Modelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant Processor Architectures
08_Fault_Modeling
Process variation: caused by equipment failures, instabilities in the process conditions, … Spot Defect: caused by mask fabrication process, lithography process, …
A. Short B. Open
Extra poly
From NCKUEE, S.J.Chang
p.8
Defect Model – Extra Material Defects
C. New device
Diff. 1 Diff. 2 Diff.
(2/2)
Extra diffusion
Poly
Extra poly
Summary
p.1
From NCKUEE, S.J.Chang
Failure & Fault
Failure: cause a circuit to operate outside its requested specification ranges Failure Mechanisms
Interconnection open Device open Device size change
Missing poly
Missing poly Missing metal
From NCKUEE, S.J.Chang
p.10
Defect Statistics
(1/2)
Distribution of defect geometrical location on a wafer
惠普彩色激光打印机 Pro M454 和惠普彩色激光多功能一体机 Pro M479 维修手册说明书
Table -1 Revision history Revision number 1
Revision date 6/2019
Revision notes HP LaserJet Pro M454 HP LaserJet Pro MFP M479 Repair manual initial release
Additional service and support for HP internal personnel HP internal personnel, go to one of the following Web-based Interactive Search Engine (WISE) sites: Americas (AMS) – https:///wise/home/ams-enWISE - English – https:///wise/home/ams-esWISE - Spanish – https:///wise/home/ams-ptWISE - Portuguese – https:///wise/home/ams-frWISE - French Asia Pacific / Japan (APJ) ○ https:///wise/home/apj-enWISE - English ○ https:///wise/home/apj-jaWISE - Japanese ○ https:///wise/home/apj-koWISE - Korean ○ https:///wise/home/apj-zh-HansWISE - Chinese (simplified)
Find information about the following topics ● Service manuals ● Service advisories ● Up-to-date control panel message (CPMD) troubleshooting ● Install and configure ● Printer specifications ● Solutions for printer issues and emerging issues ● Remove and replace part instructions and videos ● Warranty and regulatory information
基于模型的执行器故障诊断
弹簧老化: 弹簧材料性能老化刚度变化、过度形 变不能恢复原位、多弹簧位置错位或倒置、个别弹簧 断裂等.
16 62
浙 江 大 学 学 报( 工学版)
第 41 卷
定位器部件故障: 涉及电气转换部件故障如压电
本文研究了基于流体力学和热力学原理建立的 描述执行器气动定位系统动态特性的数学模型, 并 通过模型计算以及实测获得故障残差, 实现故障检 测, 进一步通过对残差的分析, 进行故障分离.
收稿日期: 2007- 07- 30.
浙江大学学报( 工学版) 网址: w w w . journals. z ju. edu . cn/ eng
M F2R 16B 多弹簧气动薄膜执行机构以及西门子公 司生产的 SIP ART P S2 智能电气阀门定位器( 经改 造在开环状态下工作, 仅相当于电气转换器) 进行实 验, 模型计算参数如表 2 所示. 表 2 中的压力均为绝 对压力, 参数 V 0 是根据开始阶段的等容充气的模 型计算得到, 参数 F 可以根据在弹簧范围内推杆的 动态平衡状态计算得到, S0 、k 是通过粒子群算法辨 识[ 5 ] 得到, 其他参数是由设备和环境工艺数据计算 得到.
qm=
1 RT
p2A
dx dt
+
V2
dp2 dt
.
( 3)
式中: x 为推杆位移, A 为膜片有效面积, V 0 为薄膜
气室初始体积, V 2 为薄膜气室体积, T 为管道热力 学温度, R 为气体常数.
1. 3 执行机构
根据牛顿第二定律, 可建立起执行机构的动力
学方程为
基于地震模型土不规则建筑AMTMD相互作用系统的最优性能
程,定义AMTMD的最优参数准则为:设置AMTMD结构的最大平动和扭转角位移动力放大系数的最小值的最小化。定
义AMTMD的有效性准则为:设置AMTMD结构的最大位移动力放大系数的最小值的最小化与未设置AMTMD结构的最
大位移动力放大系数的比值。基于定义的二个准则,研究不规则建筑标准化偏心系数(NER)、扭转对侧向频率比
3.1 AMTMD控制结构平动位移时的最优性能 图1(a)给出了控制TTFR=0.5结构平动位移时
AMTMD最优频率间隔随EDFR和SRSS的变化关系曲 面;而图1(b)给出了控制TTFR=0.5结构平动位移 时AMTMD有效性随EDFR和SRSS的变化关系曲面。 由图1(a,b)知:总的来说,随着SRSS的增大,AMTMD 的最优频率间隔增大,而AMTMD的有效性减小;EDFR 对AMTMD最优频率间隔和有效性都有明显的影响。
图1在控制结构平动位移时AMTMD Fig.1 Variations in(a) optimum frequency spacing
(b)effectiveness of the AMTMD with respect to EDFR and SRSS in the mitigation of translational displacement(TI.FR=O.5)
引入地震卓越频率系数A。=∞。/to。(EDFR)。基
基金项目:上海市教育委员会科研创新项目(No.09一YZ-35) 收稿日期:2008—1l—17修改稿收到日期:2009—12—14 第一作者李春祥男,博士,教授,博士生导师,1964年12月生
于文献[7]的推导方法,可得到基于Kanai—Tajimi模型 土一不规则建筑一AMTMD相互作用系统动力方程的 矩阵形式:
simulink基础学习
SIMILINK模块库按功能进行分为以下8类子库:Continuous(连续模块)Discrete(离散模块)Function&Tables(函数和平台模块)Math(数学模块)Nonlinear(非线性模块)Signals&Systems(信号和系统模块)Sinks(接收器模块)Sources(输入源模块)连续模块(Continuous)continuous.mdlIntegrator:输入信号积分Derivative:输入信号微分State-Space:线性状态空间系统模型Transfer-Fcn:线性传递函数模型Zero-Pole:以零极点表示的传递函数模型Memory:存储上一时刻的状态值Transport Delay:输入信号延时一个固定时间再输出Variable Transport Delay:输入信号延时一个可变时间再输出离散模块(Discrete) discrete.mdlDiscrete-time Integrator:离散时间积分器Discrete Filter:IIR与FIR滤波器Discrete State-Space:离散状态空间系统模型Discrete Transfer-Fcn:离散传递函数模型Discrete Zero-Pole:以零极点表示的离散传递函数模型First-Order Hold:一阶采样和保持器Zero-Order Hold:零阶采样和保持器Unit Delay:一个采样周期的延时函数和平台模块(Function&Tables) function.mdlFcn:用自定义的函数(表达式)进行运算MATLAB Fcn:利用matlab的现有函数进行运算S-Function:调用自编的S函数的程序进行运算Look-Up Table:建立输入信号的查询表(线性峰值匹配)Look-Up Table(2-D):建立两个输入信号的查询表(线性峰值匹配)数学模块( Math ) math.mdlSum:加减运算Product:乘运算Dot Product:点乘运算Gain:比例运算Math Function:包括指数函数、对数函数、求平方、开根号等常用数学函数Trigonometric Function:三角函数,包括正弦、余弦、正切等MinMax:最值运算Abs:取绝对值Sign:符号函数Logical Operator:逻辑运算Relational Operator:关系运算Complex to Magnitude-Angle:由复数输入转为幅值和相角输出Magnitude-Angle to Complex:由幅值和相角输入合成复数输出Complex to Real-Imag:由复数输入转为实部和虚部输出Real-Imag to Complex:由实部和虚部输入合成复数输出非线性模块( Nonlinear ) nonlinear.mdlSaturation:饱和输出,让输出超过某一值时能够饱和。
Indradrive 系列 故障代码
Error MessagesF9001 Error internal function call.F9002 Error internal RTOS function callF9003 WatchdogF9004 Hardware trapF8000 Fatal hardware errorF8010 Autom. commutation: Max. motion range when moving back F8011 Commutation offset could not be determinedF8012 Autom. commutation: Max. motion rangeF8013 Automatic commutation: Current too lowF8014 Automatic commutation: OvercurrentF8015 Automatic commutation: TimeoutF8016 Automatic commutation: Iteration without resultF8017 Automatic commutation: Incorrect commutation adjustment F8018 Device overtemperature shutdownF8022 Enc. 1: Enc. signals incorr. (can be cleared in ph. 2) F8023 Error mechanical link of encoder or motor connectionF8025 Overvoltage in power sectionF8027 Safe torque off while drive enabledF8028 Overcurrent in power sectionF8030 Safe stop 1 while drive enabledF8042 Encoder 2 error: Signal amplitude incorrectF8057 Device overload shutdownF8060 Overcurrent in power sectionF8064 Interruption of motor phaseF8067 Synchronization PWM-Timer wrongF8069 +/-15Volt DC errorF8070 +24Volt DC errorF8076 Error in error angle loopF8078 Speed loop error.F8079 Velocity limit value exceededF8091 Power section defectiveF8100 Error when initializing the parameter handlingF8102 Error when initializing power sectionF8118 Invalid power section/firmware combinationF8120 Invalid control section/firmware combinationF8122 Control section defectiveF8129 Incorrect optional module firmwareF8130 Firmware of option 2 of safety technology defectiveF8133 Error when checking interrupting circuitsF8134 SBS: Fatal errorF8135 SMD: Velocity exceededF8140 Fatal CCD error.F8201 Safety command for basic initialization incorrectF8203 Safety technology configuration parameter invalidF8813 Connection error mains chokeF8830 Power section errorF8838 Overcurrent external braking resistorF7010 Safely-limited increment exceededF7011 Safely-monitored position, exceeded in pos. DirectionF7012 Safely-monitored position, exceeded in neg. DirectionF7013 Safely-limited speed exceededF7020 Safe maximum speed exceededF7021 Safely-limited position exceededF7030 Position window Safe stop 2 exceededF7031 Incorrect direction of motionF7040 Validation error parameterized - effective thresholdF7041 Actual position value validation errorF7042 Validation error of safe operation modeF7043 Error of output stage interlockF7050 Time for stopping process exceeded8.3.15 F7051 Safely-monitored deceleration exceeded (159)8.4 Travel Range Errors (F6xxx) (161)8.4.1 Behavior in the Case of Travel Range Errors (161)8.4.2 F6010 PLC Runtime Error (162)8.4.3 F6024 Maximum braking time exceeded (163)8.4.4 F6028 Position limit value exceeded (overflow) (164)8.4.5 F6029 Positive position limit exceeded (164)8.4.6 F6030 Negative position limit exceeded (165)8.4.7 F6034 Emergency-Stop (166)8.4.8 F6042 Both travel range limit switches activated (167)8.4.9 F6043 Positive travel range limit switch activated (167)8.4.10 F6044 Negative travel range limit switch activated (168)8.4.11 F6140 CCD slave error (emergency halt) (169)8.5 Interface Errors (F4xxx) (169)8.5.1 Behavior in the Case of Interface Errors (169)8.5.2 F4001 Sync telegram failure (170)8.5.3 F4002 RTD telegram failure (171)8.5.4 F4003 Invalid communication phase shutdown (172)8.5.5 F4004 Error during phase progression (172)8.5.6 F4005 Error during phase regression (173)8.5.7 F4006 Phase switching without ready signal (173)8.5.8 F4009 Bus failure (173)8.5.9 F4012 Incorrect I/O length (175)8.5.10 F4016 PLC double real-time channel failure (176)8.5.11 F4017 S-III: Incorrect sequence during phase switch (176)8.5.12 F4034 Emergency-Stop (177)8.5.13 F4140 CCD communication error (178)8.6 Non-Fatal Safety Technology Errors (F3xxx) (178)8.6.1 Behavior in the Case of Non-Fatal Safety Technology Errors (178)8.6.2 F3111 Refer. missing when selecting safety related end pos (179)8.6.3 F3112 Safe reference missing (179)8.6.4 F3115 Brake check time interval exceeded (181)Troubleshooting Guide | Rexroth IndraDrive Electric Drivesand ControlsI Bosch Rexroth AG VII/XXIITable of ContentsPage8.6.5 F3116 Nominal load torque of holding system exceeded (182)8.6.6 F3117 Actual position values validation error (182)8.6.7 F3122 SBS: System error (183)8.6.8 F3123 SBS: Brake check missing (184)8.6.9 F3130 Error when checking input signals (185)8.6.10 F3131 Error when checking acknowledgment signal (185)8.6.11 F3132 Error when checking diagnostic output signal (186)8.6.12 F3133 Error when checking interrupting circuits (187)8.6.13 F3134 Dynamization time interval incorrect (188)8.6.14 F3135 Dynamization pulse width incorrect (189)8.6.15 F3140 Safety parameters validation error (192)8.6.16 F3141 Selection validation error (192)8.6.17 F3142 Activation time of enabling control exceeded (193)8.6.18 F3143 Safety command for clearing errors incorrect (194)8.6.19 F3144 Incorrect safety configuration (195)8.6.20 F3145 Error when unlocking the safety door (196)8.6.21 F3146 System error channel 2 (197)8.6.22 F3147 System error channel 1 (198)8.6.23 F3150 Safety command for system start incorrect (199)8.6.24 F3151 Safety command for system halt incorrect (200)8.6.25 F3152 Incorrect backup of safety technology data (201)8.6.26 F3160 Communication error of safe communication (202)8.7 Non-Fatal Errors (F2xxx) (202)8.7.1 Behavior in the Case of Non-Fatal Errors (202)8.7.2 F2002 Encoder assignment not allowed for synchronization (203)8.7.3 F2003 Motion step skipped (203)8.7.4 F2004 Error in MotionProfile (204)8.7.5 F2005 Cam table invalid (205)8.7.6 F2006 MMC was removed (206)8.7.7 F2007 Switching to non-initialized operation mode (206)8.7.8 F2008 RL The motor type has changed (207)8.7.9 F2009 PL Load parameter default values (208)8.7.10 F2010 Error when initializing digital I/O (-> S-0-0423) (209)8.7.11 F2011 PLC - Error no. 1 (210)8.7.12 F2012 PLC - Error no. 2 (210)8.7.13 F2013 PLC - Error no. 3 (211)8.7.14 F2014 PLC - Error no. 4 (211)8.7.15 F2018 Device overtemperature shutdown (211)8.7.16 F2019 Motor overtemperature shutdown (212)8.7.17 F2021 Motor temperature monitor defective (213)8.7.18 F2022 Device temperature monitor defective (214)8.7.19 F2025 Drive not ready for control (214)8.7.20 F2026 Undervoltage in power section (215)8.7.21 F2027 Excessive oscillation in DC bus (216)8.7.22 F2028 Excessive deviation (216)8.7.23 F2031 Encoder 1 error: Signal amplitude incorrect (217)VIII/XXII Bosch Rexroth AG | Electric Drivesand ControlsRexroth IndraDrive | Troubleshooting GuideTable of ContentsPage8.7.24 F2032 Validation error during commutation fine adjustment (217)8.7.25 F2033 External power supply X10 error (218)8.7.26 F2036 Excessive position feedback difference (219)8.7.27 F2037 Excessive position command difference (220)8.7.28 F2039 Maximum acceleration exceeded (220)8.7.29 F2040 Device overtemperature 2 shutdown (221)8.7.30 F2042 Encoder 2: Encoder signals incorrect (222)8.7.31 F2043 Measuring encoder: Encoder signals incorrect (222)8.7.32 F2044 External power supply X15 error (223)8.7.33 F2048 Low battery voltage (224)8.7.34 F2050 Overflow of target position preset memory (225)8.7.35 F2051 No sequential block in target position