rfc3290.An Informal Management Model for Diffserv Routers
imap rfc标准
Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) is an email retrieval protocol. It stores email messages on a mail server and enables the recipient to view and manipulate them as though they were stored locally on their device. IMAP was developed in the late 1980s and has since become one of the most widely used email retrieval protocols.The IMAP standard is defined in RFC 3501, which was published in 2003. This document provides a detailed description of the protocol's functionality, including its data formats, commands, and responses. The standard specifies how IMAP clients and servers should communicate with each other to enable the retrieval and manipulation of email messages.One of the key features of IMAP is its support for multiple clients accessing the same mailbox simultaneously. This is achieved through the use of a "shared" storage model, where all clients see the same set of messages and folders stored on the server. This allows users to access their email from different devices without having to worry about synchronizing their messages manually.Another important aspect of IMAP is its support for message organization and management. Clients can create, delete, and rename folders, as well as move messages between folders. They can also search for specific messages based on various criteria, such as sender, subject, or date.IMAP also provides a range of features for managing individual messages. Clients can mark messages as read or unread, flag them for follow-up, and even move them to a specific folder. They can also reply to messages, forward them to others, and generate replies or forwards with attachments.Overall, the IMAP standard provides a powerful and flexible framework for managing email messages. Its support for shared storage, message organization, and advanced message management features make it a popular choice for both personal and business email users.。
lsa的报文格式 -回复
lsa的报文格式-回复LSA(Link-State Advertisement)是在链路状态路由协议(如OSPF和IS-IS)中使用的一种报文格式。
它用于在网络中传播信息,包括路由器的链路状态和网络拓扑,以便在整个网络中建立可靠的路由。
LSA的报文格式包含了各种字段,用于描述路由器、链路和网络的属性。
下面将一步一步解释LSA报文格式的各个字段。
1. Type(类型):这个字段用于指示LSA的类型。
不同类型的LSA用于传输不同类型的信息,通常有以下几种类型:Router LSA,Network LSA,Summary LSA和AS-external LSA等。
每个类型的LSA都有不同的用途和内容。
2. LS Age(LSA的时效):这个字段表示LSA的年龄,即它生成后经过的时间。
这个字段的目的是为了帮助路由器判断LSA是否过时,如果一个LSA的时效过高,则可能代表该LSA已经失效,需要更新。
3. Link State ID(链路状态标识):这个字段用于唯一标识一个LSA。
在Router LSA中,它表示该LSA所属的路由器的接口IP地址;在Network LSA中,它表示该LSA所属的网络的网络地址。
通过Link State ID,路由器可以识别和区分不同的LSA。
4. Advertising Router(广告路由器):这个字段指示了生成并发送该LSA的路由器的ID。
通过Advertising Router字段,其他路由器可以知道该LSA是由哪个路由器生成的。
5. LS Sequence Number(LSA序列号):这个字段表示LSA的序列号。
每个LSA都有一个唯一的序列号,用于区分各个版本的同一个LSA。
如果两个LSA的序列号相同,则表示它们是同一个LSA的不同版本。
6. Checksum(校验和):这个字段用于校验LSA的完整性。
通过计算LSA 的各个字段,并进行校验和计算,接收方可以检查该LSA是否在传输过程中发生了错误。
RFC技术介绍
1使用RFC的意义RFC是实现接口的主要方式之一,不但是一种函数,更是一种数据通信协议,类TCP/IP。
RFC不仅是一个函数,也是一个数据通信协议,SAP显然是吃定大集团的管理应用,在大集团通常分散了若干Sap应用,可通过RFC协议进行连接,Tcode:SM59 ,典型应用在如下的几个方面:(1)MDM:总部MDM做整个集团的主数据编码规划,通过XI+RFC连接自动分发到各分散服务器。
(2)BI数据仓库系统通过RFC从分散的R/3应用服务器中抽取数据,做报表分析和数据挖掘。
(3)SLM(SoLution Management),SLM通过RFC连接各企业,在SLM统一登录,R/3那边设置好RFC用户可自动登录,当然SLM还提供了完善的问题处理流程跟踪。
2 SAP RFC几种模式(1)sRFC(synchronous RFC)是RFC的第一个版本,它要求连接的双方是同步的工作方式,即都是在可用状态才能够实现成功调用。
(2)aRFC(asynchronous RFC)这种RFC可以实现异步的RFC调用方式,它可以进行多个并发调用,并且不要求被调用系统的可用状态。
发出调用系统会一直尝试直到获得被调用系统的应答。
它通常用于当你需要提高系统并行调用多个RFC的效率,相对于强制等待程序的结果,它的效率更高。
(3)tRFC(transactional RFC)是对aRFC进行相关技术改进后的一个RFC版本,其于ARFC相同点是实现异步调用,其优点是可以将多个调用进行LUW分组处理,并只执行一次运行。
现在aRFC基本上已经停用。
(4)qRFC(queue(d) RFC)是tRFC的一个增强版本,它保证了所传输数据的处理次序。
(5)pRFC(Parallel RFC)是一种特殊的RFC,它是aRFC的一种扩展类型。
因为它改善了系统的性能,在执行大量的aRFC时。
SAP 使用它在MRP里面提高速度。
但是它只能执行在同一个系统和同一个client里。
一类lsa报文格式 -回复
一类lsa报文格式-回复什么是LSA报文格式?LSA(Link State Advertisement)报文格式是一种用于OSPF(Open Shortest Path First)协议中的报文格式。
OSPF是一种用于路由选择的链路状态协议,它通过交换链路状态信息来构建网络拓扑图,并计算出最短路径。
LSA报文格式是OSPF用于交换链路状态信息的一种规范格式,它包含了路由器或者交换机对周围邻居设备发送的信息。
下面将会逐步介绍LSA报文格式的各个字段以及字段中的信息。
1. 报文头部信息:Reported Link State ID:报告的链路状态标识符,用于唯一地标识链路状态。
Advertising Router:广告路由器,指的是产生该LSA报文的路由器的ID。
Link State Sequence Number:链路状态序列号,用于唯一地标识不同的链路状态。
LSA Age:LSA的年龄,表示该链路状态信息的更新时间。
Options:选项字段,用于指示该LSA报文的特性和功能。
Checksum:校验和,用于验证整个LSA报文的完整性。
Length:报文长度,指的是整个LSA报文的字节长度。
2. 链路描述部分:Link ID:链路ID,用于标识该链路连接的目标设备。
Link Data:链路数据,用于提供与该链路相关的详细信息。
Type:链路类型,用于指示链路的类型,例如点对点连接、网络连接等等。
Metric:链路度量,用于表示链路的开销,即通过该链路达到目标设备所需的代价。
3. 发送者的附加信息:Adjacent Router:邻接路由器,指的是产生该LSA报文的路由器所连接的邻居路由器。
Neighbor ID:邻居ID,用于标识邻居路由器的唯一性。
Interface ID:接口ID,用于标识产生该LSA报文的路由器与邻居路由器之间的接口。
通过以上的介绍,我们可以看出LSA报文格式用于传递OSPF协议中的链路状态信息。
rfc相关设置及使用
rfc相关设置及使用RFC(Request for Comments)是一种用于定义互联网协议、标准和相关问题的文档。
RFC的格式由互联网工程任务组(IETF)统一规定,它们记录了网络技术的发展和演进过程。
在本文中,我们将介绍RFC相关的设置和使用。
1. 了解RFC的作用和历史:RFC是由IETF组织制定的一种标准化文档,它记录了互联网协议的设计、开发和演化过程。
RFC起源于20世纪60年代的ARPANET,是一种社区驱动的文档,通过共享和讨论来推动互联网技术的发展。
RFC文档旨在提供指南、建议和最佳实践,帮助网络技术人员解决问题。
2. 寻找和阅读RFC文档:RFC文档可以在互联网上免费获取,IETF的官方网站和其他资源库都有存档。
这些文档按照顺序编号,并且以RFC开头,比如RFC 791定义了IPv4协议。
通过搜索引擎或在IETF网站上使用关键词搜索,可以找到特定主题的RFC文档。
阅读RFC文档时,应该注意文档的状态,有一些可能已经被更新或废弃。
3. 使用RFC文档:RFC文档在网络技术的发展过程中起着重要的指导作用。
它们提供了协议规范、算法实现、安全性和隐私等方面的建议。
网络管理员、网络工程师和开发人员可以使用RFC文档来了解和理解特定协议或标准的设计原理和要求。
此外,RFC文档还常用于进行互联网协议的实现、编程和配置。
4. 参与RFC的制定过程:RFC并不是静止的文件,而是一个持续演进的过程。
任何人都可以参与到RFC的制定过程中。
要参与RFC的制定,可以加入IETF并参与相关的工作组或邮件列表。
通过这种方式,个人可以提出改进建议,参与讨论和标准化的制定。
5. 遵循RFC的指导原则:在网络技术领域,遵循RFC的指导原则是至关重要的。
这些指导原则包括设计原则、协议分层、安全性和互操作性等要求。
遵循RFC的指导原则可以确保网络协议的正确性、稳定性和可靠性,同时也可以促进网络技术的发展和创新。
总结起来,RFC在互联网技术领域起着重要的作用,它们记录了互联网协议的发展历程和指导原则。
lsa的报文格式 -回复
lsa的报文格式-回复报文是计算机网络中用于传输数据的一种通信格式。
不同的通信协议使用不同的报文格式,其中包括了头部和数据两部分。
本文将以“LSA的报文格式”为主题,详细介绍LSA(链路状态广告)协议中使用的报文格式。
链路状态广告(Link State Advertisement,LSA)是OSPF(开放最短路径优先)协议中用于交换网络拓扑信息的报文格式。
LSA报文通过在网络中的路由器之间传递,用于构建并维护一个网络中的链路状态数据库(Link State Database,LSDB)。
LSDB包含了所有路由器对网络拓扑的理解,以及路由算法用于计算最短路径的基础数据。
LSA报文分为几种不同的类型,每种类型都有自己特定的报文格式。
下面将逐一介绍每种类型的报文格式。
1. 路由器链路状态广告(Router LSA)报文格式路由器LSA用于描述一个路由器的连接情况以及其所连网络的拓扑信息。
该类型的LSA报文格式如下:[ LS Age Options LS Type Link State ID Advertising Router LS Sequence Number LS Checksum Length Link count Link ID Link Data Type TOS Metric ...]报文格式包括以下字段:- LS Age:该LSA报文的年龄,以计时单位表示。
- Options:LSA报文所携带的选项信息,如是否支持多点链接等。
- LS Type:表示该LSA报文的类型,此处为路由器LSA,值为1。
- Link State ID:该LSA的唯一标识符,对于路由器LSA,通常为该路由器的ID。
- Advertising Router:生成并发送该LSA报文的路由器的ID。
- LS Sequence Number:用于确保LSA报文的有序交付,以最新的序列号为准。
- LS Checksum:校验和字段,用于检查报文的完整性。
Cisco UCS C220 M3 Rack Server 数据表说明书
Data SheetCisco UCS C220 M3 Rack ServerProduct OverviewThe Cisco® Unified Computing System™ (Cisco UCS) combines Cisco UCS C-Series Rack Servers and B-Series Blade Servers with networking and storage access into a single converged system that simplifies management and delivers greater cost efficiency and agility with increased visibility and control. The latest expansion of the Cisco UCS portfolio includes the new Cisco® UCS C220 M3 Rack Server (one rack unit [1RU]) and Cisco UCS C240 M3 Rack Server (2RU) and the Cisco UCS B200 M3 Blade Server. These three new servers increase compute density through more cores and cache balanced with more memory capacity, disk drives and with faster I/O. Together these server improvements and complementary Cisco UCS advancements deliver the best combination of features and cost efficiency required to support IT’s diverse server needs.The Cisco UCS C220 M3 Rack Server (Figure 1) is designed for performance and density over a wide range of business workloads, from web serving to distributed databases. Building on the success of the Cisco UCS C200M2 Rack Server, the enterprise-class Cisco UCS C220 M3 server further extends the capabilities of the Cisco UCS portfolio in a 1RU form factor with the addition of the Intel® Xeon® processor E5-2600 and E5-2600 v2 product families, which deliver significant performance and efficiency gains. In addition, the Cisco UCS C220 M3 server offers up to two Intel® Xeon® processor E5-2600 or E5-2600 v2 processors, 16 DIMM slots, eight disk drives, and two 1 Gigabit Ethernet LAN-on-motherboard (LOM) ports, delivering outstanding density and performance in a compact package.The Cisco UCS C220 M3 interfaces with Cisco UCS using another unique Cisco innovation: the Cisco UCS Virtual Interface Card. The Cisco UCS Virtual Interface Card is a virtualization-optimized Fibre Channel over Ethernet (FCoE) PCI Express (PCIe) 2.0 x8 10-Gbps adapter designed for use with Cisco UCS C-Series servers. The VIC is a dual-port 10 Gigabit Ethernet PCIe adapter that can support up to 256 PCIe standards-compliant virtual interfaces, which can be dynamically configured so that both their interface type (network interface card [NIC] or host bus adapter [HBA]) and identity (MAC address and worldwide name [WWN]) are established using just-in-time provisioning. In addition, the Cisco UCS VIC 1225 can support network interface virtualization and Cisco® Data Center Virtual Machine Fabric Extender (VM-FEX) technology.Figure 1. Cisco UCS C220 M3 ServerApplicationsThe Cisco UCS C220 M3 server is a high-density general-purpose 2-socket server optimized to deliver high performance for a large range of workloads, including:●Distributed database clusters●Middleware●High-performance virtual desktops●IT and web infrastructureCisco UCS Servers Change the Economics of the Data CenterIT infrastructure matters now more than ever, as organizations seek to achieve the full potential of infrastructure as a service (IaaS), bare metal, virtualized servers, and cloud computing. Cisco continues to lead in data center innovation with the introduction of new building blocks for Cisco UCS that extend its exceptional simplicity, agility, and efficiency (Figure 2). Cisco leadership with new innovations such as the third-generation Cisco UCS C220 M3 rack server.Figure 2. Cisco UCS ComponentsCisco innovations, such as Cisco UCS Manager, allow administrators to create a software definition for a desired server (using Cisco service profiles and templates) and then instantiate that server and its I/O connectivity by associating a service profile with physical resources. This approach contrasts with the traditional approach of configuring each system resource manually, one at a time, through individual element managers. Unlike the products of other vendors, Cisco service profiles can be moved from rack server to rack or blade server, or between blade or rack servers in different chassis. In other words, Cisco UCS Manager and service profiles are both form-factor agnostic and can bridge blade chassis boundaries.Other Cisco UCS building blocks include enhanced server I/O options and expanded Cisco UCS fabric interconnects that extend scalability and management simplicity for both blade and rack systems acrossbare-metal, virtualized, and cloud-computing environments. Cisco helps ensure that nearly all parts of Cisco UCS offer investment protection and are backward compatible. For example, fabric extenders can be upgraded using the same fabric interconnects and the same Cisco UCS VIC 1225. Fabric interconnect