Chapter 3 -- How Markets work -- Norton August
泰晤士谷-- 欧洲的硅谷 - 第三章 Chapter 3
14第三章 Chapter 3泰晤士谷--欧洲的硅谷Thames Valley --Silicon Valley in EuropeBusiness investment into the UK is welcomed and supported.The Thames Valley Chamber of Commerce represents over 3000 companies including the fastest growing small businesses and major multinational organisations in the Thames Valley region - referred to as the Britain’s Silicon Valley, to the West of London.Our inward investment team provides tried and tested support services to help Chinese companies to understand the business benefits of locating in the Thames Valley and to help new companies to the UK to get up and running quickly.We are already working with China’s most recognised technology brands to grow their business in the UK.The UK prides itself on being a business friendly market place. Business investment into the UK is welcomed and supported.Whether you are establishing an office in the UK, relocating an existing European presence, or looking to meet with potential technology or supply chain partners there are support services to assist you.TVCC provides support services to help companies to settle quickly in the UK and expand泰晤士谷商会和英国商会“英中企业中心”对英投资团队会为您提供尽善尽美并且成熟的各项支持服务。
曼昆微观经济学经济学十大原理 英文版
how firms decide how much to produce, how many workers to hire(企业决策:生产(数量)、雇佣工人数量)
how society decides how to divide its resources between national defense, consumer goods, protecting the environment, and other needs(国家决策:国防、消费品、环 4 TEN PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 保等)
Tradeoff的原因本质是:资源的稀缺性
TEN PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
6
HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS Principle #1: 人们面临权衡取舍 People Face Tradeoffs
Exampense requires resources that could
机会成本也来源于资源稀缺性,由于机会成本的存在从而需要取
舍。
机会成本是人们选择,而放弃其他全部选择中收益最大的部分。
9
HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS
Principle #2: 某种东西的成本是为了得到它而放弃的东西
The Cost of Something Is What You Give Up to Get It
TEN PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
12
HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS
Principle #3: 理性人考虑边际量
Rational People Think at the Margin Rational people
《宏观经济学》参考文献
《宏观经济学》参考文献一、各章参考文献第一章导论1、凯恩斯:《就业利息与货币通论》,商务印书馆1963年版。
2、Hall and Tayler, “Macroecnomics” , 2nd Ed., Norton Co. , New York, 1988, Chapter 13、蔡继明,《宏观经济学》,人民出版社2003年版,第一章。
4、高鸿业,《西方经济学(宏观部分)》,中国经济出版社1996年版,第一章。
5、宋承先,《现代西方经济学(宏观经济学)》,复旦高校出版社1999年版,第一章。
其次章宏观经济的衡量与均衡1、Hall and Tayler, <<Macroecnomics,> , 2nd Ed., Norton Co., New York, 1988, Chapter 22、蔡继明,《宏观经济学》,人民出版社2003年版,第一章。
3、高鸿业,《西方经济学(宏观部分)》,中国经济出版社1996年版,第一章。
4、宋承先,《现代西方经济学(宏观经济学)》,复旦高校出版社1999年版,第一章。
5、美国商务部,《当今商业概览》,1976年一月号。
第三章经济增长1、Jones, “An Introduction to Mordern Theories of Economic Growth,, , McGraw-Hill Co.,New York, 19762 > So low, ^Technical Change and Agregate Production Inunction n, in “Review of Economicsand Statistics” , 1957第四章失业1、凯恩斯:《就业利息与货币通论》,商务印书馆1963年版。
2、斯蒂格利茨,《经济学》(其次版),中国人民高校出版社2000年版。
3、兰荣华,《我们国家当前失业的缘由和再就业的措施》,载《上海铁道高校学报》2000年第7期。
成功投资的24堂基本课(威廉·欧奈尔)(完美翻译版).txt.doc
《成功投资的24堂基本课》(初版时间2000年)-----作者小传投资大师威廉欧奈尔中国的投资者多半都知道沃伦巴菲特,但未必都知道威廉欧奈尔。
如果把巴菲特称之为“股王”,那么这位白手起家、而立之年便在纽约证交所给自己买下一个席位的欧奈尔,显然更像是一位谆谆教导并且身体力行的老师,从选股、选择买卖点以及散户通过购买基金赚大钱,到如何在茫茫股海中抓黑马等投资策略,他都考虑到了。
他本身的经历是他理论最为生动的证明。
他的成功就像一部小说或一场电影,充满了美国式的传奇。
他不仅成为了在股市中获取超额利润的投资大师,而且还是一名非常成功的企业家。
从500美元到20万美元欧奈尔出生于美国俄克拉荷马州,正值美国经济濒临崩溃的大萧条时期。
在德克萨斯州,他度过了少年和青年时期。
21岁那年,刚刚告别校园的欧奈尔以500美元作为资本,开始了生平第一次投资——买了5股宝洁公司的股票。
l958年,他在海顿一家股票经纪公司担任股票经纪人,开始了他的金融事业生涯。
也就是从那时起,他开始了对股票的研究工作,这就为他后来形成整套独特的选股方法奠定了基础。
1962年-1963年,他通过克莱斯勒、Syntex等两三只股票的交易,把投入的原始本金——500美元,增加到了20万美元。
60年代初,正当而立之年的欧奈尔用在股市中的收益为自己在纽约证券交易所购买了一个席位,并成立了一家以他名字命名的专门从事机构投资的股票经纪公司——欧奈尔公司。
该公司在市场上率先推出了跟踪股市走势的计算机数据库,后来才有其他公司仿效。
1973年,欧奈尔创建了“欧奈尔数据系统公司”。
建立了庞大的数据图表中心,为普通投资者服务。
此外,他们还出版“每日图线”,每周向投资者提供日K线图。
目前,该公司不仅为600多家大机构投资者服务,而且向30000多位个人用户提供每日股市分析图表及大量的基本面和技术面的分析指标。
挑战《华尔街日报》1984年,欧奈尔向权威的百年老报——《华尔街日报》发起挑战,创办了《投资者商报》,这是美国报界中全新的模式。
外贸书籍推荐
外贸书籍推荐第一篇:外贸书籍推荐外贸书籍推荐:1.《外贸七日通》2.Stephan Schiffman 基本营销书《cold calling》3.Roger Dawson 《Secrets of Power Negotiating》4.余世维先生视频讲座卖车案例——怎样让客人在价格高于预期的情况下买你的车5.《在平的世界中竞争》Competing in a flat world6.卡耐基《推销的艺术》7.罗伯特 B 西奥迪尼《影响力,你为什么说是》8.利丰《供应链管理:香港利丰集团的实践》9.牛津英汉高阶10.《优势谈判》《绝对成交》11.米尔顿弗里德曼《自由选择》《资本主义与自由》12.毅冰《外贸高手客户成交技巧》《十天搞定外贸函电》13.当当网介绍如何进500强的书第二篇:经典书籍些书一本都没读过的算不上大学生分享作者:似水年华已被分享4 次评论(0)复制链接分享转载举报下面是一些绝对值得一读的经典...不读真是枉为大学生啊...一、修为类29 本:同学们可看一些哲学、自然科学、社会历史方面的书。
畅销书:李开复:《做最好的自己》;丹尼尔·戈尔曼:《情商:它为什么比智商更重要》 1995 《谁动了我的奶酪?》、《致加西亚的信》、《拿破仑·希尔成功学全书》《如何掌控自己的时间和生活》、《高效能人士的七个习惯》中国古典名著:《论语》、《道德经》、《易经》或是后人的经典解读《孙子兵法》(特别是曹操做注的那一本,太博大精深了,每次阅读都有新的收获)《三十六计》、《三国演义》、《史记》(但要注意司马迁的个人价值取向)、《东周列国志》现代名著:费正清著《中国现代史》、《毛泽东选集》(《论持久战》、《实践论》、《矛盾论》)真的很经典!《邓小平文选》西方名著:罗素著《西方哲学史》、黑格尔的《辩证法》、霍金著《时间简史》等,有助于我们加深对事物的认识名人传记类:《曾国藩书信全集》、《胡雪岩全传》中国著名商人传记思维训练:爱德华·德·波诺(Edward De Bono)在国际上被公认为首屈一指的创造性思维大师.著作达60 多种。
公司理财罗斯英文原书第九版第三章
3-17
Potential Problems
There is no underlying theory, so there is no way to know which ratios are most relevant. Benchmarking (标杆学习) is difficult for diversified firms. Globalization and international competition makes comparison more difficult because of differences in accounting regulations. Firms use varying accounting procedures. Firms have different fiscal years. Extraordinary, or one-time, events
2904 + (196 + 457) – 98 = 3465 3465 / 967 = 3.6 times
3-13
EV Multiple(企业倍数) = EV / EBITDA
Using Financial Statements
Ratios are not very helpful by themselves: they need to be compared to something Time-Trend Analysis(时间趋势分析 )
98 / 540 = .18 times
3-6
Computing Leverage Ratios
Total Debt Ratio = (TA – TE) / TA (负债比 率)
威廉姆深交易成本经济学
3.Transaction Cost EconomicsOLIVER E.WILLIAMSONTransaction cost economics is an effort to better understand complex economic organization by selectively joining law,economics,and organization theory. As against neoclassical economics,which is predominantly concerned with price and output,relies extensively on marginal analysis,and describes thefirm as a production function(which is a technological construction),transaction cost economics(TCE)is concerned with the allocation of economic activity across alternative modes of organization(markets,firms,bureaus,etc.),employs discrete structural analysis,and describes thefirm as a governance structure (which is an organizational construction).Real differences notwithstanding, orthodoxy and TCE are in many ways complements—one being more well-suited to aggregation in the context of simple market exchange,the other being more well-suited to the microanalytics of complex contracting and nonmarket organization.I begin by contrasting the lens of contract(out of which TCE works)with the lens of choice(orthodoxy).Vertical integration,which is the paradigm prob-lem for TCE,is then examined.The operationalization of TCE is discussed in Section3.Variations on a theme are sketched in Section4.Public policy is discussed in Section5.Concluding remarks follow.1.T HE L ENSES OF C HOICE AND C ONTRACT1Big IdeasHal Varian has recently distinguished between important ideas and Big Ideas and describes Ronald Coase’s classic paper,“The Nature of the Firm”(1937)as a Big Idea(2002,p.C2).Although there is widespread agreement on this,the nature of the big idea took a long time to register.Thus as of1972,thirty-five years after the publication of“The Nature of the Firm,”Coase described his 1937article as“much cited and little used”(1972,p.63).It was much cited because it was onto something important,perhaps even big.But it was little used because the big idea was only dimly perceived and/or lacked operationalization (Coase,1992,pp.716–718).1This subsection is based on Williamson(2002b).41C.M´e nard and M.M.Shirley(eds.),Handbook of New Institutional Economics,41–65.C 2005Springer.Printed in the Netherlands.42Oliver E.WilliamsonThe essence of the Coasian contribution has been variously described (Williamson,1994,p.202;North,2000,p.37;Werin,2000,p.45).For the purposes of TCE,I contend that the overarching big idea was to move from choice to contract:bring the lens of contract systematically to bear on economic phenomena of all kinds.For many transactions,of which the make-or-buy decision is one(Coase,1937),the contractual structure is easily recog-nized.Other transactions,such as the externality problem(Coase,1960),needed to be reformulated to bring out their latent contractual features.The object,in these and other cases described herein,is to uncover previously neglected but, often,consequential features,the discovery of which often leads to different and, sometimes,deeper understandings than the orthodox lens of choice affords.If, as James Buchanan declares,“mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is...the most fundamental of all understandings in economics”(2001,p.29), then at least some of us should be thinking of economics as the“science of exchanges”(Buchanan,2001,p.28).2The Sciences of Choice and ContractEconomics throughout the20th century has been developed predominantly as a science of choice.As Lionel Robbins famously put it in his book, The Nature and Significance of Economic Science,“Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses”(1932,p.16).Choice has been developed in two parallel constructions:the theory of consumer behavior,in which consumers maximize utility,and the theory of thefirm as a production function,in which firms maximize profit.Economists who work out of such setups emphasize how quantities are influenced by changes in relative prices and available resources,a project which became the“dominant paradigm”for economics throughout the twentieth century(Reder,1999,p.48).But the science of choice is not the only lens for studying complex economic phenomena,nor is it always the most instructive lens.The other main but less fully developed approach is the science of contract.Indeed,Buchanan(1975, p.225)avers that economics as a discipline went“wrong”in its preoccupation with the