Accountability and Public Governance in Greater China

The Australian Journal of Public Administration,vol.68,no.S1,pp.S1–S4doi:10.1111/j.1467-8500.2009.00618.x INTRODUCTIONAccountability and Public Governance in Greater China Hon S.ChanCity University of Hong KongTsai-Tsu SuNational Taiwan UniversityThis special issue of the Australian Journal of Public Administration focuses on accountabil-ity and public governance in Greater China,in-cluding Hong Kong and Taiwan.It concerns a topic that has received broad attention in a vari-ety of arenas.Accountability and public gover-nance are inextricably related often in a myriad of ways.As governments hold unique power and often,though not always,public trust,they ought to be held accountable for what they do, how they do it,and whatever consequences they create.While there is little dispute over the need for appropriate accountability regimes for public governance,how these regimes should work is more controversial.Accordingly,there are intense debates about the most appropri-ate standards,avenues,and mechanisms of accountability.Over recent years,scholars have identified multiple dimensions of accountabil-ity,such as:upward and downward accountabil-ity;output based and outcome based account-ability;internal and external accountability; and short term functional and long term strate-gic accountability(Ebrahim2003;Groszyk 2002).Besides conceptual probes,questions have been raised about the relevance and use-fulness of the existing models of accountabil-ity,due to the rapidly changing relationships between governments and other social actors and in the way governments handle public af-fairs.The age of professionalism based upon the trust for professionals to deliver public ser-vices has been replaced by increasing reliance on mechanisms of explicit,transparent,sys-tematic public accountability to secure regu-latory compliance of public service providers (Ranson2003).Accountability is,thus,not only a general norm or expectation but also a disposition of increasingly specific regula-tory regimes which demonstrates conceptual and practical variations.The production of this special issue aims to provide a better understanding of theories, practices,and challenges concerning account-ability and public governance,especially in Greater China.Specifically,it is intended to stimulate thoughts and debates on the follow-ing questions:•How can we best understand the evolving nature of accountability?•What are the factors that shape accountabil-ity standards?•To what extent have the current account-ability practices lived up to expectations?•What is the relationship between account-ability and democracy?•Does accountability undermine efficiency?•In the absence of institutionalised checks and balances in some transitional societies, how can people hold governments to ac-count?•Who will perform the oversight over public officials?•Should there be an‘accountability police’?•Does performance measurement and ap-praisal provide objective and reliable ac-countability mechanisms?S2Accountability and Public Governance in Greater China March2009•How can budget and auditing systems be enhanced to ensure financial accountability of public institutions?•What can be done to deal with the respon-sibility dispersion and accountability defi-ciency in public-private partnerships?•What is the role of social auditing per-formed by non-governmental forces in public governance?•Is there a general accountability deficit in the global context?and•How should national variations in account-ability practices be interpreted? Obviously,one single issue cannot cover all as-pects of accountability and governance.That said,each article of this special issue raises a number of key points to be kept in mind when dealing with the issue of accountability in Greater China in the future.These are high-lighted below:Although accountability is the raison d’ˆe tre of auditing activities,audit does not neces-sarily generate accountability.Some of the common factors that lead to successful audit practices in countries outside China are miss-ing.For example,the requirement of an in-dependent auditing operation cannot be ful-filled because audit institutions in China sit within the government system as ordinary administrative units,the same as other bu-reaus.Ting Gong’s article shows that audits in China operate under political,administra-tive,and economic pressures.This makes it difficult for audit to serve as a public account-ability regime,which by definition would de-note its taking responsibility for and having the capacity to conduct independent and objective assessments of public finance.As China’s au-dit system has evolved to directly serve the government’s economic planning and admin-istrative control,it can hardly avoid difficul-ties when trying to perform an independent and impartial role.China’s experience with establishing a power audit regime shows that without enabling goals,impartial structural ar-rangements,and effective procedures,auditing for accountability only remains an incomplete mission.If we are keen to promote accountability,the public service ought not be regarded solely as an effective instrument of the government in power.Chor-yung Cheung’s article tackles this issue in relation to the Hong Kong public service.The unique political context of Hong Kong,in which there is an absence of a ruling party,together with the fact that higher civil ser-vants were for a long time required to double up as a decision-maker,makes the study of po-litical neutrality an important issue.Chor-yung Cheung’s article shows that the impartial public service should not be required to be loyal to one particular government,but to any government of the day irrespective of its political stance,so long as it is returned to power through proper constitutional procedure.The duty of faithfully carrying out the legitimate decisions of the gov-ernment of the day to achieve its political ob-jectives will be impartial only if the same duty will be honored by the same public service to any government of the day.While the dual role played by the colonial senior civil servants in Hong Kong did not gravely compromise the neutrality of the then civil service,more insti-tutional safeguards to enhance the neutrality of the public service are required if the regional government of Hong Kong is to maintain qual-ity governance in today’s politicised environ-ment.The transformation of regulatory bureaus into independent agencies still requires po-litical direction and decision-making in the wider public interest.Chen-Dong Tso’s case study of Taiwan and Australia shows that the promotion of public interest values may be at risk when regulatory functions are outsourced to a mission-limited independent agency.Chen-Dong Tso’s article shows that the minister is better placed than the regulator to define the publicness of service delivery based on accountable public values.The mandate for ensuring competition and universal access to services sits uneasily with private sector providers,and requires legitimate public input. Governments and ministers still bear responsi-bility for ensuring such services are available to the community.When regulators are lim-ited by resource constraints,the definition ofChan and Su S3the public good should be determined by those who hold political responsibility not those who deliver the service.New forms of consultation such as the Demo-cratic Consultation Assemblies(DCA)in China’s Wenling City have major implica-tions for grassroots democracy and political reform.These fora indicate the practical and analytical