RG1.012 核电厂地震仪表 1997
RG1.167 地震事件停机核电厂的重启动 1997
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGULATORYMarch 1997 GUIDEor-I OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCHREGULATORY GUIDE 1.167(Draft was DG-1035)RESTART OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SHUT DOWN BY A SEISMIC EVENTA. INTRODUCTIONParagraph IV(aX3) of Appendix S, "Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires shutdown of the nuclear power plant if vibratory ground motion exceed ing that of the operating basis earthquake ground mo tion (OBE) occurs or if significant plant damage oc curs.1 Prior to resuming operations, the licensee must demonstrate to the NRC that no functional damage has occurred to those features necessary for continued op eration without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.This guide provides guidance acceptable to the NRC staff for performing inspections and tests of nu clear power plant equipment and structures prior to re start of a plant that has been shut down by a seismic event.The information collections contained in this regu latory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, which were approved by the Office of Manage ment and Budget, approval number 3150--0011. The lRegulatory Guide 1.166, "Pre-Earthquake Planning and ImmediateNuclear Power Plant Operator Postearthquake Actions," provides cri teria for plant shutdown.USNRC REGULATORY GUIDESRegulatory Guides are Wisued to describe ard make available to t he public such Informa tIon as methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing specific parts of the Corn mission's reguiaelone, tedhfques used by the staff in e valuating specific problems or pos tulated accddents, and data needed by dhe NRC staff In its review of applications for per mlts a n licenses. Regulatory guides ae not substitutes for regulations, and compliance with them Is not required. Methods end solutions different from those set Out in the g uides will be acceptable 9 they provide a basis for te i ndings requisite to the Issuance or con. tinuance of a permit or license by the Commission.Tha guide was Issued after consideration of comments received from the public. Corn merts and suggestions for improvements In these guides we encouraged st a ll times, and guides win be revised, as apprpriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new In fotnnion or eiperlence.Written comments may be submitted to the Rules Review and Directives Branch, DFIPS, ADM, U.S. Nuclear Regulatorq Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information un less it displays a currently valid OMB control number.B. DISCUSSIONData from seismic instrumentation2 and a walkdown of the nuclear power plant1 are used to make the initial determination of whether the plant must be shut down after an earthquake, if the plant has not al ready shut down from operational perturbations result ing from the seismic event.The Electric Power Research Institute has devel oped guidelines that will enable licensees to quickly identify and assess earthquake effects on nuclear power plants in EPRI NP-6695, "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake," December 1989.3 This regulatory guide addresses sections of EPRI NP-6695 that relate to postshutdown inspection and tests, inspection criteria, inspection personnel, docu mentation, and long-term evaluations.2Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 2, "Nuclear Power Plant Instrumen tation for Earthquakes," describes seismic instrumentation acceptable to the NRC staff.3EPRI reports may b e obtained from the Electric Power Research Insti tute, EPRI Distribution Center, 207 Coggins Dr., RO. Box 23205, Pleasant Hill, CA 94523.The guLides wre Issued In t he following ten broad divisions:1. Power Reactors2. Research and Test Reactors3. Fuels and Materials Faclities4. Environmental msd Siting5. Materials end Plant Protection6. Products7. Transportationa. o=upational Health9. Antirust nd Financial Review10. GeneralSingle copies of regulatory guides may be obtained free of charge by w riting the O ffice of Administration, Attention: Distribution and Mall Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DC 20555-0001; or by fax at (301)415-2260.Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Infomation Service o na standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port "Royl Road, Springfield, VA 22161.EPRI NP-6695 has been supplemented to add in spections and tests as a basis for acceptance of stresses in excess of S ervice Level C and to recommend that en gineering evaluations of components with calculated stresses in excess of service Level D focus on areas of high stress and include fatigue analyses.C. REGULATORY POSITIONAfter a plant has been shut down by an earthquake, the guidelines for inspections and tests of nuclear pow er plant equipment and structures that are in EPRI NP-6695, depicted in Figure 3-2 and specified in Sec tions 5.3.2, 5.3.3, and 5.3.4; the documentation speci fied in Section in 5.3.5 to be submitted to the NRC; and the long-term evaluations that are specified in Section 6.3, with the exceptions specified below, are acceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the requirements in Para graph IV(a)(3) of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50. 1. EXCEPTIONS TO SECTION 6.3.4.1 OFEPRI NP-66951.1 Item (1) should read:If the calculated stresses from the actual seismic loading conditions are less than the allowables for emergency conditions (e.g., ASMECode Level C Service Limits or equivalent) ororiginal design bases, the item is consideredacceptable, provided the results of i nspectionsand tests (Section 5.3.2) show no damage.1.2 The second dashed statement of Item (3) should read:-An engineering evaluation of the effects ofthe calculated stresses on the functionality ofthe item. This evaluation should address all lo-cations where stresses exceed faulted allowables and should include fatigue analysis forASME Code Class 1 c omponents and systems. 2. LONG-TERM EVALUATIONSCoincident with the long-term evaluations, the plant should be restored to its current licensing basis. Exceptions to this must be approved by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.D. IMPLEMENTATIONThe purpose of this section is to provide guidance to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this regulatory guide.Except in those cases in which the applicant pro poses an acceptable alternative method for complying with the specified portions of the Commission's regula tions, the method described in this guide will be used in the evaluation of applications for construction permits, operating licenses, combined licenses, or design certi fication submitted after January 10, 1997. This guide will not be used in the evaluation of an application for an operating license submitted after January 10, 1997, if the construction permit was issued prior to that date.Holders of a n operating license or construction per mit issued prior to January 10, 1997, may voluntarily implement the methods described in this guide in com bination with the methods in Regulatory Guides 1.12, Revision 2, "Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes," and 1.166, "Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Post earthquake Actions." Other implementation strategies, such as voluntary implementation of portions of the cited regulatory guides, will be evaluated by the NRC staff on a case-by-case basis.1.167-211REGULATORY ANALYSISA s eparate regulatory analysis was not p repared for this regulatory guide. The regulatory analysis, "Revi sion of 10 CFR Part 100 and 10 CFR Part 50," was pre pared for these amendments, and it provides the regula tory basis for this guide and examines the costs and benefits of the rule as implemented by the guide. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspec tion and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 LStreet NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC, as Attachment 7 to SECY-96-118.Federal Recycling Program1.167-3。