science of choice and the optimization apparatus associated therewith. What was needed was the parallel development of a science of contract.Awaiting this,some phenomena would go unnoticed,others would be poorly understood, and public policy error would result.2Students of the history of thought will remind us that catallactics—meaning“the science of exchanges”—has much earlier origins.Indeed,a book by E.B.de Condillac on this subject was published in1776,which is when The Wealth of Nationsfirst appeared(see Murray Rothbard(1987,pp.377–378) for an historical sketch).Recurrent interest in the science of contract notwithstanding,it has operated in the shadows of the science of choice.Why the disparity?Here as elsewhere,good ideas need to be operationalized.Contractual analysis has gotten under way in a sustained way only during the past 40years.Transaction Cost Economics43 As perceived by Buchanan,the principal needs for a science of contract were to thefield of publicfinance and took the form of public ordering:“Pol-itics is a structure of complex exchange among individuals,a structure within which persons seek to secure collectively their own privately defined objec-tives that cannot be efficiently secured through simple market exchanges”(1987, p.296;emphasis added).Thinking contractually in the public ordering domain leads into a focus on the rules of the game.Issues of a constitutional eco-nomics kind are posed(Buchanan and Tullock,1962;Brennan and Buchanan, 1985).Whatever the rules of the game,the lens of contract is also usefully brought to bear on the play of the game.This latter is what I refer to as private ordering, which entails self-help efforts by the immediate parties to a transaction to align incentives and craft governance structures that are better attuned to their ex-change needs.John mons’prescient statement on the nature of the economic problem provides the unifying theme:“the ultimate unit of activ-ity...must contain in itself the three principles of conflict,mutuality,and order. This unit is the transaction”(1932,p.4).3Not only does transaction cost eco-nomics take the transaction to be the basic unit of analysis,but governance is the means by which to infuse order,thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gain.Although market competition serves these governance purposes in the context of the“simple market exchanges”to which Buchanan made reference(which is wholly in the spirit of orthodox price theory),transaction cost economics is predominantly concerned with complex market exchange where there are small numbers of parties on each side of the transaction.Rather than examine such issues with the price-theoretic apparatus of oligopoly or oligopsony,transac-tion cost economics focuses instead on uncovering and explicating the strategic hazards that are posed by small numbers exchange in the context of incom-plete contracting and the cost-effective deployment of governance to mitigate these hazards.Strategic issues that had been ignored by neoclassical economists from1870to1970now make their appearance(Makowski and Ostroy,2001, pp.482–483,490–491).Figure1sets out the main distinctions.The initial divide is between the sci-ence of choice(orthodoxy)and the science of contract.The latter then divides into public(constitutional economics)and private ordering parts,where the second is split into two related branches.One branch deals with ex ante incen-tive alignment(mechanism design,agency theory,the formal property rights literature)while the second features the ex post governance of contractual 3Not everyone associated with the lens of contract would agree.Coase,for example,contends that “American institutionalism,”of which Commons was a prominent part,“is a dreary subject...All it had was a stance of hostility to the standard economic theory.It certainly led to nothing”(1984,pp.229–230). My view is that Commons was ahead of his time.He had a lens of contract conception of economics as early as the1920s.44Oliver E.WilliamsonFigure1.The sciences of choice and contractrelations(contract implementation).Albeit related,these two are in tension. Thus whereas transaction cost economics locates the main analytical action in the ex post stage of contract(where maladaptation problems appear),the formal incentive alignment literature annihilates ex post governance.4One device for accomplishing this is to assume common knowledge of payoffs and costless bargaining.The use of strong assumptions(of which common knowledge of payoffs and costless bargaining are two)to strip away inessentials and get at the essence is,to be sure,vital to the scientific enterprise.Simplifications,however,that lose contact with core issues are deeply problematic:“A model can be right in...[a]mechanical sense...[yet be]unenlightening because...[it is]imper-fectly suited to the subject matter.It can obscure the key interactions,instead of spotlighting them”(Solow,2001,p.112).In the degree to which the core issues that are posed by contractual incompleteness are those of maladaptation, 4Contract theorists who concentrate the analytical action on the ex ante incentive alignment stage of contracting might complain that TCE makes strong assumptions also,the effect of which is to annihilate the ex ante incentive alignment stage.For example,TCE assumes that contracting parties in intermediate product markets are risk neutral,whence efficient risk bearing plays no role in incentive alignment.Contract theorists who rely on risk aversion for their main results might protest against risk neutrality.Be that as it may,TCE also assumes that contracting parties look ahead,recognize consequential con-tractual hazards that arise during contract implementation,and factor these into the ex ante contractual design—by pricing out unrelieved contractual hazards and by introducing credible commitments(in cost effective degree)—so ex ante and ex post stages of contract are definitely joined.What TCE disallows are assumptions which vaporize maladaptation and strategizing during contract implementation—of which common knowledge of payoffs and costless bargaining are two.Transaction Cost Economics45 formalizations that preserve rather than annihilate ex post governance are needed (Bajari and Tadelis,2001).2.T HE P ARADIGM P ROBLEM:V ERTICAL I NTEGRATION Contract is an encompassing concept.Rather than treat the issue in its full generality,it will be instructive to begin with a specific puzzle of economic organization,ideally one for which other contractual issues will turn out to be variations on a theme.The obvious transaction with which to begin is that of vertical integration, or,in more mundane terms,the make-or-buy decision.Not only is the make-or-buy decision the transaction on which Coase focused in1937,but it has a prior and continuing history of importance within economics.Examining the intermediate product market transactions(within and betweenfirms)also has an advantage in that it relieves many of the asymmetry conditions—of information, budget,legal talent,risk aversion,and the like—that complicate the analysis of transactions infinal product markets.5Coase’s classic article opens with a basic puzzle:Why does afirm emerge at all in a specialized exchange economy?If the answer resides in entrepreneurship, why is coordination“the work of the price mechanism in one case and the entrepreneur in the other”(Coase,1937,p.389)?Coase appealed to transaction cost economizing as the hitherto missing factor for explaining why markets were used in some cases and hierarchy in other cases and averred that“The main reason why it is profitable to establish afirm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism,the most obvious...[being]that of discovering what the relevant prices are”(1937,p.391).That sounds plausible, but is it truly comparative?How is it that internal procurement by thefirm avoids the cost of price discovery?The“obvious”answer is that sole-source internal supply avoids the need to consult the market about prices because internal accounting prices of a formulaic kind(say,of a cost-plus kind)can be used to transfer a good or service from one internal stage to another.If,however,that is the source of the advantage of internal organization over market procurement,the obvious lesson is to apply this same practice to outside procurement.Thefirm simply advises its purchasing office to turn a blind eye to the market by placing orders,period by period,with a qualified sole-source external supplier who agrees to sell on cost-plus terms.In 5Final product market transactions and transactions between suppliers and distributors need to be dis-tinguished.The former refer to transactions betweenfirms(as suppliers)andfinal consumers(buyers). Serious asymmetry conditions for which consumer protections are sometimes warranted arise forfinal product market transactions.By contrast,the transactions between the manufacturer and the distributor are betweenfirms.Thus the manufacturer can sell outright to distributors(which is a market transaction).Or the manufacturer can integrate forward into distribution(so both stages are under unified ownership/hierarchy). Or the manufacturer can create franchisees(which are a hybrid mode of contracting).46Oliver E.Williamsonthat event,firm and market are put on a parity in price discovery respects—which is to say that the price discovery burden that Coase ascribes to the market does not survive comparative institutional scrutiny.Even,however,if price discovery did survive comparative institutional scrutiny,that seems to be a thin basis upon which to rest the case for using firms rather than markets if,as I contend,firm and market differ in kind rather than in degree.What economic purposes are served by the discrete structural changes that distinguish market and hierarchy?Does the move from choice (where prices are focal)to contract implicate other,possibly more basic,con-siderations?What rudiments inform the logic of contract and comparative eco-nomic organization?3.T HE R UDIMENTSThis last invites the student of economic organization to step back and address contract“on its own terms.”What are the attributes of human actors that bear on the efficacy of contract?What unit of analysis should be employed?Of the many purposes of contract,which are salient?How are alternative modes of governance described?What refutable implications accrue upon reformulating the problem of economic organization in comparative contractual terms?Are the data corroborative?What are the public policy ramifications?