外文翻译--董事的高薪酬

外文原文：
INVESTEC EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
Directors pocket fat pay packets
By: Basson, Deon. Finance Week,
But policyholders' deficits not yet made up
Discusses the financial statements of Investec Employee Benefits (IEB) in the South Africa. Total profit for 2003 and 2004; Comparison of the total emoluments earned by the executive directors; Conflict of interest between shareholders and policyholders
Two executive directors of investec Employee Benefits (IEB) - Ciaran Whelan and Ademda Anumashahun –purportedly earned directors' emoluments totalling R18m in the financial year to March 2004.
IEB was formerly known as Fedsure Life and was a wholly owned subsidiary of the then listed Fedsure. In 2001, this assurer was taken over by Investec in a controversial transaction that led to considerable difference of opinion between the two camps
This snippet of information is contained in the latest IEB financial statements submitted to the Financial Services Board. IEB is an unlisted subsidiary of Investec and is therefore not subject to the JSE Securities Exchange's listing requirements in terms of which directors' remuneration must be disclosed on an individual basis.
Though IEB's financial statements for the year to March 2004 indicate better returns for policyholders, the company's still a long way from making up its historical backlog. Investec, as the only shareholder in IEB, is faring considerably better.
The income statement shows total emoluments for executive directors of R18m -with Whelan and Anumashahun stated in the directors' report as the only executive directors. If that information is correct, then each earns an average of R9m/year.
IEB is a classic case of a conflict of interest between shareholders
and policyholders. The cause of the problem was in fact the takeover, with Investec paying too much for IEB. The acquisition price was R4,5bn, of which R250m was paid in cash and the remainder by issuing 19,2m Investec shares
.Compare that with the remuneration earned by the executive directors of Old Mutual pic's wholly owned unlisted subsidiary Old Mutual Life (SA). The three executive directors - Roddy Sparks, Peter de Beyer and MP Moyo -together earned a total of R9,2m in the financial year to December 2003. Sparks's remuneration was about R3,5m, De Beyer's R3,4m and Moyo's R3,3m After that Investec was faced with the unpleasant reality of IEB having too little capital. The reason for that was the amalgamation with Norwich Life that had to be finalised. Some time before Norwich's former holding company, Norwich Holdings, was taken over by Fedsure in 1998, it was clear that Norwich Life had too little capital (.Finance Week, 24 March 2000 and 1 December 2000)
The remuneration of IEB's directors is relevcint as many policyholders in this company have historically been dissatisfied with the poor returns made on their investments，Even before the IEB takeover was finalised, Investec had poured R500m of new capital into the company. After the official takeover, another R600m followed
The policy debate that started at end-2004 focused the attention on SA's three largest insurers. Almost forgotten in this debate is Investec Employee Benefits, which ran into trouble over the past few years and whose policyholders have good reason to feel dissatisfied.
So the total cost of the investment was a massive R5,6bn. With so much capital invested in IEB, it's understandable why Investec would want to get its capital back as soon as possible. In the banking sector, a banking group's return on equity is looked at very critically.
In December 2000, IEB's embedded value was R2,6bn, which already
included the first R500m of new capital. So it's a case of an assurer acquired at an almost unheard of premium above its embedded value.
The other side of .the coin is policyholders' interests. They in fact lost out spectacularly, because of the drama that occurred after the two takeovers. In an inspection in 2003, advocate Flip Stander and Professor George Marx concluded that the reasonable expectations of policyholders weren't met between 1999 and 2002. Of course, that included the period before and after the takeover by Investec.
They also said that not all policyholders were affected equally. At the time of their inspection they were satisfied that IEB had taken sufficient precautions to compensate policyholders for their historical losses.
The results for the financial year to 31 March 2003 were only published after the completion of Marx and Stander's inspection. In that particular financial year, IEB declared an exceptionally big operating profit of R843m. An early cover report concerning that (FW, 3 December 2003) elicited angry responses in Investec circles.
Whelan's view was that the large operating profit (see table 1) and the subsequent increase in IEB's net asset value were virtually neutralised by a loss in embedded value.
Assurers' embedded value consists of NAV and the value of the in-force book. The latter is the discounted Vcilue of future profits from insurance.
Since 2001, IEB has sold a significant share of its book to Capital Alliance and also reinsured a considerable portion of its risk with the same insurer. The loss in the value of the in-force book is largely the result of that.
It was clear at the time that IEB didn't want the perception created that Investec was earning large profits as a shareholder while
policyholders were being hard done by
It now appears from the financial statements for 2004 that in this financial year policyholders did significantly better than in either of the two preceding financial years (see also table 2). However, it's doubtful that they're doing well enough to make up for the poor returns in preceding years
The returns shown (table 2) must be explained. They aren't the returns earned by individueil portfolios or the bonuses declared. They're simply the returns earned by IEB In total. One would, of course, expect some kind of correlation between these returns and the bonus rates.
From the financial statements, the following can be deduced:
•Shareholders earn better returns on their capital than policyholders earn on their investments (tables 2 and 3).
• Since 2000, IEB's embedded value has increased from R2,6bn to R4,3bn. If the R600m new capital added during the 2002 financial year is taken into consid have little cause for complaint.
• Policyholders' earnings are substantially diluted because of IEB's cost structure and profit margins (table 2). For example, in 2004 the gross investment return was 14,5% but the net investment retum was only 9%.
•In 2004, the operating profit of R168m (table 1) earned for shareholders contributed 1,1 percentage points to the dilution of policyholders' investment return (table 2). In 2003, the corresponding figure was an astonishing 4,2 percentage points.
