语用学 讲义4

Lecture on pragmatics (4) Theory of Implicature1. Some basic notions1) In the study of meaning, it is the analysis of meaning in use, context and intention that issalient.2) Grice's analysis is usually considered important and useful because of two reasons:•It shows a close relationship between the notion of meaning and the notion of intention.•It captures something essential to speaking a language.In speaking a language, the speaker attempts to communicate things to his hearer by getting the hearer to recognize his intention to communicate just those things.3) Intention is crucial in signs or words that mean something non-naturally, but not everythingintended by the speaker has a non-natural meaning.4) The important point made by Grice is the theory of implicature which focuses on the distinctionbetween what is said and what is implicated.5) The Cooperative Principle is very common not only in verbal communication but also in almostall human interactions, and it is followed reasonably, not compulsorily.6) Generally, conversational implicatures can be divided into two "kinds: Generalized andParticularized.7) Conversational implicatures possess the features of cancellability, non-detachability,calculability, non-conventionality and indeterminacy.2. Meaning and IntentionMeaning plays a very important role in pragmatics, and conversational impticature is based on the analysis of meaning. So it is necessary to discuss meaning before illustrating the theory of conversational implicature.2.1 View of MeaningIn talking about meaning, we are faced with the problem of reference, a major concern in the meaning theory.The referential theory claims that every sentence is a combination of words, and each word stands for an object. The meaning of the word is the object the word refers to. So language, at this point, has its contact with the real world. However, this theory leaves much to be desired.For example,(1) The King of China is wise.(2) The morning star is the Evening Star.Such a theory becomes useless when faced with such sentences. Sentence (1) seems to have no reference, for China is no longer a monarchy, and therefore the sentence is meaningless in this sense.Sentence (2), with the two nouns having the same reference, turns out to be uninformative as well.To solve such a meaning problem, Strawson (1950) suggested that we should makes a distinction between a sentence and the use of a sentence, an expression and the use of an expression. According to him,Sentence (1) remains informative and has its reference as a sentence, but when it is used by different people on different occasions, it can be true or false.Sentence (2) may seem to be uninformative to us in this world, but reportedly it was a great discovery in early Babylonian astronomy.Strawson (1950) pointed out:"We cannot talk of the sentence being true or false, but only of its being used to make a true or false assertion, or (if this is preferred) to express a true or false proposition."Stevenson (1963) proposes that there are two kinds of meanings:Descriptive or Conventional meaningPsychological or Pragmatic meaning.The former does not carry the individual will and attitude while the latter is dependent on the intention and feeling of the speaker and hearer. For example:This philosophical argument over meaning finally leads us to Grice's analysis of meaning and intention. In speaking a language, the speaker attempts to communicate things to his hearer by getting the hearer to recognize the speaker's intention to communicate just those things.2.2 Analysis of Meaning and IntentionGrice (in "Meaning", 1957) proposes his analysis of meaning in more or less the following way:A meant something by X = A intended the utterance of X to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention.An utterance is held to intend to convey what is normally conveyed (or normally intended to be conveyed), and we require a good reason for accepting that a particular use diverges from the general usage.Based on this analysis Grice develops his remarkable theory of conversational implicatures.The analysis reveals that:a) In communication what one expression P' means may not be closely connected with the actual intention of the expression,b) What is intended by the speaker may be divergent from the hearer's comprehension of the expression.So we cannot be sure that one utterance has its exact meaning in a natural sense and nothingmore; certainly a speaker can mean exactly what the utterance says in its propositional content.3. The Notion of Conversational ImplicatureGrice put forward the theory of conversational implicature in the William James Lectures at Harvard University in 1967. This notion is "one of the single most important ideas in pragmatics" (Levinson, 1983). It is noticeable for two contributions:a) conversational implicatures can help us understand and find satisfactory explanationsconcerning some difficult linguistic phenomena.b) the general conversational principles have some effects on the language, i.e. the formation ofcertain grammatical structures depends on context and intention.All of this cannot be explained by the single theory of semantics, so a gap exists between the semantic content and the pragmatic inference. Conversational implicatures bridge this gap. The theory can account for how the non-literal meaning is conveyed. It allows one to claim "that natural language expressions do tend to have simple, stable and unitary senses (in many cases anyway), but that this stable semantic core often has an unstable, context-specific pragmatic overlay--namely, a set of implicatures.