养老保险制度中英文对照外文翻译文献

养老保险制度中英文对照外文翻译文献（文档含英文原文和中文翻译）
翻译:
重新引入代际均衡：波兰养老保险制度
摘要：波兰于1999 年通过了新的养老金制度。

这种新的养老保险制度允许波兰，以减少退休金支出（占GDP 的百分比），而不是增加它-正如预计的经合组织其他大多数国家。

本文介绍了概念背景的新系统的设计。

新系统的长期目的是确保人口代际平衡，不论情况。

这需要稳定的国内生产总值的份额分配给整个退休一代。

传统的养老金制度的目的，相反，在稳定的份额人均国内生产总值退休人员。

在人口结构的变化观察到，在过去的一夫妻几十年，这历史性的尝试，以稳定为首占GDP 的比重为退休人员严重的财政问题和经济增长负外部性，如观察许多国家。

许多国家曾试图改革其养老金制度不同的方法来尝试解决这些不断增加的费用问题。

虽然波兰改革采用了其他地方应用技术，它的设计不同于典型的做法和教训，结果是有希望的所有经合组织国家。

本文介绍了这一理论和实际应用另一种方法，因此，新的波兰养老保险制度主要特点设计。

导言
人口结构的转型与政策过于短视一起造成了严重的问题在全世界许多国家地区的养老金。

传统的要素养老金制度的设计包括对捐款的薄弱环节和利益缺乏超过该系统的成本控制。

这些因素列入养老保险制度导致爆炸的设计成本，造成了负增长的外部因素和导致失业率持续高企。

因此，养老金改革的追求现已在世界各地，特别是在欧洲的政策议程的顶部。

然而，很少有国家能够在引进根本性的改革面积到了这个时候养老金。

在这种情况下，改革的定义是至关重要的。

对于本文的目的，“改革”是指改变系统，以消除而不是仅仅在边缘玩的贡献率- 结构性效率低下和退休年龄调整为短期财政和系统的参数政治传统的养老金制度已被证明是低效率的提供与社会保障。

