SECURITY SCHEME FOR MOBILE AGENT SYSTEM IN E- COMMERCE SCENARIO ABSTRACT
华为SecoManager安全控制器详版彩页
华为SecoManager安全控制器面对差异化的租户业务和频繁的业务变更场景，如何实现安全业务的自动化分析、可视及可管，安全策略调优以及合规性分析，是迫切需要解决的问题。
传统依赖人工管理及配置安全业务，运维比较低效。
安全策略合规性检查需要投入专人分析，往往审批不够及时，也可能疏漏风险策略。
安全策略下发对业务的影响不可预见，不能在策略部署前评估策略对用户业务的影响。
安全策略体量越来越大，致使安全运维人员难以聚焦在关键的风险策略上。
业界急需基于智能化、自动化的围绕安全策略全生命周期的安全策略管理方式，可以帮助用户快速、高效完成策略变更的同时，确保策略下发安全和准确，从而有效提升运维效率、降低运维成本。
SecoManager安全控制器是华为针对数据中心、园区、海量分支等不同场景推出的统一安全控制器，提供安全业务编排和策略统一管理，支持安全功能服务化、可视化，协同网络、安全设备和大数据智能分析系统形成全面威胁感知、分析和响应的整网主动安全防护体系。
产品图华为SecoManager 安全控制器产品特点策略多维自动化编排，安全业务分钟级部署• 应用互访关系映射与基于应用的策略管理：从基于IP 到IP 的策略管理视角过渡到基于应用互访关系的策略管理视角。
以应用为核心，抽象出网络中应用的互访关系，使得用户业务变得可视，帮助用户“0距离”贴近现网中的应用服务，有效降低安全策略数量。
旨在通过模型化的应用策略模型，简化用户配置工作量，从而帮助用户的全网策略管理工作化繁为简。
• 基于客户业务分区的策略管理：从基于安全区域的策略管理视角过渡到基于用户业务分区的策略管理视角。
传统的网络分区以安全区域为单位，比如trust 、untrust 、dmz 、local 等，面对安全设备数量较多、网络规模庞大的场景，对于用户来说安全区域、设备、策略、业务上线、业务变更等要素交织在一起，很难清晰的还原出客户业务的脉络，从而不能有效的指导安全策略的设计。
子群中完全安全的基于身份的广播加密英文
Fu lly S e c u r e Id e n t it y-b a s e dBr o a d c a s t En c r y p t io n in t h eS u b g r o u p sZhang Leyou1,2,Hu Y upu2,Wu Qing31Department of Mathematical Science,Xidian University,Xi'an710071,P.R.China2Key Laboratory of Computer Networks and Information Security,Ministry of Education,Xidian Univers ity,Xi'an 710071,P.R.China3School of automation,Xi’an Ins titute of Posts and Telecommunications,Xi’an710121,P.R.ChinaAbstr act:In this paper,we show how to use the dual techniques in the subgroups to give a secure identity-based broadcast encryption(IBBE)scheme with constant-size ciphertexts.Our scheme achieves the full security(adaptive security)under three static(i.e. non q-based)assumptions.It is worth noting that only recently Waters gives a short ciphertext broadcast encryption system that is even adaptively secure under the simple assumptions.One feature of our methodology is that it is relatively simple to leverage our techniques to get adaptive security.Key wor ds:identity-based broadcast encryption; dual system encryption;f ull secur ity;static assumption;subgroup;provable securityI.INTRODUCTIONIdentity-based encryption(IBE)was introduced by Shamir[1].It allows for a party to encrypt a message using the recipient’s identity as a public key.The ability to use identities as public keys avoids the need to distribute public key certi cates.So it can simplify many applications of public key encryption(PKE)and is currently an active research area.Identity-based broadcast encryption(IBBE) [2-6]is a generalization of IBE.One public key can be used to encrypt a message to any possible identity in IBE schemes.But in an IBBE scheme, one public key can be used to encrypt a message to any possible group of S identities.In Refs.[2, 4],the proposed scheme was based on random oracles.In addition,the size of the ciphertexts grows linearly with the number of the users.The well known construction of IBBE was proposed by Delerablée[3].This construction achieved constant size private keys and constant size ciphertexts. However the security of her main scheme achieved only selective-identity security(a weak security) and relied on the random oracles.In Refs.[5-6], two schemes with full security were proposed respectively.But they were impractical in real-life practice since their security relied on the complex assumptions which were dependent on the depth of users set and the number of queries made by an短文attacker.In addition,the work in Ref.[6]had the sublinear-size ciphertexts.Moreover,the authors in Ref.[6]used a sub-algorithm at the Encrypt phase to achieve full security which increased the computations cost.These motivate us to construct a new efficient scheme which can achieve a strong security-full security with constant size cipertexts.Recently,a new technique is applied to IBE.It is called Dual Encryption Technique.In a dual system [7-8],ciphertexts and keys can take on two forms:normal or semi-functional.Semi-functional ciphertexts and keys are not used in the real system since they are only used in the security proof.A normal key can decrypt normal or semi-functional ciphertexts,and a normal ciphertext can be decrypted by normal or semi-functional keys.However,when a semi-functional key is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext,decryption will fail.More speci cally,the semi-functional components of the key and ciphertext will interact to mask the blinding factor by an additional random term.Waters [7]first proposed a broadcast encryption scheme based on this new technique.However,the proposed scheme is not based on identity and also inefficient since its cost of decryption is dependent on depth of users set.In this paper,we present a new construction.Our construction will use the composite order groups of order N=p 1p 2p 3and identities in Z N .The keys construction will be carried out in the subgroups 1p G and 3p G .2p G will be sem i-f unctional space which is not used in the real system.Our scheme achieves O(1)-size ciphertexts and full security which is stronger than selective-identity security.In addition,we show that its security does not rely on the random oracles and is achieved under three static assumptions.II.PRELIMINARIESp osite Or der Bilinear GroupsComposite order bilinear groups were used inRefs.[7-9].In this paper,the output is (N=p 1p 2p 3,G,G 1,e),where p 1,p 2,p 3are distinct primes,G and 1G are cyclic groups of order N.A bilinear map e is a map 1:e G G G ×→with the following properties:(i)Bilinearity:for all ,u v ∈G ,a,b ∈N Z ,we have (,)a b e u v =(,)a b e u v ;(ii)Non-degeneracy:g G ∈such that (,)e g g has order N in 1G ;(iii)Co mpu tab ility:th ere is an eff icient algorithm to compute (,)e u v for all ,u v ∈G .B.Static Har dness AssumptionIn this section,we give our complex assumption.These assumptions have been used in Refs.[8-9].Assum p tion 1(Subgroup decision pr oblem for 3primes)Given (N=p 1p 2p 3,G ,1G ,e),select randomly 1p g G ∈,33p X G ∈,121p p T G ∈,12p T G ∈and set D=(N,G ,1G ,e,g ,3X ).It is hard to distinguish 1T from 2T .The advantage of an algorithm is de ned as112|Pr[(,)1]Pr[(,)1]|Adv A D T A D T ===.Defin ition 1Assumption 1holds if 1A dv is negligible.Assumption 2Given (N=p 1p 2p 3,G ,1G ,e),pick randomly 11,p g X G ∈,2,X 22p Y G ∈,333,p X Y G ∈,set D =(N,G ,1G ,e ,g ,12323,,X X X YY ).Then select1T G ∈,132p p T G ∈at random.It is hard to distinguish 1T from 2T .The advantage of an algorithm is de ned as212|Pr[(,)1]Pr[(,)1]|Adv A D T A D T ===.Definition 2Assumption 2holds if 2Adv is negligible.Assumption 3Given (N=p 1p 2p 3,G ,1G ,e ),pick randomly 1p g G ∈,2,X 222,p Y Z G ∈,33p X G ∈,,N s Z α∈,set D=(N ,G ,1G ,e ,g ,2322,,,s g X X g Y Z α).Thencompute 1(,)s T e g g α=and pick randomly 21T G ∈.It is hard to distinguish 1T from 2T .The advantage of an algorithm is de ned as312|Pr[(,)1]Pr[(,)1]|Adv A D T A D T ===.Defin ition 3Assumption 3holds if 3A dv is negligible.C.I BBEAn identity-based broadcast encryption scheme (I BBE)with the secu rity parameter and th e短文1021,(,')(,)jsID jj j i e C d e d d C =≠∏=01011,((),)(()(),)iijiisID k r i ii ssI D I D r k i iij i j j i e h ug R e g h u R R g α===≠′∏∏∏011011,((),)((),)(,)((),)(,)((),)iiijiis sI D ID k r k i i ii i s sID ID k r k k k i i iji j j i e h u g e h u R e g g e h u g e R g e R g α====≠′=∏∏∏∏=1kv .Note:In the previous equation,the orthogonality property of 123,,p p p G G G is used.It is described simply as follows.Lem ma 1[8]When ,iji p j p h G h G ∈∈for i j ≠,(,)i j e h h is the identity element in 1G .By using this lemma,one can obtain0011,((),)(,)((),)1jis sID ID k kk i i i iji j j i e h u R e R g e R g ==≠′===∏∏.B.Ef ciency AnalysisOur construction achieves O(1)-size ciphertexts.The private key of construction pr ivate key is linear in the maximal size of S.In addition,(,)e g g a can be precomputed,so there no pair computations at the p hase of Encryp tion.Fur thermore,the security of the proposed scheme is reduced to the static assumptions.These assumptions are more natural than those in the existing schemes.Table I and 2give the comparisons of efficiency with other schemes.In Table I,all schemes achieve full security.Table I Comparisons of Ef ciencyschemes Hardness PK size pk size Ciphertextsize [5]TBDHE O (λ)O (|S |)O(1)[6]1st BDHE O (m)O (|S |)O(1)[6]2nd BDHE O (m)O (1)O(1)[6]3r d BDHE O (m)O (1)Sublinear of |S|OursStaticO (m)O (|S |)O(1)Table II Comparisons of Securityschemes R.O.StaticassumptionSecurity model [3]Yes No selective [4]Yes Yes full [5]No No full [6]No No full OursNoYesfullNote:λis a security parameter.m and |S|denote the maximal size of the set of receivers and the size of receivers for one encryption.R.O.denotes the random oracles.C.Secur ity An alysisIn this section,we will prove the security of the proposed scheme.We first define semi-functional keys and sem i-f unctional ciph ertexts.Let 2g denote a generator of 2p G .Semi-functional keys:At first,a normal key 0111(,',,,,,,)i i s d d d d d d +L L is obtained using the Extract algorithm.Then some random elements 00,,j γγγ′for 1,,j s =L and j i ≠are chosen in N Z .The semi-functional keys are set as follows.002d d g γ=,2d d g γ′′=,2jj j d d g γ=,1,,j s =L ,j i ≠.Sem i-fu n ctio n al cip h er t ext s:At f irst,anormal semi-functional ciphertext 012(,,)C C C ′′′isobtained using the Encrypt algorithm.Then two random elements λ1,λ2are chosen in N Z .The semi-functional ciphertexts are set as follows.00C C ′=,1112C C g λλ′=λ1λ2,2222C C g λ′=λ2.We organize our proof as a sequence of games.The first game defined will be the real identity-based encryption game and the last one will be one in which the adversary has no advantage unconditionally.We will show that each game is indistinguishable from the next (under three complexity assumptions).We rst de ne the games as:Game real :This is a real IBBE security game.For 0≤i ≤q ,the Game i is de ned as follows.Game i :Let Ωdenote the set of private keys which the adversary queries during the games.Thisgame is a real IBBE security game with the two exceptions:(1)The challenge ciphertext will be a semi-functional ciphertext on the challenge set *S .