美国历年失业率unemployment

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失业理论题库42概念题

1．自然失业率（natural rate of unemployment）答：自然失业率又称“有保证的失业率”、“正常失业率”、“充分就业失业率”等，它是经济围绕其波动的平均失业率，是经济在长期中趋近的失业率，是充分就业时仍然保持的失业水平。

自然失业率是在没有货币因素干扰的情况下，让劳动市场和商品市场自发供求力量起作用时，总供给和总需求处于均衡状态时的失业率。

所谓“没有货币因素干扰”，指的是失业率的高低与通货膨胀率的高低之间不存在替代关系。

自然失业率决定于经济中的结构性和摩擦性的因素，取决于劳动市场的组织状况、人口组成、失业者寻找工作的能力愿望、现有工作的类型、经济结构的变动、新加入劳动者队伍的人数等众多因素。

任何把失业降低到自然失业率以下的企图都将造成加速的通货膨胀。

任何时候都存在着与实际工资率结构相适应的自然失业率。

自然失业率是弗里德曼对菲利普斯曲线发展的一种观点，他将长期的均衡失业率称为“自然失业率”，它可以和任何通货膨胀水平相对应，且不受其影响。

2．失业保障（unemployment insurance）答：失业保障指失业工人在失去工作后，可以在某一时期内得到自己工资的一个比例的计划。

失业保障这个计划的好处是减少了工人对自己收入的不确定性。

此外，使工人可以拒绝所提供的没有吸引力的工作，也会使工人和工作之间更为匹配。

但是，失业保障增加了摩擦性失业的数量，并提高了自然失业率。

那些得到失业保障津贴的失业者寻找新工作的压力小了，并很可能放弃所提供的没有吸引力的工作。

这两种行为变化都降低了就业率。

此外，由于工人知道他们的收入受到失业保障的部分保护，所以，他们不太愿意去寻找有稳定就业前景的工作，也不太愿意就工作安全保障去讨价还价。

这些行为变化提高了离职率。

因此，评价不同失业保障制度的成本与收益是一个困难的任务，也是许多研究一直关注的问题。

3．局内人与局外人（insiders versus outsiders）答：局内人是那些已经被企业雇佣的工人，一般都想使企业保持高工资。

主要内容：自然失业率摩擦性失业结构性失业如何产生劳动力市场的均衡最低工资法失业

对于十几岁的青年人来说，情况还要糟得多。就业
市场原本就对年轻人不甚友好，现在的情况可想而
知。官方提供的十几岁的劳动力的失业率目前为 26%，与一年前创纪录的27%相去不远。
更要命的是，大多数十几岁的年轻人，即便是无所事事，现在也不愿意出来找工作，因此他们也就没有被计入失业人口。截至九月底，十几岁的年轻人当中只有25%的人拥有一份工作，为历史最低水平。要知道，一代人的时间之前，有接近50%的十几岁的年轻人都在工作，在大约十年前的1999年，这一比例也还超过45%。
5. Economists have found evidence that receiving unemployment-insurance benefits
a. decreases the job-search effort of the unemployed.
b. has no effect on the job-search effort of the unemployed.
Cyclical unemployment refers to the year-to-year fluctuations in unemployment around its natural rate.
The government places each adult in each household into one of three groups.
成千上万的年轻人找不到自己的第一份工作，因此也就无法获得学习必要技能的机会，而后者对于他们的第二份工作显然是至关重要的。
缺乏经验这一重大缺陷可以让人在未来的许多年当中都遭受影响，让他们未来十年乃至更长的时间当中的收入缩水。
国际劳动组织表示，年轻人口中的高失业率是一种全球性的趋势，这就意味着导致这一局面发生的原因并非美国所独有。

世界各国失业率和自然失业率的比较

世界各国失业率和自然失业率的比较自然失业率：自然失业率（natural rate of unemployment）：指充分就业下的失业率。

自然失业率就是指在没有货币因素影响下，劳动力市场和商品市场自发供求力量发挥作用时应有的处于均衡状态的失业率，也就是充分就业情况下的失业率。

包括摩擦性失业和结构性失业。

摩擦性失业是在生产过程中，由于暂时的不可避免的摩擦而导致的失业。

结构性失业是劳动力供给结构与劳动力需求结构不一致造成的失业。

自然失业率为摩擦性失业率及结构性失业率加总之和。

由于人口结构的变化、技术的进步、人们的消费偏好改变等等因素，社会上总会存在着摩擦性失业和结构性失业。

就长期而言，景气循环带来的失业情形常会消弭无踪，社会上只留下自然失业现象，"自然"的定义并不明确，没有人能明确的指出一个社会的自然失业率是多少，它会随着人口结构的变化、技术进步、产业升级而变化，以台湾地区而言，一般认为自然失业率是介于1.5%～2.5%之间。

