Time-varying expected momentum profits
市场异象与市场效率翻译版本
市场异象与市场效率G. William Schwert威廉沃特Simon School of Business, University of Rochester西蒙商学院罗彻斯特大学This paper can be downloaded from theSocial Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:/abstract=目录1 引言 (2)2 挑选出的试验规律 (2)2.1可预见的资产的差别回报 (2)2.2各时期收益的预测性的不同 (7)3 不同类型的投资者的收益 (11)3.1个人投资者 (11)3.2机构投资者 (12)3.3套利限制 (14)4 长期回报 (15)5资产定价影响 (17)6公司金融的启示 (18)7结论 (19)Anomalies and Market Efficiency市场异象与市场效率G. William SchwertUniversity of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627and National Bureau of Economic Research(国家经济研究局)October 2002摘要实践证明,市场异象似乎与现有的资产价格行为理论并不相符。
它表明市场并不是有效的,且相关的资产价格理论也有不足之处。
这篇论文的实证表明,规模效应,价值效应,周末效应以及股息率效应在一系列研究将他们公诸于世后他们的效果变弱了或者根本不出现这些效应了。
与此同时,操作者开始实践一些学术研究中运用的投资策略。
小公司一月效应在其首次发布在学术文献上以来其作用力不断减弱,尽管有证据表明还存在这种现象。
然而,有趣的是,这种现象并不存在于那些集中投资于小型股的组合回报投资者中。
所有的这些发现使得市场异象趋于表现而非真实。
随着这些非同寻常的发现而来的恶名,诱惑了很多学者去进一步调查市场异象,并试图去解释这种现象。
CCPAM-1
• We have:
f
E (e ) = e
X
c −γ ln t+1 ct −1
E ( X ) + 0.5σ 2
1 1 −γ Et (∆ln ct+1 )+0.5γ 2σ 2 (∆ln ct+1 ) −1 R = Et (e ) = e β β r f = δ + γ Et (∆ ln ct +1) − 0.5γ 2σ 2 (∆ ln ct +1) where : r f = ln R f ; β = e−δ , ∆ ln ct +1 = ln ct +1 − ln ct
pt u′(ct +1 ) xt +1 = Et [ β ] Πt u ′(ct ) Π t +1
• Obviously, it is the same as defining a nominal discount factor by
u ′(ct +1 ) Π t pt = Et [( β ) xt +1 ] u′(ct ) Π t +1
Investors’ Utility Function
U (ct , ct +1 ) = u (ct ) + β Et [u (ct +1 ) ]
• Utility comes from consumption and is time seperable. • u(•)is increasing and concave凹形. The curvature of u captures investor’s aversion to risk and to intertemporal substitution跨 期替代. • β is called subjective discount rate个人贴 现率 and it captures investors’ impatience.
The Cross-Section of Volatility and Expected Returns
The Cross-Section of V olatility and Expected Returns∗Andrew Ang†Columbia University,USC and NBERRobert J.Hodrick‡Columbia University and NBERYuhang Xing§Rice UniversityXiaoyan Zhang¶Cornell UniversityThis Version:9August,2004∗We thank Joe Chen,Mike Chernov,Miguel Ferreira,Jeff Fleming,Chris Lamoureux,Jun Liu,Lau-rie Hodrick,Paul Hribar,Jun Pan,Matt Rhodes-Kropf,Steve Ross,David Weinbaum,and Lu Zhang for helpful discussions.We also received valuable comments from seminar participants at an NBER Asset Pricing meeting,Campbell and Company,Columbia University,Cornell University,Hong Kong University,Rice University,UCLA,and the University of Rochester.We thank Tim Bollerslev,Joe Chen,Miguel Ferreira,Kenneth French,Anna Scherbina,and Tyler Shumway for kindly providing data. We especially thank an anonymous referee and Rob Stambaugh,the editor,for helpful suggestions that greatly improved the article.Andrew Ang and Bob Hodrick both acknowledge support from the NSF.†Marshall School of Business,USC,701Exposition Blvd,Room701,Los Angeles,CA90089.Ph: 2137405615,Email:aa610@,WWW:/∼aa610.‡Columbia Business School,3022Broadway Uris Hall,New York,NY10027.Ph:(212)854-0406, Email:rh169@,WWW:/∼rh169.§Jones School of Management,Rice University,Rm230,MS531,6100Main Street,Houston TX 77004.Ph:(713)348-4167,Email:yxing@;WWW:/yxing ¶336Sage Hall,Johnson Graduate School of Management,Cornell University,Ithaca NY14850. Ph:(607)255-8729Email:xz69@,WWW:/faculty/pro-files/xZhang/AbstractWe examine the pricing of aggregate volatility risk in the cross-section of stock returns. Consistent with theory,wefind that stocks with high sensitivities to innovations in aggregate volatility have low average returns.In addition,wefind that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility relative to the Fama and French(1993)model have abysmally low average returns. This phenomenon cannot be explained by exposure to aggregate volatility risk.Size,book-to-market,momentum,and liquidity effects cannot account for either the low average returns earned by stocks with high exposure to systematic volatility risk or for the low average returns of stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility.1IntroductionIt is well known that the volatility of stock returns varies over time.While considerable research has examined the time-series relation between the volatility of the market and the expected re-turn on the market(see,among others,Campbell and Hentschel(1992),and Glosten,Jagan-nathan and Runkle(1993)),the question of how aggregate volatility affects the cross-section of expected stock returns has received less attention.Time-varying market volatility induces changes in the investment opportunity set by changing the expectation of future market returns, or by changing the risk-return trade-off.If the volatility of the market return is a systematic risk factor,an APT or factor model predicts that aggregate volatility should also be priced in the cross-section of stocks.Hence,stocks with different sensitivities to innovations in aggregate volatility should have different expected returns.Thefirst goal of this paper is to provide a systematic investigation of how the stochastic volatility of the market is priced in the cross-section of expected stock returns.We want to de-termine if the volatility of the market is a priced risk factor and estimate the price of aggregate volatility risk.Many option studies have estimated a negative price of risk for market volatil-ity using options on an aggregate market index or options on individual stocks.1Using the cross-section of stock returns,rather than options on the market,allows us to create portfolios of stocks that have different sensitivities to innovations in market volatility.If the price of ag-gregate volatility risk is negative,stocks with large,positive sensitivities to volatility risk should have low average ing the cross-section of stock returns also allows us to easily con-trol for a battery of cross-sectional effects,like the size and value factors of Fama and French (1993),the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman(1993),and the effect of liquidity risk documented by P´a stor and Stambaugh(2003).Option pricing studies do not control for these cross-sectional risk factors.Wefind that innovations in aggregate volatility carry a statistically significant negative price of risk of approximately-1%per annum.Economic theory provides several reasons why the price of risk of innovations in market volatility should be negative.For example,Campbell (1993and1996)and Chen(2002)show that investors want to hedge against changes in mar-ket volatility,because increasing volatility represents a deterioration in investment opportuni-ties.Risk averse agents demand stocks that hedge against this risk.Periods of high volatility also tend to coincide with downward market movements(see French,Schwert and Stambaugh (1987),and Campbell and Hentschel(1992)).As Bakshi and Kapadia(2003)comment,assets 1See,among others,Jackwerth and Rubinstein(1996),Bakshi,Cao and Chen(2000),Chernov and Ghysels (2000),Burashi and Jackwerth(2001),Coval and Shumway(2001),Benzoni(2002),Jones(2003),Pan(2002), Bakshi and Kapadia(2003),Eraker,Johannes and Polson(2003),and Carr and Wu(2003).with high sensitivities to market volatility risk provide hedges against market downside risk. The higher demand for assets with high systematic volatility loadings increases their price and lowers their average return.Finally,stocks that do badly when volatility increases tend to have negatively skewed returns over intermediate horizons,while stocks that do well when volatil-ity rises tend to have positively skewed returns.If investors have preferences over coskewness (see Harvey and Siddique(2000)),stocks that have high sensitivities to innovations in market volatility are attractive and have low returns.2The second goal of the paper is to examine the cross-sectional relationship between id-iosyncratic volatility and expected returns,where idiosyncratic volatility is defined relative to the standard Fama and French(1993)model.3If the Fama-French model is correct,forming portfolios by sorting on idiosyncratic volatility will obviously provide no difference in average returns.Nevertheless,if the Fama-French model is false,sorting in this way potentially provides a set of assets that may have different exposures to aggregate volatility and hence different aver-age returns.Our logic is the following.If aggregate volatility is a risk factor that is orthogonal to existing risk factors,the sensitivity of stocks to aggregate volatility times the movement in aggregate volatility will show up in the residuals of the Fama-French model.Firms with greater sensitivities to aggregate volatility should therefore have larger idiosyncratic volatilities relative to the Fama-French model,everything else being equal.Differences in the volatilities offirms’true idiosyncratic errors,which are not priced,will make this relation noisy.We should be able to average out this noise by constructing portfolios of stocks to reveal that larger idiosyncratic volatilities relative to the Fama-French model correspond to greater sensitivities to movements in aggregate volatility and thus different average returns,if aggregate volatility risk is priced.While high exposure to aggregate volatility risk tends to produce low expected returns,some economic theories suggest that idiosyncratic volatility should be positively related to expected returns.If investors demand compensation for not being able to diversify risk(see Malkiel and Xu(2002),and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf(2003)),then agents will demand a premium for holding stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility.Merton(1987)suggests that in an information-segmented market,firms with largerfirm-specific variances require higher average returns to compensate investors for holding imperfectly diversified portfolios.Some behavioral models, 2Bates(2001)and Vayanos(2004)provide recent structural models whose reduced form factor structures have a negative risk premium for volatility risk.3Recent studies examining total or idiosyncratic volatility focus on the average level offirm-level volatility. For example,Campbell,Lettau,Malkiel and Xu(2001),and Xu and Malkiel(2003)document that idiosyncratic volatility has increased over time.Brown and Ferreira(2003)and Goyal and Santa-Clara(2003)argue that id-iosyncratic volatility has positive predictive power for excess market returns,but this is disputed by Bali,Cakici, Yan and Zhang(2004).like Barberis and Huang(2001),also predict that higher idiosyncratic volatility stocks should earn higher expected returns.Our results are directly opposite to these theories.Wefind that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have low average returns.There is a strongly significant difference of-1.06%per month between the average returns of the quintile portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic volatility stocks and the quintile portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic volatility stocks.In contrast to our results,earlier researchers either found a significantly positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and average returns,or they failed tofind any statistically sig-nificant relation between idiosyncratic volatility and average returns.For example,Lintner (1965)shows that idiosyncratic volatility carries a positive coefficient in cross-sectional regres-sions.Lehmann(1990)alsofinds a statistically significant,positive coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility over his full sample period.Similarly,Tinic and West(1986)and Malkiel and Xu (2002)unambiguouslyfind that portfolios with higher idiosyncratic volatility have higher av-erage returns,but they do not report any significance levels for their idiosyncratic volatility premiums.On the other hand,Longstaff(1989)finds that a cross-sectional regression coeffi-cient on total variance for size-sorted portfolios carries an insignificant negative sign.The difference between our results and the results of past studies is that the past literature either does not examine idiosyncratic volatility at thefirm level or does not directly sort stocks into portfolios ranked on this measure of interest.For example,Tinic and West(1986)work only with20portfolios sorted on market beta,while Malkiel and Xu(2002)work only with 100portfolios sorted on market beta and size.Malkiel and Xu(2002)only use the idiosyncratic volatility of one of the100beta/size portfolios to which a stock belongs to proxy for that stock’s idiosyncratic risk and,thus,do not examinefirm-level idiosyncratic volatility.Hence,by not di-rectly computing differences in average returns between stocks with low and high idiosyncratic volatilities,previous studies miss the strong negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and average returns that wefind.The low average returns to stocks with high idiosyncratic volatilities could arise because stocks with high idiosyncratic volatilities may have high exposure to aggregate volatility risk, which lowers their average returns.We investigate this issue andfind that this is not a complete explanation.Our idiosyncratic volatility results are also robust to controlling for value,size, liquidity,volume,dispersion of analysts’forecasts,and momentum effects.Wefind the effect robust to different formation periods for computing idiosyncratic volatility and for different holding periods.The effect also persists in both bull and bear markets,recessions and expan-sions,and volatile and stable periods.Hence,our results on idiosyncratic volatility represent a substantive puzzle.The rest of this paper is organized as follows.In Section2,we examine how aggregate volatility is priced in the cross-section of stock returns.Section3documents thatfirms with high idiosyncratic volatility have very low average returns.Finally,Section4concludes.2Pricing Systematic Volatility in the Cross-Section2.1Theoretical MotivationWhen investment opportunities vary over time,the multi-factor models of Merton(1973)and Ross(1976)show that risk premia are associated with the conditional covariances between as-set returns and innovations in state variables that describe the time-variation of the investment opportunities.Campbell’s(1993and1996)version of the Intertemporal CAPM(I-CAPM) shows that investors care about risks from the market return and from changes in forecasts of future market returns.When the representative agent is more risk averse than log utility,assets that covary positively with good news about future expected returns on the market have higher average returns.These assets command a risk premium because they reduce a consumer’s abil-ity to hedge against a deterioration in investment opportunities.The intuition from Campbell’s model is that risk-averse investors want to hedge against changes in aggregate volatility because volatility positively affects future expected market returns,as in Merton(1973).However,in Campbell’s set-up,there is no direct role forfluctuations in market volatility to affect the expected returns of assets because Campbell’s model is premised on homoskedastic-ity.Chen(2002)extends Campbell’s model to a heteroskedastic environment which allows for both time-varying covariances and stochastic market volatility.Chen shows that risk-averse in-vestors also want to directly hedge against changes in future market volatility.In Chen’s model, an asset’s expected return depends on risk from the market return,changes in forecasts of future market returns,and changes in forecasts of future market volatilities.For an investor more risk averse than log utility,Chen shows that an asset that has a positive covariance between its return and a variable that positively forecasts future market volatilities causes that asset to have a lower expected return.This effect arises because risk-averse investors reduce current consumption to increase precautionary savings in the presence of increased uncertainty about market returns.Motivated by these multi-factor models,we study how exposure to market volatility risk is priced in the cross-section of stock returns.A true conditional multi-factor representation of expected returns in the cross-section would take the following form:r i t+1=a it+βim,t(r mt+1−γm,t)+βiv,t(v t+1−γv,t)+Kk=1βik,t(f k,t+1−γk,t),(1)where r it+1is the excess return on stock i,βim,tis the loading on the excess market return,βiv,tis the asset’s sensitivity to volatility risk,and theβik,tcoefficients for k=1...K representloadings on other risk factors.In the full conditional setting in equation(1),factor loadings, conditional means of factors,and factor premiums potentially vary over time.The model inequation(1)is written in terms of factor innovations,so r mt+1−γm,t represents the innovation in the market return,v t+1−γv,t represents the innovation in the factor reflecting aggregate volatility risk,and innovations to the other factors are represented by f k,t+1−γk,t.The conditional mean of the market and aggregate volatility are denoted byγm,t andγv,t,respectively,while the conditional mean of the other factors are denoted byγk,t.In equilibrium,the conditional mean of stock i is given by:a i t =E t(r it+1)=βim,tλm,t+βiv,tλv,t+Kk=1βik,tλk,t,(2)whereλm,t is the price of risk of the market factor,λv,t is the price of aggregate volatility risk, and theλk,t are prices of risk of the other factors.Note that only if a factor is traded is the conditional mean of a factor equal to its conditional price of risk.The main prediction from the factor model setting of equation(1)that we examine is that stocks with different loadings on aggregate volatility risk have different average returns.4How-ever,the true model in equation(1)is infeasible to examine because the true set of factors is unknown and the true conditional factor loadings are unobservable.Hence,we do not attempt to directly use equation(1)in our empirical work.Instead,we simplify the full model in equation (1),which we now detail.2.2The Empirical FrameworkTo investigate how aggregate volatility risk is priced in the cross-section of equity returns we make the following simplifying assumptions to the full specification in equation(1).First,we use observable proxies for the market factor and the factor representing aggregate volatility risk. We use the CRSP value-weighted market index to proxy for the market factor.To proxy innova-tions in aggregate volatility,(v t+1−γv,t),we use changes in the V IX index from the Chicago 4While an I-CAPM implies joint time-series as well as cross-sectional predictability,we do not examine time-series predictability of asset returns by systematic volatility.Time-varying volatility risk generates intertemporal hedging demands in partial equilibrium asset allocation problems.In a partial equilibrium setting,Liu(2001)and Chacko and Viceira(2003)examine how volatility risk affects the portfolio allocation of stocks and risk-free assets, while Liu and Pan(2003)show how investors can optimally exploit the variation in volatility with options.Guo and Whitelaw(2003)examine the intertemporal components of time-varying systematic volatility in a Campbell (1993and1996)equilibrium I-CAPM.Board Options Exchange(CBOE).5Second,we reduce the number of factors in equation(1) to just the market factor and the proxy for aggregate volatility risk.Finally,to capture the con-ditional nature of the true model,we use short intervals,one month of daily data,to take into account possible time-variation of the factor loadings.We discuss each of these simplifications in turn.Innovations in the V IX IndexThe V IX index is constructed so that it represents the implied volatility of a synthetic at-the-money option contract on the S&P100index that has a maturity of one month.It is constructed from eight S&P100index puts and calls and takes into account the American features of the option contracts,discrete cash dividends and microstructure frictions such as bid-ask spreads (see Whaley(2000)for further details).6Figure1plots the V IX index from January1986to December2000.The mean level of the daily V IX series is20.5%,and its standard deviation is7.85%.Because the V IX index is highly serially correlated with afirst-order autocorrelation of 0.94,we measure daily innovations in aggregate volatility by using daily changes in V IX, which we denote as∆V IX.Dailyfirst differences in V IX have an effective mean of zero(less than0.0001),a standard deviation of2.65%,and also have negligible serial correlation(the first-order autocorrelation of∆V IX is-0.0001).As part of our robustness checks in Section 2.3,we also measure innovations in V IX by specifying a stationary time-series model for the conditional mean of V IX andfind our results to be similar to using simplefirst differences. While∆V IX seems an ideal proxy for innovations in volatility risk because the V IX index is representative of traded option securities whose prices directly reflect volatility risk,there are two main caveats with using V IX to represent observable market volatility.Thefirst concern is that the V IX index is the implied volatility from the Black-Scholes 5In previous versions of this paper,we also considered sample volatility,following Schwert and Stambaugh (1987);a range-based estimate,following Alizadeh,Brandt and Diebold(2002);and a high-frequency estima-tor of volatility from Andersen,Bollerslev and Diebold(2003).Using these measures to proxy for innovations in aggregate volatility produces little spread in cross-sectional average returns.These tables are available upon request.6On September22,2003,the CBOE implemented a new formula and methodology to construct its volatility index.The new index is based on the S&P500(rather than the S&P100)and takes into account a broader range of strike prices rather than using only at-the-money option contracts.The CBOE now uses V IX to refer to this new index.We use the old index(denoted by the ticker V XO).We do not use the new index because it has been constructed by back-filling only to1990,whereas the V XO is available in real-time from1986.The CBOE continues to make both volatility indices available.The correlation between the new and the old CBOE volatility series is98%from1990-2000,but the series that we use has a slightly broader range.(1973)model,and we know that the Black-Scholes model is an approximation.If the true stochastic environment is characterized by stochastic volatility and jumps,∆V IX will reflect total quadratic variation in both diffusion and jump components(see,for example,Pan(2002)). Although Bates(2000)argues that implied volatilities computed taking into account jump risk are very close to original Black-Scholes implied volatilities,jump risk may be priced differ-ently from volatility risk.Our analysis does not separate jump risk from diffusion risk,so our aggregate volatility risk may include jump risk components.A more serious reservation about the V IX index is that V IX combines both stochastic volatility and the stochastic volatility risk premium.Only if the risk premium is zero or constant would∆V IX be a pure proxy for the innovation in aggregate volatility.Decomposing∆V IX into the true innovation in volatility and the volatility risk premium can only be done by writing down a formal model.The form of the risk premium depends on the parameterization of the price of volatility risk,the number of factors and the evolution of those factors.Each different model specification implies a different risk premium.For example,many stochastic volatility option pricing models assume that the volatility risk premium can be parameterized as a linear function of volatility(see,for example,Chernov and Ghysels(2000),Benzoni(2002),and Jones(2003)).This may or may not be a good approximation to the true price of risk.Rather than imposing a structural form,we use an unadulterated∆V IX series.An advantage of this approach is that our analysis is simple to replicate.The Pre-Formation RegressionOur goal is to test if stocks with different sensitivities to aggregate volatility innovations(prox-ied by∆V IX)have different average returns.To measure the sensitivity to aggregate volatility innovations,we reduce the number of factors in the full specification in equation(1)to two,the market factor and∆V IX.A two-factor pricing kernel with the market return and stochastic volatility as factors is also the standard set-up commonly assumed by many stochastic option pricing studies(see,for example,Heston,1993).Hence,the empirical model that we examine is:r i t =β0+βiMKT·MKT t+βi∆V IX·∆V IX t+εit,(3)where MKT is the market excess return,∆V IX is the instrument we use for innovations inthe aggregate volatility factor,andβiMKT andβi∆V IXare loadings on market risk and aggregatevolatility risk,respectively.Previous empirical studies suggest that there are other cross-sectional factors that have ex-planatory power for the cross-section of returns,such as the size and value factors of the Fama and French(1993)three-factor model(hereafter FF-3).We do not directly model these effectsin equation(3),because controlling for other factors in constructing portfolios based on equa-tion(3)may add a lot of noise.Although we keep the number of regressors in our pre-formation portfolio regressions to a minimum,we are careful to ensure that we control for the FF-3factors and other cross-sectional factors in assessing how volatility risk is priced using post-formation regression tests.We construct a set of assets that are sufficiently disperse in exposure to aggregate volatility innovations by sortingfirms on∆V IX loadings over the past month using the regression(3) with daily data.We run the regression for all stocks on AMEX,NASDAQ and the NYSE,with more than17daily observations.In a setting where coefficients potentially vary over time,a 1-month window with daily data is a natural compromise between estimating coefficients with a reasonable degree of precision and pinning down conditional coefficients in an environment with time-varying factor loadings.P´a stor and Stambaugh(2003),among others,also use daily data with a1-month window in similar settings.At the end of each month,we sort stocks into quintiles,based on the value of the realizedβ∆V IX coefficients over the past month.Firms in quintile1have the lowest coefficients,whilefirms in quintile5have the highestβ∆V IX loadings. Within each quintile portfolio,we value-weight the stocks.We link the returns across time to form one series of post-ranking returns for each quintile portfolio.Table1reports various summary statistics for quintile portfolios sorted by pastβ∆V IX over the previous month using equation(3).Thefirst two columns report the mean and standard deviation of monthly total,not excess,simple returns.In thefirst column under the heading ‘Factor Loadings,’we report the pre-formationβ∆V IX coefficients,which are computed at the beginning of each month for each portfolio and are value-weighted.The column reports the time-series average of the pre-formationβ∆V IX loadings across the whole sample.By con-struction,since the portfolios are formed by ranking on pastβ∆V IX,the pre-formationβ∆V IX loadings monotonically increase from-2.09for portfolio1to2.18for portfolio5.The columns labelled‘CAPM Alpha’and‘FF-3Alpha’report the time-series alphas of these portfolios relative to the CAPM and to the FF-3model,respectfully.Consistent with the negative price of systematic volatility risk found by the option pricing studies,we see lower average raw returns,CAPM alphas,and FF-3alphas with higher past loadings ofβ∆V IX.All the differences between quintile portfolios5and1are significant at the1%level,and a joint test for the alphas equal to zero rejects at the5%level for both the CAPM and the FF-3model.In particular,the5-1spread in average returns between the quintile portfolios with the highest and lowestβ∆V IX coefficients is-1.04%per month.Controlling for the MKT factor exacerbates the5-1spread to-1.15%per month,while controlling for the FF-3model decreases the5-1 spread to-0.83%per month.Requirements for a Factor Risk ExplanationWhile the differences in average returns and alphas corresponding to differentβ∆V IX loadings are very impressive,we cannot yet claim that these differences are due to systematic volatility risk.We will examine the premium for aggregate volatility within the framework of an uncon-ditional factor model.There are two requirements that must hold in order to make a case for a factor risk-based explanation.First,a factor model implies that there should be contemporane-ous patterns between factor loadings and average returns.For example,in a standard CAPM, stocks that covary strongly with the market factor should,on average,earn high returns over the same period.To test a factor model,Black,Jensen and Scholes(1972),Fama and French(1992 and1993),Jagannathan and Wang(1996),and P´a stor and Stambaugh(2003),among others,all form portfolios using various pre-formation criteria,but examine post-ranking factor loadings that are computed over the full sample period.While theβ∆V IX loadings show very strong patterns of future returns,they represent past covariation with innovations in market volatility. We must show that the portfolios in Table1also exhibit high loadings with volatility risk over the same period used to compute the alphas.To construct our portfolios,we took∆V IX to proxy for the innovation in aggregate volatil-ity at a daily frequency.However,at the standard monthly frequency,which is the frequency of the ex-post returns for the alphas reported in Table1,using the change in V IX is a poor approximation for innovations in aggregate volatility.This is because at lower frequencies,the effect of the conditional mean of V IX plays an important role in determining the unanticipated change in V IX.In contrast,the high persistence of the V IX series at a daily frequency means that thefirst difference of V IX is a suitable proxy for the innovation in aggregate volatility. Hence,we should not measure ex-post exposure to aggregate volatility risk by looking at how the portfolios in Table1correlate ex-post with monthly changes in V IX.To measure ex-post exposure to aggregate volatility risk at a monthly frequency,we follow Breeden,Gibbons and Litzenberger(1989)and construct an ex-post factor that mimics aggre-gate volatility risk.We term this mimicking factor F V IX.We construct the tracking portfolio so that it is the portfolio of asset returns maximally correlated with realized innovations in volatility using a set of basis assets.This allows us to examine the contemporaneous relation-ship between factor loadings and average returns.The major advantage of using F V IX to measure aggregate volatility risk is that we can construct a good approximation for innovations in market volatility at any frequency.In particular,the factor mimicking aggregate volatility innovations allows us to proxy aggregate volatility risk at the monthly frequency by simply cumulating daily returns over the month on the underlying base assets used to construct the mimicking factor.This is a much simpler method for measuring aggregate volatility innova-。