(2)The rst i keys will be semi-functional private keys.The rest of keys in Ωwill be normal.Note:In game 0,the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.In game q ,the challenge ciphertexts and all keys are semi-functional.Game nal :This game is same with game q except that the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of random group element of 1G .We will show that these games are indistin-guishable in a set of Lemmas.Let Adv game A denote the advantage in the real game.Lem ma 2Suppose that there exists an algorithm A such th at Adv realga me A 0Adv ga me A =ε.Th en we can build an algorithm B with advantage εin breaking Assumption 1.Pr oof Our algorithm B begins by receiving 3,,g X T where 1p g G ∈,33p X G ∈.It works as follows:Setup B chooses random elements 1,,,,l a a a L N b Z ∈an d sets ia i u g =,b h g =f or 1i l .It send s the p ub lic key s P K={1,,,,l g h u u L ,(,)a v e g g =}to A.Query Phase 1The adversary A issues a private key q uer y f or iden tity ID i ∈S (||S s l =).B answers as follows:It selects randomly 00,,,,1,j r t t t j s j i ′≠in N Z .Th e n it s et s 0111(,',,,,,,)iID i i s d d d d d d d +=L L =0111331313133((),,,,,,,).i i i s ID t t t t tt r r r arrr s ii i g huX g X u X u X u X u X +′+=L L It is a valid simulation to A.Ch a llen ge Th e adversar y A o utpu ts two challenge message 01,M M and a challenge set *S ={**1,,s ID ID L }.Then the ciphertext 012(,,)C C C C =is formed as*1012(,),,s iii a ID b a C M e T g C T C T γ=+∑===,γ{0,1}∈.Query phase 2The adversary continues to issue queries q j ,where q i is the following:y Extraction query (ID i ),as in phase 1with the constraint that ID i *S .Gu ess Finally,the adv er sary A outp uts aguess γ′∈{0,1}and wins the game if γ′=γ.I f 12p p T G ∈,th en 012(,,)C C C C =i s a se mi -functional ciphertext.If 1p T G ∈,012(,,)C C C C =is a normal ciphertext.Hence B can use A ’s guess to break Assumption 1with advantage ε.Lem m a 3S up p os e t hat th er e e xis ts an algorithm A that makes at most q queries and such t h at 1Adv k ga me A Adv kga me A =εf o r 1k q .Then we can build an algorithm B with advantage εin breaking Assumption 2.Pr oof Our algorithm B begins by receiving 12323,,,,g X X X YY T where 1p g G ∈,33p X G ∈.It works as follows:Setu p B chooses random elements 1,,,,l a a a L N b Z ∈a n d s et s ia i u g =,b h g =f o r 1i l .I t s en ds the p ublic keys PK={1,,,,l g h u u L ,(,)a v e g g =}to A.Quer y Phase 1Consider a private key query for i-th identity ID i ∈S (||S s l =).B answers as follows:(1)i k <,B will constr uct a semi-functional key.It selects randomly 00,,,j N r t t t Z ′∈,1,j s .j i ≠Then it sets 0111(,',,,,,,)iID i i s d d d d d d d +=L L 0112323232311(()(),(),(),,(),i ii ID r r art rt t t ii g hu YY g Y Y u Y Y u Y Y ′=L 123231(),,())i s r t r ts i u YYu YY ++L .It is a valid simulation to A.(2)i k >,B runs the Extract algorithm to obtain the normal key.(3)i k =,B f irst pick 0,,j t t 1,j s j i ≠in N Z at random.Then it sets0111(,',,,,,,)iID i i s d d d d d d d +=L L 11111133333((),,(),,(),(),,())kk k k k i s sa a aID b t t a t a t a t g T X T T X T X T X T X +++=L L .If 13p p T G ∈,this is a normal key.If T G ∈,this is a semi-functional key.Challen ge Th e ad ver sar y A o utp uts two challenge message 01,M M and a challenge set *S ={**1,,s ID ID L }.Then the ciphertext 012(,,)C C C C =is formed as 012(,),a C M e X X g γ=*1112(),s iii a ID b C X X =+∑=212C X X =,where γ{0,1}∈.Quer y phase 2The adversary continues to issue queries q j ,where q i is the following:y Extraction query (ID i ),as in phase 1with the constraint that ID i *S .短文Guess Finally,the adversary A outputs a guess γ′∈{0,1}and wins the game if γ′=γ.I f 13p p T G ∈,then B h as perf ectly simulated Gam e k-1.I f T G ∈,B has p er fectly simu lated Gam e k .Hence B can use A ’s guess to break Assumption 2with advantage ε.Lem m a 4Su pp o se th at ther e ex ists an algorithm A that makes at most q queries and such th at Adv q game A Adv f in alga me A =εf o r 1k q .Then we can build an algorithm B with advantage εin breaking Assumption 3.Pr oof Our algorithm B begins by r eceiving 2322,,,,a s g g X X g Y Z where 1p g G ∈,2,X 222,p Y Z G ∈,33p X G ∈,,N a s Z ∈.It works as follows:Setup B chooses random elements 1,,,l N a a b Z ∈L and sets ia i u g =,b h g =for 1i l .It sends the public keys PK={1,,,,l g h u u L ,2(,)a v e g X g =}to A.Qu ery Ph ase 1Consider a private key query for an identity ID i ∈S (||S s =≤l).B answers as follows:B selects randomly 0000,,,,,,,j j N r t t t z z z Z ′∈1,j s ≤≤.j i ≠≤≤Then it sets 0111(,',,,,,,)iID i i s d d d d d d d +=L L 00100111112333221233312122(()(),(),(),,(),(),,()).i i ii sii s z ID z z r a r t r t t i r z z z r t t r t s i i g X Z hu X g Z X u Z X u Z X u Z X u Z X ++′′+=L LThis is a semi-functional key.Challenge The adversary A outputs two challengemessages 01,M M an d ach alleng e set *S ={**1,,s ID ID L }.Then the ciphertext 012(,,)C C C C =is formed as*10122,(),s iii a ID b s s C M T C g Y C g Y γ=+∑===,{0,1}γ∈.Query phase 2The adversary continues to issuequeries q j ,where q i is the following:y Extraction query (ID i ),as in phase 1with theconstraint that ID i *S .Guess Finally,the adversary Aoutputs a guess γ′∈{0,1}and wins the game if γ′=γ.I f (,)as T e g g =,th en 012(,,)C C C C =is a vali dsemi-functional ciphertext.If T is random elementin 1G ,012(,,)C C C C =is a valid semi-functionalciphertext for a random message.Hence B can useA ’s guess to break Assumption 3with advantage ε.Theor em 1If Assumption 1,2and 3hold,then our IBBE is IND-ID-CPA secure.Pr oof If Assumption 1,2and 3hold,by the sequence of games and Lemma 2,3and 4,the adversary ’s ad vantage in the real gam e mu st be negligible.Hence our IBBE is IND-ID-CPA secure.V .CONCLUSIONSWe have given a new construction of IBBE in the subgroups.The proposed scheme has short size ciphertexts and achieves full security.In the standard model,we use dual techniques to prove the security of our new scheme under some simple hardness assumptions.Ackn owledgem entsThis paper was partially supported by the Nature Science Foundation of China under grant 60970119,60803149and the National Basic Research Program of China(973)under grant 2007CB311201.References[1]SHAMIR A.Identity-based Cryptosystems and SignatureSchemes[C]//Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology-Crypto,Lecture Notes in Computer Science,Berlin:Springer-V erlag press,1984,196:47–53.[2]MU Yi,SUSILO W,LIN Yanxia,et al.Identity-based Authenticated Broadcast Encryption and Distributed Authenticated Encryption[C]//Proceedings of the 9th Asian Computing Science Conference,Lecture Notes in Computer Science,Berlin:Springer-V erlag prss,2004,3321:169–181.[3]DELERABL E C.Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption with Constant Size Ciphertexts and Private Keys[C]//Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology-ASIACRYPT,Lecture Notes in Computer Science,volume 4833,Berlin:Springer-V erlag,2007:200–215.[4]DU Xinjun,W ANG Ying,GE Jianhua,et al.An ID-based Broadcast Encryption Scheme for Key Distribution[J].IEEE Transctions on Broadcasting,2005,51(2):264–266.[5]REN Yanli,GU Dawu.Fully CCA2Secure Identitybased Broadcast Encryption without Random Oracles[J].Information Processing Letters,2009,109:527–533. [6]GENTRY C,W ATERS B.Adaptive Security in BroadcastEncryption Systems[C]//Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology-Eurocry pt,Lecture Notes in Computer Science,Berlin:Springer-V erlag Press,2009,5479:171–188.[7]WA TERS B.Dual System Encryption:Realizing FullySecure Ibe and Hibe under Simple Assumptions[C]// Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology-Crypto,Lecture Notes in Computer Science,Berlin:Springer-Verlag Press, 2009,5677:619–636.(The full paper appeared Cryptology ePrint Archive Report2009/385)[8]LEWKO A,WATERS B.New Techniques for DualSystem Encryption and Fully Secure HIBE with Short Ci phertexts[C]//Proceedings of the7th Theory of Crypt ography Conferen ce2010,L ecture Notes in Computer Science,Berlin:Springer-Verlag Press,2010, 5978:455–479.[9]KA TZ J,SAHAI A,W ATERS B.Predicate EncryptionSupporting Disjunctions,Polynomial Equations,and Inner Products[C]//Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT2008,Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Berlin:Springer-V erlag Press,2008,4965:146–162.BiographiesZhang Leyou,received his Ph.D.from theXidian University in2009.Now he i s anAssociate Professo r in the dep artmen t o fMathematical science of Xidian University.His current research interests include network security,computer security,and cryptography.He has published more than twenty papers in international and domestic journals and conferences.Hu Y upu,received his Ph.D.from the XidianUniversity in1999.Now he is a Professor inthe School of T elecommunications Engineeringof Xidian University.His current research interests include information security and cryptography.He has published more than a hundred papers in international and domestic journals and conferences.He is a Member of China Institute of Communications and a Director of Chinese Association for Cryptologic Research.W u Qing,received her Ph.D.from the XidianUniversity in2009.Now she is an AssociateProfessor in the school of automation of Xi’aninstitute of posts and telecommunication.Her current research interests include information security and applied mathematics.She has published more than twenty papers in international and domestic journals andconferences.。
华为SecoManager安全控制器产品介绍说明书
Huawei SecoManager Security ControllerIn the face of differentiated tenant services and frequent service changes, how to implementautomatic analysis, visualization, and management of security services, security policy optimization,and compliance analysis are issues that require immediate attention. Conventional O&M relies onmanual management and configuration of security services and is therefore inefficient. Securitypolicy compliance check requires dedicated personnel for analysis. Therefore, the approval is usuallynot timely enough, and risky policies may be omitted. The impact of security policy delivery onservices is unpredictable. That is, the impact of policies on user services cannot be evaluated beforepolicy deployment. In addition, as the number of security policies continuously increases, it becomesdifficult for security O&M personnel to focus on key risky policies. The industry is in urgent needof intelligent and automated security policy management across the entire lifecycle of securitypolicies to help users quickly and efficiently complete policy changes and ensure policy deliverysecurity and accuracy, thereby effectively improving O&M efficiency and reducing O&M costs.The SecoManager Security Controller is a unified security controller provided by Huawei for differentscenarios such as DCs, campus networks, Branch. It provides security service orchestration andunified policy management, supports service-based and visualized security functions, and forms aproactive network-wide security protection system together with network devices, security devices,and Big Data intelligent analysis system for comprehensive threat detection, analysis, and response.Product AppearancesProduct HighlightsMulti-dimensional and automatic policy orchestration, security service deployment within minutes• Application mutual access mapping and application-based policy management: Policymanagement transitions from the IP address-based perspective to the application mutual access relationship-based perspective. Mutual-access relationships of applications on the network are abstracted with applications at the core to visualize your application services so that you can gain full visibility into the services, effectively reducing the number of security policies. The model-based application policy model aims to reduce your configuration workload and simplify network-wide policy management.