concerns of accountability and governance,common to the liberal democ-racies,are increasingly applicable to China. Philip Hsu’s article examines how local states in China embarked on new initiatives that tran-scend the economic realm and encompass a va-riety of governance issues.The restructuring of the Chinese state and society often from below has become inevitable as a result of China’s rapid economic transition and growth.The democratic headway in Wenling may appear remarkable in comparison to most of China’s other localities,but it remains far short of re-versing the domination of the vertical control of officials in local governance.Although conventional wisdom argues‘what gets measured gets done’,the assumed rela-tionship between performance and account-ability is generally more rhetorical than real. Chan and Gao’s article shows that in practice, the implementation of performance measure-ment in China leads to an accountability para-dox,in which enhanced accountability tends to hinder the improvement of government pro-ductivity.The implementation of a target-based responsibility system officially carried out in county governments since1995risks boosting short term accountability of public employees while undermining the long term productivity of government agencies.With the deepening of China’s market-oriented reforms,this perfor-mance management system appears to put the cart before the horse.The introduction of various budgetary re-forms in China means that financial ac-countability is beginning to develop despite the Chinese state remaining a non-electoral regime.Ma’s article argues that various forms of financial accountability provide a precious opportunity for citizenries to gain access to policy-making,to regulate the use of power, and to begin to impose checks and balances on the government.The key to ensuring ac-countability is to change the procedural rules in relation to the behaviour and actions in a non-electoral regime.Power can be regulated to a considerable extent as the state is transformed from a command and ownership-state to a tax-based state.Market-based economic reforms have fundamentally changed China’s economic structure,forcing the state to re-create its sys-tems of revenue extraction.The development of different forms of financial accountability can be attributed to the fact that finance depart-ments at various levels have fully recognised and utilised the potential of budget reforms in helping to centralise into their hands the bud-geting power formerly scattered among other departments.Political accountability as practiced in Hong Kong further consolidates the strong executive-led system because it strengthens the political power of the Chief Executive. Jermain Lam’s article shows that political ac-countability in Hong Kong exists largely in name and is,strictly speaking,a myth rather than a reality.There is to date no mechanism to hold ministers accountable.Y et,the practice of political accountability could be realised if po-litical leaders had the political will to enforce it. Some degree of political accountability can ex-ist in a non-democratic regime if the policies of the government closely mirrored public opin-ion and public interests.Unfortunately,these two conditions are not found in today’s Hong Kong.Answerability and punishment(or enforce-ment)are two major elements of the concept of accountability.From a Taiwanese practi-tioner’s perspective Jay N.Shih clearly illumi-nates a practitioner-based working definition of public accountability.Based on his real life experience as a minister in the Taiwanese gov-ernment,Shih suggests that the accomplish-ment of performance-based accountability de-pends very much on the state’s capacity to deal with the issues of collaborative accountability, public-private partnerships,and performance measurement.There are no scientific rules orS4Accountability and Public Governance in Greater China March2009codes of performance accountability for prac-titioners to follow.The way ahead is to de-velop a process of continuing dialogue among the public,elected representatives,and public servants.Each nation needs to undertake such a deliberative process to define and re-define periodically the acceptable definition of public accountability for its public servants. Devising and planning public sector reforms, including the promotion of public account-ability,is relatively easy,but their implemen-tation and acceptance are much more dif-ficult.Pan Suk Kim from Y onsei University, Korea provides a comparative perspective on attempts to implement public service reforms–especially on the issues of integrity and trans-parency.A committed political will with an indigenised approach is essential to the over-all process of reform in developing countries. Generally speaking bureaucrats or established officials prefer to maintain the status quo. Change agents must explain to public officials and educate them about the reasons for public sector reform and the value of accountability, as well as about good governance issues.For this,much persuasion,training and learning programs,awareness programs,and incentives must coincide with the reform in order to cope with resistance or cynicism.Cross-Cutting Issues:Moving Away from a ‘One-Size-Fits-All’Approach.When govern-ment programs continue to grow and expand in scope and complexity,the issue of account-ability draws increasing worldwide attention. Although public accountability as a power-ful imperative has been well recognised,little consensus exists on who may serve as accountability agents,what constitutes ac-countability mechanisms,and how to build accountability relationships.Theoretical con-troversies echo the complex realities of build-ing public accountability where individual countries and regions demonstrate particular characteristics when confronted with account-ability challenges.So,what are the salient issues that cut across the10articles in this collection in terms of the relations of accountability and governance in the context of Greater China?How do we un-derstand the multidimensionality of account-ability?Are accountability mechanisms more important than accountability agents? Answers to these questions require dynamic, contextual,and empirical analyses of public accountability.Dynamic analyses are impor-tant because public accountability should be regarded not just as a goal,but also as a pro-gressive process.The development of public accountability is driven and shaped by social and political forces that determine institutional needs and actions.Contextual analyses and lo-cal circumstances are important too because we dispute the applicability of a‘one-size-fits-all’approach.Each contribution to this collec-tion draws on the author’s own empirical work and offers distinctive insights.All the authors have shown they are capable of both thinking concretely and creatively as they address the multi-faceted issues surrounding accountabil-ity in transitional societies.They each examine various ways in which accountability is devel-oping and being practiced in non-liberal polit-ical regimes.Piecing the puzzles together,this special issue maps out a range of effective insti-tutional strategies and governance tactics aimed at improving public accountability. ReferencesEbrahim, A.2003.‘Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs.’W orld Development 31(5):813–829.Groszyk,W.2002.‘Outcome-Focused Management in the Unites States.’OECD Journal on Budgeting 1(4):125–147.Ranson,S.2003.‘Public Accountability in the Age of Neo-Liberal Governance.’Journal of Educa-tion Policy18(5):459–480.。