海外文献原文-推荐参考文献列表
海外文献推荐-第一期参考文献:[1] I-Cheng Yeh, Che-Hui Lien, Tao-Ming Ting, 2015, Building multi-factor stock selection models using balanced split regression trees with sorting normalisation and hybrid variables, Foresight and Innovation Policy, V ol. 10, No. 1, 48-74[2] Eugene F.Fama, KennethR.French, 2015, A Five-factor Asset Pricing Model, Journal of Financial Economics 116, 1-22[3] Achim BACKHAUS, Aliya ZHAKANOV A ISIKSAL, 2016, The Impact of Momentum Factors on Multi Asset Portfolio, Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting XIX (4), 146-169[4] Francisco Barillas, Jay Shanken, 2016, Which Alpha? Review of Financial Studies海外文献推荐-第二期参考文献:[1] PRA VEEN KUMAR, DONGMEI LI, 2016, Capital Investment, Innovative Capacity, and Stock Returns, The Journal of Finance, VOL. LXXI, NO. 5, 2059-2094[2] Houda Ben Mabrouk, Abdelfettah Bouri, 2013, New insight on the CAPM: a copula-based approach Tunisian and international evidence, Accounting and Finance, Vol. 4, No. 1, 35-62 [3] FERHAT AKBAS, 2016, The Calm before the Storm, The Journal of Finance, VOL. LXXI, NO. 1,225-266海外文献推荐-第三期参考文献:[1] Yufeng Han, Guofu Zhou, Yingzi Zhu, 2016, A trend factor: Any economic gains from using information over investment horizons? Journal of Financial Economics 122, 352-375[2] Andrea Frazzini, LasseHeje Pedersen, 2014, Betting against beta, Journal of Financial Economics 111, 1-25[3] Doron Avramov, Si Cheng, and Allaudeen Hameed, 2016, Time-Varying Liquidity and Momentum Profits, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANAL YSI, Vol. 51, No. 6, 1897-1923[4] Nicholas Barberis, Abhiroop Mukherjee, Baolian Wang, 2014, Prospect Theory and Stock Returns: An Empirical Test, Review of Financial Studies海外文献推荐-第四期参考文献:[1] Brad M. Barber, Xing Huang, Terrance Odean, 2014, Which risk factors matter to investors? Evidence from mutual fund flows, Review of Financial Studies[2] MICHAEL J. COOPER, HUSEYIN GULEN, & MICHAEL J. SCHILL. (2008). Asset growth and the cross‐section of stock returns. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 63(4), 1609–1651.[3]Bollerslev, T., Li, S. Z., & Todorov, V. (2016). Roughing up beta: continuous versus discontinuous betas and the cross section of expected stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 120(3), 464-490.[4]Baker, M., Wurgler, J., & Yuan, Y. (2012). Global, local, and contagious investor sentiment ⋆. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(2), 272-287.海外文献推荐-第五期参考文献:[1] Nicole Choi, Mark Fedenia, Tatyana Sokolyk, 2017, Portfolio Concentration and Performance of Institutional Investors Worldwide, Journal of Financial Economics[2]Cronqvist, H., Siegel, S., & Yu, F. (2015). Value versus growth investing: why do differentinvestors have different styles? ☆. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(2), 333-349.[3]Rapach, D. E., Ringgenberg, M. C., & Zhou, G. (2016). Short interest and aggregate stock returns . Journal of Financial Economics, 121(1), 46-65.[4]Novy-Marx, R. (2013). The other side of value: the gross profitability premium ☆. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(1), 1-28.海外文献推荐-第六期参考文献:[1] Suk Joon Byun, Sonya S. Limy, and Sang Hyun Yun, 2012, Continuing Overreaction and Stock Return Predictability, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis[2]Eugene F. Fama, & Kenneth R. French. (2016). International tests of a five-factor asset pricing model. Journal of Financial Economics, 123.[3]Keloharju, M., Linnainmaa, J. T., & Nyberg, P. (2016). Return seasonalities. Journal of Finance, 71(4), n/a-n/a.[4]Seasholes, M. S., & Wu, G. (2007). Predictable behavior, profits, and attention. Journal of Empirical Finance, 14(5), 590-610.[5]PA VEL SAVOR, & MUNGO WILSON. (2016). Earnings announcements and systematic risk. The Journal of Finance, 71(1).海外文献推荐-第七期参考文献:[1] Cary Frydman and Colin Camerer, 2016, Neural Evidence of Regret and its Implications for Investor Behavior, Review of Financial Studies 29, 3108-3139[2] Haghani, V., & Dewey, R. (2016). A case study for using value and momentum at the asset class level. Journal of Portfolio Management, 42(3), 101-113.[3] Tarun, C., Amit, G., & Narasimhan, J. (2011). Buyers versus sellers: who initiates trades, and when?. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 51(5), 1467-1490.[4] Hartzmark, M. S. (2015). The worst, the best, ignoring all the rest: the rank effect and trading behavior. Review of Financial Studies, 28(4), 1024.[5] Daniel, K., & Moskowitz, T. J. (2016). Momentum crashes. Journal of Financial Economics, 122(2), 221-247.海外文献推荐-第八期参考文献:[1]Hua, R., Kantsyrev, D., & Qian, E. (2012). Factor-timing model.Journal of Portfolio Management,39(1), 75-87.[2]Leshem, R., Goldberg, L. R., & Cummings, A. (2015). Optimizing value.Journal of Portfolio Management,42(2).[3]Chemmanur, Thomas J., Gang Hu and Jiekun Huang, 2015, Institutional Investors and the Information Production Theory of Stock Splits,Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis50(3), 413–445.海外文献推荐-第九期参考文献:[1]Penaranda, F. (2016). Understanding portfolio efficiency with conditioning information. Economics Working Papers, 51(3), 985-1011.[2]Cederburg, S., & O'Doherty, M. S. (2016). Does it pay to bet against beta? on the conditional performance of the beta anomaly. Journal of Finance, 71(2), 737-774.[3]Lindsey, R. R., & Weisman, A. B. (2016). Forced liquidations, fire sales, and the cost of illiquidity. Journal of Portfolio Management, 20(1), 45-57.海外文献推荐-第十期参考文献:[1] Easley, D., Hvidkjaer, S., & O'Hara, M. (2010). Factoring information into returns. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 45(2), 293-309.[2]Babenko, I., Boguth, O., & Tserlukevich, Y. (2016). Idiosyncratic cash flows and systematic risk. Journal of Finance, 71(1).[3]Chow, V., & Lai, C. W. (2015). Conditional sharpe ratios. Finance Research Letters, 12, 117-133.海外文献推荐-第十一期参考文献:[1] Mladina, P. (2017). Illuminating hedge fund returns to improve portfolio construction. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 41(3), 127-139.[2] Choi, N., Fedenia, M., Skiba, H., & Sokolyk, T. (2016). Portfolio concentration and performance of institutional investors worldwide. Journal of Financial Economics.[3] Martijn Boons, 2016, State variables, macroeconomic activity, and the cross section of individual stocks, Journal of Financial Economics 119, 489-511海外文献推荐-第十二期参考文献:[1] Blanchett, D., & Ratner, H. (2015). Building efficient income portfolios. Journal of Portfolio Management, 41(3), 117-125.[2] Özde Öztekin. (2015). Capital structure decisions around the world: which factors are reliably important?. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 50(3).[3] 2015, Does the number of stocks in a portfolio influence performance? Investment Sights海外文献推荐-第十三期参考文献:[1]Glushkov, D., & Statman, M. (2016). Classifying and measuring the performance of socially responsible mutual funds.Social Science Electronic Publishing,42(2), 140-151.[2]KLAUS ADAM, ALBERT MARCET, & JUAN PABLO NICOLINI. (2016). Stock market volatility and learning.The Journal of Finance,71(1), 419–438.[3]Miller, K. L., Li, H., Zhou, T. G., & Giamouridis, D. (2012). A risk-oriented model for factor timing decisions.Journal of Portfolio Management,41(3), 46-58.海外文献推荐-第十四期参考文献:[1]Feldman, T., Jung, A., & Klein, J. (2015). Buy and hold versus timing strategies: the winner is ….Journal of Portfolio Management,42(1), 110-118.[2]Eric H Sorensen, Nicholas F Alonso. The Resale Value of Risk-Parity Equity Portfolios[J]. Journal of Portfolio Management, 2015, 41(2):23-32.海外文献推荐-第十五期参考文献:[1]Barroso, P., & Santa-Clara, P. (2015). Momentum has its moments ☆.Journal of Financial Economics,116(1), 111-120.[2]Bender, J., & Nielsen, F. (2015). Earnings quality revisited.Social Science Electronic Publishing,39(4), 69-79.海外文献推荐-第十六期参考文献:[1]Greenberg, D., Abhilash, B., & Ang, A. (2016). Factors to assets: mapping factor exposures to asset allocations. Journal of Portfolio Management, 42(5), 18-27.[2]Goyal, A., Ilmanen, A., & Kabiller, D. (2015). Bad habits and good practices. Journal of Portfolio Management, 41(4), 97-107.海外文献推荐-第十七期参考文献:[1]Vermorken, M. A., Medda, F. R., & Schröder, T. (2012). The diversification delta: a higher-moment measure for portfolio diversification. Journal of Portfolio Management, 39(1), 67-74.[2]Asl, F. M., & Etula, E. (2012). Advancing strategic asset allocation in a multi-factor world.Journal of Portfolio Management,39(1), 59-66.海外文献推荐-第十八期参考文献:[1]Chakrabarty, B., Moulton, P. C., & Trzcinka, C. (2016). The performance of short-term institutional trades. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 1-26.[2]Stubbs, R. A., & Jeet, V. (2015). Adjusted Factor-Based Performance Attribution. USXX.海外文献推荐-第十九期参考文献:[1]Copeland, M., & Copeland, T. (2016). Vix versus size. Journal of Portfolio Management, 42(3), 76-83.[2]Kritzman, M., & Turkington, D. (2016). Stability-adjusted portfolios. Journal of Portfolio Management, 42(5), 113-122.海外文献推荐-第二十期参考文献:[1]Benos, E., Brugler, J., Hjalmarsson, E., & Zikes, F. (2016). Interactions among high-frequency traders. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 52, 1-28.[2]Richardson, S., Sloan, R., & You, H. (2011). What makes stock prices move? fundamentals vs. investor recognition. Financial Analysts Journal, 68(2), 30-50.海外文献推荐-第二十一期参考文献:[1]Bogousslavsky, V. (2016). Infrequent rebalancing, return autocorrelation, and seasonality. Journal of Finance, 71(6), 2967-3006.[2]Marcos, L. D. P. (2015). The future of empirical finance. Journal of Portfolio Management, 41(4), 140-144.海外文献推荐-第二十二期参考文献:[1] Fabian, H., & Marcel, P. (2016). Estimating beta. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 51(4), 1437-1466.[2] Christopher Cheung, George Hoguet, & Sunny Ng. (2014). Value, size, momentum, dividend yield, and volatility in china’s a-share market. Journal of Portfolio Management, 41(5), 57-70.海外文献推荐-第二十三期参考文献:[1]Mclean, R. D., & Zhao, M. (2014). The business cycle, investor sentiment, and costly external finance.Journal of Finance, 69(3), 1377–1409.[2]Kaniel, R., & Parham, R. (2017). The impact of media attention on consumer and mutual fund investment decisions. Journal of Financial Economics, 123, págs. 337-356海外文献推荐-第二十四期参考文献:[1]Chang, X., Chen, Y., & Zolotoy, L. (2017). Stock liquidity and stock price crash risk. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis.[2]Bisetti, E., Favero, C. A., Nocera, G., & Tebaldi, C. (2013). A multivariate model of strategic asset allocation with longevity risk. Ssrn Electronic Journal.海外文献推荐-第二十五期参考文献:[1] Lou, X., & Shu, T. (2013). Price impact or trading volume: why is the amihud (2002) measure priced?. Social Science Electronic Publishing.[2]Lins, K. V., Servaes, H., & Tamayo, A. (2017). Social capital, trust, and firm performance: the value of corporate social responsibility during the financial crisis. Journal of Finance, 72.海外文献推荐-第二十六期参考文献:[1] Golez, B., & Koudijs, P. (2014). Four centuries of return predictability. Social Science Electronic Publishing.[2]Ledoit, O., and Wolf, M. (2017). Nonlinear shrinkage of the covariance matrix for portfolio selection: Markowitz meets Goldilocks. The Review of Financial Studies, 30(12), 4349-4388.海外文献推荐-第二十七期参考文献:[1]Ray Dalio, Bob Prince, Greg Jensen (2015), our thoughts about risk parity and all weather, Bridgewater Associates, LP[2]Thierry, R. and Guillaume, W. (2013). Risk Parity Portfolios with Risk Factors. MPRA Paper No. 44017.海外文献推荐-第二十八期参考文献:[1] Golubov, A., & Konstantinidi, T. (2015). Where is the risk in value? evidence from a market-to-book decomposition. Social Science Electronic Publishing.[2] Moreira, A., and Muir, T. (2017). Volatility‐Managed Portfolios. Journal of Finance, 72(4).海外文献推荐-第二十九期参考文献:[1]Wahalab S. Style investing, comovement and return predictability ☆[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2013, 107(1).[2]Pástor Ľ, Stambaugh R F, Taylor L A. Do funds make more when they trade more?[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2017, 72(4): 1483-1528.海外文献推荐-第三十期参考文献:[1] K Hou, C Xue, L Zhang, Digesting Anomalies: An Investment Approach, NBER Working Papers, 2015, 28(3)[2]Berk, J. B., & Binsbergen, J. H. V. (2013). Measuring skill in the mutual fund industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 118(1), 1-20.海外文献推荐-第三十一期参考文献:[1]Klein, Rudolf F. and V. K. Chow. "Orthogonalized factors and systematic risk decomposition." Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance 53.2(2013):175-187.[2]Sorensen E H, Hua R, Qian E E. Contextual Fundamentals, Models, and Active Management[J]. Journal of Portfolio Management 32.1(2005):23-36.海外文献推荐-第三十二期参考文献:[1] Hong, H. Torous, W. & Valkanov, R. (2007). Do industries lead stock markets? Journal of Financial Economics,83 (2), 367-396.[2]Dhillon, J. Ilmanen, A. & Liew, J. (2016). Balancing on the life cycle: target-date funds need better diversification. Journal of Portfolio Management, 42(4), 12-27.海外文献推荐-第三十三期参考文献:[1]Kenneth Froot and Melvyn Teo, Style Investing and Institutional Investors, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS V ol. 43, No. 4, Dec. 2008, pp. 883–906.[2]Israel R, Palhares D, Richardson S A. Common factors in corporate bond returns[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2015.海外文献推荐-第三十四期参考文献:[1] DM Smith, N Wang, Y Wang, EJ Zychowicz, Sentiment and the Effectiveness of Technical Analysis: Evidence from the Hedge Fund Industry,Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 2016 , 51 (6) :1991-2013[2]Ronen Israel, Sarah Jiang, and Adrienne Ross (2018). Craftsmanship Alpha: An Application to Style Investing. Journal of Portfolio Management.海外文献推荐-第三十五期参考文献:[1] Huang J. The customer knows best: The investment value of consumer opinions [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2018.[2]Alberg J, Lipton Z C. Improving Factor-Based Quantitative Investing by Forecasting Company Fundamentals, Time Series Workshop at the 31st Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2017). 2017.海外文献推荐-第三十六期参考文献:[1] Davis, J. H., Aliagadiaz, R. A., Ahluwalia, H., & Tolani, R. (2017). Improving U.S. stock return forecasts: a 'fair-value' cape approach.Social Science Electronic Publishing.海外文献推荐-第三十七期参考文献:[1] Fama, E. F., & French, K. R.(2018). Choosing factors. Journal of Financial Economics, 128: 234–252.[2] Bruder, Benjamin, Culerier, Leo, & Roncalli, Thierry. (2013). How to design target-date funds?. Ssrn Electronic Journal.海外文献推荐-第三十八期参考文献:[1] David Aboody, Omri Even-Tov, Reuven Lehavy, Brett Trueman. (2018). Overnight Returns and Firm-Specific Investor Sentiment. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.[2] Arnott R, Beck N, Kalesnik V, et al. How Can 'Smart Beta' Go Horribly Wrong?[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2017.海外文献推荐-第三十九期参考文献:[1] CS Asness, A Frazzini, LH PedersenDM, 2013,Quality Minus Junk,Social Science Electronic Publishing[2] Stein, M, & Rachev, S. T. (2011). Style-neutral funds of funds: diversification or deadweight? Journal of Asset Management, 11(6), 417-434.海外文献推荐-第四十期参考文献:[1] Li Y, Sun Q, Tian S. The impact of IPO approval on the price of existing stocks: Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2018.[2] Jennifer Bender,Xiaole Sun,Ric Thomas,V olodymyr Zdorovtsov, The Journal of Portfolio Management , 2018 , 44 (4) :79-92海外文献推荐-第四十一期参考文献:[1] Yi Fang & Haiping Wang (2015) Fund manager characteristics and performance, Investment Analysts Journal, 44:1, 102-116.[2] Roni Israelov, Harsha Tummala. An Alternative Option to Portfolio Rebalancing. The Journal of Derivatives Spring 2018, 25 (3) 7-32海外文献推荐-第四十二期参考文献:[1] Robert Capone, Adam Akant, (2016), Trend Following Strategies in Target-Date Funds, AQR Capital Management.[2] Loh, R. K., & Stulz, R. M. (2018). Is sell‐side research more valuable in bad times?. Journal of Finance, 73(3): 959-1013.海外文献推荐-第四十三期参考文献:[1] Asness, C. S., Frazzini, A., Israel, R., & Moskowitz, T. J. (2015). Fact, fiction, and value investing. Final version published in Journal of Portfolio Management, V ol. 42, No.1[2] Gu, S., Kelly, B. T., & Xiu, D. (2018). Empirical asset pricing via machine learning. Social Science Electronic Publishing.海外文献推荐-第四十四期参考文献:[1] David P. Morton, Elmira Popova, Ivilina Popova, Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (2006) 503–518海外文献推荐-第四十五期参考文献:[1] Lleo, S., & Ziemba, W. T. (2017). A tale of two indexes: predicting equity market downturns in china. Social Science Electronic Publishing海外文献推荐-第四十六期参考文献:[1] Alquist, R., Israel, R., & Moskowitz, T. J. (2018). Fact, fiction, and the size effect. Social Science Electronic Publishing.[2] Kacperczyk M, NIEUWERBURGH S V A N, Veldkamp L. Time-varying fund manager skill[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2014, 69(4): 1455-1484.海外文献推荐-第四十七期参考文献:[1] Tom Idzorek, 2008, Lifetime Asset Allocations: Methodologies for Target Maturity Funds, Ibbotson Associates Research Paper,29-47[2] Da, Z., Huang, D., & Yun, H. (2017). Industrial electricity usage and stock returns. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 52(1), 37-69.海外文献推荐-第四十八期参考文献:[1] Clifford Asness and Andrea Frazzini, 2013, The Devil in HML’s Details, The Journal of Portfolio Management, volume 39 number 4.[2] Carvalho, R. L. D., Xiao, L., & Moulin, P. (2011). Demystifying equity risk-based strategies: a simple alpha plus beta description.Journal of Portfolio Management,38(3), 56-70.海外文献推荐-第四十九期参考文献:[1]Jordan Brooks, Diogo Palhares, Scott Richardson, Style investing in fixed income, Journal of Portfolio Management.[2] R Ball,J Gerakos,JT Linnainmaa,V Nikolaev,2015,Deflating profitability,Journal of Financial Economics, 117 (2) :225-248海外文献推荐-第五十期参考文献:[1] Padmakar Kulkarni, Abhishek Gupta, Stuart Doole, 2018, How can Factors be Combined, MSCI.[2] Hsieh, C. C., Hui, K. W., & Zhang, Y. (2016). Analyst report readability and stock returns. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 43(1-2), págs. 98-130.海外文献推荐-第五十一期参考文献:[1] Cici G, Rosenfeld C. A study of analyst-run mutual funds: The abilities and roles of buy-side analysts [J]. Journal of Empirical Finance, 2016, 36:8-29.[2] U-Wen Kok, CFA, Jason Ribando, CFA, and Richard Sloan Facts about Formulaic Value Investing Financial Analysts Journal. V olume 73, Issue 2海外文献推荐-第五十二期参考文献:[1] Morningstar Manager Research.(2018)Target-Date Fund Landscape. 7 May 2018[2] Yong Chen, Gregory W. Eaton, Bradley S. Paye, Micro(structure) before Macro? The Predictive Power of Aggregate llliquidity for Stock Returns and Economic Activity, Journal of Financial Economics (2018), doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.011海外文献推荐-第五十三期参考文献:[1]Arnott R D, Chaves D B, Chow T. King of the Mountain:, Shiller P/E and Macroeconomic Conditions[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2015, 44(1):55-68.[2]Risk Parity Portfolio vs. Other Asset Allocation Heuristic Portfolios [J]. The Journal of Investing. 2010 December海外文献推荐-第五十四期参考文献:[1]Cliff's Perspective, Our Model Goes to Six and Saves Value From Redundancy Along the Way,AQR Capital Management, December 17, 2014[2]D Avramov,S Cheng,A Schreiber,K Shemer,2017,Scaling up Market Anomalies,Social Science Electronic Publishing,26 (3) :89-105海外文献推荐-第五十五期参考文献:[1]Aurélien Philippot,Analysts’ reinitiations of coverage and market underreaction,Journal of Banking and Finance , 94 (2018) 208–220海外文献推荐-第五十六期参考文献:[1]Michael W. Brandt, Earnings Announcements are Full of Surprises,Social Science Electronic Publishing, January 22, 2008[2]Sujin Pyo, Jaewook Lee,Exploiting the low-risk anomaly using machine learning to enhance the Black–Litterman framework: Evidence from South Korea,Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,51 (2018) 1–12[3]Robert F Engle and Andrew J Patton,What good is a volatility model?,Robert F Engle and Andrew J Patton海外文献推荐-第五十七期参考文献:[1]Nic Schaub, The Role of Data Providers as Information Intermediaries,Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2015 :1-34海外文献推荐-第五十八期参考文献:[1]Binu George and Hardik Shah, ESG: Improving Your Risk-Adjusted Returns in Emerging Markets,GMO White Paper, Mar 2018海外文献推荐-第五十九期参考文献:[1]Campbell R. Harvey and Yan Liu. Backtesting. Journal of portfolio management, 2015海外文献推荐-第六十期参考文献:[1]Mclean R D, Pontiff J. Does Academic Research Destroy Stock Return Predictability?[J]. Journal of Finance, 2016, 71(1)海外文献推荐-第六十一期参考文献:[1]Israelov R, Tummala H. Which Index Options Should You Sell?[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2017海外文献推荐-第六十二期参考文献:[1]Eric H. Sorensen, Keith L. Miller, and Chee K. Ooi,2000,The Decision Tree Approach to Stock Selection,The Journal of Portfolio Management,42-52海外文献推荐-第六十三期参考文献:[1]Donangelo A, Gourio F, Kehrig M, et al. The cross-section of labor leverage and equity returns[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2018海外文献推荐-第六十四期参考文献:[1]Qang Bu. Do Persistent Fund Alphas Indicate Manager Skill? [J]. Journal of Wealth Management,2017,20(2)82-93海外文献推荐-第六十五期参考文献:[1]Miguel A. Lejeune A VaR Black–Litterman model for the construction of absolute return fund-offunds [J] Quantitative Finance · January 2009海外文献推荐-第六十六期参考文献:[1]Fan J H, Zhang T. Demystifying Commodity Futures in China [J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2018海外文献推荐-第六十七期参考文献:[1]Jon Hale, Sustainable Funds U.S. Landscape Report. Morningstar Research, 2018.海外文献推荐-第六十八期参考文献:[1]Sun Z, Wang A, Zheng L. Only Winners in Tough Times Repeat: Hedge Fund Performance Persistence over Different Market Conditions[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2018.海外文献推荐-第六十九期参考文献:[1] A´LVARO CARTEA,SEBASTIAN JAIMUNGAL. RISK METRICS AND FINE TUNING OF HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING STRATEGIES [J]. Mathematical Finance, V ol. 00, No. 0 (xxx 2013), 1-36.海外文献推荐-第七十期参考文献:[1] Dopfel, Frederick E. , and L. Ashley . "Optimal Blending of Smart Beta and Multifactor Portfolios." The Journal of Portfolio Management 44.4(2018):93-105.海外文献推荐-第七十一期参考文献:[1] Avraham Kamara, Robert Korajczyk, Xiaoxia Lou and Ronnie Sadka,2018,Short-Horizon Beta or Long-Horizon Alpha?, The Journal of Portfolio Management,45(1),96-105海外文献推荐-第七十二期参考文献:[1] Masulis, Ronald W., and Emma Jincheng Zhang. "How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions." Journal of Financial Economics (2018).海外文献推荐-第七十三期参考文献:[1] Hunter D, Kandel E, Kandel S, et al. Mutual fund performance evaluation with active peer benchmarks[J]. Journal of Financial economics, 2014, 112(1): 1-29.海外文献推荐-第七十四期参考文献:[1]Michael Stein and Svetlozar T. Rachev. Style Neutral Funds of Funds: Diversification or Deadweight? [J]. Journal of Asset Management, February 2011, V olume 11, Issue 6, pp 417–434海外文献推荐-第七十五期参考文献:[1] Elisabeth Kashner, 2019.01.31, Bogle led this investing Fee War, ;[2] Cinthia Murphy,2017,03.31, how to launch a successful ETF, ;[3] Drew V oros, 2019.01.23, how a small ETF Issuer Competes, ;[4] 2019.01.04, Invesco focusing on scale,海外文献推荐-第七十六期参考文献:[1] Shpak I , Human B , Nardon A . Idiosyncratic momentum in commodity futures[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2017.海外文献推荐-第七十六期参考文献:[1] Ehsani S , Linnainmaa J T . Factor Momentum and the Momentum Factor[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2017.海外文献推荐-第七十七期参考文献:[1] Iuliia Shpak*, Ben Human and Andrea Nardon. 2017.09.11, Idiosyncratic momentum in commodity futures. ResearchGate海外文献推荐-第七十八期参考文献:[1] Joel Hasbrouck. High-Frequency Quoting: Short-Term V olatility in Bids and Offers. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS海外文献推荐-第七十九期参考文献:[1] Tarun Gupta and Bryan Kelly. Factor Momentum Everywhere. Institutional Investor Journals海外文献推荐-第八十期参考文献:[1] MICHAEL A. BABYAK , P H D. What You See May Not Be What You Get: A Brief, Nontechnical Introduction to Overfitting in Regression-Type Models. S T A T I S T I C A L C O R N E R海外文献推荐-第八十一期参考文献:[1] Eric Jondeau , Qunzi Zhang , Xiaoneng Zhu. Average Skewness Matters.海外文献推荐-第八十二期参考文献:[1] JOHN A. HASLEM. Morningstar Mutual Fund Measures and Selection Model. THE JOURNAL OF WEALTH MANAGEMENT海外文献推荐-第八十三期参考文献:[1] EUGENE F. FAMA and KENNETH R. FRENCH. Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns. THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE海外文献推荐-第八十四期参考文献:[1] How Transparent Are ETFs?[2] Lara Crigger. Nontransparent Active: Next ETF Revolution?.海外文献推荐-第八十五期参考文献:[1] Olivier Rousse and Benoît Sévi. 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Testing Theories of Capital Structure and Estimating the Speed of Adjustment