• Policy management based on service partitions: Policy management transitions from thesecurity zone-based perspective to the service partition-based perspective. Conventional network zones are divided into security zones, such as the Trust, Untrust, DMZ, and Local zones. In a scenario with a large number of security devices and a large network scale, factors of security zone, device, policy, service rollout, and service change are intertwined, making it difficult to visualize services and to effectively guide the design of security policies. However, if security policies are managed, controlled, and maintained from the perspective of service partitions, users need to pay attention only to service partitions and security services but not the mapping among security zones, devices, and services, which effectively reduces the complexity of security policy design.Service partition-based FW1untrusttrustDMZ XXX FW2untrust trustDMZ XXX FW3untrust trust DMZ XXX InternetGuest partition R&D partition Data storage partitionExternal service partition Internal service partition• Management scope of devices and policies defined by protected network segments to facilitate policy orchestration: A protected network segment is a basic model of security service orchestration and can be considered as a range of user network segments protected by a firewall.It can be configured manually or through network topology learning. The SecoManager Security Controller detects the mapping between a user service IP address and a firewall. During automatic policy orchestration, the SecoManager Security Controller automatically finds the firewall that carries a policy based on the source and destination addresses of the policy.• Automatic security service deployment: Diversified security services bring security assurance for data center operations. Technologies such as protected network segment, automatic policy orchestration, and automatic traffic diversion based on service function chains (SFCs) enable differentiated tenant security policies. Policies can be automatically tiered, split, and combined so that you can gain visibility into policies.Intelligent policy O&M to reduce O&M costs by 80%• Policy compliance check: Security policy compliance check needs to be confirmed by the security approval owner. The average number of policies to be approved per day ranges from several to hundreds. Because the tool does not support all rules, the policies need to be manually analyzed one by one, resulting in a heavy approval workload and requiring a dedicated owner to spend hours in doing so. The SecoManager Security Controller supports defining whitelists, risk rules, and hybrid rules for compliance check. After a policy is submitted to the SecoManager Security Controller, the SecoManager Security Controller checks the policy based on the defined check rules and reports the check result and security level to the security approval owner in a timely manner.In this way, low-risk policies can be automatically approved, and the security approval owner needs to pay attention only to non-compliant policy items, improving the approval efficiency and avoiding the issues that the approval is not timely and that a risky policy is omitted.• Policy simulation: Based on the learning result of service mutual access relationships, the policies to be deployed are compared, and their deployment is simulated to assess the impact of the deployment, effectively reducing the risks brought by policy deployment to services.• Redundant policy deletion: After a policy is deployed, redundancy analysis and hit analysis are performed for policies on the entire network, and the policy tuning algorithm is used, deleting redundant policies and helping you focus on policies closely relevant to services.Network collaboration and security association for closed-loop threat handling within minutes • Collaboration with network for threat handling: In a conventional data center, application deployment often takes a long time. The application service team relies on the network team to deploy the network; the network team needs to understand the requirements of the application service team to deploy a network that is suitable for the application service team. The SecoManager Security Controller learns mappings between service policies and security policies based on the network topology, and collaborates with the data center SDN management and control system (IMaster NCE-Fabric) or campus SDN management and control system to divert tenant traffic to corresponding security devices based on SFCs on demand. The SecoManager Security Controller automatically synchronizes information about the tenants, VPCs, network topology (including logical routers, logical switches, logical firewalls, and subnets), EPGs, and SFCs from the SDN management and control system and combines the learned application service mutual access relationships to automatically orchestrate and deliver security policies, implementing security-network synergy.• Collaboration with security: Advanced persistent threats (APTs) threaten national infrastructure of the finance, energy, government, and other sectors. Attackers exploit 0-day vulnerabilities, use advanced evasion techniques, combine multiple attack means such as worm and ransomware, and may remain latent for a long period of time before they actually initiate attacks. The Big Data security product HiSec Insight can effectively identify unknown threats based on network behavior analysis and correlation analysis technologies. The threat handling method, namely isolation or blocking, is determined based on the threat severity. For north-south threats, the SecoManager Security Controller delivers quintuple blocking policies to security devices. For east-west threats, isolation requests are delivered to the network SDN management and control system to control switches or routers to isolate threatened hosts.Product Deployment• Independent deployment: The SecoManager Security Controller is deployed on a server or VM as independent software.• Integrated deployment: The SecoManager Security Controller and SDN management and control system are deployed on the same physical server and same VM.Database• Collaboration with the SDN management and control system to detect network topology changes and implement tenant-based automatic security service deployment.• North-south threat blocking, east-west threat isolation, and refined SDN network security control through SFC-based traffic diversion.• Interworking with the cloud platform to automatically convert service policies to security policies. Product SpecificationsOrdering InformationNote: This product ordering list is for reference only. For product subscription, please consult Huawei representatives. GENERAL DISCLAIMERThe information in this document may contain predictive statement including, without limitation, statements regarding the future financial and operating results, future product portfolios, new technologies, etc. There are a number of factors that could cause actual results and developments to differ materially from those expressed or implied in the predictive statements. Therefore, such information is provided for reference purpose only and constitutes neither an offer nor an acceptance. Huawei may change the information at any time without notice.Copyright © 2020 HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. All Rights Reserved.。
基于可编程移动代理的MANETs分布式入侵检测方法
基于可编程移动代理的MANETs分布式入侵检测方法张双;周森鑫【摘要】[目的/意义]随着互联网和大数据的迅猛发展,网络安全问题成为了当下人们关注的热点.为了更好的防御主要的网络安全攻击,提出了一种基于可编程移动代理的MANETs分布式自适应入侵检测系统的方法.[方法]首先,把通用的入侵检测模型结合到入侵检测系统中,考虑到(MANETs)无线自组织网系统的关键功能,然后提出了基于规则和基于行为的入侵检测模型.[结果]方案的提出解决了MANETs中入侵检测系统安装面临的固有挑战.用移动代理的可篡改性去检测任何潜在的试图破坏他们所携带的攻击相关的数据.%[Objective/significance] With the rapid development of Internet and big data, network security has become the focus of attention. In order to better defend the main network security attacks, a method of MANETs distributed adaptive intrusion detection system based on programmable mobile agent is proposed. [Method] Firstly, it integrates the common intrusion detection model with intrusion detection system and takes into account the key function of wireless ad hoc network system, and then puts forward rule-based and behavior-based intrusion detection model. [Result] The proposed scheme solves the inherent challenge of intrusion detection system installation in MANETs. It uses the tampered nature of mobile agents to detect the any data with potential attempt.【期刊名称】《价值工程》【年(卷),期】2018(037)011【总页数】3页(P79-81)【关键词】MANETs;移动代理;入侵检测系统;可篡改性【作者】张双;周森鑫【作者单位】安徽财经大学,蚌埠233000;安徽财经大学,蚌埠233000【正文语种】中文【中图分类】TP393.00 引言随着互联网和大数据的迅猛发展，网络安全问题成为了当下人们关注的热点。
安盟动态口令认证系统产品说明书
安盟动态口令身份认证系统产品说明文档1动态口令身份认证系统原理在传统的静态口令验证系统中，由于口令为“一次设置，重复使用”，由于口令的重复使用而增加了口令丢失和破解的危险性，降低了系统的安全系数，特别是在互联网环境下，黑客、木马和病毒泛滥，使得静态口令更加容易被泄露，造成企业信息系统和资源的非授权访问，导致直接经济损失和间接的信誉和商誉损失。
所以，除了用户记忆的静态口令外，还需要增加一个物理因素，如令牌，这样采用你所知道的（记忆的静态密码）和你所拥有的（令牌）两个要素构成有效密码，实现严格身份信息验证，而你所拥有的要素必须具有不可复制和篡改的性能。
动态口令认证即是依据上述原理实现的双因素强身份认证系统：1)本系统以令牌作为信物，实现双因素认证。
令牌显示依据种子密钥和时间随机计算的动态口令，具有不可复制和篡改的性能，而后台认证系统认为，只有持有令牌才可能输入正确的密码，反过来说，只要输入了当前时间点的正确密码，就可以认为持有可信的要素，即令牌。
用户登录时，必须同时验证静态口令（称之为PIN码）和动态口令，只有两者均正确时才能确认用户身份2)令牌与服务器之间的同步。
令牌和认证服务器一般以密钥和时间为基础，每隔一定时间（常见为60妙）就计算出一个口令，由于令牌和认证服务器双方都共享了对称密钥、时间因子和计算方法，所以计算出来的口令就是同步的和唯一的。
3)一次一密。
令牌上显示的密码只有在当前时间点有效，且使用一次即失效，实现高强度的安全性。
系统的部署结构如下：解决的主要问题：1)密码安全管理问题，实现不依赖于客户端安全意识和安全习惯可控的安全性，用户也免于设置复杂密码、记忆并定期更新之苦。
2)密码每分钟变化，只在当前时间点有效，且使用一次即失效，即使黑客在传输过程当中截获或窃听了，只有在一分钟之内解开，且解开之后，必须先于用户或管理员进入系统才构成威胁，这几乎不可能，大大加强了应用系统的安全性和可靠性。
KasperskyEP10新产品及服务介绍
系统管理
Mail & web
Agenda
1.Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Business介绍 2.报价和授权 3.IRIS 和APS服务
Kaspersky Security for Business
Bundles and product functionality
Workstations, laptops + Smartphones + File servers + Mail servers, Mail gateways + Internet gateway + Anti-spam + Collaboration servers
1 activation code + 4 key files : 1 key file for the protection of mail systems + 1 key file for the protection of Internet gateways + 1 key for anti-spam protection + 1 key file for collaboration protection
Cloud Enabled via the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN)
Core
Select
Advanced
Total
Mobile Endpoint Security
Data Protection (Encryption)
Endpoint
Management
Kaspersky EP10新产品及服务介绍
HP ProtectTools Security Manager用户指南说明书
