investors react negatively to the earnings of companies which they perceive as unsafe and risky, standardization of revenue finally meets the satisfaction of investors and maintains a high price of the shares.Another form of fraud known as “big bath behavior” (Hooper J. M., Forneli C. M, 2010), occurs when companies manipulate the profit and loss account, to make the years in which the situation has been very good to seem worse than it really is. Therefore, taking into account the significant losses, they hope to consolidate and to wipe them all at once. As a result of this action, future costs are reduced and natural profits implicitly increased. In other words, the company takes a .big bath” in one year so it can show that the profit will be increasing in the future. Handling can cause either an increase in the prices of stocks or an increase in performance bonuses for management.4. VICTIMS OF FRAUDULENT REPORTINGFinancial statements are prepared and presented at least once a year and aim to meet the information needs common to a number of potential users. Many visitors take the financial statements presented as the main source of financial information and therefore a misrepresentation may affect decisions. (See figure 2)Investors are of course the first victims of fraudulent financial reporting. If company earnings are overstated, investors who buy are deceived and if earnings are understated, the buyers are those who will lose. However they are not the only ones that bear the immediate and harmful effects. The victim list includes others who rely on information from the company's financial reports: banks and other financial institutions lend funds to the company, suppliers, customers seeking to make performance on the company’s contracts, partners, financial analysts providing investment advice about the issuer and its securities, lawyers for the issuer and probably for the issued insurance companies issuing insurance for directors and officers trust and then large claims. To avoid the victim position of fraudulent financial reporting, any user, whether a financier, a borrower, an insurer, investor or shareholder, can make a fraudulent statement when one asks himself around the possibility of achieving or identification of one of the following situations (Weir J.,2009): company reported profit but is not very good on cash flows; gross profit levels remain high, even if the company faces pressure from the market to stabilize prices; receivable accounts, debt and inventory accounts levels are rising, while sales are steady or declining; the company is close to breaching banking pacts; there is a significant year-end adjustments; there is substantial bonuses for top executives.CONCLUSIONS ：Although the achievement of financial reporting by so-called "fraudulent scheme" refers to short-term achievement of "management earnings ", they may draw the following consequences in time: undermines the credibility, quality, transparency and integrity of financial reporting process; endangers the integrity and objectivity of the auditing profession, especially auditors and audit firms; diminishes the confidence in the capital markets, as well as in market participants and in the reliability of financial information; makes capital markets less efficient; adversely affects economic growth; huge lawsuit costs; destroys the careers of people involved in fraudulent financial statements; they cause bankruptcy or substantial economic losses for companies involved in financial statement fraud; encourages regulatory intervention; erodes public confidence and trust in accounting and auditing profession.谢谢下载，祝您生活愉快！。