在同一时间试图治愈这些系统阻碍了缺乏共识什么可以取代传统的制度。

讨论这问题涉及混乱的思想背景下产生的讨论参与者，以及从这些概念作为过度使用“支付即用即付”与“资金”，即“公” 与“私”，而在同一时间，忽略了数重要的经济问题。

此外，经济学家们忽略传统的养老金。

设计和运行养老金制度是留给非经济学家，谁没有广泛关注与如何资助长期或如何弥补这些养老金养老金系统的负外部性。

波兰新养老保险制度属于非常小的成功的尝试次数适用于现
代思想的地区。

这并不意味着如某些人承担放弃社会安全目标。

相反，关键想法是放弃提供社会保障的低效率的方法，以挽救其目标和原则。

本文由两部分组成。

第一个重点是一般性问题的讨论需要解决的养老保险制度设计时。

这些问题是提交方式，超出了传统思维方式对养老金去。

在这方面的论文的第二部分，重要的是要指出，最在目前的欧盟成员国和候选国的国家养老金系统，基本上是在政策层面基本相同。

因此，解决方案在一个会员国或候选国可以预期是相同的。

比如，在法国，德国，意大利，捷克共和国，匈牙利的欧洲国家和其他欧洲国家，波兰和瑞典在过去的几十年，直到晚1990 年的开发效率低下，成本高昂的养老金制度。

因此，在部分二论文中，我们会研究如何波兰现在已经成功实施的办法列于论文的第一部分，并建立了一个强大的和中立的根本养老保险制度。

选择一般问题
养老保险制度的设计已经考虑到了一些问题。

它们的充分介绍和讨论超出了这个范围，本文提出仅列出审议的问题和最重要的意见。

养老保险制度：外部性与中立养老保险制度的一个描述很大程度上取决于双方的汇总和个人观点。

从聚合的角度，养老金制度是当前的划分方式国内生产总值之间的部分工作所保存的一代和部分分配对退休一代。

从个人的角度，养老金制度是收入分配方式对一个人的生命周期。

不论持有上述方法应用的技术或思想观点。

养老保险制度，上述定义的，并不一定是随收随付即付或资助。

这些功能源于同时在技术内容上的应用退休金制度，而不是从系统本身。

如果养老保险制度设计匿名参与和承担的再分配规模相当庞大，然后我们通常称此系统随收随付友去。

如果养老保险制度设计采用财务市场，那么我们通常称之为资助。

然而，这些通常用于两个概念不用尽一切可能的组合匿名与个性化的参与和金融与非金融类养老保险制度设计使用的技术。

二元随收随付即付与资助拨开树叶方法在一个系统中，个别参与相结合不使用金融市场。

这种方法还忽略了一个事实，即使用金融市场是指投资（私募基金的投资组合养老金组成）或延税（养老政府债券投资组合的组成），这显然是不一样的。

添加再分配或金融市场产生的养老保险制度外部性。

这些外部可以是积极的和负面的。

在再分配养老保险制度可以产生积极的外部性，如果该系统是价格便宜，即GDP 的一部分分配给退休一代并不大。

如果再分配是大，那么它会产生负外部性，如促进失业率持续高企和增长疲弱。

利用金融市场的原因增长的正外部性，如果养老保险制度的贡献钱花费投资。

如果捐款是政府债务支出就可能会造成类似的大型再分配制度，即更多的税负外部性扭曲。

这可能发生，如果对政府债务的回报率是坚持超过国内生产
总值的增长速度。

还存在另一种选择，即把尽可能靠近养老保险制度经济中立越好。

此选项要求，除其他外，结合
个人参与系统中的几代人之间的本地生产总值除以对实体经济的发展，如已经完成在波兰和瑞典
人口结构：在变化的后果不论使用的技术设计养老保险制度，养老保险制度交流了一个适合该产品的部分退役工作的一代一代。