Customer concernsAs computers become increasingly mobile and better connected, threats to data security are increasing in magnitude as well as complexity. Business customers, for whom data security can have a direct impact on the health of their business, are becoming increasingly concerned about this problem.Taking a holistic approach to security, HP has developed the HP ProtectTools Security Manager to bring many technology areas together in a way that ensures not only protection for client devices, but also ensures that client devices themselves do not become points of vulnerability that could be used to threaten the entire IT infrastructure. Security solutionsHP ProtectTools Security Manager addresses the four challenges that are keeping security features from being widely deployed and used. These are:ability — HP ProtectTools Security Manger offersa single client console that unifies security capabilities under an easy to use common user interface.2.Manageability— The modular architecture of the HP ProtectTools Security Manger enables add-on modules to be selectively installed by the end user or IT administrator, providing a high degree of flexibility to customize HP ProtectTools depending on need or underlying hardware configuration.3.Interoperability— HP ProtectTools Security Manger is built to industry standards on underlying hardware security building blocks such as embedded security chips designed to the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) standard and Smart Card technology.4.Extensibility— By using add-on software modules, HP ProtectTools Security Manager can easily grow to handle new threats and offer new technologies as they become available.The flexible plug-in software modules of HP ProtectTools Security Manager allow customers to choose the level of security that is right for their business. A number of modules are being introduced that provide better protection against unauthorized access to the PC, while making accessing the PC and network resources simple and convenient for authorized users.HP ProtectTools features guideModule Key FeaturesEmbedded Security for HP ProtectToolsprovides important client security functionality using a TPM embedded security chip to help protect against unauthorized access to sensitive user data or credentials. BIOS Configuration for HP ProtectTools*provides access to power-on user and administrator password management, easy configuration of pre-boot authentication features, such as Smart Card, power-on password and the TPM embedded security chip.Smart Card Security for HP ProtectToolsallows customers to work with the BIOS to enable optional Smart Card authentication in a pre-boot environment, and to configure separate Smart Cards for an administrator and a user. Customers can also set and change the password used to authenticate users to the Smart Card, and backup and restore credentials stored onthe Smart Card.Credential Manager for HP ProtectToolsacts as a personal password vault that makes accessing protected information more secure and convenient. Credential Manager provides enhanced protection against unauthorized access to a notebook, desktop or workstation, including alternatives to passwords when logging on to Microsoft Windows and single sign-on capability that automatically remembers credentials for websites, applications, and protected network resources. •TPM embedded security chips are designed to work with a growing number of third party software solutions while providing a platform to support future hardware and operating system architectures.•Enhances a broad range of existing applications and solutions that take advantage of supported industry standard software interfaces.•Helps protect sensitive user data stored locallyon a PC.•Provides an easier to use alternative to the pre-boot BIOS configuration utility known as F10 Setup.•Helps protect the system from the moment power is turned on.•Embedded security chip enhanced Drivelock* helps protect a hard drive from authorized access even if removed from a system without requiring the user to remember any additional passwords beyond the embedded security chip user passphrase.•User interface is fully integrated with other security software modules for HP ProtectTools.•Configures the HP ProtectTools Smart Card for user authentication before the operating system loads, providing an additional layer of protection against unauthorized use of the PC.•Provides users with the ability to back up and restore credentials stored on their Smart Card.•Users no longer need to remember multiple passwords for various password protected websites, applications and network resources.•Single sign-on works with multifactor authentication capabilities to add additional protection, requiring users to use combinations of different security technologies, such as a Smart Card and biometric, when authenticating themselves to the PC.•Password store is protected via encryption and can be hardened through the use of TPM embedded security chip and/or security device authentication, such as Smart Cards or biometrics.The table below details the key customer features and benefits of the newHP ProtectTools offerings:Customer ScenariosScenario 1 — Targeted TheftA notebook containing confidential data and customer information is stolen in a targeted theft incident at an airport security checkpoint.HP ProtectTools technologies and solutions:•Pre-boot authentication feature, if enabled, helps prevent access to the operating system.•Drivelock* helps ensure that data cannot be accessed even if the hard drive is removed and installed into an unsecured system.•Personal Secure Drive feature, provided by the Embedded Security for HP ProtectTools module, encrypts sensitive data to help ensure it cannot be accessed without authentication.Scenario 2 — Unauthorized access from internal or external locationA PC containing confidential data and customer information is accessed from an internal or externallocation. Unauthorized users may be able to gain entry to corporate network resources or data from financial services, an executive, R&D team, or private information such as patient records or personal financial data.HP ProtectTools technologies and solutions:•Pre-boot authentication feature, if enabled, helps prevent access to the operating system.•Embedded Security for ProtectTools helps ensure that data cannot be accessed even if the hard drive is removed and installed into an unsecured system.•Credential Manager for ProtectTools helps ensure that even if an unauthorized user gains access to the PC, they cannot get passwords or access to password protected applications.•Personal Secure Drive feature, provided by the Embedded Security for HP ProtectTools module, encrypts sensitive data to help ensure it cannot be accessed without authentication.Scenario 3 — Strong Password PoliciesA legislative mandate goes into effect that requires the use of strong password policy for dozens of Web based applications and databases.HP ProtectTools technologies and solutions:•Credential Manager for HP ProtectTools provides a protected repository for passwords and single sign-on convenience.•Embedded Security for HP ProtectTools protects the cache of usernames and passwords, which allows users to maintain multiple strong passwords without having towrite them down or try to remember them.HP ProtectTools technologies and solutionsFor more information:HP ProtectTools Security Solutions/hps/security/productsHP Business PC Security Solutions/products/securityHP Business PC Security Solutions/products/securityHP ProtectTools white paper/bc/docs/support/SupportManual/c00264970/c00264970.pdf*Available on select HP Business notebook computers.© 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to changewithout notice. The only warranties for HP products and services are set forth in the express warranty statements accompanying such products and services. Nothing herein should be construed as constituting an additionalwarranty. HP shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein.For more information about HP products and services, visit 。
Kaspersky Embedded Systems Security 安卓安全全面解决方案说明书
KasperskyEmbedded Systems SecurityAll-in-one security designed for embedded systemsThe embedded systems market is growing steadily. And cybercriminals are taking note.While the number of attacked devices in the first 10 months of 2019 was slightly lower than the previous year, the numberof ATM/POS infections had already exceeded those for all of 2018.Embedded systems are all around us and impact on every part of our daily lives – we depend on them for everything from PoS systems and ATMs to medical devices and telecommunications. This means more attack vectors than ever before.As support for Windows 7 winds down – ending on 12 January 2020 – there is still time for companies to update the OS in their embedded systems, and take any additional protection measures necessary. However, older Windows XP - still an extremely popular OS for embedded systems – is still being overlooked, even though support for that OS ended in 2016. This is an open invitation to hackers.Cybercriminals are increasingly turning their attention to these embedded devices as a door into the corporate network, and businesses need to be smarter than ever to keep their systems and data safe. Featuring powerful threat intelligence, real-time malware detection, comprehensive application and device controls and flexible management, Kaspersky Embedded Systems Security is all-in-one security designed specifically for embedded systems.HighlightsEfficient Design for even Low-End HardwareKaspersky Embedded Systems Security has been built specifically to operate effectively even on low-end hardware. Efficient design delivers powerful security with no risk of systems overload. Requirements start from only 256MB RAM for the Windows XP family, with around 50MB space required on the system hard drive when operating in ‘Default Deny only’ mode. Memory ProtectionPowerful Exploit Prevention technology watches over critical processes to prevent exploits from attacking unpatchedand even zero-day vulnerabilities in applications and system components. This is especially important for protection against widespread ransomware attacks such as WannaCry and ExPetr. Windows XP OptimizedMost embedded systems still run on the now-unsupported Windows® XP OS. Kaspersky Embedded Systems Security has been optimized to run with full functionally on the Windows XP platform as well as the Windows 7, Windows 8 and Windows 10 families.Kaspersky Embedded Systems Security is committed to providing 100% support for the Windows XP family for the foreseeable future, giving enough time for gradual upgrade. ComplianceThe unique, comprehensive set of protection components (anti-malware, application and device control, firewall management, File Integrity Monitoring and log audit) within Kaspersky Embedded Systems Security identifies and blocks malicious actions against your system, and detects different indicators of a security breach, in compliance with regulations (including PCI/DSS, SWIFT, etc.).ATMs POS Ticketingmachines Cashier Old PCs Medicalequipment2019 AO Kaspersky Lab. All rights reserved.Registered trademarks and service marks are the property of their respective owners.Cyber Threats News: IT Security News: IT Security for SMB: /businessIT Security for Enterprise: /enterpriseWe are proven. We are independent. We aretransparent. We are committed to building a safer world, where technology improves our lives. Which is why we secure it, so everyone everywhere has the endless opportunities it brings. Bring on cybersecurity for a safer tommorow.Know more at /transparencyFeaturesPowerful Anti-MalwareProactive, cloud-assisted threat detection and analysis work with traditional technologies to provide protection from known, unknown and advanced threats. An optional (but strongly recommended) anti-malware component can be disabled in scenarios with low-end hardware or slow communications channels.Real-time Malware Detection with Kaspersky Security Network (KSN)KSN is Kaspersky cloud-assisted, global threat intelligencenetwork. Millions of globally distributed nodes constantly feed real-world threat