preset memory (225)8.7.36 F2053 Incr. encoder emulator: Pulse frequency too high (226)8.7.37 F2054 Incr. encoder emulator: Hardware error (226)8.7.38 F2055 External power supply dig. I/O error (227)8.7.39 F2057 Target position out of travel range (227)8.7.40 F2058 Internal overflow by positioning input (228)8.7.41 F2059 Incorrect command value direction when positioning (229)8.7.42 F2063 Internal overflow master axis generator (230)8.7.43 F2064 Incorrect cmd value direction master axis generator (230)8.7.44 F2067 Synchronization to master communication incorrect (231)8.7.45 F2068 Brake error (231)8.7.46 F2069 Error when releasing the motor holding brake (232)8.7.47 F2074 Actual pos. value 1 outside absolute encoder window (232)8.7.48 F2075 Actual pos. value 2 outside absolute encoder window (233)8.7.49 F2076 Actual pos. value 3 outside absolute encoder window (234)8.7.50 F2077 Current measurement trim wrong (235)8.7.51 F2086 Error supply module (236)8.7.52 F2087 Module group communication error (236)8.7.53 F2100 Incorrect access to command value memory (237)8.7.54 F2101 It was impossible to address MMC (237)8.7.55 F2102 It was impossible to address I2C memory (238)8.7.56 F2103 It was impossible to address EnDat memory (238)8.7.57 F2104 Commutation offset invalid (239)8.7.58 F2105 It was impossible to address Hiperface memory (239)8.7.59 F2110 Error in non-cyclical data communic. of power section (240)8.7.60 F2120 MMC: Defective or missing, replace (240)8.7.61 F2121 MMC: Incorrect data or file, create correctly (241)8.7.62 F2122 MMC: Incorrect IBF file, correct it (241)8.7.63 F2123 Retain data backup impossible (242)8.7.64 F2124 MMC: Saving too slowly, replace (243)8.7.65 F2130 Error comfort control panel (243)8.7.66 F2140 CCD slave error (243)8.7.67 F2150 MLD motion function block error (244)8.7.68 F2174 Loss of motor encoder reference (244)8.7.69 F2175 Loss of optional encoder reference (245)Troubleshooting Guide | Rexroth IndraDrive Electric Drivesand Controls| Bosch Rexroth AG IX/XXIITable of ContentsPage8.7.70 F2176 Loss of measuring encoder reference (246)8.7.71 F2177 Modulo limitation error of motor encoder (246)8.7.72 F2178 Modulo limitation error of optional encoder (247)8.7.73 F2179 Modulo limitation error of measuring encoder (247)8.7.74 F2190 Incorrect Ethernet configuration (248)8.7.75 F2260 Command current limit shutoff (249)8.7.76 F2270 Analog input 1 or 2, wire break (249)8.7.77 F2802 PLL is not synchronized (250)8.7.78 F2814 Undervoltage in mains (250)8.7.79 F2815 Overvoltage in mains (251)8.7.80 F2816 Softstart fault power supply unit (251)8.7.81 F2817 Overvoltage in power section (251)8.7.82 F2818 Phase failure (252)8.7.83 F2819 Mains failure (253)8.7.84 F2820 Braking resistor overload (253)8.7.85 F2821 Error in control of braking resistor (254)8.7.86 F2825 Switch-on threshold braking resistor too low (255)8.7.87 F2833 Ground fault in motor line (255)8.7.88 F2834 Contactor control error (256)8.7.89 F2835 Mains contactor wiring error (256)8.7.90 F2836 DC bus balancing monitor error (257)8.7.91 F2837 Contactor monitoring error (257)8.7.92 F2840 Error supply shutdown (257)8.7.93 F2860 Overcurrent in mains-side power section (258)8.7.94 F2890 Invalid device code (259)8.7.95 F2891 Incorrect interrupt timing (259)8.7.96 F2892 Hardware variant not supported (259)8.8 SERCOS Error Codes / Error Messages of Serial Communication (259)9 Warnings (Exxxx) (263)9.1 Fatal Warnings (E8xxx) (263)9.1.1 Behavior in the Case of Fatal Warnings (263)9.1.2 E8025 Overvoltage in power section (263)9.1.3 E8026 Undervoltage in power section (264)9.1.4 E8027 Safe torque off while drive enabled (265)9.1.5 E8028 Overcurrent in power section (265)9.1.6 E8029 Positive position limit exceeded (266)9.1.7 E8030 Negative position limit exceeded (267)9.1.8 E8034 Emergency-Stop (268)9.1.9 E8040 Torque/force actual value limit active (268)9.1.10 E8041 Current limit active (269)9.1.11 E8042 Both travel range limit switches activated (269)9.1.12 E8043 Positive travel range limit switch activated (270)9.1.13 E8044 Negative travel range limit switch activated (271)9.1.14 E8055 Motor overload, current limit active (271)9.1.15 E8057 Device overload, current limit active (272)X/XXII Bosch Rexroth AG | Electric Drivesand ControlsRexroth IndraDrive | Troubleshooting GuideTable of ContentsPage9.1.16 E8058 Drive system not ready for operation (273)9.1.17 E8260 Torque/force command value limit active (273)9.1.18 E8802 PLL is not synchronized (274)9.1.19 E8814 Undervoltage in mains (275)9.1.20 E8815 Overvoltage in mains (275)9.1.21 E8818 Phase failure (276)9.1.22 E8819 Mains failure (276)9.2 Warnings of Category E4xxx (277)9.2.1 E4001 Double MST failure shutdown (277)9.2.2 E4002 Double MDT failure shutdown (278)9.2.3 E4005 No command value input via master communication (279)9.2.4 E4007 SERCOS III: Consumer connection failed (280)9.2.5 E4008 Invalid addressing command value data container A (280)9.2.6 E4009 Invalid addressing actual value data container A (281)9.2.7 E4010 Slave not scanned or address 0 (281)9.2.8 E4012 Maximum number of CCD slaves exceeded (282)9.2.9 E4013 Incorrect CCD addressing (282)9.2.10 E4014 Incorrect phase switch of CCD slaves (283)9.3 Possible Warnings When Operating Safety Technology (E3xxx) (283)9.3.1 Behavior in Case a Safety Technology Warning Occurs (283)9.3.2 E3100 Error when checking input signals (284)9.3.3 E3101 Error when checking acknowledgment signal (284)9.3.4 E3102 Actual position values validation error (285)9.3.5 E3103 Dynamization failed (285)9.3.6 E3104 Safety parameters validation error (286)9.3.7 E3105 Validation error of safe operation mode (286)9.3.8 E3106 System error safety technology (287)9.3.9 E3107 Safe reference missing (287)9.3.10 E3108 Safely-monitored deceleration exceeded (288)9.3.11 E3110 Time interval of forced dynamization exceeded (289)9.3.12 E3115 Prewarning, end of brake check time interval (289)9.3.13 E3116 Nominal load torque of holding system reached (290)9.4 Non-Fatal Warnings (E2xxx) (290)9.4.1 Behavior in Case a Non-Fatal Warning Occurs (290)9.4.2 E2010 Position control with encoder 2 not possible (291)9.4.3 E2011 PLC - Warning no. 1 (291)9.4.4 E2012 PLC - Warning no. 2 (291)9.4.5 E2013 PLC - Warning no. 3 (292)9.4.6 E2014 PLC - Warning no. 4 (292)9.4.7 E2021 Motor temperature outside of measuring range (292)9.4.8 E2026 Undervoltage in power section (293)9.4.9 E2040 Device overtemperature 2 prewarning (294)9.4.10 E2047 Interpolation velocity = 0 (294)9.4.11 E2048 Interpolation acceleration = 0 (295)9.4.12 E2049 Positioning velocity >= limit value (296)9.4.13 E2050 Device overtemp. Prewarning (297)Troubleshooting Guide | Rexroth IndraDrive Electric Drivesand Controls| Bosch Rexroth AG XI/XXIITable of ContentsPage9.4.14 E2051 Motor overtemp. prewarning (298)9.4.15 E2053 Target position out of travel range (298)9.4.16 E2054 Not homed (300)9.4.17 E2055 Feedrate override S-0-0108 = 0 (300)9.4.18 E2056 Torque limit = 0 (301)9.4.19 E2058 Selected positioning block has not been programmed (302)9.4.20 E2059 Velocity command value limit active (302)9.4.21 E2061 Device overload prewarning (303)9.4.22 E2063 Velocity command value > limit value (304)9.4.23 E2064 Target position out of num. range (304)9.4.24 E2069 Holding brake torque too low (305)9.4.25 E2070 Acceleration limit active (306)9.4.26 E2074 Encoder 1: Encoder signals disturbed (306)9.4.27 E2075 Encoder 2: Encoder signals disturbed (307)9.4.28 E2076 Measuring encoder: Encoder signals disturbed (308)9.4.29 E2077 Absolute encoder monitoring, motor encoder (encoder alarm) (308)9.4.30 E2078 Absolute encoder monitoring, opt. encoder (encoder alarm) (309)9.4.31 E2079 Absolute enc. monitoring, measuring encoder (encoder alarm) (309)9.4.32 E2086 Prewarning supply module overload (310)9.4.33 E2092 Internal synchronization defective (310)9.4.34 E2100 Positioning velocity of master axis generator too high (311)9.4.35 E2101 Acceleration of master axis generator is zero (312)9.4.36 E2140 CCD error at node (312)9.4.37 E2270 Analog input 1 or 2, wire break (312)9.4.38 E2802 HW control of braking resistor (313)9.4.39 E2810 Drive system not ready for operation (314)9.4.40 E2814 Undervoltage in mains (314)9.4.41 E2816 Undervoltage in power section (314)9.4.42 E2818 Phase failure (315)9.4.43 E2819 Mains failure (315)9.4.44 E2820 Braking resistor overload prewarning (316)9.4.45 E2829 Not ready for power on (316)。
Fault display and troubleshooting (English) 故障显示及排除
4. F ault display and troubleshooting4.1 GeneralThe Inverter have the protective and warning self-diagnostic functions. If fault occurs, the fault code is displayed on the digital operator. The fault contact output (RA-RB-RC or R1A-R1B-R1C, DO1, DO2 or R2A-R2C) operates, and the inverter shut off to stop the motor. If warning occurs, the digital operator will display the warning code. However, the fault-contact output does not operate. (except some certain cases, see page on ‘Warning and Self-Diagnosis Functions’). The digital operator will return to its previous status when the above warning is clear.‧When a fault has occurred, refer to the following table to identify and to clear the cause of the fault.‧Use one of the following methods to reset the fault after restarting the inverter.1. Stop the inverter.2. Switch the fault reset input at terminal f signal or press the RESET key on the digital operator.3. Turn off the main circuit power supply and turn on again.4.2 Error Message and Troubleshooting(A) ProtectiveFunctionLCD Display(English)Fault Contents Fault Contact OutputFault DC Volt. Low The main circuit DC voltage becomes lower than the low voltagedetection level (Cn-39).OperationFault Over Current The inverter output current becomes approx. 200% and above theinverter rated current.OperationFault Ground Fault A ground fault occurs at the inverter output side and the ground-faultcurrent exceeds approx. 50% of the inverter rated current. OperationFault Over Voltage The main circuit DC voltage becomes excessive because of regeneration energy caused by motor decelerating. OperationFaultOver Heat The temperature of the cooling fin reaches the detection level. OperationFault Motor Over Load Motor overload is detected by the electronic thermal relay.(motor protection) OperationFault Inverter Over Load The electronic thermal sensor detects inverter overload while theoutput current exceeds 112% of rated value. (inverter protection) OperationFault Over Torque Over torque is detected while the output current is larger than orequal to the setting of Cn-26. (machine protection) OperationFaultExt. Fault3 External fault signal eFaultExt. Fault5 External fault signal gFaultExt. Fault6 External fault signal hFaultExt. Fault7 External fault signal iFaultExt. Fault8 External fault signal jOperationEEPROM faultFaultInverter EEPROM EEPROM (BCC, no.) is bad.FaultInverter A/D A/D converter (inside the CPU) faultOperationFaultPG Over Sp. Excessive PG speed fault Operation FaultPG Open PG is open-circuit Operation FaultSp.Deviat Over Excessive speed deviation OperationFaultRS-485 Interrupt MODBUS Communication fault occurs .The inverter remains operating. operationError CausesAction to Be Taken‧ Power capacity is too small.‧ Voltage drop due to wiring resistance. ‧ A motor of large capacity connected to the same power system has been started.‧ Defective electromagnetic contractor.‧ Check the source voltage and wiring. ‧ Check the power capacity and power system.‧ Extremely rapid accel.‧ Short-circuit or ground- fault at the inverter output side. ‧ Motor of a capacity greater than the inverter rating has been started.‧ High-speed motor and pulse motor has been started. ‧ Extend the accel. time. ‧ Check the load wiring.