(a)Human ActorsIf“Nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our research methods than our view of the nature of the human beings whose be-havior we are studying”(Simon,1985,p.303),then economists and other social scientists are well-advised to describe the key cognitive,self-interest,and other attributes of human actors on which their analyses rest.Simon’s view of cog-nition is that the usual hyperrationality assumption be supplanted by bounded rationality—behavior that is“intendedly rational but only limitedly so”(1957a, p.xxiv).He further recommends that self-interest be described as“frailty of mo-tive”(1985,p.305).TCE concurs that bounded rationality is the appropriate cog-nitive assumption and takes the chief lesson of bounded rationality for the study of contract to be that all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete.But TCE also takes a further step,which takes exception with the common view that bounded rationality implies that human actors are myopic.As against myopia, human actors are assumed to have the capacity to look ahead,uncover possible contractual hazards,and work out the contractual ramifications(Shultz,1995).TCE also pushes beyond frailty of motive to make provision for opportunism. This latter does not deny that most people will do what they say and some will do more most of the time.Opportunism,however,has reference to exceptions—outliers where there is a lot at stake and parties are often observed to defect from the spirit of cooperation to insist on the letter of the incomplete contract. Strategic considerations are introduced upon making provision for opportunism.Transaction Cost Economics47(b)Unit of AnalysisThe natural unit of analysis for lens of contract purposes is the transaction. Naming a unit of analysis is always much easier,however,than identifying the critical dimensions for describing the unit of analysis—as witness the fact that the key attributes for so many would-be units of analysis are never identified.6 Awaiting dimensionalization,transaction cost economics remained a largely tautological construction.To be sure,transactions can be variously described—depending on the pur-pose.Transaction cost economics holds that three dimensions that have perva-sive ramifications for governance are asset specificity(which takes a variety of forms—physical,human,site,dedicated,brand name—and is a measure of nonredeployability),the disturbances to which transactions are subject(and to which potential maladaptations accrue),and the frequency with which transac-tions recur(which bears both on the efficacy of reputation effects in the market and the incentive to incur the cost of specialized internal governance).The ab-sence of asset specificity describes the ideal transaction in law and economics for which competition works well:“sharp in by clear agreement;sharp out by clear performance”(Macneil,1973,p.734).As asset specificity builds up,how-ever,bilateral dependency develops and,in combination with uncertainty(which pushes incomplete contracts out of alignment),the aforementioned contractual complications set in.(c)Main PurposeInterestingly,both the economist Friedrich Hayek(1945)and the organization theorist Chester Barnard(1938)were in agreement that adaptation is the central problem of economic organization.Hayek(pp.526–527)focused on the adap-tations of economic actors who adjust spontaneously to changes in the market, mainly as signaled by changes in relative prices:Upon looking“at the price system as...a mechanism for communicating information,”the marvel of the market resides in“how little the individual participants need to know to be able to take the right action.”By contrast,Barnard featured coordinated adaptation among economic actors working through administration(hierarchy).The latter is accomplished not spontaneously but in a“conscious,deliberate,purposeful”way(p.9)and comes into play when the simple market exchanges on which Hayek focused break down.In effect,the adaptations to which Hayek refers are autonomous adapta-tions in which individual parties respond to market opportunities as signaled by changes in relative prices whereas the adaptations of concern to Barnard are cooperative adaptations accomplished through administration within thefirm. 6Examples of would-be units of analysis for which operational content is missing include the role(see Simon’s critique(1957a,p.xxx),the decision-premise(which is Simon’s candidate,but which has found little application outside of cognitive psychology(Newell and Simon,1972)),and the routine(Nelson and Winter,1982).The next two paragraphs and Section4are based on Williamson(2002a).48Oliver E.WilliamsonBecause a high performance economic system will display adaptive capacities of both kinds,an understanding and appreciation for both markets and hierarchies (rather than the comparative economic systems dichotomy between markets or hierarchies)is needed.Thefirm for these purposes is described not as a produc-tion function(which is a technological construction)but as a governance struc-ture(which is an organizational construction).And the market is described simi-larly.The lens of contract,as against the lens of choice,is made the cutting edge.One of the advantages of focusing on adaptation as the main case is that it brings added meaning to the idea of mutual gain.It is elementary that gains from trade will always be realized by moving onto the contract curve.But how is this to be accomplished in a world where complex contracts are incom-plete and are implemented over time in the face of disturbances for which contingent provisions either have not been made or,if made,are often in error?Crafting governance structures that are attuned to the hazards and help the parties to restore efficiency(return to the shifting contract curve)where oth-erwise a costly impasse would develop is needed in these circumstances.More attention to designing processes that have good adaptive properties(and less to concentrating all of the action in the ex ante incentive alignment stage)is thus one of the central lessons of TCE.(d)Governance StructuresExamining economic organization through the lens of contract both places the spotlight on ex post adaptation and,in the process,gives prominence to the role of governance.Specifically,TCE holds that each generic mode of governance is defined by a syndrome of internally consistent attributes to which different adaptive strengths and weaknesses accrue.The three attributes of principal importance for describing governance struc-tures are(1)incentive intensity,(2)administrative controls,and(3)contract law regime.Spot markets and hierarchy differ with respect to these attributes as fol-lows:the high-powered incentives of markets are supplanted by low-powered incentives when transactions are organized withinfirms;market exchange is a hands-off control mechanism whereas hierarchy involves considerable hands-on administrative involvement;and whereas disputes in markets are treated in a legalistic way and rely on court ordering,courts refuse to hear(most)in-ternal disputes,whereupon thefirm becomes its own court of ultimate appeal. Firms have access tofiat that markets do not because of these dispute resolution differences.7Governance,moreover,is an encompassing concept.Going beyond polar forms,all modes of organization within which(or with the support of which)7One of the reasons why markets lackfiat is that attempts to award decision rights to autonomous agents by contract(e.g.,A will decide disputed matters of type X;B will decided disputed matters of type Y;etc.) are commonly unenforceable.That is because one of the parties to a market contract can invoke(invent)a “technicality,”the effect of which is to bring the dispute before the courts.Transaction Cost Economics49 Table1.Attributes of leading generic modes of governanceGovernance ModesGovernanceAttributes market hybrid hierarchyincentives high-powered less high-powered low-poweredadministrative nil some muchsupport bybureaucracycontract law legalistic contract asfirm as own courtregime framework of ultimate appeal(fiat)transactions are managed come under scrutiny.Hybrid modes of contracting to which credible commitment supports have been crafted(penalties against premature termination,specialized dispute settlement mechanisms and the like) are especially important.Table1summarizes the key attributes of(spot)market, hybrids,and hierarchies.As developed in the text accompanying Figures2and 3below,the clusters of attributes that define these three alternative modes ofFigure2.Transaction costs and asset specificity50Oliver E.WilliamsonFigure3.Simple contracting schemagovernance give rise to differential transaction costs among modes,conditional on the attributes of the transactions to be organized.An unremarked governance complication also needs to be introduced.This is that organization,like the law,has a life of its own(Selznick,1950,p.10). Issues of internal organization that have been featured by organization theorists (Barnard,1938;Simon,1947;March and Simon,1958)and by sociologists (Michels,1912;Merton,1936;Selznick,1949;Scott,1992)thus arise.Note in this connection that while it is relatively easy to show that internal orga-nization is subject to incentive limits and bureaucratic distortions,it is much more difficult to show that comparative cost consequences accrue upon taking a transaction out of the market and organizing it internally(Williamson,1985, Chap.6).That is because the goods and services traded in a market are produced withinfirms.The question of make-or-buy is thus whether the costs(including bureaucratic costs)are greater in two autonomousfirms than in one combined entity.TCE uncovers and explicates the incentive and bureaucratic cost conse-quences that attend the move from market to hierarchy by postulating two processes:replication and selective intervention.Were it that thefirm could replicate the market in all circumstances where market procurement works well and intervene selectively(if expected net gains can be projected)where mar-kets break down,then thefirm could never do worse than the market(through replication)and would sometimes do better(through selective intervention).As it turns out,it is impossible to realize this ambition.Incentives are unavoidablyTransaction Cost Economics51 compromised8and added bureaucratic cots are unavoidably incurred upon tak-ing a transaction out of the market and organizing it internally.The upshot is that the move from market to hierarchy is attended by tradeoffs.Discriminating alignment is thus needed.