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS Vol.44,No.2,Apr.2009,pp.237–271 COPYRIGHT2009,MICHAEL G.FOSTER SCHOOL OF BUSINESS,UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON,SEATTLE,WA98195 doi:10.1017/S0022109009090152Testing Theories of Capital Structure and Estimating the Speed of AdjustmentRongbing Huang and Jay R.Ritter∗AbstractThis paper examines time-series patterns of externalfinancing decisions and shows that publicly traded U.S.firms fund a much larger proportion of theirfinancing deficit with external equity when the cost of equity capital is low.The historical values of the cost of equity capital have long-lasting effects onfirms’capital structures through their influence onfirms’historicalfinancing decisions.We also introduce a new econometric technique to deal with biases in estimates of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage.Wefind thatfirms adjust toward target leverage at a moderate speed,with a half-life of3.7years for book leverage,even after controlling for the traditional determinants of capital structure andfirmfixed effects.I.IntroductionThe three preeminent theories of capital structure are the static trade-off, pecking order,and market timing models.Other studies have examined the rela-tive merits of static trade-off and pecking order theories.In this paper,we present empirical evidence regarding the relative importance of all three of these ing a direct measure of the equity risk premium(ERP),wefind that U.S.firms during1964–2001are much more likely to use external equityfinancing when the relative cost of equity is low.Furthermore,ERPs have long-lived effects on capital structure through their influence on securities issuance decisions,even ∗Huang,rhuang1@,Coles School of Business,Kennesaw State University,1000 Chastain Road NW,Kennesaw,GA30144;Ritter,jay.ritter@cba.ufl.edu,Warrington College of Busi-ness Administration,University of Florida,PO Box117168,Gainesville,FL32611.We thank Chun-rong Ai,Harry DeAngelo,Ralf Elsas,Kristine Hankins,Steve Huddart,Marcin Kacperczyk,Jason Karceski,Robert Kieschnick,Paul Malatesta(the editor),Andy Naranjo,M.Nimalendran,Gabriel Ramirez,Kasturi Rangan,Michael Roberts,Ren´e Stulz,Jeffrey Wurgler,Donghang Zhang,and espe-cially Mark Flannery and Ivo Welch,and seminar participants at the University of Florida,Kennesaw State University,the University of Michigan,NTU(Singapore),the2004All-Georgia Finance Con-ference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,the October2004Notre Dame Behavioral Finance Conference,the2005Western Finance Association Conference,and the2005Financial Management Association Conference,as well as two anonymous referees for useful comments.We also thank Vidhan Goyal,Kamil Tahmiscioglu,and Richard Warr for kind programming assistance and Xiao Huang for help with econometrics.This paper is based on Rongbing Huang’s2004University of Florida doctoral dissertation.Earlier versions of this paper were circulated under the title“Testing the Market Timing Theory of Capital Structure,”but most of the analysis on the speed of adjustment (Section V)was added subsequently.237238Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysisafter controlling for the traditional determinants of capital structure,consistent with the hypothesis that market timing is an important determinant of observed capital structures.After further controlling forfirmfixed effects and correcting for biases that are created by some of thefirms being present for only a short part of the sample period and leverage ratios being highly persistent,wefind thatfirms adjust toward their target leverage at a moderate speed.No single theory of capital structure is capable of explaining all of the time-series and cross-sectional patterns that have been documented.The relative impor-tance of these explanations has varied in different studies.In general,the pecking order theory enjoyed a period of ascendancy in the1990s,but it has recently fallen on hard times.With the publication of Baker and Wurgler’s(2002)article relating capital structure to past market-to-book ratios,the market timing theory has increasingly challenged both the static trade-off and pecking order theories.A number of recent papers,however,challenge Baker and Wurgler’s evidence that securities issued in a year have long-lived effects on capital structure.The market timing theory posits that corporate executives issue securities de-pending on the time-varying relative costs of equity and debt,and these issuance decisions have long-lasting effects on capital structure because the observed cap-ital structure at date t is the outcome of prior period-by-period securities issuance decisions.According to the market timing theory,firms prefer equity when they perceive the relative cost of equity as low,and they prefer debt otherwise.The capital structure literature has,to date,refrained from explicitly measuring the cost of equity.A major contribution of this paper is to link securities issuance explicitly to the cost of equity capital,using a direct measure of the ERP.Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999)test the pecking order theory by estimating an ordinary least squares(OLS)regression using afirm’s net debt issuance as the dependent variable and its netfinancing deficit as the independent variable.They find that the estimated coefficient on thefinancing deficit is close to one for their sample of157firms continuously listed during1971–1989,and they interpret the evidence as supportive of the pecking order theory.Frank and Goyal(2003),how-ever,find that the coefficient on thefinancing deficit is far below one in the1990s. We explore the role of changing market conditions infirms’changingfinancing behavior.Wefind that our market condition proxies,especially a measure for the time-varying cost of equity capital,have an important impact on the estimated coefficient of thefinancing deficit.To measure the relative cost of equity,we use the beginning-of-year implied ERP,estimated using forecasted earnings and long-term growth(LTG)rates.Con-sistent with the market timing theory,wefind thatfirms fund a large proportion of theirfinancing deficit with external equity when the relative cost of equity is low.The magnitude of the effect is economically and statistically significant.For example,an increase from3%to4%in the implied ERP results in approximately 3%more(e.g.,from62%to65%)of thefinancing deficit being funded with net debt.To our knowledge,our study is thefirst to systematically link the time series offinancing choices to the time-varying ERP for a large sample of U.S.publicly tradedfirms.After establishing the importance of market conditions for securities issuance, we examine the effect of historical ERPs on current leverage.Wefind that pastHuang and Ritter239 ERPs have long-lasting effects on afirm’s current capital structure through their influence on historicalfinancing decisions.Afirm funds a larger proportion of itsfinancing deficit with debt when the market ERP is higher,resulting in higher leverage for many subsequent years.For example,afinancing deficit that was 10%of total assets in1974,when the ERP was high,results in an increase of 2.91%in book leverage(e.g.,increasing from47.09%to50%)four years later, while afinancing deficit of10%in1996,when the ERP was low,results in an increase of only0.35%in book leverage four years later.We also estimate the speed with whichfirms adjust toward target leverage. This is perhaps the most important issue in capital structure research today.If firms adjust quickly toward their target leverage,which changes across time as firm characteristics and market conditions change,then historicalfinancing ac-tivities and market conditions will have only short-lived effects onfirms’current capital structures,implying that the market timing theory of capital structure is unimportant.The existing literature has provided mixed results on the speed of adjust-ment(SOA)toward targetfinancial leverage.Fama and French(2002)estimate an SOA of7%–18%per year.Lemmon,Roberts,and Zender(2008)find that capital structure is so persistent that the cross-sectional distribution of leverage in the year prior to the initial public offering(IPO)predicts leverage20years later,yet they estimate a relatively rapid SOA of25%per year for book leverage. Flannery and Rangan(2006)estimate an even faster SOA:35.5%per year using market leverage and34.2%per year using book leverage,suggesting that it takes about1.6years for afirm to remove half of the effect of a shock on its leverage. Both Leary and Roberts(2005)and Alti(2006)find that the effect of equity is-suance on leverage completely vanishes within two to four years,suggesting fast adjustment toward target leverage.As Frank and Goyal(2008)state in their sur-vey article:“Corporate leverage is mean reverting at thefirm level.The speed at which this happens is not a settled issue”(p.185).We reconcile these differentfindings by showing that the estimated SOA in a dynamic panel model withfirmfixed effects is sensitive to the econometric procedure employed when many of thefirms are present for relatively brief pe-riods,especially when afirm’s debt ratio is highly autocorrelated.A traditional estimator for a dynamic panel model withfirmfixed effects involves mean dif-ferencing the model.As Flannery and Rangan(2006)observe,however,the bias in the mean differencing estimate of the SOA can be substantial for a dynamic panel data set in which manyfirms have only a few years of data(the short time dimension bias).To reduce the bias,Flannery and Rangan(2006)rely on an in-strumental variable in their mean differencing estimation,while Antoniou,Guney, and Paudyal(2008)and Lemmon et al.(2008)use a system generalized method of moments(GMM)estimator.In the system GMM estimation,the model itself and thefirst difference of the model are estimated as a“system.”The system GMM estimator,however,is biased when the dependent variable is highly persistent,as is the case with debt ratios.Hahn,Hausman,and Kuersteiner(2007)propose a long differencing estima-tor for highly persistent data series.In this estimator,a multiyear difference of the model is taken rather than a one-year difference.Our simulations show that240Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysisthe long differencing estimate is much less biased than the OLS estimate ignoring firmfixed effects unless the true SOA is slow,in which case neither procedure has an appreciable bias.The long differencing estimate is also much less biased than thefirmfixed effects mean differencing estimate unless the true SOA is fast, in which case neither procedure has an appreciable bias.Hahn et al.(2007)show that the long differencing estimator is also much less biased than the system GMM estimator when the dependent variable is highly persistent(i.e.,the true SOA is slow).In a simulation,they show that if the true autoregressive parameter is0.9, the system GMM estimate is only0.664,whereas the long differencing estimator produces an estimate of0.902with a differencing length of k=5.Using the long differencing technique,wefind thatfirms only slowly rebal-ance away the undesired effects of leverage ing a differencing length of k=8,the SOA is17.0%per year for book leverage and23.2%per year for market leverage.Such estimates suggest that it takes about3.7and2.6years for afirm to remove half of the effect of a shock on its book and market leverage, respectively.This is the most important result of this paper.Throughout our empirical analysis,we do not give equal attention to the mar-ket timing,pecking order,and static trade-off models.This is because many of our findings are consistent with earlier research,and little purpose would be served by long discussions that would largely repeat the existing literature.Instead,we focus on our newfindings regarding time variation in the relative cost of equity as it relates to the pecking order and market timing hypotheses,on whether past securities issues have persistent effects on capital structure,and on the SOA to target leverage.The rest of this paper is organized as follows.Section II describes the data and summary statistics.Section III presents the empirical results of the role of market timing in securities issuance decisions.Section IV examines the effects of securities issues on capital structure.Section V discusses econometric issues and presents estimates of the SOA to target capital structure using the long differenc-ing estimator.Section VI concludes.II.Data and Summary StatisticsA.DataThefirm-level data are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)and Compustat.The sample consists offirms from1963to2001.Since R&D(item46)is missing for about39%offirm years,we set the missing value to zero to avoid losing many observations.We rely on a dummy variable to capture the effect of missing values when using R&D in our analysis.1Utilities(4900–4949)andfinancialfirms(6000–6999)are excluded because they were regulated during most of the sample period.A small number offirms with a format code 1The vast majority offirms with missing R&D are in industries such as clothing retailers for which R&D expenditures are likely to be zero.Capital expenditures and convertible debt are missing for about2%offirm years.We set missing capital expenditures(128)and convertible debt(79)to zero, although our results are essentially the same if we excludefirm years with missing capital expenditures or convertible debt.Huang and Ritter241 of4,5,or6are also excluded from the sample.2Firm years with beginning-of-year book assets of less than$10million,measured in terms of1998purchasing power,are also excluded to eliminate very smallfirms and reduce the effect of outliers.3Finally,we excludefirm-year observations for which there was an ac-counting change for adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS)No.94,which requiredfirms to consolidate off-balance sheetfinancing subsidiaries.4B.Summary Statistics of Financing ActivitiesSummary statistics offinancing activities are presented by year because we are interested in the time-series properties.Figure1presentsfinancing activities using information from the balance debt is defined as the change in book equity is defined as the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings.Following Baker and Wurgler(2002)and Fama and French (2002),book debt is defined as total liabilities plus preferred stock(10)minus deferred taxes(35)and convertible debt(79),and book equity is total assets less book debt.5In Figure1,the average ratios are the annual averages of netfinancing scaled by beginning-of-year assets(in percent),and the aggregate ratios are the annual aggregate amount of netfinancing of allfirms scaled by the aggregate amount of beginning-of-year total assets(in percent).Figure1shows that the average net debt increase exceeded10%of beginning-of-year assets in eight years.The average net equity issuance exceeded6%in12years.The average change in retained earnings shows a declining trend,with the lowest value in2001,the last year of our sample period.The aggregate net debt and equity issuancesfluctuate substantially,with aggregate net external equity issuance peaking at over7%of aggregate assets in2000.The static trade-off theory has been unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for the magnitude of thesefluctuations.The pecking2Format code5is for Canadianfirms,and format codes4and6are not defined in Compustat.3To further reduce the effect of outliers,we also dropfirm-year observations with book leverage or market leverage that is negative or greater than one and Tobin’s Q that is negative or greater than10. These variables will be defined later.Our results are robust to whether or not we keep thesefirm-year observations.4We exclude201suchfirm years identified with Compustat footnote codes.The Financial Ac-counting Standards Board(FASB)issued SFAS No.94in late1987.Heavy equipment manufacturers and merchandise retailers were most affected by the standard because they made extensive use of unconsolidatedfinance subsidiaries.For example,Ford,General Motors,General Electric,and Inter-national Business Machines all had a huge increase in debt on their balance sheets fromfiscal year 1987to1988.More specifically,Ford had a debt increase of about$93.8billion,while its end-of-year total assets were$45.0billion in1987and$143.4billion in1988,largely because Ford Credit was consolidated under the new standard.This standard also caused somefirms to divest themselves of unconsolidated subsidiaries because otherwise they would violate debt covenant agreements on the maximum amount of leverage,and their returns on assets would appear too low andfinancial leverage would appear too high.5When the liquidating value of preferred stock(item10)is missing,we use the redemption value of preferred stock(56).When the redemption value is also missing,we use the carrying value of pre-ferred stock(130).As one referee noted,convertible preferred stock is more equity-like than straight preferred stock.In unreported analysis we include the change in the carrying value of convertible preferred stock(214)in our definition of net equity.Our results remain qualitatively the same.242Journal of Financial and Quantitative AnalysisFIGURE 1Average and Aggregate Financing Activities from the Balance SheetNet debt is the change in debt and preferred stock (Compustat items 181+10−35−79).Net equity is the change in equity and convertible debt (items 6−181−10+35+79)minus the change in retained earnings (36).Graph A of Figure 1shows the equally weighted annual averages of net financing scaled by beginning-of-year assets of each firm (in percent).Graph B shows the annual aggregate amount of net financing of all firms in the sample scaled by the aggregate amount of beginning-of-year assets (in percent).Graph A.Equally Weighted Averages of Net Financing/AssetsGraph B.Aggregate Amount of Net Financing/Aggregate Amount of Assetsorder theory gains some support during 1974–1978,when the average net equity issuance was below 2%.As so often happens,however,the pattern on which the pecking order hypothesis was based began to break down shortly after the publication of Myers (1984).Figure 1understates securities issues because other firms that are retiring debt or buying back stock lower the averages.Table 1reports the percentage of firms that are net securities issuers.Issuing firms in a year are defined as those forHuang and Ritter243TABLE1Percent of Firms in Different Financing Groups across TimeAfirm is defined as issuing debt ifΔD scaled by beginning-of-year assets is at least5%,whereΔD is the change in debt and preferred stock(Compustat items181+10−35−79)from year t−1to year t,or issuing equity ifΔE scaled by beginning-of-year assets is at least5%,whereΔE is the change in equity and convertible debt(6−181−10+35+79) minus the change in retained earnings(36).The percentages of debt and equity issuers do not necessarily add up to100 becausefirms can issue both debt and equity or neither debt nor equity.Firms with beginning-of-year assets of less than $10million(1998purchasing power)are excluded.Year Total Number of Firms Debt Issues(%)Equity Issues(%) 196312933.316.3 196446535.712.0 196555845.914.3 196672254.216.3 19671,31643.816.6 19681,57053.924.5 19691,92947.434.1 19702,21140.914.7 19712,49333.814.4 19722,73943.016.7 19732,98658.610.4 19743,03957.9 6.8 19753,09728.1 6.6 19763,04638.68.1 19772,98646.97.9 19782,87557.79.5 19792,90556.911.6 19802,97545.515.4 19812,91542.419.3 19823,07334.813.1 19833,06535.723.1 19843,14645.317.7 19853,21040.216.4 19863,07939.619.4 19873,10443.919.8 19883,09744.414.8 19893,07541.214.7 19903,06339.713.5 19913,04130.616.2 19923,13335.821.8 19933,38040.224.0 19943,71545.024.5 19953,94447.625.2 19964,21443.529.7 19974,54344.829.5 19984,56449.527.4 19994,36644.726.7 20004,20243.131.5 20014,16028.427.7 which debt or equity increases by more than5%of beginning-of-year assets,the same definition that has been used,for example,in Hovakimian,Hovakimian,and Tehranian(2004)and Korajczyk and Levy(2003).Once we separatefirms with net securities issues from otherfirms,we see a higher frequency of issuing.The percentage offirms with net debt issuance of at least5%of assets is never below 28%.The pecking order theory predicts that equity issues will be rare.However, the proportion of net equity issuers(firms issuing at least5%of assets)never drops below6.6%in any year,peaks at over34%in1969,and is at least25%in each year from1995to2001.66Our proportion of equity issuers is much higher than in studies such as Jung,Kim,and Stulz (1996)and DeAngelo,DeAngelo,and Stulz(2009),which define an equity issuer as afirm conducting a public seasoned equity offering for cash.Our definition of an equity issuer,which is standard in the empirical capital structure literature,includesfirms that conduct private placements of equity or stock-financed acquisitions that increase the book value of equity by at least5%of assets,net of share repurchases.244Journal of Financial and Quantitative AnalysisOverall,our summary statistics offinancing activities cast doubt on the abil-ity of the pecking order model to describe most of the observed capital structures, consistent with Fama and French(2002),(2005),Frank and Goyal(2003),and Hovakimian(2006).C.Summary Statistics of Macroeconomic VariablesHow dofirms judge the relative cost of equity?On the one hand,somefirm executives may possess private information that is not reflected in market prices about theirfirms or their industries.On the other hand,they may follow certain psychological patterns.For example,reference points,as suggested by prospect theory,may play a role.7Alternatively,they may issue equity to take advantage of publicly observable misvaluations if the equity market becomes temporarily overvalued(Stein(1996)).Our proxy for the cost of equity is the implied ERP,estimated using analyst earnings forecasts(earnings per share(EPS)and LTG rate)at the end of the pre-vious calendar year for the30stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.8The implied ERP is defined as the real internal rate of return that equates the current stock price to the present value of all future cashflows to common sharehold-ers of thefirm(measured as book value of equity plus forecasted future residual earnings),minus the real risk-free rate(see Appendix A for details).Although they differ in their specific procedures,this is the general approach used by Claus and Thomas(2001),Gebhardt,Lee,and Swaminathan(2001),and Ritter and Warr(2002).9We follow Ritter and Warr(2002)to correct for inflation-induced distortions in the estimation of the implied ERP.The equally weighted average of 7Casual conversations with investment bankers suggest that when they advise their clients on the choice between debt and external equityfinancing,the most important factors they consider are whether a client’s stock price is near a52-week high and whether the earnings yield on the stock is below the interest rate on debt.8By using the lagged year-end values during year t for afirm with a Dec.31fiscal year,we are using the Dec.31of year t−1accounting information and stock price.For afirm with a June30fiscal year,during year t we use the June30of year t−1accounting information and Dec.31of year t−1stock price.We use forecasts from Value Line for1968–1976and from Institutional Brokers’Estimate System(IBES)for1977–2001.We hand-collect Value Line data from Value Line Investment Survey for early years when the IBES database is not available.Because previous studies document that IBES and Value Line analysts make systematically different forecasts,we estimate the implied ERP for1977using analyst forecasts from both sources and then adjust the implied ERP for1968–1976by multiplying the Value Line forecast by the ratio of the1977premium using IBES to the1977 premium using Value Line.Brav,Lehavy,and Michaely(2005)estimate the implied nominal expected market return using target prices and future dividends from Value Line for1975–2001.They estimate annual nominal expected returns varying from34.1%in1975to12.1%ing their series instead of ours does not change our major results.Our qualitative results are also robust to using the value-weighted book-to-market ratio of equity for all NYSE-listedfirms as a proxy for the relative cost of equity rather than the implied ERP.9Consistent with the literature,we assume that analyst EPS forecasts are exogenous.Bayesian an-alysts,however,may become overly conservative in their forecasts of EPS when the cost of equity is high,and overly optimistic when the cost of equity is low.This is because the market price implies fu-ture earnings,and a Bayesian analyst will incorporate these into his or her own forecasts.Furthermore, when P/E ratios are high,more optimistic forecasts are necessary in order to justify“buy”recommen-dations.The endogeneity results in a dampening of the time series of the implied ERP relative to its truefluctuations and hence creates a bias against our results.Huang and Ritter245 the implied ERP for each of the Dow30stocks is used as an estimate of the ERP for the market.The time-variation of the implied ERP may be due to either the time-variation of risk,or of the risk aversion of investors(rational reasons),or to the time-variation of investor sentiment(an irrational reason).Figure2shows the real interest rate(RIR)and the implied ERP at the end of each calendar year.The ERP turned negative during1996–2001,suggesting over-valuation of the stock market.10Firms display a high propensity to issue equity during these years,as indicated in Table1.FIGURE2Equity Risk Premium and Real Interest RateThe market equity risk premium is estimated using analyst forecasts at the year-end for the Dow30stocks from Value Line for1968–1976and from IBES for1977–2001.The real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus inflation,where the nominal interest rate is the yield on one-year Treasury bills in the secondary market at the beginning of each calendar year at /,and inflation is the rate of change of the consumer price index during the calendar year from CRSP.Figure2also shows that the RIR was very low in1973–1974and1978–1979, when the percentage of samplefirms issuing debt rose to historic highs(over56% 10Although we estimate a negative ERP for some years,our qualitative results are not dependent on the ERPs being negative.The residual income methodology that we employ states that the value of equity is equal to the book value of equity plus the present value of future residual income(economic profits).Because we assume that future residual income is mean-reverting,a large present value of future residual income can only be achieved by using a low discount rate(i.e.,since the numerator converges to zero,a small denominator is needed to generate a high ratio).When both the market-to-book ratio and the RIR are high,as was the case in the1996–2001period,the model produces a negative implied ERP.Some have argued that a high market-to-book ratio has existed in most years after1995because the book value of equity increasingly underrepresents the value of assets in place as intangibles represent more and more offirm value.If so,our estimates may overstate the downtrend in the ERP,and the true ERP may not be as negative as we estimate.Since we use the ERP as an explanatory variable,overestimating its decline would lead to underestimating the slope coefficient on the ERP.246Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysisfor each of these years in Table1).The RIR is used as a proxy for the time-varying cost of debt perceived by corporate executives.Previous studies also use the term spread and the default spread as proxies for the costs of various forms of debt(e.g.,Baker,Greenwood,and Wurgler(2003)). It is likely that the time-varying default risk premium can help explain the time-varyingfinancing decisions.We thus include the default spread,which is defined as the difference in yields between Moody’s Baa-and Aaa-rated corporate bonds. The term spread,defined as the difference in yields between10-and one-year Treasuries,is also included becausefirms might increase the use of long-term debt when the term spread is low.We also include contemporaneous measures of the statutory corporate tax rate and the real gross domestic product(GDP)growth rate.The statutory cor-porate tax rate has changed over time and may have a major influence on the financing decisions of U.S.firms(see,among others,Graham(2003)and Kale, Noe,and Ramirez(1991)).11The real GDP growth rate controls for growth op-portunities.To the degree that these variables are important and have the expected signs,this lends support to the static trade-off model.The lagged average announcement effect on seasoned equity offerings(SEOs) is included to see whether,as implied by the pecking order theory,time-varying information asymmetry is able to explain time-varyingfinancing activities.Since the pecking order theory assumes that markets are semi-strong-form efficient,the announcement effect associated with equity issues is the primary proxy for the level of information asymmetry(Bayless and Chaplinsky(1996)).Table2reports summary statistics for our proxies for market conditions. The implied ERP is positively correlated with the default spread and the statutory corporate tax rate and is negatively correlated with the RIR.III.Market Timing and Securities Issuance Decisions How important are market conditions,especially the ERP,in securities is-suance decisions?This section reports and discusses the results from i)annual OLS regressions using afirm’s net debt issuance as the dependent variable and its netfinancing deficit as the independent variable,ii)pooled OLS regressions linking the pecking order slope coefficient to the time-varying cost of capital, and iii)a pooled nested logit regression for the joint decision of whether to issue securities and which security to issue.A.Pecking Order TestsFollowing Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999),wefirst estimateΔD it=a t+b t DEF it+u it,(1)11The statutory corporate tax rate was52%in1963,50%in1964,48%in1965–1967,52.8%in 1968–1969,49.2%in1970,48%in1971–1978,46%in1979–1986,40%in1987,34%in1988–1992, and35%in1993–2001.。
Time series momentum
