11aca林帮策——外文翻译—改

浙江财经大学东方学院毕业论文（或毕业设计）外文文献翻译与商誉政策有关的会计辩论学生姓名林帮策指导教师郦姝绮分院会计分院专业名称会计学班级11ACA 学号 11204201392014年12月5日与商誉政策有关的会计辩论①一、介绍辩论围绕的FRS 10（ASB的，1997年）在英国出版的显示各种会计政策和概念有关商誉的实际各种原因主张的支持。

作者1884年和1921年之间撰写的论文，分析探讨商誉是否是一个新的企业潮流。

本文最后的结论，在这个早期有一个善意的协议，即多个领域有一个明显差异的意见，但是有多数赞成当局利用摊销政策。

分析还表明，提倡的政策是以促进和实施了谨慎性原则而得的。

在会计准则委员会（ASB）中，阿诺德等人总结：在过去一个世纪里，虽然已经对商誉会计问题有书面的描述，但仍然难以确定解决方案。

当然，在过去25年来英国的会计准则提出了具有不同有关商誉的理由以及几种不同的会计方法，立即注销法，系统摊销资本化法和资本成本价格法，永久保存及减值审查法。

学术界及会计从业者，市场分析师和公司都支持所有这些不同的政策。

阿诺德等人不扩大他们的上述声明。

特别是，他们没有解释一个解决方案的意思。

一个对会计问题的解决办法是定义在一个多种方式上的。

例如，它可以是(i)一个提供有用的信息的领先者，(ii)一个在政治上可以过半数赞成被接受的理论家。

布莱恩（1995）认为，历史上由阿诺德等人举行的存在问题，他认为，大多数领先十九世纪晚期和二十世纪早期的机关同意，只是用善意的预期购买足够的剩余利润来说服业主的净资产和业务的控制，揭示了资本回报率这个成本应该予以资本化，他们对这些盈余实现利润的摊销（布莱恩，1995：第284页）。

本文分析了会计原则，规则和基本理论以及最早提出的一些权威论点，企图进一步提供上述两种观点的详细分析。

这是通过一个详细的检查和商誉的论文在1884年和1921年之间的书面分析。

这是第一次首次发表关于商誉会计的文章（哈里斯，1884）。

后者的日期是由原始会计师在美国美国注册会计师协会（美国注册会计师协会，1921年）出版的。

这些是文献的补充，参考一般会计及审计期间文本。

鉴于希望我们的分在英国析阐明了有关问题，认为该参考指数是从①Cooper,Julie：“与商誉政策有关的会计原则和辩论”，《会计商业及金融史》，2007年7月（17）：241 – 264。

这些商誉文学历史观点讨论的情况只涉及在法律和税收框架下的辩论。

本文的结构方式如下：提出相关文献，确定了在这一领域的历史分析。

以下两节处理更加紧密与权威的历史文献：主要意见分歧之后，关于商誉会计的一些共同点是确定的。

即有一个什么样的，远远落后于历史文献的不同意见的关键问题进行审议。

最后一节得出一些结论。

二、在此之前的历史分析早期的权威文献相当注意商誉的定义和性质。

最早有关商誉的定义，认为商誉是由不同的业务属性或利益造成的。

一开始，第一部法律定义商誉是老客户将诉诸老地方的概率（道森，1903年：第196页）。

这意味着只在涉及到长期友好的处所优势占领的权利，顾客在走出去（商誉）的习惯是必须的意思实现每一个被旧公司收购其业务，与房地和公司名称进行连接的一切优势，一切都与它相连或进行业务的好处。

早期的权威文献中也付出相当多有关商誉会计师估价在十九世纪末和早期出现的商誉问题。

在实践中，随着业务的估价（例如对新业务推广或销售，二十世纪一个企业合并另一个企业的一部分）。

从理论上讲这是假设的业务作为一个整体价值是善意的，虽然识别的所有值的总和为资产视为不可分割的整体业务，可识别资产人们一般认为它可能是估价，并就如何有这样的估价应该进行一定的理论观点。