‧ Motor dielectric strength is insufficient. ‧ Load wiring is not proper.‧ Check the motor wiring impedance and the load wiring.‧ Insufficient deceleration time.‧ High input voltage compared to motor rated voltage. ‧ Extend the accel. time. ‧ Use a braking resistor.‧ Defective cooling fan. ‧ Ambient temperature rise ‧ Clogged filter.‧ Check for the fan, filter and the ambient temperature.‧ Overload, low speed operation or extended accel. time. ‧ Improper V-f characteristic setting‧ Measure the temperature rise of the motor. ‧ Decrease the output load. ‧ Set proper V/f characteristic.‧ Improper rated current (Cn-09) setting‧ Set proper V/f characteristic. ‧ Set proper rated current (Cn-09) ‧ If inverter is reset repetitively before fault removed, the inverter may be damaged. ‧ Machine errors or overload‧ Check the use of the machine.‧ Set a higher protection level (Cn-32). ‧ Fault input of external signal e , g , h , i and j . ‧ Identify the fault signal using Un-11.‧ Disturbance of external noise ‧ Excessive impact or vibration ‧ Reset EEPROM by running Sn-03.‧ Replace the control board if the fault can’t be cleared.‧ Improper setting of ASR parameter or over-speed protection level. ‧ Check the parameters of ASR and the protection level. ‧ The PG wiring is not properly connected or open-circuit. ‧ Check the PG wiring. ‧ Improper setting of ASR parameter or speed deviation level.‧ Check parameters of ASR and speed deviationlevel.‧ E xternal noise‧ E xcessive vibration or impact Communication wire ‧ N ot properly contacted‧ C heck the parameter setting, including Sn-01, Sn-02. ‧ C heck if the comm. wire is not properly contacted. ‧ R estart, if fault remains, please contact to us.(B). Warning and Self-Diagnosis FunctionsLCD Display(English)Fault Contents Fault Contact Output(blinking)Alarm DC Volt. Low The main circuit DC voltage becomes lower than the lower under-voltage level before the motor starts. No operation(blinking)Alarm Over Voltage The main circuit DC voltage becomes higher than the lower under-voltage level before the motor starts. No operation(blinking)AlarmOver HeatThe thermal protection contact is input to the external terminal. No operation(blinking)Alarm Over Torque Over torque is detected while the output current is larger than or equal to thesetting of Cn-26. However, the Sn-12 has been set such that the invertercontinue to run and disregard the over-torque warning.No operation Stall prevention operates while acceleration.Stall prevention operates while running-Stall prevention operates while deceleration.No operation(blinking)Alarm External Fault Forward and reverse rotation commands are simultaneously detectedfor a period of time exceeding 500ms. (The inverter is stoppedaccording to the stop method preset by Sn-04.)No operation(blinking)AlarmRS-485 Interrupt MODBUS Communication fault occurs. The inverter remains operating. No operationComm. Fault Transmission fault of digital operator No operation(blinking) Alarm B.B.External B.B. signal (terminal e) is input (The inverter stops and themotors stops without braking)No operation Improper inverter capacity (Sn-01) setting. No operation Improper setting of multi-function input signal (Sn-25, 26, 27 and28). No operation Improper setting of V/F characteristic (Cn-02~08) No operationAlarmInput ErrorImproper setting of Cn-18, Cn-19 No operation (blinking)AlarmOver SpeedExcessive speed (operation remains) No operation(blinking)AlarmPG OpenPG Open-circuit (operation remains) No operationAlarmSp.Deviat Over Excessive speed deviation (operation remains) No operation Load Fail Error during upload and download (operation remains)No operation EEPROM Fault Operator EEPROM error. No operationUpload Error Data incorrect during Communication from the operator to theinverter. No operationDownload Error Data incorrect during Communication from the inverter to theoperator.No operation AlarmAuto Tun-Error Motor parameter autotuning error No operation WARNInverter over load(Blink)Inverter over load RESET, internal timer operates ( to protect inverter)No actionError Causes Action to Be Taken‧ Input voltage drop ‧ Measure the main circuit DC voltage, if the voltage is lower allowance level, regulate the input voltage. ‧ Input voltage rise‧ Measure the main circuit DC voltage, if the voltage is higher than allowance level, regulate the input voltage. ‧ Overload‧ Cooling fan fault. Ambient temperature rises. ‧ Clogged filter.‧ Check for the fan, filter and the ambient temperature. ‧ Machine error or overload‧ Check the use of the machine.‧ Set a higher protection level (Cn-32). ‧ Insufficient Accel./Decel. Time ‧ Overload‧ Excessive load impact occurs while operating ‧ Increase Accel./Decel. Time. ‧ Check the load.‧ Operation sequence error ‧ 3-wire/2-wire selection error‧ Check the circuit of system ‧ Check the setting of system parameters Sn-25, 26, 27, and 28.‧ External noise ‧ Excessive vibration or impact on Communication wire ‧ Not properly contacted ‧ Check the parameter setting, including Sn-01, Sn-02. ‧ Check if the comm. wire is not properly contacted. ‧ Restart, if fault remains, please contact to us. ‧ Comm. between digital operator and inverter has notbeen established after system starts for 5 seconds.‧ Communication is established after system starts, but transmission fault occurs for 2 seconds.‧ Re-plug the connector of the digital operators. ‧ Replace the control board. ‧ External B.B. signal is input.‧ After external BB signal is removed, execute the speed search of the inverter. ‧ Inverter KVA setting error.‧ Set proper KVA value. Be aware of the difference of 220V and 440V‧ The value of Sn-25~Sn-28 is not in ascending order (Ex. Sn-25= 05, Sn-28= 02, those are improper setting).‧Set speed search command of 21 and 22 simultaneously.‧Set these values by order (the value of Sn-25 must be smaller than those of Sn-26, 27, 28) ‧ Command 21 and 22 can not be set on two multi-function-input contacts simultaneously.‧ The values of Cn-02~Cn-08 do not satisfyF max ≥ F A ≥ F B ≥ F min .‧ Change the settings.‧ Upper limit and lower limit setting is incorrect. ‧ Change the settings. ‧ Improper ASR parameter setting or over-torque protection level. ‧ Check the ASR parameter and over-torque protection level. ‧ The circuit of PG is not properly connected or open-circuit. ‧ Check the wiring of PG. ‧ Improper ASR parameter setting or over-torque protection level. ‧ Check the ASR parameter and over-torque protection level. ‧ Bad communication during operator and inverter.‧The connector is not properly connected.‧ Check if the connector is not properly connected.‧ Operator EEPROM error.‧ Disable load function of operator.‧ Replace the operator.‧ Incorrect inverter data format ‧ Communication noise. ‧ Download the data to the operator again. ‧ Check if the connector is not properly connected. ‧ Communication noise‧ Check if the connector is not properly connected.‧ Inverter capacity and motor rating are not properly matched.‧ The wiring between inverter and motor is disconnected. ‧ Motor load unbalance.‧ Correct the inverter/motor capacity ratio, wiringcable and motor load.‧inverter over load reset in 5 minutes ‧after reset inverter overload, under stop mode,supply power for 5 min, warn will autoreleased.。
美国电气制造商协会(NEMA)电机应用指导
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Fault Tolerant Data Flow Modeling Using the Generic Modeling Environment
Fault Tolerant Data Flow Modeling Using the Generic Modeling Environment Mark L. McKelvin Jr., Jonathan Sprinkle, Claudio Pinello +, and Alberto Sangiovanni-Vincentelli Electrical Engineering and Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of California, Berkeley, CA 94720+ General Motors Berkeley LabsBerkeley, CA 94720{mckelvin, sprinkle, pinello, alberto}@AbstractDesigning embedded software for safety-critical, real-time feedback control applications is a complex and error prone task. Fault tolerance is an important aspect of safety. In general, fault tolerance is achieved by duplicating hardware components, a solution that is often more expensive than needed. In applications such as automotive electronics, a subset of the functionalities has to be guaranteed while others are not crucial to the safety of the operation of the vehicle. In this case, we must make sure that this subset is operational under the potential faults of the architecture. A model of computation called Fault-Tolerant Data Flow (FTDF) was recently introduced to describe at the highest level of abstraction of the design the fault tolerance requirements on the functionality of the system. Then, the problem of implementing the system efficiently on a platform consists of finding a mapping of the FTDF model on the components of the platform. A complete design flow for this kind of application requires a user-friendly graphical interface to capture the functionality of the systems with the FTDF model, algorithms for choosing an architecture optimally, (possibly automatic) code generation for the parts of the system to be implemented in software and verification tools. In this paper, we use the Generic Modeling Environment (GME) developed at Vanderbilt University to design a graphical design capture system and to provide the infrastructure for automatic code generation. The design flow is embedded into the Metropolis environment developed at the University of California at Berkeley to provide the necessary verification and analysis framework1. IntroductionDesigners of complex heterogeneous embedded systems are often faced with increasing design costs and time-to-market pressures. In real-time feedback control systems, sensors and actuators interact with a plant and complex control algorithms execute periodically on an execution platform, as shown in Figure 1. The execution platform is a distributed system that consists of software components that implement a control algorithm and a hardware layer that includes a set of processing elements, or electronic control units (ECUs) connected via communication media, such as busses. Safety-critical systems may contain a number of redundant components for fault tolerance, thus, adding to the system design complexity. The lack of a rigorous design method and supporting tools often leads to costly iterations, and inconsistencies between system specification and implementation. Furthermore, design specifications may change throughout the process, thus, it becomes difficult for a system to evolve as changes are made in specifications.When designing fault tolerant systems, we assume that hardware or software components may fail. Faults in embedded software are commonly caused by deviations from specification of the supporting platforms or programming errors. Fault tolerance is a technique that attempts to neutralize the potential faults to avoid system failures, by incorporating redundancy in system components. Blindly duplicating all components that may fail in the implementation platform is clearly an inefficient solution especially when, as is the case for automotive applications, only a subset of the functionality of the system has to be operational when a fault occurs. To optimize the implementation of systems with partial fault tolerance, Pinello et al. introduced recently a new model of computation (MoC) Fault Tolerant Data Flow (FTDF) [1], a data flow [2][4] variant that is designed to address the specification of fault-tolerance in safety-critical, real-time feedback control systems. A model of computation is a mathematical formalism that describes the interaction between components in a system [5] and has well-defined semantics that enables formal validation techniques. The FTDF MoC enables formal analysis and automatic synthesis tools and