Time series momentum$Tobias J.Moskowitz a,n,Yao Hua Ooi b,Lasse Heje Pedersen b,ca University of Chicago Booth School of Business and NBER,United Statesb AQR Capital Management,United Statesc New York University,Copenhagen Business School,NBER,CEPR,United Statesa r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:Received16August2010Received in revised form11July2011Accepted12August2011Available online11December2011JEL classification:G12G13G15F37Keywords:Asset pricingTrading volumeFutures pricingInternationalfinancial marketsMarket efficiencya b s t r a c tWe document significant‘‘time series momentum’’in equity index,currency,commod-ity,and bond futures for each of the58liquid instruments we consider.Wefindpersistence in returns for one to12months that partially reverses over longer horizons,consistent with sentiment theories of initial under-reaction and delayed over-reaction.A diversified portfolio of time series momentum strategies across all asset classesdelivers substantial abnormal returns with little exposure to standard asset pricingfactors and performs best during extreme markets.Examining the trading activities ofspeculators and hedgers,wefind that speculators profit from time series momentum atthe expense of hedgers.&2011Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.1.Introduction:a trending walk down Wall StreetWe document an asset pricing anomaly we term‘‘timeseries momentum,’’which is remarkably consistent acrossvery different asset classes and markets.Specifically,wefind strong positive predictability from a security’s ownpast returns for almostfive dozen diverse futures andforward contracts that include country equity indexes,currencies,commodities,and sovereign bonds over morethan25years of data.Wefind that the past12-monthexcess return of each instrument is a positive predictor ofits future return.This time series momentum or‘‘trend’’effect persists for about a year and then partially reversesover longer horizons.Thesefindings are robust across anumber of subsamples,look-back periods,and holdingperiods.Wefind that12-month time series momentumprofits are positive,not just on average across these assets,but for every asset contract we examine(58in total).Time series momentum is related to,but differentfrom,the phenomenon known as‘‘momentum’’in thefinance literature,which is primarily cross-sectional innature.The momentum literature focuses on the relativeperformance of securities in the cross-section,finding thatsecurities that recently outperformed their peers over thepast three to12months continue to outperform theirContents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirectjournal homepage:/locate/jfecJournal of Financial Economics0304-405X/$-see front matter&2011Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.11.003$We thank Cliff Asness,Nick Barberis,Gene Fama,John Heaton,Ludger Hentschel,Brian Hurst,Andrew Karolyi,John Liew,Matt Richard-son,Richard Thaler,Adrien Verdelhan,Robert Vishny,Robert Whitelaw,Jeff Wurgler,and seminar participants at NYU and the2011AFAmeetings in Denver,CO for useful suggestions and discussions,and AriLevine and Haibo Lu for excellent research assistance.Moskowitz thanksthe Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago BoothSchool of Business and CRSP forfinancial support.n Corresponding author.E-mail address:tobias.moskowitz@(T.J.Moskowitz).Journal of Financial Economics104(2012)228–250peers on average over the next month.1Rather than focus on the relative returns of securities in the cross-section, time series momentum focuses purely on a security’s own past return.We argue that time series momentum directly matches the predictions of many prominent behavioral and rational asset pricing theories.Barberis,Shleifer,and Vishny(1998),Daniel,Hirshleifer,and Subrahmanyam (1998),and Hong and Stein(1999)all focus on a single risky asset,therefore having direct implications for time series,rather than cross-sectional,predictability.Like-wise,rational theories of momentum(Berk,Green,and Naik,1999;Johnson,2002;Ahn,Conrad,and Dittmar, 2003;Liu and Zhang,2008;Sagi and Seasholes,2007)also pertain to a single risky asset.Ourfinding of positive time series momentum that partially reverse over the long-term may be consistent with initial under-reaction and delayed over-reaction, which theories of sentiment suggest can produce these return patterns.2However,our results also pose several challenges to these theories.First,wefind that the correlations of time series momentum strategies across asset classes are larger than the correlations of the asset classes themselves.This suggests a stronger common component to time series momentum across different assets than is present among the assets themselves.Such a correlation structure is not addressed by existing beha-vioral models.Second,very different types of investors in different asset markets are producing the same patterns at the same time.Third,we fail tofind a link between time series momentum and measures of investor senti-ment used in the literature(Baker and Wurgler,2006;Qiu and Welch,2006).To understand the relationship between time series and cross-sectional momentum,their underlying drivers, and relation to theory,we decompose the returns to a time series and cross-sectional momentum strategy fol-lowing the framework of Lo and Mackinlay(1990)and Lewellen(2002).This decomposition allows us to identify the properties of returns that contribute to these patterns, and what features are common and unique to the two strategies.Wefind that positive auto-covariance in futures contracts’returns drives most of the time series and cross-sectional momentum effects wefind in the data.The contribution of the other two return components—serial cross-correlations and variation in mean returns—is small.In fact,negative serial cross-correlations(i.e.,lead-lag effects across securities),which affect cross-sectional momentum,are negligible and of the‘‘wrong’’sign among our instruments to explain time series momentum.Ourfinding that time series and cross-sectional momentum profits arise due to auto-covar-iances is consistent with the theories mentioned above.3 In addition,wefind that time series momentum captures the returns associated with individual stock(cross-sec-tional)momentum,most notably Fama and French’s UMD factor,despite time series momentum being constructed from a completely different set of securities.Thisfinding indicates strong correlation structure between time series momentum and cross-sectional momentum even when applied to different assets and suggests that our time series momentum portfolio captures individual stock momentum.To better understand what might be driving time series momentum,we examine the trading activity of speculators and hedgers around these return patterns using weekly position data from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission(CFTC).Wefind that speculators trade with time series momentum,being positioned,on average,to take advantage of the positive trend in returns for thefirst12months and reducing their positions when the trend begins to reverse.Consequently,speculators appear to be profiting from time series momentum at the expense of ing a vector auto-regression(VAR), we confirm that speculators trade in the same direction as a return shock and reduce their positions as the shock dissipates,whereas hedgers take the opposite side of these trades.Finally,we decompose time series momentum into the component coming from spot price predictability versus the‘‘roll yield’’stemming from the shape of the futures curve.While spot price changes are mostly driven by information shocks,the roll yield can be driven by liquidity and price pressure effects in futures markets that affect the return to holding futures without necessa-rily changing the spot price.Hence,this decomposition may be a way to distinguish the effects of information dissemination from hedging pressure.Wefind that both of these effects contribute to time series momentum,but1Cross-sectional momentum has been documented in US equities (Jegadeesh and Titman,1993;Asness,1994),other equity markets (Rouwenhorst,1998),industries(Moskowitz and Grinblatt,1999), equity indexes(Asness,Liew,and Stevens,1997;Bhojraj and Swaminathan,2006),currencies(Shleifer and Summers,1990),com-modities(Erb and Harvey,2006;Gorton,Hayashi,and Rouwenhorst, 2008),and global bond futures(Asness,Moskowitz,and Pedersen,2010). Garleanu and Pedersen(2009)show how to trade optimally on momen-tum and reversal in light of transaction costs,and DeMiguel,Nogales, and Uppal(2010)show how to construct an optimal portfolio based on stocks’serial dependence andfind outperformance out-of-sample.Our study is related to but different from Asness,Moskowitz,and Pedersen (2010)who study cross-sectional momentum and value strategies across several asset classes including individual stocks.We complement their study by examining time series momentum and its relation to cross-sectional momentum and hedging pressure in some of the same asset classes.2Under-reaction can result from the slow diffusion of news(Hong and Stein,1999),conservativeness and anchoring biases(Barberis, Shleifer,and Vishny,1998;Edwards,1968),or the disposition effect to sell winners too early and hold on to losers too long(Shefrin andStatman,1985;Frazzini,2006).Over-reaction can be caused by positive feedback trading(De Long,Shleifer,Summers,and Waldmann,1990; Hong and Stein,1999),over-confidence and self-attribution confirma-tion biases(Daniel,Hirshleifer,and Subrahmanyam,1998),the repre-sentativeness heuristic(Barberis,Shleifer,and Vishny,1998;Tversky and Kahneman,1974),herding(Bikhchandani,Hirshleifer,and Welch, 1992),or general sentiment(Baker and Wurgler,2006,2007).3However,this result differs from Lewellen’s(2002)finding for equity portfolio returns that temporal lead-lag effects,rather than auto-covariances,appear to be the most significant contributor to cross-sectional momentum.Chen and Hong(2002)provide a different interpretation and decomposition of the Lewellen(2002)portfolios that is consistent with auto-covariance being the primary driver of stock momentum.T.J.Moskowitz et al./Journal of Financial Economics104(2012)228–250229only spot price changes are associated with long-term reversals,consistent with the idea that investors may be over-reacting to information in the spot market but that hedging pressure is more long-lived and not affected by over-reaction.Ourfinding of time series momentum in virtually every instrument we examine seems to challenge the ‘‘random walk’’hypothesis,which in its most basic form implies that knowing whether a price went up or down in the past should not be informative about whether it will go up or down in the future.While rejection of the random walk hypothesis does not necessarily imply a rejection of a more sophisticated notion of market effi-ciency with time-varying risk premiums,we further show that a diversified portfolio of time series momentum across all assets is remarkably stable and robust,yielding a Sharpe ratio greater than one on an annual basis,or roughly2.5times the Sharpe ratio for the equity market portfolio,with little correlation to passive benchmarks in each asset class or a host of standard asset pricing factors. The abnormal returns to time series momentum also do not appear to be compensation for crash risk or tail events.Rather,the return to time series momentum tends to be largest when the stock market’s returns are most extreme—performing best when the market experiences large up and down moves.Hence,time series momentum may be a hedge for extreme events,making its large return premium even more puzzling from a risk-based perspective.The robustness of time series momentum for very different asset classes and markets suggest that our results are not likely spurious,and the relatively short duration of the predictability(less than a year)and the magnitude of the return premium associated with time series momentum present significant challenges to the random walk hypothesis and perhaps also to the efficient market hypothesis,though we cannot rule out the exis-tence of a rational theory that can explain thesefindings.Our study relates to the literature on return autocorrela-tion and variance ratios that alsofinds deviations from the random walk hypothesis(Fama and French,1988;Lo and Mackinlay,1988;Poterba and Summers,1988).While this literature is largely focused on US and global equities, Cutler,Poterba,and Summers(1991)study a variety of assets including housing and collectibles.The literature finds positive return autocorrelations at daily,weekly,and monthly horizons and negative autocorrelations at annual and multi-year frequencies.We complement this literature in several ways.The studies of autocorrelation examine,by definition,return predictability where the length of the ‘‘look-back period’’is the same as the‘‘holding period’’over which returns are predicted.This restriction masks signifi-cant predictability that is uncovered once look-back periods are allowed to differ from predicted or holding periods.In particular,our result that the past12months of returns strongly predicts returns over the next one month is missed by looking at one-year autocorrelations.While return con-tinuation can also be detected implicitly from variance ratios,we complement the literature by explicitly docu-menting the extent of return continuation and by construct-ing a time series momentum factor that can help explain existing asset pricing phenomena,such as cross-sectional momentum premiums and hedge fund macro and managed futures returns.Also,a significant component of the higher frequencyfindings in equities is contaminated by market microstructure effects such as stale prices(Richardson, 1993;Ahn,Boudoukh,Richardson,and Whitelaw,2002). Focusing on liquid futures instead of individual stocks and looking at lower frequency data mitigates many of these issues.Finally,unique to this literature,we link time series predictability to the dynamics of hedger and speculator positions and decompose returns into price changes and roll yields.Our paper is also related to the literature on hedging pressure in commodity futures(Keynes,1923;Fama and French,1987;Bessembinder,1992;de Roon,Nijman,and Veld,2000).We complement this literature by showing how hedger and speculator positions relate to past futures returns(and not just in commodities),finding that speculators’positions load positively on time series momentum,while hedger positions load negatively on it.Also,we consider the relative return predictability of positions,past price changes,and past roll yields.Gorton, Hayashi,and Rouwenhorst(2008)also link commodity momentum and speculator positions to the commodities’inventories.The rest of the paper is organized as follows.Section2 describes our data on futures returns and the positioning of hedgers and speculators.Section3documents time series momentum at horizons less than a year and reversals beyond that.Section4defines a time series momentum factor,studying its relation to other known return factors,its performance during extreme markets, and correlations within and across asset classes.Section5 examines the relation between time series and cross-sectional momentum,showing how time series momen-tum is a central driver of cross-sectional momentum as well as macro and managed futures hedge fund returns. Section6studies the evolution of time series momentum and its relation to investor speculative and hedging positions.Section7concludes.2.Data and preliminariesWe describe briefly the various data sources we use in our analysis.2.1.Futures returnsOur data consist of futures prices for24commodities, 12cross-currency pairs(from nine underlying currencies), nine developed equity indexes,and13developed govern-ment bond futures,from January1965through December 2009.These instruments are among the most liquid futures contracts in the world.4We focus on the most liquid instruments to avoid returns being contaminated by illiquidity or stale price issues and to match more 4We also confirm the time series momentum returns are robustamong more illiquid instruments such as illiquid commodities(feeder cattle,Kansas wheat,lumber,orange juice,rubber,tin),emerging market currencies and equities,and more illiquidfixed income futures(not reported).T.J.Moskowitz et al./Journal of Financial Economics104(2012)228–250 230closely an implementable strategy at a significant trade size.Appendix A provides details on each instrument and their data sources,which are mainly Datastream,Bloom-berg,and various exchanges.We construct a return series for each instrument as follows.Each day,we compute the daily excess return of the most liquid futures contract(typically the nearest or next nearest-to-delivery contract),and then compound the daily returns to a cumulative return index from which we can compute returns at any horizon.For the equity indexes,our return series are almost perfectly correlated with the corresponding returns of the underlying cash indexes in excess of the Treasury bill rate.5As a robustness test,we also use the‘‘far’’futures contract(the next maturity after the most liquid one).For the commodity futures,time series momentum profits are in fact slightly stronger for the far contract,and,for the financial futures,time series momentum returns hardly change if we use far futures.Table1presents summary statistics of the excess returns on our futures contracts.Thefirst column reports when the time series of returns for each asset starts,and the next two columns report the time series mean (arithmetic)and standard deviation(annualized)of each contract by asset class:commodities,equity indexes, bonds,and currencies.As Table1highlights,there is significant variation in sample mean returns across the different contracts.Equity index,bonds,and curren-cies yield predominantly positive excess returns,while various commodity contracts yield positive,zero,and even negative excess average returns over the sample period.Only the equity and bond futures exhibit statisti-cally significant and consistent positive excess average returns.More striking are the differences in volatilities across the contracts.Not surprisingly,commodities and equities have much larger volatilities than bond futures or cur-rency forward contracts.But,even among commodities, there is substantial cross-sectional variation in volatilities. Making comparisons across instruments with vastly dif-ferent volatilities or combining various instruments into a diversified portfolio when they have wide-ranging vola-tilities is challenging.For example,the volatility of natural gas futures is about50times larger than that of2-year US bond futures.We discuss below how we deal with this issue in our analysis.2.2.Positions of tradersWe also use data on the positions of speculators and hedgers from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)as detailed in Appendix A.The CFTC requires all large traders to identify themselves as commercial or non-com-mercial which we,and the previous literature(e.g., Bessembinder,1992;de Roon,Nijman,and Veld,2000),refer to as hedgers and speculators,respectively.For each futures contract,the long and short open interest held by these traders on Tuesday are reported on a weekly basis.6 Using the positions of speculators and hedgers as defined by the CFTC,we define the Net speculator position for each asset as follows:Net speculator position¼Speculator long positionsÀSpeculator short positions: This signed measure shows whether speculators are net long or short in aggregate,and scales their net position by the open interest or total number of contracts outstanding in that futures market.Since speculators and hedgers approximately add up to zero(except for a small difference denoted‘‘non-reported’’due to measurement issues of very small traders),we focus our attention on speculators.Of course,this means that net hedger posi-tions constitute the opposite side(i.e.,the negative of Net speculator position).The CFTC positions data do not cover all of the futures contracts we have returns for and consider in our analysis. Most commodity and foreign exchange contracts are covered,but only the US instruments among the stock and bond futures contracts are covered.The third and fourth columns of Table1report summary statistics on the sample of futures contracts with Net speculator positions in each contract over time.Speculators are net long,on average,and hence hedgers are net short,for most of the contracts,a result consistent with Bessembinder(1992)and de Roon,Nijman,and Veld (2000)for a smaller set of contracts over a shorter time period.All but two of the commodities(natural gas and cotton)have net long speculator positions over the sample period,with silver exhibiting the largest average net long speculator position.This is consistent with Keynes’(1923)conjecture that producers of commodities are the primary hedgers in markets and are on the short side of these contracts as a result.For the other asset classes,other than the S&P500,the30-year US Treasury bond,and the$US/Japanese and$US/Swiss exchange rates,speculators exhibit net long positions,on average. Table1also highlights that there is substantial variation over time in Net speculator positions per contract and across contracts.Not surprisingly,the standard deviation of Net speculator positions is positively related to the volatility of the futures contract itself.2.3.Asset pricing benchmarksWe evaluate the returns of our strategies relative to standard asset pricing benchmarks,namely the MSCI World equity index,Barclay’s Aggregate Bond Index,S&P GSCI Index,all of which we obtain from Datastream,the long-short factors SMB,HML,and UMD from Ken French’s Web site,and the long-short value and cross-sectional5Bessembinder(1992)and de Roon,Nijman,and Veld(2000)compute returns on futures contracts similarly and alsofind that futures returns are highly correlated with spot returns on the same underlying asset.6While commercial traders likely predominantly include hedgers, some may also be speculating,which introduces some noise into the analysis in terms of our classification of speculative and hedging trades. However,the potential attenuation bias associated with such misclassi-fication may only weaken our results.T.J.Moskowitz et al./Journal of Financial Economics104(2012)228–250231Table 1Summary statistics on futures contracts.Reported are the annualized mean return and volatility (standard deviation)of the futures contracts in our sample from January 1965to December 2009as well as the mean and standard deviation of the Net speculator long positions in each contract as a percentage of open interest,covered and defined by the CFTC data,which are available over the period January 1986to December 2009.For a detailed description of our sample of futures contracts,see Appendix A .Data start dateAnnualized meanAnnualized volatilityAverage net speculatorlong positions speculatorlong positionsCommodity futures ALUMINUM Jan-790.97%23.50%BRENTOIL Apr-8913.87%32.51%CATTLE Jan-65 4.52%17.14%8.1%9.6%COCOA Jan-65 5.61%32.38% 4.9%14.0%COFFEE Mar-74 5.72%38.62%7.5%13.6%COPPER Jan-778.90%27.39%CORN Jan-65À3.19%24.37%7.1%11.0%COTTON Aug-67 1.41%24.35%À0.1%19.4%CRUDE Mar-8311.61%34.72% 1.0% 5.9%GASOIL Oct-8411.95%33.18%GOLD Dec-69 5.36%21.37% 6.7%23.0%HEATOIL Dec-789.79%33.78% 2.4% 6.4%HOGS Feb-66 3.39%26.01% 5.1%14.5%NATGAS Apr-90À9.74%53.30%À1.6%8.9%NICKEL Jan-9312.69%35.76%PLATINUM Jan-9213.15%20.95%SILVER Jan-65 3.17%31.11%20.6%14.3%SOYBEANS Jan-65 5.57%27.26%8.2%12.8%SOYMEAL Sep-83 6.14%24.59% 6.7%11.2%SOYOIL Oct-90 1.07%25.39% 5.7%12.8%SUGARJan-65 4.44%42.87%10.0%14.2%UNLEADED Dec-8415.92%37.36%7.8%9.6%WHEAT Jan-65À1.84%25.11% 4.3%12.1%ZINCJan-91 1.98%24.76%Equity index futures ASX SPI 200(AUS)Jan-777.25%18.33%DAX (GER)Jan-75 6.33%20.41%IBEX 35(ESP)Jan-809.37%21.84%CAC 4010(FR)Jan-75 6.73%20.87%FTSE/MIB (IT)Jun-78 6.13%24.59%TOPIX (JP)Jul-76 2.29%18.66%AEX (NL)Jan-757.72%19.18%FTSE 100(UK)Jan-75 6.97%17.77%S&P 500(US)Jan-65 3.47%15.45%À4.6% 5.4%Bond futures 3-year AUS Jan-92 1.34% 2.57%10-year AUS Dec-85 3.83%8.53%2-year EURO Mar-97 1.02% 1.53%5-year EURO Jan-93 2.56% 3.22%10-year EURO Dec-79 2.40% 5.74%30-year EURO Dec-98 4.71%11.70%10-year CAN Dec-84 4.04%7.36%10-year JP Dec-81 3.66% 5.40%10-year UK Dec-79 3.00%9.12%2-year US Apr-96 1.65% 1.86% 1.9%11.3%5-year US Jan-90 3.17% 4.25% 3.0%9.2%10-year US Dec-79 3.80%9.30%0.4%8.0%30-year US Jan-909.50%18.56%À1.4% 6.2%Currency forwards AUD/USD Mar-72 1.85%10.86%12.4%28.8%EUR/USD Sep-71 1.57%11.21%12.1%18.7%CAD/USD Mar-720.60% 6.29% 4.7%24.1%JPY/USD Sep-71 1.35%11.66%À6.0%23.8%NOK/USD Feb-78 1.37%10.56%NZD/USD Feb-78 2.31%12.01%38.8%33.8%SEK/USD Feb-78À0.05%11.06%CHF/USD Sep-71 1.34%12.33%À5.2%26.8%GBP/USDSep-711.39%10.32%2.7%25.4%T.J.Moskowitz et al./Journal of Financial Economics 104(2012)228–250232momentum factors across asset classes from Asness,Moskowitz,and Pedersen (2010).2.4.Ex ante volatility estimateSince volatility varies dramatically across our assets (illustrated in Table 1),we scale the returns by their volatilities in order to make meaningful comparisons across assets.We estimate each instrument’s ex ante volatility s t at each point in time using an extremely simple model:the exponentially weighted lagged squared daily returns (i.e.,similar to a simple univariate GARCHmodel).Specifically,the ex ante annualized variance s t 2for each instrument is calculated as follows:s 2t ¼261X 1i ¼0ð1Àd Þd iðr t À1Ài Àr t Þ2,ð1Þwhere the scalar 261scales the variance to be annual,theweights ð1Àd Þd iadd up to one,and r t is the exponentially weighted average return computed similarly.The para-meter d is chosen so that the center of mass of theweights is P 1i ¼0ð1Àd Þd ii ¼d =ð1Àd Þ¼60days.The volati-lity model is the same for all assets at all times.While all of the results in the paper are robust to more sophisti-cated volatility models,we chose this model due to its simplicity and lack of look-ahead bias in the volatility estimate.To ensure no look-ahead bias contaminates our results,we use the volatility estimates at time t À1applied to time-t returns throughout the analysis.3.Time series momentum:Regression analysis and trading strategiesWe start by examining the time series predictability of futures returns across different time horizons.3.1.Regression analysis:Predicting price continuation and reversalWe regress the excess return r s t for instrument s in month t on its return lagged h months,where both returns are scaled by their ex ante volatilities s s t À1(defined above in Section 2.4):r s t =s s t À1¼a þb h r s t Àh =s s t Àh À1þe s t :ð2ÞGiven the vast differences in volatilities (as shown in Table 1),we divide all returns by their volatility to put them on the same scale.This is similar to using General-ized Least Squares instead of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).7Stacking all futures contracts and dates,we run a pooled panel regression and compute t -statistics that account for group-wise clustering by time (at the monthly level).The regressions are run using lags of h ¼1,2,y ,60months.Panel A of Fig.1plots the t -statistics from the pooled regressions by month lag h .The positive t -statistics for the first 12months indicate significant return continuation ortrends.The negative signs for the longer horizons indicate reversals,the most significant of which occur in the year immediately following the positive trend.Another way to look at time series predictability is to simply focus only on the sign of the past excess return.This even simpler way of looking at time series momen-tum underlies the trading strategies we consider in the next section.In a regression setting,this strategy can be captured using the following specification:r s t =s s t À1¼a þb h sign ðr s t Àh Þþe s t :ð3ÞWe again make the left-hand side of the regressionindependent of volatility (the right-hand side is too since sign is either þ1or À1),so that the parameter estimates are comparable across instruments.We report the t -statistics from a pooled regression with standard errors clustered by time (i.e.,month)in Panel B of Fig.1.The results are similar across the two regression specifi-cations:strong return continuation for the first year and weaker reversals for the next 4years.In both cases,the data exhibit a clear pattern,with all of the most recent 12-month lag returns positive (and nine statistically significant)and the majority of the remaining lags negative.Repeating the panel regressions for each asset class separately,we obtain the same patterns:one to 12-month positive time series momen-tum followed by smaller reversals over the next 4years as seen in Panel C of Fig.1.3.2.Time series momentum trading strategiesWe next investigate the profitability of a number of trading strategies based on time series momentum.We vary both the number of months we lag returns to define the signal used to form the portfolio (the ‘‘look-back period’’)and the number of months we hold each portfo-lio after it has been formed (the ‘‘holding period’’).For each instrument s and month t ,we consider whether the excess return over the past k months is positive or negative and go long the contract if positive and short if negative,holding the position for h months.We set the position size to be inversely proportional to the instrument’s ex ante volatility,1=s s t À1,each month.Sizing each position in each strategy to have constant ex ante volatility is helpful for two reasons.First,it makes it easier to aggregate strategies across instruments with very different volatility levels.Second,it is helpful econ-ometrically to have a time series with relatively stable volatility so that the strategy is not dominated by a few volatile periods.For each trading strategy (k ,h ),we derive a single time series of monthly returns even if the holding period h is more than one month.Hence,we do not have overlapping observations.We derive this single time series of returns following the methodology used by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993):The return at time t represents the average return across all portfolios at that time,namely the return on the portfolio that was constructed last month,the month before that (and still held if the holding period h is greater than two),and so on for all currently ‘‘active’’portfolios.Specifically,for each instrument,we compute the time-t return based on the sign of the past return from7The regression results are qualitatively similar if we run OLS without adjusting for each security’s volatility.T.J.Moskowitz et al./Journal of Financial Economics 104(2012)228–250233。
上海财经大学《高级计量经济学II》习题四及答案
2
(c) We would apply the delta method. Thus, we would require the full variance matrix of the probit estimates as well as the gradient of the expression of interest.
