非银行机构的银行业务外文翻译文献
互联网金融电子银行外文文献翻译2014年译文3050字大数据
互联网金融电子银行外文文献翻译2014年译文3050字大数据Finance's Impact on nal FinanceAbstract:As we enter the era of web 2.0.banks now have full access to the。
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毕业论文(设计)外文文献翻译及原文
金融体制、融资约束与投资——来自OECD的实证分析R.SemenovDepartment of Economics,University of Nijmegen,Nijmegen(荷兰内梅亨大学,经济学院)这篇论文考查了OECD的11个国家中现金流量对企业投资的影响.我们发现不同国家之间投资对企业内部可获取资金的敏感性具有显著差异,并且银企之间具有明显的紧密关系的国家的敏感性比银企之间具有公平关系的国家的低.同时,我们发现融资约束与整体金融发展指标不存在关系.我们的结论与资本市场信息和激励问题对企业投资具有重要作用这种观点一致,并且紧密的银企关系会减少这些问题从而增加企业获取外部融资的渠道。
一、引言各个国家的企业在显著不同的金融体制下运行。
金融发展水平的差别(例如,相对GDP的信用额度和相对GDP的相应股票市场的资本化程度),在所有者和管理者关系、企业和债权人的模式中,企业控制的市场活动水平可以很好地被记录.在完美资本市场,对于具有正的净现值投资机会的企业将一直获得资金。
然而,经济理论表明市场摩擦,诸如信息不对称和激励问题会使获得外部资本更加昂贵,并且具有盈利投资机会的企业不一定能够获取所需资本.这表明融资要素,例如内部产生资金数量、新债务和权益的可得性,共同决定了企业的投资决策.现今已经有大量考查外部资金可得性对投资决策的影响的实证资料(可参考,例如Fazzari(1998)、 Hoshi(1991)、 Chapman(1996)、Samuel(1998)).大多数研究结果表明金融变量例如现金流量有助于解释企业的投资水平。
这项研究结果解释表明企业投资受限于外部资金的可得性。
很多模型强调运行正常的金融中介和金融市场有助于改善信息不对称和交易成本,减缓不对称问题,从而促使储蓄资金投着长期和高回报的项目,并且提高资源的有效配置(参看Levine(1997)的评论文章)。
因而我们预期用于更加发达的金融体制的国家的企业将更容易获得外部融资.几位学者已经指出建立企业和金融中介机构可进一步缓解金融市场摩擦。
金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献
金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Comparative Financial Systems1 What is a Financial System?The purpose of a financial system is to channel funds from agents with surpluses to agents with deficits. In the traditional literature there have be en two approaches to analyzing this process. The first is to consider how agents interact through financial markets. The second looks at the operation offinancial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. Fifty years ago, the financial system co uld be neatly bifurcated in this way. Rich house-holds and large firms used the equity and bond markets,while less wealthy house-holds and medium and small firms used banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions. Table 1, for example, shows the ownership of corporate equities in 1950. Households owned over 90 percent. By 2000 it can be seen that the situation had changed dramatically.By then households held less than 40 percent, nonbank intermediaries, primarily pension funds and mutual funds, held over 40 percent. This change illustrates why it is no longer possible to consider the role of financial markets and financial institutions separately. Rather than intermediating directly between households and firms, financial institutions have increasingly come to intermediate between households and markets, on the one hand, and between firms and markets,on the other. This makes it necessary to consider the financial system as anirreducible whole.The notion that a financial system transfers resources between households and firms is, of course, a simplification. Governments usually play a significant role in the financial system. They are major borrowers, particularlyduring times of war, recession, or when large infrastructure projects are being undertaken. They sometimes also save significant amounts of funds. For example, when countries such as Norway and many Middle Eastern States have access to large amounts of natural resources (oil), the government may acquire large trust funds on behalf of the population.In addition to their roles as borrowers or savers, governments usually playa number of other important roles. Central banks typically issue fiat money and are extensively involved in the payments system. Financial systems with unregulated markets and intermediaries, such as the US in the late nineteenth century, often experience financial crises.The desire to eliminate these crises led many governments to intervene in a significant way in the financial system. Central banks or some other regulatory authority are charged with regulating the banking system and other intermediaries, such as insurance companies. So in most countries governments play an important role in the operation of financialsystems. This intervention means that the political system, which determines the government and its policies, is also relevant for the financial system.There are some historical instances where financial markets and institutions have operated in the absence of a well-defined legal system, relyinginstead on reputation and other im plicit mechanisms. However, in most financial systems the law plays an important role. It determines what kinds ofcontracts are feasible, what kinds of governance mechanisms can be used for corporations, the restrictions that can be placed on securities and so forth. Hence, the legal system is an important component of a financial system.A financial system is much more than all of this, however. An important pre-requisite of the ability to write contracts and enforce rights of various kinds is a system of accounting. In addition to allowing contracts to be written, an accounting system allows investors to value a company more easily and to assess how much it would be prudent to lend to it. Accounting information is only one type of information (albeit the most important) required by financial systems. The incentives to generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a financial system.Without significant amounts of human capital it will not be possible for any of these components of a financial system to operate effectively. Well-trained lawyers, accountants and financial professionals such as bankers are crucial for an effective financial system, as the experience of Eastern Europe demonstrates.The literature on comparative financial systems is at an early stage. Our survey builds on previous overviews by Allen (1993), Allen and Gale (1995) and Thakor (1996). These overviews have focused on two sets of issues.(1)Normative: How effective are different types of financial system atvarious functions?(2) Positive: What drives the evolution of the financial system?The first set of issues is considered in Sections 2-6, which focus on issues of investment and saving, growth, risk sharing, information provision and corporate governance, respectively. Section 7 consider s the influence of law and politics on the financial system while Section 8 looks at the role financial crises have had in shaping the financial system. Section 9 contains concludingremarks.2 Investment and SavingOne of the primary purposes of the financial system is to allow savings to be invested in firms. In a series of important papers, Mayer (1988, 1990) documents how firms obtained funds and financed investment in a number of different countries. Table 2 shows the results from the most recent set of studies, based on data from 1970-1989, using Mayer’s methodology. The figures use data obtained from sources-and-uses-of-funds statements. For France, the data are from Bertero (1994), while for the US, UK, Japan and Germany they are from Corbett and Jenkinson (1996). It can be seen that internal finance is by far the most important source of funds in all countries.Bank finance is moderately important in most countries and particularly important in Japan and France. Bond finance is only important in the US and equity finance is either unimportant or negative (i.e., shares are being repurchased in aggregate) in all countries. Mayer’s studies and those using his methodology have had an important impact because they have raised the question of how important financial marke ts are in terms of providing funds for investment. It seems that, at least in the aggregate, equity markets are unimportant while bond markets are important only in the US. These findings contrast strongly with theemphasis on equity and bond markets in the traditional finance literature. Bank finance is important in all countries,but not as important as internal finance.Another perspective on how the financial system operates is obtained by looking at savings and the holding of financial assets. Table 3 shows t he relative importance of banks and markets in the US, UK, Japan, France and Germany. It can be seen that the US is at one extreme and Germany at the other. In the US, banks are relatively unimportant: the ratio of assets to GDP is only 53%, about a third the German ratio of 152%. On the other hand, the US ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP is 82%, three times the German ratio of 24%. Japan and the UK are interesting intermediate cases where banks and markets are both important. In France, banks are important and markets less so. The US and UK are often referred to as market-based systems while Germany, Japan and France are often referred to as bank-based systems. Table 4 shows the total portfolio allocation of assets ultimately owned by the household sector. In the US and UK, equity is a much more important component of household assets than in Japan,Germany and France. For cash and cash equivalents (which includes bank accounts), the reverse is true. Tables 3 and 4 provide an interesting contrast to Table 2. One would expect that, in the long run, household portfolios would reflect the financing patterns of firms. Since internal finance accrues to equity holders, one might expect that equity would be much more important in Japan, France and Germany. There are, of course, differences in the data sets underlying the different tables. For example, household portfolios consist of financial assets and exclude privately held firms, whereas the sources-and-uses-of-funds data include all firms. Nevertheless, it seem s unlikely that these differences could cause such huge discrepancies. It is puzzling that these different ways of viewing the financial system produce such radically different results.Another puzzle concerning internal versus external finance is the difference between the developed world and emerging countries. Although it is true for the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany and for most other developed countries that internal finance dominates external finance, this is not the case for emerging countries. Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) show that, for a range of emerging economies, external finance is more important than internal finance. Moreover, equity is the most important financing instrument and dominates debt. This difference between the industrialized nations and the emerging countries has so far received little attention. There is a large theoretical literature on the operation of and rationale for internal capital markets. Internal capital markets differ from external capital markets because of asymmetric information, investment incentives, asset specificity, control rights, transaction costs or incomplete markets There has also been considerable debate on the relationship between liquidity and investment (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen(1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991))that the lender will not carry out the threat in practice, the incentive effect disappears. Although the lender’s behavior is now ex post optimal, both parties may be worse off ex ante.The time inconsistency of commitments that are optimal ex ante and suboptimal ex post is typical in contracting problems. The contract commits one to certain courses of action in order to influence the behavior of the other party. Then once that party’s behavior has been determined, the benefit of the commitment disappears and there is now an incentive to depart from it.Whatever agreements have been entered into are subject to revision because both parties can typically be made better offby “renegotiating” the original agreement. The possibility of renegotiation puts additional restrictions on the kind of contract or agreement that is feasible (we are referring here to the contract or agreement as executed, ratherthan the contract as originally written or conceived) and, to that extent, tends to reduce the welfare of both parties ex ante. Anything that gives the parties a greater power to commit themselves to the terms of the contract will, conversely, be welfare-enhancing.Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) (included as a chapter in this section) have suggested that financial markets have an advantage over financial intermediaries in maintaining commitments to refuse further funding. If the firm obtains its funding from the bond market, th en, in the event that it needs additional investment, it will have to go back to the bond market. Because the bonds are widely held, however, the firm will find it difficult to renegotiate with the bond holders. Apart from the transaction costs involved in negotiating with a large number of bond holders, there is a free-rider problem. Each bond holder would like to maintain his original claim over the returns to the project, while allowing the others to renegotiate their claims in order to finance the additional investment. The free-rider problem, which is often thought of as the curse of cooperative enterprises, turns out to be a virtue in disguise when it comes to maintaining commitments.From a theoretical point of view, there are many ways of maintaining a commitment. Financial institutions may develop a valuable reputation for maintaining commitments. In any one case, it is worth incurring the small cost of a sub-optimal action in order to maintain the value of the reputation. Incomplete information about the borrower’s type may lead to a similar outcome. If default causes the institution to change its beliefs about the defaulter’s type, then it may be optimal to refuse to deal with a firm after it has defaulted. Institutional strategies such as delegating decisions to agents who are given no discretion to renegotiate may also be an effective commitment device.Several authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, renegotiation is welfare-improving. In that case, the Dewatripont-Maskin argument is turned on its head. Intermediaries that establish long-term relationships with clients may have an advantage over financial markets precisely because it is easier for them to renegotiate contracts.The crucial assumption is that contracts are incomplete. Because of the high transaction costs of writing complete contracts, some potentially Pareto-improving contingencies are left out of contracts and securities. This incompleteness of contracts may make renegotiation desirable. The missing contingencies can be replaced by contract adjustments that are negotiated by the parties ex post, after they observe the realization of variables on which the contingencies would have been based. The incomplete contract determines the status quo for the ex post bargaining game (i.e., renegotiation)that determines the final outcome.An import ant question in this whole area is “How important are these relationships empirically?” Here there does not seem to be a lot of evidence.As far as the importance of renegotiation in the sense of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), the work of Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) suggests that little renegotiation occurs in the case of financially distressed firms.Conventional wisdom holds that banks are so well secured that they can and do “pull the plug” as soon as a borrower becomes distressed, leaving theunsecured creditors and other claimants holding the bag.Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that firms that have a longer relationship with a bank do have greater access to credit, controlling for a number of features of the borrowers’ history. It is not clea r from their work exactly what lies behind the value of the relationship. For example, the increased access to credit could be an incentive device or it could be the result ofgreater information or the relationship itself could make the borrower more credit worthy. Berger and Udell (1992) find that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate shocks. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1997) find that smoothing occurs as a firm’s credit risk changes.Berlin and Mester (1998) find that loan rate smoothing is associated with lower bank profits. They argue that this suggests the smoothing does not arise as part of an optimal relationship.This section has pointed to a number of issues for future research.• What is the relationship between th e sources of funds for investment,as revealed by Mayer (1988, 1990), and the portfolio choices of investorsand institutions? The answer to this question may shed some light onthe relative importance of external and internal finance.• Why are financing patterns so different in developing and developedeconomies?• What is the empirical importance of long-term relationships? Is renegotiationimportant is it a good thing or a bad thing?• Do long-term relationships constitute an important advantage of bankbasedsystems over market-based systems?金融体系的比较1、什么是金融体系?一个金融系统的目的(作用)是将资金从盈余者(机构)向短缺者(机构)转移(输送)。
商业银行创新发展中英文对照外文翻译文献
外文文献原文及翻译商业银行创新发展中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)商业银行创新发展中英文对照外文翻译文献Capability Development: Commercial BanksAbstractThe competitive strategies of Thai banks during the transformative period brought some successes and some failures associated with payment systems. In this chapter we show how banks, ranked among the largest in the world, devised and pursued innovation strategies. This allows us to contrast the competitive strategies of first movers, dominant market players, re-engineering leaders, and innovative state banks. The cases illustrate the relationship between innovation and banking leadership in the country. In the final section we assess the common characteristics of these approaches and present some lessons that can be applied by other commercial banks seeking to use IT to gain competitive advantage.Siam Commercial BankSiam Commercial Bank was officially established in 1906, following its transformation from a …Book Club‟ set-up in 1904. The Book Club, which was a private trust, formed the modern basis of the bank, providing basic banking functions such as deposits, loan extensions, and foreign exchange. It was operated by local people and primarily served Thai and Chinese clients in the local business community. The bank became the first Thai commercial bank formed after the first foreign bank, Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, began operations in the country in 1888. Most importantly, it has served as a model for many Thai commercial banks in the early and modern periods. In 1996, the bank was ranked the fourth largest Thai commercial bank in terms of total assets, and the 211th largestRole of ITSiam Commercial Bank has been progressive in the use of IT through senior-level management support which has helped shape its visions and strategies. For example, the active involvement of the chief executive officer has led to investments in data warehousing technology to learn more about the bank and, more importantly, customer information (The Asian Banker 1997b). Furthermore, the chief executive officer has clearly defined two main objectives in the use of IT: (1) to facilitate daily banking activities between the bank and customers, and (2) to develop new methods in delivering financial services (SCB Technologies 1996a).More interestingly, the bank surprised the banking community in early-1998 by announcing an increased investment in its IT budget by 2–3% over its 900 million baht investment in the previous year (Bangkok Post 1998b). This was despite the country‟s financial crisis which caused a change in the excha nge rate regime, the devaluation of the local currency, and the cutting of costs across companies. In response to the financial crisis, the bank established a non-profit organisation to serve as a job placement centre for potential employers and employees, while also providing language and computer training for unemployed IT professionals (Bangkok Post 1997n).Bank functions related to IT are mainly organised in the technology group. In addition, the information system audit department located within the human resource and control group also has a technological role. The technology group, following the initiation of ideas in the early-1980s and a reorganisation in 1996, reports directly to the bank‟s chief executive officer, and is divided into five main uni ts (SCB Technologies 1996b).