“(Levinson, 1983:99)The important point made by Grice (1975) regarding the theory of implicature is the distinction between what is said and what is implicated. By what is said, it is meant that with some knowledge of the English language, the speaker produces a standard grammatical sentence and this sentence, without any consideration of circumstantial factors, can be understood properly according to its conventional meaning.Here the speaker means exactly what is carried in the expression. By what is implied, it is meant that with factors of context and participants the expression used here can carry more meaning than that conventionally assigned to the expression.Implicature has given rise to more stress on pragmatic components like what are the preceding remarks, and what mutual knowledge was shared by the participants.4. Cooperative PrincipleGrice (1975) defines this principle as follows:Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.In communication events, what is spoken is a set of closely connected sentences rather than some isolated sentences.These sentences in general follow what has been said and done before. Usually the present sentence or utterance is connected with the preceding remark but sometimes it may refer to the goalsor directions set initially at the beginning of the whole conversation.The Cooperative Principle is followed reasonably, not compulsorily.As Grice points out, if someone cares about the goals or directions set by the participant in a conversation or general transaction like the neighbor in the above example, he will be expected to have an interest in the matter and participate in further actions. when the girl’s neighbor asks a question and thus shows his interest, he then is expected to help.The common interest in a communication is very important.If one side in a conversation lacks interest, but the communication continues, then the other side will be misled.Conclusion:Making inferences and taking responsibility for creating them are a normal required part of language use.Though people do not have to make inferences in every verbal exchange, inferences are still indispensable from the language. Without inferences there could hardly be humor and metaphorical uses.4.2 Conversational MaximsIn discussing the Cooperative Principle, Grice subdivides this general principle into more detailed and explicit maxims: Quantity , Quality , Relation and Manner.Quantity Maxim:1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange).2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.Quality Maxim:Try to make your contribution one that is true:l) Do not say what you believe to be false.2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.Relation Maxim:Be relevant.Manner Maxim:Be perspicuous:1) Avoid obscurity of expression.2) Avoid ambiguity.3) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).4) Be orderly.Those maxims are said to be observed by participants in all speech communities incommunicative events, but the ways to observe them are different from speech community to speech community.In one speech community, for example, people would consider the manner maxim to be more important than the other maxims.Whenever they speak, they produce complete and clear sentences, but whether the utterances are true and informative is secondary to the manner in which they are spoken.In another speech community on the other hand, the quality maxim is of primary importance. When people participate in a verbal exchange, they will say what they believe to be true and with adequate evidence, but the question of whether the utterances are grammatical or complete is of secondary consideration.Keenen (1976)points out: "Differences between societies, if there are any, are more likely to be differences in specification of domains in which the maxim is expected to hold and differences in the degree to which members are expected to conform to this maxim."Grice (1975) lists four possible situations where the cooperative principle can be violated:1) The speaker may violate the Cooperative Principle deliberately but without making the hearer realize it. In this case, the speaker is most likely to mislead the hearer. For example, when someone is telling a lie, he violates the Quality Maxim by saying untrue things. But if the hearer does not realize this and assumes that the speaker follows the Cooperative Principle, he will be misled.2) The speaker may avoid cooperation in an explicit way by telling the hearer that he is unwilling to cooperate. If someone asks a question, the hearer can say that he doesn't want to answer, or he cannot say any more.3) The speaker may face a dilemma. On the one hand, he wants to hold the quality maxim the present stage requires, while on the other hand, there is a possibility that other maxims will be violated if the quality maxim is held. There is a clash here.4) The speaker may deliberately violate one of the maxims or fail to fulfill it. But this is different from the first case in that the speaker assumes that the hearer knows he intends to do something, and the hearer still regards him being cooperative in observing the general Cooperative Principle. The hearer knows that the speaker is not trying to mislead him.In the first case, the speaker does not observe the Cooperative Principle and he does not tell or indicate to the other participants that he is being uncooperative or less cooperative. He may say something untrue, or lack adequate evidence or be less informative than required, just like Tom and Peter in the earlier example. Peter quietly violates the maxim of "Being as informative as is required at the present stage", so Tom is misled.In the second case, the speaker makes it explicit that he is not cooperative at the moment. Here no misunderstanding will take place. In this case, it is impossible that a conversational implicature will be generated.In the third case, the speaker faces a dilemmaThe 4th case is what can most likely generate conversational implicatures. The speaker, on the whole, observes the Cooperative Principle, but he fails to fulfill certain maxims or he deliberately fails to