该交易所可组织各种方式的权利，也可以各种方式表达。

特别是，权利可以是在金融交易市场，或者定义有关的一些经济变量，或者只是政治基础承诺。

在所有这些案件有一个养老权市场
种类。

工作代财政捐款，以购买的权利、退休代卖的权利，以获得该产品的一部分工作一代。

养老金制度的各类建立一种机构框架这个市场。

给定的贡献率，市场的需求是由工人和他们的生产力数量来确定。

退休人员的数量决定了需求侧。

然而，如果–因为它是在传统的系统–养老金的情况下管理的定义（工资替代率的承诺）之后养老金系统仅仅取决于人口结构。

更强劲的
生产率增长不能帮助平衡系统的收入和支出。

一般的人口结构变化看世界造成了传销的用于资助养老金支出不再产生足够的收入。

因此，以前的小的低效率已成为毁灭性的。

老化变以前的“金字塔型”人口结构进入了一个新的“小屋”形，如图 1 所示。

养老保险制度在很大程度上依赖于人口的人口结构。

也没有逃脱这种依赖关系，不论养老金制度技术使用。

金融市场不使养老金制度免疫依赖。

金融市场做帮助，但是，在调整系统到通过引入一个易于理解和接受的当前人口形势链接之间的利益和缴纳。

世界各地的人口结构总体变化已经造成了严重的许多国家的财政问题。

这种变化可以从视点看到传统的社会养老保险制度的目标能够实现。

在这种在这方面，两个重要的观察值得一提：在过去，少数股东- 时下绝大多数- 那些谁支付系统工人的贡献，后来收到退休人员的福利。

这意味着在个人的生活的活跃阶段，参与养老金系统是非常相似
的长期储蓄。

由于目标是提供为每个个人，以个人为主体的核算单位成为上级养老保险制度的方式来组织。

在过去，养老保险制度的国内生产总值很老的人谁是无法赚取自己的生活和金融消费渠道。

现在退休的人仍然可以打工赚来的，和他们- 平均拥有多年的生活留下来住。

因此，上面的讨论表明，养老保险制度的目标已经改变了养老退休金系统（OA ）的一部分。

然而，非养老社会保障制度（NOA ），如残疾，保持风险有关，不论老化。

这将导致社会保障体系的各部分的结论是，应采用分段，如收入（贡献）和费用（利益）可以连接到他们的目的完全随着时间的推移，各分部相互绝缘。

在这种方式中，决策者将能够看到各分部的社会保障体系，知道系统其他部分的风险，其收入和支出都被绝缘的当前状态，准确地反映了该分部的和共同的系统作为一个整体。

社会保障体系，然后将一个OA段（养老金）和各的NOA段（残疾，生育，工人的补偿等等）。

这种业务和会计改革是最重要的一个深养老保险制度改革的非财政的原因之一，并为决策者提供一个功能强大的工具来了解如何以及他们的社会保障体系，将满足其目标。

养老金：所提出的方法的总结
典型的养老金经济学，以及流行的讨论，使用下面的对立概念为思考中心基础养老金：
现付与资金；公共与私人的；多方面与多支柱。

本文提出了一种替代方法。

这种替代方法，可以在以下四对对立的概念，总结了：通用（强制覆盖整个人口）和部分（一组人自愿参与）；个性化（个人账户）与匿名（不）参与；
具体的任务/分段（OA与NOA）与多任务（OA和NOA混合在一个方案）社会保障组织；金融（通过金融市场回报率）与非财务（通过真正的经济增长产生的回报率）。

有效的养老保险制度的一种方式，使内源性的设计，这意味着它会自动调整不干预外。

系统只需要一个决定，即贡献率的初步选择。

基于比较的上面设置养老金的思维方式可以更好地描述和分析了养老保险制度是有用的。

这种方法也可以让养老金讨论超越那些促进民办养老基金和那些促进所谓的现收现付制无望的争议。

在欧盟等和其它地方的政策制定者可以使用所提出的方法的时候，看着他们的养老金制度改革。

波兰新的养老保险制度的主要特点
波兰新养老保险制度的设计是一个很好的例子应用上述，介绍了在实践中的思维方式。

命名为“安全系统通过多样性“ 1999 年 1 月开始。

它完全取代了以前的条例退休金的工作人口的大多数。

设计新系统从从无到有提供了独特的机会，以避免复杂的系统。

相反，新系统的设计是简单和透明。

主要目标是设计一个系统可以是中性的，或者至少关闭经济增长无论对中立人口老龄化。

新系统的设计不复制任何其他现有的养老保险制度在其他地方。

很强的相似性，可以发现，只有到新的瑞典养老保险制度根据类似的原则，并开始在同一时间对同一，在这一总体框架波兰新系统采用了数字技术的概念在其他国家发展。

这种新波兰养老保险制度的简要介绍对一般的系统经济性设计的重点，同时搁置最技术细节。

下面的子弹协助抓的波兰新概念的本质系统设计。

重点是普遍的养老保险制度的一部分；分离，社会保障的养老从非养老部分的一部分社会保障和分割的收入流；终止了以前的系统办公自动化的一部分；创建一个新的办公自动化系统完全养老金个人账户的基础上；权责发生制在办公自动化系统；
分裂两个帐户（第一帐户中的每个人的办公自动化捐款北区区议会，第二个帐户）；
最小的两个补充养老年金顶部，如果他们的总和低于一定水平（资金，国家预算中）。