• It's striking that the huge decline in operating profit occurred despite substantially higher returns earned for policyholders. Though shareholders stiU did very well, there are indications of greater sensitivity for the interests of policyholders than in 2003.
• Administration costs remain high at R176m, especially considering that policy liabilities fell by around Rlbn. That also contributes about
1,1 percentage points to the dilution of policyholders' investment return (table 2).
• The directors' remuneration for Whelan and Anumashahun make up more than 10% of the admin expenses.
Whelan and Anumashahun are appointed by a board, which is controlled by Investec. As in any capitalist environment it's probably fair to assume that adding value for shareholders is an important factor in determining remuneration structures.
What is more certain, however, is that bank pay will continue to be the subject of considerable public and private attention. For as long as the media are convinced of the public appetite for tales of bankers receiving multimillion dollar payouts—which is likely to be the case for as long as the economic recession persists—financial institution compensation practices will make headlines, and clamors for reform will continue. Unfortunately for financial institutions, who will continue to worry about their ability to compete for talent in the face of potential limitations on how much and what kinds of pay they can offer, and for whom the burdens of compliance and disclosure with increased regulation will not be inconsiderable, governmental oversight of pay will be around for a long time to come.
Although the full impact of the Final Guidance would not be known for some time, the Fed has already taken steps to review incentive compensation programs for deficiencies. In the announcement of the adoption of the Final Guidance, the Fed indicated it had completed the first round of an in-depth analysis of incentive compensation practices at large, complex banking organizations, which was part of the Fed’s formal “horizontal review”of incentive compensation practices announced in the Proposed Guidance. The purpose of this initiative, the Fed stated, to be carried out by a multidisciplinary group of staff
consisting of economic, legal, financial and accounting experts, was to enhance the Fed’s understanding of current practices and proposed changes to those practices, assess the strength of current controls, inform itself as to current corporate governance, and identify emerging practices In addressing this issue, the Final Guidance states plainly that boards of directors should directly approve incentive compensation arrangements for senior executives. The Final Guidance emphasizes that boards of directors have ultimate responsibility to ensure balance in the incentive compensation arrangements for all covered employees, and urges boards to be active in their oversight of incentive compensation arrangements. To be effective in this role, boards may need to rethink their structures and must have resources at their disposal in the form of counsel, consultants and other advisers. In addition, if a large bank makes significant use of incentive compensation but does not have a separate compensation committee of the board of directors composed entirely of non-employee directors in place, it should strongly consider establishing one, which committee will then interact with the audit committee or other risk committee as appropriate to address compensation risk issues.
The Final Guidance urges that banks make information about their incentive compensation arrangements for employees (including lower-level employees) and related risk-management available to shareholders to enable them to serve as effective “watchdogs” against imprudent risks in those arrangements
It's clear that Investec is satisfied that Whelan and Anumashahun are doing their jobs well. However, it's unlikely that all policyholders will share that view.
Whelan declined to commen
.
Table 1: Investec Employee Benefits hy simple ledger accounts
(Rm) Assets Policy liabilities Capital
Balances on 1 January 2001 29 939 28 582 1357
Premium income +5 266 +5 266
Reinsurance premiums 2) -13 876 -13 876
Net policy benefits -9 902 -9 902
Norwich transfer +11 705 +11 705
Investment return +3 398 +2 786 +612
Capital raised +598 +598
Operating profit -261 +261
Change in actuarial basis +305 -305
Admin expenses -574 -574
Commission -275 -275
Tax +97 +97
Other items 3) -323 -323
Balances on 31 March 2002 26053 23530 2523 Premium income +4551 +4551 Reinsurance premiums 2] -4520 -4520
Net policy benefits -5 959 -5959
Investment return +393 +72 +321
Operating profit -843 +843 Change in actuarial basis +15 -15
Admin expenses -206 -206
Commission -93 -93
Tax -118 -118
Other items 3) -78 -78
Balances on 31 March 2003 20023 16351
Reinsurance premiums 2) -1189 -1189
Net policy benefits -5006 -5006
Investrnent return +2679 +2244 +435 Operating profit -168 +168
Change in actuarial basis +38 -38
Admin expenses -176 -176
Commission -83 -83
Tax -128 -128
Other items 3) -179 ' -179
Utilisation of warranty -156 -156
Balances on 31 March 2004 18914 14677 4 237
1) Net of current liabilities 2) To Capital Alliance Life 3)
Goodwill amortisation restructuring costs etc
Smites: f'mimal statements. Imestec Employee Benefits. MI2-200A.
Table 2: Investment returns for policybolders
%2002 2003 2004 Gross investment retum 8,1 0,4 14,5 Admin expenses -1,8 -1.0 -1,1 Commission -0,8 -0.5 -0.5 Tax -0,3 -0.6 -0.8 Operating profit -0,8 -4.2 -1.1 Other items -1,0 -0.4 -1.2 Warranty provision -1,0 Change in actuarial base +1,0 +0,1 +0,2 Net investment retum 4,4 -6,2 9,0 1) Period of 15 months. Annualised,
Sources: Fmncial statements. Investec Employee Benefits. 2002-2004. Compiled by Deon Basson Resear
Table 3: Returns for shareholders
% 2002 2003 2004
Investment return 25,2 10,4 11,0 Operating profit , 13,5 27,2 4,2 Change in actuarial basis -15,7 -0,5 -1,0 Return on capital-level 1 23,0 37,1 14,2 Movement of in=force business -35,3 2) -10,8 0,2 Return on capital-level 2 -12,3 or 32,12) 26,3 14,4
1) Period of 15 months. Annualised
2) The movement in the value of in=force business includes a negative contribution of 44,4 percentage points for the 5 months to 31 May 2001. Investec only took control of IEB on 1 June 2001.
Sources: Financial statements. Investec Employee Benefits. 2002-2004. Compiled by
Deon Basson Research
Table 4: Embedded values and ratings
Rm 2000 2002 2003 2004 Net asset value 1357 2358 3672 4237 Value of in=force business 12853 428 98 92 Embedded value 2642 2786 3790 4329 Operating profit 240 261 843 168 Historic p:eratio 4 5,4 2.0 0,12 0,55 Forward p:e ratio 6 6,2 0,51 0,58
1) December 2000
2) March 2002
3) R207m on 1 June 2001 when Investec took the helm
4) Value of inforce business divded by historic operating profit
5) Annualised
6) Value of in=force business divided by following year's
operating profit
Sourte: Investec Employee Benefits, financial statements. 2002-2004. Compiled by
Deon Basson R
中文译文：
天达雇员的福利
董事的高薪酬
但保单持有人尚未弥补赤字
此文章讨论天达雇员福利（IEB)在南非的财务报表。