各国失业率：国际劳工组织近日称，全世界年轻人的失业率猛增，达到创记录的水平。

一项新的调查显示，大约有8800万15岁至24岁的年轻人没有工作，比10年前增加了百分之二十五。

全球年轻穷人1.3亿。

国际劳工组织的报告说，年轻人占15岁至64岁就业年龄人口的四分之一。

但是他们几乎占了1.86亿失业人口的一半。

国际劳工组织技术和就业部主任詹妮·斯图尔特说，在全世界5.5亿有工作的穷人当中，有1.3亿是年轻人。

他们的收入甚至无法让自己和家人的生活提高到一美元一天的贫困线以上。

她说："如果我们把现在百分之十四点四的年轻人失业率减少一半，也就是减到百分之七点二，我们实际上将为全世界的国民生产总值贡献2.2万亿美元。

"报告发现年轻妇女更难就业。

那些可以找到工作的不得不接受糟糕的工作环境，诸如较长的工作时间，低薪水，没有社会保障和其它福利。

欧盟：德国联邦劳动局宣布的德国今年一月份失业率震动了朝野各界，462.3万的失业人数创下了社会民主党与绿党联合执政五年来的最高记录。

美国历年失业率

非农数据日期：2012年5月22日摘要失业率是当今社会最为关注的民生问题，西方各国政府每到选举换届的时候，他们的候选人都会拿出自己关于控制失业的目标。

可见失业率在各国政府心目中的重要性。

失业率的高低可以体现政府的执政能力，可以获得民众的好感，而且失业率还会间接的反映一国经济的好坏，从而影响投资者的投资行为。

所以此次我挑选了失业率为我研究的方向，而众所周知美国是世界第一大经济体，它的经济形势的好坏可以决定着全球经济的发展方向，故我的研究重点就是美国的失业率。

本次的研究成果：第一，通过历史比较分析，了解美国的经济这情况。

第二，通过分析美国的失业，分析美国社会男女的竞争力。

第三，美国的相关失业保障。

关键词：政策效果，失业率，福利，失业原因2012年3月9日，世界各个投资者的目光都投向了美国的劳工统计局即将公布的非农数据。

美国是全球第一大经济体，它的好坏决定了全球经济的走向。

美国在每月的第一个周五晚公布，夏令时是北京时间晚8：30，冬令时是北京时间晚9：30公布非农数据。

非农数据就是指美国的非农业人口的失业率即美国城镇人口的失业率。

2012年3月9号，美国劳工统计局公布了2月份的非农数据报告，为8.3%，相比于一月份没有变化。

这个也说明了美国经济的逐渐回升，这一数据让人们对美国经济重新有了信心。

非农数据主要是由两方面的数据组成。

一，家庭统计数据：家庭统计数据的来源主要是从那些年龄在16周岁以上的农业工人，个体户，不付费的家庭工作者，被雇佣的私人家庭工作者。

二，机构单位统计调查数据：机构单位统计调查数据的来源主要是工厂,办公室和商店,以及联邦、州和地方政府机构。

以这两个数据作为主要数据的原因是：•一，家庭统计数据相对于机构单位统计调查数据有着更大的范围，它包括：个体户，无酬家庭工作人员，农业工人，私人家庭工作这些都是被机构单位统计调查数据排除在外的，另外家庭调查还提供了就业人群的估计。

•二，家庭统计调查包括了农业工人，个体户，不付费的家庭工作者，被雇佣的私人家庭工作者。

美国主要经济指标解读与公布时间

美国主要经济指标解读与公布时间:由于美圆在外汇市场中的地位，以及绝大多数的外汇交易都是以美圆为中心的交易等原因，美国的经济数据在汇市中最为引人注目。

以下是一些重要经济指标的理论上的观察方法和结论，但在实际运用中情况会复杂得多：1.国内生产总值（GDP）：是指某一国在一定时期其境内生产的全部最终产品和服务的总值。

反映一个国家总体经济形势的好坏，与经济增长密切相关，被大多数西方经济学家视为“最富有综合性的经济动态指标”。

主要由消费、私人投资、政府支出、净出口额四部分组成。

数据稳定增长，表明经济蓬勃发展，国民收入增加，有利于美圆汇率；反之，则利淡。

一般情况下，如果GDP连续两个季度下降，则被视为衰退。

此数据每季度由美国商务部进行统计，分为初值、修正值、终值。

一般在每季度末的某日北京时间21：30公布前一个季度的终值。

2.工业生产（INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION）：指某国工业生产部门在一定时间内生产的全部工业产品的总价值。

在国内生产总值中占有很大比重。

由于工业部门雇佣了大量工人，其变动对整个国民经济有着重大影响，与汇率呈正相关。

尤其以制造业为代表。

此数据由美联储统计并在每月15日左右晚间21：15或22；15发布。

3.失业率（UNEMPLOYMENT RATE）：经济发展的晴雨表，与经济周期密切相关。

数据上升说明经济发展受阻，反之则看好。

对于大多数西方国家来说，失业率在4%左右为正常水平，但如果超过9%，则说明经济处于衰退。

此数据由美国劳工部编制，每月第一个周五21：30公布。

4.贸易赤字（TRADE DIFICIT）：国际间的贸易是构成经济活动的重要环节。

当一国出口大于进口时称为贸易顺差；反之，称逆差。

美国的贸易数据一直处于逆差状态，重点是在赤字的扩大或缩小。

赤字扩大不利于美圆，反之则有利。

此数据由美国商务部编制，每月中、下旬某日晚间21：30公布前一个月数字。

5.经常项目收支：经常帐为一国收支表上的主要项目，内容记载一国与外国包括因为商品/劳务进出口、投资所得、其他商品与劳务所得以及片面转移等因素所产生的资金流出与流入的状况。

各种经济指标的解释说明

各种经济指标的解释说明1. ISM：美国供应治理学会,它是由美国供应治理协会公布的重要数据，对反映美国经济繁荣度及美元走势均有重要阻碍.ISM指数分为供应治理协会制造业指数和供应治理协会非制造业指数两项。

a、供应治理协会制造业指数供应治理协会制造业指数由一系列分项指数组成，其中以采购经理人指数最具有代表性。

该指数是反映制造业在生产、订单、价格、雇员、交货等各方面综合进展状况的晴雨表，通常以50为临界点，高于50被认为是制造业处于扩张状态，低于50则意味着制造业的萎缩，阻碍经济增长的步伐。

b、供应治理协会非制造业指数供应治理协会非制造业指数反映的是美国非制造业商业活动的繁荣程度，当其数值连续位于50以上水平常，说明非制造业活动扩张，价格上升，往往预示着整体经济正处于一个扩张状态；反之，当其数值连续位于50以下水平常，往往预示着整体经济正处于一个收缩状态。

美国供应治理协会（the Institute for Supply Management，ISM）是全球最大、最权威的采购治理、供应治理、物流治理等领域的专业组织。

该组织立于1915年，其前身是美国采购治理协会（the National Association of Purchasing Managers of US.），目前拥有会员45000多名、179个分会，是全美最受尊崇的专业团体之一。

