高管薪酬分散公司治理与企业绩效【外文翻译】
企业社会责任绩效、国有制与高管薪酬外文文献翻译
文献信息
文献标题：Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, State Ownership and Executive Compensation: Empirical Evidence from China（企业社会责任绩效、国有制与高管薪酬：来自中国的经验证据）
文献作者及出处：Rauf A, Amin K, Saleem Z. Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, State Ownership and Executive Compensation: Empirical Evidence from China[J]. Global Social Sciences Review, 2019, 4(1): 61-76.
字数统计：英文3857单词，21619字符；中文7067汉字
外文文献
Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, State Ownership and Executive Compensation: Empirical Evidence from China Abstract This analysis focus corporate social responsibility and executive compensation in China and also tests the relationship between state possession and executive compensation in presence of CSR. The estimated results confirm our hypotheses true in the selected sample of 2011 to 2014 of China. The firms with high CSR performances positively moderate the previously negative or no relationship between state-ownership and executive compensation. Application of 2SLS and GMM guaranteed the robustness of the results to potential endogeneities.
上市公司高管薪酬与公司绩效的实证研究外文翻译
文献出处：
Asia Pacific Journal of Management volume 36, pages1111–1164(2019)
原文：
Interactive effects of executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance: Evidence from an Asian market
Abstract：
Much of the management compensation literature focuses either on the level and structure of executives’ pay or the pay-for-performance sensitivity in a set of corporate governance structure in the Western economies. In this study, we examine the interactive effect of executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in different institutional and governance settings of an emerging market economy. Capturing monitoring and incentive alignment aspects as suggested in agency theory, we argue that in a markedly different executive compensation system in Thailand, the interrelationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance would exhibit some similarities to those found in developed economies. While there remains sparse research on how these relationships operate in Thailand, using data for 432 publicly listed Thai firms between 2000 and 2011, we find evidence of a reciprocal positive significant relationship between compensation and performance, as well as between corporate governance and performance. However, a reciprocal relationship is not found between corporate governance and compensation, which shows a mono-directional positive significant relationship running from corporate governance to compensation. These findings show similarities with those of developed economies and provide support for the need for an effective governance system to determine optimal executive compensation that will enhance firm performance and value. Our findings thus add some potentially noteworthy dimensions to the compensation literature that are especially important to policy makers and other stakeholders, and aiming to shape an optimal governance system in the emerging markets around the world.
财务管理毕业论文外文文献及翻译
LNTU Acc
公司治理与高管薪酬：一个应急框架
总体概述
通过整合组织和体制的理论，本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。我们提出了一个框架,审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应.我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响,像“软法律”和“硬法律"。
在过去的20年里，世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构，包括很大一部分的股权激励。因此，高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。正如Bruce,Buck,和Main指出，“近年来，关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌.”
关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门，当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。根据理论基础，早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。
这个文献假设，股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发,公司将更有效率的运作，表现得更好。公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述，以及这一框架的核心前提是，股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好.因此，经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为,股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制，包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。正如Jensen 和Murphy观察，“代理理论预测补偿政策将会以满足代理人的期望效用为主要目标。股东的目标是使财富最大化；因此代理成本理论指出，总裁的薪酬政策将取决于股东财富的变化。”影响积极组织结果的主要指标是付费业绩敏感性，但是这种“封闭系统"法主要是在英美的代理基础文献中找到，假定经理人激励与绩效之间存在普遍的联系，很少的关注在公司被嵌入的不同背景。除了相当大的研究工作，对这些因果关系的实证结果的好坏并没有定论。举例来说,实证研究与股票激励在财务表现方面的分析相符并未能证明重要的影响.在最近批判的代理理论，Aguilera，Filatotchev，Gospel和Jackson指出其“情境化”的性质,因此它无法准确地比较和解释企业的多样性在不同的组织和体制环境的治理
上市企业经营绩效与高管薪酬激励研究外文文献翻译
上市企业经营绩效与⾼管薪酬激励研究外⽂⽂献翻译
⽂献出处: Firth M. The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensation incentive [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015，12（5）41-51.
原⽂
The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensation
incentive
Firth M
Abstract
Executive compensation problems is the result of modern enterprise ownership and control separated, target inconsistency exists between the owners and executives, the problem such as asymmetric information, the complexity and uncertainty of modern enterprise operation is exacerbated by the seriousness of this problem, and through the contract signed with executive compensation performance, design and implement a good compensation plan can effectively solve the above problems. In today's knowledge economy, the competition between enterprises is actually the competition between talents, executives, especially excellent executives has become the core of enterprise resources, in view of the particularity of human capital of executives, executives how to effectively motivate, attract and promote the interests of the enterprise has become the key to enterprise development, and executive pay is playing such a role.
