澳大利亚公私伙伴关系的绩效审计：使政府的政策合法化或提供独立的监督？【外文翻译】

原文：Performance Audit of Australian Public Private Partnerships：Legitimising Government Policies or Providing IndependentOversight?PERFORMANCE AUDIT OVERSIGHT OF PPPs: INSIGHTS FROM THELITERATUREIn performance audits, audit criteria are the benchmarks against which the activities of audited bodies are compared, and upon which audit conclusions and recommendations rely. These criteria are a largely uncodified set of standards about what constitutes ‘good practice’ (Pollitt et al., 1999; and Gendron et al.,2001). Consequently, the criteria, and their use in performance audit, are crucial to its perceived ability to provide independent oversight of the effectiveness and management of program implementation.Confirming findings in Australia (Hamburger, 1989; Guthrie, 1989; and Guthrie and Parker, 1999) and international literature (Normanton, 1966; Gendron et al., 2001; and Cooper, 2003), Pollitt et al.’s (1999) longitudinal study into performance audit practice found evidence of a fundamental link between NPM implementation and changing performance audit practice. Although there is general agreement about the origins and distinctive characteristics of NPM and performance audits, their development and outworking are intertwined, contested, context-dependent and change over time (Guthrie and Parker, 1999; and Pollitt et al., 1999). Performance audit practice both influences, and is influenced by, NPM implementation (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; and Pollitt et al., 1999).Like NPM, performance audits are concern ed with ‘effectiveness’ and ‘good management’ and raise questions about the use of ‘best practice’ performance accountability frameworks as audit criteria (Pollitt et al., 1999; Gendron et al., 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; and Skærbæk, 2006). Some auditors general are actively engaged in developing these frameworks, and also appear to use them asaudit criteria (often as a consequence of a desire to foster ‘modernisation’ in the public sector (Skærbæk, 2006)). However, these activities also appear to legitimise government policy and have been criticised as potentially compromising the ability of auditors-general to provide independent and effective oversight of the implementation of those policies (Gendron et al., 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; and Skærbæk, 2006).Pollitt et al. (1999) classifies performance audits into two types: systemsbased and substantive. Systems-based audits essentially check adherence to procedures mandated by audited bodies (Pollitt et al., 1999) or to ‘best practice frame works’ promulgated by the auditors-general themselves (Gendron et al., 2001). They are, therefore, conducted on the premise that steering mechanisms represent ‘good management practice’ criteria. Performance audit objectives have been considered to have been achieved when it is concluded that standards are conformed with (Pollitt et al., 1999).By contrast, substantive audits investigate the effectiveness of policy implementation in relation to core activities and the quality of service experienced by users against externally-derived criteria (Pollitt et al., 1999). They involve a degree of scepticism and some understanding of human nature and a willingness to independently recalculate benchmarks. They include some systems-based elements to provide low-level assurance about adherence to internally-mandated steering mechanisms. However, substantive audits move beyond checking the effectiveness of adherence to internal control systems or audit-mandated performance frameworks. They disclose the ramifications of poorly implemented procedures supported by quantitative and qualitative explanations and examples, providing a richer understanding of reasons for performance failure, and the basis for conclusions and recommendations. Also, they may challenge the boundary between investigating the effectiveness of policies per se and the effectiveness of policy implementation (Guthrie, 1989; Hamburger, 1989; and Pollitt et al., 1999), explaining the political sensitivity of performance audits. Substantive audits are costly both politically and in terms of time and labour (for example, they frequently involve the use of consultants)(Pollitt et al., 1999).Pollitt et al.’s (1999) study found that most reviewed performance audits were systems-based. The exception was UK performance audits from 1993 to 1995,6 which were categorised as substantive. However, Gendron et al. (2001), previous Australian studies and PFI literature challenge these findings.UK literature argues that the substantive issue for performance audits in a PFI context is providing assurance about the achievement of anticipated risk transfer and VFM. This is accomplished by investigating whether the spending of public money (in the PFI operating stage) is in accordance with contractual agreements (Edwards et al., 2004; and Pollock and Price, 2004); or concluding that no changes in contracted payment streams to government have occurred. Broadbent et al. (2004) call for PFI performance audits to broaden their investigation of VFM achievement to include a broad range of ex post non-financial outcomes at the government, agency and project levels.The Australian performance audit literature finds that individual auditorsgeneral have adopted strikingly different interpretations of what performance