数据由供应治理协会（ISM）每月初某日公布。

供应治理协会制造业指数由一系列分项指数组成，其中以“采购经理人指数”最具有代表性。

采购经理人指数（Purchase Management Index）是衡量制造业在生产、新订单、商品价格、存货、雇员、订单交货、新出口订单和进口等八个范畴的状况。

采购经理人指数是以百分比来表示，常以50%作为经济强弱的分界点：即当指数高于50%时，被说明为经济扩张的讯号。

当指数低于50%，专门是专门接近40%时，则有经济萧条的担忧。

它是领先指标中一项专门重要的附属指针，市场较为看重美国采购经理人指数，它是美国制造业的体检表，在全美采购经理人指数公布前，还会公布芝加哥采购经理人指数，这是全美采购经理人指数的一部分，市场往往会就芝加哥采购经理人的表现来对全国采购经理人指数做出预期。

曼昆宏观经济学第28章失业与自然失业率

Unemployment and Its Natural Rate失业与自然失业率28失业的分类•失业问题通常分为两类。

•长期与短期：The natural rate of unemployment 自然失业率The cyclical rate of unemployment 周期性失业率自然失业率•自然失业率是在长期中不会自行消失的失业率。

它是经济中正常情况下存在的失业量。

周期性失业率•周期性失业率是指失业量围绕其自然失业率的逐年波动。

•它与经济活动的短期上升和下降密切相关。

描述失业三个基本问题:°如何衡量经济的失业率?±如何解释观察到的失业数据?²如何治理失业如何衡量失业？•衡量失业是劳工统计局(BLS)的工作。

它每月调查6万个随机挑选的家庭。

这种调查被称为现期人口调查。

根据对调查的回答，劳工统计局把每个受调查家庭中的每个成员（16岁以上）划入三类：Employed 就业者Unemployed 失业者Not in the labor force 非劳动力人口如何衡量失业？•美国劳工统计局把16岁或16岁以上的人看为成年人。

•如果一个人前一周的大部分时间用于有酬工作，这个人就被当作就业者。

•如果一个人暂时被解雇，正在寻找工作或等待新工作开始的日子，这个人就是失业者。

•如果一个人不属于前两类中的任何一类，这个人就是非劳动力人口，例如全日制学生、家务劳动者或退休者。

如何衡量失业？•劳动力–劳动力——既包括就业者又包括失业者的工人总量。

–劳工统计局把劳动力定义为就业者与失业者之和。

图2. 1960年以来的失业率108642019701975196019651980198519902005Percent ofLabor Force19952000Natural rate ofunemployment Unemployment rate劳动力百分比自然失业率失业率图3. 1950年以来男人与妇女的劳动力参工率1008060402001950195519601965197019751980198519902000劳动力百分比（％）Women男人1995中国失业率统计现状•目前，中国官方惟一定期发布的失业率为“城镇登记失业率”。

实证分析失业率与通货膨胀率的关系

Financial View | 金融视线MODERN BUSINESS现代商业130实证分析失业率与通货膨胀率的关系江俊瑶1　朱琳21.重庆人文科技学院重庆　4015242.重庆水利电力职业技术学院　重庆　402160摘要:失业率和通货膨胀率作为宏观经济中重要的参考研究指标，菲利普斯曲线充分反映了其二者的关系。

近年来，菲利普斯曲线逐渐失效。

本文通过收集1948年到2020年6月的美国的失业率与通货膨胀率的数据，进行回归分析，讨论菲利普斯曲线是否还存在此消彼长的关系。

最后，根据其结论做出总结以及两者的发展趋势。

关键词:失业率；通货膨胀率；菲利普斯曲线中图分类号:F831 文献识别码:A 文章编号:1673-5889(2020)29-0130-03一、引言宏观经济研究中，失业率和通货膨胀率对弄清经济状况至关重要。

作为宏观经济调控的关键指标，两者都反映一个国家的总体经济状况。

一方面，失业率从一定程度上反映当前社会闲置的劳动力；另一方面，当失业率较高时，则意味着当前社会的经济并不乐观。

当然，这并不意味着失业率越低，经济就越好。

通货膨胀率是指一段时间内商品物价平均水平的上升幅度。

在研究过程中，通常使用消费者价格指数(CPI)来代表通货膨胀率(Scott，2015)。

研究失业率以及通货膨胀率可以更好地发现当前的经济发展环境并根据其具体状况制定相关政策(特别是货币政策)。

此外，稳定通货膨胀率和减少失业率一直是政府的宏观调控目标。

政府可以将当前的政治以及经济状况与分析预测相结合，以制定适当政策，从而促进经济增长。

1958年，新西兰经济学家威廉·菲利普斯在《1861-1957年英国失业和货币工资变动率之间的关系》一文中最先提出了菲利普斯曲线，反映了通货膨胀率与失业率的关系，表明失业与通货膨胀存在一种交替关系的曲线，基本关系为通货膨胀率高时，失业率低；通货膨胀率低时，失业率高。

近年来，越来越多的经济学家指出通货膨胀率与失业率之间的关系不再适用菲利普斯曲线，其交替关系的曲线趋于平缓。

失业 Unemployment

基于对调查问题的回答，劳工统计局将每个成年人归入三种类型之一： Based on the answers to the survey y questions, the BLS places each adult into one of three categories:

失业是如何衡量的？ How is Unemployment Measured?
失业是如何衡量的？ How is Unemployment Measured?
失业率按劳动力中失业者的百分比来计算。 The unemployment rate is calculated as the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed.

What problems arise in interpreting the unemployment data?
失业者没有工作的时间一般是多长？
How long are the unemployed typically without work?
7
8
失业是如何衡量的？ How is Unemployment Measured?
5

周期性失业指的是失业围绕其自然失业率的逐年波动。 y unemployment p y refers to the y year-toCyclical year fluctuations in unemployment around its natural rate. 它和经济周期的短期上升和下降相联系。 It is associated with short-term ups and downs of the business cycle.