商业银行创新发展中英文对照外文翻译文献Firstly, the technology policy division overlooks broad technological developments and provides a centre of co-ordination. It prepares and monitors policies, plans, and the bank‟s expenditures in IT. Secondly, the system engin eering department develops, implements, tests, operates, and maintains the bank‟s computer systems. Thirdly, the technology and process engineering department overlooks the management of the bank‟s two main computer centre, controls the operating systems, and manages the bank‟s data warehouse located in mainframe computers. It also overlooks the purchase of computer equipment. Fourthly, the business relations department manages the bank‟s call centre, promotes the use of IT in the bank and to the public, an d finally, overlooks the bank‟s customer information facility system, credit monitoring, and collection system, and black list system. And lastly, the applied technology department conducts research into the use of new information technologies, maintains computer software, and manages computer hardware, software, and communication standards. This last function has played a particularly important role in building and strengthening bank capabilities and is discussed later.Bank Automation and InnovationComputers were first introduced in 1975. This mainly supported deposit functions located at the bank‟s head office. Early use of IT was extended to more sophisticated bank operations, and financial products and services. The pioneering ATM provided a new method of delivering payment services and was widely adopted by other local commercial banks which diffused nation-wide accordingly. In the 1990s, the bank once again became a pioneer in introducing on-line electronic banking communications in Thailand, particularly in tele-banking and infobanking systems.The bank introduced two major changes in the early 1990s. They were the adoption of customer-based business process management and organisational restructuring at the bank‟s head office. Price Waterhouse was co ntracted to advise on improving the bank‟s commercial lending and counter services, for which the consultants studied customer requirements and modified the bank‟s work processes to help address their needs. This partly resulted in the increased use of IT.A project called “relationship banking 2020” (RB 2020) was initiated jointly with IBM to help shift the bank‟s focus from an account-based to a customer-based system. RB 2020 restructured the way retail banking was delivered to bank customers since the early 1970s, and pioneered an analytical capability that assists in identifying the most suitable services for a specific target group of customers. This project, introduced in early 1996, was to be widely diffused and installed in over 400 bank branches nation-wide.The bank also adapted and applied object-oriented technology to support the delivery of financial services. For example, loan authorisation systems were built based on expert systems which has decision-making capabilities based on a 100-points scale. If a loan application scored high points, the computer approvedthe loan. Otherwise, an average or low score further considered or rejected the application accordingly. Furthermore, the bank built a mobile loan authorization system which efficiently analysed and approved a customer loan application data, following on-line verification by portable computers with its head office. Such services provided new channels for delivering financial services and improved customer convenience.Information technology was also applied to improve personnel management and商业银行创新发展中英文对照外文翻译文献staff promotion (SCB Technologies 1996c). In 1994, the bank‟s human resource and control group introduced a personnel IS that recorded all personnel particulars including education, work experience, and training. Thereafter, an employee promotion system was successfully introduced in 1995. This was aimed to support the bank‟s concept of a learning organisation. The second system was later enhanced to support decision-making in personnel promotion, and was aimed to make personnel information widely available to specific bank departments and branches located nation-wide.Bangkok BankBangkok Bank was established by the Sophonpanich family in 1944 and is the largest Thai commercial bank, enjoying wide recognition regionally and internationally. In 1996, it was ranked the largest Thai commercial bank in assets, and the 121th largest international commercial bank (KTB 1997; The Banker 1997). The bank was also recognised by IBCA, a leading rating institution in Europe, to be the world‟s second most profitable bank in 1994–1995. In 1995, the bank was presented with an award for excellence as the “Best Domestic Bank” in Thailand (Euromoney 1995), having been the largest commercial bank in Southeast Asia, and having expanded its international operations, particularly in the Indo-Chinese region and in the People‟s Republic of China.Role of ITBangkok Bank‟s chairman, together with senior-level management, have clearly defined the bank‟s future theme as being focused on electronic banking and IT which is in support of providing innovative financial services and generating fees-basedincome (Bangkok Post 1997p). Such a technologically oriented theme was well supported with regular five-year technological improvement plans. For example, an approximate sum of 400–500 million baht was allocated, as of 1998, for the replacement of computer hardware and software among the bank‟s nation-wide branches. Nevertheless, the bank‟s senior vice president (SVP) for systems development suggests that the support of such a strategy involves not only investments in IT.IT related functions of the bank are located within a technology division which is part of broader support service operations. This includes other …housekeeping‟ divisions like financial information services, operation, general service, and personnel. In the technology division, there are two departments headed by an executive vice president in charge, including the system development, and information-processing departments, which are, in turn, headed by senior vice presidents and managers.The application of satellite technology supported branch banking in the provincial areas. In addition, this supplemented the use of telephone lines in such remote areas which were inadequate in number and were also relatively unreliable. Therefore, the bank innovated by combining two types of technologies – satellite and microwave technologies. The bank‟s senior EVP for support service operations further explains the potential and problems in this choice of innovation.Sources of InnovationThe sources of innovation can be grouped in four main areas. The first and most important source is bank personnel. At the organisational level, the bank introduced a range of policies and programmes aimed at promoting the quality of staff and services.商业银行创新发展中英文对照外文翻译文献Since the bank began to use computers in the early 1970s, employees working in a particular department became familiar with their tasks, leading to user-driven innovation. Departmental employees, who are owners of specific job functions, gained familiarity with particular routines and used them as a basis for defining user requirements. The bank‟s senior EVP for support service operations emphasized this point.This suggests that the technology division plays a supporting role to other departments. As the decision to use or to invest in a particular type of technology remains with the user, the search for new IT rests with users. For example, staff from specialised bank divisions may request for technology after learning about new applications from overseas travel and training.The second source, computer companies, is a result of such outward-oriented training programmes. For example, this has included training with computer companies such as IBM which provided courses on project management and programming skills. In addition, the bank organised training courses with Microsoft at the bank‟s premises and at the software firm‟s authorised training centres. Such courses have specifically included server administration which is a required skill in nonmainframe technology and has become an emerging trend in the country, particularly networking in local and wide area environments.The third source is the systems development department which has been behind the bank‟s pioneering use of IT. As the bank was the first to develop computer online systems in the country, it enjoyed an early mover advantage, and more importantly, acquired and build-upon these early technological capabilities. The bank‟s SVP forsystems development further suggests that such capabilities may be partly attributed to the systems development department, which has focused its strengths,for example, in the development of retail payment systems.The fourth, and least important source, is consulting companies. During the re-engineering of its work processes, the bank contracted consulting firms, for example Booz Allen and Hamilton, to assist in developing new credit processes, credit lease management, and credit workflow systems. Although such firms have served as the bank‟s idea catalysts and informer of market and technology trends in banking, such sources of knowledge have provided a limited contribution. The bank made two reservations. Firstly, although foreign firms were more experienced, as compared to their local counterparts, this did not suggest that all foreign consultants were experts. Secondly, foreign firms merely made recommendations but faced difficulties in implementing project details. Thus, the bank strongly supports selfreliance and self-judgement, and even argued that 90% of consultant recommendations were widely available in textbooks.Lessons LearnedThis section discusses the common characteristics shared by the commercial banks and draws some lessons for other commercial banks seeking to use IT for competitive advantage. Although there has been widespread developments in IT in the banking sector, major technological developments and trends were initiated by the large commercial banks. Therefore, this group has become technology leaders and their involvement has served as a precedent for, or in some cases as a catalyst to the adoption of new information technologies in the commercial banking sector.商业银行创新发展中英文对照外文翻译文献Most importantly, however, is the acquisition of personnel at the senior-management level. Although such policies are not explicit, it has become one of the common characteristics among the commercial banks. Such individuals have been recruited, or in some cases appointed, to acquire managerial skills and senior management was actively involved in setting IT strategies. In Thailand, where a large number of commercial banks are family-controlled, there has been the appointment of influential figures in the country to key organisational positions. This has largely been to gain and maintain political and social connections in government and business. Thus, such invisible human resources are unique and difficult to transfer, but would provide a potential source of competitive advantage.In sum, the combined case studies helped identify the major sources of innovation which contributed towards banking automation and payments system modernisation. Although such sources included skilled staff, IT, and re-engineering, their potential as a source of sustained competitive advantage varied. In order to develop and provide innovative products and services, commercial banks increasingly depend on the development or acquisition of skilled bank personnel, in contrast with increased investments in IT, or even in bank re-engineering.译文:商业银行能力发展摘要泰国银行在转型期间采用的竞争策略使其支付系统有成功与失败之处。
不良贷款管理中英文对照外文翻译文献
不良贷款管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Non-performing Loans Management and RecoveryWilliam J. Bauman and Alan S. BlinderAbstractWith the deepening of China's economic system reform development and continuous improvement of the system of the market economy, banks ' lending business becomes completely open to individuals, personal loans of business growing, continues to expand the scope of business, especially the development of individual housing loan more quickly. Personal housing loan business in China at the time of its development, there are bad credit risks as well as the competitive situation is not optimistic, to a certain extent, hamper the development of individual housing loans, to sustainable development, research management must be strengthened on a number of issues. This article from the current development status of individual housing loan business to start, pointed out that because of the existing problems as well as problems and focus on how to develop personal housing loan bad credit risk reduction, foreign experiences and lessons learned, and thoughts and countermeasures for management, to promote the healthy and rapid development of the business.Key words:Housing loans to individuals; Bad credit risks; present situation; problem; Countermeasure1. IntroductionUnder the five-category loan classification, substandard, doubtful and loss loans are defined as non-performing loans. Because the reasons behind non-performing loans formation are different, credit associates must take effective measures to manage, recover and dispose of these parts of asset according to their different characteristics. The bank should first find out the responsibilities of the guarantor and dispose of the security in time. Only when they confirm that the guarantor has lost the guarantee abilities and the security is not sufficient to pay off the loan, can they begin to dispose of the non-performing loans.2. ReasonsThere are many reasons why banks have poorly performing loan portfolios. Irrespective of these causes, banks have an obligation to shareholders, depositors and creditors to maximize cash flow from assets, the most troublesome aspect of which has been the poor record of banks in recovering loans. It is this factor that has contributed the most to bank insolvency, and liquidity constraints.There are several complementary options available to banks to restructure problem loans and portfolios, including:•Exercise of collateral (liens against property, inventories) through judicial or extra-judicial means.•Out-of-court settlement that may focus exclusively on debt negotiation, restructuring and repayment, or lead to the financial, physical and operational restructuring of the enterprise.•Bankruptcy/liquidation procedures through formal court proceedings. This may involve liquidation, reorganization or privatization of an enterprise to enforce partial or total loan repayment.(Besides the bank itself, sometimes government also leads a restructuring program to help the bank to solve the problem of NPL in order to stabilize the banking industry or the whole economy, for example, Asset Management Company (AMC), a special purpose company, buys or exchanges NPL from bank and disposes of them).3. Work-Out UnitWith aggregate loan portfolios universally troubled by delinquencies and defaults, some banks have opted to develop work-out units to improve loan portfolio quality. When work-out units are established, they are usually set up to deal with most of a bank's problem loans, effectively sectioning off non-performing loans from the broader bank portfolio of performing loans. The benefits expected from work-out units include;•Concentrated focus on the recovery of problem loans;•More developed banking expertise and credit risk evaluation skills;•Improved internal bank system (early warning systems, collateral requirements, credit information needs).Work-out units can make a significant difference in restructuring loan portfolios, particularly when supported by effective technical assistance.4.Loan Restructuring and Loan "Rollover"Case-by-case loan restructuring is common in market-oriented economies, particularlywhen borrowers are unable to meet the original terms of the loan agreement due to external factors. These restructuring invariably changes in the amount, terms and /or schedule of interest rates, principal repayment, and collateral values. Loan covenants ( ratios, report requirements) often change to facilitate compliance. In some cases, radical measures such as replacing management are involved.This approach is similar to what work-out units attempt to do: recover portions of loan portfolios which have deteriorated and are non-performing. However, workout units are often organized on the basis of sector, location or bank exposure. Case-by-case loan restructuring is conducted on an individualized basis. The benefits of individual case-by-case loan restructurings include:•Reinforcement of the bank-client relationship.•Retention of the loan by the bank on its balance sheet, even if provisions are made for possible losses.•Preservation of the firm's relations with other parties (trade creditors, other banks, buyers, employees), thereby maintaining its reputation without embarrassing and costly bankruptcy / liquidation procedures.As with debt-equity swaps, the risk to the bank is that it is overly optimistic about prospects, and that additional resources are committed to the borrower adding to bank losses and reduced loan able funds at a future date. This has occurred frequently in transition economies (such as China, East European countries, former Soviet Union).In transition economy banks, the closest approximation to the Western loan restructuring has been the loan "rollover" which has been a common practice. Rollovers generally involve the following two techniques:•Simple rollover of principal on/before the due date, with the enterprise meeting interest obligations.•Rollover of principal on/before due date, with interest added back to the principal amount (“interest capitalization").The first technique is legitimate and rational unless the enterprise is unable to repay principal, and likely to remain impaired in the future. The second technique often reflects a troubled loan and enterprise, and has been typically practiced in transition economy banking systems. Further more, the latter technique has been accompanied by accounting treatment which mistakenly recognizes these assets as performing loans, artificially inflating income statements and balance sheet book values.5. Debt-equity Swaps and Loan Sales / Asset SwapDebt-equity swap results in bank ownership of enterprises occur with differing frequencies in different countries. In some countries, bank ownership of enterprises is common (German interlocking directorates), while in other countries it is strictly regulated (USA) or strictly prohibited (In China, debt-equity swap is done through asset management company). By swapping NPL for equity, banks can exercise more directcontrol/supervision over enterprise management while the enterprise benefits from increased debt capacity. The risk to bank is excess exposure to a risky investment which may jeopardize deposit safety and bank capital, and demand scarce management time and resources.Debt-equity swap represents nascent venture capital operation. Perhaps only one in 10 of these investments may succeed, but this should be sufficient to cover the risk of the other nine losing investment. Given existing low book values and the currently thin market that is likely to improve in the coming years, banks are prudent to allocate a small percentage of assets to enterprises they believe will generate significant profit at a later date. At that point, banks can sell their shares, and reap significant profit to bolster capital. All of this makes more sense given the current downside risk, which is limited, as most of these transactions are paper transactions that do not further impair bank liquidity.But bank equity swap may be indicative of the failure of banks in some countries to properly define bank's roles as financial intermediaries, streamline their operations, specialize in a few key areas within the limit of their current managerial and staffing capabilities, write down their assets to more accurate values, and progress toward a more stable and prudently managed system devoid of excess risk. Investment in losing enterprises raises the risk of future liquidity being drained to prop up these enterprises in the hope of eventual profitability, which puts depositors and shareholders at risk.In addition to debt-equity swaps, loan sales swaps are an option that could be used to restructure bank balance sheets. However, this option has not been commonly found in transition economy due to absence of secondary market development.6. Securitization of Non-performing LoanNon-performing loan securitization is a pooling of non-performing loans packaged and issued as securities to investors through arrangements of legal structure, cash flow, and credit rating mechanisms. Non-performing Loans are also known as bad loans, overdue loans, receivables under collection, and loans still under normal payment statuses, but with circulating bonds rated lower than CCC level. During the securitization period, the originator (seller) will select the most ideal portfolio based on a set of eligibility criteria, such as debtors' locations, credit period, currency, and overdue ratings from all available non-performing loans.After the screening process, bank will proceed with the risk assessment, cash flow simulation and credit tranche. The securities are then offered to investors after confirmation from credit rating agencies and regulatory approval obtained. The asset management agency is particularly important to a non-performing loan securitization since the asset management agency's expertise is instrumental to increasing collection rates of these non-performing loans. Investors' risks are minimized through credit enhancement techniques; default risks, prepayment risks, etc. are also emphasized to evaluate the risk profile of non-performing loans.7. In-court Bankruptcy / Liquidation ProceedingsResorting to legal procedures to collect the repayment of non-performing loans is the last defense line. In practice, banks should grasp the timing of litigation. Because blind lawsuits will involve banks' time, energy, money and people. In addition, they could have negative impact on the relationship between banks and their clients.Firstly, before litigation, banks should investigate the borrowers' income resources and asset categories and prevent them from hiding or transferring asset in this period of time. Banks can apply to the court for asset preservation. Secondly, banks should try best to correct the deficiencies of credit documents and win themselves advantageous conditions in litigation. Thirdly, banks should also prepare themselves for the results of reconciliation or failure.Bankruptcy/liquidation is an effective complement to out-of-cnurt approaches, and serves as a last stage of debt collection, providing creditors with control over debtors in financial distress and prompting their restructuring. For this reason, many countries (transition economies) have developed and are seeking to expand the use of formal bankruptcy to broaden the array of dispute resolution mechanisms, provide banks with long needed recourse, and instill greater financial discipline on enterprises.8. Exercise of CollateralWhen a debt matures or is going to mature and the debtor has encountered serious operation difficulties, the debtor cannot repay the loan in cash and the guarantor cannot repay the loan in cash either. Maybe after negotiation, the two parties (the bank and the borrower) or three parties (the bank, the borrower and the guarantor) can reach a consensus. In line with the consensus or the ruling by the court, the debtor or the guarantor can make in-kind repayment of debts, which is one of the important means to dispose of non-performing loans.9. Writing-off Bad LoansIn accordance with relevant state rules and regulation, if the principal of a loan is identified as unrecoverable, the bad loan can be written off. Writing-off of bad loans is the internal activity of a bank. So the bank still enjoys the recourse right and should continue to demand the repayment of the fund.10. ConclusionWere analyzed by the non-performing loans management recycling. Bad credit risk management, there are still many problems to be solved, how the lending business in the international financial place needs to be further research and continue to explore. In short,the management of non-performing loans of China's economic development has made a significant contribution, but there are still shortcomings in their own system, the external competitive environment in the development of the personal loan there are many adverse, which requires countries to fully understand individual housing loans an important role on the basis of, for the banks internal management and external risk management and reasonable planning to ongoing development. Personal loans also have to recognize their own position and where to adopt appropriate strategies and market positioning, innovation, adjustment, reform, focusing on risk management in order to more rapidly grow.ReferencesSteven Husted,Michael Melvin, International Economics [M], (the fifth edition), Higher Education Press, 2002Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2005). Financial and legal constraints to growth: Does firm size matter? The Journal of Finance, 60, 137–177.Peng, Y. (2004). Kinship networks and entrepreneurs in China's transitional economy. American Journal of Sociology, 109,1045–1074Qian, Y. (2000). The process of China’s market transition (1978–1998):The evolutionary, historical, and comparative perspectives. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156, 151–171.Shane, S., & Cable, D. (2002). Network ties, reputation, and the financing of new ventures. Management Science, 48, 364–381.Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy.International Political Science Review, 22, 201–214.Liu, Z. (2003). The economic impact and determinants of investment in human and political capital in China. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 51, 823–850. Birner, R., & Witter, H. (2003). Using social capital to create politicalcapital. In The commons in the New Millennium: Challenges andadaptation (pp. 291–334). Cambridge and London: MIT Press.不良贷款的管理和回收威廉J鲍姆,阿伦S布林德摘要随着我国金融体系建设的进一步发展和市场体制的迅速完善,银行的贷款业务逐渐向个人完全展开,个人贷款的业务种类不断增多,业务范围持续扩大,特别是个人住房贷款业务的发展更为迅猛。
银行营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献
银行营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献银行营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)银行营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献原文:MARKETING OF BANK PRODUCTS – EMERGINGCHALLENGES &NEW STRATEGIESDr. R.K. UppalDirector, UGC Sponsored Major Research ProjectD.A.V. College, Malout (Punjab)Abstract:The present paper acknowledges with same limitation that Indian private sector banks and foreign bank‟s marketing strategies are quite better than our public sector banks.The paper also suggests some strategies for the enhancement of bank marketing. Only those banks will survive in the future which will adopt effective and realistic strategy to win the trust of the customer.Keywords: Bank Marketing, Customer, Challenges and StrategiesIntroductionBanks Marketing is defined as a aggregate of function directed at providing service to satisfy customer‟s financial needs and wants, more effectively than the competition keeping in view the organizational objective of the bank. The bank marketing has become a very complex yet interesting subject as it requires the knowledge of economics, sociology, psychology, banking and also core marketing concept (Sasanee, M.K. p. 5). In marketing, it is the customer who has the upper hand. The mantra of effective marketing bank products lies in the systematic and professional approach towards satisfying customers needs (Ojha, V.K. p. 19). Thus, banks have to set up “Research and Market Intelligence” wings so as to ensure customer satisfaction and to keep abreast of market development (Ananthakrishnan, G. p. 9).Product and ServiceA product is defined as “Anyt hing that has the capacity to provide the satisfaction use or perhaps, the profit desired by the customer”. Product and service are the words used interchangeably in banking parlance. The bank products are deposit, borrowing or other product like credit card or foreign exchange transaction which are tangible and measurable whereas service can be such products plus the way/manner in which they are offered that can be expressed but cannot be measured i.e. intangibles. Better银行营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献service is more important than just a good product in the marketing of banking service, so the focus should be on the want and need of satisfying that product or service.Marketing Approach to Banking Services·Identifying the customer‟s financial needs and wants.· Develop appropriate banking products and services to meet customer‟s needs.· Determine the prices for the products/services developed.·Advertise and promote the product to existing and potential customer of financial services.· Set up suitable distribution channels and bank branches.· Forecasting and research of future market needs.Scheme of the paperThe paper has been divided into six sections. After the brief introduction, second section reviews some studies related to the present theme. Third section highlights objectives and research methodology. Fourth section discusses results. Section five reflects strategies and last section concludes the paper.Review of related studyDwivedi, R. (2007) explained that finance functions are important but not as important as the marketing functions. Friction between the marketing and finance functions would be detrimental to the smooth development and functioning of any business organization. Finance objectives like value maximization to shareholders are integral parts of any new strategy adopted by the organization. But this objective seems to have been lost amidst the flurry of marketing activities focusing on market share. Conscious efforts must be taken to avoid the missing core objective and for sales growth. Dixit, V.C. (2004) concludes that for successful marketing and to make it more effective, identify the customer needs by way of designing new products to suit the customers. The staff should be wellequipped with adequate knowledge to fulfill the customer‟s needs. We should a dopt long-term strategies to convert the entire organization into a customer-oriented one. Gupta, O. (1997) described the emergence of services sector and banks experience in service marketing. He emphasized customer satisfaction as the key to success and suggested a few measures to meet the needs and expectations of the customers. Gurumurthy, N. (2004) asserts银行营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献that technology today is claimed to be a …leveler‟ and not a…differentiator‟. After the …wow‟ feelings die down, technology would become a must for most clients.Banking products can be easily copied and replicated by competitors unlike manufactured products. It is also not a viable model for marketers to compete on price. The solution, therefore, would lie in effective application of marketing strategies.Jain, A. (2007) described that marketer has to know that each and every country is having various marketing environment. Comparatively, it has to be very clear that the international marketer is bound to hold on the reorganization that every marketing environment differs from place to place as well as nation to nation than that of the same country state. It is also evident from the study that the global business transactions have to be sound planned and objectives oriented in nature. Sreedhar (1991) have dealt with marketing in commercial banks. They have emphasized motivation research, marketing research and promotional aspects in marketing of services and suggested to improve the marketing strategies to cope with the changing environment.Objectives· To study and analyze the marketing developments regarding products and services in various bank groups.· To suggest some strategies for the enhancement of bank marketing.Research DesignMarketing has suddenly become a buzzword in the banking sector. Customer has suddenly moved to the centre-stage and he has now a choice. How do banks then attract a customer to use their product and services? One has to reckon the fact that the old loyalty can no longer be taken for granted. Banks have to make efforts to retain the existing customers and also use strategies to attract new customers to their fold.Sample DesignThe Indian banking industry has been divided into three major bank groups.· Public Sector Bank Group – G-I (28)· Private Sector Bank Group – G-II (28)· Foreign Bank Group – G-III (29)Now all the work is done by technological tools. Many e-delivery channels like ATM,银行营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献credit card, Mbanking, Tele-banking, I-banking have come into existence. Now banks take profit into consideration rather than price. Customer was slave to the bank before 1993 but now he has become the king of the bank. Customer can get feedback as per his own wish.All the parameters have shown the remarkable performance after the banking reforms. But public sector banks lags behind the private sector and foreign banks. Private sector banks and foreign banks are growing fast than the public sector banks. Thus the table implies that private sector and foreign banks are more efficient in the marketing of their products and services.Challenges of bank marketing·TechnologyMarketing by private sector banks and foreign banks is more effective than public sector banks because these banks are IT oriented. Private sector banks and foreign banks are attracting more customers by providing e-services. Thus, technology has become a challenge before the public sector banks.·Untrained StaffOften it happens that when a prospective customer approaches the branch, the employees seem to have very little knowledge about the scheme. This reflects an ugly picture of our bank‟s image. Banks are not losing one prospective customer but 10 more customers who would be touch of this man. Attitude of the employees towards customers is also not very well. Thus, it is a need of time to reorient the staff.·Rural MarketingThis is a big challenge before the Indian banks to enhance rural marketing to increase their customers. Banks should open their branches not only in the urban and semi-urban areas but also in the rural areas.·Trust of CustomersMarketing can be enhanced only by increasing the customers. Customers can be increased or attracted only by winning the trust of the customers.·Customer AwarenessCustomer awareness is also a challenge before the banks. Bank can market their银行营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献products and services by giving the proper knowledge about the product to customer or by awarding the customer about the products. Bank should literate the customers.Strategies for the enhancement of bank marketingIn the fierce competitive market, needs of customer keep changing. Hence, our marketing strategy must be dynamic and flexible to meet the changing scenario. Here are steps that form successful and effective marketing strategy for bank products.·Form a Saleable Product SchemeBank should form a scheme that meets the needs of customers. A bunch of such schemes can also form a product. A bank product may include deposit scheme, an account offering more flexibilities, technically sound banking, tele/mobile/net banking, an innovative scheme targeted to special group of customers like children, females, old aged persons, businessman etc. In short, a bank product may consist of anything that you offer to customers.·Effective BrandingMan is a bundle of sentiments and emotions. This can effectively be helpful in branding our products. Considering the features of products and target group of customers, the product can be effectively branded so as to sound it catchy and appealing.·Products for WomenThe national perspective plan for women states that 94 pc of women workers are engaged in the unorganized sector and 83 pc of these in agriculture and allied activities like dairy, animal husbandry, sericulture, handloom, handcrafts and forestry. Banks should do something to improve their access to credit which they require.·AdvertisementAdvertisement is an eminent part of marketing of bank products. Advertisement should be such that appeals to people. It should not follow the orthodox pattern of narrating a product. For effective advertisement, bank should understand people‟s tastes and choices.·Selling Products in Rural AreasFor enhancing the marketing of their product, bank should sell their products in rural银行营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献areas. For it, there is a need to open branches in the rural areas.·Informing Customers About ProductsThe bank should embark upon aggressive marketing of its products, particularly at the time of launching a new product, which will inform the perspective customers regarding product and at the same time relieve staff at branch level from explaining the product to all customers.·Re-orient StaffSincerity of efforts in implementation of the measures is lacking among the bank staff. It is a fact that its employees are not able to rise up to the expectations of its customers. They lack in their behaviour, attitude and efficiency. The phenomenon is glaring at urban centers. Therefore, it calls for an immediate attention which is missing link in the entire process of marketing, and the bank should undertake all such steps to motivate and reorient its staff.·Sale of Products and Services through E-delivery ChannelsAfter the Information Technology Act, many new e-delivery products have been introduced. These edelivery channels are very helpful in enhancing the marketing of various products and services. Thus Indian banks should sale the products and services through e-delivery channels.·Sale of Products and Services through Web-sitesInternet is a network of network which connects the world. Thus, banks should sale their products through web-site. This will enhance the marketing of the products not only at the national but also at the international level.ImplicationThus the study implies that for a successful and effective banking marketing of bank products is a necessary condition. This condition can only be fulfilling only by attracting the more and more customers. Thus, bank should make only policies which are helpful in fulfilling the needs of customers.ConclusionBanking sector reforms have changed the traditional way of doing banking business. Mainly technology is the outcome of banking reforms. Customer is now the king and银行营销策略中英文对照外文翻译文献customer focus or satisfaction of customer is the main aim of the banks. With the introduction of new products and services competition has grown up among the banks. Only those banks will survive who face the competition with the effective ways of marketing.References1.Ananthakrishnan, G. (2004), “Marketing of Bank Products”, IBA Bulletin,(April)p92.Dwivedi,R. (2007), “Managing Marketing-Finance Interface”, Journal of Commerce and Trade, Vol.2, No. 2 (Oct.), p. 323.Dixit, V.C. (2004), “Marketing Bank Products”, IBA Bulletin, (April), p.154.Gupta, O, “Emerging Issues in Service Marketing-Banks Experience”, SBI Monthly Review, (Dec.),p. 6275.Gurumurthy, N. (2004), “Marketing Bank Products”, IBA B ulletin, (April), p.236.Jain, A. (2007), “Managerial Role in International Marketing Strategies”, Journal of Commerce and Trade, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Oct.), p. 297.Malik, S.C. (1996), “Building Human Capital for Banking”, Vichaar, Vol. 16, Issue 4, (Oct.)8.Oj ha, V.K. (2004), “Mantra of Effectively Marketing Bank Products”, IBA Bulletin, (April), p.199.Patnaik, U. and Chhatoi, B. (2006), “Bank Marketing” edited book by Sonali Publications, New Delhi.10.Sreedhar, G., “Marketing-Style of Indian Banks”, The Bank er, New Delhi, (Feb.)11.Sasanee, M.K. (2004), “Marketing Bank Products”, IBA Bulletin, (April), p. 5原文与译文译文:银行产品营销 - 新挑战和新策略Dr. R.K. UppalDirector, UGC Sponsored Major Research ProjectD.A.V. College, Malout (Punjab)摘要:本文有一定的局限性,印度的私人银行和外资银行的营销策略相比公共部门银行来说要更好一些。
民营银行发展外文文献翻译最新译文3800多字
文献出处: Raut D. The study of international comparative on the development of private banks [J]. International Journal of Services and Operations Management, 2016, 10(3): 279-293.原文The study of international comparative on the development of private banksRaut DAbstractCommunity Banks is an important part of the banking system. Rural cooperative financial organizations in Japan are very successful. They all serve the economy for the vulnerable groups, their are no scale advantage, but because of its accurate market positioning and comparative advantage into full play, and a series of laws and institutions supporting system support, under the big Banks with highly competitive environment, the accumulation of viability, expanding living space.Keywords: Private Banks; Community financial; Path dependence1 operation and characteristics of community Banks in the United StatesThe United States there are a lot of private financial institutions, including bank per capita for most of the world and the community bank (Community Banks) closely related to the widely distributed. Community Banks generally defined according to the assets, the total assets of less than $1 billion all Banks in the ranks of community Banks. Community Banks more set in rural or semi-rural areas, according to a 2012 independent association (ICBA) community Banks in the United States, to the end of 2012, a total of 8932 community Banks across the United States and 39094 branches, these outlets with 54% distribution in rural areas; 26% distribution in the suburbs of the city; 4% distribution in northwest; Only 17% of distribution in the city. The main service object is the vulnerable groups in market economy, the community households and small businesses. In line with such a management idea, community Banks with big Banks for the high-end customer resources; at the same time, we also want a proportion of funds for community of unemployment of come off sentry duty the funding needs of the crowd. The fed's research suggests that community Banks in the United States some poor community economic development has made importantprogress has played a key role.1.1 economic analyses for community Banks to surviveAs a financial intermediary, community Banks to survive the comparative advantage of outstanding reflected in its in relationship lending, and this kind of business is the production of soft information and use of the basic elements. The so-called Soft Information (Soft Information) is difficult to be quantified, the verification and transmit Information. Due to long-term community Banks and enterprises and their owners, suppliers and customers, business communities in various dimensions such as contact, accumulated a lot of information about enterprise. That community Banks based on information superiority in the history of geographical advantages, has more than corporate financial statements and significant value of collateral and credit score, which helps to promote relational loan originators to better solve the problem of the borrower's information opaque (Baas and Shorten, 2015; Berger and Udall, 2010, 2012), the community Banks are able to carry out business activities at a relatively low transaction costs. A lot of empirical research of relationship lending paper drew this conclusion. This advantage first depends on the location of community Banks, community Banks operating capital mainly comes from the community and community for small and medium-sized units, community Banks' shareholders and directors are composed of local residents, and highly centralized equity structure (Brinkley, etc., 2013).The positioning strategy of relying on the community and in the community development, community Banks in the region of the enterprises and residents more familiar, can effectively achieve the community enterprises