其基本做法看到了商誉价值乘以一个选择的数年的利润选择的定义计算。

最初的定义是纯利润平均净利润。

这是考虑到资金已经投入量，以赚取的利润。

这就确保了只有超额利润导致商誉的估值。

这是这个估价，鼓励评论家也定义为超额利润商誉方法的使用。

无论是作为导致或影响来看，法院认为可识别的企业资产商誉转让企业财产，因此，1895年，麦克纳马拉在威尔默诉法院也证实了它作为固定资本的地位。

商誉也是合法财产范围内的1891年印花税法的意义（更多，1891年：第283页，道森，1903年：第196页）。

商誉作为资产是没有取得会计，直到1928年公司法，该记录在其资产负债表格式的善意建议在英国成文法明确。

1895年戴维委员会的建议包括在资产负债表格式作为企业资产商誉，但这些人不是在该法1900.However，该法已列入有关详情公布结果的公司招股章程内。

在一项业务出售给一家公司，即将发行的招股章程邀请公众认购股份或债券，为'亲善'付出了代价，需要单独披露的招股说明书。

不过，由于法院认为作为一个企业的资产商誉，会计师接受为1928年以前的会计资产。

特别是，商誉被列为固定资产，正在开发或收购，以使事业进行其业务，而不是转售（Dicksee，1892年：第121页和1897年：第45页）。

一些由先前学者提供商誉的会计历史分析可以通过跟踪会计、法律意见和词源早期作家解释商誉的定义、概念和性质。

他指出，十九世纪的思想在转变。

被作为一种诱因，如地点或良好声誉，吸引持续的乘客设置的第一个念头，商誉的认识逐渐过渡到被上级盈利能力为基础的概念，讨论了这些估价方法。

他回顾了在该地区重要的早期著作的数量。

这些作者也讨论了企业会计政策的选择。

由休斯公司提供的（1982）商誉的会计政策历史会讨论选择。

然而，这一历史的重点主要是在结构和体制框架内的美国活动。

商誉被视为一个在任何时间点的主要业务的存在形式反映。

在分析商誉的性质，体制框架和凡勃伦和加尔布雷斯的想法是一直被利用的。

内皮尔（1994）提供了一个在英国会计简史的品牌。

关于本文中所提到的品牌通常被归入商誉的标题，或根据商标和专利。

内皮尔标识在这个时候对商誉会计的若干方面起了一定的作用。

购买的商誉会进行核算，而不是内部产生的商誉，以及对商誉的在购买企业的账目记录给出了一些例子。

一旦商誉是在账目内，内皮尔确定了三个办法。

首先，它可以立即消除或注销。

第二，它可能被削减到异常高的利润作为其入账价值。

第三，不规则的资产资本化，商誉摊销系统可与其他长期资产有限的生命一样。

内皮尔，实际上和大多数企业的首选一样选择第二项，但他不讨论理论和实践的三个选项宣传以及企业在实践中作出的选择的原因状态。

布莱恩（1995）特别关注会计实务准则第22条的解释，将有关商誉的会计列入了核销商誉政策并得出结论，当时领先的会计当局已同意既是一个善意的概念视图和其会计处理的规则，商誉被视为剩余利润。

其中，购买时需要购买者资本化及摊销金融账户（1995年：第284页）。

布莱恩承认，某些当局倡导可供选择的会计政策，不过他认为：首先，早期领导机关绝大多数赞成摊销。

其次，核销资本往往主张只有在法律上建立伙伴关系和个体商人提供，从而使业主能避免在未来任何出售时披露他们的购买价格。

第三，那些主张保留对公司的商誉也经常这样做的实际的原因为了避免法院潜在的尴尬起伏的必要性。

以上文章观点显示，早期的权威文献强调的会计政策，维持长期的业务范围内的合理分配资金决定了援助的利润。

越来越强调适当的股利支付给出的数值例子。

谨慎性原则之间的会计政策和资本保全理论要求的链接。

最适当的会计政策辩论建议尽快运行的谨慎原则解决商誉问题。

在某种程度上，股息是一个在十九世纪，并发表了资产负债管理利润代理，辩论也可以被看作是关于会见尊重资本市场的需求来观察和计算产生的利润（：第284页1995）的资本回报，布莱恩的分析强调率。

三、结论本文研究了由阿诺德等人提出的竞争要求和布莱恩（1995年：第284页）关于商誉性质和周围的任何在十九世纪末和二十世纪初的原则和有关商誉的会计政策的同意程度。