hardware can be upgraded independently of fabric extenders and blade chassis. Cisco continues to innovate in all these areas, helping ensure that both now and in the future, more powerful rack servers with larger, faster memory have adequate I/O bandwidth and compute power. Cisco completes this vision through continuous innovation in VIC, fabric extender, fabric interconnect, blade server, blade chassis, and rack server technologies and form-factor-agnostic Cisco UCS Manager Software.The Cisco UCS C220 M3 is part of a family of rack servers: the Cisco C-Series Rack Servers. Cisco UCS C-Series servers extend unified computing innovations to an industry-standard form factor to help reduce total cost of ownership (TCO) and increase business agility. Designed to operate both in standalone environments and as part of Cisco UCS, the Cisco UCS C-Series servers employ Cisco technology to help customers handle the most challenging workloads. The Cisco UCS C-Series complements a standards-based unified network fabric, Cisco Data Center VM-FEX virtualization support, Cisco UCS Manager Software, Cisco fabric extender and fabric interconnect architectures, and Cisco Extended Memory Technology. Again, Cisco is innovating across all these technologies. With Cisco UCS architectural advantages, software advances, continuous innovation, and unique blade server and chassis designs, Cisco UCS is the first truly unified data center platform. In addition, Cisco UCS can transform IT departments through policy-based automation and deep integration with familiar systems management and orchestration tools.Unique Benefits in a Familiar PackageThe Cisco UCS C220 M3 server extends Cisco’s product portfolio to meet the needs of customers that choose to deploy rack servers. Available from Cisco and its data center partners, the Cisco UCS C220 M3 advances the rack server market with the features outlined in Table 1.Table 1. Features and BenefitsUnified management (when integrated into Cisco UCS) ●Entire solution managed as a single entity with Cisco UCS Manager, improving operational efficiency and flexibility●Service profiles and templates that implement role- and policy-based management, enabling more effective use of skilled server, network, and storage administrators●Automated provisioning and increased business agility, allowing data center managers to provision applications in minutes rather than days by associating a service profile with a new, added or repurposed Cisco UCS C220 M3 server●Capability to move service profiles from rack server to another rack server, or blade to rack server, or rack to blade server in minutes instead of hours or daysIntel Xeon processor E5-2600 and E5-2600 v2 product families ●Automated energy efficiency reduces energy costs by automatically putting the processor and memory in the lowest available power state while still delivering the performance required and flexible virtualization technology that optimizes performance for virtualized environments, including processor support for migration and direct I/O●Up to twice the performance for floating-point operations. Intel Advanced Vector Extensions (Intel AVX) provides new instructions that can significantly improve performance for applications that rely on floating-point or vector computations●Cisco UCS C-Series servers keep pace with Intel Xeon processor innovation by offering the latest processors with an increase in processor frequency and improved security features. With the increased performance provided by the Intel Xeon processor E5-2600 and E5-2600 v2 product families, Cisco UCSC-Series rack servers offer an improved price-to-performance ratio, making Cisco UCS servers among the best values in the industry●Advanced reliability features, including Machine Check Architecture Recovery, to automatically monitor, report, and recover from hardware errors to maintain data integrity and keep mission-critical services online ●Hardened protection for virtual and cloud Environments: Establish trusted pools of virtual resources with Intel® Trusted Execution Technology (Intel® TXT). Intel TXT ensures that physical servers and hypervisors boot only into cryptographically verified “known good states.” It safeguards your business more effectively by protecting your platform from the insertion of malware during or prior to launchHot-swappable SAS, SATA, or SSD drives ●Up to 4 LFF or 8 SFF front-accessible, hot-swappable, internal SAS, SATA, or SSD drives, providing redundancy options and ease of serviceability●Balanced performance and capacity to best meet application needs:◦SATA SSDs◦15,000-RPM SAS drives for highest performance◦10,000 RPM SAS drives for high performance and value◦7200-RPM SATA drives for high capacity and valueRAID 0, 1, 5, 6, 10, 50, and 60 support A choice of RAID controllers provides data protection for up to 8 SAS, SATA, or SSD drives in PCIe and mezzanine card form factors.Cisco UCS C-Series Integrated Management Controller (CIMC) ●Web user interface for server management; remote keyboard, video, and mouse (KVM); virtual media; and administration●Virtual media support for remote CD and DVD drives as if local●Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) 2.0 support for out-of-band management through third-party enterprise management systems●Command-line interface (CLI) for server managementFast-memory support 16 DIMM slots supporting DDR3 1866-MHz memory for optimal performanceRedundant fans and power supplies ●Dual-redundant fans and hot-swappable, redundant power supplies for enterprise-class reliability and uptime ●Power efficiency through Cisco Common Form-Factor Platinum Power Supplies (450W and 650W)Support for up to 2 PCIe 3.0 slots ●Flexibility, increased performance, and compatibility with industry standards●PCIe 3.0 slots, which are estimated to substantially increase the bandwidth over the previous generation and offer more flexibility while maintaining compatibility with PCIe 2.0●I/O performance and flexibility with one x8, half-height and half-length slot and one x16, full-height andhalf-length slotIntegrated dual-port Gigabit Ethernet ●Outstanding network I/O performance and increased network efficiency and flexibility ●Increased network availability when configured in failover configurationsTrusted Platform Module (TPM) ●TPM is a chip (microcontroller) that can securely store artifacts used to authenticate the platform (server). These artifacts can include passwords, certificates, or encryption keys●TPM can also be used to store platform measurements that help ensure that the platform remains trustworthy, helping ensure authentication and authorizationTool-free access Tool-free access to all serviceable items, and color-coded indicators to guide users to hot-pluggable and serviceable itemsCisco Flexible Flash (FlexFlash) memory The server supports up to two internal Cisco FlexFlash drives (secure digital [SD] cards). The first SD card is preloaded with four virtual drives. The four virtual drives contain, respectively, the Cisco Server Configuration Utility, the Cisco Host Upgrade Utility, the Cisco C-Series server drivers set, and a blank virtual drive on which you can install an OS or a hypervisor. The second SD card is blank and can be used to mirror the first.Product SpecificationsTable 2 lists the specifications for the Cisco UCS C220 M3 server. Table 2. Product SpecificationsRegulatory StandardsTable 3 lists regulatory standards compliance information.Table 3. Regulatory Standards Compliance: Safety and EMCOrdering InformationFor a complete list of part numbers, please refer to the corresponding SFF SpecSheet or LFF SpecSheet. Cisco Unified Computing ServicesUsing a unified view of data center resources, Cisco and our industry-leading partners deliver services that accelerate your transition to a Cisco UCS C-Series Rack Server solution. Cisco Unified Computing Services help you quickly deploy the servers, optimize ongoing operations to better meet your business needs, and migrate to Cisco’s unified computing architecture. For more information, visit/go/unifiedcomputingservices.For More InformationPlease visit /go/unifiedcomputing.。
RFC3920中文版
RFC3920可扩展的消息和出席信息协议 (XMPP): 核心协议关于本文的说明本文为互联网社区定义了一个互联网标准跟踪协议,并且申请讨论协议和提出了改进的建议。
请参照“互联网官方协议标准”的最新版本(STD 1)获得这个协议的标准化进程和状态。
本文可以不受限制的分发。
版权声明本文版权属于互联网社区 (C) The Internet Society (2004).摘要本文定义了可扩展消息和出席信息协议(XMPP)的核心功能,这个协议采用XML 流实现在任意两个网络终端接近实时的交换结构化信息。
XMPP提供一个通用的可扩展的框架来交换XML数据,它主要用来建立即时消息和出席信息应用以实现RFC 2779 的需求。
目录1.绪论2.通用的架构3.地址空间4.XML流5.TLS的使用6.SASL的使用7.资源绑定8.服务器回拨9.XML节10.服务器处理XML节的规则11.XMPP中的XML用法12.核心的兼容性要求13.国际化事项14.安全性事项15.IANA事项16.参考1. 绪论1.1. 概览XMPP是一个开放式的XML协议,设计用于准实时消息和出席信息以及请求-响应服务。
其基本的语法和语义最初主要是由Jabber开放源代码社区于1999年开发的。
2002年,XMPP工作组被授权接手开发和改编Jabber协议以适应IETF的消息和出席信息技术。
作为XMPP工作组的成果,本文定义了 XMPP 1.0 的核心功能;在 RFC 2779 [IMP-REQS] 中指定的提供即时消息和出席信息功能的扩展,定义在 XMPP-IM 协议 [the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Instant Messaging and Presence] 中。
1.2. 术语本文中大写的关键字 "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", 和 "OPTIONAL" 的确切含义符合 BCP 14, RFC 2119 [TERMS].2. 通用的架构2.1. 概览尽管XMPP没有结合任何特定的网络结构,通常认为它是客户-服务器架构的一种实现,在这里客户端用XMPP的方式访问服务器采用的是TCP连接,服务器之间的通信也是TCP连接。
SIP协议中的媒体协商
Reliable Provisional Responses、
EarlyMedia扩展需求
• 扩展目的
– 传递可靠的呼叫进展 – 传递被叫侧的媒体描述
• 扩展方法
– 扩展消息 PRACK
• 为1xx响应提供消息确认
– 扩展消息头 RSeq/RAck
• 保证PRACK与对应的1xx匹配
– 1xx响应扩展消息头:RSeq – PRACK请求扩展消息头:RAck
• PRACK是1xx的“最终响应”
– 如果INVITE-1xx完成了Offer-Answer,PRACK-200PRACK可 以完成进一步的Offer-Answer
• PRACK-200PRACK是可靠传输的
– 如果可靠的1xx携带Answer,则必须建立Session
• 一次Offer-Answer结束了 • Early Session
ANM
200
INVITE ACK
200 INVITE
ACK
64 T1 ACM
ANM
CPG ?
如何传递呼叫中事件
STATE KEY LABORATORY TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORK
需求的分析(续)
UserA
INVITE SDP 100
– 增加消息
STATE KEY LABORATORY OF SWITCHING TECHNOLOGY AND TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORK
与传统Telephony业务互通的努力
• IETF
– Session Initiation Protocol for Telephones – 俗称 SIP-T
• ITU-T
rfc中常用的测试协议
rfc中常用的测试协议引言在计算机网络领域中,为了确保网络协议的正确性和稳定性,测试协议起到了至关重要的作用。
RFC(Request for Comments)是一系列文件,用于描述互联网相关协议、过程和技术。
在RFC中,也包含了一些常用的测试协议,用于验证和评估网络协议的功能和性能。
本文将介绍RFC中常用的测试协议,并深入探讨其原理和应用。
二级标题1:PING协议三级标题1.1:概述PING协议是一种常用的网络测试协议,用于测试主机之间的连通性。
它基于ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol)协议,通过发送ICMP Echo Request报文并等待目标主机的ICMP Echo Reply报文来判断目标主机是否可达。
三级标题1.2:工作原理PING协议的工作原理如下: 1. 发送方主机生成一个ICMP Echo Request报文,并将目标主机的IP地址作为目的地。
2. 发送方主机将报文发送到网络中。
3.中间路由器收到报文后,将报文转发到下一跳路由器。
4. 目标主机收到ICMP Echo Request报文后,生成一个ICMP Echo Reply报文,并将其发送回发送方主机。
5. 发送方主机收到ICMP Echo Reply报文后,通过比较报文中的标识符和序列号等字段,判断目标主机是否可达。
三级标题1.3:应用场景PING协议在网络中的应用非常广泛,常用于以下场景: - 测试主机之间的连通性,判断网络是否正常工作。
- 测试网络延迟,通过计算ICMP Echo Request报文的往返时间来评估网络质量。
- 排查网络故障,通过检查ICMP Echo Reply报文中的错误码来定位故障原因。
二级标题2:Traceroute协议三级标题2.1:概述Traceroute协议用于跟踪数据包从源主机到目标主机经过的路径。
它通过发送一系列的UDP报文,并在每个报文中设置不同的TTL(Time to Live)值来实现。
rfc2630.Cryptographic Message Syntax