intelligence to our systems, ensuring rapid response to even the newest, emerging and evolving threats, including mass attacks.This constant flow of new data about attempted malware attacks and suspicious behavior creates instant file verdicts, delivering real-time protection against the latest threats.Application ControlAdopting a Default Deny scenario using Application Launch Control optimizes your system’s resilience to data breaches. By prohibiting the running of any applications other than specified programs, services, and trusted system components, you can automatically block most forms of malware completely.Software distribution control uses a ‘trusted installer’ approach, eliminating the need for time-consuming, manual whitelisting of files created or changed during a software update or installation. Just specify the installer as trusted and carry out the update in the usual way.Device Monitoring and ControlDevice Control from Kaspersky gives you the ability to control USB storage devices connected or trying to connect physically to systems hardware. Preventing access by unauthorized devices means you block a common point of entry used by cybercriminals as the first step in a malware attack.All USB device connections are monitored and logged so that inappropriate USB use can be identified as a possible attack source during the incident investigation and response process.Windows Firewall ManagementWindows Firewall can be configured directly from Kaspersky Security Center, giving you the convenience of local firewall management through a single unified console. This is essential when embedded systems are not in domain and Windows firewall settings can’t be configured centrally.File Integrity Monitoring*File Integrity Monitoring tracks actions performed on specified files and folders within scope. You can also configure file changes to be tracked during periods when monitoring is interrupted.Log Audit*Kaspersky Embedded Systems Security monitors possible protection violations based on inspecting Windows Event Logs. The application notifies the administrator when it detects abnormal behavior that may indicate an attempted cyberattack.SIEM IntegrationKaspersky Embedded Systems Security can convert events in application logs into formats supported by the syslog server, so these can be transmitted to, and successfully recognized by, all SIEM systems. Events can be exported directly from Kaspersky Embedded System Security to SIEM or centrally via Kaspersky Security Center.Flexible ManagementKaspersky Embedded Systems Security can be managed from the command line, local GUI, or the centralized policy-based management via Kaspersky Security Center. Security policies, signature updates, anti-malware scans and results collection are easily managed through a single centralized management console – Kaspersky Security Center. In addition, clients in a local network can be managed through any local console – particularly useful when working in the isolated, segmented networks typical of embedded systems.* Requires Kaspersky Embedded Systems Security Compliance Edition licenseSystem integrity monitoring • File integrity monitor • Log InspectionAnti-malware protection • Optional• Real-time/on-demand • Exploit prevention against ransomware and other threats Optimized system requirements • RAM 256MB and more • OS: Windows XP and laterSystem control• Application launch control • Software distribution control • Device controlNetwork protection • Firewall management。
明御_运维审计与风险控制系统_产品白皮书2016
2 产品优势···································································································································································3
3 产品功能···································································································································································8
2.1 支持手机 APP、动态令牌等多种双因子认证····························································································· 3 2.2 覆盖最全的运维协议，让运维安全无死角·································································································· 3 2.3 运维方式丰富多样，适用自动化运维等复杂场景······················································································· 4 2.4 自动学习、自动授权，大大减轻管理员的配置工作··················································································· 4 2.5 灵活、可靠的自动改密，保障密码安全······································································································ 4 2.6 文件传输审计，让数据窃取行为无藏身之地······························································································ 5 2.7 丰富的 API 接口，轻松实现平台化整合······································································································ 5 2.8 一键生产合规报表，省心又省力·················································································································· 5 2.9 拥有多项领先专利技术································································································································· 7 2.10 双存储架构等多种冗余机制，保障自身稳定可靠····················································································· 7
MAS(Mobile Agent Server移动代理服务器)
中国移动通信集团湖南有限责任公司省级行业集团客户中心
湖南省国税局（解决方案）
纳税人利用GPRS连接 到税局服务器，通过 wap平台对本期及历史 税款信息进行查询。
方案主要功能
手机查 税功能
手机小额 报税功能
短信交税 提醒功能
税局为方便纳税人提供 的一种智能提醒服务，
纳税人可及时收到税务
部门纳税、完税通知等 信息。
目前信息化现状
中国移动通信集团湖南有限责任公司省级行业集团客户中心
湖南省国税局（需求分析）
税收征收困难
没能调动纳 税人的积极 性
一部分纳税人“纳税意识” 不高。 税户多且分散、月底税务 大厅排队人员太挤，耽误 双方时间。 小额纳税人占税收的大部 分，但确形成一种不查不 交的现象。以至于影响到 其它一般纳税人的积极性。
中国移动通信集团湖南有限责任公司省级行业集团客户中心
资费说明—国家资费标准
一、设备费:
MAS档次 低档 MAS硬件设备费 （元/台） 15000 业务运营支撑 费（数字化部 队）标准为 （元/年） 3000 合计 18000
二、业务使用费:
可选套餐 价格 包含短信条数 折算价格 超出部分
套餐一
套餐二 套餐三 套餐四 套餐五
2
提
纲
1
MAS 产生背景
MAS 业务介绍 MAS 成功案例 MAS 流程资费
2
3
中国移动通信集团湖南有限责任公司省级行业集团客户中心
业务办理流程
系统正常运转， 实现信息化 技术人员上门安装 MAS服务器，根据 具体应用进行开发 签署协议，客户经 理将协议提交，申 请接入数据 客户单位与移动达 成MAS业务合作意 向
三一重工（需求分析）
Mobilesecurity
客户端数据库测试Mobil来自 SecurityWebView
• 以webview为主体的app，从入侵和攻击的 角度来看，主要安全隐患在http抓包，逆向 工程 • Webview相关的app安全测试还是web测试 那一套：XSS，sql注入 • 大部分app走的还是http和https
• 接口测试验证接口逻辑，可用性，边界值， 异常检查，不能预先保证客户端调用不出 问题。通过http抓包，可以从数据包中获取 很多用户敏感信息，这些信息可能是从服 务器端下发到客户端的，尽管这些信息可 能并不显示。 • 另外，抓到包后，客户端没有验证，直接 篡改消息，也是比较大的安全隐患。
逆向工程
• 对Android，反编译，修改、加入自己的代 码，尤其是有些开放平台，结合开放平台 的SDK文档，再加上反编译后获得的信息， 即使代码混淆，也能推测出很多东西。 • 方法：在本地搭建http代理记录APP访问日 志，然后sqlmap批量扫这些去重的日志！
接口测试
• 接口测试的工具：itest，httpclient
SecurID 4.0 快速入门指南（iOS 和 Android 应用）说明书
适用于iOS和Android应用程序的SecurID4.0快速入门指南适用于iOS和Android的SecurID4.x将RSA SecurID Authenticate应用程序和SecurID软件令牌的功能结合到一个方便的令牌中，您可以使用它安全地登录公司帐户。
从SecurID4.x开始，您可以从单个应用程序访问您的SecurID软件令牌以及使用批准(推送通知)、Authenticate Tokencode和生物识别。
您需要什么设备：l您将在其中安装应用程序的移动设备。
该设备必须具有iOS版本11或更高版本或者Android版本7或更高版本。
l如果贵公司需要，您可以从中访问自助服务门户的第二台计算机或移动设备。
您的管理员将提供可能包括以下任何内容的信息：l指向贵公司自助服务门户或SecurID My Page的URL，其中包含注册应用程序的说明，包括每个帐户的新注册代码、URL或二维码。
l如果您之前使用过RSA SecurID Authenticate应用程序，则需要有关将现有帐户转移到SecurID4.0应用程序的说明。
此过程可能特定于您的公司。
l使用二维码扫描、URL链接或电子邮件附件导入软件令牌的信息以及密码(如果需要)。
如果您的手机上已有软件令牌，则无需导入。
安装SecurID4.0后，令牌将起作用。
步骤1：检查您的电话请按适用于您的操作系统的说明进行操作。
在底部，点按关于查看您的版本。
点按常规，然后点按版本号显示为“软件版本”或您的设备是否已越狱或经过Root？不要在越狱或经过Root的设备上安装SecurID应用程序。
这样做将彻底禁用该应用程序及其内容。
步骤2：安装SecurID应用程序1.在手机上，转到Apple App Store或Google Play。
2.搜索SecurID。
图标如下所示：3.安装应用程序。
步骤3：导入您的软件令牌如果您将使用SecurID软件令牌，请执行此步骤。
Atmel SMART SAMA5D4系列720p硬件视频解码器和高级安全密钥应用说明书
Key Applications• Control panels for security, home automation, thermostats, etc.• Surveillance cameras• Industrial human-machine interface (HMI)• Fitness equipment, such as treadmills and exercise machines • Industrial and residential gateways •Smart grid infrastructureThe new Atmel ® | SMART SAMA5D4 series, expands the SAMA5 microprocessors family and targets IoT, Industrial and Consumer applications. It is ARM ® Cortex ®-A5-based, and adds a 720p resolution hardware video decoder and advanced security features. The chip has significantly better system performance using the ARM NEON ™ 128-bit SIMD (single instruction, multiple data) architecture extension and a 128kByte L2 Cache. The IC has advanced security features to protect the application software from counterfeiting, to safeguard software assets, and to securely store and transfer data.Key Highlights720p 30fps Video PlaybackThe SAMA5D4 series enables you to bring up to 720p 30fps video playback to your user interface applications using theembedded hardware video decoder that supports H264, VP8, MPEG4, and JPEG. This is complemented by an integrated TFT LCD display controller and resistive touchscreen interface.High-performance ArchitectureBased on the ARM Cortex-A5 core with the ARM NEON SIMD engine, the SAMA5D4 series is ideal for applications requiring high-precision computing and fast signal processing. This series of microprocessors delivers 945DMIPS at 600MHz and a 128kB of L2 cache improves the overall system performance. The SAMA5D4 also features a 32-bit wide DDR controller running up to 200MHz that can deliver up to 1408MB/s of bandwidth. It is configurable in either a 16- or 32-bit bus interface allowing you an optimum trade-off between performance and memory cost.Advanced SecurityThe SAMA5D4 series security features prevent cloning of your application, protects and authenticates software, and securely stores and transfer data. It allows unique on-the-fly encryption and decryption of software code from the external DRAM, and includes secure boot, tamper detection pins, and safe erasure of security-critical data. The part features the ARM TrustZone ® system-wide approach to security as well as advanced hardware encryption engines supporting private and public key cryptography.Lifetime CommitmentAtmel offers customers a 12-years lifetime commitment from the time of this product’s introduction.Memory Connectivity User Interface User Interface System SecurityControl User Interface42-ch DMADDR2, LPDDR, LPDDR2Controller 3 HS/FS/LS USB ports 3 Host or 2 Host +1 Device2 EMAC 10/100w/ IEEE15882 HS SDIO/SD/MMC 8 UART, 8 SPI ,4 TWI, Soft modemTFT LCD Controller with Overlays720p Video Decoder Camera Interface,2 I2SResistive TouchscreenController2 RC OSC, 2 xtal OSC, 2 PLL, Voltage Regulator Watchdog, POR, RTC Backup unit with8 kb SRAMRSA, ECC co-processor 3DES, AES, SHA, TRNGOn the fly DDR Encryption/Decryption 8x Tamper Pins, Secure Boot5-ch 10-bit ADC 4 x 16-bit PWM 9 x 32-bit Timers152 IOsSLC/MLC NAND Controllerwith 24-bit ECC External Bus Interface128 kb SRAM BootROM 512 Fuse Bits64-bit AXI/AHBCortex ®-A5SAMA5D4600 MHz2x32 kb L1 Cache 128 kb L2 CacheAtmel Corporation 1600 Technology Drive, San Jose, CA 95110 USA T : (+1)(408) 441. 0311 F : (+1)(408) 436. 