第十二章失业与通货膨胀理论[鲍步云主编《西方经济学(宏观部分)》]中国科学技术大学出版社2016年版

* N s U* L s f
例某月1% 的雇员失去工作，s=1%；同时19%的失业者找到工作，f=19%。则自然失业率为5%。
四、非自然失业的成因
(一) 有效需求不足论有效需求不足论(theory of insufficient effective demand)认为，失业是由于有效需求不足导致的。原因：紧缩性缺口。紧缩性缺口是指在实际总需求小于充分就业时的总需求时的状况。根据凯恩斯的分析，就业水平取决于国民收入水平，而国民收入又取决于总需求。周期性失业就是由于总需求不足而引起的短期失业，它一般出现在经济周期的萧条阶段。凯恩斯分析的非自愿失业正是这种周期性失业。
(三) 技术进步论
技术进步论(theory of technical progress)认为，技术进步会引起失业。
原因：第一，生产自动化的发展，必然减少对劳动的需求，使失业增加。第二，在经济增长过程中，资本品相对价格的下降和劳动力相对价格的上升加剧了机器取代工人的趋势，从而也就加重了这种失业。
n P P 2t Pnt P 1t CPI (a1 a2 an ) 100% ai it 100% i 1 P P20 Pn 0 Pi 0 10
其中：Pit为第i种消费品或劳务的计算期价格 Pi0为第i种消费品或劳务的基期价格 ai为基期用于第i种消费品或劳务的支出占全部消费支出的比重
第十二章
失业与通货膨胀理论
第一节失业
第二节通货膨胀
第三节通货膨胀的成因与经济效应第四节失业与通货膨胀的关系第五节失业治理的宏观经济政策第六节通货膨胀治理的宏观经济政策
了解失业的含义、失业的社会经济影响以及失业的形成
原因;

经济指标名词解释

经济指标名词解释失业率：Unemployment 他作为反映一国宏观经济的晴雨表，预示着该国当前与前景发展的好坏，势必影响了货币政策的制定，对汇率产生重大影响。

非农就业人口：Nonfarm payroll employment 美国的就业报告数字，与失业率一同公布，通常公布时间为每月第一周的周五。

国民生产总值：GNP 目前各国每季度公布一次，它以货币的形式表现了该国在一个时期内所有部门的全部生产和服务的综合，是不同经济数据的综合表现，反映了当前经济发展的状况。

生产价格（物价）指数：PPI 显示了商品的成本（生产原材料价格的变化），对未来商品价格的变化，从而影响了今后消费的价格，消费心理的改变。

消费价格（物价）指数：CPI 反映了消费者目前所花费在商品和劳务等的价格变化，显示了通货膨胀的变化状况，是人们观察该国通货膨胀的一项重要指标。

个人收入：Personal Income 包括一切从工资及社会福利所取得的收入，反映了该国个人的实际购买力水平，预示了未来消费者对于商品，服务等需求的变化。

个人消费支出：Personal Consumption Expenditures 包括个人购买商品和劳务两方面的支出，是衡量居民消费支出的重要指标。

消费信心指数：反映该国国民对其经济发展的看好程度，预示了未来消费支出的变化。

工业生产指数：Industrial Production 工业生产指数反映了该国生产和制造业的总生产情况。

住房开工率：Housing Starts 衡量该国建筑业活跃程度的指标，由于建筑业为经济发展变化周期中的先导产业，预示未来经济的变化。

采购经理人指数: PMI 反映制造业在生产，订单，价格，雇员，交货等各方面综合发展状况的晴雨表，通常以50%为分界线，高于50%被认为是制造业的扩张，低于50%则意味着经济的萎缩。

全美采购经理人协会指数：NAPM 美国的采购经理人指数，与芝加哥采购经理人指数在前后两天公布。

通货膨胀与失业之间的短期权衡取舍宏观经济政策的六个争论问题PPT课件

通货膨胀与失业之间的短期权衡取舍宏观经济政策的六个争论问题
失业与通货膨胀 Unemployment and Inflation
通胀与失业的关系这一话题吸引了过去半个世纪最重要的一些经济学家的注意力。 The relationship between inflation and unemployment is a topic that has attracted attention of some of the most important economists of the last half-century.
(a) AD－AS模型 The Model of AD and AS
(b) 菲利普斯曲线 The Phillips Curve
Price Level
106 102
短期AS
Short-run Inflation Rate
AS
(percent per
B
高AD
year)
6
B
A
High AD
0 7,500
(unemployment is 7%)
低AD Low AD
Quantity
of Output
8,000
(unemployment
is 4%)
2
0
4
(output is
8,000)
A
菲利普斯曲线 Phillips curve
7
Unemployment
(output is Rate (percent)
7,500)
通货膨胀与失业之间的短期权衡取舍宏观经济政策的六个争论问题
通货膨胀与失业之间的短期权衡取舍宏观经济政策的六个争论问题
失业与通货膨胀：长期 Unemployment and Inflation: The

6.失业

失业的人找到Байду номын сангаас作将是迅速的，自然失业率将会趋向于0.
▪ 但是有两个原因使得f < 1:
1. 工作搜寻 job search 2. 工资刚性wage rigidity
工作搜寻与摩擦性失业
▪ 摩擦性失业frictional unemployment是由于个
人寻找工作需要时间所导致的失业
▪ 即使工资弹性或有大量工作机会存在
第六章失业unemployment
本章学习以下主要内容：自然失业率失业的分类与原因失业的效应欧美失业的经验数据与政策
一自然失业率Natural rate of unemployment
▪ Natural rate of unemployment:
自然失业率是围绕着经济波动的平均失业率。又叫充分就业失业率，长期失业率。
wages for their members.
▪ When the union wage exceeds the eq’m wage,
unemployment results.
▪ Insiders: Employed union workers whose interest
is to keep wages high.
▪ 原因
▪ 工人有不同的能力与偏好 ▪ 不同工种有不同的技能要求 ▪ 劳动力的跨地区流动并不是迅速的 ▪ 劳动市场的信息不完全
部门转移Sectoral shifts
▪ 需求构成在行业与地区间的变化叫做需求的部门转
移
▪ 比如技术进步会使得更多的工人会从事计算机修理
工作，只有更少的工人从事打字机修理工作。
2000: 13.8%
1980: 9.1%
2008: 16.2%