Network Working Group R. Housley Request for Comments: 2630 SPYRUS Category: Standards Track June 1999 Cryptographic Message SyntaxStatus of this MemoThis document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions forimprovements. Please refer to the current edition of the "InternetOfficial Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization stateand status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright NoticeCopyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. AbstractThis document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax. Thissyntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encryptarbitrary messages.The Cryptographic Message Syntax is derived from PKCS #7 version 1.5 as specified in RFC 2315 [PKCS#7]. Wherever possible, backwardcompatibility is preserved; however, changes were necessary toaccommodate attribute certificate transfer and key agreementtechniques for key management.Housley Standards Track [Page 1]Table of Contents1 Introduction (4)2 General Overview (4)3 General Syntax (5)4 Data Content Type (5)5 Signed-data Content Type (6)5.1 SignedData Type (7)5.2 EncapsulatedContentInfo Type (8)5.3 SignerInfo Type (9)5.4 Message Digest Calculation Process (11)5.5 Message Signature Generation Process (12)5.6 Message Signature Verification Process (12)6 Enveloped-data Content Type (12)6.1 EnvelopedData Type (14)6.2 RecipientInfo Type (15)6.2.1 KeyTransRecipientInfo Type (16)6.2.2 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo Type (17)6.2.3 KEKRecipientInfo Type (19)6.3 Content-encryption Process (20)6.4 Key-encryption Process (20)7 Digested-data Content Type (21)8 Encrypted-data Content Type (22)9 Authenticated-data Content Type (23)9.1 AuthenticatedData Type (23)9.2 MAC Generation (25)9.3 MAC Verification (26)10 Useful Types (27)10.1 Algorithm Identifier Types (27)10.1.1 DigestAlgorithmIdentifier (27)10.1.2 SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier (27)10.1.3 KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier (28)10.1.4 ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier (28)10.1.5 MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm (28)10.2 Other Useful Types (28)10.2.1 CertificateRevocationLists (28)10.2.2 CertificateChoices (29)10.2.3 CertificateSet (29)10.2.4 IssuerAndSerialNumber (30)10.2.5 CMSVersion (30)10.2.6 UserKeyingMaterial (30)10.2.7 OtherKeyAttribute (30)Housley Standards Track [Page 2]11 Useful Attributes (31)11.1 Content Type (31)11.2 Message Digest (32)11.3 Signing Time (32)11.4 Countersignature (34)12 Supported Algorithms (35)12.1 Digest Algorithms (35)12.1.1 SHA-1 (35)12.1.2 MD5 (35)12.2 Signature Algorithms (36)12.2.1 DSA (36)12.2.2 RSA (36)12.3 Key Management Algorithms (36)12.3.1 Key Agreement Algorithms (36)12.3.1.1 X9.42 Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Hellman. 37 12.3.2 Key Transport Algorithms (38)12.3.2.1 RSA (39)12.3.3 Symmetric Key-Encryption Key Algorithms (39)12.3.3.1 Triple-DES Key Wrap (40)12.3.3.2 RC2 Key Wrap (41)12.4 Content Encryption Algorithms (41)12.4.1 Triple-DES CBC (42)12.4.2 RC2 CBC (42)12.5 Message Authentication Code Algorithms (42)12.5.1 HMAC with SHA-1 (43)12.6 Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrap Algorithms (43)12.6.1 Key Checksum (44)12.6.2 Triple-DES Key Wrap (44)12.6.3 Triple-DES Key Unwrap (44)12.6.4 RC2 Key Wrap (45)12.6.5 RC2 Key Unwrap (46)Appendix A: ASN.1 Module (47)References (55)Security Considerations (56)Acknowledgments (58)Author’s Address (59)Full Copyright Statement (60)Housley Standards Track [Page 3]1 IntroductionThis document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax. Thissyntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encryptarbitrary messages.The Cryptographic Message Syntax describes an encapsulation syntaxfor data protection. It supports digital signatures, messageauthentication codes, and encryption. The syntax allows multipleencapsulation, so one encapsulation envelope can be nested insideanother. Likewise, one party can digitally sign some previouslyencapsulated data. It also allows arbitrary attributes, such assigning time, to be signed along with the message content, andprovides for other attributes such as countersignatures to beassociated with a signature.The Cryptographic Message Syntax can support a variety ofarchitectures for certificate-based key management, such as the onedefined by the PKIX working group.The Cryptographic Message Syntax values are generated using ASN.1[X.208-88], using BER-encoding [X.209-88]. Values are typicallyrepresented as octet strings. While many systems are capable oftransmitting arbitrary octet strings reliably, it is well known that many electronic-mail systems are not. This document does not address mechanisms for encoding octet strings for reliable transmission insuch environments.2 General OverviewThe Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is general enough to supportmany different content types. This document defines one protectioncontent, ContentInfo. ContentInfo encapsulates a single identifiedcontent type, and the identified type may provide furtherencapsulation. This document defines six content types: data,signed-data, enveloped-data, digested-data, encrypted-data, andauthenticated-data. Additional content types can be defined outside this document.An implementation that conforms to this specification must implement the protection content, ContentInfo, and must implement the data,signed-data, and enveloped-data content types. The other contenttypes may be implemented if desired.As a general design philosophy, each content type permits single pass processing using indefinite-length Basic Encoding Rules (BER)encoding. Single-pass operation is especially helpful if content is large, stored on tapes, or is "piped" from another process. Single-Housley Standards Track [Page 4]pass operation has one significant drawback: it is difficult toperform encode operations using the Distinguished Encoding Rules(DER) [X.509-88] encoding in a single pass since the lengths of thevarious components may not be known in advance. However, signedattributes within the signed-data content type and authenticatedattributes within the authenticated-data content type require DERencoding. Signed attributes and authenticated attributes must betransmitted in DER form to ensure that recipients can verify acontent that contains one or more unrecognized attributes. Signedattributes and authenticated attributes are the only CMS data typesthat require DER encoding.3 General SyntaxThe Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) associates a content typeidentifier with a content. The syntax shall have ASN.1 typeContentInfo:ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {contentType ContentType,content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIERThe fields of ContentInfo have the following meanings:contentType indicates the type of the associated content. It isan object identifier; it is a unique string of integers assignedby an authority that defines the content type.content is the associated content. The type of content can bedetermined uniquely by contentType. Content types for data,signed-data, enveloped-data, digested-data, encrypted-data, andauthenticated-data are defined in this document. If additionalcontent types are defined in other documents, the ASN.1 typedefined should not be a CHOICE type.4 Data Content TypeThe following object identifier identifies the data content type:id-data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 1 }The data content type is intended to refer to arbitrary octetstrings, such as ASCII text files; the interpretation is left to the application. Such strings need not have any internal structure Housley Standards Track [Page 5](although they could have their own ASN.1 definition or otherstructure).The data content type is generally encapsulated in the signed-data,enveloped-data, digested-data, encrypted-data, or authenticated-data content type.5 Signed-data Content TypeThe signed-data content type consists of a content of any type andzero or more signature values. Any number of signers in parallel can sign any type of content.The typical application of the signed-data content type representsone signer’s digital signature on content of the data content type.Another typical application disseminates certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs).The process by which signed-data is constructed involves thefollowing steps:1. For each signer, a message digest, or hash value, is computed on the content with a signer-specific message-digest algorithm.If the signer is signing any information other than the content,the message digest of the content and the other information aredigested with the signer’s message digest algorithm (see Section5.4), and the result becomes the "message digest."2. For each signer, the message digest is digitally signed using the signer’s private key.3. For each signer, the signature value and other signer-specific information are collected into a SignerInfo value, as defined inSection 5.3. Certificates and CRLs for each signer, and those not corresponding to any signer, are collected in this step.4. The message digest algorithms for all the signers and theSignerInfo values for all the signers are collected together with the content into a SignedData value, as defined in Section 5.1.A recipient independently computes the message digest. This message digest and the signer’s public key are used to verify the signaturevalue. The signer’s public key is referenced either by an issuerdistinguished name along with an issuer-specific serial number or by a subject key identifier that uniquely identifies the certificatecontaining the public key. The signer’s certificate may be included in the SignedData certificates field.Housley Standards Track [Page 6]This section is divided into six parts. The first part describes the top-level type SignedData, the second part describesEncapsulatedContentInfo, the third part describes the per-signerinformation type SignerInfo, and the fourth, fifth, and sixth partsdescribe the message digest calculation, signature generation, andsignature verification processes, respectively.5.1 SignedData TypeThe following object identifier identifies the signed-data contenttype:id-signedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 2 }The signed-data content type shall have ASN.1 type SignedData:SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {version CMSVersion,digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL,signerInfos SignerInfos }DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifierSignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfoThe fields of type SignedData have the following meanings:version is the syntax version number. If no attributecertificates are present in the certificates field, theencapsulated content type is id-data, and all of the elements ofSignerInfos are