do so in order to generate a conversational implicature.What is said by the speaker differs from what is implicated. But there is no reason to say that he is not cooperative. He merely exploits some sub-maxims.In other words, when the verbal exchange does not follow the direction set initially, the hearer realizes the changes and finds the contrary of what the speaker actually says. Other meanings have been conceived in other deeper levels.The general cooperative principle is being adhered to in another way. So long as the hearer assumes that the speaker is cooperative, he will go on trying to find the most appropriate meaning to the seemingly untrue, irrelevant utterances by the speaker.This process is called "Default interpretation" by G. Leech (1983).Some improvements on CPMartinich(1980,1984)pointed out that Quantity is too narrowly formulated: it deals only with what is said and not with what is implied and consequently it needs to be revised.The Maxim of Quality (provisional version)(1) Do not say, or imply, what you believe to be false.(2) Do not say, or imply, that for which you lack adequate evidence.This reformulation takes us one step forward. Another step is provided by the recognition that the revised Maxim still applies only to those speech acts in which the speaker tries to say how the world is; to statements, assertions and the like. It is necessary to design the Maxims such that they cover a broader range of speech-act types.The Maxim of Quality (final version):Do not participate in any speech act unless you believe that the conditions for its successful and non-defective performance are satisfied.The Maxim of RelationBe relevant;more specifically(1) Make your contribution one that indicates, or at least does not conceal, the direction in which the conversation is moving.(2) Express yourself in terms that will enable your hearer to tie your contribution into the conversational context.Compare:Grice was not very satisfied with his original formulation of relation:“Though the maxim itself is terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good deal; questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them in later work (Grice, 1989:27).The Maxim of MannerMake your contribution in the manner best suited to the speech act you intend to perform and to the purpose of the conversation in which you are participating.(1) Avoid obscurity of expression.(2) Avoid ambiguity.(3) Be brief.4) Be orderly.Obviously, in the model made by Martinich, speech and activity types is emphasized. In other words, it aims to accommodate a broader range of speech-act types. (cf. Levinson, 1979) The avoidance of obscurity, ambiguity and prolixity is of secondary or minor importance. The telling of jokes and the use of puns are cases in point.Horn’s revisionHorn holds: "Grice's original framework is clearly at best incomplete and at worst inadequate beyond repair to the task of predicting sets of nonlogical inferences which are actually drawn from a given utterance in a given context” (Horn:1988:130)In his view, Gricean maxims can be replaced by two fundamental and antithetical principles: the Q(uantity)-principle, corresponding, approximately, to the first maxim of Quantity, and the Relation-principle, corresponding, again approximately, to the second maxim of Quantity, the maxim of Relation, "and possibly all the manner maxims" .The Q-PrincipleMake your contribution sufficient: Say as much as you can (given R).The R-PrincipleMake your contribution necessary: Say no more than you must (given Q).According to Horn, the whole Gricean mechanism for pragmatic inference can be derived from the dialectic interaction between the Q- and R-principles in the following way:The Division of Pragmatic LabourThe use of a marked (relatively complex and/or prolix) expression when a corresponding unmarked (simpler, less "effortful") alternative expression is available tends to be interpreted as conveying a marked message (one which the unmarked alternative would not or could not have conveyed. ) In other words, the R-principle generally takes precedence until the use of a contrastive linguistic form induces a Q-implicature to the non-applicability of the pertinent R-implicature.Levinson’s revisionIn Levinson's view, Horn has conflated an important distinction between(i) semantic minimisation(ii) expression minimisation.By (i), it is meant that semantically general expressions are preferred to semantically specific expressions,by (ii) it is meant that "shorter" expressions are preferred to "longer" ones. In the Division of Pragmatic Labour, the Q-Principle operates both in terms of units of speech production and in terms of semantic informativeness: "Horn gives no indication that he even recognizes the equivocation over these two rather different senses of reduction or minimization, and he certainly doesn't explicitly connect them".According to Levinson, we should separate the pragmatic principle(s) governing the surface form of an utterance from the pragmatic principle(s) governing its informational content.He argues for the following mechanism which relies upon the distinction between what each principle enjoins the speaker to do and what it licenses the addressee to think:The Q-Principlea) Speaker's maxim:Do not provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, unless providing a stronger statement would contravene the I-Principle.b) Recipient's corollary:Take it that the speaker made the strongest statement consistent with what he or she knows.The I-Principlea) Speaker's maxim: The Maxim of Minimisation.Say as little as necessary. That is, produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your communicational ends (bearing the Q-Principle in mind).b)Recipient's corollary: The Maxim of Enrichment.Amplify the informational content of the speaker's utterance, by finding the most specific