以及天达保险公司在2003年和2004年的利润总额的比较，执行董事所赚取的总薪酬，执行董事与股东之间的冲突以及投保人的利益问题
天达（IEB）的2名执行董事- Ciaran Whelan 和 Ademda Anumashahun据称执行董事在2004年3月财政年度的薪酬总额人民币1800万
IEB是的前身是当时上市公司Fedsure全资子公司，它是从事人寿保险业的。

在2001年这个保险公司在有2个完全不同的意见分歧下被天达公司给收购了这种片断信息是载于IEB最近提交至财经事务局财务的报表上显示出来的，IEB是天达未上市的子公司，因此其中的董事酬金不必一定要披露，个别条款也不用受约翰内斯堡证券交易所的要求
虽然在2004年三月IEB的财务报表表明对投保人更好的回报，但是公司要解决弥补以前所积压的问题还是需要很长的路要走的。

天达作为IEB的唯一股东，要做出对于解决IEB的这个问题要相当好的应对方法
收益表显示了执行董事薪酬总额为人民币1800万，Ciaran Whelan 和Ademda Anumashahun在作为董事会上作为唯一的执行董事报告上称：如果该信息是正确的，那么每一个执行董事平均每年收入人民币900万
IEB是一个股东和投保人之间的利益冲突的经典案例。