Solution 2 (a) If P (y = 1jz1; z2) = z1 1 + 1z2 + 2z22 , then
@P (y = 1jz1; z2) = ( @z2
1+2
2z2)
z1 1 + 1z2 + 2z22
for given z, this is estimated as
(^ consistently estimated by maximizing
X N
X N
li ( ) = fyi ln (Ui
i=1
i=1
x0i ) + (1
yi) ln [1
(Ui x0i )]g
1
(c) The partial e¤ ect of x3 on P (yi = 1jxi) is
and P (yi1 = 1jxi; ci; ni = 1) = 1 [(xi2 xi1) ]
2
Advanced Econometrics II Answer 4
Yahong Zhou March 2, 2014
1. Consider a latent variable modeled by
y = x0i + "i
上海财经大学《高级计量经济学II》习题四及答案
Advanced Econometrics II Problem Set 4
经济学中英文对照
经济名词术语参考查询AB[编辑] C[编辑] D[编辑] E[编辑] FGI[编辑] K[编辑] L[编辑] M[编辑] N[编辑] O[编辑]P[编辑] Q[编辑] R[编辑] S[编辑] T[编辑][编辑]V[编辑]W经济名词术语参考查询第二部分[编辑] B[编辑] C[编辑] D[编辑] E[编辑] F[编辑] G[编辑] H[编辑] I[编辑] K[编辑] L[编辑] MMacroeconomics 宏观经济学对经济总体行为的分析,主要研究产出、收入、价格水平、对外贸易、失业和其他总体经济变量。
(参见微观经济学,microeconomics)。
Malthusian theory of population grow th 马尔萨斯人口增长理论马尔萨斯首次提出的一种假设:认为人口增长的“自然”倾向快于食品供给的增长。
因此,随着时间推移,人均食品生产增长率趋于下降,从而给人回增长设置了一种障碍。
一般地说,这种观点认为:随着人口的收入水平和生活标准的提高,人口倾向于更快地增长。
Managed exchangerate 管理汇率制当今最流行的一种汇率体制。
在这种体制中,国家会不时地采取一些干预措施以稳定货币,但没有固定的或官方公布的平价。
Marginal cost边际成本参见成本边际(cost,marginal)。
Marginal principle边际原则一个基本概念:当人们活动的边际成本等于边际收益的时候,他们就实现了自己的收入或利润的最大化。
Marginal Product(MP)边际产品当所有其他投入不变时,追加一单位投入所得到的额外的产出。
有时称作边际物质产品(Marginal physicalproduct)。
Marginal product theory of distribution 分配的边际产品理论由约翰·B·克拉克提出的一种收入分配理论。
根据该理论,每一生产性投入依据其边际产品获得相应的报酬。
香港英文.pptx
TV series
stars
Tourism
Cantonese morning tea
Che Zai Mian Curried fish balls
Egg puffs
Jackie Chan
Leslie Cheung Andy Lau
Eason Chan
Jacky Cheung
Basic information
ESCAPE TO HONG KONG
To prevent refugees from stealing into to Hong Kong,the government built iron fence
in 1979 Xi Zhongxun said : this phenomenon reflect the contradictions among the people. Only by developing outback economy can we solve this problem
THANKS
Thank you for your attention!
Shang Hai VS Hong Kong
Yangtze River Delta
Pearl River Delta
economic hinterland huge market
International Finance Centre?
clean and efficient government
fairness and public accountability
Area:1104 square kilometers
Population:7.24 million
History
金融建模动量因子
您对动量因子的理解是什么呢?请大家积极回帖,一起来探讨!自从Jegadeesh和Titman首先在1993年Journal of Finance上发表了动量因子(Momentum Factor)的研究成果之后(Jegadeeshand Titman, Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency, 1993,简而言之,动量因子就是采取逢高买进,逢低卖出的策略所取得的回报),由于它显著的超额回报率(market excess return),数十年来一直是学术界经久不衰的研究课题之一,研究范围包括各个资本市场,各种资产类型,各种时间跨度。
例如:•关于S&P的: Style Momentum Within the S&P 500 Index (Chen and De Bondt, 2004)和Cross-Asset StyleMomentum (Kim,2010)•美国行业/板块: Do Industries ExplainMomentum? (Moskowitz and Grinblatt,1999),Understanding the Nature of the Risks andSources of Rewards to Momentum Investing (GrundyandMartin, 1998)•美国小盘股: Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst Coverage, and the Profitability of MomentumStrategies (Hong et al, 1999)•欧洲股票市场: International MomentumStrategies,(Rouwenhorst, 1997)•英国股票市场: The Profitability of Momentum Investing, (Lui et al, 1999),Momentum in the UK Stock Market (Hon and Tonks,2001)•中国股票市场: Contrarian and Momentum Strategiesin the China Stock Market: 1993-2000 (Kang et al,2002), The “Value” Effect and the Market for ChineseStocks (Malkiel and Jun, 2009), Momentum andSeasonality in Chinese Stock Markets (Li, Qiu, and Wu, 2010) 和Momentum Phenomenon in the Chinese Class A and B Share Markets (Choudhry and Wu, 2009)•日本股票市场: Eureka! A Momentum Strategy that Also Works in Japan (Chaves , 2012)•澳洲股票市场: Do Momentum Strategies Work?: Australia Evidence, (Drew, Veeraraghavan, and Ye, 2004)•瑞士股票市场: Momentum and IndustryDependence (Herberger, Kohlert, and Oehler, 2009)•新兴股票市场: Local Return Factors and Turnover in Emerging Stock Markets, (Rouwenhorst, 1999)•前沿新兴股票市场: The Cross-Section of Stock Returns in Frontier Emerging Markets (Groot, Pang, and Swinkels,2012)•全球股票市场: Momentum Investing and Business Cycle Risk: Evidence from Pole to Pole, (Griffin et al,2002), International Momentum Strategies (Rouwenhoust, 1998), The Case for Momentum (Berger, Isael, Moskowitz, 2009)•外汇市场: Do Momentum Based Strategies Still Work In Foreign Currency Markets? (Okunev and White,2003), Interaction between Technical Currency Trading and Exchange Rate Fluctuations (Schulmeister,2006), Momentum in Stock Market Returns: Implications for Risk Premia on Foreign Currencies (Nitschka,2010), 和Currency Momentum Strategies (Menkhoff et al, 2011)•大宗商品市场: Momentum Strategies in Commodity Futures Markets (Miffre and Rallis, 2007), The Strategicand Tactical Value of Commodity Futures (Erb and Harvey, 2006)•技术分析: 52-Week High and MomentumInvesting (Georgeand Hwang, 2004).•公司盈利: Momentum Strategies (Chan et al,2006), Firm-specific Attributes and the Cross-section ofMomentum (Sagi and Seasholes, 2007)•在时间维度上: Market States and Momentum (Cooper, Gutierrezand Hameed, 2003),Time-Varying MomentumProfitability (Wang and Xu, 2010), Time SeriesMomentum (Moskowitz et al, 2011), 212 Years of PriceMomentum (Gezcy, 2013), A Century of Evidence onTrend Following (Hurst, Ooi, Pedersen, 2012), TwoCenturies of Trend Following (Lempérière, 2014).还有各种从价格动量 (price momentum)衍生出的变体,例如:•“新鲜”动量:Fresh Momentum (Chen, Kadan and Kose, 2009)•“残余”动量:Residual Momentum (Blitz, Huij and Martens, 2011)•CAPM/Fama-French“残余”动量:Some Tricks to Momentum (SocGen, 2012)•“双重”动量:Risk Premia Harvesting Through Dual Momentum (Antonacci,2013)•“共同”动量: Comomentum: Inferring Arbitrage Activity from Return Correlations (Lou and Polk, 2012)•趋势因子: Trend Factor: A New Determinant ofCross-Section Stock Returns (Han and Zhou, 2013)在跨多种资产的研究中,人们通常把动量因子(Momentum Factor)和价值因子(Value Factor)放在一起研究,例如: Global Tactical Cross-AssetAllocation: Applying Value and Momentum Across Asset Classes (Blitz and VanVliet, 2007), Value and Momentum Everywhere (Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen,2009), Using aZ-score Approach to Combine Value and Momentum in Tactical Asset Allocation (Wang and Kohard, 2012), 和Size, Value, and Momentum in International Stock Returns (Fama and French, 2011)也有和反转(Reversal/Mean Reversion)一起研究,例如:Momentum–Reversal Strategy (Yu and Chen, 2011), An Institutional Theory of Momentumand Reversal (Vayanos and Woolley,2010), Momentum and Mean Reversion across National Equity Markets (Balvers and Wu, 2006), Macromomentum: Returns Predictability in International Equity Indices (Bhojraj, 2001)至于动量因子产生的原因至今没有定论,投资者的行为偏差(behavior bias)算是其中一个,主要体现在投资者对于自己掌握的信息过于自信,从而导致资产价格对于新信息反应不足(underreaction): Investor Psychology and Security Market Under-andOver-Reactions(Daniel, Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam,1998), Overconfidence, Arbitrage, and Equilibrium Asset Pricing (Daniel, Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam,2001)其他类似的解释例如:When are Contrarian Profits Due to Stock Market Overreaction? (Lo and Mackinlay, 1990), A Model of Investor Sentiment (Barberis,Shleifer, Vishny, 1997), A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading and Overreaction in Asset Markets (Hong and Stein, 1997), Price Momentum andTrading Volume (Lee and Swaminathan, 1998),Underreactions and Overreactions:The Influence of Information Reliability and Portfolio Formation Rules (Bloomfieldet al, 1998), Rational Momentum Effects (Johnson, 2002)除此之外,还有从其他不同角度进行解释的,例如:•交易成本(Trading Cost): The Illusory Nature of Momentum Profits (Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou,2004), Trading Cost of Asset Pricing Anomalies (Frazzini, Israel and Moskowitz,2012)•横截面预期收益(Cross-sectional ExpectedReturns):Momentum is Not an Anomaly(Dittmar et al, 2007)•知情交易(Informed Trading): Momentum and Informed Trading (Hameed et al, 2008)•市场情绪(Sentiment): Sentiment and Momentum(Doukas et al, 2010)•经济周期 (Business Cycle): Momentum, Business Cycle, and Expected Returns(Chordia and Shivakumar,2002)•文化差异 (Cultural Difference): Individualism and Momentum around the World (Chui, Titman and Wei,2009)•过度协方差(Excess Covariance): Momentum and Autocorrelationin Stock Returns(Lewellen, 2002)•避税 (Tax Loss Harvesting): PredictingStock Price Movements from Past Returns: The Role of Consistency and Tax-LossSelling (Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 2004)•宏观风险溢价(Macroeconomic Risk Premium): Momentum Profits, Factor Pricing and Macroeconomic RiskFactor (Zhang, 2008)•前景理论(Prospect Theory ): Prospect Theory, Mental Accounting, and Momentum(Grinblatt and Han,2004)•处置效应(Disposition Effect): The Disposition Effect and Underreaction to News(Frazzini, 2006),其中前景理论与处置效应均指投资者在处理股票时,倾向卖出赚钱的股票、继续持有赔钱的股票。
Time-varying estimates of CAPM betas
Time-varying estimates of CAPM betas
Nicolaas Groenewoldaቤተ መጻሕፍቲ ባይዱ*, Patricia Fraserb
b
Department of Economics, University of Western Australia, Nedlands, WA 6009, Australia Department of Accounting, University of Aberdeen, Edward Wright Building, Dunbar Street, Aberdeen, Scotland UK AB24 3QY, UK
ÐÐÐÐ * Corresponding author. 1 See. e.g., [2] for the US and [3±5] for evidence using Australian data. 0378-4754/99/$20.00 # 1999 IMACS/Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 3 7 8 - 4 7 5 4 ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 3 3 - 6
1. Introduction The CAPM beta () is a parameter which plays a central role in modern finance as a measure of an asset's risk. It is, however, unobservable and consequently a great deal of energy has been devoted to its estimation. The unobservability of can be resolved by simply regressing an asset's return on the return to the market portfolio (the ``market model'') using time-series data as long as the asset returns are stationary so that their distribution has time-invariant parameters (including the CAPM ). The assumption of time-invariant parameters is implicit in tests of the CAPM where the mean return to an asset is measured by the sample mean over some period of time and the asset's is estimated as the (constant) slope parameter in the market model. The time-invariance assumption is also implied in the practice of using a estimated over a given period to make inferences (about asset value, say) in some different (normally future) time period. However, it has long been recognised that asset returns may not be stationary in practice, resulting in instability over time.1 This recognition is reflected in the common practice of estimating s over only
A Neoclassic Model of Financially Constrained Stock Returns
Comments WelcomeA Neoclassical Model ofFinancially Constrained Stock ReturnsHoracio Sapriza∗and Lu Zhang†April2004AbstractWe use the q-theoretical investment model augmented withfinancial constraints toanalyze the effects of these constraints on risk and expected returns.Wefind thatfinancial constraints reducefirm value and investment rates,and these adverse effectsare more important for smallfirms andfirms in relative distress.More strikingly,wealsofind that constrainedfirms are less risky and earn lower expected returns thanunconstrainedfirms,and thatfinancial constraints are more binding in good times.Ourmodel helps resolve the anomalies regarding the empirical relations amongfinancialconstraints,business cycle,and expected returns.∗Department of Economics at the University of Rochester,email:hsap@.†Corresponding author,William E.Simon Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of Rochester,tel:(585)275-3491,fax:(585)273-1140,email:zhanglu@.1IntroductionWe analyze theoretically the effects offinancial constraints on risk and expected returns using the neoclassic framework of optimal investment(e.g.,Abel(1983);Abel and Eberly (1994,1996)).Financial constraints are parsimoniously modeled as a dividend nonnegativity constraint.We solve the model explicitly and examine the determination of the shadow price of external funds,risk,and expected return from state variables such as capital stock and aggregate andfirm-specific productivity shocks.Our mainfindings are easy to summarize:1.Financial constraints reducefirms’market-to-book ratios and investment rates.2.Financial constraints are more likely to be binding forfirms with small scale ofproduction and forfirms in relative distress or with lowerfirm-specific productivity.Strikingly,the constraints are more likely to be binding when aggregate economic conditions are relatively good.3.Also strikingly,financially constrainedfirms are less risky and earn lower expectedreturns than unconstrainedfirms.The magnitude of these effects on risk and expected returns is inversely related to both capital stock andfirm-specific productivity,but is relatively unrelated to aggregate economic conditions.Our explicitly solved model provides rich insights into the economic mechanisms underlying these results.Sincefinancial constraints restrict the feasible set of investment choices,constrainedfirms’market-to-book ratios and investment rates are lower than those of unconstrainedfirms.The magnitude of these effects depends on to what extentfinancial constraints are binding,i.e.,the shadow price of externalfinance.The shadow price is in turn2determined by the gap between thefirms’investment demands and their internal funds.For smallfirms,their internal funds are low but investment rates are high because they invest more and grow faster in the model.Thus smallfirms are more constrainedfinancially, consistent with the evidence in Gertler and Gilchrist(1994).Productivity shocks,both aggregate andfirm-specific,have two offsetting effects on the shadow price of external funds.A positive shock raises the internal funds,decreasing the shadow price,but the shock also raises investment demands,increasing the shadow price.Forfirm-specific shocks,the former force dominates;thusfirms with lowfirm-specific productivity are more likely to be constrained.However,for aggregate shocks,the latter force dominates;thusfirms in booms are more likely to be constrained.We show that this asymmetric response of the shadow price of external funds to aggregate andfirm-specific shocks is driven by the stochastic discount factor.1Aggregate shocks affect the stochastic discount factor,butfirm-specific shocks do not.With time-varying discount rates,aggregate shocks affect capital investment through two channels.In the presence of positive aggregate shocks,firms will increase investment because their capital stocks become more productive(the productivity channel).Further,because discount rates fall with positive aggregate shocks,firms’expected continuation values go up,stimulating investment even further(the discount rate channel).In contrast,firm-specific shocks impact investment only through the productivity channel.As a result,investment rates are much more sensitive to aggregate shocks than tofirm-specific shocks.Our results explain why partial equilibrium investment models cannot generate the pattern of asymmetric response.These models routinely assume a constant discount rate, 1While time-varying expected return has been well established in asset pricing literature(e.g.,Cochrane (2001)),its implications for corporate investment seem to have been largely underexplored.One notable exception is Lettau and Ludvigson(2002).3implying that aggregate andfirm-specific shocks enter symmetrically intofirms’decisions. In these models,firms are more constrained in bad times,just likefirms with lowerfirm-specific productivity are more constrained in our model.Our results also suggests that the asymmetric response is likely to show up in general equilibrium models because their implied discount rates are linked to aggregate consumption and are thus stochastic.Indeed,Gomes, Yaron,and Zhang(2003a)show that the implied shadow price of external funds is procyclical in several general equilibrium models(e.g.,Bernanke and Gertler(1989);Carlstrom and Fuerst(1997);and Bernanke,Gertler,and Gilchrist(1999)).What drives our model’s prediction that constrainedfirms are less risky and earn lower expected returns than unconstrainedfirms?Firms are constrained because their investment demands are higher than their internal funds.Investment demands are in turn determined by marginal q,the net present value of future cashflow generated by one additional unit of capital discounted byfirms’expected rmally,q can be viewed as the ratio of future cashflow divided by expected return;or equivalently,expected return equals future cashflow divided by q.It follows that constrainedfirms must have lower expected returns than unconstrainedfirms,because:(i)constrainedfirms have lower internal funds relative to q;and(ii)the level of internal funds is a good predictor of future cashflow in view of the persistence of productivity.This q-theoretical mechanism driving the negative correlation between the shadow price of external funds and expected returns is qualitatively similar to that driving the negative correlation between q(or investment rate)and expected returns.2 The rest of the trip is organized as follows.Section2discusses our relative contribution in context of the existing literature.Section3constructs the neoclassic model augmented 2Abel and Blanchard(1986),Cochrane(1991),and Lettau and Ludvigson(2002)document the negative correlation between investment rate and stock returns at the aggregate level.Titman,Wei,and Xie(2003) document the similar relationship at thefirm level.4withfinancial constraints.We present our results in Section4.Finally,Section5concludes. 2Link to the LiteratureSeveral empirical studies suggest that the size and book-to-market effects could be driven by afinancial distress risk factor(e.g.,Fama and French(1992,1993,1996)).Intuitively,small and valuefirms are more likely to end up infinancial distress;if a recession comes along, thesefirms are likely to do very poorly,so investors would require higher returns to hold their stocks.Consistent with this interpretation,Chan and Chen(1991)find that marginal firms with low production efficiency and highfinancial leverage seem to drive the smallfirm effect.Thorbecke(1997)and Perez-Quiros and Timmermann(2000)find that small stock returns are especially sensitive to recessions and monetary policy shocks.More recent studies using direct measures offinancial distress,as opposed to using size and profitability as proxies,report dissonant evidence.Altman(1993)shows that the bonds of the most distressedfirms earn lower than average subsequent returns.Dichev(1998)and Griffin and Lemmon(2002)show thatfirms with high distress or bankruptcy risk earn lower returns on average,and suggest that mispricing is the likely explanation for this evidence. Using an index offinancial constraints from Kaplan and Zingales(1997),Lamont,Polk,and Saa-Requejo(2001)find that returns offinancially constrainedfirms are on average lower than those of unconstrainedfirms,and the return dispersion between these two types offirms is unrelated to business cycles.However,using a different index,Whited and Wu(2004)find a positive and significant risk premium for afinancial constraints factor.These competing explanations are difficult to evaluate without models that explicitly tie thefirm characteristics of interest to risk and expected returns.Our modelfills this void.We demonstrate that smallfirms andfirms with relatively low productivity are riskier and earn5higher expected returns even within the model withoutfinancial constraints;thusfinancial frictions are not necessary for interpreting the evidence in Chan and Chen(1991),Thorbecke (1997),and Perez-Quiros and Timmermann(2000).Further,we show that constrainedfirms are less risky and earn lower expected returns than unconstrainedfirms in the model with financial constraints;thus mispricing is not necessary for interpreting the low average returns of constrainedfirms.Our results also challenge the conventional wisdom in the imperfect capital market theories thatfinancial constraints are more effective in recessions.We are not thefirst to make this point.As mentioned before,Gomes,Yaron,and Zhang(2003a)show that the implied shadow price of external funds is in fact procyclical in the general equilibrium models of Bernanke and Gertler(1989)and Carlstrom and Fuerst(1997).Further,Gomes,Yaron, and Zhang(2003b)use GMM to estimate the stochastic investment Euler equation imposed on stock returns andfind evidence that the shadow price of external funds exhibits strong procyclical variation.3Our contribution is to pinpoint exactly the role of the stochastic discount factor in driving this counterintuitive result.Further,Gomes et al.(2003a,2003b) do not discuss constrainedfirms’risk and expected returns relative to those of unconstrained firms,because these authors modelfinancial constraints at the aggregate level.Other related papers include Dow,Gorton,and Krishnamurthy(2003),who construct a general equilibrium model with imperfect corporate governance to explain the term structure of interest rates;their model also implies thatfinancial frictions are more important in good economic conditions.Li(2003)examines empirically the role offinancial constraints onfirm-level returns.Albuquerque and Wang(2004)analyze the effects of corporate governance on capital investment and asset prices.Our paper is also related to the growing literature that 3Gomes,Yaron,and Zhang(2003b)parameterize their stochastic discount factor as a linear function of aggregate investment return following Cochrane(1996).6ties risk and expected returns to the economic fundamentals offirms.Berk(1995)proposes a direct mechanism linking size and book-to-market to expected returns.Jermann(1998) and Kogan(2003)examine the determinants of expected returns within general equilibrium production economies.Berk,Green,and Naik(1999)construct a dynamic real options model in which assets in place and growth options change in predictable ways,which in turn imparts predictability in the cross-section of returns.Carlson,Fisher,and Giammarino (2003)emphasize the importance of operating leverage,and Cooper(2003)analyzes the role offixed cost of capital adjustment in driving the book-to-market effect.3The ModelTo analyze the effects offinancial constraints on risk and expected return,we incorporate these constraints into the neoclassic investment model augmented with an exogenous stochastic discount factor.3.1EnvironmentProduction requires one input,capital,k t,and is subject to both an aggregate shock,x t,and an idiosyncratic shock,z t.The aggregate productivity shock has a stationary and monotone Markov transition function,denoted Q x(x t+1|x t),as follows:x t+1=x(1−ρx)+ρx x t+σxεx t+1,(1)whereεx t+1is an i.i.d.standard normal shock.The idiosyncratic productivity shocks,denoted z jt,are uncorrelated acrossfirms,indexed by j,and have a common stationary and monotone Markov transition function,denoted Q z(z jt+1|z jt),as follows:z jt+1=ρz z jt+σzεz jt+1,(2)7whereεz jt+1is an i.i.d.standard normal shock.