techniques.A synthesis-based design methodology is proposed in [1] to involve the designer in a high-level exploration of fault coverage and cost tradeoff. It features a synthesis tool that uses FTDF as the central programming model. The synthesis tool automatically deduces the necessary software and hardware replication, distributes each software process on the execution platform, and derives an optimal scheduling of the processes on each ECU to minimize latency. The tools that support the synthesis-based design flow are embedded in the Metropolis [11] design environment.In this paper, we extend the method allowing a designer to construct an application in the FTDF domain in a user-friendly environment and by implementing the FTDF specification as automatically generated software. The tool used to do so is Generic Modeling Environment (GME) [8], a tool that takes a Model Integrated Computing (MIC) [6] approach to constructing domain specific environments.1.1 Model Integrated Computing and GenericModeling EnvironmentMIC facilitates model analysis and automatic program synthesis by incorporating Model Integrated Program Synthesis (MIPS) to transform a model in a specific domain to a physical artifact. More precisely, GME is a domain specific modeling tool that supports the MIC methodology and contains a MIPS environment for interpreting and generating physical artifacts of that model. GME uses the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and the Object Constraint Language (OCL) technologies [10] to construct domain specific environments.GME is a component-based architecture used for constructing domain specific modeling environments developed by the Institute for Software Integrated Systems at Vanderbilt University. GME uses UML class diagrams to compose domain specific environments. GME supports MIPS through the Builder Object Network version 2.0 (BON2) [8]. BON2 is a GME component interface used to transform models to physical artifacts. BON2 consists of software classes and interfaces to support the interpretation of a model. These classes and interfaces are automatically generated by GME, and most of them are independent of the specific domain. However, a domain-specific interface is generated that allows traversal of objects in a specific domain. We illustrate with an example of how this approach can yield a better implementation than using a manual coding method.This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, FTDF semantics and structure will be reviewed. Section 3 will give the overall design methodology and various steps in the process. Section 4 will follow with a simple example. Results of the example application are given in Section 5, and Section 6 will conclude.Figure 1. An example of an execution platform.1.2 Related WorkUML-based tools such as the ones described in [12] and [13] are used for modeling safety-critical applications. These tools are familiar to the software programmer, who is often times not the domain expert, and they provide flexibility in the modeling of domains. Our work closely relates to commercial graphical block diagram and data flow oriented environments, such as Matlab/Simulink [14] by MathWorks and SCADE [15] by Esterel Technologies, which are commonly used to model safety-critical systems. They are general-purpose control dominated design environments and their semantics do not explicitly deal with fault tolerance. Our work provides precise semantics using the FTDF model of computation and a more natural way of visually describing the structural dependencies amongst components in a safety-critical application, similar to using reliability block-diagram models, as described by Viswanadham and others [16].2. Fault Tolerant Data Flow SemanticsFTDF is a synchronous [3] MOC: every actor executes once per iteration, satisfying the precedence order dictated by the data dependencies. Then, the next iteration may start. This section reviews the fundamental components of an FTDF model: tokens, actors, and communication media. An FTDF graph structure provides the structural dependencies amongst components in a FTDF model.2.1 TokensTokens are encapsulations of data. In addition, in the FTDF domain, tokens are appended with two fields: the epoch field and the valid field. The valid field is used to record the Boolean outcome of some fault-detection algorithm (e.g. majority voting, checksum, CRC). Moreover, an actor may explicitly mark any of its output tokens as invalid to inform quickly the downstream actors of some error. An actor receiving a token can check the token’s validity before attempting to use it. The epoch field is used in the execution model as a synchronization mechanism for the distributed processes. Finally, replicas of the sending actor will run on different ECUs and produce replicas of a same token.2.2 ActorsIn an actor-oriented design framework [7], actors are functional components that execute and communicate with other actors in a model. An actor contains ports that are connected via an abstraction of communication channels, or connections. Actors also contain a firing rule and firing function. A firing rule is a guard condition that must be satisfied by input values to the actor. The firing function executes a body code that implements a particular functionality of the actor. A firing is a single execution of the firing rule followed by the firing function of an actor.In FTDF, actors are typed. The FTDF actors have four types. Source actors initiate execution of their code without accepting any input tokens and produce output tokens. Sink actors accept input tokens to fire and produce no output tokens. Source and sink actors are abstractions of sensors and actuators, respectively. Regular actors have inputs and outputs. The firing rule for N-input regular actors prescribes that the actor fires when all N inputs are available. Firing on all inputs is typical of other dataflow languages [2][4]. The input actor is a regular actor that can fire on a subset of inputs. For example, an input actor that may fire if at least two of three inputs are available would have the following set of firing rules: U = [{*, *, *}, {⊥, *, *}, {*,⊥, *}, {*, *, ⊥}], where “*” represents the presence of a value and “⊥“ denotes the absence of a value. Input actors behave similarly to N-of-M components, which are often found in reliability block diagram models.2.3. Communication MediaCommunication media act as unidirectional channels that transmit tokens between actors. Media may be affected by communication errors. The composition of actors and communication media is represented as a directed, acyclic graph called an FTDF graph. The rules given here are simplifications of the rules given in [1]. Given a set of actors, say A, and a set of communication media M, an FTDF graph, G is given as G = (V, E), where V is the set of vertices, E is the set of directed arcs, V = A, and E = M. In the FTDF semantics, a FTDF graph is legal if the following conditions hold:1. G is connected.2. Data types between input and output ports connected viachannel must be the same.3. G is acyclic.4. At least one source and one sink actor must exist in themodel.An FTDF graph represents data dependencies of the actors (causality relations) that must be satisfied when scheduling the actors for execution on an implementation platform.3. Design MethodologyThe overall design flow of a modeling environment for FTDF applications is presented in Figure 2. The flow begins with the designer constructing a visual application model using the FTDF paradigm. GME stores objects in the model in a model database. The designer instantiates an interpreter from the GME user interface to initiate the model interpretation on objects in the model database. The graphical model is interpreted to generate a configuration file for the execution model (the run-time environment). The configuration file is used to generate and build the code for a complete executable model of the FTDF graph.3.1 Fault Tolerant Data Flow Domain ConstructionThe FTDF domain is constructed as a paradigm in GME. The paradigm is created using UML class diagrams, an internal syntactic structure in GME. The structure is used to define a finite set of visual objects. An instantiation of the FTDF paradigm allows the designer to use elements of that set of objects to construct an FTDF application model. The primary visual objects that may be used in the GME graphical interface are channels, ports, actors, and ECUs. Objects are parameterized for ease of differentiating between multiple components and configuring the components. If a designer chooses to duplicate an actor or ECU, then a copy is created that copies all attributes of the object and, it is automatically labeled to distinguish the difference between the two copies. If any attributes differ, then it is the designer’s job to alter the attributes.A UML class diagram depicts their relationship in Figure 3.A port is a typed, atomic object in the FTDF paradigm that does not provide any hierarchy. It can be of type internal or external. The types are used to distinguish whether or not a port is connected to actors on the same ECU or actors located on another ECU. A channel is a typed object that forms a connection between two ports – a source port and a destination port. The ports place constraints on the type of channel that connects two ports. For example, it is possible to have a system implement multiple protocols on different types of channels. Ports ensure that the channel type match the type of ports on each end of a channel.An actor is a typed object that could contain at least one port, depending on the type of actor. GME eases the use of adding, deleting, or modifying actor types in the domain from within GME. Actors have attributes that are used to configure important properties, including fields for implementing a firing rule and a firing function (also called an execution rule in Figure 3) for each actor and a field for specifying a timeout value for the execution model. Ideally, the code entered into the firing rule and firing function fields would be user specified code in the host programming language used to implement the execution model, like the ANSI C programming language.An ECU object is a hierarchical abstraction of a processing element. It contains at least one actor object. It concurrently executes its member actors. Structural relationships between different ECUs are captured with typed channels and ports.Figure 2. Design flow for a domain-specific environment for specifying FTDF applications.3.2 Interpreter DesignThe BON2 component generates an interface for the network of objects used in an FTDF paradigm during model interpretation. The FTDF interpreter utilizes the interfaces generated by BON2 to traverse FTDF objects. Model checking in GME can be done using OCL, using the interpreter, or by carefully defining appropriate relationship between a domain’sUML diagrams. For the FTDF paradigm, we chose to use the interpreter and relationships between FTDF objects. The interpreter in the FTDF paradigm not only transforms a model, but it can also be used to check whether the designer has constructed a legal FTDF graph.The interpreter uses a visitor-style traversal scheme introduced by Gamma et al. [9] that begins by traversing each ECU object in a model. This style eases modifications or extensions to the FTDF paradigm. Each actor of an ECU is traversed, and the actor information is obtained. Each actor’s connections can be queried to allow traversal of channel objects to determine the source and destination ports and associated actors. As the objects are traversed, a configuration file is created. This