version 1, then the value of version shall be 1.Alternatively, if attribute certificates are present, theencapsulated content type is other than id-data, or any of theelements of SignerInfos are version 3, then the value of versionshall be 3.digestAlgorithms is a collection of message digest algorithmidentifiers. There may be any number of elements in thecollection, including zero. Each element identifies the messagedigest algorithm, along with any associated parameters, used byone or more signer. The collection is intended to list themessage digest algorithms employed by all of the signers, in anyorder, to facilitate one-pass signature verification. The message digesting process is described in Section 5.4.Housley Standards Track [Page 7]encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a contenttype identifier and the content itself. Details of theEncapsulatedContentInfo type are discussed in section 5.2.certificates is a collection of certificates. It is intended that the set of certificates be sufficient to contain chains from arecognized "root" or "top-level certification authority" to all of the signers in the signerInfos field. There may be morecertificates than necessary, and there may be certificatessufficient to contain chains from two or more independent top-level certification authorities. There may also be fewercertificates than necessary, if it is expected that recipientshave an alternate means of obtaining necessary certificates (e.g., from a previous set of certificates). As discussed above, ifattribute certificates are present, then the value of versionshall be 3.crls is a collection of certificate revocation lists (CRLs). Itis intended that the set contain information sufficient todetermine whether or not the certificates in the certificatesfield are valid, but such correspondence is not necessary. There may be more CRLs than necessary, and there may also be fewer CRLs than necessary.signerInfos is a collection of per-signer information. There may be any number of elements in the collection, including zero. The details of the SignerInfo type are discussed in section 5.3.5.2 EncapsulatedContentInfo TypeThe content is represented in the type EncapsulatedContentInfo:EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {eContentType ContentType,eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIERThe fields of type EncapsulatedContentInfo have the followingmeanings:eContentType is an object identifier that uniquely specifies thecontent type.eContent is the content itself, carried as an octet string. TheeContent need not be DER encoded.Housley Standards Track [Page 8]The optional omission of the eContent within theEncapsulatedContentInfo field makes it possible to construct"external signatures." In the case of external signatures, thecontent being signed is absent from the EncapsulatedContentInfo value included in the signed-data content type. If the eContent valuewithin EncapsulatedContentInfo is absent, then the signatureValue is calculated and the eContentType is assigned as though the eContentvalue was present.In the degenerate case where there are no signers, theEncapsulatedContentInfo value being "signed" is irrelevant. In this case, the content type within the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being "signed" should be id-data (as defined in section 4), and the content field of the EncapsulatedContentInfo value should be omitted.5.3 SignerInfo TypePer-signer information is represented in the type SignerInfo:SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {version CMSVersion,sid SignerIdentifier,digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,signature SignatureValue,unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeUnsignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }AttributeValue ::= ANYSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRINGThe fields of type SignerInfo have the following meanings:version is the syntax version number. If the SignerIdentifier is the CHOICE issuerAndSerialNumber, then the version shall be 1. If Housley Standards Track [Page 9]the SignerIdentifier is subjectKeyIdentifier, then the versionshall be 3.sid specifies the signer’s certificate (and thereby the signer’spublic key). The signer’s public key is needed by the recipientto verify the signature. SignerIdentifier provides twoalternatives for specifying the signer’s public key. TheissuerAndSerialNumber alternative identifies the signer’scertificate by the issuer’s distinguished name and the certificate serial number; the subjectKeyIdentifier identifies the signer’scertificate by the X.509 subjectKeyIdentifier extension value.digestAlgorithm identifies the message digest algorithm, and anyassociated parameters, used by the signer. The message digest is computed on either the content being signed or the contenttogether with the signed attributes using the process described in section 5.4. The message digest algorithm should be among thoselisted in the digestAlgorithms field of the associated SignerData. signedAttributes is a collection of attributes that are signed.The field is optional, but it must be present if the content type of the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being signed is not id-data. Each SignedAttribute in the SET must be DER encoded. Usefulattribute types, such as signing time, are defined in Section 11. If the field is present, it must contain, at a minimum, thefollowing two attributes:A content-type attribute having as its value the content typeof the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being signed. Section11.1 defines the content-type attribute. The content-typeattribute is not required when used as part of acountersignature unsigned attribute as defined in section 11.4.A message-digest attribute, having as its value the messagedigest of the content. Section 11.2 defines the message-digest attribute.signatureAlgorithm identifies the signature algorithm, and anyassociated parameters, used by the signer to generate the digital signature.signature is the result of digital signature generation, using the message digest and the signer’s private key.unsignedAttributes is a collection of attributes that are notsigned. The field is optional. Useful attribute types, such ascountersignatures, are defined in Section 11.Housley Standards Track [Page 10]The fields of type SignedAttribute and UnsignedAttribute have thefollowing meanings:attrType indicates the type of attribute. It is an objectidentifier.attrValues is a set of values that comprise the attribute. Thetype of each value in the set can be determined uniquely byattrType.5.4 Message Digest Calculation ProcessThe message digest calculation process computes a message digest oneither the content being signed or the content together with thesigned attributes. In either case, the initial input to the message digest calculation process is the "value" of the encapsulated content being signed. Specifically, the initial input is theencapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING to which the signing processis applied. Only the octets comprising the value of the eContentOCTET STRING are input to the message digest algorithm, not the tagor the length octets.The result of the message digest calculation process depends onwhether the signedAttributes field is present. When the field isabsent, the result is just the message digest of the content asdescribed above. When the field is present, however, the result isthe message digest of the complete DER encoding of theSignedAttributes value contained in the signedAttributes field.Since the SignedAttributes value, when present, must contain thecontent type and the content message digest attributes, those values are indirectly included in the result. The content type attribute is not required when used as part of a countersignature unsignedattribute as defined in section 11.4. A separate encoding of thesignedAttributes field is performed for message digest calculation.The IMPLICIT [0] tag in the signedAttributes field is not used forthe DER encoding, rather an EXPLICIT SET OF tag is used. That is,the DER encoding of the SET OF tag, rather than of the IMPLICIT [0]tag, is to be included in the message digest calculation along withthe length and content octets of the SignedAttributes value.When the signedAttributes field is absent, then only the octetscomprising the value of the signedData encapContentInfo eContentOCTET STRING (e.g., the contents of a file) are input to the message digest calculation. This has the advantage that the length of thecontent being signed need not be known in advance of the signaturegeneration process.Housley Standards Track [Page 11]Although the encapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING tag and lengthoctets are not included in the message digest calculation, they arestill protected by other means. The length octets are protected bythe nature of the message digest algorithm since it iscomputationally infeasible to find any two distinct messages of anylength that have the same message digest.5.5 Message Signature Generation ProcessThe input to the signature generation process includes the result of the message digest calculation process and the signer’s private key. The details of the signature generation depend on the signaturealgorithm employed. The object identifier, along with anyparameters, that specifies the signature algorithm employed by thesigner is carried in the signatureAlgorithm field. The signaturevalue generated by the signer is encoded as an OCTET STRING andcarried in the signature field.5.6 Message Signature Verification ProcessThe input to the signature verification process includes the resultof the message digest calculation process and the signer’s publickey. The recipient may obtain the correct public key for the signer by any means, but the preferred method is from a certificate obtained from the SignedData certificates field. The selection and validation of the signer’s public key may be based on certification pathvalidation (see [PROFILE]) as well as other external context, but is beyond the scope of this document. The details of the signatureverification depend on the signature algorithm employed.The recipient may not rely on any message digest values computed bythe originator. If the signedData signerInfo includessignedAttributes, then the content message digest must be calculated as described in section 5.4. For the signature to be valid, themessage digest value calculated by the recipient must be the same as the value of the messageDigest attribute included in thesignedAttributes of the signedData signerInfo.6 Enveloped-data Content TypeThe enveloped-data content type consists of an encrypted content ofany type and encrypted content-encryption keys for one or morerecipients. The combination of the encrypted content and oneencrypted content-encryption