早期的权威文献的分析表明有关于商誉会计几个方面的协议。

这些措施包括商誉的性质和定义，它作为会计资产的地位，是整体不可分割的业务，它能够单独估价，并承认其在账目的情况。

然而，确定有关购买的商誉后续计量存在着舆论差异。

与会者普遍同意，立即写了这样的善意作为（唯一的交易商和合作伙伴关系）非法人企业最适当的会计处理储备了。

对公司而言，四个不同的政策主张：（一）按成本立即注销储备；（二）利用和永久保留；（三）通过建立一个从利润中拨款商誉储备按成本资本化，永久保留；（四）利用成本和摊销的利润。

本文是在与布莱恩一致认为，大多数早期领导机关赞成利用摊销法。

然而，这不应被理解为关于商誉的认定不存在实质性分歧，并与有关政策的辩论。

至于阿诺德等人的主张，解决办法是可望而不可及，他们很可能不会特别是30年的思考围绕上个世纪（本文件涵盖的期间）打开，这是从过去的30年文学达到他们的出版物明确指出，解决方案并没有在这个意义上达成其中的一个定论，也不是一个政治上可以接受的会计标准的意思一致的答案。

在这些说法中，说明商誉确有存在。

Debating Accounting Principles andPolicies: the Case of Goodwill②1 IntroductionDebate surrounding the publication of FRS 10 (ASB,1997) in the UK displayed support for a variety of accounting policies for goodwill,advocated for a variety of practical and conceptual reasons.An analysis of papers written on goodwill between 1884 and 1921 explores whether this lack of unanimity is a recent phenomenon or not. The paper concludes that during this earlier period there were a number of areas of agreement regarding goodwill but,although a majority of authorities favoured a capitalise/amortise policy,there was a significant difference of opinion relating to its treatment once recorded in the accounts.Analysis also suggests that advocated policies were derived from a desire to promote and operationalise the principle of prudence.In a report for the Accounting Standards Board (ASB),Arnold et al. (1992) concluded that,‘Although much has been written on the problem of accounting for goodwill during the past century,a solution remains elusive’ (Arnold et al.,1992:pvi.). Certainly,in the last 25 years UK accounting standards have proposed,with differing ‘mixes’ and differing rationales,three different approaches to accounting for goodwill –immediate write-off to reserves,capitalisation at cost with systematic amortisation and capitalisation with permanent retention and impairment review (Accounting Standards Committee (ASC),1984;ASB,1997;International Accounting Standards Board, 2004).Academics,accounting practitioners,market analysts and companies have supported all these various policies (see,for example, Solomons,1989;Grinyer et al.,1990;Arnold et al.,1992;Baxter, 1993;ASB,1994; Archer et al., 1995;ASB, 1995, 1996).②Cooper,Julie:”Debating Accounting Principles and Policies:the Case of Goodwill”,《Accounting, Business & Financial History》，2007，7(17)：241-264．Arnold et al. do not expand on their above statement.In particular,they do not explain what they mean by a ‘solution’.A solution to an accounting problem could be defined in a number of ways.For example, it could be (i) one agreed by a majority of leading theorists as giving useful information,or (ii) one that would be politically acceptable.Bryer (1995) argues that historically the view held by Arnold et al., is ‘questionable’.He suggests that most leading late nineteenth and early twentieth-century authorities agreed that goodwill was simply the purchase of sufficient expected‘surplus profits’ to persuade the owner(s) to part with the net assets and control of a business,and that to reveal the rate of return on capital this cost should be capitalised and amortised against those surplus profits as they are realized’ (Bryer, 1995:p284).This paper analyses the accounting principles,rules and underlying theory put forward by some of the earliest authoritative commentators in an attempt to provide further detailand analysis of the two views given above.This is achieved by a detailed examination and analysis of papers written on goodwill between 1884 and 1921.This first date refers to what appears to be the first published accounting article on goodwill (Harris, 1884).The latter date is determined by the publication of the original Accountants’Index by the AICPA in the United States (AICPA, 1921).This literature is supplemented by reference to general accounting and auditing texts of the period.Given that our analysis wishes to shed light on the debate regarding historical views of goodwill in the UK,the literature considered here from the Index relates only to the UK.This also locates the debate within a consistent legal and tax framework.The article is structured in the following manner.The next section identifies prior literature relating to historical analysis in this area.The following two sections deal more closely with the authoritative historical literature:some common ground with respect to accounting for goodwill is identified,followed by key differences of opinion. There is then a consideration of what was the key issue behind the different opinions in the historical literature.The final section draws some conclusions.2. Prior Historical AnalysesEarly authoritative literature paid considerable attention to the nature and definition of goodwill.The earliest definitions saw goodwill as being derived from,or caused by,various business attributes or advantages.Initially,with the first legal definition1 given by Lord Eldon in 1810,in Crutwell v.Lye,goodwill was‘nothing more than the probability that the old customers will resort to the old place’ (in Dawson, 1903:p196).This was