Ch11货币金融学 米什金 第七版

4.Bank Supervision: Chartering and Examination （银行监管：注册与检查） .Reduces adverse selection problem of risk takers or undesirable people owning banks Reduces moral hazard by preventing risky activities CAMELS rating system(骆驼氏评级体系): capital adequacy(资本充足率), asset quality(资产质量), management(管理状况), earnings(收益), liquidity(流动性), sensitivity to market risk(市场风险敏感度)
8. Restrictions on Competition to Reduce RiskTaking（对竞争的限制）
A. restriction on branching（分支机构）, reduced competition between banks B. preventing nonbank institutions from competing with banks Disavantages( Restrictions on Competition) : higher charges to consumer ; decreased the efficiency of banking institutions International Banking Regulation 1. Bank regulation abroad similar to ours 2. Particular problem of regulating international banking
2.
Restrictions on Asset Holdings（对持有资产的 限制） A. Reduces moral hazard of too much risk taking
3. Bank Capital Requirements（银行资本金要求） A. Reduces moral hazard: banks have more to lose when have higher capital B. Higher capital means more collateral for FDIC Bank Capital Requirements take two forms: leverage ratio(杠杆比率): 1/EM = capital/assets Risk-based capital requirements (capital adequacy 资本充足率): capital/risk-weighted assets ≥8%
§1.Asymmetric Information and Bank Regulation
Government Safety Net ：Deposit Insurance（政府安 全网：存款保险） Restrictions on Asset Holdings（对持有资产的限制） Bank Capital Requirements（银行资本金要求） Bank Supervision: Chartering and Examination（银 行监管：注册与检查） Assessment of risk management（风险管理评估） Disclosure Requirements （信息披露要求） Consumer Protection（消费者保护） Restrictions on competition（对竞争的限制）
chapter 11
Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation
In this chapter, we develop an economic analysis of why regulation of banking takes the form it does. Unfortunately, the regulatory process may not always work very well, as evidenced by recent crises in the banking systems, not only in the United States but in many countries throughout the world. We also use our economic analysis of banking regulation to explain the worldwide crises in banking and how the regulatory system can be reformed to prevent future disasters.
5. Assessment of Risk Management
（风险管理评估）
Four elements of sound risk management are assessed to come up with the risk management rating: (1) The quality of oversight provided by the board of directors and senior management(董事会和高级管理层实施监管的质 量） (2) the adequacy of policies and limits for all activities that present significant risks（对所有具有重大风险的业务活动的 政策和限制措施的有效性） (3) the quality of the risk measurement and monitoring systems（风险度量和监管体系的质量） (4) the adequacy of internal controls to prevent fraud or unauthorized activities on the part of employees.（预防雇员 欺诈和从事未被授权的活动的内部控制措施是否得当）
(A) bank failure(银行破产）⇒ depositors would be reluctant to put money in the bank ⇒bank less viable (B) depositors’ lack of information about the quality of bank asset ⇒bank panics（银行恐慌）
Two methods to handle a failed bank:
payoff(偿付法) ;purchase and assumption（购买和接管法）
B. Creates moral hazard incentives for banks to take on too much risk C. Creates adverse selection problem of crooks and risk-takers wanting to control banks D. “Too Big to Fail” (银行太大不能倒闭)increases moral hazard incentives for big banks
1 .Government Safety Net and Deposit Insurance
A. Prevents bank runs due to asymmetric information: depositors can’t tell good from bad banks Two reasons why the banking system might not function well:
New bank:
submit application （提交申请） ⇒evaluating the application（评估） ⇒charter （ 批 准 ） ⇒ call reports （ 提 交 报 告 ） ⇒examination (at least once a year)（检查） Bank Examiner National banks OCC member State banks Fed Nonmember state banks FDIC
会（S&Ls）的净值 ↓）
行倒闭 ↑和风险性贷款 ↑）
Later Stages: Regulatory Forbearance（监管宽容）
1. Regulators allow insolvent S&Ls to operate because（选择监管宽容的处理方法的原因） A. Insufficient funds（没有充足的保险资金） B. FHLBB cozy with S&Ls（监管人与被监管人员的 关系太亲密） “僵尸储贷协会” C. Sweep problems under rug（掩饰问题） 2. Huge increase in moral hazard for zombie S&Ls （指还在经营但已经资不抵债的S&Ls ：living dead活 死人）: now have incentive to “betting the bank”（拿银行下 赌注） 3. Zombies hurt healthy S&Ls（活死人从健康的储贷协 会吸取利润 ） 4. Outcome: Huge losses（结果：巨大损失） Competitive Equality in Banking Act of 1987 （1987年《银 行平等竞争法》）
6.Disclosure Requirements （信息披露要 求） 7.Consumer Protection（消费者保护）
Truth in lending（诚实信贷） : Consumer Protection Act(消费者保护法1969) Standardized interest rates (APR) Regulation Z Prevent discrimination（禁止歧视）: Equal Credit Opportunity Act(信贷机会均等法 1974) ; Regulation B; Community Reinvestment Act(社区 Banking Crisis:Why?
§2.The 1980s U.S Banking Crisis:Why?
Early Stages（危机早期）
1. Decreasing profitability: banks take risk to keep profits up（利润下降: ⇒ 寻找新的、有
潜在风险的业务以保持利润水平） 松管制的新立法⇒高风险活动↑）
2. Deregulation in 1980 and 1982, more opportunities for risk taking（1980，1982,放 3. Innovation of brokered deposits（经纪人存 款） enabled circumvention of $100,000 insurance limit 4. π ↑ i ↑, net worth of S&Ls ↓（π ↑ i ↑, 储贷协 Result: Bank Failures ↑ and risky loans ↑（银
§ 3.Political Economy of S&L Crisis
Explanation: Principal-Agent Problem（监管者与政府官员 之间的委托——代理问题） 1. Regulators influenced by politicians and desire to avoid blame（试图逃避监管不力的指责）