configuration file is a textual description of a network of FTDF application model objects and provides enough information to generate the code for the executable model. The configuration file has a flexible format so that it may be modified later. A sample configuration format for a single actor on a single processor is given in Figure 4. The sample configuration file is composed of unique information about each ECU and actor in the FTDF network. It contains destination actors and user specified C code that is obtained from the actor objects.Figure 3. A UML class diagram for objects in theFTDF paradigm.Figure 4. Sample template for a configuration file.3.3 The Executable ModelApplications in the domain of safety-critical control systems are expected to execute periodically on a possibly infinite stream of input data on an implementation platform with bounded memory. The executable model is a distributed system based on a runtime platform. The model can be executed to simulate the FTDF application, including the timing behavior of components. It can also be used as a final implementation if the target execution platform supports directly the runtime platform. The runtime platform and the executable model are currently implemented as a separate entity from the GME environment to allow changes in the underlying architecture. The runtime platform is a debugged C library that creates necessary data structures for coordinating the communication and computation of a network of FTDF components on a target platform. Our target platform is a network of personal computers running the Linux operating system communicating with an Internet Protocol (IP) stack. This enables rapid prototyping and simulation on various systems that can be networked using the IP protocol suite. Ideally, the designer could choose the target platform to execute its model on, for example using a real-time operating system instead of Linux. . The runtime platform parses the configuration file that is generated by the interpreter, and compiles the code into an executable file per host. The configuration file produced by the interpreter contains information from the FTDF application model, such as a network of ECUs, actor connections, and additional attributes such as actor code specified by the designer to allow reconstruction of the FTDF application in the runtime platform.In the runtime platform, actors are functions coded in C with well-defined interfaces. The designer only has to care about the functions he or she writes that characterizes the functionality of that actor. Since a legal FTDF graph operates under synchronous semantics and each actor in a schedule is assumed to execute once in a cycle, a schedule of actors on the runtime platform may execute infinitely (assuming no faults that may cause an actor’s firing function to not execute) with bounded memory. As a result, channels between actors are implemented with one-place buffers. ECUs operate concurrently.The runtime platform supports the simulation of more than one ECU on a same host, using Unix-based processes to run actors on different ECUs concurrently. Communication channels are simulated using pipes between processes to transmit and receive tokens or, when operating over a network of hosts, using the IP stack.4. An ExampleA simple example is given to illustrate the code generation capability of the FTDF design environment. The original application is illustrated in Figure 5. Figure 6 illustrates the application modeled in the GME graphical user interface using FTDF objects.Figure 5. Example application.The example given contains five actors. The actors are a source and sink actor denoted as “Sensor” and “Actuator” respectively, two regular actors denoted as “Controller” and “Fine Controller” in Figure 5, and an input actor denoted as “Arbiter”. The firing function of each is very simple; each actor’s firing rule and firing function contains a total of 12 lines of C code in the execution platform. Figure 7 illustrates a sample output after executing the interpreter in the FTDF paradigm on this example model. The configuration file is then read and parsed by the runtime platform. The runtime platform configures memory requirements and other data structures based on this configuration file. For sake of simplicity, the firing rule and firing function are given in pseudo-code in Figure 7. Ideally, this would be C code checked by the compiler during compilation on the runtime platform.Figure 6. Example application modeled in GME. 5. ResultsThe goal of this project is to create a FTDF design environment in GME that will aid in automatic deployment of embedded software for fault tolerant applications. The approach uses a visual modeling environment where the designer can easily enter models and realize application instances from the FTDF domain such that errors in application specification can be reduced and the time to specify an application can be reduced. The results given in this section are results from the sample application described in the previous section.Table 1 gives a summary of the estimated time and effort to create the FTDF design environment. The FTDF paradigm is constructed in GME, along with the interpreter. The runtime environment is implemented in 1084 lines of C code. Those three tasks are performed only once and can be reused for any subsequent application. The estimated time to develop and create the FTDF paradigm in GME assumes a basic understanding of UML class diagrams. In GME, the software architecture that supports an interpreter design is composed of a number of C++ files. To implement an interpreter for the FTDF paradigm, the first author implemented over 800 additional lines of code. The code utilizes the software architecture of GME to produce the configuration file that is used by the runtime environment to configure a FTDF application.Table 2 contrasts the amount of time it takes to configure the runtime environment with the appropriate connections between actors, location of actors on specific ECUs, and actor code for each actor in an application. Configuring the runtime environment consists of producing the configuration file shown in Figure 7 that details the structure of the application. The results in this table will vary depending on the size of the application. The example application contains 5 actor instances with approximately 50 total lines of code for actor code implementation and 2 ECU instances. So, one can imagine how the gain of using the FTDF paradigm in GME to specify an application for the runtime environment can scale with the application size. Table 3 gives a summary of the number of lines of code used to implement the given example application. These numbers will vary with the size of the application.Task Time (hours) FTDF Paradigm Development 12Interpreter Design 40Runtime Environment 85Table 1: Implementation time of the designenvironment.Time to enterapplication(hours)Time to produceconfiguration(Minutes) GME 1 0.15Manual 2 20Table 2: Time for entering example application and configuring the runtime environment.Lines of codeActor code for the application(firing rules and firing functionsonly)50 Configuration file 24Table 3: Lines of code used to implement the givenexample application.6. ConclusionsIn this paper, we presented a design flow for fault-tolerant applications running on a distributed implementation platform. The Fault-Tolerant Data Flow (FTDF) model of computation has been used for the specification and modeling of fault-tolerance in safety-critical, real-time feedback control applications. To aid in the design process of specifying an FTDF model and integrating validation and analysis tools, a design environment for FTDF was developed in the General Model Environment (GME). The environment allows the domain expert to model a system hierarchically using FTDF semantics and to automatically generate code for an execution of that model.Figure 7. Configuration file for example.An intuitive user interface is constructed that allows a visual representation of an FTDF model. The user interface allows a designer to produce quickly an execution model that may be used to verify timing requirements or generate code for a target system. Results show that the semi-automatic approach to code generation we propose in this paper made it quicker to prototype an execution model. Freeing the domain expert from detailed coding or from a difficult interaction with coding experts, results in reduced errors and shorter design time.The runtime system as of today is not completely integrated with the design environment. Complete integration in the environment as well as of the environment in Metropolis is one of our future goals. In addition, reliability analysis tools are being considered for addition to the design flow.7. AcknowledgementsThis work is partially supported by the Center for Hybrid and Embedded Software and Systems under the National Science Foundation ITR (Cooperative Agreement) CCR-0225610, MARCO/Gigascale Research Center, and General Motors Berkeley Labs. Interactions with the Metropolis design team from UC Berkeley is recognized and acknowledged.8. References[1] C. Pinello, L. P. Carloni, and A. L. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli. “Fault-tolerant deployment of embedded software for cost-sensitive real-time feedback control applications,” In Proc. Conf. Design, Automation, and Test in Europe (DATE), 2004.[2] E. A. Lee and D. G. Messerschmitt. “Synchronous data flow,” Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 75, no. 9, September, 1987.[3] A. Beneviste, P. Caspi, S. Edwards, N. Halbwachs, P. Le Guernic, and R. de Simone. “The synchronous language twelve years later,” In Proc. of the IEEE, March 1997.[4] E. A. Lee and T. M. Parks, “Dataflow process networks,” Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 83, no. 5, pp. 773-801, May, 1995.[5] S. Edwards, L. Lavagno, E. Lee, A. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli. “Design of embedded systems: formal methods, validation and synthesis,” Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 85(n.3), March 1997.[6] J. Sprinkle. “Model-integrated computing,” IEEE Potentials, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 28-30, February, 2004.[7] E. A. Lee and S. Neuendorffer. “Classes and subclasses in actor oriented designs,” Proc. of the Conference on Formal Methods and Models for Codesign (MEMOCODE), June 2004.[8] A. Ledeczi, M. Maroti, A. Bakay, G. Karsai, J. Garrett, C. Thomason IV, G. Nordstrom, J. Sprinkle, P. Volgyesi, “The generic modeling environment,” Workshop on Intelligent Signal Processing, Budapest, Hungary, May 17, 2001.[9] E. Gamma, R. Helm, R. Johnson, and J. Vlissides. Design Patterns: Elements of Reusable Object-Oriented Software. Addison-Wesley, 1995.[10] OMG UML Documentation website available at:/technology/uml .[11] The Metropolis Project Team. “The metropolis meta model version 0.4,” Technical Report UCB/ERL M04/38, University of California, Berkeley, CA USA 94720, September 2004.[12] J. Jurjens, E. Fernandez, R. France, B. Rumpe, ”Critical systems development with UML,” In Proc. of UML'03 satellite workshop, TUM technical report, 2003.[13] C. Leangsuksun, H. Song, and L. Shen. “Reliability modeling using UML,” The 2003 International Conference on Software Engineering Research and Practice, Las Vegas, June 2003.[14] MathWorks, “MATLAB/SIMULINK”, available at:.[15] Esterel Technologies, “SCADE Suite for Avionics”, available at: .[16] N. Viswanadham, V. V. S. Sarma, and M. G. Singh. Reliability of Computer and Control Systems. North-Holland, vol. 8, 1987.。
早古生代北阿尔金HP/LT混杂岩片——_一个“化石”俯冲隧道