(e)Predictions and Empirical TestingThe main engine from which the predictions of TCE are derived is that of discriminating alignment,according to which transactions,which differ in their attributes,are aligned with governance structures,which differ in their cost and (adaptive)competence,so as to effect a transaction cost economizing result.The upshot is that there is a place for each generic mode of governance,yet each should be kept in its place.The TCE answer to the Coasian puzzle of which transactions go where and why resides precisely in discriminating alignment, the efficacy of which relies in part on weak-form natural selection(Simon,1983, p.69)to penalize errors of inefficient alignment.It will be convenient here to focus on three modes:spot markets(M),hybrid modes of contracting(X),into which credible commitments have been intro-duced,and hierarchies(H).The basic argument is that(1)markets are well-suited to making autonomous adaptations,firms enjoy the advantage for comparative adaptation purposes,and hybrids are located in between,(2)the needs for adap-tation vary among transactions(especially with reference to asset specificity), and(3)bureaucratic cost burdens increase as transactions move from market, to hybrid,to hierarchy.In a heuristic way,the transaction cost consequences of organizing transac-tions in markets(M)and hierarchies(H)as a function of asset specificity(k) are shown in Figure2.As shown,the bureaucratic burdens of hierarchy place it at an initial disadvantage(k=0),but the cost differences between M(k)and H(k)narrow as asset specificity builds up and eventually reverse as the need for cooperative adaptation becomes especially great(k 0).As indicated,more-over,the hybrid mode of organization X(k),is viewed as a market-preserving credible contracting mode that possesses adaptive attributes located between classical markets and hierarchies.Incentive intensity and administrative control thus take on intermediate values and Karl Llewellyn’s(1931)concept of contract 8The issues here are rather involved.The interested reader is referred to Williamson(1985,Chap.6) for a discussion.Briefly the argument is that(1)replication is essential if parity betweenfirm and market is to be assumed,(2)such replication implies that incentives are unchanged in each of the separable stages upon taking a transaction out of the market and organizing it internally,yet(3)unchanged incentive intensity cannot be accomplished if the acquiring stage exercises control over the accounting system(to include transfer prices,overhead rates,depreciation,and the like)and cannot credibly commit to behaving nonstrategically,to include intervening always but only for good cause(selective intervention).But there is more.Not only is incentive intensity unavoidably weakened when transactions move from market to hierarchy,but cooperative adaptation across successive stages is promoted by intentionally weakening incentive intensity within thefirm.。
投资大师沃尔特施洛斯文集
沃尔特施洛斯文集1994 年:股市赚钱要诀——沃尔特·施洛斯下面是沃尔特·施洛斯 1994 年写的股市赚钱的 16 个要诀。
股市赚钱要诀沃尔特和埃德温施洛斯有限合伙人公司1994 年 3 月 10 日1. 最重要的因素是价格,与价值相比是高是低。
2. 要确定公司的价值是多少。
记住,股票代表企业的部分所有权,不只是一纸凭证。
3. 从净资产入手,估算并确定企业的价值。
负债一定不能等于 100% 的净资产(普通股的股本和盈余留存)。
4. 有耐心。
股票不会立即上涨。
5. 不听消息或抓短线。
专业人员要是有这个本事,你别模仿。
别因为坏消息卖出。
6. 不害怕孤独,但要确定自己的判断正确。
你无法 100% 确定,要寻找自己的逻辑中有什么弱点。
下跌时分批买入,上涨时分批卖出。
7. 一旦做了决定,要有勇气相信自己的判断。
8. 找到并追随合适的投资理念。
我说的方法是适合我的。
9. 卖出时别太急。
你可以在股票涨到了你认为合理的价格时卖出。
许多时候只是因为股票涨了,比如涨了 50%,人们就说卖掉锁定利润。
卖出之前,要重新评估公司,比较价格与净资产价值。
要注意股市的估值水平:是不是股息率较低、市盈率较高?股市是否处于历史高位?人们是否非常乐观?10. 买入股票时,我发现最好在过去几年的低位附近买入。
可能有一只股票最高涨到 125,然后跌到 60,你就动心了。
三年前,这只股票的价格是 20。
这说明这只股票现在还是有下跌的风险。
11. 要打折买入资产,而不是买盈利。
盈利的短期变化可能非常大,而资产一般变化缓慢。
要是按盈利买入,对公司的理解就得深得多。
12. 你敬重的人给出了建议要倾听,接不接受你自己决定。
记住,钱是你自己的钱,赚钱容易守财难。
一旦亏了很多钱,很难再赚回来。
13. 不要让情绪影响判断。
买卖股票,最不该有的情绪或许就是贪婪和恐惧。
14. 记住复利原理。
例如,你每年赚 12%,并将收益继续投资,不考虑税费,资金会在 6 年以后翻倍。
高级商务英语阅读Chapter 3
Question 1
How
did Steve Hilton feel when Lehman Brothers collapsed?
The
world was coming to an end.
Question 2
What
did Mr. Hilton do to save his company?
Notes to the Text
Lehman
Brothers Holding Inc.
The fourth largest investment bank in the U.S
(behind Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Merill Lynch). Declare bankruptcy in 2008.
Notes to the Text
The hobbled financial system will make it hard for cash-hungry start-ups to get financing, so innovation will suffer. hobbled这里具有双重含义,一方面指代(美国)金 融体制不完善,有诸多弊病;另一方面也说明不完 善的金融体制给美国经济发展造成了严重的阻碍。 cash-hungry start-ups这里指缺乏(急需)资金的新 兴公司。 残缺的金融体系令急需资金的新兴公司融资艰难, 使得技术创新步履维艰。
Giving up options to buy thousands of lots. Laying off 3/4 of his employees.
Redesigning his houses to cut construction cost.
维也纳酒店-运营管理手册
目录一、企业介绍 (3)二、维也纳酒店集团理念 (3)(一)企业文化 (3)(二)经营理念 (3)(三)产品 (4)(四)好员工/好经理= 理念+ 业绩 (4)三、矩阵管理图 (4)四、集团运营部架构图 (4)五、酒店日常工作相关规定 (4)(一)酒店总查制度 (4)(二)酒店总经理日常工作 (6)(三)总部人员到酒店查帐相关规定 (8)(四)分店业务章管理制度 (9)(五)酒店节能制度 (9)(六)营业状况手机短信 (10)(七)关于员工因公到分店内住宿的规定 (10)(八)分店短信促销费用计费方式 (10)(九)酒店营业时间和收费单位的确定 (11)(十)背景音乐播放的规定及流程 (11)(十一)实地调查和电话调查 (12)(十二)酒店总经理工作交接表 (13)(十三)消防栓使用须知 (13)(十四)商务大床房标配设施和服务 (13)(十五)大堂地图标示分店位置的旗标粘贴方位 (14)(十六)分店工号牌统一标准 (14)(十七)分店总经理/店长提交的例行报告 (15)(十八)客房棉织品数量标配 (16)(十九)赠送睡前牛奶活动 (17)(二十)分店每月例会释义 (18)(二十一)招牌灯及门口灯关闭制度 (18)(二十二)设立分公司流程19(二十三)房地产租赁备案指南(广州地区适用,其他地区供参考) (20)(二十四)《操作手册》分店保管相关规定 (21)(二十五)有关外地广告招牌事宜 (21)(二十六)品牌物资设计申请表流程单使用须知 (21)六、电子商务部相关流程 (21)(一)责任划分 (21)(二)无法上网处理流程 (22)七、营销部相关制度 (23)(一)特约商户相关规定 (23)(二)公司卡协议的注意事项 (25)八、市场营销部相关流程 (26)(一)邮件签名格式 (26)(二)宣传资料有关用词 (26)九、客服中心相关制度 (26)(一)客户投诉闭环处理制度 (26)(二)取消订单规范用语 (29)(三)携程订单注意事项 (30)十、财务相关制度 (31)(一)担保预订NO SHOW的处理 (31)(二)关于各分店开发票事宜 (31)(三)报销注意事项 (31)(四)发票管理相关规定 (32)十一、人事相关制度 (33)(一)宿舍管理制度 (33)(二)转正、异动、社保流程 (34)十二、附表 (36)(一)员工入住宿舍登记表(打印) (36)(二)特约商户统计表(打印) (36)(三)酒店总经理交接表(打印) (37)(四)客户投诉(建议)处理记录表(打印) (38)(五)每月例会纪要(打印) (38)(六)《会员手册》领用登记表(打印) (40)(七)人事异动申请表(印刷) (41)(八)试用员工转正申请审批表(印刷) (41)(九)离职申请表(印刷) (43)(十)分店调价申请表(打印) (43)(十一)分店房型调整申请表(打印) (44)(十二)工程/维修申请表(印刷) (45)(十三)流程调整申请表(打印) (46)(十四)品牌物资申请表(打印) (47)(十五)新项目申请表(打印) (48)十三、流程/标准调整记录(打印) (48)一、企业介绍“睡好、吃好、友好”维也纳3好连锁酒店秉承“天天睡好觉”的服务理念,在客房产品中充分应用人体工程学设计,以专业和专注的职业精神,将客房设计成一个舒适、环保、干净、安全的睡眠空间.用高级卫浴产品装备的卫生间,格调新颖时尚,大水量按摩喷头能洗去客人旅途的疲惫;采用五星级酒店多用的高级床垫和全棉床上用品,确保身体支承力和睡眠舒适性:专业的隔音门窗、墙体设计,保证了远远超越同级别酒店的安静隔音效果;经过不断改进增设多种亲切柔和的色彩,以满足视觉感官的欣悦;广泛采用绿色环保材料和符合人体工程学的家具设备,充分保障住客的健康。
关于如何做生意的书
关于如何做生意的书English Answer:1. The Lean Startup by Eric Ries.This book is a classic in the world of startups. It teaches you how to validate your business idea quickly and cheaply, so you can avoid wasting time and money on ideas that are not going to work.2. Traction: A Startup Guide to Getting Customers by Gabriel Weinberg and Justin Mares.This book is a practical guide to getting your first customers. It covers everything from marketing to sales, and it's full of actionable advice that you can put into practice right away.3. The 4-Hour Workweek by Timothy Ferriss.This book is a bit more controversial, but it's still a must-read for anyone who wants to start a business. It teaches you how to automate your business so you can have more time to do the things you love.4. Rich Dad Poor Dad by Robert Kiyosaki.This book is a personal finance classic that can also teach you a lot about how to start and run a business. It's full of practical advice on how to make money and build wealth.5. The E-Myth Revisited by Michael E. Gerber.This book is a must-read for any small business owner. It teaches you how to build a business that can run without you, so you can focus on the things that you're good at.6. The Innovator's Dilemma by Clayton M. Christensen.This book is a classic in the world of innovation. It teaches you how to avoid the pitfalls that can kill yourbusiness when you're trying to innovate.7. Good to Great by Jim Collins.This book is a study of companies that have made the leap from good to great. It teaches you the principles that can help you build a great business.8. Zero to One by Peter Thiel.This book is a contrarian take on starting a business. It teaches you how to find a unique idea that can't be copied, and how to build a successful business around it.9. The Hard Thing About Hard Things by Ben Horowitz.This book is a memoir by a successful venture capitalist. It's full of practical advice on how to start and run a business, and it's a must-read for anyone who's serious about entrepreneurship.10. Rework by Jason Fried and David Heinemeier Hansson.This book is a short, but powerful guide to starting and running a business. It's full of actionable advice that can help you save time and money, and it's a great read for anyone who's looking to start their own business.Chinese Answer:1. 精益创业作者,埃里克·莱斯。