这个问题的根本原因，只要是天达在收购IEB时支付太多费用。

此次收购的价格是45亿，其中25亿用现金支付，其余部分用发售股份为代价
这些执行董事报酬同老的PIC的全资附属非上市人寿保险公司董事收入相比，。

三名执行董事Roddy Sparks, Peter de Beyer and MP Moyo在2003年12月财政年度一起一共赚了920万。

Sparks的报酬约350万，Peter De Beye的报酬大概是340万，Moyo's的报酬大概是230万
之后，天达将面临着IEB资本太少这样的令人不愉快的尴尬局面。

造成该局面的原因是此次合并与当初诺里奇人寿保险合资的情况是大同小异的，在1998年诺里奇前控股公司：诺里奇控股，被Fedsure所收购（摘自：金融周，2000
年3月24日和2000年12月1日）
IEB公司的董事酬金历来是造成许多投保人对他们的投资的低回报不满意的最主要的原因所在。

即使在IEB被天达收购签约后，并且天达给IEB注入了5亿人民币的资本进入公司。

随后进行官方声明后又注入了6亿人民币的资金后。

这种情况仍然没有起色
在2004年年底，开展了一次政策报告辩论会，此次辩论会的焦点在开始时都集中在三个最大的保险公司。

在这次辩论中几乎所有人都遗忘了去讨论天达的员工股福利，这个在过去数年的数年里让公司陷入困境，让保单持有人有充分的理由去质疑公司的业绩的最大原因，最重要的困扰因素。

因此，随着在给IEB投资总成本达到巨大的56亿人民币后，这是可以理解天达为什么会希望尽快得使其资本回收。

在银行这些金融部门，一个银行集团对股本回报率是非常审慎地去进行计算的。

在2000年12月结算时，IEB的内含价值为26亿人民币，甚至其中已经包括第一注入的5亿新资本。

所以这是一个几乎闻所未闻的收购费远高于其内在价值获的情况
从另一个方面来说是投保人的观点。

由于发生了前后戏剧性的收购，他们实际上已经迷失在了保险公司外在的那种壮观的形象。

在2003年的检查中，倡导翻转机构模型理论的支持者和乔治·马克思教授得出的结论是；投保人在1999年和2002年之间没有达到他们预期的或者说投保人人的合理期望。

当然，这其中包括天达在接管IEB之前和之后的这段时间
他们还表示，并非所有保单持有人即投保人都受到同样影响。

在他们检查时IEB期间他们认为IEB已经了采取足够的预防措施以补偿投保人的以前的损失，他们对于这点感觉还是满意的。

在倡导翻转机构模型理论的支持者和乔治·马克思教授检查结束后。

并公布了2003年3月31日截止的本财政年度的结果。

由于这年是一个比较特殊的财政年度，IEB公开的宣布了一个特殊的比较有点夸大性质的特大经营利润8亿四千三百万人民币。

天达的早期的报告涉及了于此有关的信息在各界引起了愤怒的反应（摘自；星期六，03年12月3日）
惠兰的看法是，在IEB的净资产价值增加即获得了大型营业利润这个利润里
面几乎包含了大部分都是损失的价值大型营业利润（见表1），
Assurers的嵌入式值由资产净值和在明面的账面价值。

后者是从保险公司未来的利润折现的价值
自2001年以来，IEB已销售给资本联盟相当显着的份额，并且其再保险业务是保险公司的避免风险的相当重要的一部分。

其中的有效保单账面价值很大程度上的损失在正是由于这一原因。

很明显在那时候，IEB不想将那些的收入明确记录下来是想作为天达股东的巨额利润，而让投保人收到了不公平的待遇。

现在看来，从在2004年的财政年度的财务报表显示投保人应该比前两个财政年度更应该值得去注意财务报表（详情另见表2）。

而且，保险公司在打算正在做的更好去补偿值钱令投保人低收益的所做的措施也是值得去怀疑的。

表2所显示的收益必须得给出恰当的解释。

这些收益不是返回天达银行证券的投资组合或公开声明的奖金。

他们赚取的是IEB的总收益。

当然其中他们还是希望这些收益率和奖金的还是有相关的联系的
从财务报表，可以得出以下相关结论
•股东赚取更高的回报超过投保人资本投资上赚取的收益（详见表2和表3）•自2000年以来，IEB的内部价值增加了从26亿人民币增加到了43亿人民币。

如果在2002年财政年度将6亿人民币的新资本也增加进去可能会减少很多不必要的的抱怨
•投保人的收入实质上是很无力的，这是因为IEB的成本结构框架和稀少的利润空间（见表2）。

比如，在2004年的总投资回报率为14.5%，但是净投资回报率却只有稀少的9%
•在2004年，经营利润是1.68亿人民币（见表1），为股东赚取利润的贡献点是1,1个百分点。

在2003年，相应的数字却是惊人的4,2个百分点。