key for a recipient is a "digitalenvelope" for that recipient. Any type of content can be envelopedfor an arbitrary number of recipients using any of the three keymanagement techniques for each recipient.Housley Standards Track [Page 12]The typical application of the enveloped-data content type willrepresent one or more recipients’ digital envelopes on content of the data or signed-data content types.Enveloped-data is constructed by the following steps:1. A content-encryption key for a particular content-encryptionalgorithm is generated at random.2. The content-encryption key is encrypted for each recipient.The details of this encryption depend on the key managementalgorithm used, but three general techniques are supported:key transport: the content-encryption key is encrypted in the recipient’s public key;key agreement: the recipient’s public key and the sender’sprivate key are used to generate a pairwise symmetric key, then the content-encryption key is encrypted in the pairwisesymmetric key; andsymmetric key-encryption keys: the content-encryption key isencrypted in a previously distributed symmetric key-encryption key.3. For each recipient, the encrypted content-encryption key andother recipient-specific information are collected into aRecipientInfo value, defined in Section 6.2.4. The content is encrypted with the content-encryption key.Content encryption may require that the content be padded to amultiple of some block size; see Section 6.3.5. The RecipientInfo values for all the recipients are collected together with the encrypted content to form an EnvelopedData value as defined in Section6.1.A recipient opens the digital envelope by decrypting one of theencrypted content-encryption keys and then decrypting the encryptedcontent with the recovered content-encryption key.This section is divided into four parts. The first part describesthe top-level type EnvelopedData, the second part describes the per- recipient information type RecipientInfo, and the third and fourthparts describe the content-encryption and key-encryption processes. Housley Standards Track [Page 13]6.1 EnvelopedData TypeThe following object identifier identifies the enveloped-data content type:id-envelopedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 3 }The enveloped-data content type shall have ASN.1 type EnvelopedData: EnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {version CMSVersion,originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,recipientInfos RecipientInfos,encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,unprotectedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnprotectedAttributes OPTIONAL }OriginatorInfo ::= SEQUENCE {certs [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL }RecipientInfos ::= SET OF RecipientInfoEncryptedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {contentType ContentType,contentEncryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT EncryptedContent OPTIONAL }EncryptedContent ::= OCTET STRINGUnprotectedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeThe fields of type EnvelopedData have the following meanings:version is the syntax version number. If originatorInfo ispresent, then version shall be 2. If any of the RecipientInfostructures included have a version other than 0, then the version shall be 2. If unprotectedAttrs is present, then version shall be 2. If originatorInfo is absent, all of the RecipientInfostructures are version 0, and unprotectedAttrs is absent, thenversion shall be 0.originatorInfo optionally provides information about theoriginator. It is present only if required by the key management algorithm. It may contain certificates and CRLs:certs is a collection of certificates. certs may containoriginator certificates associated with several different key Housley Standards Track [Page 14]management algorithms. certs may also contain attributecertificates associated with the originator. The certificates contained in certs are intended to be sufficient to make chains from a recognized "root" or "top-level certification authority" to all recipients. However, certs may contain morecertificates than necessary, and there may be certificatessufficient to make chains from two or more independent top-level certification authorities. Alternatively, certs maycontain fewer certificates than necessary, if it is expectedthat recipients have an alternate means of obtaining necessary certificates (e.g., from a previous set of certificates).crls is a collection of CRLs. It is intended that the setcontain information sufficient to determine whether or not the certificates in the certs field are valid, but suchcorrespondence is not necessary. There may be more CRLs thannecessary, and there may also be fewer CRLs than necessary.recipientInfos is a collection of per-recipient information.There must be at least one element in the collection.encryptedContentInfo is the encrypted content information.unprotectedAttrs is a collection of attributes that are notencrypted. The field is optional. Useful attribute types aredefined in Section 11.The fields of type EncryptedContentInfo have the following meanings: contentType indicates the type of content.contentEncryptionAlgorithm identifies the content-encryptionalgorithm, and any associated parameters, used to encrypt thecontent. The content-encryption process is described in Section6.3. The same content-encryption algorithm and content-encryption key is used for all recipients.encryptedContent is the result of encrypting the content. Thefield is optional, and if the field is not present, its intendedvalue must be supplied by other means.The recipientInfos field comes before the encryptedContentInfo field so that an EnvelopedData value may be processed in a single pass.6.2 RecipientInfo TypePer-recipient information is represented in the type RecipientInfo.RecipientInfo has a different format for the three key management Housley Standards Track [Page 15]。
RFC逻辑定律
RFC逻辑定律SAP 高级应用开发 - RFCRFC Remote function Call 远程功能调用, 是SAP系统之间以及非SAP系统之间程序通信的基本接口技术. 例如BAPI , ALE都是基于RFC实现的RFC连接类型:1.类型2: R/2连接2.类型3: ABAP连接或R/3连接,指定主机名和通信服务3.类型I:内部连接,与当前系统连接到同一ABAP系统中,预定义无法修改,与SM51中所显示的应用服务器名相同4.类型L:逻辑目标,通常工作流系统指定过程中配置的RFC目标即为该类型的逻辑目标5.类型X:指定安装了特殊的ABAP设备驱动程序的系统,必须制定ABAP设备驱动程序名6.类型S:通过SNA或APPC启动的外部程序连接7.类型M:通过CMC到ABAP系统的异步RFC连接8.类型T:通过TCP/IP并使用RFC库或SAP连接器的外部程序连接;分为启动(指定主机名、程序路径名)和注册(RFC服务器程序)两种连接模式。
9.类型G:定义外部系统到本地HTTP连接10.类型H:定义ABAP系统到本地的HTTP连接远程调用RFM:1.远程目标可以是文字或变量,其值为SAP系统中一直的远程目标系统。
2.若远程系统是当前系统中的SAP应用服务器,也可以直接指定应用服务器名称,则SM59中的I类型目标3.SM59定义的RFC目标是区分大小写的。
DESTINATION附加项中目标变量的值必须与其完全一致通过CALL FUNCTION语句进行远程功能调用时,可形成不同的调用模式:1. CALL FUNCTION DESTINATION 以同步RFC方式实现RFM 调用,若后面无其他附加项,则形成同步RFC调用,调用程序等待远程调用结果以继续执行2. CALL FUNCTION STARTING NEW TASK 以异步RFC方式实现RFM调用,调用程序不等待远程调用结果继续执行,结果将在回调子程序(callback subroutine)中接收3. CALL FUNCTION IN BACKROUND TASK 以事务性RFC方式实现RFM调用,远程功能暂不开始执行,等待COMMIT WORK 语句出现时,一次性执行一个或多个远程功能远程功能调用时,仅允许通过值传递参数,不能进行引用传递,因为在RFC过程中,可以传递参数,并返回结果,但不能改变调用程序的上下文对表类型参数,在本地普通功能调用中默认为引用传递,不需要创建内表的本地副本,但RFC不支持引用传递机制,将进行隐式的值传递调用,必须在RFC客户和RFC服务器之间交换整个表,只传输实际表格,如果没有指定表参数,则在被调用功能中使用空表RFC 创建连接类型时:1.LOAD BALANCING选择NO:指定TARGET HOST,SYSTEM NUMBER2. LOAD BALANCING选择YES,要指定TARGET SYSTEM (SM51),MESSAGE SERVER(RZ03),GROUP(SMLG)除去SM59定义的远程目标之外,SAP提供两个预定义目标,可以再CALL FUNCTION 语句的DESTINATION附加附件中使用:l目标NONE,将运行当前程序的应用服务器作为目标系统,调用过程将通过RFC接口实现,并拥有RFC上下文,应用于任意调用类型l目标BACK,用于被远程调用的RFM内部的CALL FUNCTION 语句中的目标制定,通过已建立的RFC连接反过来调用该模块的调用者或已载入的其他功能模块SAP ABAP 系统间的RFC实现(通过RFM实现)远程调用RFM:1.远程目标可以是文字或变量,其值为SAP系统中一直的远程目标系统。
3GPP协议导读
V0.0.2 徐莉
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4 与CN相关的 3GPP协议介绍..............................................................................10
4.1 21 SERIES....................................................................................................... 10 4.2 22 SERIES....................................................................................................... 10 4.3 23 SERIES........................................................................................................11 4.4 24SERIES........................................................................................................ 13 4.5 25 SERIES....................................................................................................... 14 4.6 26 SERIES....................................................................................................... 15 4.7 29 SERIES....................................................................................................... 16 4.8 32 SERIES....................................................................................................... 19 4.9 33 SERIES....................................................................................................... 27 4.10 35 SERIES....................................................................................................... 28 4.11 41 SERIES....................................................................................................... 29 4.12 42 SERIES....................................................................................................... 29 4.13 43 SERIES....................................................................................................... 30 4.14 44 SERIES....................................................................................................... 31 4.15 48 SERIES....................................................................................................... 31 4.16 49 SERIES....................................................................................................... 33 4.17 52 SERIES....................................................................................................... 33 4.18 补充业务相关协议...................................................................................... 33
(完整word版)TCPIP答案
1-1 你认为在因特网的发展过程中,哪几件事对其发展起到了非常重要的作用?1—2 什么是数字地球?数字地球是按地理空间位置,以极高的分辨率(1米左右)对大地进行选点抽样,将抽样点上的自然资源信息,社会资源信息作为该点的属性输入到计算机中,然后对这些信息进行统筹安排,抽样分析和逻辑组合,最终为决策者提供服务。
虚拟现实技术是实现数字地球的关键技术之一.1-3 中国国内第一个被IETF认可的RFC文档是什么文档?1-4 与因特网相关的机构IAB、IETF、IRTF、ISOC、InterNIC、ICANN、W3C的主要工作分别是什么?1—5 RFC文档有哪几种可能的状态?各种状态的含义是什么?RFC文档共有8种状态。
3个状态属于标准化轨迹,3个状态属于非标准化轨迹,2个状态为其他状态。
(1)标准化轨迹由3个成熟级构成,由低到高分别为提案标准、草案标准和标准。
提案标准经过了深入的审查过程,收到多组织关注并认为有价值。
但在成为因特网标准之前,还可能有很大变化. (2)非标准轨迹分为实验性的规范,信息性的规范,历史性的规范。
实验性规范是研究和开发工作的归档记录。
信息性的规范并不表示得到了英特网组织的推荐和认可,是一些因特网组织以外的协议组织和提供者提出的未纳入因特网标准的规范可以以这种规范发布。
历史性的规范已经被更新的规范所取代.(3)其他状态。
有一些RFC文档专门用于对因特网组织机构商议结果进行标准化,为当前最佳实现BCP。
还有一些RFC文档未被分类,其状态被标记为未知性(UNKNOWN),如因特网早起RFC 文档。
2-1 网络协议的对等实体之间是如何进行通信的?2—2 协议分层有什么好处?网络协议的分层有利于将复杂的问题分解成多个简单的问题,从而分而治之;分层有利于网络的互联,进行协议转换时可能只涉及某一个或几个层次而不是所有层次;分层可以屏蔽下层的变化,新的底层技术的引入,不会对上层的应用协议产生影响。
early media RFC 3960中文版
2. SIP的会话建立
在介绍两种早期媒体模型之前,我们先简要的总结一下SIP中是如何建立会话的。让我们把早期媒体和SIP固有的features分开.(例如在200(ok)之前播放媒体来避免媒体剪裁)
SIP是通过offer/answer 模式来协商会话参数的。 一个用户agent 提供者,准备绘画的描述,叫offer.另一个用户agent,回复者,回复另一个会话描述叫做answer. 这样的双两个之间的向握手来协商用于媒体交换的媒体参数.