εz jt+1andεz it+1are uncorrelated with each other for any pair(i,j)with i=j.Moreover,εx t+1is independent ofεz jt+1for all j.The production function is given by:y jt=e x t+z jt kαjt,(3)where0<α<1and y jt and k jt are the output and capital stock offirm j at period t, respectively.The production technology exhibits decreasing-return-to-scale.Because of our focus on the asset pricing implications offirm-levelfinancial frictions,we parameterize directly the stochastic discount factor.Specifically,we assume:log m t+1=logη+γt(x t−x t+1)(4)γt=γ0+γ1(x t−x)(5)where m t+1denotes the stochastic discount factor from time t to t+1and1>η>0,γ0>0, andγ1<0are constant parameters.Eq.(4)can be considered as a reduced-form representation of the intertemporal rate of substitution of afictitious representative consumer.To incorporate a time-varying price of risk,we assume in Eq.(5)thatγt is decreasing in aggregate economic conditions modeled by the demeaned aggregate productivity x t−¯x withγ1<0.We remain agnostic about the precise economic sources driving the countercyclical price of risk.44Some possibilities include time-varying risk aversion in Campbell and Cochrane(1999);loss aversion in Barberis,Huang,and Santos(2001);limited market participation in Guvenen(2003);countercyclical human capital investment in Wei(2003);and countercyclical durable consumption in Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2003),Piazzessi,Schneider,and Tuzel(2003),and Yogo(2003).Lettau and Ludvigson(2001)implement empirically a similar stochastic discount factor in cross-sectional asset pricing tests.83.2Firm ValueSuppress thefirm index j for notational simplicity.The profit function for an individualfirm with capital stock k t,idiosyncratic productivity z t,and aggregate productivity x t is:π(k t,z t,x t)=e x t+z t kαt−f(6)where f denotes the nonnegativefixed cost of production,which must be paid every period by all thefirms in production.A positivefixed cost implies the existence offixed outside opportunity costs for some scarce resources(e.g.,managerial labor)used by thefirms.Let v(k t,z t,x t)denote the market value of thefirm.Thefirm’s dynamic problem can be stated as:v(k t,z t,x t)=maxk t+1,i t {π(k t,z t,x t)−i t−h(i t,k t)+M t+1v(k t+1,z t+1,x t+1)Q z(dz t+1|z t)Q x(dx t+1|x t)}(7) subject to the capital accumulation rule:k t+1=i t+(1−δ)k t(8)Thefirst three terms on the right-hand side of(7)reflect current dividends,i.e.,profit minus investment expenditure i and adjustment cost h.The adjustment cost is assumed to be symmetric and quadratic:h(i t,k t)=θ2 i t k t2k t(9)whereθ>0is the adjustment cost parameter.93.3Dividend Nonnegativity ConstraintWe modelfinancial constraints parsimoniously as a dividend nonnegativity constraint:d t≡π(k t,z t,x t)−i t−h(i t,k t)≥0(10)As in many previous studies(e.g.,Whited(1992),Bond and Meghir(1994),and Moyen (2003)),a lower bound on dividend payment is essential to modelingfinancial constraints in a dynamic framework.Otherwisefirms can undo the effects of any other forms of financial frictions by paying negative dividend,which is equivalent to costless external equity financing.Other modeling devices offinancial constraints exist in the literature(e.g.,Stein (2003)).We choose the dividend constraint primarily to ease the comparison with previous literature as well as for its simplicity.Given that we do not model many more realistic features offinancial frictions,we only focus on the qualitative,as opposed to quantitative, implications of the dividend constraint on risk and expected returns.Letµ(k t,z t,x t)denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the dividend constraint (10).µcan thus be interpreted as the shadow price of external funds.The higherµis,the morefinancially constrained thefirm will ing a similar characterization in Christiano and Fisher(2000),we show in Appendix A that:µ(k t,z t,x t)=v k(k t,z t,x t)d k(k t,k t+1(k t,z t,x t),z t,x t)−1(11)where v k and d k denote thefirst-order derivatives offirm value and dividend with respect to capital stock,respectively.The interpretation of Eq.(11)is straightforward.First,all else being equal,firms with higher v k(i.e.,marginal q)are more likely to be constrained.This is intuitive,sincefirms with10higher marginal q have higher investment demand,and hence higher demand for external funds.Second,all else being equal,firms whose one additional unit of capital can generate more dividend(i.e.,d k is higher)are lessfinancially constrained.This is again intuitive, since higher internal funds alleviate the need for externalfinance.3.4Risk and Expected ReturnRewriting the value function(7)at the optimum gives:v jt=d jt+E t[m t+1v jt+1]or equivalently1=E t[m t+1r jt+1](12) where the stock return r jt+1is defined as:5r jt+1≡v jt+1/(v jt−d jt)(13)We can further rewrite Eq.(12)as the well-known beta-pricing form following Cochrane (2001):E t[r jt+1]=r ft+βjtλmt(14)where r ft is the real interest rate from period t to t+1.The amount of risk is defined by:βjt≡−Cov t[r jt+1,m t+1]/Var t[m t+1](15) and the price of risk is given byλmt≡Var t[m t+1]/E t[m t+1](16) 5Note that v(k jt,z jt,x t)is the cum-dividendfirm value in that it is measured before dividend is paid out.Define v e jt≡v jt−d jt to be the ex-dividendfirm value,then r jt+1reduces to the usual definition r jt+1=(v e jt+1+d jt+1)/v e jt.114FindingsSince closed-form solutions are generally not available for this class of dynamic investment models,we calibrate the parameters and solve the model numerically.Section4.1presents the results on value and policy functions,and Section4.2presents the results on the multiplier, risk,and expected returns.We discuss the intuition driving our results in Section4.3.Results from extensive sensitivity experiments are reported in Section4.4.Calibration of an economic model involves restricting some parameter values exogenously and setting others to replicate a benchmark data set as a model solution(e.g.,Dawkins, Srinivasan,and Whalley(2001)).Once the model is calibrated and solved,we can use it to assess the effects of an unobservable change in parameter values.The model solution then predicts the way in which the economy is likely to respond to the change,while the previous solution serves as the reference point.Table1summarizes the key parameter values in the model.Our calibration largely follows that of Zhang(2003).Briefly,all model parameters are calibrated at the monthly frequency to be consistent with the convention in the empirical literature.The parameter values of capital shareα,depreciation rateδ,and persistenceρx and conditional volatilityσx of aggregate productivity are standard in many previous studies.The parametersη,γ0,and γ1are set to match the average Sharpe ratio and the mean and volatility of real interest rate implied by the stochastic discount factor.The calibration of the remaining four parameters has relatively less guidance from previous literature,but we conduct extensive sensitivity analysis by perturbing their values.Appendix B contains the details of the calibration and Appendix C describes the value function iteration technique used to solve the model.124.1Value and Policy FunctionsFigure1plots the Tobin’s Q(market-to-book ratio)(v/k)u,investment rate(i/k)u,and dividend rate(d/k)u for unconstrainedfirms.Figure1also plots the differences in these variables (v/k), (i/k),and (d/k)between constrained and unconstrainedfirms,defined as the variables of constrainedfirms minus those of unconstrainedfirms.Since there are in total three state variables(i.e.,capital stock k,aggregate productivity x,and idiosyncratic productivity z),wefirst plot in Panels A–F the variables as functions of capital stock k and idiosyncratic productivity z,whilefixing aggregate productivity x at its long run average level¯x.Each panel from A to F hasfive curves corresponding tofive values of z with the arrow in the panels indicating the direction along which z increases.We then plot in Panels G–L the variables as functions of capital stock k and x,whilefixing z at its long run average level¯z=0.Each panel from G to L has three curves corresponding to three values of x with the arrow in the panels indicating the direction along which x increases.Several patterns emerge from Figure1.Wefirst consider the behavior of unconstrained firms reported by thefirst and third rows of panels.Panels A and G show that Tobin’s Q increases in both idiosyncratic productivity z and aggregate productivity x.Moreover,small firms have high market-to-book ratios relative to largefirms when size is measured by capital stock k.Similar to Tobin’s Q,investment rate also decreases in capital stock and increases in both productivity levels,as shown in Panels B and H.From Panels C and I,dividend rate has a non-monotonic relation with capital stock.Very smallfirms typically pay lower and even negative dividends,indicating that thesefirms rely heavily on external funds tofinance their high investment rates.Of course,firms do not pay negative dividends in practice;we simply use negative dividends as a modeling device for external equity in the unconstrained model. Dividend rates approach certain steady levels as capital stock k becomes large.Panels C13and I also show that dividend rate increases in idiosyncratic productivity z but decreases in aggregate productivity x.This result indicates that in good times when x is relatively high,firms rely more on external equity tofinance investment.How dofinancial constraints affectfirm value and policy functions?The second and fourth rows of panels in Figure1plot the difference in market-to-book,investment rate,and dividend rate,defined as constrainedfirms’variables minus those of unconstrainedfirms. From Panels D and J,the market-to-book ratios of the constrained model are always lower than those of the unconstrainedfirms.This is intuitive,since the dividend constraint imposes restrictions on the feasible set of capital accumulation choices.The magnitude of the adverse effect onfirm value decreases monotonically in capital stock k and idiosyncratic productivity z,but increases in aggregate productivity x.Thus,smaller and less profitablefirms are more likely to be constrained,especially in relatively good aggregate economic conditions.From Panels E and K,financial constraints reduce the investment rates of constrained firms relative to those of unconstrainedfirms.This is again intuitive,because constrained firms cannotfinance adequately their investment demands and are forced to reduced their investment rates.The magnitude of the adverse effect on investment rate again decreases monotonically in capital stock k andfirm-specific productivity z,but increases in aggregate productivity x.Similar pattern shows up in dividend rates as well.Panel F shows that the difference in dividend rates between constrained and unconstrainedfirms is higher forfirms with lower idiosyncratic productivity z,indicating that thesefirms are more constrained. Similarly,Panel L shows that the difference in dividend rates is higher when aggregate productivity x is higher,suggesting that constraints are more binding in good times.In sum,our model predicts thatfinancial constraints reducefirm value and investment rates,and the magnitude of these effects decreases monotonically in the scale of production14k andfirm-specific productivity z,but increases in aggregate economic condition x.4.2Multiplier,Risk,and Expected Excess ReturnThis subsection investigates how the multiplier associated with the dividend constraint,risk, and expected return are determined by the state variables in the model.The multiplier is of particular interest,because it can be interpreted as the shadow price of external funds that measures directly the degree offinancial constraints.Figure2plots the multiplierµfor constrainedfirms,riskβu and expected excess return e u for unconstrainedfirms,as well as their differences βand e calculated as those of constrainedfirms minus those of unconstrainedfirms.From Panels A and F,the multiplier decreases in capital stock k andfirm-specific productivity z,but increases in aggregate productivity x.Therefore,consistent with our results from Figure1,financial constraints are more likely to be binding for smallfirms,less profitablefirms,and when aggregate economic conditions are relatively good.From Panels B and D,the risk and expected excess return of unconstrainedfirms decrease in both capital stock k andfirm-specific profitability z:smallfirms and less productivefirms are riskier and earn higher expected returns.From Panels C and E,the risk of unconstrained firms increases with aggregate productivity x,but their expected excess return decreases with x.This seemingly inconsistent result can be reconciled by noting that the price of risk,λmt defined in Eq.(16)is countercyclical.(Figure3reports that the price of risk and aggregate productivity x are inversely related.)Intuitively,in good times when x is high,the amount of risk is also high;however,the price of risk is low,which gives rise to a low expected excess return.The opposite is true in bad times.Strikingly,Panels G and I report that constrainedfirms are less risky and earn lower15expected returns than unconstrainedfirms!Further,the magnitude of the difference in risk and expected return between constrained and unconstrainedfirms is inversely related to capital stock andfirm-specific productivity.Finally,From Panels H and J,the effects offinancial constraints on risk and expected return are not related to aggregate economic conditions.4.3DiscussionWhy arefinancial constraints more likely to be binding when aggregate productivity is high, but whenfirm-specific productivity is low?In other words,why does the shadow price of external funds respond negatively tofirm-specific productivity shocks but positively to aggregate shocks?Why are constrainedfirms less risky and earn lower expected returns in our model?We provide some intuition here.The driving force of the shadow price responding asymmetrically tofirm-specific and aggregate shocks is the stochastic discount factor which depends on aggregate shocks,but not onfirm-specific shocks.Intuitively,to what extentfinancial constraints are binding depends on the gap between thefirms’investment demands and internal funds.A higher gap means thatfirms are more constrainedfinancially.Productivity shocks have two offsetting effects on thefinancial gap.A positive shock raises internal funds and reduces the gap,but it also raises investment demands and thereby increases the gap.Forfirm-specific shocks,thefirst channel dominates;thusfirms with higher idiosyncratic productivity are less likely to be constrained.The same effects also apply for aggregate shocks.However,aggregate shocks affect investment demands through an additional channel,because aggregate shocks enter the stochastic discount factor as in Eq.(4).For example,when there is a positive aggregate shock,firms will increase investment16demands through the usual cashflow channel since their capital stocks are more productive. In addition,a positive aggregate shock leads to a lower discount rate,1/m t+1,which in turn increases the expected continuation value,E t[m t+1v jt+1],and stimulates real investment demands further.The incremental investment demands exceed the incremental internal funds generated by the positive aggregate shock,thereby increasing thefinancial gap and the shadow price of external funds.As a corollary,the discount rate channel on investment demands should disappear without the stochastic discount factor.In this case,the asymmetric response of the shadow price of external funds to aggregate andfirm-specific shocks should disappear as well.This is indeed what happens in the model.Figure4reports Tobin’s Q,investment rate,and the multiplier as functions of the state variables in the model with constant discount factor,i.e.,γ0=γ1=0.6Without stochastic discount factor,firm value and investment rates are much less sensitive to aggregate shocks than the benchmark case.To make the sensitivities visible in thefigure,we increaseσx from.007/3to0.025when constructing Figure4.From Panels A and F in Figure4,the multiplier now responds negatively to both aggregate shocks andfirm-specific shocks.From Panels G and H,the adverse effects offinancial constraints on Tobin’s Q decrease with both aggregate andfirm-specific productivity.The same conclusion holds for the effects on investment rates,as shown in Panels I and J.This is intuitive:with constant discount factor,aggregate andfirm-specific shocks enterfirms’value-maximization problem symmetrically.As a result,just likefirms with low idiosyncratic productivity are more constrained,firms are more constrained when aggregate productivity is low.In sum,the stochastic discount factor is the driving force of the pattern that constraints are more binding in good times in the benchmark model.6To keep the average real interest rate around2%per annum,we changeηfrom0.994to0.9985.Leaving ηunchanged does not affect the qualitative predictions of the model.17。
复旦大学 研究生投资学讲义 CHPT15- the equity market cross-section and time-series properties
Chapter 15 the equity market (cross-section patternsand time-series patterns)Fan LongzhenIntroduction•In this class, we again look at the stock return data, but with a very different view point;•Previously, we examined the data through the “eyes”of CAPM. We had a noble intension, although it didn’t work very well;•Now we are going to get our hands “dirty”, and plunge right into the data, without a formal model;•In particular, we will look at some well-established patterns---size,value, and momentum—that have beensuccessful in explaining the cross-sectional stock returns.Multifactor-regressions•For each asset i, we use a multi-factor time-series regression to quantify the asset’s tendency to move with multiple risk factors:• 1. Systematic factors:•:risk premium•:risk premium • 2 idiosyncratic factors:•: no risk premium • 3. Factor loadings:•beta(i): sensitivity to market risk;•: sensitivity to the factor risk.i tt i f t M t i i f t i t e F f r r r r ++−+=−)(βαM t r )(f t M t M r r E −=λtF )(t F F E =λi t e 0)(=i t e E i fThe pricing relation•Given the risk premia of the systematic factors, the determinants of expected returns:•What are the additional systematic factors?FiM i f t i t f r r E λλβ+=−)(Size: small or big•We sort the socks by their market capitalization: share price* number of shares outstandingValue or growth•We can sort the cross-section of stocks by their book-to-market ratios: growth stocks:firm with low book-to-market ratios;•Value stocks:firms with high book-to-market ratios.Other factors•Price-to-earining ratios,•The market skewness fcator•---Havey and Siddique(JF,2000) report that systematic skewness is economically important and commands an average risk premium of 3.6% per year.Time-series behavior•For the time-series behavior of stock returns, we focus in particular on the time-varying nature of expected return and volatility;•We are interested in building dynamic models that explicitly incorporate conditioning information to best describe the behavior of future stock returns.Predictability and marketefficiency•In addition to the random walk test, there is mounting evidence that stock returns are predictable;•Some argue that predictability implies market inefficiency. What do you think?•Others contend it is simple a result of rational variation in expected returns;•Suppose this is true. Can we find a coherent story that relates the variation through time of expected returns to business conditionsWhat cause expected returns to vary?•Using the intuition of CAPM, expected returns canvary for two reasons:• 1. Varying risk aversion;• 2. Varying exposure to market risk, or varying market risk.•When income is high, investor want save more, higher saving lead to lower expected returns;•Empirical implication?Variables related to business condition •Default spreads: difference in yields between defaultable bonds and treasury bonds with similar maturities. When the business condition is bad, the systematic default risk increases, widening the default spread.•Term premiums: difference in yields between long-and short-term treasury bonds. This is a forward-looking variable predictive of future inflation, and is found to be important in forecasting real economic activity.•Financial ratios: book-to-market, dividend yields, ect. Variables that are important in fundamental valuationTime-varying volatility---volatility also changes with time •If the rate of information arrival is time-varying, so is the rate of price adjustment, causing the volatility to change over time;•The time-varying volatility of the market return is related to the time-varying volatility of a variety of economic variables, includinginflation, money growth, and industrial production;•Stock market volatility increases with financial leverage: a decrease in stock price causes an increase in financial leverage, cause volatility to increase;•Investors’s sudden changes of risk attitudes, changes in market liquidity, and temporary imbalance of supply and demand could all cause market volatility to change over time.•What are the testable empirical implications?Stochastic volatility•More generally, volatility is a stochastic process of its own, this is an active area of research in academics and in industry.•Some well-known facts about stochastic volatility:• 1. It is persistent: volatile periods are followed by volatile periods;• 2. It is mean-reverting: over time, volatility converges to its long-run mean.• 3. There is a negative correlation between volatility and return: large negative price jumps are coupled with large positive volatility jumps.。
Time Varying Volatility Models
7.2 ARCH and GARCH Models
69
Suppose Zj has a normal distribution. Since the kurtosis of a normal distribution is equal to 3, we have K(Zt) = E[z^^]/(E[zf])^ =3 . For s^, it holds that
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7 Time Varying Volatility Models
ized ARCH) model; Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) and Zakoian (1994) extended it to the TGARCH (threshold GARCH) model; and Nelson (1991) extended it to the EGARCH (exponential GARCH) model. This chapter focuses on the ARCH-type modeling approach and the causality technique developed by Cheung and Ng (1996).