失业率ppt课件

- 就业人口 - 失业人口
不在劳动力人口（Not in Labor Force）：不愿意就业的劳动年龄人口
6
二、就业率和失业率的概念
失业率（Rate of Unemployment）
失业人口占劳动力的比率
就业率（Rate of Employment）
就业人口占劳动年龄人口的比率
失业：凡在一定年龄范围内愿意工作而没有工作，并正在寻找工作的人都是失业。
非劳动力：不属于前两个类别的人
劳动力定义为就业者和失业者之和
5
劳动年龄人口(Working-Age Population)
劳动年龄人口：男16-60岁；女16-55岁劳动力人口（Labor Force）：劳动年龄人口中愿意就业的（包括处于失业状态，但继续寻找工作的）
9
美国的失业：1960-2007年
12
失业率
10
劳动力百分比
8
6
4
自然失业率
2
0 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
10
就业、失业和非劳动力人口的关系
不在劳动力人口
失业人口
就业人口
11
我国失业统计存在的问题
与我国经济转型背景相适应，我国失业统计存在多方面特点或问题。第一，仅包括城镇经济，没有包括农村。第二，仅限于有城市户口的经济活动人口。第三，失业统计中判断人们是否在就业服务机构求职登记为标准。第四，没有包括下岗人员。
12
下岗现象
下岗即退下工作岗位，但工人仍属该工厂单位，且没有工资，实际上等于失业，特指中国国有企业在机构改革中失去工作的工人，是中国的特有名词。

全球各国统计年鉴指标数据：5-6_失业率(2000-2017)

15.3
7.0
8.2
2.9
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.9
4.1
6.6
7.2
11.2
1.9
2.6
7.6
2.7
3.1
2.4
6.1
8.0
5.6
11.7
12.1
13.5
4.3
4.3
14.5
0.6
1.4
11.1
11.3
8.5
10.8
7.7
8.4
15.5
11.3
12.4
4.7
4.4
5.1
3.0
13.7
14.8
12.5
7.8
4.0
5.1
9.6
13.0
12.0
7.2
14.0
10.7
8.5
2.3
2.2
1.1
11.4
11.8
12.9
12.9
15.9
13.2
5.7
4.3
5.1
17.9
15.3
13.5
3.8
4.1
3.9
11.5
9.7
8.1
9.0
8.0
6.6
25.2
26.6
27.3
22.1
19.6
17.2
4.7
4.4
4.2
2.4
2.0
9.7
4.8
4.6
5.7
4.9
3.5
3.8
3.8
3.6
16.3
17.8
9.6
3.8
7.6
10.8
10.1