假如UAC从不同的UAS收到早期媒体,它将会显示给用户。 假如早期媒体有语音,那么在同一时间播放不用的语音流给用户,将会混淆。另一方面,不用的媒体形式(例如:视频)可以在用一时间展现给用户。 例如UAC可以创建马赛克用不同的input。
然而,即使不同的媒体类型可以在同一时间展现给用户,假如UAC的带宽有限制,它将不能同时收到从不同用户来的不同的早期媒体。因此,很多时候,UAC需要选择一个单一的早期媒体会话, 然后mute(静音)它们发出update 请求。
然而,有时SIP回复在任何媒体包之前到达UAC。有一种情况就是UAS尝试发送早期媒体但是不能立即发送。例如,UAs在交换媒体之前,需要用交互式链接建立(ICE)可能需要很多次UDP协议的交换遍历通过NAT(STUN)消息。再这样的情况下,一个早期媒体标识可以让UAC在这期间不产生本地铃音。然而,当早期媒体没有到达UAC,用户不会知道对方正在振铃,即使180ringing被收到了。因此,一个播放本地铃音是个很好的解决方法,知道早期媒体报文从UAS发到UAC。这样的解决办法不需要早期媒体标识。
.\Sound\default\Ringing.wav
真正的实现甚至需要看媒体报文里面的消息,因为它们可能只带了无声或者舒适噪音。
rfc9334远程证明标准
rfc9334远程证明标准
摘要:
1.远程证明标准的背景和重要性
2.rfc9334 远程证明标准的具体内容
3.rfc9334 标准在网络安全领域的应用
4.我国对rfc9334 远程证明标准的采纳和实施
5.总结与展望
正文:
远程证明标准是网络安全领域中一个至关重要的组成部分,它为远程身份验证提供了统一的规范和指导。
其中,rfc9334 远程证明标准是当前被广泛接受和应用的一种标准。
rfc9334 远程证明标准是由IETF(互联网工程任务组)制定的,于2016 年发布。
该标准定义了一种通用的、可扩展的远程证明协议,用于在网络设备之间进行身份验证和授权。
具体来说,rfc9334 标准定义了一种名为“TLS 远程证明”的协议,该协议基于传输层安全(TLS)协议,可以提供强加密、数据完整性和认证服务。
在网络安全领域,rfc9334 远程证明标准被广泛应用于各种场景,如服务器认证、客户端认证、网络设备认证等。
通过使用该标准,可以有效降低网络攻击的风险,提高网络安全性。
我国对rfc9334 远程证明标准的采纳和实施也在逐步推进。
我国相关政府部门和标准化组织已经积极参与到rfc9334 标准的制定和完善过程中,并在我
国网络安全法规和标准中提出明确要求,鼓励和指导国内企业采用rfc9334 标准。
总之,rfc9334 远程证明标准为网络安全领域提供了重要支持。
随着网络攻击手段的不断升级,远程证明标准将发挥越来越重要的作用。
iso20000信息安全管理体系
iso20000信息安全管理体系摘要:1.初始化客户端ID 的定义2.初始化客户端ID 的作用3.初始化客户端ID 的实现方式4.初始化客户端ID 的注意事项正文:在计算机科学中,初始化客户端ID(initializeclientid)是一种常见的操作,它的主要目的是在程序或系统中为每个客户端分配一个唯一的标识符。
这个标识符通常是一个数字或字符串,它可以用来区分不同的客户端,从而实现对客户端的精确管理和控制。
初始化客户端ID 的作用主要体现在以下几个方面:首先,它可以帮助程序或系统识别不同的客户端,从而实现对客户端的个性化服务。
例如,在一个网络应用中,通过初始化客户端ID,服务器可以识别出不同的客户端,并为其提供不同的服务内容。
其次,初始化客户端ID 可以帮助程序或系统跟踪客户端的操作记录,从而提高服务质量和用户体验。
例如,在一个电商平台中,通过初始化客户端ID,服务器可以记录每个客户端的购物记录,并为其提供个性化的推荐服务。
初始化客户端ID 的实现方式有很多,常见的方法包括:1.使用随机数生成器生成一个随机数,作为客户端ID。
这种方法简单易行,但生成的ID 可能不唯一。
2.使用客户的个人信息(如用户名、邮箱等)作为客户端ID。
这种方法可以保证ID 的唯一性,但可能会涉及到客户的隐私问题。
3.使用第三方提供的客户端ID 生成服务。
这种方法可以保证ID 的唯一性和安全性,但需要支付一定的费用。
在初始化客户端ID 时,需要注意以下几点:1.客户端ID 必须唯一,不能出现重复的情况。
2.客户端ID 的生成过程应该具有一定的随机性,以减少冲突的概率。
3.客户端ID 的存储和传输应该具有一定的安全性,以防止被非法获取或篡改。
上传CRS脚本到信息库失败-缺少LDAP服务器磁盘空间
上传CRS脚本到信息库失败-缺少LDAP服务器磁盘空间ContentsIntroductionPrerequisitesRequirementsComponents UsedConventions问题解决方案UCCX 7.x :疏忽加载自定义java.jar文件解决方案UCCX 7.0 :错误,当加载新脚本时解决方案 1解决方案 2Related InformationIntroduction本文描述原因为什么加载用户响应解决方案(CRS)脚本到贮藏库失效Cisco Unified Contact Center Express (UCCX)环境。
PrerequisitesRequirements本文档的读者应掌握以下这些主题的相关知识:Cisco Unified通信管理器qCisco Unified Contact Center ExpressqComponents Used本文档中的信息基于以下软件和硬件版本:Cisco Unified通信管理器qCisco Unified Contact Center Express 3.x/4.x/5.x/6.x/7.xqThe information in this document was created from the devices in a specific lab environment.All of the devices used in this document started with a cleared (default) configuration.If your network islive, make sure that you understand the potential impact of any command.Conventions有关文档规则的详细信息,请参阅 Cisco 技术提示规则。
问题当CRS脚本不能加载到贮藏库时,有三种症状:修改一个特定脚本,顺利地被保存,并且被验证,但是装载对贮藏库的此脚本失效与此错误信息:error while uploading the scriptq 此错误信息出现于JVM日志:javax.naming.OperationNotSupportedException: [LDAP: error code53 - The LDAP server is unwilling to perform that operation]; remainingname 'cn=Cs.aef'Note: 上述错误信息在多条线路显示由于空间限制。
应用AAA模版限制访问
应用AAA模版限制访问
佚名
【期刊名称】《网络安全和信息化》
【年(卷),期】2017(000)006
【摘要】AAA是认证(Authentication)、授权(Authorization)、计费(Accounting)的缩写,如何安全、有效而可靠地保护网络资源的合理使用和用户的利益,成为所有网络服务提供商必须要解决的问题。
从A服务就是针对这个问题,为网络运营商提供一个对用户进行有效管理的平台。
【总页数】3页(P123-125)
【正文语种】中文
【中图分类】TP393
【相关文献】
1.基于AAA服务器策略的企业网动态安全访问的实现 [J], 彭亚发;洪晓峰
2.安全网络访问的三种方法:使用ISA Server 2004限制应用程序的网络访问 [J], Debra; Littlejohn; Shinder; Thomas; W.Shinder; 高斌(译)
3.使用SRP的隐藏安全级别来保护你的桌面安全:使用软件限制策略和受限制的访问令牌,你无需拦截关键应用程序就可以把恶意代码拒之门外 [J], Russell Smith; 黄思维(译者)
4.IPTV AAA访问量异常情况与处理对策研究 [J], 秦国华;李良
5.IPTV AAA访问量异常情况与处理对策研究 [J], 秦国华;李良
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Network Working Group Y. Bernet Request for Comments: 3290 Microsoft Category: Informational S. Blake Ericsson D. Grossman Motorola A. Smith Harbour Networks May 2002 An Informal Management Model for Diffserv RoutersStatus of this MemoThis memo provides information for the Internet community. It doesnot specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of thismemo is unlimited.Copyright NoticeCopyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.AbstractThis document proposes an informal management model of Differentiated Services (Diffserv) routers for use in their management andconfiguration. This model defines functional datapath elements(e.g., classifiers, meters, actions, marking, absolute dropping,counting, multiplexing), algorithmic droppers, queues and schedulers. It describes possible configuration parameters for these elements and how they might be interconnected to realize the range of trafficconditioning and per-hop behavior (PHB) functionalities described in the Diffserv Architecture.Table of Contents1 Introduction (3)2 Glossary (4)3 Conceptual Model (7)3.1 Components of a Diffserv Router (7)3.1.1 Datapath (7)3.1.2 Configuration and Management Interface (9)3.1.3 Optional QoS Agent Module (10)3.2 Diffserv Functions at Ingress and Egress (10)3.3 Shaping and Policing (12)3.4 Hierarchical View of the Model (12)4 Classifiers (13)Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 1]4.1 Definition (13)4.1.1 Filters (15)4.1.2 Overlapping Filters (15)4.2 Examples (16)4.2.1 Behavior Aggregate (BA) Classifier (16)4.2.2 Multi-Field (MF) Classifier (17)4.2.3 Free-form Classifier (17)4.2.4 Other Possible Classifiers (18)5 Meters (19)5.1 Examples (20)5.1.1 Average Rate Meter (20)5.1.2 Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) Meter (21)5.1.3 Two-Parameter Token Bucket Meter (21)5.1.4 Multi-Stage Token Bucket Meter (22)5.1.5 Null Meter (23)6 Action Elements (23)6.1 DSCP Marker (24)6.2 Absolute Dropper (24)6.3 Multiplexor (25)6.4 Counter (25)6.5 Null Action (25)7 Queuing Elements (25)7.1 Queuing Model (26)7.1.1 FIFO Queue (27)7.1.2 Scheduler (28)7.1.3 Algorithmic Dropper (30)7.2 Sharing load among traffic streams using queuing (33)7.2.1 Load Sharing (34)7.2.2 Traffic Priority (35)8 Traffic Conditioning Blocks (TCBs) (35)8.1 TCB (36)8.1.1 Building blocks for Queuing (37)8.2 An Example TCB (37)8.3 An Example TCB to Support Multiple Customers (42)8.4 TCBs Supporting Microflow-based Services (44)8.5 Cascaded TCBs (47)9 Security Considerations (47)10 Acknowledgments (47)11 References (47)Appendix A. Discussion of Token Buckets and Leaky Buckets (50)Authors’ Addresses (55)Full Copyright Statement (56)Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 2]1. IntroductionDifferentiated Services (Diffserv) [DSARCH] is a set of technologies which allow network service providers to offer services withdifferent kinds of network quality-of-service (QoS) objectives todifferent customers and their traffic streams. This document usesterminology defined in [DSARCH] and [NEWTERMS] (some of thesedefinitions are included here in Section 2 for completeness).The premise of Diffserv networks is that routers within the core ofthe network handle packets in different traffic streams by forwarding them using different per-hop behaviors (PHBs). The PHB to be applied is indicated by a Diffserv codepoint (DSCP) in the IP header of each packet [DSFIELD]. The DSCP markings are applied either by a trusted upstream node, e.g., a customer, or by the edge routers on entry tothe Diffserv network.The advantage of such a scheme is that many traffic streams can beaggregated to one of a small number of behavior aggregates (BA),which are each forwarded using the same PHB at the router, therebysimplifying the processing and associated storage. In addition,there is no signaling other than what is carried in the DSCP of each packet, and no other related processing that is required in the core of the Diffserv network since QoS is invoked on a packet-by-packetbasis.The Diffserv architecture enables a variety of possible serviceswhich could be deployed in a network. These services are reflectedto customers at the edges of the Diffserv network in the form of aService Level Specification (SLS - see [NEWTERMS]). Whilst furtherdiscussion of such services is outside the scope of this document(see [PDBDEF]), the ability to provide these services depends on the availability of cohesive management and configuration tools that can be used to provision and monitor a set of Diffserv routers in acoordinated manner. To facilitate the development of suchconfiguration and management tools it is helpful to define aconceptual model of a Diffserv router that abstracts awayimplementation details of particular Diffserv routers from theparameters of interest for configuration and management. The purpose of this document is to define such a model.The basic forwarding functionality of a Diffserv router is defined in other specifications; e.g., [DSARCH, DSFIELD, AF-PHB, EF-PHB].This document is not intended in any way to constrain or to dictatethe implementation alternatives of Diffserv routers. It is expected that router implementers will demonstrate a great deal of variability in their implementations. To the extent that implementers are able Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 3]to model their implementations using the abstractions described inthis document, configuration and management tools will more readilybe able to configure and manage networks incorporating Diffservrouters of assorted origins.This model is intended to be abstract and capable of representing the configuration parameters important to Diffserv functionality for avariety of specific router implementations. It is not intended as a guide to system implementation nor as a formal modeling description. This model serves as the rationale for the design of an SNMP MIB[DSMIB] and for other configuration interfaces (e.g., other policy-management protocols) and, possibly, more detailed formal models(e.g., [QOSDEVMOD]): these should all be consistent with this model. o Section 3 starts by describing the basic high-level blocks of aDiffserv router. It explains the concepts used in the model,including the hierarchical management model for these blocks which uses low-level functional datapath elements such as Classifiers,Actions, Queues.o