of all kinds of information, including credit conditions, thus largely solving the problem of information asymmetry between the fact. In general, the position of the big Banks located away from potential relational same borrowers, relationship lending will be along with the information from the (Informational short) increase and decrease; Or is reduced with the rising cost of borrower's specific information (Hausa and Marquez, 2012).Second, community Banks are larger Banks have an advantage in dealing with a soft, also depends on its decision-making mechanism. Hierarchical structure ofcomplex big Banks because of the principal-agent chain is long, solve the problem of agency costs will be higher. While small independent community bank because of management level, structure, less intensive, which can reduce agency problems (Berger and Udall and Clapper, 2011; Berger and Udall, 2012).Community Banks credit manager for loan project quality judgment is that the accuracy of it directly receiving, processing all kinds of soft information, the information production and capital allocation type of combination under the premise of the credit manager will get positive incentives; And in large and complex hierarchical structure, the existence of multiple levels of management in the bank, the configuration of the power centralized in the higher level, information separate production and capital, and in view of the small businesses the personification of the fuzzy characteristics of all kinds of soft to hard upper layer upon layer, thus weakening the soft information collection, production, credit manager turned from things hard rate (J Stein, 2012).Thus community Banks can be more flexible and convenient on the examination and approval procedures, to provide customers the creditability of the material and guarantee conditions may be extended appropriately, thus better able to convenience of customers, maximize customer satisfaction.Third, although small, community Banks but due to concentrate resources in area small and medium-sized enterprise customers and the community residents, the advantage of economies of scale can make it more carefully to meet the needs of the target customer base, help to get the costs down the experience curve and economies of scale. Big Banks, by contrast, in the large enterprise customers provide wholesale business at the same time, if also for small business and retail business, may cause organization is not economic Williamson (Organizational Diseconomies).In other words, if a financial institutions engaged in several varieties, when these business varieties with different techniques, may be the cause of scope not economic problems (Berger, Deserts and Straphang, 2009).It is this focus on specialized management mode, can make the community Banks gradually cultivate and accumulate their survival ability, gain more competitive advantage.1.2 American community Banks to survive the institutional environment analysisAlthough the competition pressure from big Banks in the United States is everywhere, and the large number of community Banks can survive and develop, depends entirely on its unique operation mode and comparative advantages, and is closely related to the economic system and financial system in the United States. The United States is a unique dual banking system country, namely in the federal or state registration after all can practice, and to prevent the oligarch monopoly, has long been the United States banned Banks set up branches across the state. This has spawned some assets on a smaller scale, no branches or branches less constructions smaller Banks and deposit financial institutions; At the same time, in order to protect the interests of depositors, strengthen depositors confidence in the bank, the United States pioneered the deposit insurance system, establish the safety of residents' deposits provide guarantee of government insurance institutions the federal deposit insurance corporation (FDIC), thus, provides the community Banks and big Banks important institutional environment of fair competition.In addition, the United States and improve the financial legal system also provides legal protection to the survival of community Banks. The antitrust laws to prevent and curb the industry monopoly. Mergers and acquisitions between us law, American Banks, except for bank regulators agreed to and approved by the ministry of justice and the federal trade commission. Small enterprises are designed to solve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises. According to the law to set up small business administration, and promote the commercial financial institutions to small business financing. Community reinvestment act is to encourage and support financial institutions to government economic underdeveloped legal expression of specific community to carry out financial activities, its regulation, all kinds of deposit financial institutions must provide financing of small businesses for the community, the community investment performance Is a bank regulatory approval to establish branches or other bank mergers and acquisitions in an important indicator, so small bank mergers and acquisitions has increased the big bank branch or beyond the expansion of the cost.2 operation and characteristics of the Japanese system of rural cooperative financeJapan's financial system besides the government financial institutions, private financial organizations, and the most distinctive is set on the basis of the spirit of mutual aid, in the rural areas to protect and improve the production and operation of the broad masses of farmers and agricultural cooperative combination system for the purpose of life under the credit agencies. The credit agency whose nature is the cooperative financial organizations, from the grassroots to the national association of credit, is divided into three levels. Three levels of financial organizations (hereinafter referred to as the jag, letter agriculture, agriculture, forestry and chic) independent business accounting, independent, self-financing, no supervisor, subordinate to the only economic exchanges. Japan of rural cooperative finance is safeguarding the interests of the disadvantaged farmer’s economy as its fundamental goal. The main credit business is deposits, loans, settlement and other supplementary business. During the recession, combined system financial institutions in addition to the grant of cheap credit to farmers, but also has the characteristics of policy finance. In the high-speed economic growth period, private finance has made great progress, integrated management features, by opening new financial business, absorption of farmers in the hands of idle funds, to the farmer returned, and provide asset management services.2.1 The business characteristics of the rural cooperative financial institutionsCooperative finance is the membership service to give priority to, characteristic of AIDS is obvious between members, and Japan’s rural cooperative financial institutions are no exception. Although there are non-members, but share is restricted, in principle is not less than 1/5 of the members to business, and have a limited amount of services.Business features of Japan's peasants associate finance is the following: (1) the jag system personal savings and a high percentage of personal loans, is significantly higher than other financial institutions. (2) The proportion of deposit is higher. Because for personal, deposit ratio is higher, and jag’s individual accounts for the vast majority of customers, so the proportion of time deposits is accordingly high. (3) Theproportion of long-term loans. This is mainly because the jag not only exercises the functions of general commercial Banks, and in the countryside is a long-term credit bank role. (4) Microfinance business. The jag faces most of the customers for the individual, which determines its business into more than for the low efficiency of microfinance operations. (5) The savings and loan rate is low. Other financial institutions that index is in commonly 70% ~ 80%, and the savings and loan rate of the jag significantly below this level, only about 25%.(6) capital has the characteristics of seasonal variation. Main show is in crop harvest fewer loans, deposits to increase.2.2 The Japanese system of rural cooperative finance to get government support and, law guaranteeAny country cooperative financial organizations are joint economic weakness, than the monopoly of big financial institutions, service to farmers and smallholders cooperative financial organization risk is huge, and the high cost, this needs the government adopted the policy of protection and support. The Japanese government for the support of rural cooperative financial organizations including the initial government investment manages send directors and supervisors; and after the government assistance and intervention to eliminate, still on the fiscal and taxation to give special offer of cooperative finance. What’s more, the successive governments have kept the stability and continuity of the cooperative financial legal system, legislation is relatively perfect, formed the rural cooperative financial legal system. Including agricultural cooperative group, agriculture, forestry and the central Treasury, etc., various laws are detailed rules for the business scope of the rural cooperative financial institutions, regulatory matters and authority, etc., really have, there are laws for the rural cooperative financial robust operation provides a legal basis.In addition to maintain the stability of the financial order, perfect risk prevention mechanism is also important measures. In the Japanese financial system have direct or indirect risk guarantee system, to safeguard the interests of depositors, mainly including deposit insurance system, mutual aid system and the agricultural credit guarantee system, etc.Aid refers to the deposit insurance institutions in order tomaintain credit order, which indirectly protect the interests of depositors, the necessary conditions, to provide financial assistance to the combination.Aid method is directed to aid, loans, provide a debt guarantee, etc.Mutual aid system is set up self-service financial system, based on mutual aid idea, complement each other and deposit insurance system of a kind of guarantee insurance system. Its purpose is to prevent the combination operation difficulties, maintain its normal business and credit. Aid content for low interest rates in the system of mutual aid loans, the term of 1 year of less than, funded by mutual aid reserves and mutual aid funds. Mutual aid reserves for financial organization in agriculture and even the letter must have deposit, letter farmers even it in agriculture, forestry and cicc.The mutual aid fund is in the agriculture and forestry and chic set up special fund.Credit guarantee system is to ensure that the interests of rural financial institutions in the financing process and set up the security system of system, mainly including loss compensation and debt guarantees. Loss compensation is to point to by a third party of financing mechanism of creditor's rights, debt contract between the borrower and guarantee, when the borrower fails to perform the debt, by a third party to compensate losses of the creditor. The third party for public institutions in general. The system is set up to improve the credit ability of financing institutions.译文民营银行发展的国际比较研究Raut D摘要社区银行是美国银行体系的重要组成部分; 农村合作金融组织在日本开展得非常成功。
银行私有化民营银行外文文献翻译中英文
银行私有化民营银行外文文献翻译中英文英文Bank Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of UgandaCommercial BankGeorge Clarke, Robert Cull, Michael FuchsSummaryBecause large state-owned banks are often the only financial service providers in remote areas of low-income countries, policymakers worry that even if privatization improves performance, it might reduce access. We study this issue through a case study: the privatization of Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) to the South African bank Stanbic. Though market segmentation remains a concern since Stanbic faces little or no direct competition in many remote areas, some innovative aspects of the sales agreement have enabled the bank to improve its profitability while maintaining, or even improving, access to financial services for some hard-to-serve groups.Key words: bank privatization, Uganda, Africa, access to financeIntroductionAlthough the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of state ownership have been debated, empirical studies have mostly found that private firms perform better than similar state-owned firms (Megginson, 2005b, Megginson and Netter, 2001, Shirley and Walsh, 2000). Empiricalstudies looking at private and state-owned banks have reached similar conclusions. Credit growth, portfolio quality, profitability, and productivity are higher in systems dominated by private banks.1Comparisons between private and state-owned firms suggest that privatization should improve performance. But critics have noted that privatized firms do not always act like firms that have always been private (Caves, 1990, Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988, Kay and Thompson, 1986). Limits placed on privatized firms, such as limits on layoffs, price controls to keep products affordable and, for banks, lending requirements and restrictions on branch closings might harm performance. Moreover, if problems in the institutional environment mean state-owned enterprises perform poorly, then the privatization process—and regulation after privatization—might be as flawed as public ownership. Privatized banks might therefore be unable to act like private banks would.Although the empirical evidence on the effect of privatization on bank performance in developing countries is mixed, outcomes are not random. Performance improves more when the government fully relinquishes control; when banks are privatized to strategic investors rather than through share issues; and when bidding is open to all, including foreign banks (Clarke, Megginson, 2005a).The impact of privatization on access to credit, payments, and savings services has been studied less than the impact on bankperformance. Clarke, Megginson, 2005a note that credit growth might be slower after privatization to foreign owners if foreign banks lend more prudently than state-owned banks. Other researchers have found that foreign banks tend to lend to different types of customers and base their lending decisions on different criteria than domestic banks (Mian, 2006, Petersen and Rajan, 1995).The empirical evidence also suggests reason for caution. Clarke, Crivelli, and Cull, (2005) find credit growth of provincial banks in Argentina was slower after they were privatized. Other private banks, however, increased their lending meaning that the overall level of real credit was on par with pre-privatization levels within a few years of privatization. Haber (2005) finds that although the privatization of most of the Mexican banking sector to foreign owners coincided with improved bank performance, loan growth was slower. In part this was because of poor enforcement of contract rights. Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005) also find that credit growth was slow in banks privatized to foreign owners in Central and Eastern Europe. It seems possible, therefore, that there is a tension between the pursuit of profits and the extension of outreach for privatized banks, especially when contracting environments are poor.These tensions are likely to be pronounced in Africa where few private banks have rural networks and where banking sectors areconcentrated and often dominated by state-owned banks. Because state-owned banks are the main providers of financial services in remote areas, access to services might get worse after privatization even if performance improves.We study these issues looking at a specific case: the privatization of a majority stake in Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) to Stanbic (South Africa) in late 2001. This privatization satisfies all three features of successful bank privatizations discussed above, making it a likely candidate for success. This case study is therefore a test of whether elements of best practice apply in a concentrated, under-developed banking sector—a situation not unique to Uganda.UCB’s dominant position before privatization makes this an especially interesting case. Since Stanbic did n ot close any of UCB’s 68 branches after privatization, it maintains the most extensive branch network in Uganda. Only one other commercial bank, the agriculturally-oriented Centenary Rural Development Bank had more than four branches outside Kampala. Stanbic, therefore, faces little or no competition in most areas, something that is uncharacteristic of the privatizations studied to date. Although the privatization of a dominant public bank in a small sector makes this case different from those in previous studies, many recent privatizations in sub-Saharan Africa and other low-income countries are likely to be similar. Admittedly, Stanbicoccupies a unique position in Uganda, but, were it not for this it might have been difficult to attract a credible strategic investor.UCB’s importance might have also affected how the government treated privatization. Privatization of a large bank with a dominant rural network is politically difficult. Political accommodations that make a deal palatable to the government might affect profitability.The government had reason to be concerned about post-privatization access in rural areas. Had there been competition, privatization might have affected prices of banking services. In remote areas, however, it was not so much price of service as whether service is available at all. Stanbic is the only option for access to the payments system in many places.5 Lack of reliable data has made it difficult to explore profitability-outreach tensions and only the extraordinary effort of Bank of Uganda (BOU) staff in collecting, cleaning, and organizing the data has made it possible in this case. In addition to financial statement data, the BOU provided branch-level financial information for Stanbic. This allowed us to test whether geographic factors such as population density and income affected Stanbic’s activities after privatization.To analyze profitability-outreach tensions, we first test whether UCB/Stanbic’s performance improved after privatization relative to other banks using bank-level indicators such as return on assets, share of non-performing loans, and the ratio of operating costs to assets. Next, onoutreach, we perform similar tests using bank-level indicators for credit growth and the sectoral composition of lending. We also use branch-level information, which is available only for Stanbic, to look at how outreach was affected by privatization. If performance improved relative to other banks and outreach declined, we will take it as evidence consistent with post-privatization profitability-outreach tensions.BackgroundThe Uganda Credit and Savings Society, which was created in 1950 to extend credit to entities without access to commercial banks, was converted into UCB in 1965. Before this, three foreign-owned banks (Barclays, Grindlays, and Standard), with clients almost exclusively affiliated with parent companies in the United Kingdom, dominated commercial lending. The creation of UCB was part of an effort to promote indigenous interests and extend access to financial services.UCB, however, quickly ran into problems. Its criteria for evaluating creditworthiness were often not commercially sound and, as a result, its share of non-performing loans was high. Poor portfolio quality and UCB’s mandate to open additional up-country branches meant that repeated capital injections were needed.UCB’s branch network expanded under activist government policies pursued in the 1970s. All banking activities of government bodies, parastatals and cooperative unions were transferred to UCB in 1972.Foreign banks were forced to either close up-country branches or sell them to UCB. This made UCB the sole provider of banking services in many locations, particularly in rural areas. Although financial sector liberalization, which started in 1987 and accelerated in the early 1990s, brought an influx of new banks, UCB’s (now Stanbic’s) branch network remains the largest.Despite liberalization, Uganda’s banking sector slipped into crisis in the early to mid-1990s. During 1994–98, half of the sector faced solvency problems (Caprio & Klingebiel, 2003). Despite Citibank’s entry in September 1999, the number of banks in Uganda contracted over this period. Credit to the private sector by deposit-taking banks hovered between 4% and 5% of GDP during 1993–2003, passing 6% only in 2004.Not surprisingly, UCB had problems during this time. But because it was the backbone of the payments system, especially in rural areas, and because the deposit insurance program was not fully capitalized (Kasekende, 2004), closure and liquidation were not considered. To preserve confidence in the payments system, the government cautiously restructured UCB, keeping it open throughout the process and maintaining its majority shareholding.In 1995, the government established the non-performing asset recovery trust (NPART), which assumed UCB’s non-performing assets.The government also sold non-core assets, reduced staffing levels, and invested substantial