失业率在美国和欧洲的对比2000

CESifo Working Paper Series UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITEDSTATES AND IN EUROPEA CONTRAST AND THE REASONSRobert M. SolowWorking Paper No. 231January 2000CESifoPoschingerstr. 581679 MunichGermanyPhone: +49 (89) 9224-1410/1425Fax: +49 (89) 9224-1409http://www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 231January 2000UNEMPLOYMENT INTHE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPEA CONTRAST AND THE REASONSThis paper was presented atCESifo Symposium No. 1on the European Unemployment Problem,Munich, 22 June, 1999Robert M. SolowMITDepartment of Economics50 Memorial DriveCambridge, MA 02142USAUnemployment in the United States and in EuropeA Contrast and the ReasonsI hope it will be understood from the beginning that I am not one of those Ameri-cans who think that the Celestial Economist smiles with special favor on the U.S.A., or that American businessmen are more entrepreneurial, American work-ers more ingenious, and American policies more appropriate than their European counterparts. Not at all: I spend most of my time finding fault with American busi-nessmen, workers and economic policies, and with American ideas about those things. Nevertheless, what I plan to say today is implicitly critical of European and German thinking about macroeconomics, and also about the policies that follow from that thinking. I ask you please to keep it in mind that I am really trying to make a few general remarks about macroeconomic principles and macroeconomic poli-cies. I could just as well be talking about two places called Ruritanien and Schlar-affenland, not Germany and the U.S., and maybe I am.The basic facts we have to understand are easy to describe and well known to most of us. In 1970 the unemployment rate in the U.S. was five percent, that in (West) Germany was one percent, and in the rest of the European Union the u n-employment rate stood at three percent. In those days, myself included, used to wonder that the U.S. would have to do in order to reproduce the European experi-ence. In 1997 the unemployment rate was still five percent in the U.S. (4.9 percent to be exact) and in 1998 it was a full half-point lower. Meanwhile the (Unified) Ger-man unemployment rate was at ten percent and the rest of the European Union was between eleven and twelve percent.The contrast is certainly striking. Europe used to have consistently lower unem-ployment than the U.S.; now it has higher. Since 1970, there has been no trend in U.S. unemployment; it is actually a bit lower than it was then. But there have been marked business-cycle fluctuations, with the unemployment rate peaking in 1975, 1982 and 1992, and reaching low points before and after the peaks. Today we have the lowest unemployment rate in 30 years. When you look at the European experience, the clear impression is that there has been a strong upward trend that dominates the business cycle. Unemployment fell cyclically in the late 1980s, but not sharply; it has fallen a bit recently, but even less sharply. There seems to be notendency for the European unemployment rate to go back to the levels that were commonplace thirty years ago.It is very important to realize that this striking contrast can not be explained by a corresponding difference in the size of the working population. It is not the case that unemployment is now low in the U.S. and high in Europe because Americans choose not to join the labor force while Europeans do. It is, in fact, the other way round. In 1997, 73.5 percent of Americans between 15 and 64 years of age were employed, as against 60.4 percent for the European Union and 63.5 percent for Germany. the figures for participation in the labor force are, of course, similar: 77.4 percent of Americans in that age group are counted in the labor force, as against 67.7 percent in the EU and 70.4 percent in Germany. Those observations apply to men and women together, but the figures would be pretty much the same if we considered men and women separately. In fact the contrast is sharpest for women: 67.1 percent of the age group is employed in the U.S., 50.5 percent in the EU, and 54.6 percent in Germany. We shall have to explain the contrast in unemployment by explaining the parallel contrast in employment.I want to make another observation that may be useful later on. It is that unemploy-ment has fallen much further in the U.S. in the past six years than most economists thought it could do without setting off a burst of inflation. I can easily remember when most of my colleagues believed that whenever the unemployment rate fell below six percent - some said 6.5 percent - inflation would get worse. We crossed that line more than four years ago and are now at 4.3 percent unemployment. Dur-ing those years of considerable prosperity and job creation, there has been no tendency for the price level to rise dangerously. Very recently there has been a slow acceleration of wages, not yet translated into prices, though of course there is every reason to watch carefully.Those are the basic facts. I have ignored a few minor details, some of which would sharpen the contrast and some of which would weaken it. Conscience requires me to say that a part of the ability of the recent American economy ot have very low unemployment and very low inflation at the same time is just good luck. This good luck takes several forms, including (a) the spectacular drop in the price of comput-ers, combined with large and growing purchases of computer equipment, (b) a period of slow growth of the health-care costs that are otherwise such a problemfor the U.S., and (c) continued improvements in the measurement of the Consumer Price Index itself, most of which eliminate earlier overstatement of inflation. These sources of price stability can not continue forever, so a time may come when the performance of the U.S. economy will no longer seem so wonderful. But I want to emphasize that the minor amendments I mentioned will not change the basic con-trast you have seen. There might be a gentle rise in the U.S. unemployment rate after 1970, instead of fluctuations around a horizontal trend. But the rise would still be small compared with what has happened in France and Germany, and else-where in the European Union.That contrast poses an inevitable question: what explains the difference between the current levels of unemployment in Europe and the U.S.? There is a tendency in matters like this to assume that there must be one single answer to this question, one secret ingredient that explains why the U.S. has kept its unemployment rate moderately low while Europe has seen its rate rise to high levels and get stuck there. That would make for drama; but economic life is not necessarily like a de-tective story, what Americans call a "whodunit". It is more likely that the difference between American and European unemployment arises from the cumulation of several differences in institutions and policies.Furthermore, the talk of "Europe" is not always appropriate. There are big differ-ences within Europe; for instance Austria, Norway and, more recently, the Nether-lands and Denmark have avoided the high unemployment that has continued to characterize France and Germany. In particular, as you know better than I, Ger-many has special problems of its own, associated with reunification and with the international role of the Bundesbank. The most I can hope to do is to pick out a few useful lessons that bear on the main issue.The conventional understanding of this contrast, especially among Europeans, seems to rest entirely on labor-market rigidities. As evidence I can cite the title of a recent and exhaustive article (in English) by my old friend Professor Horst Sie-bert, President of the Kieler Institut für Weltwirtschaft, member of the Sachver-ständigenrat, and certainly one of Europe´s leading economists. The article was called "Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in Europe".Beyond doubt there are plenty of labor-market rigidities to rest an argument on. The main ones to attract attention seem to have been: (a) the relatively low r e-placement rate embodied in the U.S. unemployment insurance system compared with most European countries, as well as the relatively short duration of benefits allowed in the U.S., the natural consequence being more active search by unem-ployed workers and more willing acceptance of inferior job offers; (b) the broad scope of legal restrictions on discharging workers in Europe which, though per-haps working against unemployment in the short run, has the long-run effect of dis-couraging job creation and strengthening the power of incumbent workers to pro-tect wages at the expense of outsiders seeking employment: (c) the relatively low minimum wage in the U.S., which allows higher employment of low-productivity workers at the expense of greater wage inequality; (d) Siebert points out that the U.S. labor market generally allows greater wage differentiation between classes of workers than in Europe, but I think this may be a more complicated matter than just a difference in labor-market institutions; (e) the greater density and power of trade unions in Europe; (f) the wider wedge of payroll taxes and social charges in Europe that surely pushes some low-wage workers below the