2023/039(12):3533 3554ActaPetrologicaSinica 岩石学报doi:10.18654/1000 0569/2023.12.02毛小红,林宜慧,张建新.2023.早古生代北阿尔金HP/LT混杂岩片———一个“化石”俯冲隧道.岩石学报,39(12):3533-3554,doi:10.18654/1000-0569/2023.12.02早古生代北阿尔金HP/LT混杂岩片———一个“化石”俯冲隧道毛小红1 林宜慧2 张建新1MAOXiaoHong1,LINYiHui2andZHANGJianXin11 自然资源部深地动力学重点实验室,中国地质科学院地质研究所,北京 1000372 韩山师范学院地理科学与旅游学院,广州 5210411 KeyLaboratoryofDeep EarthDynamicsofMinistryofNaturalResources,InstituteofGeology,ChineseAcademyofGeologicalSciences,Beijing100037,China2 DepartmentofGeography,HanshanNormalUniversity,Guangzhou521041,China2023 08 01收稿,2023 10 20改回MaoXH,LinYHandZhangJX 2023 EarlyPaleozoicNorthAltunHP/LTmélangeslice:Afossilsubductionchannel.ActaPetrologicaSinica,39(12):3533-3554,doi:10.18654/1000 0569/2023.12.02Abstract High pressure/lowtemperature(HP/LT)metamorphicrocksintheNorthAltunoccurasatectonicsliceinsubduction accretioncomplex Itismainlycomposedofstronglydeformedmetamorphicsedimentaryrocks(argillaceousschist,calcareousschistandquartzschist)andasmallnumberofpodsofblueschistsandeclogiteswithinmeta sedimentaryrocks,andcontactedwithadjacentophioliticmélangebyfaults Eclogiteconsistsofomphacite,garnet,phengite,barroisiteandquartzwithvaryingamountsofglaucophane,chlorite,calcite,albiteandtitanite Blueschistconsistsofgarnet,glaucophane,carbonate,actinolite,chlorite,albite,quartzandepidotewithvaryingamountsofphengite,andwithorwithoutomphaciteandlawsoniteinclusionsingarnet PhaseequilibriummodellingconstraintheP Tconditionsofblueschist(SampleA06 16 7)andeclogite(SampleA03 3 5 3),respectively ItshowsthattheP TconditionsofthepeakpressureareT=~524℃,P=~2 1GPaandT=~527℃,P=~2 2GPa,andbothofthemhaveunderwentisothermaldecompressionfromeclogitefaciestoblueschist(blueschist greenschist)faciesconditionsduringexhumation Combinedwithpreviousdata,itshowsthatdifferenttypesofrocksintheHP/LTmetamorphicterraneinNorthAltunmayhaveundergonedifferentmetamorphicevolutionaryhistories,reflectingtheinhomogeneityofthepaleo subductionchannel,andjuxtaposedatrelativelyshallowlevelwithinsubductionchannel,whichhaveexperiencedpenetrativedeformationunderblueschistorblueschist greenschistfaciesconditionsKeywords NorthAltun;Eclogite;Blueschist;Phaseequilibria摘 要 北阿尔金高压/低温(HP/LT)变质岩呈构造岩片分布在俯冲 增生杂岩中,主要由强变形的变质沉积岩(泥质片岩、钙质片岩和石英片岩)和少量呈透镜状分布在变沉积岩中的蓝片岩和榴辉岩组成,与相邻的蛇绿混杂岩呈断层接触。
MODEL1815 多站式雷达配置指南说明书
`MODEL1815 Multi-Station ConfigurationBuilding a Multi-Station with the MODEL 1815 RadarWith version 1.03 software and above, up to three (3) displays can be connected to one dome antenna : The display units (RDP157) are networked via Ethernet allowing control and adjustment of the Radar from additional second or third stations.Unit Item Version RemarksDisplay Unit RDP157 Application 0359375-01.03 Version 1.03 updates both the main application and FPGA software.FPGA0359372-01.02The antenna unit (RSB127-120) does not require update. Software v01.03 is only for the display units (RDP157) If software is needed, it is posted under the 1815 product page. (https:///en/support/1815)1. InstallationInterconnectionThe following diagrams compare a standalone configuration with that of the multi-station. The main difference is antenna cable type. While the standalone configuration requires the standard cable, the multi-station requires a cable with the RJ45 connector fitted, allowing it to be connected to an Ethernet hub. The type needed is the same cable type used on the DRS4DL+ or DRS4D-NXT radars. Assorted cables length options are shown under those products as accessories.Antenna Cable Length and Supply Voltages in Standalone and Multi Station ConfigurationsYou must use a supply voltage of 24 VDC if using a 30m antenna cable for either configuration type. 12/24 VDC input is allowed for the standalone or multi-station configurations that are using up to 20m antenna cable length.NMEA0183 IN/OUT(1) While radar images from one antenna can be shared via Ethernet, NMEA0183 data is NOT shared . Make sure toinput NMEA0183 data such as AIS, heading, and other navigation data to the NMEA0183 port(s) on each RDP157 as required. A splitter might be needed to ensure proper signal levels depending on the installation.(2) If the NMEA0183 OUTPUT data is needed from the display, it should NEVER be tied to the output of another display.For example, if TLL is needed from each display location, you will need separate input ports at your receiving device.Cable terminations for RDP157The multi configuration radar cable consists of RJ45connector and three (3) wires. These individual wiresare not used to connect the RDP157 to an Ethernethub. Make sure that these wires are fully terminated(cut clean) in order to avoid short circuit.Standalone Configuration Multi Station Configuration2.Independent and Synchronized AdjustmentsThe RDP157 at the second and/or third stations can independently adjust Radar screens. However, some settings are synchronized. The following table shows independent or synchronized adjustments or operation.Basic Operation✓: Independent adjustment availableOperation - IndependentAdjustmentRemarksPower ON/OFF - ✓Each RDP157 can be turned on or off.Range Scale - Synchronized All the stations show echoes in the same range scale.Auto and Manual Gain/Sea/Rain - SynchronizedAll the stations show echoes in the Auto or Manualmode with the same gain, sea, and rain settings.Mode Key - ✓See the following table for details.Alarm Key - ✓See the following table for details.FUNC Key - ✓-Menu Settings✓: Independent adjustment availableLayer 1 Layer 2 IndependentAdjustmentRemarksBrill/Color Echo Brill ✓- Rings Brill ✓-Mark Brill ✓-HL Brill ✓-Character Brill ✓-Viewing Position ✓-Display Color ✓-Echo Color ✓-Background Color ✓-Character Color ✓-Menu Transparency ✓-Echo Color Mode ✓-Custom Echo Color ✓- Display Display Mode ✓- Zoom ✓-Zoom Reference ✓-Off-Center Mode ✓-Save Off-Center ✓-Echo Area ✓-Text Display ✓-STBY Display ✓- Echo Auto SEA Synchronized - Echo Stretch ✓-Echo Average ✓-Noise Rejection Synchronized -Wiper ✓-Int Rejection Synchronized -Display-Curve Synchronized -Low Level Echo ✓- Alert Settings Target Alarm 1 ✓- Target Alarm 2 ✓-Target Alarm Level ✓-Watchman Synchronized -Panel Buzzer ✓-External Buzzer ✓-Alert Status ✓- Trail Gradation ✓- Color ✓-Reference ✓-Level ✓-Restart ✓-Narrow ✓-Own Ship ✓-Trail Erase ✓- Tuning Tuning Mode Synchronized - Manual Tuning Synchronized -Tune Initialization Synchronized - Others FUNC Setup ✓- WPT Mark ✓-EBL Reference ✓-VRM Unit ✓-Cursor Data ✓-TLL Mode ✓-Target Vector Time ✓- Vector Reference ✓-Past Positions ✓-Past Posn Interval ✓-CPA Synchronized -TCPA Synchronized -Proximity ✓- OS/Barge Mark OS Mark ✓- OS Length ✓-OS Beam ✓-Barge Mark ✓-Barge Position ✓-Barge Length ✓-Barge Beam ✓-Barge Arrangement ✓- TT Display ✓- Color ✓-Auto Acquisition Synchronized -Erase Lost Targets Synchronized -TT Erase Synchronized - AIS Display ✓- Color ✓-Number of Targets ✓-Sort By ✓-Range ✓-Sector Start ✓-Sector End ✓-Ignore Slow Targets ✓-Erase Lost Targets ✓- GPS Navigational Aid ✓- Datum ✓-Datum Number ✓-WAAS ✓-WAAS Number ✓-Satellite Monitor ✓-Self Test ✓-Cold Start ✓-Initial Key Beep ✓- Off-Center Speed ✓-Compass Type ✓-Range Preset ✓While the displayed range scale is synchronized between the RDP157 units, preset range values are independently adjustable on each unit.E.g. RDP157 No. 1 sets 3 NM range to OFF. RDP157 No. 2 sets 3 NM range to ON. When No. 2 is selected with the 3 NM range scale, No. 1 also shows echoes with the 3 NM range although 3 NM is not selectable from No. 1.Wind Direction ✓-NMEA Port 1 ✓-NMEA Port 2 ✓-NMEA Mixing Out ✓- Test Self Test ✓- LCD Test ✓-Radar Sensor Test ✓- Sector Blanks Sect-Blank 1 Status Synchronized - Sect-Blank 1 Start Synchronized -Sect-Blank 1 End Synchronized -Sect-Blank 2 Status Synchronized -Sect-Blank 2 Start Synchronized -Sect-Blank 2 End Synchronized - Units Range Unit Synchronized - Ship Speed Unit ✓-Depth Unit ✓-Temperature Unit ✓-Wind Speed Unit ✓- TT Multiple of detailed TTsettings…Synchronized - Installation Simulation ✓- Antenna Rotation Synchronized -Heading Alignment Synchronized -Sweep Timing Synchronized -MBS Adjustment Synchronized -Auto Install Setup Synchronized -Total On Time Synchronized The total time is stored in the antenna. Total TX Time Synchronized The total time is stored in the antenna.Memory ResetPartiallySynchronized-Factory Language ✓-Usage ✓-IMPORTANT NOTE: Some of the features listed above require external sensors to be connected(In example. Position/Heading/Nav Data)--- END --- Version date 3/27/20- All brand and product names are registered trademarks, trademarks or service marks of their respective holders.。
ACPL-332J
Description of Operation/运作描述1.Normal Operation/正常运作During normal operation, V OUT of the ACPL-332J is con-trolled by input LED current I F (pins 5, 6, 7 and 8), withthe IGBT collector-to-emitter voltage being monitoredthrough DDESAT. The FAULT output is high. See Figure 37.在正常运作状态,V OUT通过输入LED电流I F (pins 5, 6, 7 and 8)控制,同时IGBT集电极至发射极电压通过DDESAT进行检测。
故障输出“FAULT”为高电平, 见图37。
2.Fault Condition/故障状态The DESAT pin monitors the IGBT Vce voltage. When thevoltage on the DESAT pin exceeds 6.5 V while the IGBT ison, V OUT is slowly brought low in order to “softly” turn-offthe IGBT and prevent large di/dt induced voltages. Alsoactivated is an internal feedback channel which bringsthe FAULT output low for the purpose of notifying themicro-controller of the fault condition.DESAT 脚位检测IGBT V CE电压。
当DESAT 脚位电压超过6.5V而IGBT处于导通状态时,V OUT被缓慢降到低电平以“软”关断IGBT, 防止大的di/dt诱发性电压产生. 同时被激活的有内部反馈通道, 其将故障信号“FAULT”(FAULT拔) 输出为低电平以通知微控制器发生了故障状态.3.Fault Reset/故障清零Once fault is detected, the output will be muted for 5 μs(minimum). All input LED signals will be ignored duringthe mute period to allow the driver to completely softshut-down the IGBT. The fault mechanism can be reset bythe next LED turn-on after the 5us (minimum) mute time.See Figure 37.一旦故障被检测到,输出将会被闭锁5微秒(最少), 在闭锁期间,所有LED输入信号将会被忽略以使驱动完全软关断IGBT。
Discovery常见问题
Discovery软件其实就是一个工作平台,也就是将传统的地质制图工作作成了一体化的平台,如果你是初学者,那么,你可以多跑软件流程,同时,结合你具体的工区(project),来作练习。
如果你有较长的工作时间(油田研究院或者采油厂地质研究所),那么,在你加载完基本数据后,你就可以作很多基础的工作了。
比如,砂体厚度(储层)平面图,地层厚度、物性(孔隙度,渗透率)等等,这样会比传统的工作方法(手工)效率高很多。
关于具体的工作流程,Discovery软件中在建立工区时有个Workflow,Discovery 软件包括地震解释(SV)、测井解释(Prizm)、平面图(Goatlas)剖面图(Xsection),简单的叠后处理(Pstax),正演(GMAPlus),以及坐标系统,井数据库等等模块,但确实没有反演(Inversion)模块。
1、可是现在我的断层文件中只有Inline,Crossline,Faultname,time四列,没有X,Y坐标信息,还能加入马?我看你给的头文件中也没有提到Inline,Crossline。
其他的比如解释者等信息可以不加马?SV中加载断层文件确实比较复杂,在SV中加载断层文件(Fault Trace)必须要有X Y 坐标,反而没有InLine和CRLIne却是可以的。
这与一般的地震解释和反演软件有所区别。
也可以说是SV的一个缺点。
解决只有InLine和CrLine而没有X,Y的断层文件(Fault Trace)的办法有两个:(1)重新让解释人员给你输出,呵呵,这个办法最简单了:)(2)自己转换线道号为XY坐标,自己或者照别人编一个就行了,实在不会的话,在Excell里也可以转化的,转换的办法就是简单的集合运算,呵呵,我就不详细解释了:)提示:最好的办法还是按照我上次说的用默认格式输入,要不,你的断层(Fault segment)可能会出现混乱!2、层位和断层ASC码文件格式是:断层:fycWX1002 262 650 2062 7 1层位; 363(Inline) 415(Crossline) 1992(Time)断层和层位都没有X,Y坐标在Seisvision-》Horizon—》Horizon import中需要设置那些参数才能导入层位和断层。
Prototyping a GA Pipeline for Complete Hardware Evolution
2. Background and ivation
The design productivity gap in the electronic industry is a well known fact. How can the design community utilise the design capacity that technology is o ering and at the same time ensure it's correctness? To nd solutions to the problem of developing large and complex designs, new design paradigms are required 3]. One possible solution is to turn away from traditional design techniques following the various design and testing phases and instead allow hardware to evolve until a correct solution is found. Hardware evolution is based on evolutionary techniques developed in the eld of arti cial intelligence 4]. The required circuit design may be evolved using software simulation to evaluate intermediate solutions | Extrinsic evolution, or by evaluating intermediate solutions implemented in hardware | Intrinsic evolution.