audits are and how they should be conducted, resulting in observable differences in their conduct (Hamburger, 1989). Early Australian studies conclude that investigated performance audits tend to concentrate on economy and efficiency as opposed to effectiveness (Hatherly and Parker, 1988), confirming that auditing for effectiveness is a contentious and technically demanding activity (Pollitt et al., 1999).In summary, the literature suggests that PPP performance audits most frequently investigate systems-based adherence to steering mechanisms, rather than the substantive effectiveness of steering mechanism implementation in achieving stated objectives.RESEARCH METHODSThis research is based on a historically-informed documentary study of PPP steering mechanisms and performance audit reports (identified by Gendron et al., 2001, as a ‘window’ through which researchers can understand how auditors-general socially construct performance auditing at particular points in time). The first PPPperformance audit report was published in 1994 and the most recent in May 2006. Initially, all reports were read independently by two researchers to identify the presence (or absence) of reference to the eleven items that constitute the PPP performance audit framework. A small number of categorisation differences were settled consultatively. A code was allocated to each report to facilitate discussion of results.Finally, as revealed in Table 3, the reports were investigated to ascertain the primary impetus of the audit to determine whether substantive audits shared any discernable context-bound elements that may influence the conduct of performance audit, such as type of PPP project, auditor-general and controversy surrounding the project/audit. Three broad triggers were identified: ‘parliament’,indicating that the audit had been formally requested by a parliamentary resolution; ‘public concern’, indicating that the PPP project had attracted an unusual level of controversy, which was either acknowledged in the audit report or confirmed independently; and ‘new project’, indicating that the audit office had initiated the audit to review the implementation of a new PPP project.PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTSResults related to each of the paper’s three objectives are addressed sequentially Objective 1: Document the Extent and Focus of Australian PPP Performance Audits Interestingly, Table 3 reveals that audits which pre-date the development of Partnerships Victoria steering mechanisms (PA1, PA2, PA3, PA4 and PA5), nevertheless engage with those stee ring mechanisms’ key procedures. This indicates that there was broad auditor-general awareness and understanding of the key elements of PPP arrangements prior to 2000. Table 3 demonstrates that the PPP steering mechanism framework (as set out in Table 2) accurately captures the extent and focus of Australian PPP performance audit. This confirms the use by auditors-general of steering mechanisms to provide guidance as to appropriate ‘best practice’ criteria in systems-based audits and in the systems-based elements of substantive audits.It appears, however, that no Australian audit office strategically audits PPPs on an ongoing basis. New projects are the most frequent trigger for audit. The ad hocnature of PPP auditing may be explained by a lack of resources and expertise in state audit offices. The focus of audits on the pre-contracting stage could be explained by the long gestation of PPP projects, and the complexity and importance of key decision making processes in the pre-contracting stage to achievement of VFM and other objectives in the operating stage. The evidence indicates the apparent unwillingness of most auditors-general to actively engage with PPP performance and VFM achievement.Objective 2: Determine Whether Audits are Substantive or Systems-Based Analysis of one of the audits classified as systems-based8 (PA6) and the four classified as substantive is framed around a number of variables identified as differentiators between the two audit categories. These variables are: the context in which the audit was conducted; its purpose; quotations from the reports to support classification; other notable features, including audit findings/ recommendations; and an indication of systems-based aspects of substantive audits.Objective 3: Investigate the Influence of Contextual Elements on Substantive Audits The literature poses a link between the decision to undertake a performance audit and the controversy surrounding the audited program or project. It also suggests that individual auditors-general may be associated with substantive audits. The results presented in Table 3 confirm these findings. The impetus variables ‘public concern’ and ‘parliament’ are proxies for controversy. Six of the ten audits were associated with a high level of public debate that may have triggered performance audit. Of those audits, four have been classified as substantive. The four substantive audits were undertaken by two auditors general in two jurisdictions, and all took place prior to 2000, confirming the predicted connection between individual auditors-general, substantive audit and controversy.REFLECTION AND CONCLUSIONThe objective of this research was to understand the extent, focus and characteristics of Australian performance audit of PPPs. It provides evidence that only a few performance audits of these complex, long