核电厂仪表和控制系统及其供电设备质量保证分级
中华人民共和国国家标准核电厂仪表和控制系统及其供电设备质量保证分级GB/T 15475-1995Classification of quality assurancefor instrumentation and control system and theirelectrical equipment of nuclear power plants国家技术监督局1995-01-27批准1995-10-01实施1 主题内容与适用范围本标准规定了核电厂仪表和控制系统以及他们的供电设备(以下简称核电厂仪表及其供电设备)质量保证(以下简称质保)的级别及其划分的主要依据和质量保证活动要求。
本标准适用于压水堆核电厂仪表和控制系统以及他们的供电设备。
2 引用标准GB/T 15474 核电厂仪表和控制系统及其供电设备安全分级HAF0400 核电厂质量保证安全规定。
3 质保分级3.1 根据HAF0400的原则,核电厂仪表和控制系统及其供电设备质保分级的主要依据是:a.物项对核电厂安全、可靠性运行和满意性能的重要性;b.物项的复杂性、独特性和新颖性;c.工艺、方法和设备是否需要特殊的控制、管理和检查;d.能用检查和试验对其功能合格性进行验证的程度;e.物项的质量史和标准化程度;f.安装后,物项在维修、在役检查更换和事故情况下的可达性。
3.2 核电厂仪表和控制系统及其供电设备的质保活动分级:核电厂仪表及其供电设备的质保活动,按质保要求应为QA1、QA2、QA3 和QA四级,按核安全要求则为QA1、QA2和QA3三级(因QA级属工业生产质保活动,无核安全要求,不属于本标准范畴)。
3.2.1 质保1级(QA1级)安全级(1E级)的设备要求QA1级,这些设备是完成反应堆安全停堆、安全壳隔离、堆芯冷却以及从安全壳和反应堆排出热量所必需的,或者是防止放射性物质向环境过量排放所必需的,见GB/T 15474。
3.2.2质保2级(QA2级)1E级设备也可能要求QA2级。
国内外核电厂抗震设计规范比较
第30 卷,第4期2014 年12 月世界地震工程WORLD EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERINGV o l.30N o.4D ec.2014文章编号: 1007 -6069( 2014) 04 -0068 -09国内外核电厂抗震设计规范比较刘国强2 ,金波1,3,高永武1(1.中国地震局工程力学研究所,中国地震局地震工程与工程振动重点实验室,黑龙江哈尔滨150080;2.山东电力工程咨询院有限公司,山东济南250013;3.哈尔滨工程大学,黑龙江哈尔滨150001)摘要: 核电厂抗震设计规范作为核电规范标准体系的重要组成,对于保障核电厂在遭遇地震作用下能够安全停堆或安全运行起着至关重要的作用。
我国对现行核电厂抗震设计规范GB50267 -97 的修订工作已经完成,并于2012 年形成了修订送审稿。
本文针对核电厂抗震设计规范GB50267 -97 规范与2012 年修订送审稿的差异,进行了全面的比较研究。
同时,结合美国和法国两国核电标准中有关抗震设计与中国2012 修订送审稿的差异性进行了分析,探究造成不同规范间差异的原因及影响。
关键词: 核电厂; 抗震设计规范; GB50267 -97; ASCE4 -98; RCC -G中图分类号: P315 文献标志码: AComparison of nuclear power plant seismic design in chinese and foreign codeLIU Guoqiang2 ,JIN Bo1,3 ,GAO Yongwu1(1. L a bo rat o r y o f Earthquake E ng ineeri ng V ibrati o n,Institude o f E ng ineeri ng M echanics,C E A,Harbin150080,C hina;2.Shando ng Electric P o w er E ng ineeri ng C o nsulti ng Institute C o.td,Jinan250013,C hina;3.Harbin E ng ineeri ngU ni v ersit y,Harbin150001,C hina)A b s t ract:T he code f or seis m ic desi gn of the nuclear pow er plants is an i m por tant part of nuclear pow er code s ys- t em,and it pl ays a vi sital r ol e t o insure the nuclear pow er plant t o shut dow n or keep runni ng s af tl y under the eart h- quake. N ow our count r y has com pleted the r evi si on w or k of the code f or seis m ic desi gn of the nuclear pow er plant GB50267-97,and f orm ed the s ubm itted ver si on in2012.In this paper,it is studied that the di ff erences of di ff er- ent ver si ons of the codes f or seis m ic desi gn of nuclear pow er plant,w hich include GB50267-97and2012s ubm it- ted ver si on. A t the s am e ti m e,the seis m ic desi gn codes of the nuclear pow er standards of the U nited St ates and France are com pared w ith t hos e of C hina,and it als o studied the causes andi nf lunences of the di ff erences bet w een di ff erent codes.Key words: Nuclear power plant; Seismic design code; GB50267 -97; ASCE4 -98; RCC -G引言2007 年7 月,日本新泻地震导致柏崎刈羽核电站发生核泄漏事故。
RG.1.61核电厂抗震设计阻尼值
核电厂抗震设计阻尼值DAMPING VALUES FOR SEISMIC DESIGN OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS美国核管理委员会USNRC RG 1.61(2007年3月第一次修订版)环境保护部核与辐射安全中心二〇一二年九月美国核管理委员会2007年3月第一次修订版管理导则核监管研究办公室管理导则1.61(草案编号DG-1157,2006年10月出版)核电厂抗震设计阻尼值 1.61 (2007026)A.引言根据HAF102要求,本导则为核电厂Ⅰ类抗震结构、系统和部件(SSCs)地震反应分析中所使用、可接受的阻尼值提供指导。
特别地,HAD102/02 要求对安全重要的SSCs设计应抵御诸如地震等自然灾害的影响而不能失去其正常的安全性能。
这些SSCs也应设计成适应灾害影响并适应与正常环境条件有关的运行事件和假想事件。
我国核安全监管当局认为本导则规定的阻尼值符合有关地震反应分析的规范和导则的要求。
指定的阻尼值用于弹性模态地震反应分析,其中能量耗散用粘滞阻尼模拟(即,阻尼力与速度成比例)。
--------------------------------------------------------------------B.讨论背景阻尼是衡量动力荷载作用下材料或结构系统能量耗散的尺度,用于描述动力系统能量耗散的数学模型及求解过程的专业术语。
开展弹性系统地震反应分析时,可以通过在模型中指定粘滞性阻尼大小(即阻尼力与速度成正比)来考虑能量耗散。
核工业界和许可证持有者建议核安全局接受更合理的阻尼值以用于SSCs的抗震分析与设计。
结构阻尼1993年最初版本Rg1.61提供了结构适用的阻尼值,有关结果见文献NUREG/CR-6011[3],分析了有关数据以确定能显著影响结构阻尼的参数。
基于此项研究,最初版本Rg1.61阻尼值是合适的,但需要必要的修订。
特别是,对于钢结构,Rg1.61规范应区分摩擦型镙拴连接和承压型镙拴连接。
RG1.183 评价设计基准事故的另一种辐射源项 2000