薪酬管理外文文献翻译
The existence of an agency problem in a corporation due to the separation of ownership and control has been widely studied in literatures. This paper examines the effects of management compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions. This paper is significant because it helps to understand the relationship between them. This understandings allow the design of an optimal management compensation scheme to induce the manager to act towards the goals and best interests of the company. Grossman and Hart (1983) investigate the principal agency problem. Since the actions of the agent are unobservable and the first best course of actions can not be achieved, Grossman and Hart show that optimal management compensation scheme should be adopted to induce the manager to choose the second best course of actions. Besides management compensation schemes, other means to alleviate the agency problems are also explored. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest two ways for reducing the agency problem: competitive market mechanisms and direct contractual provisions. Manne (1965) argues that a market mechanism such as the threat of a takeover provided by the market can be used for corporate control. "Ex-post settling up" by the managerial labour market can also discipline managers and induce them to pursue the interests of shareholders. Fama (1980) shows that if managerial labour markets function properly, and if the deviation of the firm's actual performance from stockholders' optimum is settled up in managers' compensation, then the agency cost will be fully borne by the agent (manager).
薪酬管理外文文献翻译
薪酬管理外文文献翻译
The existence of an agency problem in a corporation due to the separation of ownership and control has been widely studied in literatures. This paper examines the effects of management compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions. This paper is significant because it helps to understand the relationship between them. This understandings allow the design of an optimal management compensation scheme to induce the manager to act towards the goals and best interests of the company. Grossman and Hart (1983) investigate the principal agency problem. Since the actions of the agent are unobservable and the first best course of actions can not be achieved, Grossman and Hart show that optimal management compensation scheme should be adopted to induce the manager to choose the second best course of actions. Besides management compensation schemes, other means to alleviate the agency problems are also explored. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest two ways for reducing the agency problem: competitive market mechanisms and direct contractual provisions. Manne (1965) argues that a market mechanism such as the threat of a takeover provided by the market can be used for corporate control. "Ex-post settling up" by the managerial labour market can also discipline managers and induce them to pursue the interests of shareholders. Fama (1980) shows that if managerial labour markets function properly, and if the deviation of the firm's actual performance
管理层薪酬对公司绩效的研究【外文翻译】
外文翻译
原文
Salary affect how performance
Material Source：Executive Compensation; 2010/2011 Supplement, Author：Modern
Health The SEC has amended its disclosure rules to require, among other matters, a discussion about a company’s compensation policies and pra ctices for all employees if they create risks that are “reasonably likely” to have a material adverse effect on the company, taking into account program features and other factors that mitigate or counteract such risks.
The SEC referred in adopting the amendments, indicates that the “reasonably likely” is higher than “possible” but lower than “more likely than not.”
That said, a conclusion that the disclosure trigger is not met necessarily rests on an assessment of the balance of risk and reward implied by the company’s compensation program design and incentives, taken as a whole. As with many SEC rules in the post-SOX era, process will be key. A predicate for analyzing the disclosure question will be an inventory and review of the operation of compensation programs for all employees, which should be undertaken promptly in light of the effective date of the rules.
外文翻译--董事会结构,高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例
本科毕业论文（设计）
外文翻译
原文二：
Board Composition, Executive Remuneration,And Corporate
Performance: The Case Of Reits
Introduction
Stockholders in modern corporations are the residual risk bearers. As they don't have the expertise to run their firms, stockholders must rely on the firm'smanagement team. Jensen and Ruback (1983) defined the management team as the top managers as well as the board of directors of the firm. The separation between ownership and control in the modern corporation creates the incentives for managers to pursue their self-interest goals and not to maximize the shareholders’ wealth in what is termed in the literature as the agency conflict.
绩效报酬与对高层管理的激励【外文翻译】
绩效报酬与对高层管理的激励【外文翻译】
外文翻译
原文
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives.
Material Source: EBSCO Author: Michael C· Jensen The conflict of interest between shareholders of a publicly owned corporation and the corporation’s chief executive officer (CEO)is a classic example of a principal-agent problem. If shareholders had complete information regarding the CEO’s activities and the firm’s investment opportunities, they could design a contract specifying and enforcing the managerial action to be taken in each state of the world. Managerial actions and investment opportunities are not, however, perfectly observable by shareholders; indeed ,shareholders do not often know what actions the CEO can take or which of these actions will increase shareholder wealth. In these situations, agency theory predicts that compensation policy will be designed to give the manager incentives to select and implement actions that increase shareholder wealth.
高管薪酬状况外文文献翻译中英文
外文文献翻译
(含：英文原文及中文译文)
文献出处：Y azan Damiri; The State of Executive Compensation[D]; University of Tennessee-Knoxville ; 5-2006
英文原文
The State of Executive Compensation
Y azan Damiri
University of Tennessee-Knoxville
Companies use different methods to compensate executives. An ideal compensation package aligns executive incentives with shareholder interests to minimize agency problems. These methods often include a combination of: salary, bonus, stock options, stock grants, and pensions. Since the use of stock options has recently been a subject of great controversy, they will be discussed in greater detail since corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom have been linked to stock option grants (Hall-Murphy). However, the first component of compensation that will be discussed is one that the average employee can relate to-salary.