4200 | © 2015 Atmel Corporation. / Rev.: Atmel-45090B-SAMA5D4_E_US_092015Atmel,® Atmel logo and combinations thereof, Enabling Unlimited Possibilities,® and others are registered trademarks or trademarks of Atmel Corporation in U. S. and other countries. ARM,® ARM Connected ® logo and others are the registered trademarks or trademarks of ARM Ltd. Other terms and product names may be trademarks of others.Disclaimer: The information in this document is provided in connection with Atmel products. No license, express or implied, by estoppel or otherwise, to any intellectual property right is granted by this document or in connection with the sale of Atmel products. EXCEPT AS SET FORTH IN THE ATMEL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SALES LOCATED ON THE ATMEL WEBSITE, ATMEL ASSUMES NO LIABILITY WHATSOEVER AND DISCLAIMS ANY EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY WARRANTY RE-LATING TO ITS PRODUCTS INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL ATMEL BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE, SPECIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, DAMAGES FOR LOSS AND PROFITS, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, OR LOSS OF INFORMATION) ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THIS DOCUMENT, EVEN IF ATMEL HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. Atmel makes no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this document and reserves the right to make changes to specifications and products descriptions at any time without notice. Atmel does not make any commitment to update the information contained herein. Unless specifically provided otherwise, Atmel products are not suitable for, and shallnot be used in, automotive applications. Atmel products are not intended, authorized, or warranted for use as components in applications intended to support or sustain life.EcosystemAtmel has created and supports a free Linux ® distributions available at and https:///linux4sam . With our commitment to the Linux open-source community, we provide full coverage of SoC peripherals in the Linux kernel as well as bootloaders such as AT91Bootstrap and U-Boot.Atmel offers a free graphics software development kit (SDK) based on Qt available at . This SDK includes demos, widgets, backgound images, a set of icons, and useful graphical elements. Using these proven elements, you can develop your own customized user interface.Atmel is now offering a free Android ™ port for the SAMA5D devices, available at /android4sam . Originally developed for mobile handset devices, Android is ideal for use in embedded applications such as control panels, smart watches, DECT phones, and more. Android comes with multimedia and connectivity stacks, graphical user interfaces and a comprehensive SDK.For RTOS, bare metal C or C++ designers, Atmel delivers the softpack, a set of around 40 C drivers that run on the SAMA5D4 evaluation kits and exercises all peripherals. The softpack is also very useful for board bring up as well asquick prototyping and available for download from the product page on the Atmel web site.All devices are -40°C to +85°C temperature range.* Security: On the fly encryption/decryption of DRAM, secure boot, tamper detection pins, secure key storage, ARM Trust Zone, hardware cryptography engines RSA, ECC, AES, 3DES as well as SHA and TRNGTo evaluate and prototype your application, Atmel provides a low cost evaluation kit. To ease your design process and reduce your time-to-market, Atmel collaborates with a global and expanding network of partners that deliver hardware, PMIC, memories, SOM (system-on-module), and software solution for the SAMA5D4 series of MPUs. For more information on our partners and the Atmel evaluation kit, you can visit /microsite/SAMA5SAMA5D4 Series Selector GuideFor more information on the SAMA5D4 series, go to /SAMA5D4。
一种基于Mobile Agent的Web Service新型安全模式
另一方面 ， 移动代理 和 Ｗｅ ｂ服务 安全性仍 然是应用 中一个
０ 引 言
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首要关 注的问题 Ｊ 目前 ， ｂ服务和移动代理安全大 多使 用 。 Ｗｅ 基于 Ｃ Ａ的公钥 基本措施。因此 ， 个守信 的第三方是 必需 的。 一 用户必须有他 们 自己的密钥 ， 服务提供 商必须 管理所 有用户 的 公钥 ， 并且用不 同 的密 钥对 数据 加 密∞ 。但在 某些 应用 中 ， Ｊ 这
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ｔｅｍｅ ｏ ｕｒｎ ｓｃｒｙｍ ｃ ａｉ ｉ ｏｔ ｓ ｇＣ （ ｅｔ ｃｔ ｎＡ ｔｏｉｅ ）ｂｓｄｐ ｂｉ ｋｙｉ ｒ ｔ ｃｕｅ Ｗｉ ｉ ｓｈ ｍ ， ｅ ｉ ｔ ｄｔ ｃ ｒ ｔ ｅｕｉ ｅｈ ｎ ｍ ｗｔ ｕ ｕｉ Ａ Ｃ ｒｆ ａ ｏ ｕｈｒｉ ｖ ｈ ｏ ｅ ｔ ｓ ｈ ｎ ｉ ｉ ｉ ｔ ｓ ａｅ ｕ ｌ ｅ ａ ｒ ｔｒ． ｔ ｔ ｓ ｃｅ ｅ ｗ ｃ ｆ ｎ ｓｕ ｈｈ
关 键 词 移动代理 Ｗｅ ｂ服 务 安 全 模 式 密钥
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Kaspersky Security for Mobile 手机安全说明
Kaspersky Security for Mobile © 2022 AO Kaspersky Lab目录Kaspersky Security for Mobile 帮助新增功能取决于管理工具的应用程序功能的比较分发包在 Kaspersky Security Center Web Console 和 Kaspersky Security Center 云控制台中工作关于 Kaspersky Security Center Web Console 和云控制台中的移动设备管理Kaspersky Security Center Web Console 和云控制台中的移动设备管理的主要功能关于 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 应用程序关于 Kaspersky Security for iOS 应用程序关于 Kaspersky Security for Mobile (Devices) 插件关于 Kaspersky Security for Mobile (Policies) 插件硬件和软件要求已知问题和注意事项在 Kaspersky Security Center Web Console 或云控制台中部署移动设备管理解决方案部署方案准备 Kaspersky Security Center Web Console 和云控制台以进行部署配置管理服务器以连接移动设备创建管理组创建自动将设备分配至管理组的规则部署管理插件从可用分发包列表安装管理插件从分发包安装管理插件部署移动应用程序使用 Kaspersky Security Center Web Console 或云控制台部署移动应用程序激活移动应用程序提供 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 应用程序所需的权限管理证书查看证书列表定义证书设置创建证书续订证书删除证书与 Firebase Cloud Messaging 交换信息在 Kaspersky Security Center Web Console 和云控制台中管理移动设备将移动设备连接到 Kaspersky Security Center将未分配的移动设备移至管理组向移动设备发送命令从 Kaspersky Security Center 移除移动设备管理组策略用于管理移动设备的组策略查看组策略列表查看策略分发结果创建组策略修改组策略复制组策略将策略移动到另一个管理组删除组策略定义策略设置配置反病毒保护配置实时保护配置移动设备上的病毒扫描自动运行配置反病毒数据库更新定义设备解锁设置配置对被盗或丢失设备的数据的保护配置应用程序控制配置使移动设备符合公司安全要求的合规性控制启用和禁用合规性规则编辑合规性规则添加合规性规则删除合规性规则不合规标准列表不合规时的操作列表配置用户对网站的访问配置功能限制防止 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 被删除配置移动设备与 Kaspersky Security Center 的同步卡巴斯基安全网络与卡巴斯基安全网络交换信息启用和禁用卡巴斯基安全网络与 Google Analytics for Firebase、SafetyNet Attestation、Firebase Performance Monitoring 和 Crashlytics 交换信息配置移动设备上的通知检测设备入侵定义授权许可设置配置事件配置有关在用户设备上安装、更新和删除应用程序的事件网络负载在基于 MMC 的管理控制台中工作关键用例关于 Kaspersky Security for Mobile基于 MMC 的管理控制台中的移动设备管理的主要功能关于 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android关于 Kaspersky Device Management for iOS关于 Exchange 邮箱关于 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 管理插件关于 Kaspersky Device Management for iOS 管理插件硬件和软件要求已知问题和注意事项部署解决方案架构常见集成解决方案部署方案Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 的部署方案iOS MDM 配置文件的部署方案准备管理控制台以便部署集成解决方案配置连接移动设备的管理服务器设置在管理控制台中显示“移动设备管理”文件夹创建管理组为设备自动分配至管理组创建规则创建常规证书安装 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android权限使用 Google Play 链接安装 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 的其他安装方法从 Google Play 或华为应用市场手动安装创建和配置安装包创建独立安装包配置同步设置激活 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 应用程序安装 iOS MDM 配置文件关于 iOS 设备管理模式通过 Kaspersky Security Center 安装安装管理插件更新先前版本的应用程序升级先前版本的 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android安装先前版本的 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android升级先前版本的管理插件删除 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android远程删除应用程序允许用户删除应用程序由用户删除应用程序配置和管理开始使用启动和停止应用程序创建管理组用于管理移动设备的组策略创建组策略配置同步设置管理对组策略的修订删除组策略限制配置组策略的权限保护在安卓设备上配置防病毒保护在互联网上保护 Android 设备保护被盗或丢失设备的数据向移动设备发送命令解锁移动设备数据加密配置设备解锁密码强度为安卓设备配置强解锁密码为 iOS MDM 设备配置强解锁密码为 EAS 设备配置强解锁密码配置虚拟专用网 (VPN)在安卓设备上配置 VPN（仅限三星）在 iOS MDM 设备上配置 VPN在安卓设备上配置防火墙（仅限三星）防止 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 被删除检测设备入侵（根权限）在 iOS MDM 设备上配置全局 HTTP 代理向 iOS MDM 设备添加安全证书向 iOS MDM 设备添加 SCEP 配置文件控制配置限制运行 Android 10 及更高版本的设备的特殊注意事项配置安卓设备的限制配置 iOS MDM 设备功能限制配置 EAS 设备功能限制配置用户对网站的访问在安卓设备上配置网站访问在 iOS MDM 设备上配置网站访问使用公司安全要求控制安卓设备的合规性应用程序启动控制安卓设备上的应用程序启动控制为应用程序配置 EAS 设备限制安卓设备上的软件清单在 Kaspersky Security Center 中配置安卓设备的显示管理配置与 Wi-Fi 网络的连接将安卓设备连接至 Wi-Fi 网络将 iOS MDM 设备连接至 Wi-Fi 网络配置电子邮件在 iOS MDM 设备上配置邮箱在 iOS MDM 设备上配置 Exchange 邮箱在安卓设备上配置 Exchange 邮箱（仅限三星）管理第三方移动应用程序配置 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 的通知将 iOS MDM 设备连接到 AirPlay将 iOS MDM 设备连接到 AirPrint配置访问点名称 (APN)在安卓设备上配置 APN（仅限三星）在 iOS MDM 设备上配置 APN配置安卓工作配置文件关于安卓工作配置文件配置工作配置文件添加 LDAP 帐户添加日历帐户添加联系人帐户配置日历订阅添加网络收藏夹添加字体使用第三方 EMM 系统管理应用程序（仅限 Android）开始使用如何安装应用程序如何激活应用程序如何连接设备到 Kaspersky Security CenterAppCon g 文件网络负载加入卡巴斯基安全网络与卡巴斯基安全网络交换信息启用和禁用使用卡巴斯基安全网络使用卡巴斯基私有安全网络对第三方服务的数据提供与 Firebase Cloud Messaging 交换信息与 Google Analytics for Firebase、SafetyNet Attestation、Firebase Performance Monitoring 和 Crashlytics 交换信息全局接受附加声明三星 KNOX通过 KNOX Mobile Enrollment 安装 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 应用程序创建 KNOX MDM 配置文件在 KNOX Mobile Enrollment 中添加设备安装应用程序配置 KNOX 容器关于 KNOX 容器激活 Samsung KNOX在 KNOX 中配置防火墙在 KNOX 中配置 Exchange 邮箱附录配置组策略的权限应用程序类别使用 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 应用程序程序功能主界面概览设备扫描运行计划扫描更改保护模式反病毒数据库更新计划的数据库更新设备丢失或被盗时如何操作Web 保护应用程序控制获取证书与 Kaspersky Security Center 同步不使用 Kaspersky Security Center 激活 Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 应用程序启用 Android 13 上的辅助功能更新应用程序卸载应用程序带有手提箱图标的应用程序KNOX 应用程序使用 Kaspersky Security for iOS 应用程序程序功能安装应用程序使用激活码激活应用主界面概览更新应用程序卸载应用程序程序授权许可关于最终用户许可协议关于授权许可关于订阅关于密钥关于激活码关于密钥文件Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Android 中的数据提供Kaspersky Security for iOS 中的数据提供联系技术支持如何获得技术支持通过“Kaspersky CompanyAccount”获得技术支持有关应用程序的信息源术语Apple 推送通知服务 (APNs) 证书EAS 设备Exchange Mobile Devices ServerIMAPiOS MDM 服务器iOS MDM 设备iOS MDM 配置文件Kaspersky Security Center Web ServerKaspersky Security Center 管理员Kaspersky 更新服务器Kaspersky 类别POP3SSL代理服务器供给配置文件最终用户授权许可协议卡巴斯基安全网络 (KSN)卡巴斯基私有安全网络（私有 KSN）反病毒数据库合规性控制安卓工作配置文件安装包密钥文件应用程序管理插件授权许可授权许可的有效期清单文件激活码激活程序病毒监控设备策略管理员工作站管理服务器管理组组任务网络钓鱼解锁码订阅设备管理员证书签名请求隔离有关第三方代码的信息商标声明Kaspersky Security for Mobile 帮助Kaspersky Security for Mobile 旨在保护和管理公司移动设备以及公司员工用于公司用途的个人移动设备。
移动代理服务器 Mobile Agent Server
移动代理服务器Mobile Agent Server一、是Mobile Agent Server的简称，是协助企业原有业务系统实现无线应用的接入工具，实现MAS接入后企业原有的业务系统可以方便的实现无线应用，如：OA 系统可以实现手机办公、邮件通知、手机审批等。
1、MAS系统组成和功能：MAS系统包括MAS终端、MAS服务器和MAS管理平台，中国移动通过在集团客户（主要为拥有完备企业信息系统的政府行业用户和企业）内部部署移动代理服务器，为集团客户提供的基于移动终端（包括短信、彩信、GPRS 、WAP、手机客户端等）的信息化应用服务。
通过移动代理服务器将不同的行业用户应用和业务延伸到移动终端。
1．1 MAS服务器组成和功能：MAS服务器的组成：MAS服务器由应用接入适配插件模块、业务调度模块、移动安全接入模块及管理模块组成。
各组成完成的功能：应用接入适配插件模块实现移动应用业务的移动应用接口，通过多种移动通讯方式完成移动办公、移动Email、数据的现场查询、采集、录入、WAP应用等移动应用业务。
业务处理模块对从应用系统接收到的数据信息进行处理，主要功能包括信息处理及路由、用户认证、业务调度、日志处理和QoS控制等。
移动安全接入模块一方面通过移动行业网关提供的接口协议，实现MAS服务器与行业网关的数据通信。
另一方面采用安全加密技术提供短信安全接入、彩信安全接入、GPRS安全接入、WAP安全接入、USSD安全接入、智能终端安全接入功能，通过这种方式实现信息的空中加密传输，为MAS终端提供安全服务。
管理模块完成MAS服务器的自管理和服务，可提供网络管理、认证鉴权在内的接口子模块。
可选用业务导航、路由管理、业务管理、数据管理、应用发布、统计分析、地址本管理、系统配置管理等功能模块。
1．2、MAS管理平台：MAS管理平台运行于移动公司，通过加密IP通道与MAS服务器进行通讯，完成对MAS服务器的管理和控制，具体的管理的内容有配置管理、认证管理、监控管理、故障管理、安全管理、升级维护管理。
security认证原理
security认证原理
安全认证原理是指在计算机系统或网络中，确认用户身份并授
予相应权限的过程。
安全认证的原理包括以下几个方面：
1. 身份验证，身份验证是安全认证的第一步，用于确认用户的
身份。
常见的身份验证方式包括用户名和密码、生物特征识别（如
指纹、面部识别）、智能卡等。
用户提供凭证后，系统会验证其身
份是否合法。
2. 访问控制，一旦用户身份得到验证，系统会根据用户的身份
和权限进行访问控制。
这意味着系统会根据用户的身份和权限级别
来决定其可以访问的资源和操作。
3. 加密技术，安全认证还依赖于加密技术，用于保护传输过程
中的数据安全。
加密技术可以确保用户的身份信息和敏感数据在传
输过程中不被窃取或篡改。
4. 双因素认证，为了提高安全性，一些系统还采用双因素认证，即除了用户名和密码外，还需要用户提供第二个身份验证因素，如
手机短信验证码、硬件令牌等。
总的来说，安全认证的原理是通过身份验证、访问控制和加密技术来确保用户身份合法性和数据安全，从而保护系统和网络不受未经授权的访问和攻击。
堡垒机的英语术语
堡垒机的英语术语堡垒机的英语术语是SIEM，全称Security Information and Event Management，即安全信息和事件管理。
堡垒机是一种用于监控和分析网络安全事件的系统。
它可以收集来自各种来源的安全数据，包括网络流量、日志、威胁情报等，并对这些数据进行分析，以发现潜在的安全威胁。
堡垒机的英文术语还包括：1.Security Operations Center(SOC)：安全运营中心2.Security Orchestration,Automation,and Response(SOAR)：安全编排、自动化和响应3.Threat Detection and Response(TDR)：威胁检测和响应以下是堡垒机的英文术语的具体解释：●SIEM：SIEM系统可以帮助安全团队识别和响应安全事件，从而降低网络安全风险。
SIEM系统通常包括以下功能：✧数据收集：SIEM系统可以从各种来源收集安全数据，包括网络流量、日志、威胁情报等。
✧数据分析：SIEM系统可以对收集到的数据进行分析，以发现潜在的安全威胁。
✧事件响应：SIEM系统可以根据发现的安全威胁触发事件响应，以降低安全风险。
●SOC：SOC是负责监控和分析网络安全事件的团队。
SOC通常使用SIEM系统来帮助他们执行这些任务。
●SOAR：SOAR系统是用于自动化安全事件响应的系统。
SOAR系统可以帮助安全团队提高安全事件响应的效率和准确性。
●TDR：TDR是用于检测和响应威胁的系统。
TDR系统可以帮助安全团队识别和响应来自各种来源的威胁。
怎样关闭华为安全监测(新思科技渗透测试服务帮助MATESO确保密码安全管理器的安全性)
怎样关闭华为安全监测（新思科技渗透测试服务帮助MATESO确保密码安全管理器的安全性）渗透测试可让用户进行试探性风险分析和业务逻辑测试，从而无需使用源代码即可系统地查找和消除 Web 应用和 Web 服务运行中的重大业务漏洞。