Section 4 describes Classifier elements.o Section 5 discusses Meter elements.o Section 6 discusses Action elements.o Section 7 discusses the basic queuing elements of AlgorithmicDroppers, Queues, and Schedulers and their functional behaviors(e.g., traffic shaping).o Section 8 shows how the low-level elements can be combined tobuild modules called Traffic Conditioning Blocks (TCBs) which are useful for management purposes.o Section 9 discusses security concerns.o Appendix A contains a brief discussion of the token bucket andleaky bucket algorithms used in this model and some of thepractical effects of the use of token buckets within the Diffserv architecture.2. GlossaryThis document uses terminology which is defined in [DSARCH]. Thereis also current work-in-progress on this terminology in the IETF and some of the definitions provided here are taken from that work. Some Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 4]of the terms from these other references are defined again here inorder to provide additional detail, along with some new termsspecific to this document.Absolute A functional datapath element which simply discards all Dropper packets arriving at its input.Algorithmic A functional datapath element which selectivelyDropper discards packets that arrive at its input, based on adiscarding algorithm. It has one data input and oneoutput.Classifier A functional datapath element which consists of filters that select matching and non-matching packets. Basedon this selection, packets are forwarded along theappropriate datapath within the router. A classifier, therefore, splits a single incoming traffic stream into multiple outgoing streams.Counter A functional datapath element which updates a packetcounter and also an octet counter for everypacket that passes through it.Datapath A conceptual path taken by packets with particularcharacteristics through a Diffserv router. Decisionsas to the path taken by a packet are made by functional datapath elements such as Classifiers and Meters.Filter A set of wildcard, prefix, masked, range and/or exactmatch conditions on the content of a packet’sheaders or other data, and/or on implicit or derivedattributes associated with the packet. A filter issaid to match only if each condition is satisfied.Functional A basic building block of the conceptual router.Datapath Typical elements are Classifiers, Meters, Actions,Element Algorithmic Droppers, Queues and Schedulers.Multiplexer A multiplexor.(Mux)Multiplexor A functional datapath element that merges multiple(Mux) traffic streams (datapaths) into a single trafficstream (datapath).Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 5]conserving services packets no sooner than a scheduled departuretime, even if this means leaving packets queuedwhile the output (e.g., a network link or connectionto the next element) is idle.Policing The process of comparing the arrival of data packetsagainst a temporal profile and forwarding, delayingor dropping them so as to make the output streamconformant to the profile.Queuing A combination of functional datapath elementsBlock that modulates the transmission of packets belongingto a traffic streams and determines theirordering, possibly storing them temporarily ordiscarding them.Scheduling An algorithm which determines which queue of a setalgorithm of queues to service next. This may be based on therelative priority of the queues, on a weighted fairbandwidth sharing policy or some other policy. Suchan algorithm may be either work-conserving or non-work-conserving.Service-Level A set of parameters and their values which togetherSpecification define the treatment offered to a traffic stream by a(SLS) Diffserv domain.Shaping The process of delaying packets within a traffic stream to cause it to conform to some defined temporalprofile. Shaping can be implemented using a queueserviced by a non-work-conserving scheduling algorithm. Traffic A logical datapath entity consisting of a number ofConditioning functional datapath elements interconnected inBlock (TCB) such a way as to perform a specific set of trafficconditioning functions on an incoming traffic stream.A TCB can be thought of as an entity with oneinput and one or more outputs and a set of controlparameters.Traffic A set of parameters and their values which togetherConditioning specify a set of classifier rules and a trafficSpecification profile. A TCS is an integral element of a SLS.(TCS)Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 6]conserving services a packet, if one is available, at everytransmission opportunity.3. Conceptual ModelThis section introduces a block diagram of a Diffserv router anddescribes the various components illustrated in Figure 1. Note that a Diffserv core router is likely to require only a subset of thesecomponents: the model presented here is intended to cover the case of both Diffserv edge and core routers.3.1. Components of a Diffserv RouterThe conceptual model includes abstract definitions for the following: o Traffic Classification elements.o Metering functions.o Actions of Marking, Absolute Dropping, Counting, andMultiplexing.o Queuing elements, including capabilities of algorithmicdropping and scheduling.o Certain combinations of the above functional datapath elements into higher-level blocks known as Traffic Conditioning Blocks(TCBs).The components and combinations of components described in thisdocument form building blocks that need to be manageable by Diffserv configuration and management tools. One of the goals of thisdocument is to show how a model of a Diffserv device can be builtusing these component blocks. This model is in the form of aconnected directed acyclic graph (DAG) of functional datapathelements that describes the traffic conditioning and queuingbehaviors that any particular packet will experience when forwardedto the Diffserv router. Figure 1 illustrates the major functionalblocks of a Diffserv router.3.1.1. DatapathAn ingress interface, routing core, and egress interface areillustrated at the center of the diagram. In actual routerimplementations, there may be an arbitrary number of ingress andegress interfaces interconnected by the routing core. The routingcore element serves as an abstraction of a router’s normal routing Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 7]and switching functionality. The routing core moves packets between interfaces according to policies outside the scope of Diffserv (note: it is possible that such policies for output-interface selectionmight involve use of packet fields such as the DSCP but this isoutside the scope of this model). The actual queuing delay andpacket loss behavior of a specific router’s switchingfabric/backplane is not modeled by the routing core; these should be modeled using the functional datapath elements described later. The routing core of this model can be thought of as an infinitebandwidth, zero-delay interconnect between interfaces - propertieslike the behavior of the core when overloaded need to be reflectedback into the queuing elements that are modeled around it (e.g., when too much traffic is directed across the core at an egress interface), the excess must either be dropped or queued somewhere: the elementsperforming these functions must be modeled on one of the interfacesinvolved.The components of interest at the ingress to and egress frominterfaces are the functional datapath elements (e.g., Classifiers,Queuing elements) that support Diffserv traffic conditioning andper-hop behaviors [DSARCH]. These are the fundamental componentscomprising a Diffserv router and are the focal point of this model. Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 8]+---------------+| Diffserv |Mgmt | configuration |<----+-->| & management |------------------+SNMP,| | interface | |COPS | +---------------+ |etc. | | || | || v v| +-------------+ +-------------+| | ingress i/f | +---------+ | egress i/f |-------->| classify, |-->| routing |-->| classify, |---->data | | meter, | | core | | meter |data outin | | action, | +---------+ | action, || | queuing | | queuing || +-------------+ +-------------+| ^ ^| | || | || +------------+ |+-->| QOS agent | |-------->| (optional) |---------------------+QOS |(e.g., RSVP)|cntl +------------+msgsFigure 1: Diffserv Router Major Functional Blocks3.1.2. Configuration and Management InterfaceDiffserv operating parameters are monitored and provisioned throughthis interface. Monitored parameters include statistics regardingtraffic carried at various Diffserv service levels. These statistics may be important for accounting purposes and/or for trackingcompliance to Traffic Conditioning Specifications (TCSs) negotiatedwith customers. Provisioned parameters are primarily the TCSparameters for Classifiers and Meters and the associated PHBconfiguration parameters for Actions and Queuing elements. Thenetwork administrator interacts with the Diffserv configuration andmanagement interface via one or more management protocols, such asSNMP or COPS, or through other router configuration tools such asserial terminal or telnet consoles.Specific policy rules and goals governing the Diffserv behavior of a router are presumed to be installed by policy management mechanisms. However, Diffserv routers are always subject to implementation limits Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 9]which scope the kinds of policies which can be successfullyimplemented by the router. External reporting of such implementation capabilities is considered out of scope for this document.3.1.3. Optional QoS Agent ModuleDiffserv routers may snoop or participate in either per-microflow or per-flow-aggregate signaling of QoS requirements [E2E] (e.g., usingthe RSVP protocol). Snooping of RSVP messages may be used, forexample, to learn how to classify traffic without actuallyparticipating as a RSVP protocol peer. Diffserv routers may rejector admit RSVP reservation requests to provide a means of admissioncontrol to Diffserv-based services or they may use these requests to trigger