特别是有没有这样的元素作为一个“国家基本养老金” 的制度。

社会再分配的存在，但它被移动从退休金制度。

养老保险制度的唯一的作用是提供一个有效的方法，对收入分配工作的一代人生命周期。

对于整个社会保障体系的贡献率并没有改变。

不过工人的工资是“票房注册”，以便向他们介绍他们的想法，付出的贡献的一部分，并建造了总成本的意识养老保险制度。

因此，自1999 年1 月工人和雇主分担没有任何费用的捐款在捐款总额的大小真正的变化。

该整个操作影响的百分比，但不是真正的金钱流动。

因此新的系统是基于以前的系统相同的贡献流入。

结束语
为人们提供与社会保障- 包括消费融资的退休一代一代的产品进行的工作是非常高的名单在大多数国家的社会优先事项。

这是社会的重要，特别是在欧洲。

然而，传统的养老金制度的低效率在实现这一目标的提出风险。

社会和民众主义言论向公众表明，改变内养老保险制度是危险的社会目标。

在现实中，大多数国家在世界上，它是刚好相反。

时间越长，传统的养老金制度是举起，在更多的社会造成的破坏性影响将被创建。

波兰属于一个国家的非组，为众多的人准备我们的时间，即人口老龄化最严峻的挑战。

新养老保险制度不仅将停止对养老保险制度的成本增加，但会也让他们减少。

这将使更多的资源用于发展，这反过来也将有助于更强劲的增长，加双方的工作生活和退休一代的标准。

波兰新的养老金制度的例子，以及瑞典之一，有趣的另一个原因。

这种类型的系统有利于劳动力的流动，这是特别需要在欧洲。

免费的劳工运动，就不可能实现如果从一国转移到另一个影响到退休后的收入预期。

因此，在养老保险制度的中立性目标将有越来越多的欧洲重要整合。

原文:
Reintroducing Intergenerational Equilibrium: Key
Concepts behind the New Polish Pension System
By: Marek G óra
William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 574
June 2003
Abstract
Poland adopted a new pension system in 1999. This new pension system allows Poland to reduce pension expenditure (as a percent of GDP), instead of increasing it as is projected for the majority of other OECDc ountries. This paper presents the conceptual background of the new system design. The new system' s long -term bjective is to ensure intergenerational equilibrium irrespective of the demographic situation. This requires stabilisation of the share of GDP allocated to the entire retired generation. Traditional pension systems aim, instead, at stabilisation of the share of GDP per retiree. The change in demographic structure observed over the past for a couple of decades and this historic attempt to stabilise the share of GDP per retiree led to severe fiscal problems and negative externalities for growth, as observed in numerous countries.
Many countries have tried to reform their pension systems in different ways to try to resolve the issue of these ever-increasing costs. Although the Polish reform uses a number of techniques applied elsewhere, its design differs from the typical approaches –and the lessons and results are promising for all OECDc ountries. This paper presents the theoretical and practical application of this alternative approach and as such, the key features of the new Polish pension system design. Introduction
Demographic transition together with myopic policies has caused severe problems in the area of pensions in many countries around the world. Elements of traditional pension systems ' design include a weak link of
benefits to contributions and the lack of control over costs of the system. Inclusion of these elements in the pension system design led to the explosion of costs, caused negative externalities for growth and contributed to persistently high unemployment. As such, the quest for pension reform is now on the top of policy agendas around the world, and especially in Europe. However, very few countries have been able to introduce fundamental reforms in the area of pensions to this time. In
this case, the definition of reform is crucial. For the purposes of
this paper, “reform ” means changing the system in order to remove tructural inefficiencies –and not just playing at the margins with contribution rates and retirement ages to adjust the system's parameters for short-term fiscal and political reasons.Traditional pension systems have proven to be inefficient in providing societies with social security. At the same time attempts to cure these systems are hampered by a lack of consensus on what could replace the
traditional system. Discussions on this issue involve confusion stemming from the ideological context of the discussion participants,
as well as from overuse of such concepts as “pay-as-you- go” versus “funding ”, or “public ” versus “private ”, while at the same time ignoring a number of important economic issues.
Furthermore, economists have traditionally ignored pensions. Designing and running pension systems was left to non-economists, who were not extensively concerned with how to finance pensions in the
long-term or with how to counteract these pension systems' negative externalities. The new Polish pension system belongs to very small number of successful attempts to apply modern thinking in the area of pensions. This does not
mean –as some may assume –giving up social security goals. Rather, the key idea was to give up the inefficient methods of delivering
social security in order to save its goals and principles.
This paper consists of two parts. The first focuses on a discussion of general issues that need to be addressed when designing a pension system. These issues are presented in a way that goes beyond the traditional way of thinking on pensions. In regards to this second part of the paper, it is important to point out that most countries in the current EU member states and candidate countries have pension systems that are essentially the same at the basic policy level. As such, the solutions in one member state or candidate country can be expected to be the same. Like European states such as France, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary and other European states, Poland and Sweden over the past decades and until the late 1990' s developed inefficient,
costly pension systems. As such, in part two of the paper we shall examine how Poland has now successfully implemented the approach presented in the first part of the paper, and created a fundamentally strong and neutral pension system.
Selected general issues
Pension system design has to take into account a number of issues. Their full presentation and discussion goes beyond the scope of this paper This paper presents only a list of the issues for consideration and the most important observations. The pension system: externalities versus neutrality The description of a pension system depends strongly on both the aggregated and individual viewpoint. From the aggregated perspective, the pension system is a way of dividing current GDP between a part kept by the working generation and a part allocated to the retired generation. From the individual perspective, the pension system is a way of income allocation over a person 's life cycle. The above holds irrespective to the technical method applied or the ideological viewpoint. The pension system –as defined above –is not necessarily pay-as-you-go or funded. Such features stem from technical elements additionally applied on the top of the pension system, rather than from the system itself. If the pension system design assumes anonymous participation and a substantial scale of redistribution then we usually call this system pay-as-you-go.