50本商业经典书籍笔记
50本商业经典书籍笔记50 Must-Read Business Classics Book Notes.1. Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap... and Others Don't by Jim Collins.2. Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies by Jim Collins and Jerry I. Porras.3. The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail by Clayton M. Christensen.4. The Lean Startup by Eric Ries.5. Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future by Peter Thiel.6. The Hard Thing About Hard Things: Building a Business When There Are No Easy Answers by Ben Horowitz.7. Traction: A Startup Guide to Getting Customers by Gabriel Weinberg and Justin Mares.8. Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling Technology Products to Mainstream Customers by Geoffrey A. Moore.9. The 4-Hour Workweek: Escape 9-5, Live Anywhere, and Join the New Rich by Timothy Ferriss.10. Rework by Jason Fried and David Hansson.11. The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People by Stephen R. Covey.12. Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us by Daniel H. Pink.13. Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions by Dan Ariely.14. Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion by Robert B. Cialdini.15. Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman.16. The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Lifeand Business by Charles Duhigg.17. The E-Myth Revisited by Michael E. Gerber.18. The Art of War by Sun Tzu.19. The 22 Immutable Laws of Marketing by Al Ries and Jack Trout.20. Positioning: The Battle for Your Mind by Al Riesand Jack Trout.21. The Customer-Centric Enterprise by Peter F. Drucker.22. Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles by Peter F. Drucker.23. The Innovator's Solution: Creating and SustainingSuccessful Growth by Clayton M. Christensen and Michael E. Raynor.24. The Lean Six Sigma Pocket Toolbook by Michael L. George, David Rowlands, and Mark P. Price.25. The Machine That Changed the World by James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones, and Daniel Roos.26. The Toyota Way: 14 Management Principles from the World's Greatest Manufacturer by Jeffrey K. Liker.27. The Goal: A Process of Ongoing Improvement by Eliyahu M. Goldratt.28. The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action by Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton.29. Financial Intelligence for Entrepreneurs by Karen Berman and Joe Knight.30. Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles andAchieve Brilliant Results by Deepak Malhotra and Max Bazerman.31. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement WithoutGiving In by Roger Fisher, William L. Ury, and Bruce Patton.32. The Power of Positive Leadership: How to Inspire Teams and Produce Breakthrough Results by Jon Gordon.33. The Oz Principle: Getting Results ThroughIndividual and Organizational Accountability by Roger Connors, Tom Smith, and Craig Hickman.34. Radical Candor: Be a Kick-Ass Boss Without Losing Your Humanity by Kim Scott.35. Give and Take: Why Helping Others Drives Our Success by Adam Grant.36. The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference by Malcolm Gladwell.37. Outliers: The Story of Success by Malcolm Gladwell.38. Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking by Malcolm Gladwell.39. David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants by Malcolm Gladwell.40. Talking to Strangers: What We Should Know About the People We Don't by Malcolm Gladwell.41. The Ride of a Lifetime: Lessons Learned from 15 Years as CEO of the Walt Disney Company by Robert A. Iger.42. Shoe Dog: A Memoir by the Creator of Nike by Phil Knight.43. Long Shot: Never Too Old, Never Too Late, and Always Time to Dream by Dean Karnazes.44. The Ride of a Lifetime: Lessons Learned from 15 Years as CEO of the Walt Disney Company by Robert Iger.45. Trillion Dollar Coach: The Leadership Playbook of Silicon Valley's Bill Campbell by Eric Schmidt, Jonathan Rosenberg, and Alan Eagle.46. The Outsiders: Eight Unconventional CEOs and Their Radically Rational Blueprint for Success by William N. Thorndike Jr.47. The Great Game of Business: Unlocking the Power of Ownership for Employees and Unleashing the Potential of Your Company by Jack Stack.48. The Five Dysfunctions of a Team: A Leadership Fable by Patrick Lencioni.49. The Advantage: Why Organizational Health Trumps Everything Else in Business by Patrick Lencioni.50. Primal Leadership: Unleashing the Power of Emotional Intelligence by Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie McKee.中文回答:1. 从优秀到卓越,为何有些公司能脱颖而出,而另一些却不能吉姆·柯林斯。
牛市的理由书籍英文版
牛市的理由书籍英文版English:Some well-known books that discuss the reasons behind a bull market include "Stocks for the Long Run" by Jeremy Siegel, which explores the historical performance of the stock market and the factors that contribute to long-term growth. Another popular book is "A Random Walk Down Wall Street" by Burton Malkiel, which delves into the efficiency of the market and the strategies investors can use to navigate it successfully. "The Little Book That Still Beats the Market" by Joel Greenblatt offers insights into his investment approach and how to identify undervalued stocks. These books provide readers with a comprehensive understanding of the market dynamics, valuation methods, and investment strategies that can lead to a bull market.中文翻译:一些讨论牛市背后原因的著名书籍包括杰里米·西格尔的《用于长期投资的股票》,该书探讨了股票市场的历史表现以及长期增长的因素。
10本经典的所有交易员需要终身领会的投资投机书籍
10本经典的所有交易员需要终身领会的投资投机书籍一. 10本经典的所有交易员需要终身领会的投资投机书籍1. How to Trade In Stocks 怎样交易股票by Jesse Livermore (Author)这本书是关于这个自杀者的总结,假使这本书出的早些,作者又会名扬天下的,这个人就是李佛摩尔.子书: Jesse Livermore: World's Greatest Stock Trader 李佛摩尔:世界最伟大的股票交易者by Richard Smitten (Author)其实瑞秋的这个标题不好,书中讲了很多除股市外的交易,如期货等.读这本书是不够的,你应该将这四本书一起读,仔细的领悟.子书: Reminiscences of a Stock Operator Illustrated (A Marketplace Book) 《股票作手回忆录》(大家都这么用这个题目,我也用了,因为太流行了,当然准确的翻译应该是: 一个股票操盘手回忆录的历程.by Edwin Lefevre (Author), Marketplace Books (Author), William J. O'Neil (Author)子书: Reminiscences of a Stock Operator (Wiley Investment Classics) 《股票作手回忆录》by Edwin Lefèvre (Author), Roger Lowenstein (Foreword)说明:这本书排名第一当之无愧, 它是立志于华尔街的案头书.2. 《华尔街四十五年》江恩华尔街四十五年英文版(William D. Gann - 45 Years In Wall Street一代大师江恩,当然是奇人,但要辩证的分析,早年的江恩近于玄学,这本书是它的心血结晶. 国内出版过中文版,翻译的不是非常理想。
科技商业化相关的书籍
以下是一些关于科技商业化的书籍推荐:1. 《创新者的窘境》(The Innovator's Dilemma)- 克莱顿·克里斯坦森(Clayton M. Christensen)2. 《从0到1》(Zero to One)- 彼得·蒂尔(Peter Thiel)和布莱克·马斯特斯(Blake Masters)3. 《创新者的解答》(The Innovator's Solution)- 克莱顿·克里斯坦森(Clayton M. Christensen)和迈克尔·雷瑞(Michael E. Raynor)4. 《商业模式新生代》(Business Model Generation)- 亚历山大·奥斯特瓦尔德(Alexander Osterwalder)和伊夫·皮尼奥特(Yves Pigneur)5. 《创新者的基因》(The Innovator's DNA)- 杰夫·迪尔(Jeff Dyer)、哈尔·格雷戈森(Hal Gregersen)和克莱顿·克里斯坦森(Clayton M. Christensen)6. 《科技商业化:从创意到市场》(Technology Ventures: From Idea to Enterprise)- 托马斯·休斯(Thomas H. Byers)、理查德·道尔(Richard C. Dorf)和安德鲁·尼尔森(Andrew J. Nelson)7. 《创新者的生存法则》(The Innovator's Survival Guide)- 艾德·罗伯茨(Edward D. Hess)8. 《科技创业:从商业计划到成功公司》(Technology Entrepreneurship: Creating, Capturing, and Protecting Value)-乔治·D·帕特南(George D. Patton)和杰弗里·G·卡尔森(JeffreyG. Carr)9. 《科技创新与商业化》(Technology Innovation and Commercialization)- 约翰·R·哈里斯(John R. Harris)和斯蒂芬·P·麦克纳利(Stephen P. MacNamara)10. 《科技创新与商业化:理论与实践》(Technology Innovation and Commercialization: Theory and Practice)- 约翰·R·哈里斯(John R. Harris)和斯蒂芬·P·麦克纳利(Stephen P. MacNamara)这些书籍涵盖了科技商业化的不同方面,包括创新、商业模式、创业、市场营销等,可以帮助读者了解科技商业化的原理和实践。
有没有写英国股市的书
有没有写英国股市的书有许多书籍涵盖了英国股市的主题。
以下是一些关于英国股市的经典书籍:1. "The City: A Guide to London's Global Financial Center" by Paul Vallée2. "The Money Machine: How the City Works" by Philip Coggan3. "When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management" by Roger Lowenstein4. "The Financial Times Guide to Investing: The Definitive Companion to Investment and the Financial Markets" by Glen Arnold5. "Shares Made Simple: A Beginner's Guide to Sharemarket Success" by Rodney Hobson6. "The New Case for Gold" by James Rickards7. "The Intelligent Investor" by Benjamin Graham8. "The Definitive Guide to Swing Trading Stocks" by Kevin Brown9. "Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits and Other Writings" by Philip A. Fisher10. "How to Make Money in Stocks: A Winning System in Good Times and Bad" by William J. O'Neil这只是一小部分关于英国股市的书籍,还有很多其他经典和专业的著作。
Chapter3 王关富 商务英语阅读 译文.doc
第3课 Time to RebalanceGreg Ip表示,美国经济要从依靠消费和借贷转向依靠出口和储蓄,这将会是几十年来规模最大的经济转型。
Steve Hilton仍旧记得2008年雷曼兄弟破产之后长达几个月的绝望感。
在Hilton先生经营的物产公司Meritage Home的销售部办公室里,顾客挤破了脑袋,为的不是买房,而是想要撤回他们已经签订的合同。
“我有一阵子似乎觉得世界末日即将来临。
”他如此回忆。
接下来的几个月里,希尔顿先生不断努力想要挽救他的公司。
他没有买下经济繁荣时期公司在亚利桑那州、佛罗里达州、内华达州和加州抢购到的房产,因此损失惨重。
最终他解雇了2300名员工中的四分之三,也重新设计了其拥有的房屋,目的是将建造成本减半:更简易的屋顶,合乎标准的窗户大小,更小的选择余地。
12英尺的天花饭、富丽堂皇的楼梯、花岗岩台面,这些经济繁荣时期人人都想要的装饰都被略去。
现在的Meritage公司仅为能贷到款的顾客提供服务,即那些享有联邦ZF担保贷款的初次购房者。
公司正变的更加节约务实,以求挣扎着生存下去。
这种情况对于整个美国来说都是一样的。
几乎每个行业都在过去的两年里裁员,那些直接面向消费者的行业尤甚。
房屋制造和汽车制造业裁员近三分之一,零售业和银行业裁员8%。
随着经济不断复苏,一些工作岗位会重现,但大部分不是,因为这并不是一场普通的经济萧条。
靠泡沫支持的资产价格、愈发易容易申请到的带快和廉价的石油令美国的消费主义不断滋长,而现在,这样的情况一去不复返了。
现在,美国经济即将开始几十年来规模最大的经济转型。
这种宏观经济层面上由债务和消费转向储蓄和出口方式的转变会带来微观经济的变革:不同的生活方式,各地不同的工作。
本篇特别报告将会详细描述此次经济转型及其复杂性。
此次经济危机及随后的经济萧条是的以往的经济发展模式遭遇了一个急刹车。
尽管最近经济小幅回暖,但房价较峰值时已下跌29%,股价的下跌幅度也很相似。
18本商科学生必读书籍(华尔街名著)
声明:以下所列书籍主要为金融类,由美国知名网站和机构推荐。
所有来源来自于互联网。
1.Reminiscences of a Stock Operator (Wiley Investment Classics)中文名:股票操盘手回忆录(点击阅读百度文档,中文版)很老的一本华尔街经典,第一版次出版于1923年,先后改版多次。
作者以自传形式描述在那个机会与智慧并存的年代,自己在华尔街操盘的经历。
2. Working the Street: What You Need to Know About Life on Wall Street中文名:(暂没找到中文版)(点击图片进入谷歌英文扫描版)3. Liar’s Poker: Rising Through the Wreckage on Wall Street中文名:说谎者的扑克牌(点击阅读百度文库,中文扫描版)“说谎者的扑克牌”是华尔街上金融家们玩的一种休闲游戏,以最善于瞒骗他人而实行心理欺诈者为胜。
迈克尔·刘易斯将其用为隐喻。
描述了自己在华尔街最大的投资银行之一的所罗门兄弟公司里四年的工作经历—一从意外受雇、接受培训,直到成长为只凭一个电话即可以调动数百万美元资金的明星交易员。