薪酬管理外文文献翻译
The existence of an agency problem in a corporation due to the separation of ownership and control has been widely studied in literatures. This paper examines the effects of management compensation schemes on corporate investment decisions. This paper is significant because it helps to understand the relationship between them. This understandings allow the design of an optimal management compensation scheme to induce the manager to act towards the goals and best interests of the company. Grossman and Hart (1983) investigate the principal agency problem. Since the actions of the agent are unobservable and the first best course of actions can not be achieved, Grossman and Hart show that optimal management compensation scheme should be adopted to induce the manager to choose the second best course of actions. Besides management compensation schemes, other means to alleviate the agency problems are also explored. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest two ways for reducing the agency problem: competitive market mechanisms and direct contractual provisions. Manne (1965) argues that a market mechanism such as the threat of a takeover provided by the market can be used for corporate control. "Ex-post settling up" by the managerial labour market can also discipline managers and induce them to pursue the interests of shareholders. Fama (1980) shows that if managerial labour markets function properly, and if the deviation of the firm's actual performance from stockholders' optimum is settled up in managers' compensation, then the agency cost will be fully borne by the agent (manager).
我国上市公司高管薪酬与绩效关系实证研究的外文翻译
文献出处:
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 362)
原文：
An Empirical Study of Relationship Between Executive Compensation and Performances of Chinese Listed Company—Based on Simultaneous Equations Model
Abstract：
As a potentially important internal incentive, the executive compensation has gradually become a research focus. Based on simultaneous equations model and principal component analysis, this paper studies the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China’s manufacturing listed companies from 2009 to 2012, we find that the improved corporate performance can advance executive compensation. At the same time, we also find executive compensation has positive feedback effect to company performance. The paper also sees that the company’s equity incentive has the potency to improve the effectiveness of the performance. This result offers insights to shareholders focused on enhancing the design of internal corporate governance mechanism.
公司治理外文文献及翻译 精品
附录A
公司治理与高管薪酬：一个应急框架
总体概述
通过整合组织和体制的理论，本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。我们提出了一个框架，审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应。我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响，像“软法律”和“硬法律”。
在过去的20年里，世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构，包括很大一部分的股权激励。因此，高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。正如Bruce，Buck，和Main指出，“近年来，关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌。”
关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门，当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。根据理论基础，早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。
这个文献假设，股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发，公司将更有效率的运作，表现得更好。公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述，以及这一框架的核心前提是，股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好。因此，经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为，股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制，包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。正如Jensen 和Murphy观察，“代理理论预测补偿政策将会以满足代理人的期望效用为主要目标。股东的目标是使财富最大化；因此代理成本理论指出，总裁的薪酬政策将取决于股东财富的变化。”影响积极组织结果的主要指标是付费业绩敏感性，但是这种“封闭系统”法主要是在英美的代理基础文献中找到，假定经理人激励与绩效之间存在普遍的联系，很少的关注在公司被嵌入的不同背景。除了相当大的研究工作，对这些因果关系的实证结果的好坏并没有定论。举例来说，实证研究与股票激励在财务表现方面的分析相符并未能证明重要的影响。在最近批判的代理理论，Aguilera，Filatotchev，Gospel和Jackson 指出其“情境化”的性质，因此它无法准确地比较和解释企业的多样性在不同的组织和体
高管薪酬分散,公司治理,与企业绩效【外文翻译】
高管薪酬分散,公司治理,与企业绩效【外文翻译】
中文3623字
外文翻译
原文：
Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm
performance
Executive compensation has been a central research topic in economics and business during the past two decades, recently gaining impetus in the wake of corporate scandals that have exposed significant vulnerabilities in corporate governance and the subsequent far reaching regulatory changes (Sarbanes–Oxley). Prior research into executive compensation has primarily focused on issues related to the level and structural mix of compensation packages, and their sensitivity to firm performance (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Yermack 1995; Baber et al. 1996; Hall and Liebman 1998; Core et al. 1999; Murphy 1999; Bryan et al. 2000). Early compensation studies focused on the CEO, subsequently expanding the scope to the compensation of the entire managerial team. Thus, for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) report that managers with divisional responsibilities have lower pay–performance sensitivities than do managers with broad oversight authority, who in turn have lower pay–performance sensitivities than does the CEO, concluding that pay–performance sensitivity increases with the span of authority. Similarly, Barron and Waddell (2003) examine the characteristics of compensation packages of the five highest paid executives and find that higher rank managers have a greater proportion of
高管薪酬和激励外文翻译(可编辑)
高管薪酬和激励外文翻译
外文题目Executive Compensation And Incentives 外文出处 Acodemy of Management Perspectives,20062:p25-40 外文作者 Martin J. Conyon
原文:
Executive Compensation And Incentives
Martin J. Conyon