margin of employ-ability; even if the long-run incidence of such charges is generally on workers´wages, this tax-shifting may not be possible at or near the minimum wage.That is an impressive array of labor-market rigidities. So perhaps it is understand-able that this is the only explanation of high unemployment that is ever discussed seriously by civil servants and central bankers in much of Europe, especially Ger-many. Consequently the only potential cure for high and persistent unemployment that is ever seriously discussed is labor-market reform and wage moderation, though that process is inevitably slow and sure to be socially divisive.One important respect in which labor-market rigidity clearly plays a major role is in the employment of low-wage workers in an important industry like retailing in the U.S. The relatively low minimum wage has allowed the retail-trade sector to absorb a large number of low-productivity, low-wage workers. And retail formats have evolved correspondingly. In France, for instance, the high minimum wage simply cuts off many workers from the job market. Germany does not have a legal mini-mum wage, but custom and the large tax wedge must have a similar effect. This part of the population is larger in the U.S. than in Europe, probably because of badly-run, ineffective school systems, especially in poor neighborhoods. Of courseI would not recommend that the E.U. imitate the U.S. in this respect; but it could learn from American experience and find its own mode of adaptation.I do not think one can deny the significance of labor-market rigidities in Europe, and the likelihood that greater flexibility in the U.S. contributes to its much more favorable performance in terms of employment. But I believe that the almost exclu-sive focus on this aspect of the problem is a major mistake. It hides other, very important, lines of causality, and steers Europe away from possible policy strate-gies that could have substantial results in much less time, and with a fairer distri-bution of the burden.I think this is in part an intellectual failure. Sometimes it is hard to escape the thought that the single-minded focus on the labor market stems from the naive be-lief that unemployment must be a defect in the labor market, as if the hole in a flat tire must always be on the bottom, because that is where the tire is flat. Alterna-tively, or in addition, one detects an equally naive belief that a complicated market economy achieves some sort of favorable, unimprovable, equilibrium very quickly, smoothly and inevitably.There are good empirical reasons for rejecting this convenient belief that the labor market by itself provides an adequate account of the sad story of European u n-employment. At the crudest level, the timing is wrong. One of the two big increases in unemployment took place in the early 1980s, although there was no change in labor-market regulation to account for it.The argument was sometimes made that European wage determination (unlike the U.S.) exhibited "real-wage resistance" or effective indexing of the nominal wage. This stickiness of the real wage could certainly be a source of unemploy-ment in principle and in fact. But real-wage resistance must eventually have worn off. The profit share has risen to very high levels in Europe, meaning that real wages have not kept pace with productivity. But unemployment did not wither away, so this story is inadequate. And the further rise in unemployment after 1990 came during a period when labor markets were being deregulated in the major nations of Europe. (The most recent increase in Germany, in 1996-97, actually happened at a time of wage moderation.) Some other forces must have been at work.The second empirical reason for rejecting an exclusive focus on the labor market is less obvious and more indirect. A useful summary indicator of many kinds of labor-market rigidity is the position of the so-called Beveridge curve, named after Sir William Beveridge´s famous wartime report Full employment in a Free Soci-ety. Beveridge chose to define "full employment" as a situation in which there are as many unfilled jobs as there are unemployed workers. The definition was not generally acceptable, but it suggested studying the relation between the number of unemployed workers and the number of unfilled jobs, both expressed as a fraction of the labor force.In any country at any moment, the Beveridge curve is a downward-sloping relation between the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate. One can usually find such a curve in national time series, if the relevant data exist. It has a negative slope for the common-sense reason that jobs are easier to fill, and the vacancy rate there-fore is lower, the more unemployed workers there are for employers to choose among. A perfectly flexible or efficient labor market would interpose no obstacle to the frictionless matching of an unfilled job and an unemployed worker with the ap-propriate skills. Flexible wages would adjust so that every part of the labor market had, within reason, adequate employment opportunities. In that case, vacant jobs and unemployed workers could not coexist. The Beveridge curve would coincide with the axes of the diagram: there could be vacancies with no unemployment or there could be unemployment with no vacancies. One would expect pressure on wages in either case.Of course no real-world labor market could be perfectly flexible in that sense. La-bor-market rigidities (including skill mismatches as a special form of rigidity) are precisely what allow vacancies and unemployment to coexist, and the more rigidi-ties there are, the more the Beveridge curve diverges from the hypothetical limiting case, the further from the zero-zero point it is located.It is easy to check that each of the specific symptoms of labor-market rigidity that I enumerated earlier has the likely effect of shifting the Beveridge curve outward. Looking at the history of a nation´s vacancy and unemployment rates will tell us something about the extent to which its labor market has become more or less flexible. In the U.S., for instance, there appears to be a well-defined Beveridgecurve for 1958-71 that shifted adversely in the early 1970s and then returned to its initial position in 1987-88, and has stayed there since.It is more interesting and relevant to look at France and Germany, where the story is quite different. I will show you the pictures: it is hard to decide if there was a small adverse shift in the French and German Beveridge curves around 1975 or if there was none at all. We do not need to know: even if there was an adverse shift, a worsening of overall labor-market rigidity, it was very small compared with the U.S. The main message transmitted by the Beveridge curves for France and Ger-many transcends this minor possibility of alternative interpretations. The message goes squarely against the cliché that high and persistent unemployment is entirely or mainly a matter of worsening function of the labor market. It is precisely in France and Germany that there is no sign of a major unfavorable shift of the Beveridge curve during the period of rising unemployment.To the extent that the location of the Beveridge curve is a reasonable summary of the degree of labor-market rigidity, the large continental economies do not seem to have suffered from noticeable more rigid labor markets during the high-unemployment 1980s than they did in the low-unemployment 1970s. In fact, what stands out from the data for France and Germany is precisely the depressed level of the vacancy variable, i.e., the weakness of the demand for labor. Unfortunately the data sources do not allow the analysis to be extended to the 1990s (especially for Germany after unification), but there is no reason to suppose that the situation has changed. A pure supply-side explanation of the difference between the U.S. and Europe seems to be quite inadequate in view of the facts.I think I detect also in Germany a tendency to identify "supply-side policies" with labor-market deregulation. That does not have to be the case; and I think it very likely that part of the European problem stems from differences centering around product markets. These take the form of excessive product-market regulation, ac-companied by practices that limit the exposure of European firms to competition from best-practice firms, especially from transplants. A closely related deficiency is that European capital markets fail to force corporate governance structures to achieve better performance. I can not take time to provide the evidence for these suspicions now; it is contained in some studies of French and German economicperformance made by the McKinsey Global Institute, in which I have participated along with some other economists.What has this sort of thing got to do with unemployment? Careful studies in the U.S. have demonstrated the importance of analyzing net changes in employment and unemployment as the resultant of gross flows of job creation and job destruc-tion. One notices that, even when total employment and unemployment are hardly changing at all, large numbers of jobs are being created while others are being destroyed. There is always movement in and out of the three basic states: e m-ployed, unemployed, inactive.As