extended by Vice-ChancellorWood in 1859,in Churton v.Douglas:Lord Eldon did not mean to confine the rights involved in the term goodwill to the advantage of occupying premises to which customers were in the habit of going(Goodwill) must mean every advantage that has been acquired by the old firm by carrying on its business,everything connected with the premises and the name of the firm, and everything connected with or carrying with it the benefits of the business.Early authoritative literature also paid considerable attention to the valuation of goodwill.For accountants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the issue of goodwill arose in practice with the task of business valuation (for example, on the promotion of new businesses or the sale of a business or part of a business). Theoretically it was assumed that the value of the business as a whole was the sum of the values of all the identifiable assets.4 Although goodwill was regarded as inseparable from the business as a whole,as an identifiable asset it was assumed that it could be separately valued,and there were definite theoretical ideas as to how such a valuation should proceed.The basic approach saw the value of goodwill calculated by multiplying a chosen definition of profits by a chosen number of years.Initially the definition of profits was purely average net profits.This was refined in particular to take into account the amount of capital that had been invested in order to earn those profits.This ensuredthat only excess profits contributed to the valuation of goodwill.It was the use of this method of valuation that encouraged commentators to also define goodwill as excess profit.Whether viewed as cause or as effect,the courts regarded goodwill as transferable business property and therefore as an identifiable business asset.In 1895 in Wilmer v. McNamara the courts also confirmed its status as fixed capital.Goodwill was also legal property within the meaning of the Stamp Act 1891 (More, 1891: p. 283; Dawson,1903: p. 196). Goodwill as an accounting asset was not made explicit in British statute law until the Companies Act 1928, which recorded goodwill in its suggested balance sheet formats.The Davey Committee of 1895 had included goodwill as a business asset within its suggested balance sheet formats but these were not included in the resultant Companies Act 1900.However,that Act had included particulars relating to the publication of prospectuses.On the sale of a business to a company that was about to issue a prospectus inviting the public to subscribe for shares or debentures,the price paid for the ‘Goodwill’ had to be separately disclosed in that prospectus.However,given that the courts regarded goodwill as a business asset, accountants accepted it as an accounting asset before 1928. In particular,goodwill was classified as a fixed asset,being developed or acquired in order to enable the undertaking to carry on its business rather than for resale (Dicksee, 1892: p. 121 and 1897:p45).Some prior literature offering an historical analysis of accounting for goodwill can be found.Courtis (1983) discussed the nature and definition of goodwill by tracing its conceptual clarification via earlier writers on accounting,legal opinion and etymology.He identified a shift in thinking over the nineteenth century.From being first thought of as a set of inducements,such as location or good repute, which attract persistent patronage, the understanding of goodwill came to be dominated by methods for its valuation based on superior earning power concepts and by the accounting notion of a residuum.Carsberg (1966) discussed these valuation methods.He reviewed a number of significant early writings in the area and assessed the contribution of P.D. Leake in the light of these.Neither of these authors discussed the accounting policychoices of businesses.The history of goodwill provided by Hughes (1982) does discuss accounting policy choice.However,the emphasis of that history is primarily on events in the US, which are placed in a structural and institutional framework.Goodwill is seen as a reflection of the dominant form of business existing at any point in time.In analysing the nature of goodwill,the institutional framework and ideas of Thorstein Veblen and John Kenneth Galbraith are utilised.Napier (1994) provides a brief history of brand accounting in the UK.With respect to the time frame of this paper, brands were usually subsumed under the heading of goodwill,or under trademarks and patents.Napier identifies a number of aspects of accounting for goodwill at this time.Purchased goodwill would be accounted for,whereas internally generated goodwill was not, and a number of examples of the recording of goodwill in the accounts of purchasing businesses are given.Once goodwill was included in the accounts,Napier identifies three approaches to its subsequent treatment.First it could be immediately eliminated,or written-off, altogether.Second it could be capitalised as an asset with its recorded amount possibly being reduced irregularly