在书中,刘易斯将投资世界中许多不为人知的技巧、诀窍和手段娓娓道来,披露了自己是如何参透华尔街的波谲云诡、逐步掌握投资走势的,让读者有了感同身受的体验。
本书的另一个亮点,是从作者的视角展示了所罗门兄弟公司在20世纪80年代的戏剧性历史。
4. Monkey Business: Swinging Through the Wall Street Jungle中文名:华尔街的大马猴“华尔街的大马猴》讲述两位年轻银行家罗尔夫和特鲁珀在华尔街的人生经历,这是特鲁珀和罗尔夫的个人成长经历,更是所有新入行的年轻银行家所必须经历的磨难。
无论就职于哪一家银行,相信任何一位银行助理都不乏同样的感受。
关于趋势交易的书籍
关于趋势交易的书籍
1. 《趋势交易》(Trend Following)- 迈克尔·科瓦尔
2. 《揭示趋势:一位交易员的思维模式和交易策略》(Revealing the Secrets of Trend Following:A Trader's Journey from Strategy to Programming)- 迈克尔·韦塞尔
3. 《趋势交易系统设计》(Trend Trading Set-Ups)- 罗伯特·席恩
4. 《趋势交易模型》(The Trend Trading Model)- 杰米·赖特
5. 《趋势交易成功之道》(The Way to Trade Trends)- 约翰·杨
6. 《趋势交易:用技术分析赚钱的方法》(Trend Trading for a Living)- 托马斯·卡里
7. 《坚定的趋势跟随者》(The Disciplined Trader:Developing Winning Attitudes)- 马克·道格拉斯
8. 《趋势交易:利用市场心理学和技术分析赚钱》(The New Trading for a Living)- 亚历山大·埃尔德
9. 《趋势交易:在外汇市场获利的秘诀》(Trend Trading:Profitable Strategies for Trading with Market Trends)- 布兰登·华特斯
10. 《趋势交易与资本管理》(Trend Trading and Money Management)- 迈克尔·哈巴特迪格。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性,平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益,请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间:9:00-18:30)。
C HAPTER 3T HE C APITALIST M ARKET:H OW I T IS S UPPOSED TO W ORKFinal draft, August 2009The American economy is a special case of capitalism. In order to understand how the American economy works, therefore, we will need to spend some time talking in more general terms about the nature of capitalism as an economic system, and this in turn means we will have to discuss a number of fairly abstract ideas and develop a number of theoretical tools, many of which come from economics. This will be the main task of this chapter and the next. In this chapter we will begin by defining capitalism as an economic system and then examine the central arguments in favor of capitalism by its defenders. This will give us a picture of how capitalism is supposed to work. In the following chapter we will discuss some of the dilemmas and problems of capitalism as an economic system which explains its limitations and failures. The chapters which follow, then, apply these ideas to a number of more specific problems in the American economy today: the environment, transportation, health care, consumerism, and training. The central theme in each of these analyses is how the over-reliance on capitalist markets in the American economy produces inefficient outcomes. Our exploration of the American economy concludes in Chapter 9 by outlining a range of institutional innovations which might contribute to resolving these problems by strengthening the role of democratic governance and collaborative problem solving over economic processes.I. What is a Capitalist Free Market Economy?Economic life can be organized in many ways. This is a crucial idea: history contains an enormous variety of ways of organizing economic activity and, undoubtedly, there are possibilities that have not yet happened but eventually will. The first step in giving more precision to our understanding of capitalism as a specific way of organizing an economy is to get some appreciation of this broader variation.Here are a few examples of non-capitalist economic structures:Feudalism. In Feudal economies, the key economic resource is land. Different classes of people have different kinds of rights and relationship to the land. Peasants are “tied” to the land: they do not have the right to simply leave. They have the right to farm the land, but in order to do so they have to give a certain proportion of their production to feudal lords.Sometimes this takes the form of feudal peasants working part of the time on land directly controlled by lords and part of the time on land which they control; in other situations, a certain proportion of their product is taken in the form of a rent. Unlike in market economies, they are not free to make their own choices about what to do.Slavery. In slavery people are the private property of other people and are owned in the same sense that a farm animal can be owned. This is different from feudalism, in which peasants have specific kinds of rights to the land and specific forms of autonomy, under theconstraints of their obligations to lords. In slavery that autonomy and those rights disappear entirely.Simple market economy. In a simple market economy, most producers own their own means of production and produce both for their own consumption and for the market. There is not really a labor market since people work for themselves, not for others, except perhaps as a transient state.State bureaucratic socialism. In state bureaucratic socialism, such as in the Soviet Union in most of the 20th century, the state owns all of the important means of production and state officials of various sorts make the basic decisions about investment, production, technology, and so on. The economy is run through some kind of centralized planning process.Other possibilities? There may be many other ways of organizing the economy that have not really been tried on a wide scale. Some people have argued for the possibility of what is sometimes called “market socialism”. One form this might take is an economy in which firms are owned by their employees, not by capitalists, but production is still orientedtowards the market. Other people have argued for a state-owned economy, but one that is organized in a highly decentralized and democratic manner in which planning was less the business of central planners and more of citizen participants in various kinds of planning processes. Neither of these may be realistic, but what we know almost for sure is that there are possibilities beyond those that we have observed in history so far.Capitalism, then, is one of the many historically variable ways that economic systems can be organized. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is defined by three principle conditions: production is organized for the market; the means of production are privately owned, and investment is privately controlled; and the people who use those means of production to produces goods and services, that is workers, are hired on a labor market to work in firms as employees. Defined in this way capitalism is not identical to the idea of a “market economy.” To be sure, capitalism is organized through markets, but not all market economies are capitalist. In the examples above, a simple market economy has markets and private ownership, but the producers are self-employed owners rather than employees. State owned firms, rather than privately owned firms, can produce for a market, and this too would not be capitalism. Slave plantations in the United States before the Civil War produced cotton for the market, but slavery itself was not a form of capitalism. Capitalism is different from all of these “market economies”. It is that form of market economy in which production and investment are privately controlled, and the work of production is performed by employees, hired from free labor markets.The United States economy is strongly dominated by capitalism, more so than most other countries in the world. But it would be a very big mistake to say that it has a purely capitalist economy. Many aspects of production and distribution in the United States are organized in decidedly non-capitalist ways: educational services are provided by public schools; the Veterans Administration produces healthcare services for a part of the population; many cities have publicly produced mass transit; churches, civic associations and other non-profit organizations provide a wide range of services within communities; significant aspects of the information produced and distributed through the internet are done in what is termed “open source” processes based on voluntary activity and nonmarket coordination; and a great deal of caregiving and meal preparation is done within households for direct consumption. All of these are instances of noncapitalist economic activity.A nice illustration of the difference between capitalist and noncapitalist ways of organizing economic activity is the contrast between two ways in which people get access to books: bookstores and libraries. The United States turns out to have one of the best developed publiclibrary systems in the world. Ironically, perhaps, this system was largely founded through the philanthropy of one of the wealthiest and most powerful capitalists of the late 19th century, Andrew Carnegie. What are the key differences between bookstores and libraries? When you enter a bookstore in search of a book you go to the part of the store in which the book is shelved, take it off the shelf, look at its price, and then decide whether or not it is worth it to you to spend that amount of money to have the book. Your access to the book is governed by your willingness (and ability) to pay for it. In a library you go to the shelf, see if the book is there. If it is, you take it and check it out. If it is not, you put your name on a waiting list and get notified when the book is available. The access to the book is rationed by time: your willingness to wait for it. The librarian then notes how long the waiting list is and, depending upon the resources of library, the level of community support for its activities, and its policies concerning waiting lists, decides whether or not to order more copies of the book.The underlying principles of a library and a bookstore are thus quite different. The basic principle of access to books in the library is “to each according to need” or interest, while the principle in the bookstore is “to each according to ability to pay.” These two mechanisms have very different consequences in the world. Libraries are clearly more egalitarian in the sense that they embody an ideal of equal opportunity for all. No one is at a disadvantage because of personal resources. If bookstores were the only