amounts to upgrade computer systems (Kasekende, 2004). In 1998, UCB was recapitalized and a minority shareholding block (49%) was sold to a Malaysian Company, Westmont Land Bhd.The partial privatization of UCB, however, ran into problems. Unknown to the government, Westmont had borrowed money from Greenland Bank to purchase its equity stake in UCB. Greenland had signed an agreement with the BOU in that same year to remedy insolvency and correct violations of insider lending and single loan exposure limits (Brownbridge, 2002). After the transaction, UCB began lending to Greenland and its related companies despite the inherent conflicts of interest.In 1999, the BOU had to intervene in UCB, but not before 64% of its assets were non-performing. The government decided to re-privatize UCB to more competent owners. The government announced that it would prefer to maintain a 20% shareholding although it would consider selling its entire stake. Multiple restructuring options were considered including sale on an “as is” basis, without non-core assets, or without loss-making and remote branches (Kasekende, 2004). Under any option, recapitalization was necessary given the state of UCB’s balance sheet.In late 2001, Stanbic Bank of South Africa acquired 80% of UCB. The remaining 20% of shares were transferred to a trust to be held forsale to Ugandan residents before being sold in 2006. Stanbic had to combine its existing operations in Uganda with UCB’s within 6 months of closing. Stanbic and UCB were fully merged in the financial data in the third quarter of 2002, and thus we use this as the beginning of post-privatization period.Under the sales agreement, the buyer could alter staffing and restructure branches subject to stipulations. On staffing, the government agreed to cover severance costs for up to 500 employees for two years. On branching, Stanbic agreed to maintain the entire network for the same period. After that, Stanbic could file written notice with BOU that a branch was not financially viable, along with a proposed schedule for closure. If BOU found Stanbic’s analysis reasonable, the gover nment had to negotiate compensation to keep such branches open. In cases where Stanbic and the government could not agree on compensation, BOU would permit closure. As of September 2004, only one of 33 branches mentioned in the annex to the sales agreement as potentially unprofitable (Mulago) did not appear in our database of branch-level financial statements. Overall, the data cover 74 branches, six more than the combined total for UCB and Stanbic in 2000. On that basis, the government has been successful in its desire to sell UCB to a private interest that would maintain the branch network.ConclusionsThe privatization of UCB to Stanbic might have been expected to improve bank profitability and performance. The government fully relinquished control to a strategic investor (Stanbic, a large South African bank) in an open sales process that allowed foreign participation. Previous studies have found that bank privatizations with these characteristics are more successful (Clarke, Megginson, 2005a).Although this provided reasons for optimism, there were potential pitfalls. Most importantly, because of UCB’s large branch network, it faced little competition outside Kampala. Moreover, the privatization of a dominant bank with an extensive branch network can be politically difficult, resulting in restrictions that harm bank performance.Despite these concerns, privatization appears to have been successful. UCB’s portfolio was cleaned and Stanbic has maintained the low share of non-performing loans that it inherited. Profitability and the rate of credit growth are on par with other Ugandan banks—an improvement over UCB’s pre-privatization performance. The fears expressed at the outset of the paper about a tension between profitability and outreach after privatization are not supported by the data. Profitability has improved, but there is no evidence that outreach has declined—indeed there are a number of indications that it has expanded.The empirical results also suggest that the sale improved access to credit for some hard-to-serve groups. Although it started from a very lowbase due to restrictions on UCB lending during the BOU intervention, credit growth has been most rapid at branches outside Kampala, especially in areas where Stanbic faces no local competitors. Deposit growth has been stronger in Kampala, although growth outside Kampala is substantial. As important, the number of depositors has grown as or more quickly than deposits, suggesting that formal savings have increased across economic strata. Deposit growth is not therefore solely due to the wealthy placing more of their assets in banks. Moreover, Stanbic has maintained, and even expanded, UCB’s branch network.The bank’s post-privatization portfolio allocation suggests that there has been a shift in strategy. Since privatization, Stanbic has increased agricultural lending, while decreasing its holding of government securities and lending to manufacturing. In part, the decline in holdings of government securities reflects changes in macroeconomic management as the government reduced the supply of T-Bills. Another part of the decline is likely due to the tendency to hold fewer government securities after privatization. By contrast, the decline in manufacturing lending—a strength of Stanbic before the privatization—represents a strategic shift.This shift, however, was not without costs. Under the sales agreement, Stanbic was required to merge the activities of both institutions within 6 months of closing the transaction. As a result, Stanbic’s expense ratio h as remained higher than that of other Ugandanbanks. These expenses also reflect the costs of re-branding and installing a proprietary intra-bank payment system. Although investing in improvements to its payments infrastructure might mean that Stanbic has established a barrier to entry for other banks, some other banks also are now clearing payments from remote parts of the country through the upgraded system. Of course, price of access to the new system should be monitored. Because many of these costs are not recurrent, Stanbic’s operating costs should decline in the future.Indeed, there are already signs of improvements. In 2002, 37% of Stanbic branches were unprofitable (i.e., had negative ROA). This fell to 20% in 2003 and to 16% in 2004. This suggests that the additional revenue associated with the new strategy exceeds the additional costs in a growing number of districts.Although concerns about market segmentation persist, the early indications are that, if structured correctly, privatization of a large bank with an extensive branch network in a low-income country with a concentrated sector can yield substantial performance improvements. At the least, the second attempt at privatizing UCB was a vast improvement over the first attempt, in which the government maintained a controlling share and did not attract a high-quality buyer.中文撒哈拉以南非洲的银行私有化:以乌干达商业银行为例乔治·克拉克,罗伯特·库尔,迈克尔·福克斯摘要由于大型国有银行通常是低收入国家偏远地区的唯一金融服务提供者,因此政策制定者担心,即使私有化可以提高绩效,也可能会减少获得贷款的机会。
金融学专业非银行机构的银行业务大学毕业论文英文文献翻译及原文
金融学专业非银行机构的银行业务大学毕业论文英文文献翻译及原文毕业设计(论文)外文文献翻译文献、资料中文题目:非银行机构的银行业务文献、资料英文题目:文献、资料来源:文献、资料发表(出版)日期:院(部):专业:金融学班级:姓名:学号:指导教师:翻译日期: 2021.02.14外文文献翻译学院经济管理学院专业金融学文献题目:非银行机构的银行业务文献出处: 译文内容:摘要目的--金融危机以及随后而来对现存银行机构的不信任,为新的竞争者进入金融服务提供了机会。
银行业以外的机构通过他们受信赖的品牌,更强的资料获取技术以及更强大的客户服务理念无形中动摇了金融服务的潜规则,也因此将生意带离了传统的操作者。
此论文目的就是检验这种无形的非银行机构在英国金融服务行业的进入以及扩张,并分析他们的前景,在最后仔细考虑他们将面对的巨大挑战。
设计方法:此论文以一篇于2021年发表的《乐购银行和维珍理财》报告为基准:探讨银行业没有银行。
此报告提供了对英国市场的分析以及潜在的主要竞争者。
这个报告更为精简的在论文中展现,并且经过修改更好的体现了国际关联。
调查结果:论文讨论了乐购银行和维珍理财的优缺点,并总结了他们在进入这个行业所要面对的各种挑战。
创新之处:论文十分中肯的给出了公众对乐购银行和维珍理财进入英国金融服务行业的意见。
它还提供了其他国家该行业新竞争者的教训。
关键词:金融服务,银行,消费行为论文形式:观点论文简介金融危机对未来的银行业构成产生多重大的影响?毫无质疑的,此次的危机使银行的资产,流动性,会计方式都重大的改变。
但是,危机还前所未有的使此领域向新的竞争者的进入打开大门?民众对主流银行深深地不信任使其他领域野心勃勃的公司获得了成为金融服务行业的主要提供商巨大契机?非银行业者进入金融服务先前已经被无数次讨论。
1994年一篇关于美国银行家的圆桌研究总结了“银行业的本质是一个现代的经济;然后银行却不是”。
评论员也预测了银行业以外的机构将用他们更强的信息获取技术和客户服务来动摇金融服务行业,谨慎的吃下将有利可图的生意并孤立银行。
银行和非银行金融机构对中国经济增长的影响【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文The Impact of Bank and Non-Bank Financial Institutions on Local EconomicGrowth in ChinaMaterial Source: Author:Xiaoqiang Cheng & Hans Degryse Recent debate on finance and growth in China boils down to the question on how Chinese firms are financed and monitored. One strand of literature reasons that the Chinese legal system and formal financial sector are too weak to enforce sound governance and thus the law, finance and growth nexus does not hold in China (e.g., Allen et al. (2005) and Boyreau-Debray (2003)). Chinese growth then stems from informal financing channels and institutions. The other strand reasons that formal finance in China contributes to growth, despite the relative weakness of the legal system (e.g. Hasan et al. (2006), Ayyagari et al.(2007), Rousseau and Xiao (2007), or (Demitriades et al. 2008)).1 Informal finance serves firms who cannot tap formal finance. However, informal finance cannot serve the needs of the higher end of the market since their monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are insufficiently developed (Ayyagari et al. (2007)). We find that banking development plays an important role in Chinese economic growth. Our evidence taken together with that from other recent papers (e.g. Hasan et al. (2006), Ayyagari et al. (2007), Rousseau and Xiao (2007), and Demetriades et al. (2008)), who also support the role of formal finance in China using different datasets and methods, show that the Allen et al. (2005) conjectures are becoming very much a minority view. Our paper therefore shifts the balance of evidence away from the view that formal finance played little role in financing Chinese economic growth.In China, most non-bank financial institutions only operate within a province. While banks, especially state-owned banks, have their national-level headquarters, cross-province bank lending seldom happens due to the restriction imposed by the central bank of China. Therefore it is safe for us to compare the performance of those two types of financial institutions at provincial level. Financial development of those financial institutions in each province is measured, in a conventional way, by the ratios of local savings and loans to GDP. The panel dataset we employ coversthe period 1995–2003, right after the mid-1990s financial reforms took place. Choosing such a period also helps us alleviating the reverse impact from growth to financial reforms. For instance, the concern that financial reforms were initiated exactly at the time that the economy was expected to boom should then be less of a concern. The growth rates have shown a decreasing trend during our sample period, as the Chinese government has managed to “soft land” the economy since the mid-1990s.Our results show that a clear difference exists between the impact of financial development of banks and non-bank financial institutions on growth. While having extended most of their loans to the large and medium sized firms, banks contribute significantly to local growth. This effect is more pronounced in provinces with foreign entry. As a comparison, non-bank financial institutions, while granting most of their loans to smaller firms in China, seem to be not important for local growth. Such results are robust across different specifications controlling for omitted variables or reverse causality. We attribute this difference to the fact that banks, relative to non-bank financial institutions, have benefited much more from the Chinese ongoing financial reforms. In particular, the reforms include commercialization of state-owned banks, market entry deregulation, and liberalization of interest rates. Our results suggest that, despite the relatively weak Chinese financial sector, at margin banks played an important role in the allocation of funds, and in turn spurred growth. Our finding sharpens the insights of Allen et al. (2005) on the one hand, and Ayyagari et al. (2007), Demetriades et al. (2008), and Rousseau and Xiao (2007), on the other hand, which mainly argue that only the informal and formal financial sector drive growth, respectively.Before 1994, the four state-owned banks7 were dominating the whole banking sector. In 1994, three policy banks were created to undertake policy lending previously assigned to the four state-owned banks. The latter then became the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs hereinafter) for commercial financial business only. At the same time, a series of financial reforms have been carried out in order to improve the internal management and risk-control of the SOCBs, and to delink them from their non-banking arms (Li (2001)). In 1998, the Chinese central bank (the People’s Bank of China (PBOC hereinafter), allowed the SOCBs to make their own lending decisions on a commercial basis. In contrast, the non-bank financial sector has received few reforms. These have been deterred since there is no consensus on the ownership and functions of the non-bank financial institutions,especially of the rural credit cooperatives (RCCs hereinafter) (He (2006) and Xie (1998)). The development of legislation for the trust and investment companies (TICs hereinafter) lags behind that of banks. While the Trust Law didn’t enact till the end of 2001, the Commercial Banking Law enacted already in 1995 providing a legal framework for standardizing the operations of the commercial banks.Figure 1 presents an overview of China’s financial institutions at the end of 1994, right after the commercialization. The banking sector entails three policy banks and fifteen commercial banks, of which the four SOCBs are by far the most important in terms of assets. One should notice that each state-owned bank has a large number of branches in almost every city in China. Among the eleven joint stock banks, Bank of Communications (BoCom) is the largest with China’s finance ministry its main shareholder. Researchers often refer to the four SOCBs and BoCom as “the five biggest state-owned banks”. The non-bank financial sector consists of urban credit cooperatives (UCCs hereinafter), RCCs, TICs, financial companies (FCs), and other institutions. There are many UCCs and RCCs in China, but they are isolated from each other and do not have country-wide headquarters as banks. In sum, bank and non-bank financial institutions are the only two types of financial institutions in China, according to the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking.Commercialization has several effects. First, the SOCBs gradually reduced their exposure to the state-owned sector, as the proportion of loans to the state-owned sector decreased from 82.4% in 1994 towards 64.4% in 2002. Over the period 1994–2002, the short-term loans extended to the non-state-owned sector grew faster, especially stemming from SOCBs, suggesting that the SOCBs were making greater efforts to support the nonstate- owned sector than non-bank financial institutions.8 Second, SOCBs had been able to attract high quality personnel, which are crucial to select and monitor projects. The evolution of non-performing loans (NPLs hereinafter) of SOCBs and non-bank financial institutions illustrates that commercialization improved the efficiency of lending. Table 1 shows that the NPL ratio in the banking sector had been continuously decreasing between 2000 and 2003. Next to the fact that the Chinese government has injected capital to SOCBs, most of the NPLs were actually due to the policy lending during the pre-reform period and little had been newly generated after commercialization (Zhang (2003a, b) and Xu (2005)). The few available data on the NPL ratio of non-bank financial institutions suggest that this ratio was much higher (50%) and possibly at an increasing trend.China has made an effort to stimulate competition among the SOCBs and also to introduce competition from other banks with different ownership structures. In 1986 and 1996, the first joint stock commercial bank (Bank of Communication) and the first private joint stock commercial bank (China Minsheng Banking Corp., LTD. (CMBC)) were created, respectively. Moreover, foreign financial institutions were allowed to setup representative offices in China in 1981. Foreign banks were allowed to setup branches in most important coastal cities in 1994 and were allowed to conduct RMB business in Shanghai and Shenzhen two years later.How to reconcile these results with Allen et al. (2005), who argue that the Chinese financial system is weak and that informal finance and informal institutions promote growth, and Ayyagari et al. (2007), (Demitriades et al. 2008), and Rousseau and Xiao (2007), who find that formal finance leads to greater firm growth? We find that only banking development leads to greater growth, in line with some of the findings of Ayyagari et al. (2007), (Demitriades et al. 2008), and Rousseau and Xiao (2007), whereas the development of non-bank financial institutions seems not to cause growth. It is clear that the Chinese financial institutions do have inefficiencies compared to their international counterparts. But compared to other domestic financial institutions, the Chinese banks have benefited greatly from financial reforms and thus changed dramatically from only granting policy loans to starting allocating capital and monitoring projects according to commercial standards.This paper contributes to the recent debate on the role of formal and informal finance for growth in China using some new perspectives. In particular, we argue that non-bank financial institutions in China have characteristics of both informal and formal finance and deserve special attention. Therefore comparison of the heterogeneity between those two types of financial institutions allows gaining further insights on whether the formal or the informal financial sector leads to growth in China. Non-bank financial institutions, which have long been ignored by the finance and growth literature, are thus brought under the spot for the first time. In addition, we are the first to link financial reforms, financial development and growth. Banks and non-bank financial institutions thus serve as the “reference group” for each other in identifying the reform-finance-growth nexus.Using a province-level panel dataset over the period 1995–2003, we find that bank development, in particular bank credit, greatly contributes to province growth. For instance, an increase of bank loans to GDP ratio from the lowest to the highest in our sample increases future annual growth by 8.5 percentage points. In contrast,in most specifications, the development of non-bank financial institutions is not correlated with growth. We attribute this difference to banks having benefited more from the reform process such as commercialization, entry deregulation and liberalization than non-bank financial institutions. Banks may have been able to gradually build up a commercial culture, getting rid of the intervention from the local government, attract better quality personnel, and improve their viability during opening-up for foreign institutions. Compared to banks, non-bank financial institutions were largely underdeveloped. This argument is also confirmed by China’s recent attempts to reform urban and rural cre dit cooperatives by transforming them into local commercial banks. The different findings on the development of banks and nonbank financial institutions show that the reform-finance-growth nexus also applies within the formal financial sector in China.译文银行和非银行金融机构对中国经济增长的影响资料来源:斯普林格数据库作者:陈晓强和汉斯迪格瑞斯在最近一次的辩论中,中国的经济增长归结为中国的企业是如何资助和监督的问题。
Non-bank finance in Europe 欧洲非银行金融机构
Non-bank finance in Europe欧洲非银行金融机构Embracing the alternatives采用新方法Banks are changing. That means other providers of capital must step forward, especially in Europe 银行有变,资本家须出手,尤其是向欧洲Fixing one problem often creates another. The financial crisis has produced a wave of regulation to make the banking system safer.Banks are being required to hold more capital. They are being p ushed out of riskier areas of activity. This week regulators in Americaand Britain gave more details of plans to impose losses on bank bondholders to spare taxpayers the cost of resolvingfailing lenders(see article). Such reforms are needed. Banks must be better cushioned againstlosses and it must be possible for them to fail.左支右绌的事时常发生。
在本次金融危机的影响下,为增强银行体系安定性,银行业监管开始受到重视。
银行需要提高其资本持有量,并远离金融海啸的高危地带。
本周,英美两国的银行监管当局为避免让其纳税人来承担不良债务,就提高银行债券持有人的损失负担一事,进一步交流了该计划的细节问题。
文献综述和外文翻译的撰写要求
Keeping organizational information in a file-processing system has a number of major disadvantages.
?Data redundancy and inconsistency. Since the files and application programs are created by different programmers over a long period, the various files are likely to have different formats and the programs may be written in several programming languages. Moreover, the same information may be duplicated in several places (files). For example, the address and telephone number of a particular customer may appear in file that consists of savings-account records and in a file that consists of checking-account records. This redundancy leads to higher storage and access cost. In addition, it may lead to data inconsistency; that is, the various copies of the same data may no longer agree. For example, a changed coustomer address may be reflected in savings-account records but not elsewhere in the system.
会计专业毕业论文外文文献翻译.