4极永磁无刷直流电机仿真结果英文翻译
4极永磁无刷直流电机仿真结果BRUSHLESS PERMANENT MAGNET DC MOTOR DESIGNFile: Setup1.resGENERAL DATARated Output Power (kW):0.55 额定输出功率Rated Voltage (V):220 额定电压Number of Poles:4 极数Given Rated Speed (rpm):1500 给定额定转速Frictional Loss (W):11 摩擦损耗Windage Loss (W):0 风损Rotor Position:Inner 转子位置Type of Load:Constant Power 负载类型Type of Circuit:C2 控制电路类型Lead Angle of Trigger in Elec. Degrees:0 晶体管导通角Trigger Pulse Width in Elec. Degrees:120 导通脉宽One-Transistor Voltage Drop (V): 2 晶体管压降One-Diode Voltage Drop (V): 2 二极管压降Operating Temperature (C):75 运行温度Maximum Current for CCC (A):0Minimum Current for CCC (A):0STATOR DATANumber of Stator Slots:24 定子槽数Outer Diameter of Stator (mm): 120 定子外径Inner Diameter of Stator (mm): 75 定子内径Type of Stator Slot: 3 定子槽类型Stator Sloths0 (mm): 0.5hs1 (mm): 1hs2 (mm): 8.2bs0 (mm): 2.5bs1 (mm): 5.6bs2 (mm): 7.6rs (mm): 0Top Tooth Width (mm): 4.62351 齿顶宽度Bottom Tooth Width (mm): 4.78125 齿底宽度Skew Width (Number of Slots) 1 斜槽宽Length of Stator Core (mm): 65 定子铁心长度Stacking Factor of Stator Core:0.95 定子叠压系数Type of Steel:D23_50 定子材料Slot Insulation Thickness (mm): 0 槽绝缘厚度Layer Insulation Thickness (mm): 0 层绝缘厚度End Length Adjustment (mm): 0 端部长度调整Number of Parallel Branches:1Number of Conductors per Slot:60 每槽导体数Type of Coils:21 绕组类型Average Coil Pitch: 5 平均节距Number of Wires per Conductor:1 电线每导体数Wire Diameter (mm): 0.71 线径Wire Wrap Thickness (mm): 0.08 线绝缘厚度Slot Area (mm^2):59.42 槽面积Net Slot Area (mm^2):54.12 净槽面积Limited Slot Fill Factor (%):75 最大槽满率Stator Slot Fill Factor (%):69.1907 槽满率Coil Half-Turn Length (mm): 143.747 线圈半匝长ROTOR DATAMinimum Air Gap (mm): 0.5 最小气隙Inner Diameter (mm): 26Length of Rotor (mm): 65Stacking Factor of Iron Core:0.95 叠压系数Type of Steel:D23_50 转子材料Polar Arc Radius (mm): 37 极弧半径Mechanical Pole Embrace:0.7 机械极弧系数Electrical Pole Embrace:0.699985 电极弧系数Max. Thickness of Magnet (mm): 3.5 最大磁钢厚度Width of Magnet (mm): 38.7594 磁钢宽度Type of Magnet:XG196/96 磁钢材料Type of Rotor:1 转子类型Magnetic Shaft:No 转轴是否磁性PERMANENT MAGNET DATA 永磁材料参数Residual Flux Density (Tesla):0.96 剩磁密度Coercive Force (kA/m):690 矫顽力Maximum Energy Density (kJ/m^3):183 最大磁能积Relative Recoil Permeability:1 相对回复磁导率Demagnetized Flux Density (Tesla):5.85937e-005 退磁磁通密度Recoil Residual Flux Density (Tesla):0.867073 回复剩磁密度Recoil Coercive Force (kA/m):690.015 回复矫顽力MATERIAL CONSUMPTION 材料消耗Armature Copper Density (kg/m^3): 8900 电枢铜密度Permanent Magnet Density (kg/m^3): 7800 永磁材料密度Armature Core Steel Density (kg/m^3): 7820 电枢铁芯密度Rotor Core Steel Density (kg/m^3): 7820 转子铁芯密度Armature Copper Weight (kg): 0.729388 电枢铜重量Permanent Magnet Weight (kg): 0.275114 永磁材料重量Armature Core Steel Weight (kg): 2.63935 电枢铁心重量Rotor Core Steel Weight (kg): 1.44611 转子铁心重量Total Net Weight (kg): 5.08996 总重量Armature Core Steel Consumption (kg): 5.44721 电枢铁心消耗Rotor Core Steel Consumption (kg): 1.85836 转子铁心消耗STEADY STATE PARAMETERS 稳态参数Stator Winding Factor:0.879653 定子绕组系数D-Axis Reactive Inductance Lad (H):0.021587 直轴电枢反应电抗Q-Axis Reactive Inductance Laq (H):0.021587 交轴电枢反应电抗D-Axis Inductance L1+Lad(H):0.0281925 直轴同步电抗Q-Axis Inductance L1+Laq(H):0.0281925 交轴同步电抗Armature Leakage Inductance L1 (H):0.00660549 电枢绕组漏抗Zero-Sequence Inductance L0 (H):0 零序电抗Armature Phase Resistance R1 (ohm): 5.67264 电枢绕组相电阻Armature Phase Resistance at 20C (ohm): 4.6662 20度绕组相电阻D-Axis Time Constant (s):0.00380546 直轴时间常数Q-Axis Time Constant (s):0.00380546 交轴时间常数Ideal Back-EMF Constant KE (Vs/rad):0.981343 反电势常数Start Torque Constant KT (Nm/A):0.800227 启动转矩常数Rated Torque Constant KT (Nm/A):1.02912 额定转矩常数NO-LOAD MAGNETIC DATA 空载磁路数据Stator-Teeth Flux Density (Tesla): 1.61237 定子齿磁密Stator-Yoke Flux Density (Tesla): 1.16604 定子轭磁密Rotor-Yoke Flux Density (Tesla):0.728065 转子轭磁密Air-Gap Flux Density (Tesla):0.677341 气隙磁密Magnet Flux Density (Tesla):0.731645 磁钢磁密Stator-Teeth By-Pass Factor:0.00468801 定子齿旁路系数Stator-Yoke By-Pass Factor:3.45683e-005 定子轭旁路系数Rotor-Yoke By-Pass Factor: 2.00386e-005 转子轭旁路系数Stator-Teeth Ampere Turns (A.T):36.1578 定子齿安匝Stator-Yoke Ampere Turns (A.T):14.5864 定子轭安匝Rotor-Yoke Ampere Turns (A.T): 3.18795 转子轭安匝Air-Gap Ampere Turns (A.T):323.26 气隙安匝Magnet Ampere Turns (A.T):-377.204 磁钢磁势Armature Reactive Ampere Turns 电枢反应安匝at Start Operation (A.T):3647.8 启动安匝数Leakage-Flux Factor:1 漏磁系数Correction Factor for Magnetic 磁路修正系数Circuit Length of Stator Yoke:0.582455 定子轭磁路修正系数Correction Factor for MagneticCircuit Length of Rotor Yoke:0.793199 转子轭磁路修正系数No-Load Speed (rpm):2091.38 空载转速Cogging Torque (N.m): 6.36774e-013 齿槽转矩FULL-LOAD DATA 负载特性数据Average Input Current (A): 2.93027 平均负载电流Root-Mean-Square Armature Current (A): 1.95039 电枢电流有效值Armature Thermal Load (A^2/mm^3):58.7204 电枢热负荷Specific Electric Loading (A/mm):11.9199 电枢线负荷Armature Current Density (A/mm^2): 4.92624 电枢电流密度Frictional and Windage Loss (W):13.0778 风磨损耗Iron-Core Loss (W):28.9672 铁芯损耗Armature Copper Loss (W):43.1578 电枢铜耗Transistor Loss (W):8.92247 晶体管损耗Diode Loss (W):0.44813 二极管损耗Total Loss (W):94.5734 总损耗Output Power (W):550.085输出功率Input Power (W):644.659 输入功率Efficiency (%):85.3297 效率Rated Speed (rpm):1783.34 额定转速Rated Torque (N.m): 2.94556 额定转矩/负载Locked-Rotor Torque (N.m):40.3887 堵转转矩/启动转矩Locked-Rotor Current (A):50.559 启动电流WINDING ARRANGEMENT 绕组排列The 2-phase, 2-layer winding can be arranged in 6 slots as below: AAABBBAngle per slot (elec. degrees):30 每槽电角度Phase-A axis (elec. degrees):105 A相轴电角度First slot center (elec. degrees):0 第一槽中心角TRANSIENT FEA INPUT DATA 瞬态数据For Armature Winding: 电枢绕组Number of Turns:360 匝数Parallel Branches: 1 并联支路数Terminal Resistance (ohm): 5.67264 相电阻End Leakage Inductance (H):0.00252843 终端漏抗2D Equivalent Value: 二维分析用到的等效数据Equivalent Model Depth (mm):65 等效气隙长度Equivalent Stator Stacking Factor:0.95 等效定子叠压系数Equivalent Rotor Stacking Factor:0.95 等效转子叠压系数Equivalent Br (Tesla):0.867073 等效剩磁磁密Equivalent Hc (kA/m):690.015 等效矫顽力Estimated Rotor Moment of Inertia (kg m^2):0.00149257 转动惯量估计值。
rms数值模拟软件教程
RMS 初级培训教程北京万格迪信息技术有限公司Beijing Vangand IT Ltd. Co.,前言RMS是一个功能强大的油藏随机模拟软件,其有灵活多样地数据输入方式和多种模拟方法;该手册旨在对RMS用户进行初级培训。
手册中的数据输入和模拟方式以简单的地质情况为例,有关RMS详细的使用方法,请参考用户手册或随机帮助。
北京万格迪信息技术有限公司Beijing V angand IT Ltd. Co.,Tel:+86-10-62321436Fax:+86-10-623471951.关于RMS1.1 RMS功能简介:RMS 是一个较先进的油藏模拟软件。
通过精确的储层建模和油藏描述,确定储层的空间分布结构、沉积相空间展布状况,建立储层物性三维数据体、流体分布情况。
为提新井位提供直观而可信的参考资料,为老井开采方案的确定提供依据。
同时,RMS还能针对有利目标、帮助钻井工程完成精确而科学的钻井方案设计。
1.2 RMS工作流程及模块:模块相应功能1.3 RMS工作平台工程面板:数据的输入、输出、流程计算、模块运行Menu bar: 菜单条Data folder: 数据文件夹Jobs folder: 作业列表文件夹Workflous : 作业流程设计区域Properfies: 属性窗口多窗口显示面板:图形显示、编辑、图形文件的输出、图形的打印Menu bar: 菜单条Tool bar: 工具条Graphical display area: 显示区域1.4 RMS启动UNIX:%>RMSWindow:双击RMS或Start→programs→Roxar→RMS1.5 环境变量设置1.5.1 坐标系统设置Optiona→Project Coordinate system…→缺省选项为ANY,即本地区(X,Y,Z)坐标系统Create/edit coordinate system…→可设置或编辑新的地理或大地投影坐标系统。
四川拉拉铜矿床断层三维可视化模型
四川拉拉铜矿床断层三维可视化模型张达兵;李峰;汪德文【摘要】The faults in Lala Cu deposit have maj or effects on formation and occurrence status of ore-bodies. However,because of insufficient integrity level of historical geological data,the known faults are discontinu-ous spatially and the location on paper is inconsistent with its actual location.The author applies three-di-mensional geological modelling to solve the existed problems.Through comparing old and new geological da-ta and dividing phases of faults and completing the trace of faults,and by applying three-dimensional mining software of DIMINE,the author establishes a relatively completed fault three-dimensional visual model.%拉拉铜矿床的断层对矿体形成和赋存状态影响很大,但由于以往地质资料综合程度不够,断层一直存在空间上不连续以及位置与实际位置不符等问题。
笔者应用三维地质建模方法,针对以往存在的问题,通过重新整理对比新老地质资料,划分断层期次,完善断层迹线,并采用 DIMINE 三维矿业软件,建立了较为完善的断层三维可视化模型。
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Manuscript for ReviewModelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant Processor ArchitecturesJournal:Electronics LettersManuscript ID:ELL-2005-3160Manuscript Type:LetterDate Submitted by theAuthor:02-Sep-2005Complete List of Authors:Flint, James; Loughborough University, Dept of Electronic &Electrical EngineeringTouloupis, Emmanuel; Loughborough University, Electronic andElectrical EngineeringChouliaras, Vassilios; University of Loughborough, Electronic andElectrical EngineeringWard, David; MIRA Ltd.Keywords:VLSI, FAULT TOLERANT COMPUTING, TESTINGPage 1 of 13Modelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant ProcessorArchitecturesAddress for correspondenceJames A FlintDepartment of Electronic and Electrical EngineeringLoughborough UniversityLoughboroughLeicestershireLE11 3TUUKTelephone+44 (0)1509 227036Fax+44 (0)1509 227014EmailJ.A.Flint@KeywordsVLSIFAULT TOLERANT COMPUTINGTESTINGPage 2 of 13 Touloupis, Flint, Chouliaras and Ward: Modelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant Processor ArchitecturesModelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant ProcessorArchitecturesE. Touloupis, J. A. Flint, V. A. Chouliaras and D. D. WardAbstract:The fault-tolerant microprocessor systems used in safety-criticalapplications need to be thoroughly validated during the design stages. As feature sizesreduce in future CMOS technologies, there is an increased probability of transient andintermittent faults. This paper proposes a new model for multiple bit-flips in the timedomain, which can be used to target fault injection experiments. This extends thesingle or multiple bit-flip model that is currently used. Some results from faultinjection experiments on two different processor architectures are also presented toillustrate the applicability of this model.Introduction: Semiconductor materials are by their nature sensitive to ionisingradiation. Radiation-induced faults in microelectronic circuits are caused whencharged particles (usually from radiation belts or cosmic rays) lose energy by ionisingthe medium through which they pass, leaving behind electron-hole pairs. These faultsare known as Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and their effects on computer systems havebeen studied thoroughly [1]. The vast majority of SEUs generate transient faults andin rare cases permanent faults, which can affect the reliability and availability of thecomputer system by altering internally stored data. As geometries in CMOS processesshrink the sensitivity to radiation increases [2] due to lower supply voltages andsmaller electrical charges that constitute the stored data. Furthermore, the occurrencerate of on-chip electrical disturbances such as electromagnetic coupling between wiresalso increases due to the smaller distances between interconnects [3]. Finally, thePage 3 of 13Touloupis, Flint, Chouliaras and