全球很多企业都在实施渗透测试，以抢在黑客攻击之前找出应用和服务中的漏洞。
MATESO背景介绍MATESO是一家德国创新公司，提供高级解决方案和Password Safe 密码安全管理器，用于安全地管理身份、密码和文档。
全球许多公司都使用MATESO的密码安全解决方案来保护其数据和系统，包括法兰克福证券交易所30大德国公司中的20家。
MATESO总经理Thomas Malchar意识到企业级密码管理的必要性，因此开发了一套完整的企业密码管理解决方案，方便企业更容易且安全地访问敏感数据，从而在确保安全性同时提升了员工效率。
包括渗透测试在内的定期第三方外部审核加强了MATESO的高安全标准，以识别和解决安全漏洞。
挑战：需要来自值得信赖的合作伙伴的严格安全测试MATESO首席技术官兼网络安全宣传师Sascha Martens指出：“对我们而言，安全不仅仅是一种可选项。
这是对客户的承诺，我们每天都在尽力兑现这一承诺。
”为了确保其旗舰产品Password Safe解决方案的持续安全性，MATESO 希望与一家世界级的应用安全公司合作，该公司的评估需要获得MATESO及其客户信赖。
新思科技(Synopsys)在2023年Gartner魔力象限应用安全测试中被评为领导者，帮助全球企业管理软件安全和代码质量风险。
经过多方考量，MATESO选择与新思科技合作。
Sascha Martens介绍道：“我们最新版本的Password Safe加入许多新功能。
Web应用客户端及胖客户端都可以进行严格测试，以最大程度地为客户降低风险，这点很重要。
我们的目标是发现并消除漏洞，接收详细报告及按需获得可行的补救指南。
明御运维审计与风险控制系统产品简介
明御®运维审计与风险控制系统国内领先的统一运维安全管理与审计系统支持多种部署方式支持统一账户管理全方位的运维风险控制丰富的审计功能产品概述明御®运维审计与风险控制系统（简称：DAS-USM）是安恒信息结合多年运维统一安全管理的理论与实践经验积累的基础上，结合各类法令法规（如SOX、PCI、企业内控管理、等级保护等）对运维审计的要求，自主研发完成的业内首创支持灵活部署方式，集统一账户管理与单点登录，支持多种字符协议与图形协议的实时监控与历史查询，全方位风险控制的统一运维安全管理与审计产品。
明御®运维审计与风险控制系统是一种符合4A(认证Authentication、账号Account、授权Authorization、审计Audit)统一安全管理平台方案并且被加固的高性能抗网络攻击设备，具备很强安全防范能力，作为进入内部网络的一个检查点，能够拦截非法访问与恶意攻击，对不合法命令进行阻断，过滤掉所有对目标设备的非法访问行为。
系统具备强大的输入输出审计功能，为企事业内部提供完全的审计信息，通过账号管理、身份认证、资源授权、实时监控、操作还原、自定义策略、日志服务等操作增强审计信息的安全性，广泛适用于需要统一运维安全管理与审计的“政府、金融、运营商、公安、能源、税务、工商、社保、交通、卫生、教育、电子商务及企业”等各个行业。
部署明御®运维审计与风险控制系统，能够极大的保护政府机关与企事业单位内部网络设备及服务器资源的安全性，使得企事业内部网络管理合理化，专业化，信息化。
典型部署1、旁路模式2、桥接模式主要功能1.单点登录✧用户只需一次登录系统，就可以无需认证的安全访问被授权的多种应用系统✧用户无需记忆多种系统的登录用户ID 与口令✧增强认证的系统，从而提高了用户认证环节的安全性✧实现与用户授权管理的无缝连接，这样可以通过对用户、角色、行为与资源的授权，增加对资源的保护与对用户行为的监控及审计2.账号管理✧集中管理所有服务器、网络设备账号，从而可以集中授权、认证与审计✧通过对账号整个生命周期的监控与管理，降低管理大量用户账号的难度与工作量✧通过统一的管理能够发现账号中存在的安全隐患，制定统一的、标准的、符合安全账号管理要求的账号安全策略✧通过建立集中账号管理，企业可以实现将账号与具体的自然人相关联，实现多级用户管理与细粒度的用户授权，还可以实现针对自然人的行为审计，以满足审计需要3.身份认证✧系统为用户提供统一的认证接口，不但便于对用户认证的管理，而且能够采用更加安全的认证模式，提高认证的安全性与可靠性✧提供多种认证方式可供用户选择✧具有灵活的定制接口，方便与第三方认证服务器结合4.资源授权✧系统提供统一的界面对用户、角色及行为与资源进行授权，达到对权限的细粒度控制，最大限度保护用户资源的安全✧集中访问授权与访问控制可以对用户对服务器主机、网络设备的访问进行审计与阻断✧授权的对象包括用户、用户角色、资源与用户行为✧系统不但能够授权用户可以通过什么角色访问资源这样基于应用边界的粗粒度授权，对某些应用还可以限制用户的操作，以及在什么时间进行操作这样应用内部的细粒度授权5.访问控制✧系统提供细粒度的访问控制，最大限度保护用户资源的安全。
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SECURITY SCHEME FOR MOBILE AGENT SYSTEM IN E-COMMERCE SCENARIORajwinder Singh and A.K.SarjeDeptt. of Electronics and Computer EngineeringIndian Institute of Technology Roorkee,Roorkee – 247667, India.rwsingh@ABSTRACTMobile agents are software program that can autonomously migrate from a platform to another platform to accomplish their tasks and it is believed that they will play an important role in future e-commerce system, offering higher flexibility and improved performance. In spite of those benefits from mobile agent system, security in mobile agent system is especially hard to achieve when a mobile agent is executed on remote platform that may behave maliciously or mobile agent may behave maliciously on the remote platform. There has been a lot of work done in the area of mobile agent’s security. Recently, Bae et al. proposed a security scheme for mobile agent system using an IDENTITY- BASED digital signature scheme and claimed that their scheme provided complete security to mobile agent system.However, in this paper, we show that their security scheme still suffers from some security weakness such as man in middle attack and previous agent platform can forge the signature. And then we further propose a new security scheme for secure mobile agent system that solves the weakness of their protocol using dynamic generated partial multi signature with message flexibility and provides the security services such as mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and the prevention of replay and exclude attack. The propose scheme is suitable and practical for protecting mobile agent from malicious platform in e-commerce scenario over the Internet.KEY WORDSMobile Agent, malicious platform, multi-signature schemeSECURITY SCHEME FOR MOBILE AGENT SYSTEM IN E-COMMERCE SCENARIO1 INTRODUCTIONMobile agents are software programs that can autonomously migrate from platform to platform to accomplish their goals in computer networks [1]. The mobile agents are executed locally on remote hosts to perform their task and return to the end-user to report their results. The main advantages of the mobile agent paradigm lie in its ability to move the client code and computation to remote server resources; reducing network traffic and to overcome network latencies [2]. Thus a mobile agent offers a new computing paradigm for distributed application development due to combination of autonomy and mobility characteristics. There are several application areas of mobile agent systems such as information searching and retrieval, network management and e-commerce. However, it is difficult to find commercial distributed applications using a mobile agent. Since a real distributed environment is an open network, it is very vulnerable to a variety of security attacks. Despite the benefits of mobile agent paradigm, they pose new threats to security as stated in [3,5] and could classify into two areas.Threats to agent platform from malicious agents.Threats to agent from malicious agent platformsMany researchers have been worked to solve the mobile agent’s security in above areas [4]. Since the first problem is similar to the one that already existed with Java and ActiveX technologies in which the host has to run software coming from untrusted sources.Second problem is harder than the first one because the mobile agent is executed on the remote agent platform that has no direct control over the remote platform by the agent owner and more vulnerable to attacks by remote agent platform if platform is malicious since during its execution the remote platform is able to access the agent’s code, data and state. [5] Recently, Bae et al [6] proposed a security scheme to solve the security issues for mobile agent system by using the digital multi-signature [7] and identity-based key distribution scheme [8]. But their protocol has some security weaknesses; i.e., their protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack and the previous agent platform can forge the multi-signature.In this paper, we discuss the security weaknesses of Bae et al. security scheme. Next we propose a security scheme for protecting mobile agent system. To solve the weaknesses of their protocol and strengthen the security of the mobile agent system, we apply dynamic generated partial multi-signature scheme with message flexibility [9] to our scheme. Our scheme provides the mutual authentication, confidentiality of the mobile agent's execution results, the non-repudiation, and the prevention of replay attack and exclude attack. In this paper we consider a shopping scenario in which a mobile agent searches the best price of the item.The paper is organised as follows. In next section 2, we explain the notations used in this paper. The security scheme of Bae et al. and their security weakness are briefly describes in section 3 and 4 respectively. In section 5, we present the proposed scheme for mobile agent security in e-commerce scenario. In section 6, we analyze the security of our proposed scheme. Finally, we present our conclusion.2 NOTATIONSModel and cryptography notations used in the paper are same as in [6] and defined as follows.AP The ith agent platform (0 ≤ i ≤ n) on migration path of mobile agentiAP Agent home platformAMC Trusted agent management centeri Id Identity information ofi AP A_ name A name of mobile agent (or agent)A_code An executable code of mobile agentA_ exe_ results i Execution results of mobile agent at the agent platform AP iA_ exe_ results All execution results of mobile agent at the every agent platformA_ sign A multi-signature for A_exe_results iMA A mobile agent, a set of {A_ name, A_ code, A_ exe_results, A_sign}Cert A :A's certificatep and q Large primes with p= 2q+1gA generator g ∈*p z has order of q x iA secret key of AP i y iA public key of AP i , yi = g xi (mod p) hA strong one-way hash function sk A, B:A session key between A andB E kAn encryption function with key k time i Timestamp made by APi“||” Concatenation.AP i → AP n : M The agent platform AP i sends the message M to the agent platform AP n3 SECURITY SCHEME OF BAE ET AL.We first describe the Bae et al security scheme presented in [6]. Their scheme employed Okamoto-Ohta multi signature scheme based on Fiat-Shamir Scheme [7] and identity based key distribution scheme [8] to solve the security issues for mobile agent system. In their scheme, secure communication is obtained by using one-time password between hosts for each section through Identity-based key distribution rather than maintaining a public key directory. It generates multi-signature on the mobile code and verifies results of the previous step when migrating to next server. Then, the executable code and resulting data can be protected and unauthorized tampering can be detected in real time. Moreover, malicious disposal of agent and unauthorized copying can be detected by monitoring the migration condition of agent at the agent management center.The scheme is composed of five phases that are Registration (agent platform registration and key distribution), CreateAgent, ExecuteAgent, TransferAgent and AuditAgent.In the registration phase, all agent platforms (AP i (0≤i ≤n)) should be registered at AMC in order to execute service to mobile agent system and AMC generates session key using ID upon request of registration from agent platform and distributes it to the agent platform using the smart card.In CreateAgent phase, the agent is created at agent home AP o with the path information and generates the session key with AMC using Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme [10].Then, AP 0 sends an encrypted agent code and path information to AMC as belowAP 0 → AMC:)time ,MA (E 0sk AMC ,0The AP 0 generates the session key with AP 1 using Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme and also generates the multi signature on the execution result of the agent using Okamoto-Ohta multi signature scheme. Then APo sends the encrypted data to AP 1AP 0 → AP1:)time ,MA (E 0sk 1,0In the ExecuteAgent phase, when an agent migrates to AP i+1, the platform treats this agent as one thread, executes the agent, makes a log i and renews the resultLog i =),__(,i i k time results exe A E AMC i A_exe_results i = A_exe_result i-1 || log iThen AP i generates a multi-signature on the execution results A_exe_result i of the agent using Okamoto-Ohta multi signature scheme.In the TransferAgent phase, the agent migrates from agent platform to agent platform whenever the agent has made requests. The session key between agent platforms (AP 1i ,i k E +i and AP i+1) is generated and session key is between AP AMC ,1i k E +i+1 and AMC is also generated. The AP i transmits the sign for result of execution and agent code to AP i+1AP i → AP i+1:)time ,MA (E i sk 1i ,i +And then can verify the signature written by the previous AP 1+i AP i . If the verification is correct, AP i+1 execute this agent. Otherwise AP i+1 reports to the AMC.In the AuditAgent phase, the AMC