If the pension system design uses financial markets, then we usually call it funded. However, these two typically used concepts do not exhaust all possible combinations of anonymous versus individualised participation and financial versus non-financial pension system design techniques used. The dualistic pay-as-you-go versus funded approach leaves aside the combination of individual participation in a system that does not use financial markets. This approach also neglects the fact that using financial markets meansi nvestment (pension portfolio consists of private equities) or deferring taxes (pension portfolio consists of government bonds), which is obviously not the same. Adding redistribution or financial markets to the pension system generates externalities. These
externalities can be positive and negative. Redistribution within the pension system can generate positive externalities if the system is inexpensive, namely the part of GDP allocated to the retired generation is not large. If the redistribution is large, then it generates negative externalities, such as contributing to persistently high unemployment and
weak growth. Using financial markets causes positive externalities for growth if the pension system spends contribution money on investment.
If the contributions are spent on government debt they may lead to negative externalities similar to those of large redistributive system, namely more tax distortions. This can happen if the rate of return on government
debt is persistently above the rate of GDPg rowth. There exists yet another option, namely to bring the pension system as close toeconomic neutrality as possible. This option requires, among other things, combining individual participation in the system with dividing GDP between generations based on real economy developments, such as has been done in Poland and Sweden.
Demographic structure: consequences of the change .Irrespective of the pension system design technique used, the pension system exchanges a right of the retired generation for a part of the product of the working generation. The exchange can be organised in various ways and also the rights can be expressed in various ways. In particular, the rights can be either traded in the financial markets, or defined in relation to some economic variables, or just based on political promise. In all of these cases there is a kind of market for pension rights. The working generation finances contributions in order to purchase the rights; the retired generation sells the rights in order to get a part of the product of the working generation. The various types of pension systems create an institutional framework for this market.
Given the contribution rate, the demand side of the market is determined by the number of workers and their productivity. The number of retirees determines the demand side. However, if – as it is the case in traditional systems – pensions are
administratively defined in terms of wages (replacement rate promised) then the pension system depends solely on the demographic structure. Even strong productivity growth cannot help in balancing the system' s revenue and expenditure. The general change of the demographic structure we see around the world has caused the pyramid scheme used for financing pension expenditure to no longer generate sufficient revenues. In consequence, previous minor inefficiencies have become devastating. Ageing turned the previous “pyramid-shape ” demographic structure into a new “hut-shape” one, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The pension system strongly depends on the demographic structure of the population. There is no escape from this dependency irrespective of pension system technique used. Using financial markets do not make pension systems immune from this dependency. Financial markets do help, however, in adjusting the system to the
current demographic situation by introducing an easy to understand and acceptable
link between benefits and contributions paid. The general change of the demographic structure around the world has caused severe fiscal problems for many countries. This change can be seen also from the viewpoint of being able to achieve the traditional social goals of the pension system. In this regard, two important observations are worth mentioning: In the past, the minority – nowadays the vast majority – of those
who pay contributions to the system as workers, afterwards receive benefits as retirees. This means that in the active phase of the individual ' s life, participation in the pension system is very similar to long term saving. As the goal is to provide for each individual, using the individual as the main accounting unit becomes a superior way to organize the pension system.
In the past, the pension system channelled GDP to the very old people who were unable to earn a living and finance consumption on their own. Nowadays people who retire are still able to work and earn, and they – on average have many years of life left to live.
As such, the discussion above shows that the objective of the pension system has changed for the old-age part of the pension system (OA). However, the non-old-age parts of social security systems (NOA), such as disability, remain risk related, irrespective to ageing. This leads to the conclusion that the various parts of the social security system should be segmented, such that revenues (contributions) and expenses (benefits) can be tied to their purpose exclusively over time, and each segment insulated from each other.
In this way, policy makers would be able to look at each segment of the social security system, knowing that its revenues and expenses have been insulated from the risks of other parts of the system and are an accurate reflection of the current state of that segment and together of the system as a whole. The social security system, would then be made of an OA segment (pensions) and various NOA segments (disability, maternity, worker ' s compensation, and so forth). This operational and accounting reform is one of the most important non-fiscal reasons for a deep pension reform and would provide policy makers with a powerful tool to understand how well their social security system can and will meet its goals.