密级:绝密外文翻译THESIS OF BACHELOR题目:浅析商业银行会计风险控制存在的问题及对策英文题目: Analysis of Commercial Bank Accounting Risk Control Problems and Countermeasures 学院: 系别:专业:班级:学生姓名:学号:指导老师:起讫日期:我国商业银行会计风险成因及防范对策历史资料表明:导致许多国家20世纪以来先后爆发银行危机的主要原因是未能妥善解决银行风险问题。
长期以来,这一问题也困扰着我国,成为威胁我国国民经济持续、健康发展的重大隐患。
几年来国家采取了一系列必要措施:从1994至1995年给银行业立法,1996年后加强金融审慎性监管,1998年为四大银行补充2700亿元资本金,1999年成立资产管理公司并剥离五大行的1。
4万亿元不良资产,2000年以后国务院严令各行降低不良资产率,等等。
但这些措施均没有触及体制不合理这个根本问题,因而无法从根本上控制银行风险增量,提高银行经营绩效。
目前,我国银行潜伏的高风险日益暴露出来.面临2006年银行业全面开放后外资金融机构进入所带来的竞争和挑战,本届政府下决心彻底改革国有银行的体制,去年末央行动用外汇储备向中国银行、中国建设银行注资450亿美元,充实其资本金,使之达到《巴塞尔协议》规定的8%的资本充足率,推动国有银行股份制改革和最终上市,从根本上解决国有银行风险的增量问题。
因此,研究中国银行风险的特点、特殊的制度成因,股份制改革和公司治理结构建立这些被称为治本措施的一系列政策问题,具有重要的理论和现实意义。
本文第一章首先阐述了我国银行风险的表现形式.其中银行信用风险特别是国有商业银行资产信贷质量问题,成为当前最为突出的金融风险;国有商业银行的流动性风险虽未显现(暂时被居民的高储蓄率所掩盖),但潜在的支付困难因素日益增多;财务风险主要表现在国有商业银行资本金严重不足和经营利润虚盈实亏两方面;此外我国银行还存在着较为严重的利率汇率风险、市场风险、犯罪风险。
银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献
银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献1银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Banks analysis of financial dataAbstractA stochastic analysis of financial data is presented. In particular we investigate how the statistics of log returns change with different time delays t. The scale-dependent behaviour of financial data can be divided into two regions. The first time range, the small-timescale region (in the range of seconds) seems to be characterised by universal features. The second time range, the medium-timescale range from several minutes upwards can be characterised by a cascade process, which is given by a stochastic Markov process in the scale ττ. A corresponding Fokker–Planck equation can be process in the scaleextracted from given data and provides a non-equilibrium thermodynamical description of the complexity of financial data.Keywords: Banks; Financial markets; Stochastic processes;Fokker––Planck equationFokker1.IntroductionFinancial statements for banks present a different analytical problem than manufacturing and service companies. As a result, analysis of a bank’s financial statements requires a distinct approach that recognizes a bank’’s financial statements requires a distinct approach that recognizes a bank somewhat unique risks.Banks take deposits from savers, paying interest on some of these accounts. They pass these funds on to borrowers, receiving interest on the loans. Their profits are derived from the spread between the rate they pay forfunds and the rate they receive from borrowers. This ability to pool deposits from many sources that can be lent to many different borrowers creates the flow of funds inherent in the banking system. By managing this flow of funds,banks generate profits, acting as the intermediary of interest paid and interest received and taking on the risks of offering credit.2. Small-scale analysisBanking is a highly leveraged business requiring regulators to dictate minimal capital levels to help ensure the solvency of each bank and the banking system. In the US, a bank’’s primary regulator could be the Federal banking system. In the US, a bankReserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision or any one of 50 state regulatory bodies, depending on the charter of the bank. Within the Federal Reserve Board, there are 12 districts with 12 different regulatory staffing groups. These regulators focus on compliance with certain requirements, restrictions and guidelines, aiming to uphold the soundness and integrity of the banking system.As one of the most highly regulated banking industries in the world, investors have some level of assurance in the soundness of the banking system. As a result, investors can focus most of their efforts on how a bank will perform in different economic environments.Below is a sample income statement and balance sheet for a large bank. The first thing to notice is that the line items in the statements are not the same as your typical manufacturing or service firm. Instead, there are entries that represent interest earned or expensed as well as deposits and loans.As financial intermediaries, banks assume two primary types of risk asthey manage the flow of money through their business. Interest rate risk is the management of the spread between interest paid on deposits and received on loans over time. Credit risk is the likelihood that a borrower will default onits loan or lease, causing the bank to lose any potential interest earned as wellas the principal that was loaned to the borrower. As investors, these are theprimary elements that need to be understood when analyzing a bank’’s primary elements that need to be understood when analyzing a bankfinancial statement.3. Medium scale analysisThe primary business of a bank is managing the spread between deposits. Basically when the interest that a bank earns from loans is greater than the interest it must pay on deposits, it generates a positive interest spread or net interest income. The size of this spread is a major determinant of the profit generated by a bank. This interest rate risk is primarily determined by the shape of the yield curve.As a result, net interest income will vary, due to differences in the timing of accrual changes and changing rate and yield curve relationships. Changes in the general level of market interest rates also may cause changes in the volume and mix of a bank’’s balance sheet products. For example, when volume and mix of a bankeconomic activity continues to expand while interest rates are rising,commercial loan demand may increase while residential mortgage loangrowth and prepayments slow.Banks, in the normal course of business, assume financial risk by making loans at interest rates that differ from rates paid on deposits. Deposits often have shorter maturities than loans. The result is a balance sheet mismatch between assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits). An upward sloping yield curve is favorable to a bank as the bulk of its deposits are short term and their loans are longer term. This mismatch of maturities generates the net interest revenue banks enjoy. When the yield curve flattens, this mismatch causes net interest revenue to diminish.4.Even in a business using Six Sigma® methodology. an “optimal” level of working capital management needs to beidentified.The table below ties together the bank’s balance sheet with the income statement and displays the yield generated from earning assets and interestbearing deposits. Most banks provide this type of table in their annual reports. The following table represents the same bank as in the previous examples: First of all, the balance sheet is an average balance for the line item, rather than the balance at the end of the period. Average balances provide a better analytical frame analytical framework to help understand the bank’s financial performance. work to help understand the bank’s financial performance. Notice that for each average balance item there is a correspondinginterest-related income, or expense item, and the average yield for the time period. It also demonstrates the impact a flattening yield curve can have on a bank’s net interest income.The best place to start is with the net interest income line item. The bank experienced lower net interest income even though it had grown averagebalances. To help understand how this occurred, look at the yield achieved on total earning assets. For the current period ,it is actually higher than the prior period. Then examine the yield on the interest-bearing assets. It issubstantially higher in the current period, causing higher interest-generating expenses. This discrepancy in the performance of the bank is due to the flattening of the yield curve.As the yield curve flattens, the interest rate the bank pays on shorter term deposits tends to increase faster than the rates it can earn from its loans. This causes the net interest income line to narrow, as shown above. One way banks try o overcome the impact of the flattening of the yield curve is to increase the fees they charge for services. As these fees become a larger portion of the bank’s inco portion of the bank’s income, it becomes less dependent on net interest me, it becomes less dependent on net interest income to drive earnings.Changes in the general level of interest rates may affect the volume ofcertain types of banking activities that generate fee-related income. For example, the volume of residential mortgage loan originations typically declines as interest rates rise, resulting in lower originating fees. In contrast,mortgage servicing pools often face slower prepayments when rates are rising, since borrowers are less likely to refinance. Ad a result, fee income and associated economic value arising from mortgage servicing-related businesses may increase or remain stable in periods of moderately rising interest rates.When analyzing a bank you should also consider how interest rate risk may act jointly with other risks facing the bank. For example, in a rising rate environment, loan customers may not be able to meet interest payments because of the increase in the size of the payment or reduction in earnings. The result will be a higher level of problem loans. An increase in interest rate is exposes a bank with a significant concentration in adjustable rate loans to credit risk. For a bank that is predominately funded with short-term liabilities, a rise in rates may decrease net interest income at the same time credit quality problems are on the increase.5.Related LiteratureThe importance of working capital management is not new to the finance literature. Over twenty years ago. Largay and Stickney (1980) reported that the then-recent bankruptcy of W.T. Grant. a nationwide chain of department stores. should have been anticipated because the corporation had been running a deficit cash flow from operations for eight of the last ten years of its corporate life. As part of a study of the Fortune 500’s financ ial management practices. Gilbert and Reichert (1995) find that accounts receivable management models are used in 59 percent of these firms to improve working capital projects. while inventory management models were used in 60 percent of the companies. More recently. Farragher. Kleiman andSahu (1999) find that 55 percent of firms in the S&P Industrial indexcomplete some form of a cash flow assessment. but did not present insights regarding accounts receivable and inventory management. or the variations of any current asset accounts or liability accounts across industries. Thus. mixed evidence exists concerning the use of working capital managementtechniques.Theoretical determination of optimal trade credit limits are the subject of many articles over the years (e.g.. Schwartz 1974; Scherr 1996). with scant attention paid to actual accounts receivable management. Across a limited sample. Weinraub and Visscher (1998) observe a tendency of firms with low levels of current ratios to also have low levels of current liabilities.Simultaneously investigating accounts receivable and payable issues. Hill. Sartoris. and Ferguson (1984) find differences in the way payment dates are defined. Payees define the date of payment as the date payment is received. while payors view payment as the postmark date. Additional WCM insight across firms. industries. and time can add to this body of research.Maness and Zietlow (2002. 51. 496) presents two models of valuecreation that incorporate effective short-term financial management activities. However. these models are generic models and do not consider unique firm or industry influences. Maness and Zietlow discuss industry influences in a short paragraph that includes the observation that. “An industry a company is located i located in may have more influence on that company’s fortunes than overall n may have more influence on that company’s fortunes than overall GNP” (2002. 507). In fact. a careful review of this 627GNP” (2002. 507). In fact. a careful review of this 627-page textbook finds -page textbook finds only sporadic information on actual firm levels of WCM dimensions.virtually nothing on industry factors except for some boxed items with titles such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In--House Credit Card” (128) andnothing on WCM stability over time. This research will attempt to fill thisvoid by investigating patterns related to working capital measures within industries and illustrate differences between industries across time.An extensive survey of library and Internet resources provided very few recent reports about working capital management. The most relevant set of articles was Weisel and Bradley’s (2003) arti cle on cash flow management and one of inventory control as a result of effective supply chain management by Hadley (2004).6.Research MethodThe CFO RankingsThe first annual CFO Working Capital Survey. a joint project with REL Consultancy Group. was published in the June 1997 issue of CFO (Mintz and Lezere 1997). REL is a London. England-based management consulting firm specializing in working capital issues for its global list of clients. The original survey reports several working capital benchmarks for public companies using data for 1996. Each company is ranked against its peers and also against the entire field of 1.000 companies. REL continues to update the original information on an annual basis.REL uses the “cash flow from operations” value loc ated on firm cash flow statements to estimate cash conversion efficiency (CCE). This value indicates how well a company transforms revenues into cash flow. A “daysof working capital” (DWC) value is based on the dollar amount in each of the aggregate. equally-weighted receivables. inventory. and payables accounts. The “days of working capital” (DNC) represents the time period between purchase of inventory on acccount from vendor until the sale to the customer. the collection of the receivables. and payment receipt. Thus. it reflects the company’s ability to finance its core operations with vendor credit. A detailed investigation of WCM is possible because CFO also provides firmand industry values for days sales outstanding (A/R). inventory turnover. and days payables outstanding (A/P).7.Research FindingsAverage and Annual Working Capital Management Performance Working capital management component definitions and average values for the entire 1996 –– 2000 period . Across the nearly 1.000 firms in thefor the entire 1996survey. cash flow from operations. defined as cash flow from operations divided by sales and referred to as “cash conversion efficiency” (CCE). averages 9.0 percent. Incorporating a 95 percent confidence interval. CCE ranges from 5.6 percent to 12.4 percent. The days working capital (DWC). defined as the sum of receivables and inventories less payables divided by daily sales. averages 51.8 days and is very similar to the days that sales are outstanding (50.6). because the inventory turnover rate (once every 32.0 days) is similar to the number of days that payables are outstanding (32.4 days). In all instances. the standard deviation is relatively small. suggesting that these working capital management variables are consistent across CFO reports.8.Industry Rankings on Overall Working Capital Management PerformanceCFO magazine provides an overall working capital ranking for firms in its survey. using the following equation:Industry-based differences in overall working capital management are presented for the twenty-six industries that had at least eight companies included in the rankings each year. In the typical year. CFO magazine ranks 970 companies during this period. Industries are listed in order of the mean overall CFO ranking of working capital performance. Since the best average ranking possible for an eight-company industry is 4.5 (this assumes that the eight companies are ranked one through eight for the entire survey). it is quite obvious that all firms in the petroleumindustry must have been receiving very high overall working capital management rankings. In fact. the petroleum industry is ranked first in CCE and third in DWC (as illustrated in Table 5 and discussed later in this paper).Furthermore. the petroleum industry had the lowest standard deviation of working capital rankings and range of working capital rankings. The only other industry with a mean overall ranking less than 100 was the Electric & Gas Utility industry. which ranked second in CCE and fourth in DWC. The two industries with the worst working capital rankings were Textiles and Apparel. Textiles rank twenty-second in CCE and twenty-sixth in DWC. The apparel industry ranks twenty-third and twenty-fourth in the two working capital measures9. Results for Bayer dataThe Kramers––Moyal coefficients were calculated according to Eqs. (5) and The Kramers(6). The timescale was divided into half-open intervalsassuming that the Kramers––Moyal coefficients are constant with respect to assuming that the Kramersthe timescaleττin each of these subintervals of the timescale. The smallestthe timescaletimescale considered was 240 s and all larger scales were chosen such that ττi timescale considered was 240 s and all larger scales were chosen such that . The Kramers––Moyal coefficients themselves were parameterised =0.9*τi+1. The Kramersin the following form:This result shows that the rich and complex structure of financial data, expressed by multi-scale statistics, can be pinned down to coefficients with a relatively simple functional form.10. DiscussionCredit risk is most simply defined as the potential that a bank borrower or counter-party will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. When this happens, the bank will experience a loss of some or all of the credit it provide to its customer. To absorb these losses, banks maintain anallowance for loan and lease losses. In essence, this allowance can be viewed as a pool of capital specifically set aside to absorb estimated loan losses. This allowance should be maintained at a level that is adequate to absorb theestimated amount of probable losses in the institution’’s loan portfolio. estimated amount of probable losses in the institutionA careful review of a bank’’s financial statements can highlight the keyA careful review of a bankfactors that should be considered becomes before making a trading or investing decision. Investors need to have a good understanding of the business cycle and the yield curve-both have a major impact on the economic performance of banks. Interest rate risk and credit risk are the primary factors to consider as a bank’’s financial performance follows the yield curve. When to consider as a bankit flattens or becomes inverted a bank’’s net interest revenue is put underit flattens or becomes inverted a bankgreater pressure. When the yield curve returns to a more traditional shape, a bank’’s net interest revenue usually improves. Credit risk can be the largest bankcontributor to the negative performance of a bank, even causing it to lose money. In addition, management of credit risk is a subjective process that can be manipulated in the short term. Investors in banks need to be aware of these factors before they commit their capital.银行的金融数据分析摘要 财务数据随机分析已经被提出,特别是我们探讨如何统计在不同时间τ记录返回的变化。
英语作文-大数据时代下非金融机构支付服务的发展与应用
英语作文-大数据时代下非金融机构支付服务的发展与应用In the era of big data, non-financial institutions have witnessed significant growth and application of payment services. This evolution stems from the immense potential that big data offers in enhancing efficiency, security, and user experience across various sectors. Non-financial institutions, including e-commerce platforms, technology companies, and telecommunications providers, have capitalized on big data technologies to revolutionize payment services, leading to profound changes in how transactions are conducted and managed.One of the primary drivers of development in non-financial payment services in the big data era is the extensive utilization of data analytics. By leveraging vast amounts of data generated from customer transactions, behavior patterns, and preferences, non-financial institutions can gain valuable insights to optimize their payment processes. These insights enable them to tailor payment services to individual needs, improve fraud detection mechanisms, and enhance risk management strategies. Moreover, data analytics empower non-financial institutions to offer personalized recommendations and incentives, fostering customer loyalty and satisfaction.Another key aspect of the development of non-financial payment services in the big data era is the integration of advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML). These technologies enable non-financial institutions to automate and streamline payment processes, reducing manual intervention and minimizing errors. For example, AI-powered chatbots and virtual assistants are increasingly being utilized to facilitate seamless and intuitive payment experiences for customers. ML algorithms are also employed for predictive analysis, enabling non-financial institutions to forecast payment trends and anticipate customer needs with greater accuracy.Furthermore, the proliferation of mobile devices has significantly influenced the evolution of non-financial payment services in the big data era. With the widespreadadoption of smartphones and tablets, non-financial institutions have seized the opportunity to develop innovative mobile payment solutions. Mobile payment apps, digital wallets, and contactless payment technologies have become increasingly prevalent, offering consumers convenient and secure alternatives to traditional payment methods. The integration of biometric authentication, such as fingerprint and facial recognition, further enhances the security of mobile payment transactions, instilling trust and confidence among users.In addition to catering to consumer needs, non-financial institutions have also expanded their payment services to businesses, driving economic growth and fostering digital transformation. Through big data analytics, non-financial institutions can offer tailored payment solutions to businesses, optimizing cash flow management, and facilitating seamless transactions with suppliers and partners. Moreover, the integrationof application programming interfaces (APIs) enables non-financial institutions to collaborate with other service providers, creating interconnected ecosystems that enhance interoperability and innovation in payment services.Overall, the development and application of payment services by non-financial institutions in the big data era represent a paradigm shift in the financial landscape. By harnessing the power of big data, advanced technologies, and mobile connectivity, non-financial institutions are reshaping the way payments are made and processed, driving efficiency, security, and convenience for both consumers and businesses alike. As we continue to embrace the opportunities afforded by big data, the evolution of non-financial payment services is poised to accelerate, ushering in a new era of digital commerce and financial inclusion.。
非银行支付机构风险管理外文文献翻译最新译文
非银行支付机构风险管理外文文献翻译最
新译文
这份文档旨在翻译有关非银行支付机构风险管理的最新外文文献。
以下是翻译的内容:
[原文内容]
[译文内容]
本文讨论了非银行支付机构风险管理的重要性。