interpretation, up to what you judge to be the speaker's intended point.Specifically(a) assume that stereotypical relations obtain between referents or events, unless (i)-that is inconsistent with what has been taken for granted, or (ii) the speaker has broken the Maxim of Minimisation by choosing a prolix expression;(b) assume the existence or actuality of what a sentence is "about" if that is consistent with what is taken for granted;(c) avoid interpretations that multiply entities referred to; specifically, prefer co-referential readings of reduced noun phrases.The M-Principlea) Speaker's maxim:Do not use a prolix, obscure or marked expression without reason.b) Recipient's corollary:If the speaker used a prolix or marked expression, he or she did not mean the same as he or she would have had he or she used the unmarked expression -- specifically, he or she was trying to avoid the stereotypical associations and I-implicatures of the unmarked expression5. Generalized and Particularized ImplicaturesGenerally, conversational implicatures can be divided into two kinds: Generalized and Particularized.5.1 Generalized ImplicaturesGrice (1975) points out that generalized and conventional implicatures are very similar and examples of conventional implicatures alone are rather rare. For the sake of convenience, we will lump them together.Generalized implicature is obtained by assuming that the speaker is observing the conversational maxims and his uttering of the prior sentence will generally carry some implicatures.The Quantity Maxim can also generate generalized implicatures. When one makes a statement, this statement is the strongest and most informative, if we assume the speaker follows the conversational maxims.The Manner Maxim has a complicated nature and some aspects are similar to the study of rhetoric.5.2 Particularized ImplicaturesThese implicatures are generated in a conversation by overtly and deliberately violating some sub-maxims for communicative purposes.They are inferences dependent on particular time, place, and people. The speaker in this situation follows the general Cooperative Principle, but he violates some sub-maxims.The following is a set of factors which have to be analyzed if we want to work out the implicature:1) The conventional meaning of the utterance, i.e., thepropositional content. This is the first step, for, if we don't know what these meanings are, the utterance is only a series of sounds not much different from the sounds in nature.2) The Cooperative Principle and sub-maxims.3) The context. This may include time, place, people, attitude and evaluation of the world.4) The mutual understanding of the participants, what has been said and what is expected to follow.5) All these things must be accessible to the participants in the conversation.With all these conditions satisfied, there comes a general pattern of working out a conversational implicature:1) The speaker has said something P, by considering the present situation the hearer cannot find any reason to treat the speaker as being uncooperative or not following the general principle.2) The speaker cannot be thought of as being so unless he actually means something Q.3) The speaker knows that the hearer is aware that the supposition that the speaker actually means Q is required.4) The speaker intends the hearer to think Q as well, or at least the speaker is willing to allow the hearer to think Q.So the speaker, by producing the utterance P has implicated the proposition Q.6. Special Features of Implicatures1) CancellabilityConversational implicatures are a set of inferences somewhat like those inferences in an induction and deduction process in logic. In a deduction process, from two premises we can get a smaller inference.Conversational implicatures belong to the latter type of inference. They can be cancelled by adding one more clause to them. If one says "Bill has four books", with the Quantity Maxim in mind we can get the implicature "Bill has only four books and no more". But if we add "perhaps five or more" to the sentence, the implicature is cancelled without making it contradictory..Sometimes without any additional clauses, the conversational implicature can be cancelled. "It may be contextually cancelled, if the form of utterance that usually carries it is used in a context that makes it clear that the speaker is opting out"(Grice, 1975: 57).2) Non-detachabilityConversational implicatures are generated from the semantic content by assuming the Cooperative Principle. So they are attached to the content rather than to the form, or in other words, it is not possible to get rid of the implicatures by substituting words with synonyms.In certain contexts, if one expression has given rise to the conversational implicature, then no matter what other synonymous forms are used, the implicature will be shared by all these synonymous forms.3) CalculabilityThis means that for every conversational implicature, it is possible to make an argument like that given by Grice in the earlier discussion on the process of generating implicature. With "the literal meaning or the sense of the utterance on the one hand, and the Cooperative Principle and the maxims on the other, it follows that an addressee would make the inference in question to preserve the assumption of cooperation."4) Non-conventionalitySince the conversational implicature is worked out from the literal meaning in terms of the Cooperative Principle and maxims, and the sentence meaning is already known before the implicature is worked out, the implicature cannot be part of the literal meaning. The literal meaning remains the same in all contexts, but conversational implicamres will vary or be lost as the context changes.5) IndeterminacyThis refers to the fact that an expression with a single meaning can produce different implicatures as the contexts and participants vary.11。