Pensions: Summary of the proposed approach
Typically pension economics, as well as popular discussions, use the following opposing concepts as a central basis for thinking on pensions:
Pay-as-you-go versus funding;
Public versus private;
Monopillar versus multipillar.
This paper presents an alternative approach. This alternative approach can be summarised in the following four pairs of opposing concepts:
Universal (mandatory covering the entire population) versus partial (voluntary participation of a group of people);
Individualised (individual accounts) versus anonymous (no accounts) participation;
Task specific/segmented (OA separated from NOA) versus multitask (OA and NOA mixed within one scheme) organisation of social security;
Financial (generating the rate of return through financial markets) versus nonfinancial (generating the rate of return through real economy growth).
The efficient pension system is designed in a way that makes it endogenous, which means it adjusts automatically without intervening from outside. The system needs only one decision, namely the initial choice of the contribution rate.
The way of thinking on pensions based on the above set of comparisons can be useful for better describing and analysing the pension system. This approach can also let the discussion on pensions go beyond the hopeless controversy of those who promote private funded pension funds and those who promote what is called the pay-as-you-go system.
As such policy makers in the European Union and elsewhere could benefit using the proposed methodology when looking at reforming their pension systems.
Key features of the new Polish pension system
The new Polish pension system design is a good example of applying the above described way of thinking in practice. The system named “Security through Diversity ” started on 1 January 1999. It entirely replaced previous regulations on oldage pensions for majority of working population. Designing the new system from scratch provided the unique opportunity to avoid complicating the system. Instead, the new system design is simple and transparent. The main goal was to design a
system that can be neutral or at least close to neutrality for economic growth irrespective of population ageing. The design of the new system does not copy any other pension system existing elsewhere. Strong similarity can be found only to the new Swedish pension system based on similar principles and started on the same day.16 At the same time, within this general framework the new Polish system uses a number of technical concepts developed in other countries. This brief
presentation of the new Polish pension system focuses on the general economic design of the system, while leaving aside most technical details.
The following bullets help in grasping the essence of the concept of the
new Polish system design.
Focusing on the universal part of the pension system;
Separation of the old-age part of social security from the non-old-age parts of social security ; and segmenting the flows of revenue;
Termination of the part of the previous system;
Creation of a new pension system, entirely based on individual
accounts; Accrual accounting within the system;
Splitting each person 's OA contributions between two accounts (first account –NDC, second account –FDC);
Annuitisation of account values at the moment of retirement;
Minimum pension supplement on the top of both annuities if their sum is below certain level (financed out of the state budget).
It should be strongly stressed that both accounts are annuitised at the same moment and play exactly the same role within social security. In particular there is no such element of the system as a “basic state pension ”. Social redistribution exists but it has been moved out from
the pension system. The sole role of the pension system is providing working generation with an efficient method of income allocation over their life cycle. The contribution rate for the entire social security system has not changed. However workers ' salaries were “grossed up ” in order to introduce to them the idea that they pay part of the
contribution and to build their awareness of the overall cost of the pension system. As such, since 1 January 1999 both workers and employers share the cost of contributions without any real change in the size of the total contributions. The whole operation affected percentages but not real flows of money. Thus the new system is based on the same contribution inflow as the previous system.
Final remarks
Providing people with social security –including financing consumption of the retired generation out of the product of the working generation - is very high on the list of social priorities in most countries. It is especially important in European societies. However, the inefficiency of traditional pension systems put achieving this goal at
risk. Social and populist rhetoric suggests to the public that changes within the pension system are dangerous for social goals. In reality, for most countries in the world, it is just the opposite. The longer the traditional pension systems are held up, the more socially damaging effects will be created. Poland belongs to a non-numerous group of countries that are prepared for one of the most difficult challenges of our time, namely the ageing of the population. The new pension system will not only stop the increase of costs of the pension system but will also allow for their reduction. This will leave more resources
available for development, which, in turn, will contribute to stronger growth and the increase of living standards of both the working and the retired generation. The example of the new Polish pension system, as well as the Swedish one, is interesting for yet another reason. This type of system contributes to labour mobility, which is particularly needed in Europe.
Free movement of labour cannot be achieved if moving from one country to another affects expected retirement income. As such, aiming at pension system neutrality will be more and more important for European integration.。