provisioning changes for a flow-aggregation in the Diffservnetwork. A flow-aggregation in this context might be equivalent to a Diffserv BA or it may be more fine-grained, relying on a multi-field (MF) classifier [DSARCH]. Note that the conceptual model of such arouter implements the Integrated Services Model as described in[INTSERV], applying the control plane controls to the data classified and conditioned in the data plane, as described in [E2E].Note that a QoS Agent component of a Diffserv router, if present,might be active only in the control plane and not in the data plane. In this scenario, RSVP could be used merely to signal reservationstate without installing any actual reservations in the data plane of the Diffserv router: the data plane could still act purely onDiffserv DSCPs and provide PHBs for handling data traffic without the normal per-microflow handling expected to support some Intservservices.3.2. Diffserv Functions at Ingress and EgressThis document focuses on the Diffserv-specific components of therouter. Figure 2 shows a high-level view of ingress and egressinterfaces of a router. The diagram illustrates two Diffserv router interfaces, each having a set of ingress and a set of egresselements. It shows classification, metering, action and queuingfunctions which might be instantiated at each interface’s ingress and egress.The simple diagram of Figure 2 assumes that the set of Diffservfunctions to be carried out on traffic on a given interface areindependent of those functions on all other interfaces. There aresome architectures where Diffserv functions may be shared amongstmultiple interfaces (e.g., processor and buffering resources thathandle multiple interfaces on the same line card before forwardingacross a routing core). The model presented in this document may be easily extended to handle such cases; however, this topic is not Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 10]treated further here as it leads to excessive complexity in theexplanation of the concepts.Interface A Interface B+-------------+ +---------+ +-------------+| ingress: | | | | egress: || classify, | | | | classify, |--->| meter, |---->| |---->| meter, |--->| action, | | | | action, || queuing | | routing | | queuing |+-------------+ | core | +-------------+| egress: | | | | ingress: || classify, | | | | classify, |<---| meter, |<----| |<----| meter, |<---| action, | | | | action, || queuing | +---------+ | queuing |+-------------+ +-------------+Figure 2. Traffic Conditioning and Queuing ElementsIn principle, if one were to construct a network entirely out oftwo-port routers (connected by LANs or similar media), then it might be necessary for each router to perform four QoS control functions in the datapath on traffic in each direction:- Classify each message according to some set of rules, possiblyjust a "match everything" rule.- If necessary, determine whether the data stream the message ispart of is within or outside its rate by metering the stream.- Perform a set of resulting actions, including applying a droppolicy appropriate to the classification and queue in question and perhaps additionally marking the traffic with a DifferentiatedServices Code Point (DSCP) [DSFIELD].- Enqueue the traffic for output in the appropriate queue. Thescheduling of output from this queue may lead to shaping of thetraffic or may simply cause it to be forwarded with some minimumrate or maximum latency assurance.If the network is now built out of N-port routers, the expectedbehavior of the network should be identical. Therefore, this modelmust provide for essentially the same set of functions at the ingress as on the egress of a router’s interfaces. The one point ofdifference in the model between ingress and the egress is that alltraffic at the egress of an interface is queued, while traffic at the ingress to an interface is likely to be queued only for shaping Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 11]purposes, if at all. Therefore, equivalent functional datapathelements may be modeled at both the ingress to and egress from aninterface.Note that it is not mandatory that each of these functional datapath elements be implemented at both ingress and egress; equally, themodel allows that multiple sets of these elements may be placed inseries and/or in parallel at ingress or at egress. The arrangementof elements is dependent on the service requirements on a particular interface on a particular router. By modeling these elements at both ingress and egress, it is not implied that they must be implementedin this way in a specific router. For example, a router mayimplement all shaping and PHB queuing at the interface egress or may instead implement it only at the ingress. Furthermore, theclassification needed to map a packet to an egress queue (if present) need not be implemented at the egress but instead might beimplemented at the ingress, with the packet passed through therouting core with in-band control information to allow for egressqueue selection.Specifically, some interfaces will be at the outer "edge" and somewill be towards the "core" of the Diffserv domain. It is to beexpected (from the general principles guiding the motivation ofDiffserv) that "edge" interfaces, or at least the routers thatcontain them, will implement more complexity and require moreconfiguration than those in the core although this is obviously not a requirement.3.3. Shaping and PolicingDiffserv nodes may apply shaping, policing and/or marking to traffic streams that exceed the bounds of their TCS in order to prevent onetraffic stream from seizing more than its share of resources from aDiffserv network. In this model, Shaping, sometimes considered as a TC action, is treated as a function of queuing elements - see section 7. Algorithmic Dropping techniques (e.g., RED) are similarly treated since they are often closely associated with queues. Policing ismodeled as either a concatenation of a Meter with an Absolute Dropper or as a concatenation of an Algorithmic Dropper with a Scheduler.These elements will discard packets which exceed the TCS.3.4. Hierarchical View of the ModelFrom a device-level configuration management perspective, thefollowing hierarchy exists:Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 12]At the lowest level considered here, there are individualfunctional datapath elements, each with their own configurationparameters and management counters and flags.At the next level, the network administrator manages groupings of these functional datapath elements interconnected in a DAG. These functional datapath elements are organized in self-contained TCBs which are used to implement some desired network policy (seeSection 8). One or more TCBs may be instantiated at eachinterface’s ingress or egress; they may be connected in seriesand/or in parallel configurations on the multiple outputs of apreceding TCB. A TCB can be thought of as a "black box" with one input and one or more outputs (in the data path). Each interface may have a different TCB configuration and each direction (ingress or egress) may too.At the topmost level considered here, the network administratormanages interfaces. Each interface has ingress and egressfunctionality, with each of these expressed as one or more TCBs.This level of the hierarchy is what was illustrated in Figure 2.Further levels may be built on top of this hierarchy, in particularones for aiding in the repetitive configuration tasks likely forrouters with many interfaces: some such "template" tools for Diffserv routers are outside the scope of this model but are under study byother working groups within IETF.4. Classifiers4.1. DefinitionClassification is performed by a classifier element. Classifiers are 1:N (fan-out) devices: they take a single traffic stream as input and generate N logically separate traffic streams as output. Classifiers are parameterized by filters and output streams. Packets from theinput stream are sorted into various output streams by filters which match the contents of the packet or possibly match other attributesassociated with the packet. Various types of classifiers usingdifferent filters are described in the following sections. Figure 3 illustrates a classifier, where the outputs connect to succeedingfunctional datapath elements.The simplest possible Classifier element is one that matches allpackets that are applied at its input. In this case, the Classifier element is just a no-op and may be omitted.Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 13]Note that we allow a Multiplexor (see Section 6.5) before theClassifier to allow input from multiple traffic streams. Forexample, if traffic streams originating from multiple ingressinterfaces feed through a single Classifier then the interface number could be one of the packet classification keys used by theClassifier. This optimization may be important for scalability inthe management plane. Classifiers may also be cascaded in sequenceto perform more complex lookup operations whilst still maintainingsuch scalability.Another example of a packet attribute could be an integerrepresenting the BGP community string associated with the packet’sbest-matching route. Other contextual information may also be usedby a Classifier (e.g., knowledge that a particular interface faces a Diffserv domain or a legacy IP TOS domain [DSARCH] could be used when determining whether a DSCP is present or not).unclassified classifiedtraffic traffic+------------+| |--> match Filter1 --> OutputA------->| classifier |--> match Filter2 --> OutputB| |--> no match --> OutputC+------------+Figure 3. An Example ClassifierThe following BA classifier separates traffic into one of threeoutput streams based on matching filters:Filter Matched Output Stream-------------- ---------------Filter1 AFilter2 Bno match CWhere the filters are defined to be the following BA filters([DSARCH], Section 4.2.1):Filter DSCP------ ------Filter1 101010Filter2 111111Filter3 ****** (wildcard)Bernet, et. al. Informational [Page 14]。