way of getting books, then poor people would have much less access to books. One can easily imagine libraries being used for all sorts of things besides books – movies, recordings, artwork, tools, video cameras, etc. And indeed, some public libraries in the United States do provide some of these. Imagine how the American economy would be different if libraries were ever to become a general, pervasive model for access to such a wide range of things?So, the United States is definitely not a purely capitalist economy. Nevertheless, in the spectrum of developed capitalist countries in the world today, it is on the end of the continuum in which capitalism is strongest. And most Americans think that this is a good thing. Most Americans are suspicious of government regulation, let alone public ownership, and many, perhaps most, believe that relatively unfettered markets and private enterprise are the best way of organizing economic activity. It will help us understand how the American economy works and what are its problems by laying out the central lines of defense of a free market capitalist economy, and the basic argument underlying the skepticism about the role of Government in regulating economic life. This is the task of the rest of this chapter.II. Arguments for CapitalismDefenders of free market capitalism generally make two kinds of arguments. The first is a moral argument: If you truly value individual freedom, this is the most freedom-enhancing way to organize economic life. All other ways of running an economy involve more coercion of the lives of individuals in ways that violates their liberty, or risk that coercion in the future. The second is a pragmatic argument: the free market and unfettered private ownership is the most efficient way of organizing the economy. It delivers the goods. Let us briefly look at the first of these, and then in more detail the second, since in the end it is main way that capitalist institutions are defended.1. The Moral ArgumentThe moral defense of capitalism is usually associated with what is called libertarianism. The basic idea is quite simple: Individual freedom is the paramount social value, where freedom ismainly understood in terms of what is sometimes called “negative freedom,” the freedom from coercion by other persons or organizations. In this sense of freedom, you are “free” if no one can tell you what to do without your consent. Both you and a media tycoon have the “same” freedom of speech since no one tells you what to say. Unfettered markets are thus morally good things because in a market buyers and sellers meet and voluntarily make exchanges without coercion.The moral defense of capitalism is simply a logical extension of these arguments about voluntary exchange on free markets. If people are free, then they should be allowed to use their property however they like so long as this does not interfere with anyone else’s property rights. This means that owners of the means of production should be free to use their capital as they wish, and in particular, they should be free to hire workers to use those means production on any terms voluntarily agreed upon by the workers and employers. So long as all of the agreements are voluntary – no one is directly forced by someone else to sign a contract – this is an expression of individual freedom and autonomy. Restrictions of voluntary contracts – including restrictions governing things like working conditions, pay, rights to hire and fire, and so on – are all violations of this conception of freedom. A minimally regulated capitalism is the form of economic organization that best satisfies these moral principles.2. The Pragmatic Argument for capitalismThere are two broad pragmatic arguments for capitalism as a way of organizing economic activities: first, capitalism provides the most effective way of coordinating a complex economic system, and second, it creates powerful incentives for innovation and economic growth. The full arguments underlying these claims involve quite a lot of complex economic theory, but the basic ideas are relatively simple.CoordinationThe first pragmatic argument for capitalism centers on a crucial problem faced by any complex economic system: how to effectively coordinate the economic activities of widely dispersed people in such a way that their activities fit together reasonably well. You want to build a house. You need lumber, nails, wire, ceramic tiles, paint, carpets and many other things, as well as a variety of tools and machines. All of these “inputs” into your housebuilding were themselves produced with machines and energy and many raw materials from all over the world involving tens of thousands of people engaged in laboring activity. How do you let these people know that you want a particular kind of nail and a particular variety of lumber, and that you need these on a particular date in order to build your house? It is an unbelievably complex matter to get all of this activity even moderately well coordinated. The most basic defense of capitalism as an economic system says that a market economy based on decentralized privately owned firms is the best way to solve this problem. How is this supposed to work?In a stylized way we can think of two primary methods of solving this complex coordination problem. One solution is planning and command, the other is decentralized markets. In a planning model, activities of individuals and firms are coordinated by a planning authority telling people what to do. This is how coordination takes place in some large organizations and corporations: there is a hierarchy of managers with various responsibilities for figuring what to do, and they issue orders to subordinates which ultimately set in motion specific activities of people at the bottom. This is also, more or less, how economic coordination worked in the Soviet Union: central planners formulated plans, allocated resources to firms, and instructed those firms what to produce. Authoritative command works reasonably well in some contexts, but it hasproven very problematic when applied to large and complex systems. Even apart from the problem that a system of comprehensive planning and control of a complex economy seems to violate the values of individual freedom and autonomy, the task seems impossibly complex and likely to produce massive inefficiencies.Decentralized markets with privately owned enterprises is the principle alternative to centralized planning as a way of solving this massive coordination problem. The story about how this coordination is accomplished was first systematically elaborated by Adam Smith in his famous account of the “invisible hand” of the market. Even if, in the end, we discover that this story is far too simple and that the free market does not really function in the way Adam Smith believed, nevertheless it is a remarkable account and remains the core of the pragmatic defense of capitalist institutions today.The key idea in the theory of the invisible hand of market coordination is the notion of “prices” as a mechanism for supplying both information and incentives to people in such a way that their activities can be coordinated. “Price” is a pretty odd phenomenon if you think about it: you take two things, an apple and a hammer and a number gets assigned to each which tells you how many apples are worth the same as one hammer: 10 apples = 1 hammer.How, then, do prices of things work to coordinate a vastly complex system of decentralized economic activity? The conventional story revolves around the way the interplay of supply and demand shapes the movement of prices: If, at the existing price of widgets, there are more people who want widgets than the supply of widgets, then the price will rise because people who want widgets will bid the price up. This creates a big incentive for producers of widgets to produce more, since the higher prices mean that they will make a greater profit. Production of widgets thus increases, the supply rises, and eventually as supply equals demand, the prices fall. Eventually no one is willing to produce more widgets at the going price, which means that the price must be pretty close to the cost of producing widgets. This is called by economists an “equilibrium” -- a situation where price and quantity remain stable because no one has an incentive to change their behavior.This interplay of supply and demand through the mechanism of price this leads to what economists call allocative efficiency: resources and activity are allocated to different purposes in such a way that the amount of different sorts of things that get produced is exactly the right amount given what people want and how much money they have. The degree of coordination this involves is really amazing: When you go to a store and buy a chocolate bar you are giving information to the store owner who automatically passes that information to the chocolate bar company in the form of new orders of candy bars; the candy bar manufacturer then communicates the information to the cocoa importer when ordering new supplies; and the importer ultimately passes this information to the farmer in West Africa growing the cocoa beans. Each of these actors in the chain has a personal incentive to respond to the information. When you buy a candy bar you are, through a chain of information and incentives, communicating with a farmer in Africa.Defenders of capitalism, emphasize two important implications of the way capitalist markets accomplish this broad economic coordination. First, if capitalist markets work this way, then the underlying dynamics of the economy are driven by the preferences and behaviors of consumers. Consumers are really running the economy. They the ones who are in command, and have as great a power as royalty of old. The idea is referred to as “consumer