Ward: Modelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant Processor Architecturesincreasing clock frequencies increase the probability of latching a fault that occurs ona combinational circuit in the output memory element [4]. As a result, embeddedprocessor designers are increasingly employing fault-tolerant techniques to protect theinternal datapaths and storage elements. This practice is in addition to the well-established requirement to protect the memory blocks, which are generally consideredto be more susceptible to transient faults. An additional consequence of shrinkingfeature sizes and of increasing clock frequencies is the increased likelihood thatmultiple faults will occur from a single upset event. Fault-injection experiments onmicroprocessors found in the literature use only single bit-flips or concurrent multiplebit-flips [5, 6, 7]. Concurrent multiple bit-flips are often used in the evaluation offault-tolerant memories. However, memory arrays and memory elements associatedwith the non-programmer-visible state control logic (such as the pipeline stageregisters of a RISC CPU) affect the processor’s operation in a different way. For thatreason it is necessary to enhance the existing fault models with temporal parametersin order to efficiently validate the latter.Fault model:As has been explained, radiation-induced errors may occur in severalconsecutive clock cycles due to the characteristics of future CMOS sub-microntechnologies. Furthermore, these errors may occur in different locations, dependingon the different fault-propagating paths. Electromagnetic interference (EMI) with aperiodic form can also be a source of consecutive errors. In order to model non-concurrent multiple faults we propose the use of the normal distribution as a means ofselecting the occurrence cycle number for each fault. Each randomly selected faultoccurs at a cycle determined from the cumulative distribution function defined by:Touloupis, Flint, Chouliaras and Ward: Modelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant Processor Architectures∞− −−=x x dx e x y 22121)(σµσπ (1)Where µ is the mean fault injection cycle number, σ is the standard deviation and x is the cycle number. To select the cycle number at which to inject the fault into a particular pre-selected register, a sample is taken from a uniformly-distributed set of numbers in the interval 0 y(x) 1 and then x is determined from the inverse. The distribution function is plotted in Figure 1 for a mean error cycle of x = 50 and with several different standard deviations. It should be noted that there is a finite probability of the fault occurring outside the execution time of the program. In the event that this happens, another random number is selected according to the linear distribution function: MAX x xx y =)( (2)Where x MAX is the last execution cycle number being considered in the fault injection campaign. By using this scheme it is guaranteed that the chosen fault or faults will be injected only during the execution of the program, and in addition it forms a method for injecting concentrated or uniformly distributed individual or multiple faults. For small values of σ, the fault profile takes the form of the cumulative distribution function of (1) and as σ increases it tends towards the uniform distribution of (2). This approach is general, and is potentially useful for characterising the properties of microprocessors in a variety of scenarios.Fault injection experiments : Using the multiple fault model described above, we have performed a set of fault-injection campaigns on two different processor configurations: a 5-stage pipelined microprocessor that implements the SPARC v8 Page 4 of 13Page 5 of 13Touloupis, Flint, Chouliaras and Ward: Modelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant Processor Architecturesinstruction set (hereafter known as the simple architecture), and a fault-tolerantversion of the above processor that has a triplicated core [8]. We injected doublefaults on the pipeline registers only, while the processor was executing two differentbenchmark programs (mtx4x4, bitcnt). We also gathered information concerning theprocessor’s status and the results that were produced. 6000 pairs of faults wereinjected in each campaign, resulting in a total number of 240,000 simulations. SinceVHDL simulation times are long, only a limited number of values for were selected(Table 1). Pairs of faults that occur within 5 clock cycles are of particular interestbecause of the 5-stage pipeline, and can be considered as the result of a single particlestrike. A slightly larger interval between faults has been studied by setting equal to10. The value of 510 was chosen so that the fault interval is smaller or equal to theexecution time of the shortest benchmark (mtx4x4). For each pair of faults, israndomly selected within the program execution time. Figures 2 and 3 present thepercentage of the injected faults that caused the simple and the fault-tolerantarchitecture respectively to produce wrong results. Whilst some of the information inthis study is quite clear and indeed, expected, such as the fact that the fault tolerantcore has a much better overall reliability, much more detail is revealed by conductingthis study. In this example the variations observed in Fig. 3 for different values ofreveal that for the fault tolerant architecture the timing of fault occurrence has asignificant impact on the system behaviour. Similar variations can be observed to asmaller extent in Fig. 2 for the simple architecture. Fault-tolerant systems and faultdetection mechanisms in general have a critical period after the occurrence of a faultwhere this fault is masked or corrected. With the use of this model the effects of asecond fault during this period can be studied efficiently. The results give anindication about the likely effect of transients when contrasted with the performancePage 6 of 13 Touloupis, Flint, Chouliaras and Ward: Modelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant Processor Architecturesunder uniformly distributed random faults. By carrying out a study of this type andstudying the temporal combination of faults that generates the wrong results, it ispossible to identify weaknesses in the design, which can be targeted for improvement.Conclusion: In this paper we have presented a general fault model for examiningmultiple faults in the time domain. The distribution of faults around a predefined timecan be adjusted through a single parameter. Fault injection campaigns on differentprocessor architectures implemented using this approach demonstrate the processor’sbehaviour under multiple fault injection and how the timing intervals between faultscan affect the behaviour of the system under study. This model can be used for anynumber of faults for the validation of digital systems where timing of faults plays animportant role.Authors’ affiliation:E. Touloupis, J. A. Flint and V. A. Chouliaras, Department of Electronic Engineering,Loughborough University, Ashby Road, Loughborough, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU,United KingdomD. D. Ward, MIRA Ltd, Watling Street, Nuneaton, Warwickshire, CV10 0TU, UnitedKingdomAcknowledgementThe authors wish to thank MIRA Ltd for funding this research.Page 7 of 13Touloupis, Flint, Chouliaras and Ward: Modelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant Processor ArchitecturesReferences[1] J. F. Ziegler, H. W. Curtis, H. P. Muhlfeld, C. J. Montrose, B. Chin, M. Nicewicz,C. A. Russell, W. Y. Wang, L. B. Freeman, P. Hosier, L. E. LaFave, J. L. Walsh, J.M. Orro, G. J. Unger, J. M. Ross, T. J. O'Gorman, B. Messina, T. D. Sullivan, A. J.Sykes, H. Yourke, T. A. Enger, V. Tolat, T. S. Scott, A. H. Taber, R. J. Sussman, W.A. Klein and C. W. Wahaus, “IBM experiments in soft fails in computer electronics,”IBM Journal of Research and Development, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 3–18, January 1996.[2] C. Constantinescu, “Trends and challenges in VLSI circuit reliability,” IEEEMicro, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 14–19, July – August 2003.[3] E. Dupont, M. Nicolaidis and P. Rohr, “Embedded robustness IPs for transient-error-free ICs,” IEEE Design & Test of Computers, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 56–70, May2002.[4] F. Irom and F. F. Farmanesh, “Frequency dependence of single-event upset inadvanced commercial PowerPC microprocessors,” IEEE Trans. on Nuclear Science,vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 3505–3509, December 2004.[5] M. Rebaudengo, M. Sonza Redonda and M. Violante, “Accurate analysis of singleevent upsets in a pipelined microprocessor,” Journal of Electronic Testing: Theoryand Applications, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 577–584, October 2003.[6] R. Velazco, S. Rezgui and R. Ecoffet, “Predicting error rate for microprocessor-based digital architectures through C.E.U. (code emulating upsets) injection,” IEEETrans. on Nuclear Science, vol. 47, no. 6, pp. 2405-2411, December 2000.[7] E. Jean, J. Arlat, M. Rimén, J. Ohlsson and J. Karlsson, “Fault injection intoVHDL models: The MEFISTO tool,” in Proc. of the 24th Annual InternationalSymposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing, pp. 66-75, 1994.Page 8 of 13 Touloupis, Flint, Chouliaras and Ward: Modelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant Processor Architectures[8] E. Touloupis, J. A. Flint, V. A. Chouliaras and D. D. Ward, “A fault-tolerantprocessor core architecture for safety-critical automotive applications,” Presented atthe SAE 2005 World Congress & Exhibition.Page 9 of 13Touloupis, Flint, Chouliaras and Ward: Modelling Multiple Faults in Fault-Tolerant Processor ArchitecturesFigure CaptionsFigure 1: Example of cumulative normal distribution functions for =50.Figure 2: Wrong results generated vs. level of fault distribution for the simpleprocessor.Figure 3: Wrong results generated vs. level of fault distribution for the fault-tolerantprocessor.Table CaptionsTable 1: Values of in fault-injection experiments.Figure 1Concurrent The two faults are concurrent= 0.83 99% of the two faults occur within 5 clock cycles= 10 99% of the two faults occur within 60 clock cycles= 510 99% of the two faults occur within 3056 clock cyclesUniform The time of the two faults is chosen by using a uniform distribution。