7.2 ARCH and GARCH Models
We begin with a brief review of the ARCH family of Statistical models. The ARCH model was originally designed by Engle (1982) to model and forecast the conditional variance. The process allows the conditional variance to change over time as a function of past errors while the unconditional variance remains constant. Let variable y^ have the following AR(k) process: yt=^o+Z!li^iyt.i+^t^ (7.1)
conditional skewness in asset pricing tests
conditional skewness in asset pricing tests 标题:Conditional Skewness in Asset Pricing Tests: A Comprehensive OverviewIntroduction:Asset pricing tests are fundamental tools in financial economics that help us understand the relationship between risk and expected return. These tests often rely on various factors, such as market beta, size, value, and momentum, to explain the cross-sectional variations in asset returns. However, traditional asset pricing models often fail to capture all the nuances of market behavior, leading to anomalies and unexplained variations in returns. One such aspect that has gained increasing attention in recent years is conditional skewness.Conditional skewness refers to the time-varying asymmetry in the distribution of asset returns. It implies that the shape of the return distribution is not constant but changes depending on the state of the market or the economy. This phenomenon has significant implications for asset pricing, as it can influence investors' risk preferences and portfolio choices.In this article, we will delve into the concept of conditional skewness in asset pricing tests, exploring its importance, measurement, and impact on asset pricing models. We will also discuss how incorporating conditional skewness can improve our understanding of market behavior and enhance the performance of asset pricing models.1. Understanding Conditional Skewness:Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of a probability distribution. A positively skewed distribution has a long tail on the right side, indicating more extreme positive returns, while a negatively skewed distribution has a long tail on the left side, indicating more extreme negative returns. In finance, asset returns are often assumed to follow a normal distribution, which is symmetric and has zero skewness.However, empirical studies have shown that asset returns exhibit significant skewness, with more frequent small losses and fewer but larger gains. Moreover, this skewness is not constant but varies over time, depending on market conditions, investor sentiment,and other factors. This time-varying skewness is known as conditional skewness.Conditional skewness can be caused by various factors, such as leverage effects, information shocks, and behavioral biases. For example, during bear markets, negative news can trigger large sell-offs, leading to more negative skewness. Conversely, during bull markets, positive news can drive prices up, resulting in more positive skewness.2. Measuring Conditional Skewness:Measuring conditional skewness requires estimating thetime-varying shape of the return distribution. There are several methods to achieve this, including parametric and non-parametric approaches.Parametric methods assume a specific functional form for the return distribution, such as the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model or the stochastic volatility model. These models allow for time-varying volatility and can incorporate skewness through additional parameters. Forexample, the GJR-GARCH model includes a leverage effect parameter that captures the asymmetric response of volatility to positive and negative shocks.Non-parametric methods, on the other hand, do not assume any specific functional form for the return distribution. Instead, they use data-driven techniques, such as kernel density estimation or quantile regression, to estimate the shape of the return distribution directly. These methods can provide more flexibility and robustness but may require more data and computational resources.3. The Impact of Conditional Skewness on Asset Pricing:Conditional skewness can have significant implications for asset pricing, as it affects investors' risk preferences and portfolio choices. Investors are typically risk-averse and prefer assets with higher expected returns to compensate for the risk they bear. However, if the return distribution is skewed, the risk associated with different assets may not be fully captured by traditional measures such as variance or standard deviation.For example, an asset with high positive skewness may have a lowaverage return but offer a higher probability of large gains, making it attractive to investors seeking high rewards. Conversely, an asset with high negative skewness may have a high average return but expose investors to a higher risk of large losses, making it less desirable.Moreover, conditional skewness can also affect the pricing of derivatives and other contingent claims, as their payoffs depend on the shape of the underlying asset's return distribution. For instance, options prices are sensitive to the implied volatility skew, which reflects the difference in implied volatilities across different strike prices and maturities.4. Incorporating Conditional Skewness in Asset Pricing Models:To account for the impact of conditional skewness on asset pricing, researchers have developed various extensions of traditional asset pricing models. These models typically introduce additional factors or parameters that capture the time-varying skewness of asset returns.One approach is to include a skewness factor in multi-factor assetpricing models, such as the Fama-French three-factor model or the Carhart four-factor model. The skewness factor represents the exposure of an asset to the market-wide skewness and can explain the cross-sectional variation in returns beyond traditional factors.Another approach is to use regime-switching models that allow for different levels of skewness in different market regimes. These models can capture the changing nature of risk and return during different economic cycles and provide more accurate predictions of future returns.5. Conclusion:Conditional skewness is an important aspect of asset pricing that has received growing attention in recent years. By capturing the time-varying asymmetry in the distribution of asset returns, conditional skewness can shed light on the complex dynamics of financial markets and improve our understanding of investor behavior.Incorporating conditional skewness in asset pricing tests can enhance the performance of traditional models and help explainsome of the anomalies and puzzles observed in financial data. However, measuring and modeling conditional skewness is not without challenges, and further research is needed to develop more robust and reliable methods.Overall, conditional skewness offers a promising avenue for advancing our knowledge of asset pricing and improving the accuracy and relevance of financial models in practice.。
成功或是毁灭的英文作文
成功或是毁灭的英文作文English:Success or destruction are two sides of the same coin, each with its own implications and consequences. 。
Success can bring about immense joy and fulfillment.It's like reaching the peak of a mountain after a long and arduous climb. You feel a sense of accomplishment, pride, and satisfaction. For instance, when I finally landed my dream job after years of hard work and perseverance, I felt like all my efforts had paid off. I was over the moon!Moreover, success often opens doors to new opportunities. It's like a domino effect; one success leads to another. For example, when a business achieves great success in the market, it can expand its operations, reach more customers, and ultimately increase its profits. This positive momentum propels individuals and organizations forward, driving them to even greater heights.On the other hand, destruction carries a much darker connotation. It signifies loss, devastation, and ruin. It's like a tornado tearing through a peaceful town, leaving chaos and destruction in its wake. When I experienced a business failure due to poor decision-making, it felt like my world was crumbling around me. I was devastated anddidn't know how to pick up the pieces.Furthermore, destruction often has far-reaching consequences beyond the initial event. It's like a ripple effect spreading through water; one small disturbance can create waves that impact everything in its path. For instance, when a natural disaster strikes, it not only causes physical damage but also disrupts communities, economies, and lives. The aftermath can be catastrophic, requiring immense resources and time to recover.In conclusion, success and destruction are intertwined aspects of life, each with its own significance and repercussions. While success brings joy, fulfillment, and opportunities, destruction brings loss, devastation, andfar-reaching consequences. It's essential to strive for success while being mindful of the potential for destruction, as both can shape our lives in profound ways.---。
Macroprudential Policy:An Organizing Framework
3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Considerable efforts are underway to draw lessons from the recent crisis. One of these lessons is the need for an overarching policy framework to address the stability of the financial system as a whole―a macroprudential policy framework. Macroprudential policy seeks to limit systemic, or system-wide, financial risk. Defining elements of macroprudential policy are its objective, its scope of analysis (the financial system as a whole and its interactions with the real economy), its set of powers and instruments, and their governance (prudential tools and those specifically assigned to macroprudential authorities). Macroprudential policy is a complement to microprudential policy and it interacts with other types of public policy that have an impact on systemic financial stability. Indeed, prudential regulation, as carried out in the past, also had some macroprudential aspects, and the recent crisis has reinforced this focus; hence, a clear separation between “micro” and “macro” prudential, if useful conceptually, is difficult to delineate in practice. Moreover, no matter how different policy mandates are structured, financial stability tends to be a common responsibility, reflecting the far reaching consequences of financial crises. This calls for coordination across policies, to ensure that systemic risk is comprehensively addressed. Equally important, macroprudential policy is no substitute for sound policies more broadly, including, in particular, strong prudential regulation and supervision, and sound macroeconomic policies. Operational independence in other policy areas, including monetary and microprudential policy, should not be undermined in the name of macroprudential policy. Finally, given the global nature of the financial system, the multilateral aspects of macroprudential policy will need to be fully considered—an important aspect that is only touched upon in this paper. To be effective, institutional arrangements for macroprudential policy need to ensure a policymaker’s ability and willingness to act—including clear mandates; control over macroprudential instruments that are commensurate with those mandates; arrangements that safeguard operational independence; and provisions to ensure accountability, supported by transparency and clear communication of decisions and decision-making processes. This paper draws a number of key takeaways from the work conducted to date within and outside the Fund. Given the partial state of our knowledge, it is too early at this stage to cast these as a set of principles of good practices that could support internationally consistent implementation of macroprudential policies. However, the preliminary views offered on key aspects of macroprudential policymaking, as summarized in Box 1, could form the basis for ensuring broad consistency in Fund advice on macroprudential policies, given growing demands in this area; and could, in due course, be an input towards an internationally agreed set of macroprudential principles. Much further work will be needed in the coming years to achieve this goal.
represents three times our expected revenue -回复
represents three times our expected revenue -回复题目:Exploring the Scenario of Revenue Exceeding Expectations by Threefold导语:随着企业运营的不断发展,预计收益的重要性也越来越凸显。
然而,当我们的收益超出预期的三倍时,这意味着什么?这篇文章将一步一步地回答这个问题,并探讨相应的影响和机会。
既能帮助我们了解这种情况的潜力和优势,又能提供相关策略和建议以充分利用这一特殊机遇。
1. 引言及收益预期的意义(约150字)在这个竞争激烈的商业环境中,准确预测和管理收益对企业的成功至关重要。
投资者、股东和管理层都希望看到企业的财务状况良好,并实现预期的收益增长。
然而,当我们的收益超出预期的三倍时,无疑会给企业带来巨大的机遇和挑战。
2. 当收益超出预期三倍时的潜在因素(约300字)收益超出预期的三倍往往是企业异常增长的结果,将涉及一系列有利因素。
首先,市场需求超过预期,这可能是由于新市场的发展或既有市场的爆发式增长。
其次,企业可能凭借卓越的产品或服务创新获得了竞争优势,吸引了大量的客户。
此外,扩大营销和销售渠道,以及提供卓越的客户服务,也可能是超额收入的因素之一。
最后,管理层的高效决策和团队协作可能会促成业绩的惊人增长。
3. 收益超出预期三倍的正面影响(约400字)超过预期的收益将带来一系列正面影响,从而增强企业的可持续发展和竞争优势。
首先,超额收入将提高企业的市场地位和品牌价值,为进一步的增长奠定基础。
其次,它将增加企业的现金流和利润,为投资和扩展提供更多资源。
此外,超额收入还能带来财务安全感,从而增强股东和投资者对企业的信心和支持。
4. 利用超额收入的机遇和策略(约400字)在利用超额收入的机遇时,企业需要制定有效的策略来最大化利益。
首先,企业可以考虑扩大市场份额,进一步巩固其在现有市场中的地位,或进入新的市场。
计量经济学常用英语词汇集锦
计量经济学常用英语词汇集锦Absolute deviation, 绝对离差Absolute residuals, 绝对残差Acceleration in an arbitrary direction, 任意方向上的加速度Acceleration normal, 法向加速度Acceleration space dimension, 加速度空间的维数Acceleration tangential, 切向加速度Acceleration vector, 加速度向量Acceptable hypothesis, 可接受假设Actual frequency, 实际频数Adaptive estimator, 自适应估计量Addition theorem, 加法定理Additive Noise, 加性噪声Adjusted rate, 调整率Adjusted value, 校正值Admissible error, 容许误差Alpha factoring,α因子法Alternative hypothesis, 备择假设Analysis of correlation, 相关分析Analysis of covariance, 协方差分析Analysis Of Effects, 效应分析Analysis Of Variance, 方差分析Analysis of regression, 回归分析Analysis of time series, 时间序列分析Angular transformation, 角转换ANOVA Models, 方差分析模型Arcsine transformation, 反正弦变换Area under the curve, 曲线面积AREG , 评估从一个时间点到下一个时间点回归相关时的误差ARIMA, 季节和非季节性单变量模型的极大似然估计Arithmetic grid paper, 算术格纸Arrhenius relation, 艾恩尼斯关系Asymptotic efficiency, 渐近效率Asymptotic variance, 渐近方差Attributable risk, 归因危险度Autocorrelation of residuals, 残差的自相关Bar chart, 条形图Bar graph, 条形图Base period, 基期Bayes' theorem , Bayes定理Bell-shaped curve, 钟形曲线Bernoulli distribution, 伯努力分布Best-trim estimator, 最好切尾估计量Binary logistic regression, 二元逻辑斯蒂回归Binomial distribution, 二项分布Bisquare, 双平方Bivariate Correlate, 二变量相关Bivariate normal distribution, 双变量正态分布Bivariate normal population, 双变量正态总体Biweight interval, 双权区间Biweight M-estimator, 双权M估计量Block, 区组/配伍组BMDP(Biomedical computer programs), BMDP统计软件包Boxplots, 箱线图/箱尾图Breakdown bound, 崩溃界/崩溃点Canonical correlation, 典型相关Case-control study, 病例对照研究Categorical variable, 分类变量Cauchy distribution, 柯西分布Center of symmetry, 对称中心Centering and scaling, 中心化和定标Central tendency, 集中趋势Central value, 中心值CHAID -χ2 Automatic Interaction Detector, 卡方自动交互检测Chance error, 随机误差Chance variable, 随机变量Characteristic equation, 特征方程Characteristic root, 特征根Characteristic vector, 特征向量Chebshev criterion of fit, 拟合的切比雪夫准则Chernoff faces, 切尔诺夫脸谱图D test, D检验Data acquisition, 资料收集Data bank, 数据库Data capacity, 数据容量Data deficiencies, 数据缺乏Data handling, 数据处理Data manipulation, 数据处理Data processing, 数据处理Data reduction, 数据缩减Data sources, 数据来源Data transformation, 数据变换Data validity, 数据有效性Dead time, 停滞期Degree of freedom, 自由度Degree of precision, 精密度Degree of reliability, 可靠性程度Degression, 递减Density function, 密度函数Error Bar, 均值相关区间图Effect, 实验效应Eigenvalue, 特征值Eigenvector, 特征向量Empirical distribution, 经验分布Empirical probability, 经验概率单位Enumeration data, 计数资料Equal sun-class number, 相等次级组含量Equally likely, 等可能Equivariance, 同变性Error, 误差/错误Error of estimate, 估计误差Error type I, 第一类错误Error type II, 第二类错误Estimand, 被估量Estimated error mean squares, 估计误差均方Estimated error sum of squares, 估计误差平方和Euclidean distance, 欧式距离Exceptional data point, 异常数据点Expectation plane, 期望平面Expectation surface, 期望曲面Expected values, 期望值Experiment, 实验F distribution, F分布F test, F检验Factor, 因素/因子Factor analysis, 因子分析Factor score, 因子得分Factorial design, 析因试验设计False negative, 假阴性False negative error, 假阴性错误Family of distributions, 分布族Family of estimators, 估计量族Fatality rate, 病死率Gamma distribution, 伽玛分布Gauss increment, 高斯增量Gaussian distribution, 高斯分布/正态分布Gauss-Newton increment, 高斯-牛顿增量General census, 全面普查Generalized least squares, 综合最小平方法GENLOG (Generalized liner models), 广义线性模型Geometric mean, 几何平均数Gini's mean difference, 基尼均差GLM (General liner models), 通用线性模型Goodness of fit, 拟和优度/配合度Gradient of determinant, 行列式的梯度Graeco-Latin square, 希腊拉丁方Grand mean, 总均值Gross errors, 重大错误。
ACCA英国注册会计师(F4)Chapter 7题库大全
ACCA英国注册会计师(F4)Chapter 7题库大全姓名:_____________ 年级:____________ 学号:______________1、What is the hourly payment method being described?Payment method Basic rate Overtime premium Overtime paymentThis is the amount paid above the basic rate for hoursworked in excess of the normal hours.This is the total amount paid per hour for hours workedin excess of the normal hours.This is the amount paid per hour for normal hours worked.答案解析:Payment methodBasic rate Overtime premium Overtime paymentThis is the amount paid above the basic 对rate for hoursworked in excess of the normal hours.This is the total amount paid per hour for 对hours worked in excess of the normal hours.This is the amount paid per hour for normal hours worked 对.2、Which remuneration method is being described?Payment methodTime-rate Piecework Piece-rate plus bonusLabour is paid based solely on the production achieved.Labour is paid extra if an agreed level of output is exceeded.Labour is paid according to hours worked.答案解析:Payment method Time-ratePiecework Piece-rate plus bonusLabour is paid based solely on the production 对achieved.Labour is paid extra if an agreed level of output is 对exceeded.Labour is paid according to hours worked. 对3、Which TWO of the following labour records may be used to allocate costs to the variouscost units in a factory?AEmployee record cardBAttendance record cardCTimesheetDJob card答案解析:A timesheet and a job card are used to allocate labour costs to cost units. An attendance record card is used for payroll purposes and an employee record card details all of the information relating to an employee.4、 In tort no previous transaction or contractual relationship need exist.ATrueBFalse答案解析:True. No transaction or relationship is needed.5、Ann got trapped in a public toilet due to the lock being faulty. Rather than wait for help, she tried to climb out of the window but fell and broke her leg.Which of the following is this an example of?ARes ipsa loquiturBVolenti non fit injuriaCNovus actus interveniensDContributory negligence答案解析:Ann contributed to her injury by her actions.6、 In relation to the tort of negligence, which of the following describes the standard of care expected of individuals?AWhat can be reasonably expected of them personally in the circumstancesBWhat a reasonable person would do in the circumstancesCWhat the person is actually capable of in the circumstancesDWhat it is actually possible to do in the circumstances答案解析:The standard of care is what a reasonable person would do in the circumstances.7、What is the effect of volenti non fit injuria in the law of tort?AIt is a complete defence to an action in negligenceBIt reduces the amount of damages that a defendant is liable forCIt reverses the burden of proof so that the defendant must prove that they were not negligent答案解析:Volenti non fit injuria is a complete defence to an action in negligence. The defendant is not liable because the claimant voluntarily accepted the risk of injury or loss. Contributory negligence reduces the amount of damages that a defendant must pay. Res ipsa loquitur reverses the burden of proof.8、In negligence, what is the limit of a defendant’s liability for damages?AThe full losses incurred by the claimantBThe losses that the defendant could reasonably foreseeCThe amount of losses that the defendant can afford to pay答案解析:A claimant is only liable for the losses that they could reasonably foresee and this may mean that the defendant does not receive damages in respect of all the losses suffered.9、 Which of the following parties are owed a duty of care by an accountant in respect of accounts that they have produced?AThe client onlyBThe client and any person relying on the accountsCThe client and any person that the accountant knows will rely on the accountsDThe client and to the public at large答案解析:An accountant owes a duty of care to those they have a special relationship with. This includes the client that the accounts were prepared for, but also to anyone who the accountant knows will rely on the accounts.10、材料全屏Roger regularly takes part in a sport that involves fighting with wooden sticks. He has been successful in many fights but recently took part in one in which he lost to Jack. The fight took place under the necessary safety regulations and was stopped before Roger was hurt too badly. However, soon after the fight, it was clear that he had received severe brain damage and he now has difficulty talking.Lulu used a public toilet at her local train station. Unfortunately the lock was defective and she was stuck inside. In a hurry to escape, she attempted to climb out of the window (despite a warning notice not to do so) and fell to the ground outside, injuring her head.34【论述题】Identify the elements that a claimant must prove to be owed a duty of care in a negligence claim答案解析:To establish a duty of care, a claimant must prove that the harm was reasonably foreseeable, there was a relationship of proximity between the parties and it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care.11、12、State whether the fight organiser has any defence to a negligence claim by Rodger答案解析:Volenti non fit injuria is the voluntary acceptance of the risk of injury and is a defence to a claim of negligence. It applies where the claimant expressly consented to the risk (such as on waiver forms signed by those taking part in dangerous sports), or it may be implied by their conduct.Whilst it is not clear that Roger expressly agreed to the risk, it is reasonable for him to expect it. Roger has taken part in many fights, so he cannot argue that he was not aware of the risk – therefore the organisers are likely to be exonerated from any liability under negligence for the injuries caused to Roger.13、State whether the train station has any defence to a negligence claim by Lulu答案解析:Contributory negligence does not exonerate the defendant from their negligence completely, but their liability to pay compensation may be reduced by the courts if the injured party is proved to have contributed to the loss they suffered in some way. In the case of Sayers v Harlow UDC 1958, a lady was injured while trying to climb out of a public toilet cubicle which had a defective lock. The court held that she had contributed to her injuries by the method by which she had tried to climb out.This case is almost iden tical to Lulu’s so it is expected that the train station may use this defence and the courts will reduce damages awarded to Lulu on a percentage basis that is just and reasonable. This is typically in the range of 10% to 75%, however it is possible to reduce the claim by up to 100%.14、The ‘neighbour’ principle was established by the landmark caseACaparo v Dickman 1990BAnns v Merton London Borough Council 1977CDonoghue v Stevenson 1932DThe Wagon Mound 1961。
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Time-varying expected momentumprofitsDongcheol Kim a ,Tai-Yong Roh b ,Byoung-Kyu Min c ,⇑,Suk-Joon Byun baBusiness School,Korea University,Seoul,Republic of KoreabGraduate School of Finance,Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST),Seoul,Republic of Korea cInstitute of Financial Analysis,University of Neuchatel,Neuchatel,Switzerlanda r t i c l e i n f o Article history:Received 15November 2013Accepted 11September 2014Available online 22October 2014JEL classifications:G12G14Keywords:MomentumTime-varying expected returnsMarkov switching regression model Business cycle Procyclicality Growth optionsa b s t r a c tThis paper examines the time variations of expected momentum profits using a two-state Markov switching model with time-varying transition probabilities to evaluate the empirical relevance of recent rational theories of momentum profits.We find that in the expansion state the expected returns of winner stocks are more affected by aggregate economic conditions than those of loser stocks,while in the recession state the expected returns of loser stocks are more affected than those of winner stocks.Consequently,expected momentum profits display strong procyclical variations.We argue that the observed momentum profits are the realization of such expected returns and can be interpreted as the procyclicality premium .We provide a plausible explanation for time-varying momentum profits through the differential effect of leverage and growth options across business cycles.Ó2014Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.1.IntroductionThe cross-sectional difference in average stock returns across their recent past performance has become one of the most contro-versial issues in academia as well as industry since the pioneering work of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).A simple momentum strat-egy buying recent winners and selling recent losers generates both statistically and economically significant profits.There are two explanations for the sources of these momentum profits in the literature:One is that momentum profits result from investors’irrational underreaction to firm-specific information (e.g.,Barberis et al.,1998;Daniel et al.,1998;Hong and Stein,1999;Jiang et al.,2005;Zhang,2006;Chui et al.,2010).Another is a rational risk-based explanation stating that momentum profits are realizations of risk premiums because winner stocks are riskier than loser stocks (e.g.,Conrad and Kaul,1998;Berk et al.,1999;Johnson,2002;Ahn et al.,2002;Bansal et al.,2005;Sagi and Seasholes,2007;Liu and Zhang,2008).In contrast to the extensive aforementioned literature on the cross-sectional aspects of momentum,the intertemporal aspects of momentum profits have received much less attention.Studies of the intertemporal aspects of momentum profits focus on procyc-lical time variations in momentum profits.Johnson (2002)and Sagi and Seasholes (2007)provide the theoretical insight that momen-tum profits are likely to be procyclical.According to Johnson (2002),winner stocks have higher exposure to growth rate risk than loser stocks.Since expected growth rates tend to be high in expansions and growth rate risk is accordingly high,expected returns on momentum portfolios should be higher in expansions than in recessions.In a similar vein,the model of Sagi and Seasholes (2007)suggests that winner stocks tend to have more valuable growth options in expansions than in recessions and such firms are riskier and associated with higher expected returns in expansions,since growth options are riskier than assets in place.There is also empirical evidence of the procyclicality of momen-tum profits.Chordia and Shivakumar (2002)show that profits of momentum strategies can be explained by a set of lagged macro-economic variables that are related to business cycles and payoffs to momentum strategies disappear after stock returns are adjusted for their predictability based on these macroeconomic variables.These authors also find that momentum trading delivers reliably positive profits only during expansionary periods but negative,/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.09.0040378-4266/Ó2014Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.⇑Corresponding author.Tel.:+41327181574;fax:+41327181401.E-mail addresses:kimdc@korea.ac.kr (D.Kim),mooseroh@business.kaist.ac.kr (T.-Y.Roh),byoungkyu.min@unine.ch (B.-K.Min),sjbyun@business.kaist.ac.kr (S.-J.Byun).statistically insignificant profits during recessions.Theirfindings uncover procyclical time variations in momentum profits.Cooper et al.(2004)alsofind that momentum profits depend on the state of the market in a procyclical way.Average momentum profits are positive following periods of up markets but negative following periods of down markets.However,these authors interpret these results as consistent with the overreaction models of Daniel et al. (1998)and Hong and Stein(1999).1In our view,a possible reason behind the discrepancy in the above authors’different interpretations is that the above two stud-ies do not link time-series and cross-sectional properties of expected returns.For example,the empirical specification used by Chordia and Shivakumar(2002),regressing momentum payoffs on the lagged macroeconomic variables,does not impose a covari-ance between momentum portfolio returns and the pricing kernel. Thus,we cannot discriminate whether winners are riskier than los-ers or vice versa from their results.2Cooper et al.