Executive compensation is a complex and controversial subject. For many years, academics, policymakers, and the media have drawn attention to the high levels of pay awarded to U.S. chief executive officers CEOs, questioning whether they are consistent with shareholder interests. Some academics have further argued that flaws in CEO pay arrangements and deviations from shareholders’ interests are widespread and considerable. For example, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried provide a lucid account of the managerial power view and accompanying evidence. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan too provide an analysis of the ‘skimming view’ of CEO pay. In contrast, John Core et al. present an economic contracting approach to executive pay and incentives, assessing whether CEOs receive inefficient pay without performance. In this paper, we show what has happened to CEO pay in the United States. We do not claim to distinguish
财务管理毕业论文外文文献及翻译
财务管理毕业论文外文文献及翻译核准通过，归档资料。
未经允许，请勿外传～
LNTU Acc
公司治理与高管薪酬:一个应急框架
总体概述
通过整合组织和体制的理论，本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。我们提出了一个框架，审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应。我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响，像“软法律”和“硬法律”。
在过去的20年里，世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构，包括很大一部分的股权激励。因此，高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。正如Bruce，Buck，和Main指出，“近年来，关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌。”
关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门，当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。根据理论基础，早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。
这个文献假设，股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发，公司将更有效率的运作，表现得更好。公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述，以及这一框
架的核心前提是，股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好。因此，经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为，股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制，包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。正如Jensen 和Murphy观察，“代理理论预
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本科毕业论文（设计）
外文翻译
原文：
Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm
performance
Executive compensation has been a central research topic in economics and business during the past two decades, recently gaining impetus in the wake of corporate scandals that have exposed significant vulnerabilities in corporate governance and the subsequent far reaching regulatory changes (Sarbanes–Oxley). Prior research into executive compensation has primarily focused on issues related to the level and structural mix of compensation packages, and their sensitivity to firm performance (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Yermack 1995; Baber et al. 1996; Hall and Liebman 1998; Core et al. 1999; Murphy 1999; Bryan et al. 2000). Early compensation studies focused on the CEO, subsequently expanding the scope to the compensation of the entire managerial team. Thus, for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) report that managers with divisional responsibilities have lower pay–performance sensitivities than do managers with broad oversight authority, who in turn have lower pay–performance sensitivities than does the CEO, concluding that pay–performance sensitivity increases with the span of authority. Similarly, Barron and Waddell (2003) examine the characteristics of compensation packages of the five highest paid executives and find that higher rank managers have a greater proportion of incentive-based compensation in pay packages than do lower ranked executives.
The issue of pay dispersion across managerial team members has received conceptual attention by labor economists and organization theorists, yet scant empirical research has been performed to date. In this study, we investigate empirically the effect of managerial compensation dispersion on firm performance.
We draw on two competing models—the tournament theory and equity fairness arguments—to formulate our hypotheses: Tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen,1981) views the advancement of executives in the corporate hierarchy as a tournament in which individuals compete for promotion and rewards. High-performing executives with considerable managerial potential win promotion and commensurate compensation. A large spread of compensation across corporate hierarchical levels attracts talented and venturesome participants to compete in the managerial tournament, providing extra incentives to exert effort. The winners’ talent and the extra effort exerted will, according to the tournament model, translate to high firm performance.
The empirical evidence on the tournament theory is rather limited and results are mixed. Supporting evidence comes from studies of sport activities (Ehrenberg and Bognanno,1990; Becker and Huselid,1992) and by controlled experiments (Bull et al.,1987). In business settings, Main et al. (1993), using survey data for top executives in 200 US firms, during 1980–1984, report that a greater spread of top-executive compensation is positively related to firm performance. Similarly, based on proprietary data of 210 Danish firms during 1992–1995, Eriksson (1999) provides somewhat weak evidence that higher pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance. In contrast, O’Reilly et al. (1988) do not find support for the tournament argument in a sample of 105 Fortune 500 firms, and Conyon et al. (2001) report that variation in executive compensation is not associated with enhanced firm performance in a sample of 100 UK firms in 1997.
In contrast with the tournament model, notions of equity fairness postulate that the quality of social relations in the workplace affect firm performance (Akerlof and Yellen,1988,1990; Milgrom,1988; Milgrom and Roberts,1990) and that large pay dispersion adversely affects employee relations and morale, leading to counterproductive organizational activities, which eventually reduce firm performance. Supporting evidence for the adverse effects of wage dispersion on performance is also limited. Using a sample of university faculty, Pfeffer and Langton (1993) report that greater wage dispersion within academic departments reduces