term and controversial arrangements have taken place in Australia, and that auditing has mostly concentrated oninvestigating the pre-contracting stage. Nevertheless, auditors general have provided welcome disclosures about aspects of these arrangements that would otherwise have remained hidden from parliaments and the public.Only two Australian auditors-general have investigated the achievement of anticipated risk transfer and VFM in the operating stage. Both audit pre-2000 PPPs that include the delivery of core services by consortia. PA9 analyses the financial and non-financial ramifications of unabated payments for substandard service delivery and of poorly-constructed quantitative performance indicators in private prison contracts. PA8 also focuses on payments and performance in a privately owned and operated hospital.This research indicates that the auditors-general whose reports were classified as substantive were also more likely to question government policy and/or implementation strategies as well as consider the audited transactions within a wider public-sector policy context.The evidence presented in this paper indicates that since 2000 Australia’saudit offices have largely failed to provide adequate independent external scrutiny of PPP projects. Systems-based audits of the pre-contracting stage provide assurance that steering mechanisms have been implemented adequately, or recommendations as to how program objectives can be more effectively achieved. The evidence suggests that Australia’s auditors-general have no strategic plan to audit PPPs substantively on a regular basis. It appears that they have not established an audit methodology to facilitate substantive evaluation of PPP arrangements from the perspective of the achievement of program effectiveness or cost-benefit analysis. English and Guthrie (2003) raised the question of who provides independent assessment of PPPs in Australia. They concluded that departments of treasury are the major PPP agenda-setters and evaluators, implying that little independent external examination is taking place. This conclusion is confirmed by a recent Victorian Parliamentary Accounts and Estimates Committee (VPAEC) investigation into that state’s post-2000 PPPs (Tomazin, 2006).It seems that Australia’s parliaments are now providing more substantiveindependent external review of PPP projects than auditors-general. VPAEC (2006), for instance, examined PPP governance arrangements; risk allocations and transfers; economic benefits; their accountability and public interest ramifications; and the impact of changes in international accounting standards. Examinations undertaken by the Committee on the achievement of risk allocation and VFM in a number of projects led it to conclude that the Victorian Government has been paying a high premium for the transfer of risk to the private sector, significant amounts of which had reverted back to the Government in the operating stage of a sample of different PPP types. This conclusion is at odds with that offered in PA6, the only PPP performance audit conducted in Victoria since 2000. The VPAEC was also highly critical of the Government’s refusal to provide it with access to the information it required to undertake the inquiry. In the end, it had to rely on publicly available information to conclude its investigations. The refusal of the Victorian Government to provide information to a parliamentary committee of inquiry echoes an earlier government’s refusal to permit the then Auditor-General to disclose financial information about Victoria’s private prisons (see PA9). It suggests Victorian auditors-general may have difficulties in undertaking and reporting substantively on PPPs.The NSW Auditor-General’s report into the Cross City Tunnel (PA5), by contrast, was more limited in scope. PA5 indicates that audit’s purpose was to investigate whether the upfront payment (by the winning consortium to the government) was a legitimate reimbursement of expenditure; whether the variations to the contract were reasonable and handled appropriately; and whether the changes to the surface roads (to funnel motorists into the tunnel) were based on a robust assessment against stated objectives. This audit was also critical of steering mechanism implementation, and provided recommendations as to how identified implementation failures at agency level could be avoided in the future.This research suggests that Australian auditors-general may need to engage more robustly with the operating stage of PPPs. This conclusion is confirmed by a finding of the VPAEC (2006) that there has been limited independent external scrutiny of PPP projects undertaken to date’.14 Inadequate independent oversight (in quality andquantity) means that it is impossible to conclude that Australian PPPs deliver anticipated risk transfer, VFM savings, and other program objectives. The extent of systems-based audit of the pre-contracting stage suggests that contemporary PPP performance audit in Australia may have more to do with legitimising government policies than with providing independent oversight.Source：Linda M. Performance Audit of Australian Public Private Partnerships：Legitimising Government Policies or Providing Independent Oversight[J].Financial Accountability &Management，2007，23(3)：313-333.译文：澳大利亚公私伙伴关系的绩效审计：使政府的政策合法化或提供独立的监督？公私伙伴关系的绩效审计监督：文献综述的视角在澳大利亚绩效审计中，审计准则是审计机构开展审计活动的基准，可以作为审计机构提出审计结论和建议的依据。