I hinted earlier, much of the European failure to reduce unemployment arises from low exit rates from unemployment during limited business-cycle upswings. This in turn suggests that an important part of the problem is an inadequate rate of job creation. Here may be the source of the shocking difference between Europe and the U.S. in the incidence of long-term unemployment. In the U.S. in 1997, 8.7 percent of all the unemployed had been out of work for more than 12 months. The corresponding figure for Germany (1996) was 47.8 percent, for France 41.2 per-cent, for the U.K. 38.6 percent, and for the E.U. as a whole 50.2 percent. Even in recession years the incidence of long-term unemployment is much lower in the U.S. If more jobs were being created in Europe, in a variety of industries in a vari-ety of places, the exit rate from unemployment would be higher. It is even possible that the tolerant character of the European unemployment insurance system is as much a response to as it is a cause of the low exit probability from unemployment.A weakness in job creation could have several sources; one of them might be those legal restrictions on firing workers. But I suggest that product-market d e-regulation (of opening hours, land use, banking practices) and increased competi-tion might help to reduce unemployment by improving employment prospects. This would look fairer and be fairer than a narrow focus on labor-market measures that would just increase working class insecurity. If it should be confirmed that Euro-pean firms are backward about creating jobs, then one can easily think of other ways to improve the situation, like easing the supply of venture capital and finance for small and start-up firms. Exclusive focus on the labor market tends to crowd such possibilities completely off the radar screen.Now I want to speak about the unspeakable: I am almost tempted to suggest that women and young people leave the room. The subject is one that, if it is mentioned at all in polite company, is grouped with witchcraft, drunkenness, and the abuse of children, things that we know are there but that are best denied. It is possible that one source of continued high unemployment in Europe is that the domestic d e-mand for goods and services, and therefore for labor, has been forced to unnec-essarily and unhealthily low levels?To be more blunt, I mean to suggest that American fiscal and monetary policy has been more successful than Europe has been in supporting aggregate demand, and above all more aggressive in taking advantage of opportunities to expand whenever inflationary pressure has been weak, whatever the cause of that weak-ness. This could be important for two reasons. The first reason is quite direct: the direct effect of excessively tight fiscal and monetary policy on an economy with limited wage and price flexibility, that is, on any economy we know. It is not a new thought that the imposition of the Maastricht criteria and the rush to satisfy them have forced European economies into fiscal consolidation and high real interest rates. The only dream-like aspect of this is the belief sometimes expressed and tacitly accepted that this can have nothing to do with high unemployment.The second reason why demand-side policy could be very important has to do with its interaction with the supply side. Any gain in labor-market flexibility or in product-market deregulation will be both more effective and more easily accepted if it oc-curs at a time when aggregate demand is strong and market prospects are favor-able. There is likely to be considerable payoff to coordination of supply-side and demand-side policies within the large European countries and among members of the European Union.In even more unfashionable words, I think that some part of European and German unemployment is "Keynesian" in character and would respond to expansionary demand-side policy at a time when there is little inflationary pressure. I do not want to guess how much unemployment, in Germany for instance, is accounted for in this way. I have seen one estimate that it could be between 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points. Other nations of the European Union could of course differ, in either direc-tion. This is just the sort of question that economic research could illuminate; the puzzle is that more is not being done.Bad policy sometimes comes from bad ideas (although it may occasionally hap-pen that bad ideas are fabricated to justify bad policies). I have just suggested that a key question for Germany (and France and much of Europe) today is this: how much scope is there for deliberate expansion of demand? To put it more explicitly: by how much could the level of production and income rise without pressing on productive capacity and stimulating inflation? For economists this very same question appears in a slightly different form: what is the gap between the current level of aggregate output and potential output, the level of GDP that would employ capital and labor fully, without stretching or overheating?It seems to me that, in Germany, both the Bundesbank and the Sachverständigen-rat answer that question in a doctrinaire way. They simply assume that the gap is almost never more than trivial. In other words, they take it for granted that, in the absence of inflation, the economy is always producing just about the right amount, employing just about the right number of people, utilizing its capital at just about the right intensity, given the rules governing the labor market. In that view it is essen-tially never correct to use fiscal and monetary policy to create additional demand for goods and services in order to induce higher production. At least it is never correct now, whenever now is.There is a very strange asymmetry at work here, however. I suspect we could all easily imagine circumstances in which the Bundesbank would think it appropriate, even necessary, to use monetary policy to eliminate excess demand, i.e., to cause the economy to contract. It is therefore possible for demand to exceed supply in the aggregate. But somehow it never happens that demand falls short of supply persistently enough to call for offsetting policy. I think there is no good theoretical argument to support this view. It is at best an article of faith. Where I come from, many economists think that the gap between actual and potential output is a quan-tity that may be positive or negative, depending on circumstances. In any case it is a quantity to be imperfectly estimated, not something known by divine intuition.Some European central banks, including the Bundesbank, go through the motions of estimating the gap by a more or less elaborate statistical procedure. I can not go into the technical details here, but these procedures are essentially a dogmatic exercise. They are guaranteed either to smooth away any persistent differencebetween actual and potential output, or else to tell you that if output is below poten-tial this year it must have been above potential last year or the year before. I can be more explicit: if I understand the Bundesbank´s method adequately, it is re-quired always to make the average level of potential output during each four or five year period equal the average level of output actually observed during that same period. This means that the calculation can never conclude that there has been a persistent gap in either direction. This method is not confirming the dogma; it is part of the dogma.If this method had been applied in the 1930s, it would have reported a much smaller Depression than we believed then and believe now to have occurred; it would have claimed that the Depression was only about half as bad as it appeared to be. In addition, it would have come to the truly remarkable conclusion that some of those long depression years - which certainly contributed to the rise of Hitler -were actually years of excess demand and overemployment. The Bundesbank, if it had existed then, would have felt impelled to contract the already desperate econ-omy; and the Sachverständigenrat would have agreed.Of course that foolishness would never have occurred. Their own intelligence and common sense would have told the Bundesbank and Sachverständigenrat what was happening, and they would have reacted constructively. Yes, of course they would, but we are then entitled to ask the question: why should it take a catastro-phe like the Great Depression to interpose a little common sense into macroeco-nomic thinking?In the U.S., economists have developed simple methods to estimate the gap be-tween potential and actual output that do not prejudge the answer. I do not think that we are foolishly optimistic about the accuracy of these estimates; we know that they rest on observed economic regularities that may change unpredictably; so the estimates are only rough approximations, and may be systematically wrong for a while before the errors are noticed and corrected. But at least they are a way to appeal to observation instead of doctrinaire belief. I am going to see what such methods might say about Germany today. Please do not take what I say literally. The exercise should be carried out by German research workers who are more familiar with the data than I am. I wonder why they are not already doing so.。