sovereignty”. Producers – whether they be giant multinational corporations or small firms – have powerful incentives torespond to information given them by the consumers of their products. If they fail to respond to that information, they lose money and eventually go out of business. Again, it is thus the final consumers of the goods and services produced by the economic system who have the most fundamental power, since it is their preferences and choices which set in motion the information and incentive system which coordinates market. This is appealing, since it corresponds to popular ideas about individual autonomy and freedom: apparently powerful corporations are really controlled by consumers.The second implication is a particular (some people would say peculiar) sense in which capitalist markets do not simply do a pretty good job in coordinating a complex system of economic activity, but they do so in a way that is “optimal”. To say that a particular way of doing things is optimal is to say that it is as good as possible, that any other alternative would produce worse results. In an ideal capitalist free market, when one person makes an offer to exchange something, if someone accepts the offer, then they both are better off; if no one accepts the offer it is because no one could be made better off by the exchange. If you let everyone freely make exchanges, then eventually you will reach an “equilibrium” in which no further exchanges happen. This is a situation in which no one can improve without someone else being worse off. This kind of situation has a special name in economics: “Pareto optimality”, named after the Italian Wilfredo Pareto. The claim of defenders of the free market is that if the market is allowed to work freely it will generate a distribution of goods that satisfies this condition of Pareto optimality.Innovation and growthAs many advocates of free markets stress, unfettered capitalist markets are not simply an efficient way of allocating existing resources; they also promote all sorts of innovations, both innovations which contribute to economic growth by improving human productivity and innovations in products which improve the quality of life. This is thought to be the real magic of capitalism: capitalist markets generate a dynamic economic system which ultimately improves the lives of people through innovation and growth.There are three core reasons for this innovative dynamic: First, the market rewards people and firms financially for making the right decisions and punishes them for making the wrong decisions, where “right” means both producing things people want to buy and producing them at lower cost so more people can afford them. Second, the market allows people and firms to take risks in order to obtain the rewards which markets potentially offer. Innovation is a gamble, and markets provide one way of letting people engage in gambles which potentially have significant social benefits in the form of new products and technological improvements. Third, competition among firms intensifies both of these processes: Capitalist markets put considerable pressure on firms to innovate in order to survive against competition. Over time this means that firms that innovate successfully will tend to expand and those which do not will decline, thus increasing the pressure on less successful firms adopt existing innovations and seek new ones. The result is that innovations tend to diffuse throughout an economic system, thus raising productivity and underwriting significant economic growth.Risk-taking is key here, for most innovations are the result of investing time, energy and resources without any assurance these will generate a pay off. Of course, capitalist markets are not the only way of encouraging socially-useful risk-taking. Much research, for example, is conducted in academic institutions and government research institutes in which risks are taken and considerable innovation occurs, animated not by the potential of making huge amountsmoney, but rather by desires for reputation and the opportunity to do interesting work that contributes to knowledge and public welfare. Still, capitalist markets have proven to be a powerful engine for innovation through the combination of competitive pressures and opportunities for financial payoffs to successful risk-taking. Particularly because of the ways in which capitalism facilitates such broadly decentralized and diffused forms of risk-taking and innovation in which the initiative and inspiration of creative individuals get linked to financial resources of investors, capitalism has proved to be an engine of economic growth.III. Arguments against state interference with the marketThe moral and pragmatic defense of capitalism involves not simply an affirmation of the virtues of capitalism, but also a critique of the state. “The Government which governs least governs best” is a standard aphorism of advocates of capitalist systems.The moral argument against the state is simpler than the pragmatic argument and is most purely embodied in libertarian thought. Governments rule by command backed up by force. Governments are therefore inherently a threat to freedom; the sheer fact of the state implies a restriction on freedom. This does not mean that Governments should be abolished – most advocates of unfettered markets are not anarchists. But they believe that the role of government should be strictly circumscribed and the burden of proof is always on those who say the government should do something. The state should be what Ferdinand LaSalle called “a Nightwatchman state.” This is a state whose role is limited as much as possible to the task of protecting property rights and the rules of the game rather than actively intervening in the economy to “solve” problems. If this conception of what the state should do is minimalist, and largely negative — “don’t go there!” “ don’t tread on me!”— the contrasting conception of the state is commonly called “affirmative.” An affirmative state doesn’t put markets off limits to intervention. A democratic affirmative state is one that deliberately uses its power, in markets and elsewhere, to improve democratic conditions. This might take any number of forms, but one classic one is by relieving the social exclusions and material inequalities that undermine the democratic ideal of equal citizenship. Proponents of such a state think that using public power in these and other ways to further democracy is nothing to be embarrassed about. In fact, they think that the whole point of democratic government is to be “of the people, by the people, for the people,” not “of the market, by the market, for the market.”While the moral argument for a limited state has appeal to libertarians, this by itself would not be persuasive to many, perhaps most, people. People see many problems in American society – poverty, pollution, inadequate health care, to name only a few – and at various times in American history people have turned to the state for help. Opponents of a strong role for the state in a market economy have thus given considerable weight to the pragmatic argument. “The state is the problem, not the solution,” is another aphorism.Two kinds of pragmatic arguments are particularly common in the attacks on state intervention. These can be referred to as the thesis of state incompetence and the thesis of state malevolence.The state incompetence thesis suggests that government bureaucracy is inevitably clumsy and ineffective, bogged down in “red tape” and a preoccupation with one-size fits all rules and regulations. Politicians and government officials may be well-meaning, but their attempts at imposing regulations on the market almost always backfire, undermining the crucial incentives that generate efficiency in market. Efforts at environmental protection, for example, generateendless paperwork, environmental impact studies, rigid rules that fail to take into account local conditions, and endless litigation. Even if the goals were worthy, the effects are undesirable.The state malevolence thesis is much stronger. Here the state is not just viewed as all thumbs and no fingers, but as an iron fist. Bureaucrats strive to accumulate power either for its own sake or to serve their own career interests. Corruption is a chronic problem, not just in the sense of politicians and bureaucrats taking bribes (although this happens often enough) but in the sense of state officials protecting powerful economic actors from market competition through subsidies, tax breaks and self-serving regulations in exchange for their political support. The state is either captured by special interests which use the power of the state to gain special advantages, or it is an autonomous machine bent on domination for domination’s sake. Perhaps the original intention of building up this machine was benevolent, seeking the means to solve real problems. But once created, this state machine becomes Frankenstein, a monster which cannot be controlled by its creator. Only if the monster is slain can the full virtues of capitalism be unleashed.*It would be an exaggeration to say that most Americans fully accept these libertarian arguments against the state and for a largely deregulated free market form of capitalism. Public opinion surveys consistently indicate much more ambivalence than this. Americans typically believe in democracy and the need for a state that does much more than just enforce the rules of the game, and while they are strong supporters of private enterprise and market capitalism, there is considerable skepticism that an unregulated, free-for-all market is the best for securing either freedom or efficiency. In the next chapter we will examine a range of problems generated by market capitalism which markets by themselves cannot solve.。