(2004)alsofind that asymmetries conditional on the state of the market complement the evidence of asymmetries in factor sensitivities,volatility,corre-lations,and expected returns and thus argue that asset pricing mod-els,both rational and behavioral,need to incorporate(or predict) such regime switches.Stivers and Sun(2010)show that time varia-tion in momentum profits can be tied to variation in the market’s cross-sectional return dispersion.They regard this return dispersion as a leading counter-cyclical state variable according to the theory of Gomes et al.(2003)and Zhang(2005).These authorsfind that the recent cross-sectional return dispersion is negatively related to the subsequent momentum profits and thus suggest that momentum profits are procyclical.3This paper aims to combine the time-series and cross-sectional implications of the profitability of momentum trading.As Fama (1991,p.1610)states,‘‘In the end,I think we can hope for a coher-ent story that relates the cross-section properties of expected returns to the variation of expected returns through time.’’This paper seeks to provide empirical evidence for such a coherent story for momentum.To do so,we adopt the two-state Markov switch-ing regression framework with time-varying transition probabili-ties by following Perez-Quiros and Timmermann(2000)and Gulen et al.(2011).Thisflexible econometric model allows us to combine the cross-sectional evidence on past stock returns with the time-series evidence on the evolution in conditional returns and to describe asymmetries in the response of momentum profits to aggregate economic conditions across the state of the economy by incorporating regime switches.We also examine a differential response in expected returns to shocks to aggregate economic conditions between winner and loser stocks across the state of economy and the procyclicality of momentum profits.By employing a similar approach,Perez-Quiros and Timmermann(2000)examine whether a differential response exists in expected returns to shocks to aggregate eco-nomic conditions between small and largefirms.Gulen et al. (2011)also examine a differential response in expected returns between value and growthfirms andfind strong counter-cyclicality of the value premium.Our paper is not thefirst to examine the pro-cyclicality of momentum profits.Chordia and Shivakumar(2002), Cooper et al.(2004)and Stivers and Sun(2010)already documented procyclical variations in momentum profits.Unlike the previous literature,however,this paper shows that the risks of winner and loser stocks are asymmetrical across business cycles and time-variation in riskiness is a driving force for time-variation in momentum profits.In particular,we provide a plausible explana-tion for why winners are riskier than losers in expansions but losers are riskier than winners in recessions.We document two mainfindings.First,in the recession state, loser stocks tend to have greater loadings on the conditioning mac-roeconomic variables than winner stocks,while in the expansion state winner stocks tend to have greater loadings on these vari-ables than loser stocks.In other words,in recessions loser(winner) stocks are most(least)strongly affected,while in expansions win-ner(loser)stocks are most(least)strongly affected.This indicates that returns on momentum portfolios react asymmetrically to aggregate economic conditions in recession and expansion states. Second,the asymmetries in winner and loser stocks’risk across the states of the economy lead to strong procyclical time-variations in the expected momentum profits.The expected momentum profit estimated from the Markov switching regression model tends to be positive and spike upward just before entering a reces-sion(i.e.,the peak of the business cycle),while it becomes negative during recessions,reaching a maximal negative value at the end of a recession(i.e.,the trough of the business cycle).The above two findings are robust to estimating exogenously the state transition probabilities and identifying the states,using alternative instru-mental variables in modeling state transition probabilities,and assuming the fat-tailed distribution of stock returns.We also examine the economic significance of out-of-sample predictability of the model by setting up a simple stylized trading rule based on the prediction.The results show that the economic significance of out-of-sample predictability is particularly significant when this trading rule is applied to loser stocks and during a recession state.Thefirst mainfinding above implies that the riskiness of winner and loser stocks is different across business cycles and,conse-quently,momentum profits are time-varying.We provide a plausi-ble explanation for time-varying momentum profits through the differential effect of leverage and growth options across business cycles.During expansions,growth options have a higher effect and leverage has a lower effect,and winner stocks tend to have greater growth options and lower leverage.As a result,winner stocks are riskier in expansions.On the contrary,during recessions, growth options have a lower effect and leverage has a higher effect, and loser stocks tend to have lower growth options and higher leverage.Thus,loser stocks are riskier in recessions.We argue that leverage and growth options are the underlying driving forces for the different riskiness of winner and loser stocks and for time-varying momentum profits.The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.Section2dis-cusses the sources of time-varying momentum profits.Section3 presents a method to estimate the two-state Markov switching regression model with time-varying transition probabilities. Section4describes the data and the empirical results for the model fitted to momentum portfolios.Section5provides a plausible explanation for the observed time-varying momentum profits. Section6sets forth a summary and conclusions.2.Sources of time-varying expected momentum profitsIn his theoretical model,Johnson(2002)argues that stock prices are a convex function of expected growth,meaning that growth rate risk increases with growth rates and thus,stock price changes1Cooper et al.(2004)report that a multifactor macroeconomic model of returns,asused by Chordia and Shivakumar(2002),does not explain momentum profits aftercontrolling for market frictions.Additionally,these authors report that the macro-economic model cannot forecast the time-series of out-of-sample momentum profits,whereas the lagged return of the market can.Hence,they suggest that the laggedreturn of the market is the type of conditioning information that is relevant inpredicting the profitability of the momentum.2Chordia and Shivakumar(2002)admit to this weakness in their approach:‘‘We donot impose cross-sectional asset pricing constraints in this study.Proponents of thebehavioral theories may argue that,to be rational,the payoff to momentum strategiesmust covary with risk factors’’(p.988).3Stivers and Sun(2010)also show that the recent cross-sectional return dispersionis shown to be positively related to the value premium and thus suggest that thevalue premium is countercyclical.192 D.Kim et al./Journal of Banking&Finance49(2014)191–215(or stock returns)should be more sensitive to changes in expected growth when the expected growth is higher.If exposure to this risk carries a positive premium,expected returns rise with growth rates.Other things being equal,firms with large recent positive price moves(winners)are more likely to have had positive growth rate shocks thanfirms with large recent negative price moves(los-ers).Hence,a momentum sort will tend to sortfirms by recent growth rate changes and sorting by growth rate changes will also tend to sortfirms according to growth rate levels and hence by end-of-period expected returns.In other words,recent winners (losers)will tend to have both higher(lower)growth rate changes in the recent past and higher(lower)subsequent expected returns. Motivated by Johnson’s(2002)theoretical work,Liu and Zhang (2008)show that the risk exposure of winners on the growth rate of industrial production differs from those of losers.Assuming that the growth rate of industrial production is a common factor sum-marizingfirm-level changes of expected growth,these authors document that winners have temporarily higher average future growth rates than losers.More importantly,theyfind that the expected growth risk as defined by Johnson(2002)is priced and increases with expected growth.4In their theoretical model,Sagi and Seasholes(2007)show that afirm’s revenues,costs,and growth options combine to explain momentum profits and they exercise their theoretical insights to show that momentum strategies usingfirms with high revenue growth volatility and valuable growth options outperform tradi-tional momentum strategies.Their model suggests thatfirms with valuable growth options exhibit higher autocorrelation thanfirms without such growth options,becausefirms that performed well in the recent past are better poised to exploit their growth options. Since growth options are riskier than assets in place,suchfirms are riskier and are thus associated with higher expected returns. Winner stocks that have good recent performance are likely to have riskier growth options than loser stocks that have bad recent performance.Subsequently,winner stocks should earn higher expected returns than loser stocks.Importantly,the Sagi and Seasholes(2007)model implies that momentum profits should be procyclical:‘‘During up markets,firms tend to move closer to exercising their growth options,which tends to increase return autocorrelations.During down markets,firms tend to move closer tofinancial distress,which tends to decrease return autocorrela-tions’’(p.391).The above theoretical models suggest that momentum profits are procyclical.The expected growth rates mentioned by Johnson (2002)are high in expansions and growth rate risk is accordingly high.Since trading strategies based on momentum tend to have high exposure to this risk,their expected returns should be higher in expansions than in recessions.In a similar vein,procyclical stocks tend to have greater growth rate risk and more valuable growth options in expansions than in recessions and thus such firms are riskier and associated with higher expected returns in expansions.According to Johnson(2002)and Sagi and Seasholes (2007),recent winner stocks are likely to have greater growth rate risk and riskier growth options and should earn higher expected returns than recent loser stocks.Therefore,observed momentum profits(or returns on winner-minus-loser portfolios,hereafter WML)are realizations of such expected returns and can be interpreted as the procyclicality premium.3.An econometric model of time-varying expected returnsBased on Sagi and Seasholes’(2007)theoretical model,we argue that momentum profits are procyclical because of the extent of exercising growth options across business cycles.To empirically examine the procyclical behavior of momentum profits,the Markov switching regression framework is appropriate since it can accommodate the time-varying behavior of momentum profits across business cycles and business cycles can be regarded as states.In this regard,we employ the Perez-Quiros and Timmermann(2000)Markov switching regression framework with time-varying transition probabilities based on Hamilton(1989) and Gray(1996).Let r t be the return of a test asset in excess of the riskless return at time t and let X tÀ1be a vector of conditioning variables available up to time tÀ1used to predict r t.The Markov switching specification takes all parameters(the intercept term, slope coefficients,and volatility of excess returns)as a function of a single,latent state variable,S t.Specifically,r t¼b0;Stþb0S tX tÀ1þe t;e t$N0;r2S t;ð1Þwhere N0;r2Stdenotes a normal distribution with mean zero and variance r2St.In a two-state Markov switching specification,S t=1or S t=2,meaning that the parameters to be estimated are eitherh1¼b0;1;b01;r21ÀÁor h2¼b0;2;b02;r22ÀÁ.Since the above Markov switching model allows the risk and expected return to vary(or transit)across two states,it is neces-sary to specify how the underlying states evolve through time. We assume that the state transition probabilities follow afirst-order Markov chain as follows:pt¼ProbðS t¼1j S tÀ1¼1;y tÀ1Þ¼pðy tÀ1Þ;ð2Þ1Àpt¼ProbðS t¼2j S tÀ1¼1;y tÀ1Þ¼1Àpðy tÀ1Þ;ð3Þqt¼ProbðS t¼2j S tÀ1¼2;y tÀ1Þ¼qðy tÀ1Þ;ð4Þ1Àqt¼ProbðS t¼1j S tÀ1¼2;y tÀ1Þ¼1Àqðy tÀ1Þ;ð5Þwhere y tÀ1is a vector of variables publicly available at time tÀ1 and affects the state transition probabilities between times tÀ1 and t.Although the standard formulation of the Markov switching model assumes the state transition probabilities to be constant,it would be more reasonable to assume that the probability of staying in a state depends on prior conditioning information,y tÀ1,and thus is time-varying,since investors are likely to possess information about the state transition probabilities superior to that implied by the model with constant transition probabilities.The literature shows that the economic leading indicator(Filardo,1994;Perez-Quiros and Timmermann,2000),interest rates(Gray,1996;Gulen et al.,2011),or the duration of the time spent in a given state (Durland and McCurdy,1994;Mahue and McCurdy,2000)is used as prior condition information.We estimate the above two-state Markov switching model using maximum likelihood methods.5Let h=(h1,h2)denote the vector of parameters to be estimated in the likelihood function. The probability density function of the return,conditional on being state j,is Gaussian defined asfðr t j X tÀ1;S t¼j;hÞ¼1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi2pr2jq expÀr tÀb0;jÀb0jX tÀ122r2j8><>:9>=>;ð6Þfor j=1,2.The information set X tÀ1contains X tÀ1,r tÀ1,y tÀ1,and lagged values of these variables.Then,the log-likelihood function is4Liu and Zhang(2008)alsofind that in many specifications this macroeconomic risk factor explains more than half of momentum profits and conclude that risk plays an important role in driving momentum profits.However,some papers report different results.For example,Grundy and Martin(2001)and Avramov and Chordia (2006)report that controlling for time-varying exposures to common risk factors doesnot affect momentum profits.Griffin et al.(2003)show that the model of Chen et al. (1986)does not provide any evidence that macroeconomic risk variables can explain momentum.5Another estimation approach is a Bayesian approach based on numerical Bayesian methods such as the Gibbs sampler and Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods(Kim and Nelson,1999).D.Kim et al./Journal of Banking&Finance49(2014)191–215193L ðr t j X t À1;h Þ¼X T t ¼1log ½/ðr t j X t À1;h Þ ;ð7Þwhere the density function /(r t j X t À1;h )is simply obtained by sum-ming the probability-weighted state probabilities across the twostates.It is defined as/ðr t j X t À1;h Þ¼X2j ¼1f ðr t j X t À1;S t ¼j ;h ÞProb ðS t ¼j j X t À1;h Þ;ð8Þwhere Prob (S t =j j X t À1;h )is the conditional probability of being in state j at time t given information at time t À1.The conditional state probabilities can be obtained from the standard probability theorem:Prob ðS t ¼i j X t À1;h Þ¼X2j ¼1Prob ðS t ¼i j S t À1¼j ;X t À1;h ÞProb ðS t À1¼j j X t À1;h Þ:ð9ÞBy Bayes’rule,the conditional state probabilities can be written asProb ðS t À1¼j j X t À1;h Þ¼f ðr t À1j S t À1¼j ;X t À1;y t À1;X t À2;h ÞProb ðS t À1¼j j X t À1;y t À1;X t À2;h ÞP j ¼1f ðr t À1j S t À1¼j ;X t À1;y t À1;X t À2;h ÞProb ðS t À1¼j j X t À1;y t À1;X t À2;h Þ:ð10ÞThe conditional state probabilities Prob (S t =i j X t À1;h )are driven by iterating recursively Eqs.(9)and (10)and the parameter estimates of the likelihood function are obtained (Gray,1996).Variations in the state probabilities are evidence that the conditional expected return is time-varying.4.Empirical results4.1.Data and model specificationWe use monthly excess returns (raw returns minus the one-month Treasury bill return)on the momentum decile portfolios as test assets.Momentum portfolios are constructed in accordance with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)by sorting all stocks every month into one of 10decile portfolios based on the past six-month returns and holding the deciles for the subsequent six months.We skip one month between the end of the portfolio formation period and the beginning of the holding period to avoid potential micro-structure biases.All stocks in a given portfolio have equal weight.Portfolio 1is the past loser,while Portfolio 10is the past winner.Gulen et al.(2011)examine the time-varying behavior of the expected value premium and show that the expected value pre-mium displays strong countercyclical variations,while we show that the expected momentum profits display strong procyclical variations.To compare the opposite time-varying behaviors of these two stock return regularities,we match the beginning of the sample period with Gulen et al.(2011):Our sample period is from March 1960to December 2012.Table 1presents the mean,standard deviation,skewness,and kurtosis of monthly excess returns on the 10decile momentum portfolios.The mean excess returns monotonically increase from 0.369%per month for the past loser portfolio (Portfolio 1)to 1.127%per month for the past winner portfolio (Portfolio 10).The mean return on the WML is quite significant:0.758%per month.A distinct pattern is found in skewness,which almost monotonically decreases from 1.375for the loser portfolio to À0.661for the winner portfolio.Portfolios 1through 4are posi-tively-skewed,while Portfolios 5through 10are negatively-skewed.These results indicate that past (short-term)winners are preferred to past losers in the mean–variance framework,but this may not necessarily be true when considering the third moment,since positively-skewed portfolios should be preferred to nega-tively-skewed portfolios.This is consistent with the Arrow–Pratt notion of risk aversion.Loser portfolios tend to have greater kurto-sis than do winner portfolios.To show that momentum returns are asymmetrically affected by macroeconomic variables across states (or business cycles),we model the excess returns of each of the momentum portfolios as a function of an intercept term and lagged values of the relative three-month Treasury bill rate,the default spread,the growth in the monetary base,and the dividend yield.These variables are commonly used in the literature on the predictability of stock returns.As in Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000)and Gulen et al.(2011),we use the relative three-month Treasury bill rate (RREL)as a state variable proxying for investors’expectations of future economic activity.According to Fama (1981),an unobserved negative shock to real economic activity induces a higher Treasury bill rate through an increase in the current and expected future inflation rate.He argues that a negative correlation between stock returns and inflation is not a causal relation but is proxying for a positive relation between stock returns and real activity.Thus,the Treasury bill rate,which is an indicator of the short-term inter-est rate,tends to have a negative relation with stock returns (e.g.,Fama and Schwert,1977;Fama,1981;Campbell,1987;Glosten et al.,1993).Berk et al.(1999)present a theoretical modelTable 1Moments of monthly excess returns for ten decile momentum portfolios.Momentum portfolio Mean Standard deviation Skewness Excess Kurtosis q 1(r it )q 1r 2itÀÁLoser 0.3699.064 1.375 6.4910.201[0.000]0.213[0.000]20.549 6.7340.581 5.1930.220[0.000]0.138[0.001]30.722 6.0520.340 5.2510.224[0.000]0.143[0.000]40.751 5.5990.138 5.0710.213[0.000]0.104[0.009]50.799 5.294À0.108 4.4070.201[0.000]0.080[0.043]60.817 5.123À0.273 4.1740.185[0.000]0.055[0.163]70.863 5.112À0.419 4.3020.170[0.000]0.051[0.194]80.900 5.220À0.580 4.0250.157[0.000]0.048[0.224]90.979 5.532À0.709 3.7280.154[0.000]0.074[0.062]Winner 1.127 6.516À0.661 2.6640.162[0.000]0.114[0.004]WML0.7585.999À2.97117.0000.166[0.020]0.109[0.006]This table reports the mean,standard deviation,skewness,and excess kurtosis of excess returns (in percent)on the momentum portfolios which are constructed in accordance with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).That is,all stocks are sorted every month into one of ten decile portfolios based on past six-month returns,and held for six months.Excess returns are calculated as the difference between monthly stock returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate.The data for the one-month Treasury bill rate are from Kenneth French’s Web site.‘WML’indicates ‘Winner’portfoliominus ‘Loser’portfolio.q 1(r it )and q 1r 2itÀÁare the first-order autocorrelations of the raw excess return and squared raw excess returns,respectively.Numbers in brackets indicate p -values of the first-order autocorrelations.The sample period is from March 1960to December 2012.194D.Kim et al./Journal of Banking &Finance 49(2014)191–215predicting that changes in interest rates will affect expected stock returns differently acrossfirms and providing a direct link between cross-sectional dispersions of expected stock returns and interest rates.Interest rates should be a true cause of ex post stock returns, because an increase(decrease)in the real interest rate induces a reduction(increase)in stock values.The default spread(DEF)is defined as the difference between yields on Baa-rated corporate bonds and10-year Treasury bonds from the Federal Reserve Economic Data at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis and is included to capture the effect of default pre-miums.Fama and French(1989)show that the major movements in DEF seem to be related to long-term business cycle conditions and the default spread forecasts high returns when business condi-tions are persistently weak and low returns when conditions are strong.Indeed,the default spread is one of the most frequently used conditioning variables in predicting stock returns(e.g.,Keim and Stambaugh,1986;Fama and French,1988;Kandel and Stambaugh,1990;Jagannathan and Wang,1996;Chordia and Shivakumar,2002).The growth in the money base(MB)is defined as the12-month log-difference in the monetary base reported by the St.Louis Fed-eral Reserve.This variable is included in the conditional mean equation,since this variable affects stock returns through changes in macro liquidity(or moneyflow liquidity)and eventually micro liquidity(or transaction liquidity)in stock markets.6This variable also affects stock returns through shocks in monetary policies that can affect aggregate economic conditions.In particular,Fama (1981)argues that it is important to control for money supply when establishing the inflation-future real economic activity proxy story.The dividend yield(DIV)is defined as the sum of dividend pay-ments accruing to the Center for Research in Security Prices(CRSP) value-weighted market portfolio over the previous12months divided by the contemporaneous level of the index at the end of the month.The standard valuation model indicates that stock prices are low relative to dividends when discount rates and expected returns are high and vice versa.Thus,the dividend yield (usually measured by the ratio of dividends to price)varies with expected returns.Thus,the dividend yield proxies for time-varia-tion in the unobservable risk premium.There is ample empirical evidence that the dividend yield predicts future stock returns (e.g.,Keim and Stambaugh,1986;Campbell and Shiller,1988; Fama and French,1988;Kandel and Stambaugh,1990).7 To capture the movements of momentum portfolio returns,we specify Eq.(1)by including the above-mentioned return predict-able variables in the following conditional mean equation:r it¼b i0;St þb i1;StRREL tÀ1þb i2;StDEF tÀ1þb i3;StMB tÀ2þb i4;St DIV tÀ1þe it;ð11Þwhere r it is the monthly excess return for the i th decile momentumportfolio at time t,e it is the normally distributed random error termwith mean zero and variance r2i;St,and S t={1,2}.The regressors arelagged by one month.The conditional variance of excess returns,r2i;S t,is allowed to depend only on the state of economy:ln r2i;St¼k i;St:ð12ÞWe do not include autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity(ARCH)effects in the conditional volatility equation.Table1showsthefirst-order autocorrelations of the raw excess returns and thesquared raw excess returns in each of the10decile momentumportfolios.All ten portfolios exhibit a significant positivefirst-orderautocorrelation at the one percent level.Only six squared rawexcess returns out of the ten portfolios have significantfirst-orderautocorrelation coefficient estimates at thefive percent level.Theseresults indicate that ARCH effects are less important in the condi-tional volatility in our framework.Following Gray(1996)and Gulen et al.(2011),we model thetime-varying state transition probabilities to be dependent onthe level of short interest rates,Treasury bill rates,as follows:p it¼Prob S it¼1j S itÀ1¼1;y tÀ1¼U p i0þp i1RREL tÀ1ÀÁ;ð13Þ1Àp it¼Prob S it¼2j S itÀ1¼1;y tÀ1;ð14Þq it¼Prob S it¼2j S itÀ1¼2;y tÀ1¼U p i0þp i2RREL tÀ1ÀÁ;ð15Þ1Àq it¼Prob S it¼1j S itÀ1¼2;y tÀ1;ð16Þwhere RREL tÀ1is the relative three-month Treasury bill rate calcu-lated as the difference between the current Treasury bill rate andits12-month backward moving average,and U(Á)is the cumulativeprobability density function of a standard normal variable.8Forrobustness checks,we also use two alternative instrumentalvariables in modeling state transition probability equations insteadof the relative three-month Treasury bill rate:the Composite LeadingIndicator and the industrial production growth rate.However,theresults are qualitatively similar,as reported in Section4.5.4.2.Estimation results4.2.1.Identifying the statesTable2reports the estimation results of the parameters in Eqs.(11)–(16)for portfolios P1(loser),P2,P4,P6,P8,and P10(winner).9The constant parameter estimates in the conditional mean equationin state1(^b i0;1Þare much lower than those in state2(^b i0;2Þin allmomentum portfolios.The constant term in state1monotonicallyincreases across the portfolios from the loser to the winner portfoliosand is more precisely estimated.Eight out of10constant terms instate1are significantly estimated at the1%level and all10constantterm estimates are negative.In contrast,there is no particular pat-tern in the constant term in state2and any of the10constant termsare not significantly estimated.The conditional standard deviationestimate in state1ð^r i;1Þis greater than that in state2ð^r i;2Þin allportfolios.All conditional volatilities are highly significantlyestimated.Schwert(1990)and Hamilton and Lin(1996)find thatreturn volatilities are higher in recession periods than in expansionperiods.Theirfindings are verified with historical National Bureauof Economic Research(NBER)business cycle dates.These resultsmay indicate that state1is the recession state and state2is the6Instead of the growth in monetary base,we also include the inflation rate. However,the results are qualitatively similar.The reason that the inflation rate can be included is that since both economic theory and traditional idea imply that stock returns and inflation should be positively correlated,since equities are‘‘hedges’’against inflation because they represent claims to real assets.However,the United States and other industrialized countries exhibit a significant negative correlation between inflation and real stock returns in the post-war periods(e.g.,Fama and Schwert,1977;Fama,1981;Geske and Roll,1983;Danthine and Donaldson,1986; Stulz,1986;Kaul,1987,1990;Marshall,1992;Boudoukh et al.,1994;Bakshi and Chen,1996).This negative correlation between inflation and real stock returns is often termed the stock return–inflation puzzle.Many authors have tried to resolve this puzzle(e.g.,Fama,1981;Marshall,1992;Geske and Roll,1983;Kaul,1987).In contrast to existing evidence of a negative relation at short horizons,Boudoukh andRichardson(1993)find evidence to suggest that long-horizon nominal stock returns are positively related to both ex ante and ex post long-term inflation.7Ang and Bekaert(2007)report that the dividend yield does not univariately predict excess returns,but the predictive ability of the dividend yield is considerably enhanced,at short horizons,in a bivariate regression with the short rate.8Instead of the relative Treasury bill rate,we also use the one-month Treasury bill rate in the state transition probability equation.However,the results are quite similar.The results are available upon request.9The estimation results for portfolios P3,P5,P7,and P9are not reported because of space constraint.The results are available upon request.D.Kim et al./Journal of Banking&Finance49(2014)191–215195。