它强调了这些机构面临的主要风险和可以采取的管理和减轻风险的策略。
文章强调了建立全面有效的风险管理框架的必要性,以确保非银行支付系统的稳定性和安全性。
文章提到的风险包括操作风险、信用风险、流动性风险以及法律和合规风险。
建议非银行支付机构应进行全面的风险评估,并采取适当的风险管理措施来降低漏洞,并防止潜在的财务损失。
这包括建立强大的内部控制、使用先进的风险评估工具和建立稳固的风险管理结构。
文章还强调了监管部门和非银行支付机构之间的监管监督和合作的重要性。
它讨论了监管框架在制定行业标准、监测合规性以及执行法规以保护消费者利益和维护金融体系稳定方面的作用。
总之,对于非银行支付机构来说,健全的风险管理对于应对复杂的金融环境、保持客户的信任和信心至关重要。
通过实施强大的风险管理实践,并与监管部门密切合作,这些机构可以最大限度地减少风险的影响,确保其运营的长期可持续性。
外文翻译--欧洲跨境银行的监管
外文题目:Supervising cross-border banks in Europe出处:Journal of Banking Regulation; Aug2008, Vol. 9 Issue 4, p227-246, 20p作者:Aerdt Houbenn, Iskander Schrijvers and Tim Willems原文:AbstractThis paper investigates the institutional set-up of European banking supervision against the backdrop of the current structure of the European banking market.The point of departure is that, in order to avoid incentive problems and white spots, the institutional structure of supervision should reflect the structure of the market under supervision. Based on different data for the largest entities, this paper seeks to determine the prime orientation of European banks: is it national,regional, pan-European or global? It is established that European banks are still primarily nationally oriented,that the number of internationally oriented banks is small and that global activities are almost as large as European ones. Moreover, these banks’ European activities are shown to be clustered, reflecting different regional orientations. In the absence of substantive pan-European banks, this differentiated market structure calls for a tailor-made approach to supervision in Europe. This suggests building on the model for consolidated supervision.IntroductionEuropean integration and broader globalisation have spurred cross-border mergers and acquisitions(M&As) in virtually all economic sectors.Until recently, this process was less prominent in the banking sector. Both the number and value of European cross-border M&As in the financial sector have, however, been on the rise of late, reflecting European banks’ strategic pursuit of diversification benefits and economies of scale and scope. Underlying factors have been liberalisation and deregulation, as well as progress in information technology.This development has fuelled a discussionon whether the current institutional set-up of prudential supervision in Europe is still suited to deal with the emerging economic reality of large cross-border exposures, especially in the banking sector. In this context, some have even clamoured for the introduction of a centralised,pan-European supervision of banks.To promote the solidity of individual financial institutions, and therewith of economy-wide financial stability, while minimising any ensuing distortions, the supervisory set-up needs to be both effective and efficient. In a cross-border context, this requires harmonised supervisory standards, adequate decisionmaking power, balanced incentives, limited supervisory layers and reliable insights into the specific circumstances of institutions under supervision. Clearly, in a tightly integrated banking sector, as may be expected in Europe in the long run, this implies an integrated,centralised form of supervision. But the key question is: does the current structure of the European banking sector already call for a centralised supranational European supervisory authority? Or would a pan-European approach likely reduce the efficacy and efficiency of supervision? Is there an intermediate, tailormade set-up?The question of what supervisory model corresponds best with the current structure of the European banking landscape is central to this paper. To address this question, the following section discusses the existing supervisory structure governing cross-border banking activities in Europe, together with its strengths and weaknesses. Three alternative approaches are presented in the subsequent section, again along with their strengths and weaknesses. Then a further section analyses the empirical features that characterise the European banking sector. This sets the stage for a discussion on the currently preferable supervisory structure for European banks in the penultimate section, including remaining challenges.The final section concludes.The current european supervisory structure for cross-border banksThe current European Union (EU) supervisory structure for cross-border banks finds its origin in the First and Second European Banking Directives (1977, 1988), and has evolved through a number of additional legislative acts commonly referred to as the ‘Single Market Programme’.Today it represents a mixed form of home- and host-country control on the basis of the subsidiarity principle, supported by a limitednumber of articles in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) on consultation,cooperation and information sharing.Article 129 CRD goes furthest in granting decision-making power to the home supervisor, specifically for the authorisation of group-wide internal risk-based models.The CRD is supplemented by provisions for mutual recognition and cooperation among supervisory authorities laid down in the socalled ‘Memoranda of Understanding’(MoUs).These MoUs are mostly bilateral and generally include practical provisions with respect to cooperation and information sharing in ongoing supervision, including in the field of on-site inspections.More specifically, the allocation of supervisory responsibilities currently depends on whether foreign operations are run as branches or subsidiaries. In the case of branches, the consolidating (or group) supervisor in the country where the parent of the group is incorporated (the home country), is responsible for prudential supervision and the provision of deposit insurance.In the case of subsidiaries,these responsibilities are borne by the subconsolidating supervisor in the country, where the subsidiary is located as a separate legal entity(the host country). Since preserving financial stability is still primarily a national responsibility and given that emergency lending requires local currency, the host central bank acts as the lender of last resort.Finally, the consolidating supervisor is responsible for the stability of the entire group on a consolidated level. To that end,Article 129 CRD stipulates that the consolidating supervisor shall coordinate the gathering and dissemination of relevant information, and the planning of supervisory activities both in going concern and in emergency situations.This set-up has the advantage of safeguarding the interests of host countries in the case of foreign subsidiaries over which the host country supervisor has direct supervisory power, while also advancing adequate supervision at the consolidated or group level.Nonetheless, the current supervisory structure has several substantial disadvantages. First, externalities may arise on account of the incongruity in coverage between the responsibilities for supervision on the one hand, and those for financial stability and crisis management on the other. In particular, negative spillover effects may occur in the case of foreign branches, which are of systemic importance to thehost country but are insignificant to the home country. The home supervisor may then attach less importance to sustaining such a branch, since its failure would not endanger financial stability in its own country.For this reason, supervisory authorities in Eastern Europe are reluctant to allow banking activities in the form of foreign branches for fear of losing control over their national financial stability.In fact, New Zealand requires foreign banks to operate via subsidiaries —over which it has supervisory power —rather than branches, as its banking sector is dominated by Australian banks that are not systemically important to the Australian financial system.In the EU, the majority of cross-border banking activities are currently undertaken through subsidiaries, but the share of branches is also significant.Expansion through subsidiaries, however, has become relatively more common in recent years, reflecting increased cross-border penetration into retail markets.Secondly, it is doubtful whether the current set-up has sufficient incentives for the supervisors involved to pass on information adequately.Supervisory authorities in one country may tend to limit the knowledge about mishaps they share with partner supervisory authorities in order to avoid loss of confidence in an institution or to cover up their own failings. This may undermine the efficacy of supervision in normal circumstances.Thirdly, the current structure of cooperation between supervisors built upon MoUs is laborious and may prove unstable under stress or in times of crises. After all, MoUs do not—and cannot—cover all eventualities, are not legally enforceable, and lack political accountability.Were an extremely adverse event to occur, prerogatives might be questioned;a supervisory party might be tempted to renege on earlier agreements and any other party would have no formal means of opposing.Moreover,information sharing might then become slower and more patchy, thereby lessening the speed and quality of decision making. These are essential elements in crisis management, which may thus become less effective.A fourth disadvantage is its administrative inefficiency. Given the predominance of crossborder activities via legally separate subsidiaries,the current supervisory structure implies that cross-border banks have to deal with numerous differentsupervisors and accompanying regulations.A typical large financial institution might have to report in a variety of formats to more than 20 autonomous supervisors within the EU.This implies an onerous administrative and regulatory burden. In response, Nordea(the largest banking group in Scandinavia,headquartered in Sweden) has raised the idea of converting all its foreign subsidiaries into branches — thereby bringing all regulatory issues back to its consolidating supervisor, the Swedish Finansinspektionen.In sum, the current supervisory set-up is not fully equipped to deal with the challenges of a cross-border banking system: incentives for information sharing may be inadequate, cooperation is laborious and may founder under stress, and institutions’administrations are heavily burdened. In some instances, the regulatory environment even dictates the business structure. In this light, with a view to fostering a market-driven and stable development of the European banking system, consideration should be given to alternative supervisory structures.Alternative supervisory structuresIn broad terms, among the alternatives to the current set-up that have been proposed for Europe, three supervisory models can be distinguished for cross-border operating banks:(1)centralised supervision conducted by a pan-European Financial Authority (EFA);(2)coordinated supervision conducted by a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS),comprising both a central EFA and all national financial authorities in the EU;and (3)consolidated (lead) supervision, comprising only the consolidated (lead) and sub-consolidated supervisory authorities actually supervising a given institution. This section weighs these alternatives, specifically by gauging the implications for information sharing, crisis management and financial stability, neutrality(ie ensuring a level playing field) and political accountability, as well as for the efficiency of the banks and the supervisor. A tentative assessment is also given of the political feasibility.A pan-European Financial AuthorityIn this model, supported for instance by Breuer,Couppey-Soubeyran and Sessin,andArnold,a central body is fully responsible for the supervision of all cross-border activities through branches and subsidiaries of EU banks.This central body, commonly referred to as the EFA, cooperates with the representatives of all 27 EU supervisors in ongoing supervision and crisis management.Indeed, a variant of this model has a two-tier structure in which the centre directly supervises all institutions with significant cross-border activities in the EU and delegates the supervision of domestically oriented banks to the national supervisors.In each variant of this model however, all ultimate decision making takes place at the centre and any decentralised implementation also falls under the centre’s responsi bility and control.Supervision by a single, pan-European supervisor would have the advantage of creating unambiguous incentives. Conflicts of interest between EU countries would no longer influence supervisory actions and all possible cross-border externalities would be internalised.The EFA would promote a level playing field and would have a clear-cut mandate to promote financial stability in the EU. Administrative procedures would be harmonised to the extent possible, duplication of supervisory activities would be avoided and decision making could be quick in crisis situations.On the other hand, a centralised pan-European supervisor would generally be located further away from the institutions it supervises and would thus risk lacking relevant,up-to-date knowledge of local financial conditions and practices. To the extent that the EFA’s executive bodies are lean, countries may feel ill-represented in (and may thus resist) its decision making, while if all EU member states are represented, decision making is likely to prove complex and time-consuming. But the model’s real impediment lies in its poor political feasibility. This relates, first, to the absence of a federal financing mechanism that would cover the costs of a possible bank bailout. Indeed, it is unthinkable that a centralised body would decide on supervisory actions but would be able to leave eventual costs to be borne at the local level. Secondly, such a set-up would require a far-reaching institutional and legal convergence of national supervisory structures in the EU. While recent years has seen some convergence, notably a move to more integrated and autonomous supervisory authorities, major differences remain.Beyond this, in view of the current emphasis on subsidiarity, it is unlikely that politicians will agree with a transfer of supervisoryresponsibilities to a supranational European body. In this context, the establishment of a central pan-European authority would create challenges as to the accountability of such a regulatory‘Leviathan’.In all, implementation of this model in the near futureseems unrealistic.A European System of Financial SupervisorsThe second model for the supervision of Europe’s banks also concentrates decision making, but places greater weight on the role of the national supervisors.The balance is delicate: international coordination is established in an ESFS in which both the centre and the national supervisors are represented. Decision making within this ESFS is similar to that on monetary policy by the European System of Central Banks (viz. in a Council, by majority voting, with each member state in principle having a single vote alongside the representation of the ECB as the centre). Supervisory implementation is expressly decentralised. In this model, the consolidated supervisor is responsible for supervising all EU-wide operations of a given bank, including its branches and subsidiaries, but any sub-consolidated supervisor can appeal to the ESFS if it feels its interests are insufficiently taken into account. If the ESFS subsequently judges a complaint well founded, it may overrule the consolidated supervisor. Crisis management is decided upon at the European level, although the national teams of the relevant sub-consolidated supervisors remain in charge of implementation.Among others, Vives,and Schoenmaker and Van Laecke have advocated this model.外文题目:Supervising cross-border banks in Europe出处:Journal of Banking Regulation; Aug2008, Vol. 9 Issue 4, p227-246, 20p作者:Aerdt Houbenn, Iskander Schrijvers and Tim Willems译文:欧洲跨境银行的监管摘要本文探讨了在反对当前欧洲金融市场结构的背景下,如何建立欧洲银行监管机构。
银行私有化民营银行外文文献翻译中英文
银行私有化民营银行外文文献翻译中英文英文Bank Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of UgandaCommercial BankGeorge Clarke, Robert Cull, Michael FuchsSummaryBecause large state-owned banks are often the only financial service providers in remote areas of low-income countries, policymakers worry that even if privatization improves performance, it might reduce access. We study this issue through a case study: the privatization of Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) to the South African bank Stanbic. Though market segmentation remains a concern since Stanbic faces little or no direct competition in many remote areas, some innovative aspects of the sales agreement have enabled the bank to improve its profitability while maintaining, or even improving, access to financial services for some hard-to-serve groups.Key words: bank privatization, Uganda, Africa, access to financeIntroductionAlthough the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of state ownership have been debated, empirical studies have mostly found that private firms perform better than similar state-owned firms (Megginson, 2005b, Megginson and Netter, 2001, Shirley and Walsh, 2000). Empiricalstudies looking at private and state-owned banks have reached similar conclusions. Credit growth, portfolio quality, profitability, and productivity are higher in systems dominated by private banks.1Comparisons between private and state-owned firms suggest that privatization should improve performance. But critics have noted that privatized firms do not always act like firms that have always been private (Caves, 1990, Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988, Kay and Thompson, 1986). Limits placed on privatized firms, such as limits on layoffs, price controls to keep products affordable and, for banks, lending requirements and restrictions on branch closings might harm performance. Moreover, if problems in the institutional environment mean state-owned enterprises perform poorly, then the privatization process—and regulation after privatization—might be as flawed as public ownership. Privatized banks might therefore be unable to act like private banks would.Although the empirical evidence on the effect of privatization on bank performance in developing countries is mixed, outcomes are not random. Performance improves more when the government fully relinquishes control; when banks are privatized to strategic investors rather than through share issues; and when bidding is open to all, including foreign banks (Clarke, Megginson, 2005a).The impact of privatization on access to credit, payments, and savings services has been studied less than the impact on bankperformance. Clarke, Megginson, 2005a note that credit growth might be slower after privatization to foreign owners if foreign banks lend more prudently than state-owned banks. Other researchers have found that foreign banks tend to lend to different types of customers and base their lending decisions on different criteria than domestic banks (Mian, 2006, Petersen and Rajan, 1995).The empirical evidence also suggests reason for caution. Clarke, Crivelli, and Cull, (2005) find credit growth of provincial banks in Argentina was slower after they were privatized. Other private banks, however, increased their lending meaning that the overall level of real credit was on par with pre-privatization levels within a few years of privatization. Haber (2005) finds that although the privatization of most of the Mexican banking sector to foreign owners coincided with improved bank performance, loan growth was slower. In part this was because of poor enforcement of contract rights. Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005) also find that credit growth was slow in banks privatized to foreign owners in Central and Eastern Europe. It seems possible, therefore, that there is a tension between the pursuit of profits and the extension of outreach for privatized banks, especially when contracting environments are poor.These tensions are likely to be pronounced in Africa where few private banks have rural networks and where banking sectors areconcentrated and often dominated by state-owned banks. Because state-owned banks are the main providers of financial services in remote areas, access to services might get worse after privatization even if performance improves.We study these issues looking at a specific case: the privatization of a majority stake in Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) to Stanbic (South Africa) in late 2001. This privatization satisfies all three features of successful bank privatizations discussed above, making it a likely candidate for success. This case study is therefore a test of whether elements of best practice apply in a concentrated, under-developed banking sector—a situation not unique to Uganda.UCB’s dominant position before privatization makes this an especially interesting case. Since Stanbic did n ot close any of UCB’s 68 branches after privatization, it maintains the most extensive branch network in Uganda. Only one other commercial bank, the agriculturally-oriented Centenary Rural Development Bank had more than four branches outside Kampala. Stanbic, therefore, faces little or no competition in most areas, something that is uncharacteristic of the privatizations studied to date. Although the privatization of a dominant public bank in a small sector makes this case different from those in previous studies, many recent privatizations in sub-Saharan Africa and other low-income countries are likely to be similar. Admittedly, Stanbicoccupies a unique position in Uganda, but, were it not for this it might have been difficult to attract a credible strategic investor.UCB’s importance might have also affected how the government treated privatization. Privatization of a large bank with a dominant rural network is politically difficult. Political accommodations that make a deal palatable to the government might affect profitability.The government had reason to be concerned about post-privatization access in rural areas. Had there been competition, privatization might have affected prices of banking services. In remote areas, however, it was not so much price of service as whether service is available at all. Stanbic is the only option for access to the payments system in many places.5 Lack of reliable data has made it difficult to explore profitability-outreach tensions and only the extraordinary effort of Bank of Uganda (BOU) staff in collecting, cleaning, and organizing the data has made it possible in this case. In addition to financial statement data, the BOU provided branch-level financial information for Stanbic. This allowed us to test whether geographic factors such as population density and income affected Stanbic’s activities after privatization.To analyze profitability-outreach tensions, we first test whether UCB/Stanbic’s performance improved after privatization relative to other banks using bank-level indicators such as return on assets, share of non-performing loans, and the ratio of operating costs to assets. Next, onoutreach, we perform similar tests using bank-level indicators for credit growth and the sectoral composition of lending. We also use branch-level information, which