knows the migration path and according to AP 0 → AP 1: and also know session key shared with AP )time ,MA (E 0sk 1,0i whenever agent migrates. Hence the AMC decrypts all the execution result of the agent that travels according to planned path and arrives at AMC after signature verification. And then AMC encrypts the execution result with the session key k H, AMC and transmits it to agent home. Finally agent reports to home and terminates execution.4 SECURITY ANALYSIS BAE ET AL. SECURITY SCHEMEIn this section, we present the security weakness on the Bae et al. security scheme. There are two security weaknesses in the Kim-Chung protocol. First, their scheme is vulnerable to intruder-in-the-middle attack [11], because it uses the unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange as the method of session key generation in the CreatAgent phase, the ExecuteAgent phase and the TransferAgent phase. The man-in-the-middle attack on this protocol is as follows. AP i and AP j have secret random values R i and R j , respectively. An illegal adversary creates R ’i and R ’j . The adversary intercepts AP i 'sexponential value and replaces it with . He also intercepts AP i R g i 'R g j 's exponential value andreplaces it with . AP j R g j 'R g i forms session key k i, j = , while AP j 'i R R g j forms session key k j, i = . The adversary is able to compute both these keys. When AP j i 'R R g i sends a message encrypted under k i,j to AP j , the adversary deciphers it, re-enciphers under k j,i , and forwards it to AP j . Similarly the adversary deciphers messages encrypted by AP j under k j,i , and re-enciphers them under k i,j . Both AP i and AP j believe that they communicate securely, while the adversary reads all messages. Therefore, the adversary can know the agent code, the path information and the execution results of the agent which should be protected from unauthorized user. Since the adversary can be other agent platforms, other agent platforms can know all execution results of the agent in the previous agent platforms. Therefore, this protocol does not provide a confidentiality of execution results.Secondly since each agent platform AP i generates the multi-signature on a different A_ exe_ results i using Okamoto-Ohta multi-signature scheme without message fexibility; i.e., the message flexibility means that a message does not need to be fixed beforehand, the previous signer can forge the multi-signature as follows. After the previous signer AP j (1≤ j ≤· i ) intercepts the multi-signature transmitted from AP i to AP i +1, AP j changes her own execution results and re-signs on the changed execution results and sends the forged multi-signature to AP i +1.5 PROPOSED SECURITY SCHEME FOR MOBILE AGENTIn this section, we propose a security scheme for the secure mobile agent system that solves the weaknesses of Bae et al. security scheme and provides the mutual authentication, confidentiality, the non-repudiation, and the prevention of replay attack and exclude attack. In our protocol, each agent platform efficiently generates partial multi- signature on execution results of the mobile agent using dynamic generated partial multi-signature scheme that has the feature of the message flexibility. So, unlike Bae et al. scheme, the previous agent platform cannot forge the multi-signature in this scheme. And it also protects the mobile agent's code and execution results from unauthorized entity using encryption function. The proposed security scheme has five phases such as agent platform registration phase, mobile agent creation phase, mobile agent execution phase, mobile agent migration phase and mobile agent arrival phase.5.1 Agent platform Registration PhaseAll agent platform and agent home must register at the AMC before access the service of mobile agent system. The protocol between all agent platforms AP i and AMC for registration and to obtain the session key between them using KEA key exchange algorithms [12] is as follows1. AP i sends a request message request i and cert i to the AMC.2. AMC sends cert AMC to the AP i and register them at AMC.3. Session key sk AMC, i are established between each AP i and AMC using KEA protocol.5.2 Mobile Agent Creation PhaseThe protocol for mobile agent creation at agent home AP o as follows:1. The mobile agent is created at AP o and the result is A_exe_result 0.2. Generates the partial multisignature (s o , r o ) on the result of mobile agent creation A_exe_result 0 to ensure that AP o created that mobile agent as follows:AP o selects a random number k o ∈ Z q *AP o computes Ro = p mod y 0k or o = (h (A_exe_result 0 || Id o ))-1. R o mod qs o = (x 0r o + y 1).k 0-1 mod q3 Session key sk 0,1 is generated between AP o and AP 1 using KEA key exchange algorithm.4. Now, AP o generated and . After initialization the agent immigrates with the information (Id0, r )time ,MA (E 0sk 1,0)time ,MA (E 0sk AMC ,0o , s o , E sk 0,1(MA, time 0)) to AP 1 and (Id 0, ro, so, E sk 0,AMC (MA, time 0)) to AMC.5.3 Mobile Agent Execution PhaseWhen a mobile agent migrates to AP i+1 , a platform treats this as one thread. The protocol for mobile agent execution at platform AP i+1 as s follows1. AP i+1 executes the mobile agent and then it makes a log i and renews the A_exe_results.log i =)time ,results _exe _A (E i i sk AMC ,i A_exe_results i, = A_exe_results i- 1 || log iAt this stage, the results of the execution must be protected from other agent platforms and this can be done with the help of private key of the AP i .2 APi generates the partial multisignature on A_exe_results i to ensure that the AP i executes themobile agent and make the results A_exe_results i asAP i selects a random number k i ∈ Z p *AP i computes R i = , p mod y i k 0r i = (h (A_exe_results i || Id i ))-1. R i mod qs i = (x i r i + y i+1).k 0-1 mod qThe last platform AP n uses the partial multisignature from AP n-1 to compute the final multisignature and indicates as the next destination the initial signer platform as:S n = (x n r n + y o ).k n -1 mod q5.4 Mobile Agent Migration PhaseThe protocol for mobile agent migration from platform AP i to AP i+1 as follows:1. Session key sk i, i+1 is established between AP i and AP i+1 using KEA protocol when a mobileagent is migrated from AP i to AP i+1.2. The AP i sends the partial multisignature for the results of execution and encrypted agent code Esk i,i+1(MA, time i ) to AP i+1 .5.5 Mobile agent Arrival PhaseWhen a mobile agent reaches at agent home platform, it calculatesFor i= n, n-1, ----2, Ri’ = , and Ti = Ri’.r p mod y .y 1i i o 1i 1i s r x i y .s o−+−i -1 mod q by using AP i ’s public key y i and verifies r i-1=T i . (h (A_exe_results ||Idi))-1 mod qFor i=1, Ri’ = , and Ti p mod y .g 1i i o 21i s r x 0y .s −−’ = Ri’.r j -1 mod q and verifies Ti ’= (h(A_exe_results 1 ||Id 1))Now, the agent home platform verifies the signatures provided by each new platform and decrypts the result. If signature verification fails, the agent platform must report the AMC for further action i.e. either got the information from the AMC for rechecking the signature or again executes the agent.6 SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SECURITY SCHEMEIn this section we analyze the security of the proposed scheme. The proposed scheme uses the dynamic generated partial multi-signature with message flexibility. With the proposed scheme, the agent home platform creates the mobile agent and signs the result and then forwards this to the next platform. Each new platform can modify the results and sign the result. The order of platform to be visited need not be specified in advance but may be generated dynamically. The verification process shows who signed with modified result and the order of platforms visited. Also since the execution result and results of the mobile agent are protected by the encryption function, it is very useful and practical in protecting the mobile agent from malicious platform in the E-commerce over the Internet to find the best price of the products.The proposed security scheme provides the basic security service like the mutual authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, prevention of replay and excludes attack, protection of private key of the agent home platform and solves the weakness of the Bae et al security scheme as follows:Mutual Authentication: Since the proposed security scheme establishes the session keybetween two-agent platforms, so anyone who does not know the private key corresponding to public key of the certificate cannot compute the session key. Hence the mutual authentication is provided between two-agent platforms. Confidentiality of the agent code and data: Since the private key of the agent home platform is used in the mobile agent creation phase, no other platform knows the resultexcept agent home platform AP0 and achieve the confidentiality security service on agentcode and data.Integrity of agent code and data: Since the mobile agent is encrypted with the next platform session key and send this information to next platform as well as AMC and nextplatform can verify the integrities of agent code and data through the verification process.If any incorrectness is detected, this is being reported immediately to the AMC.Protection of result obtained at each platform: Since the agent home platform’s public key is included in the first step of signature generation. After the agent is dispatched tocollect information, each new platform generates the partial signature and encrypts theinformation. If any verifier, except the agent home platform and the platform that provides the information, wants to verify and decrypts the information, it must get theprivate key of the agent home original platform or of the platform that provides theinformation.Prevention of replay attack: Since each agent platform uses different timestamp and random number in proposed scheme, the unauthorized entity cannot succeed in the replayattack.Prevention of exclude attack: Since the public key of next platform is added in the generation of the partial multisignature so that verification of the signing order of platform agent visits will be fixed after agent return back to the agent home platform.Also the proposed scheme solves the weakness of the Bae et at as follows. First, since our security scheme uses the authenticated key exchange protocol KEA in the session key generation, unauthorized entity who does not know the communicating agent platform's private key cannot perform the intruder-in-the-middle attack. Second, we use the dynamically generated multi-signature scheme with message flexibility. So, the previous agent platform cannot forge the multi-signature by using the verification of signing order.7 CONCLUSIONIn this paper, we briefly reviewed the Bae et al security scheme for mobile agent system and shown that there scheme suffered from the man in middle attack, and previous agent platform forged the multisiganture and exclude attackWe further proposed a security scheme for the mobile agent system that solves the security weakness of Bae et al security scheme. 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