in years of abnormally high profits.Third, goodwill could be amortised systematically in the same way as other long-lived assets with finite lives. Napier states that in practice most companies preferred the second of these options but he does not discuss theoretical and/or practical reasons for the advocacy of the three options and for the choices made by companies in practice.Bryer (1995) is particularly concerned with explaining the inclusion in SSAP 22,Accounting for goodwill (ASC, 1984) of the policy of writing-off goodwill against capital.In so doing he includes a discussion of a number of early authorities (1995:p291–294) and concludes that leading accounting authorities of the time had agreed both a conceptual view of goodwill and the rules for its accounting treatment –goodwill was viewed as‘surplus profit’ which,when purchased, required capitalisation and amortisation in the financial accounts of the purchaser (1995: p. 284).As leading authorities in support of this Bryer (1995: pp. 291–293) quotes Matheson (1884), More (1891) and Leake (1912, 1914) and refers to Whinney (1898) and Payne(1892).He also quotes Hatfield (1913) who mentions Child, Cooper, Guthrie and Pixley as among those favouring a regular writing off of goodwill.Bryer recognises that certain authorities advocated alternative accounting policies,however he argues (for the UK) that:firstly, the substantial majority of early leading authorities favoured amortization.Secondly, writing off against capital was only legally available for partnerships and sole traders, and was often advocated for them so that owners could avoid disclosing their purchase price at any future sale, and not on accounting grounds. Thirdly, those advocating the retention of goodwill for companies also often did so for ‘practical’ reason to avoid the costly and potentially embarrassing necessity of widespread court-sanctioned write-downs of capital.The above quotations suggest that the emphasis of early authoritative literature was on determining an accounting policy to aid decisions on the appropriate distribution of profits in the context of the need to maintain the permanent capital of the business. The numeric examples given by More and Leake further emphasise the appropriate dividends to be paid. The principle of prudence was the link between the accounting policy and the theoretical requirement for capital maintenance. What is evident from the debate over the most appropriate accounting policy is that operationalising the principle of prudence was not always clear to the authorities themselves.To the extent that dividends were a proxy for (realised) profits in the nineteenth century and management published a balance sheet, the debate could also be seen to be about meeting the demand of the capital market with respect to observing the generation of profit and calculating the rate of return on capital which Bryer’s analysis emphasises (1995:p284).3 ConclusionThis paper has investigated the competing claims made by Arnold et al. (1992: p.vi) and Bryer (1995:p284) as regards the nature and extent of any agreement surrounding the principles and policies for accounting for goodwill during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.Analysis of the early authoritative literature suggests that there were several areas of agreement with respect to accounting for goodwill.These included the nature and definition of goodwill,its status as an accounting asset,its inseparability from the business as a whole, its ability to be separately valued,and the circumstances of its recognition in the accounts.However,a significant difference in opinion was identified relating to the treatment of purchased goodwill subsequent to its recording in the accounts. There was a general agreement that the immediate write-off of such goodwill to reserves as the most appropriate accounting treatment for unincorporated businesses (sole traders and partnerships).For companies, however,four different policies were advocated: (i) immediate write-off to reserves;(ii) capitalise at cost and permanently retain;(iii) capitalised at cost,permanently retain but establish a goodwill reserve via appropriations from profit; and (iv) capitalise at cost and amortise to profit.This paper is in agreement with Bryer that the majority of early leading authorities favoured capitalise/amortise.However,this should not be read as meaning that there was not substantial disagreement with and debate about the policy.As for Arnold et al.’s claim that a solution was ‘elusive’,they were probably not particularly thinking about the 30 years surrounding the turn of the last century (the period covered by this paper),and it is clear from the literature of the last 30 years up to their publication that a ‘solution’ had not been reached in the sense of an agreed answer among theorists,nor in the sense of a politically acceptable accounting standard.In these senses, they were merely stating the obvious,so Bryer’s suggestion that we should question the broadness of their statement was warranted.。