is available only for Stanbic, to look at how outreach was affected by privatization. If performance improved relative to other banks and outreach declined, we will take it as evidence consistent with post-privatization profitability-outreach tensions.BackgroundThe Uganda Credit and Savings Society, which was created in 1950 to extend credit to entities without access to commercial banks, was converted into UCB in 1965. Before this, three foreign-owned banks (Barclays, Grindlays, and Standard), with clients almost exclusively affiliated with parent companies in the United Kingdom, dominated commercial lending. The creation of UCB was part of an effort to promote indigenous interests and extend access to financial services.UCB, however, quickly ran into problems. Its criteria for evaluating creditworthiness were often not commercially sound and, as a result, its share of non-performing loans was high. Poor portfolio quality and UCB’s mandate to open additional up-country branches meant that repeated capital injections were needed.UCB’s branch network expanded under activist government policies pursued in the 1970s. All banking activities of government bodies, parastatals and cooperative unions were transferred to UCB in 1972.Foreign banks were forced to either close up-country branches or sell them to UCB. This made UCB the sole provider of banking services in many locations, particularly in rural areas. Although financial sector liberalization, which started in 1987 and accelerated in the early 1990s, brought an influx of new banks, UCB’s (now Stanbic’s) branch network remains the largest.Despite liberalization, Uganda’s banking sector slipped into crisis in the early to mid-1990s. During 1994–98, half of the sector faced solvency problems (Caprio & Klingebiel, 2003). Despite Citibank’s entry in September 1999, the number of banks in Uganda contracted over this period. Credit to the private sector by deposit-taking banks hovered between 4% and 5% of GDP during 1993–2003, passing 6% only in 2004.Not surprisingly, UCB had problems during this time. But because it was the backbone of the payments system, especially in rural areas, and because the deposit insurance program was not fully capitalized (Kasekende, 2004), closure and liquidation were not considered. To preserve confidence in the payments system, the government cautiously restructured UCB, keeping it open throughout the process and maintaining its majority shareholding.In 1995, the government established the non-performing asset recovery trust (NPART), which assumed UCB’s non-performing assets.The government also sold non-core assets, reduced staffing levels, and invested substantial amounts to upgrade computer systems (Kasekende, 2004). In 1998, UCB was recapitalized and a minority shareholding block (49%) was sold to a Malaysian Company, Westmont Land Bhd.The partial privatization of UCB, however, ran into problems. Unknown to the government, Westmont had borrowed money from Greenland Bank to purchase its equity stake in UCB. Greenland had signed an agreement with the BOU in that same year to remedy insolvency and correct violations of insider lending and single loan exposure limits (Brownbridge, 2002). After the transaction, UCB began lending to Greenland and its related companies despite the inherent conflicts of interest.In 1999, the BOU had to intervene in UCB, but not before 64% of its assets were non-performing. The government decided to re-privatize UCB to more competent owners. The government announced that it would prefer to maintain a 20% shareholding although it would consider selling its entire stake. Multiple restructuring options were considered including sale on an “as is” basis, without non-core assets, or without loss-making and remote branches (Kasekende, 2004). Under any option, recapitalization was necessary given the state of UCB’s balance sheet.In late 2001, Stanbic Bank of South Africa acquired 80% of UCB. The remaining 20% of shares were transferred to a trust to be held forsale to Ugandan residents before being sold in 2006. Stanbic had to combine its existing operations in Uganda with UCB’s within 6 months of closing. Stanbic and UCB were fully merged in the financial data in the third quarter of 2002, and thus we use this as the beginning of post-privatization period.Under the sales agreement, the buyer could alter staffing and restructure branches subject to stipulations. On staffing, the government agreed to cover severance costs for up to 500 employees for two years. On branching, Stanbic agreed to maintain the entire network for the same period. After that, Stanbic could file written notice with BOU that a branch was not financially viable, along with a proposed schedule for closure. If BOU found Stanbic’s analysis reasonable, the gover nment had to negotiate compensation to keep such branches open. In cases where Stanbic and the government could not agree on compensation, BOU would permit closure. As of September 2004, only one of 33 branches mentioned in the annex to the sales agreement as potentially unprofitable (Mulago) did not appear in our database of branch-level financial statements. Overall, the data cover 74 branches, six more than the combined total for UCB and Stanbic in 2000. On that basis, the government has been successful in its desire to sell UCB to a private interest that would maintain the branch network.ConclusionsThe privatization of UCB to Stanbic might have been expected to improve bank profitability and performance. The government fully relinquished control to a strategic investor (Stanbic, a large South African bank) in an open sales process that allowed foreign participation. Previous studies have found that bank privatizations with these characteristics are more successful (Clarke, Megginson, 2005a).Although this provided reasons for optimism, there were potential pitfalls. Most importantly, because of UCB’s large branch network, it faced little competition outside Kampala. Moreover, the privatization of a dominant bank with an extensive branch network can be politically difficult, resulting in restrictions that harm bank performance.Despite these concerns, privatization appears to have been successful. UCB’s portfolio was cleaned and Stanbic has maintained the low share of non-performing loans that it inherited. Profitability and the rate of credit growth are on par with other Ugandan banks—an improvement over UCB’s pre-privatization performance. The fears expressed at the outset of the paper about a tension between profitability and outreach after privatization are not supported by the data. Profitability has improved, but there is no evidence that outreach has declined—indeed there are a number of indications that it has expanded.The empirical results also suggest that the sale improved access to credit for some hard-to-serve groups. Although it started from a very lowbase due to restrictions on UCB lending during the BOU intervention, credit growth has been most rapid at branches outside Kampala, especially in areas where Stanbic faces no local competitors. Deposit growth has been stronger in Kampala, although growth outside Kampala is substantial. As important, the number of depositors has grown as or more quickly than deposits, suggesting that formal savings have increased across economic strata. Deposit growth is not therefore solely due to the wealthy placing more of their assets in banks. Moreover, Stanbic has maintained, and even expanded, UCB’s branch network.The bank’s post-privatization portfolio allocation suggests that there has been a shift in strategy. Since privatization, Stanbic has increased agricultural lending, while decreasing its holding of government securities and lending to manufacturing. In part, the decline in holdings of government securities reflects changes in macroeconomic management as the government reduced the supply of T-Bills. Another part of the decline is likely due to the tendency to hold fewer government securities after privatization. By contrast, the decline in manufacturing lending—a strength of Stanbic before the privatization—represents a strategic shift.This shift, however, was not without costs. Under the sales agreement, Stanbic was required to merge the activities of both institutions within 6 months of closing the transaction. As a result, Stanbic’s expense ratio h as remained higher than that of other Ugandanbanks. These expenses also reflect the costs of re-branding and installing a proprietary intra-bank payment system. Although investing in improvements to its payments infrastructure might mean that Stanbic has established a barrier to entry for other banks, some other banks also are now clearing payments from remote parts of the country through the upgraded system. Of course, price of access to the new system should be monitored. Because many of these costs are not recurrent, Stanbic’s operating costs should decline in the future.Indeed, there are already signs of improvements. In 2002, 37% of Stanbic branches were unprofitable (i.e., had negative ROA). This fell to 20% in 2003 and to 16% in 2004. This suggests that the additional revenue associated with the new strategy exceeds the additional costs in a growing number of districts.Although concerns about market segmentation persist, the early indications are that, if structured correctly, privatization of a large bank with an extensive branch network in a low-income country with a concentrated sector can yield substantial performance improvements. At the least, the second attempt at privatizing UCB was a vast improvement over the first attempt, in which the government maintained a controlling share and did not attract a high-quality buyer.中文撒哈拉以南非洲的银行私有化:以乌干达商业银行为例乔治·克拉克,罗伯特·库尔,迈克尔·福克斯摘要由于大型国有银行通常是低收入国家偏远地区的唯一金融服务提供者,因此政策制定者担心,即使私有化可以提高绩效,也可能会减少获得贷款的机会。
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文献信息:文献标题:Banking without the banks(非银行机构的银行业务)国外作者: Steve Worthington,Peter Welch文献出处:《International Journal of Bank Marketing》,2011,29(2):190-201 字数统计:英文2307单词,12289字符;中文4209汉字外文文献:Banking without the banksAbstractPurpose–The financial crisis and the subsequent distrust of the existing banks have created an opportunity for new competitors to enter the market for financial services. Organisations from outside banking could use their trusted brands, their stronger grasp of information technology and their stronger customer service ethos to potentially shake-up the provision of financial services and hence to take business away from the "traditional" players. This paper aims to examine the potential for these "non-banks" to enter and expand into the UK financial services sector and to analyse their prospects, before finally reflecting on how big a challenge they face in entering this market.Design/methodology/approach–The paper is based on a report entitled "Tesco Bank and Virgin money: prospects for banking without the banks" released in 2010, which offers an analysis of the UK market and of the main potential entrants. It presents a much abridged version of the report and has also been revised to provide a more international relevance.Findings–The paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the two main potential entrants, Tesco Bank and Virgin Money, and draws conclusions based on some of the challenges that they will face in seeking to enter this market.Originality/value–The paper is very relevant, given the publicly espoused aspirations of both Tesco Bank and Virgin Money to enter the market for financial services in the UK. It may also have lessons for other new entrants in other countries.Keywords Financial services, Banks, Consumer behaviourIntroductionHow significant are the effects of the financial crisis on the future structure of the banking sector?Clearly, the crisis is leading to major changes in the capital, liquidity and accounting regimes for banks. But might the crisis also open up the sector to new competitors on a scale not seen before? Is the distrust of mainstream banks now so deep that ambitious companies in other sectors have an unparalleled opportunity to become major providers of banking services?Opportunities for "non-banks" to enter the market have been discussed many times before. A 1994 study for the American Bankers' Roundtable concluded that "banking is essential to a modern economy; banks are not." Commentators have also forecasted that companies from outside banking would use their stronger grasp of information technology and customer service to shake-up financial services, taking lucrative business away from cautious and insular banks.In many markets, retailers were seen as the biggest threat. Their strong brands, marketing know-how, existing store networks and store and loyalty cards offered a potential entry platform. Indeed, in the UK, leading retailers took up the challenge and have now been offering financial services for many years. Marks & Spencer (M&S), the leading clothing, food and household goods retailer, entered the market for financial services as far back as the late 1980s. Tesco and Sainsbury's, then the two largest UK supermarket chains, launched banking services in the mid-1990s.Disruptive value brands such as Virgin and easygroup, that operate across structurally diverse consumer sectors (air travel, music retailing, mobile telephony, hotels) have also seen opportunities in financial services. Virgin Money launched in 1995 with an index tracking unit trust (mutual fund) and has since expanded its range of services. Easymoney, the financial services arm of the easygroup, now offers comparison sites for mortgages, bank accounts, credit cards and personal loans.However, until the crisis, the "non-banks" concentrated on a select range offinancial services and often operated through partnerships with existing banks. For example, the UK retailers concentrated principally on credit cards and other forms of consumer credit, simple savings accounts and insurance policies that could be sold directly. Tesco and Sainsbury's operated through joint ventures with RBS and HBOS respectively while M&S sold its financial services business to HSBC. Similarly, Virgin Money offers a select range of financial services across lending, savings and insurance. It sold its stake in the innovative "One Account" mortgage joint venture with RBS, though it remains an introducer for the business.Nevertheless, the crisis may have extended the opportunities for "non-banks'. Tesco and Virgin Money in particular appear to be planning a move from niche players in financial services to full-service providers of retail banking. Each has signalled their intention to expand with current accounts and mortgages both being talked about. Tesco bought out RBS's stake in their financial services joint venture and re-named Tesco Personal Finance as Tesco Bank. Virgin Money has announced the purchase of a small regional UK bank to expedite its acquisition of a banking licence and provide a platform for launching a retail banking business.Furthermore, both are ambitious in their visions for retail banking (see Table I). Virgin Money talks of an ambition "to offer a new kind of bank in the UK –one where everyone benefits", while Tesco says it will focus on "being simple, straightforward and rewarding loyalty".In the wake of the financial crisis and given the stated ambitions of Virgin and Tesco in particular, this paper examines the potential for these "non-banks" to expand into UK retail banking. It begins by reviewing their development as players in the financial services sector, along with their expansion plans. Next it analyses their prospects by using a SWOT analysis, before finally offering some conclusions and sobering thoughts for these "new players".Table I.Virgin Money and Tesco Bank: banking visionsVirgin MoneyDevelopment to dateVirgin moved into financial services into the mid-1990s. Since then, it has essentially operated as a niche player in personal financial services, with many of the services actually supplied by third parties even if carrying the famous Virgin brand. Virgin Money was founded as Virgin Direct as far back as 1995, as a joint venture between a member of the Virgin group of companies and insurance group Norwich Union to offer equity savings products directly to the UK retail consumer market. It was one of the pioneers of index-tracking funds which carried low fees compared with actively managed funds.In 1997, Virgin Direct Personal Financial Service Limited launched The Virgin One Account, a joint venture with RBS. The One Account was the UK's first current account mortgage direct to the retail market. However, in 2001, RBS bought out Virgin Direct Personal Financial Service Limited's stake in the joint venture and the management team transferred to RBS. Virgin Direct subsequently changed its name toVirgin Money and increased its product offering, adding a credit card offered in partnership with Bank of America (MBNA), additional savings and insurance products. In April 2004, Virgin Group Investments Limited acquired full ownership of Virgin Money and as at January 2010, Virgin Money had over 2.5 million customers with over £2 billion of funds under management and over 2.3 million Virgin Money cards in issue. In January 2010, Virgin Money announced a recommended offer for Church House Trust, a small regional bank offering deposits and mortgages.Expansion plansIn terms of product strategy, Virgin Money says it "aims to bring simplicity to the UK banking market which has traditionally been a complex sector." The focus will be on a strong retail deposit base, with Virgin Money saying its approach to banking is "founded on developing a sustainable, savings-based business."Tesco BankDevelopment to dateDespite the current level of interest in supermarket banking, it is important to note that Tesco like Virgin has been providing financial services for more than a decade. The supermarket group began offering financial services as far back as the mid-1990s. Tesco Personal Finance (TPF, now Tesco Bank) has focused principally on consumer credit (credit cards and unsecured loans), savings accounts and insurance. Overall, the bank now has six million customer accounts.For most of its life, TPF was a 50/50 joint-venture with RBS. However, following Tesco's acquisition of RBS's stake in TPF in December 2008, TPF is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of the retailer. Tesco announced the renaming of Tesco Personal Finance as Tesco Bank at the time of its 2009/2010 interim results in October 2009. Tesco Personal Finance (now Tesco Bank, Tesco Bank is the trading name of Tesco Personal Finance plc) is now fully-owned by Tesco plc. It falls within Tesco's Retailing Services Division.On a fully consolidated basis, TPF accounted for 50 per cent of retailing services' profit in 2008/2009. On becoming a subsidiary, TPF's results were consolidated intoTesco's UK business for the final ten weeks of the 2008/2009 financial year.Expansion plansClearly, the ambition is to be the personal customer's core provider of banking services. On current accounts, Tesco commented in one of the presentations: "We want to service our customers' main banking relationship", and "We want customers to say …I bank with Tesco‟."AnalysisBringing together the profiles of Virgin Money and Tesco Bank, how are we to assess their prospects? An obvious way of structuring the analysis of the non-banks' prospects is through a conventional SWOT framework. However, in terms of applying a SWOT framework to the non-banks' prospects, opportunities and threats lend themselves better to the characteristics of the retail banking market, and strengths and weaknesses to the non-banks themselves. The analysis therefore looks first at the opportunities and threats presented by the market to non-banks. It then considers the non-banks' strengths and weaknesses (see Table II).Table II. Tesco Bank and Virgin Money: SWOT analysisConclusionsBefore the financial crisis, both Virgin and Tesco had provided financial services for more than a decade. However, both were happy to operate as niche providers. They concentrated on a select range of products, operating through partnerships with existing banks and insurance companies. Neither showed an appetite for directly competing as full-service providers in retail banking and perhaps they were wise to do so.In the wake of the financial crisis, both now harbour ambitions to become full-service retail banks. But are the changes flowing from the financial crisis sufficient to justify such an expansion? Existing banks may be more unpopular, making non-banks more attractive. Nevertheless there is a debit as well as credit side to the post-crisis investment case. Banking is set to be less profitable, making the market less attractive. The biggest challenge for Tesco Bank and Virgin Money as full-service retail banks may be to grow quickly and profitably while at the same time doing banking in a way that is markedly different from the mainstream. Tesco admits that one of the challenges it faces is the industry's "standard economic model". The hurdles to overcome on both current accounts and mortgages are high.The pricing of retail banking products in the UK has in some ways been analagous to the famous description of the art of taxation of Jean Baptiste Colbert, French economist and Minister of Finance under King Louis XIV of France: The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest possible amount of feathers with the smallest possible amount of hissing.Existing pricing structures are reinforced by the attachment of UK consumers to "free" current account banking, "free" credit cards and "free" ATM withdrawals. In practice, these attachments to notionally "free" banking services acts as a significant barrier to innovation and competition in pricing, and has resulted in significant cross-subsidies between different groups of banking customers.Virgin and Tesco therefore face the challenge of offering current accounts profitably without themselves relying on the same revenue models as existingproviders. They also face the challenge of acquiring deposits without either offering unprofitable rates or tempting introductory rates and then reducing them over time. Also in light of their stated "visions" for banking, high standards will be expected. Their services will be closely scrutinised by consumer and personal finance journalists, and ranked in the many comparison sites on the internet. Reputationally, Virgin and Tesco are likely to face tougher standards than existing banks.From the perspective of competition and consumer choice, the banking ambitions of Virgin and Tesco are clearly welcome. Indeed for all those who follow developments in banking, it will be fascinating to watch. This is an attempt to do banking without the banks on a scale not seen before. Virgin has already signalled that it is prepared to challenge the "free-in-credit" model that dominates personal banking in the UK. But even brands as strong as Tesco and Virgin will find it tough to shake-up a market with habits and structures as entrenched as UK personal banking.中文译文:非银行机构的银行业务摘要目的—金融危机以及随后而来的对现存银行机构的不信任,为新的竞争者进入金融服务市场提供了机会。