Regulatory guides are issued to describe and make available to the public such information as methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing specific parts of the NRC’s regulations,techniques used by the staff in evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents,and data needed by the NRC staff in its review of applications for permits and licenses.Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations,and compliance with them is not required.Methods and solutions different from those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.This guide was issued after consideration of comments received from the ments and suggestions for improvements in these guides are encouraged at all times,and guides will be revised,as appropriate,to accommodate comments and to reflect new information or experience.Written comments may be submitted to the Rules and Directives Branch,ADM,U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Washington,DC 20555-0001.Regulatory guides are issued in ten broad divisions:1,Power Reactors;2,Research and Test Reactors;3,Fuels and Materials Facilities;4,Environmental and Siting;5,Materials and Plant Protection;6,Products;7,Transportation;8,Occupational Health;9,Antitrust and Financial Review;and 10,General.Single copies of regulatory guides (which may be reproduced)may be obtained free of charge by writing the Distribution Services Section,U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Washington,DC 20555-0001,or by fax to (301)415-2289,or by email to DISTRIBUTION@.Electronic copies of this guideU.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION July 2000REGULATORYGUIDEOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCHREGULATORY GUIDE 1.183(Draft was issued as DG-1081)ALTERNATIVE RADIOLOGICAL SOURCE TERMS FOREVALUATING DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTSAT NUCLEAR POWER REACTORSAVAILABILITY INFORMATIONSingle copies of regulatory guides,both active and draft,and draft NUREG documents may be obtained free of charge by writing the Reproduction and Distribution Services Section,OCIO, USNRC,Washington,DC20555-0001,or by email to<DISTRIBUTION@>,or by fax to(301)415-2289.Active guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Information Service on a standing order basis.Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS,5285 Port Royal Road,Springfield,VA22161.Many NRC documents are available electronically in our Reference Library on our web site,<>,and through our Electronic Reading Room(ADAMS,or PARS, document system)at the same site.Copies of active and draft guides and many other NRC documents are available for inspection or copying for a fee from the NRC Public Document Room at2120L Street NW.,Washington,DC;the PDR’s mailing address is Mail Stop LL-6, Washington,DC20555;telephone(202)634-3273or(800)397-4209;fax(202)634-3343;email is <PDR@>.Copies of NUREG-series reports are available at current rates from the ernment Printing Office,P.O.Box37082,Washington,DC20402-9328(telephone(202)512-1800);or from the National Technical Information Service by writing NTIS at5285Port Royal Road, Springfield,VA22161;telephone(703)487-4650;or on the internet at</ordernow>.Copies are available for inspection or copying for a fee from the NRC Public Document Room at2120L Street NW.,Washington,DC;the PDR’s mailing address is Mail Stop LL-6,Washington,DC20555;telephone(202)634-3273or(800)397-4209;fax (202)634-3343;email is<PDR@>.TABLE OF CONTENTSA.INTRODUCTION (1)B.DISCUSSION (2)C.REGULATORY POSITION (4)1.IMPLEMENTATION OF AST (4)1.1Generic Considerations (4)1.2Scope of Implementation (6)1.3Scope of Required Analyses (7)1.4Risk Implications (10)1.5Submittal Requirements (10)1.6FSAR Requirements (11)2.ATTRIBUTES OF AN ACCEPTABLE AST (11)3.ACCIDENT SOURCE TERM (12)3.1Fission Product Inventory (12)3.2Release Fractions (13)3.3Timing of Release Phases (14)3.4Radionuclide Composition (15)3.5Chemical Form (15)3.6Fuel Damage in Non-LOCA DBAs (16)4.DOSE CALCULATIONAL METHODOLOGY (16)4.1Offsite Dose Consequences (16)4.2Control Room Dose Consequences (17)4.3Other Dose Consequences (19)4.4Acceptance Criteria (19)5.ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY (20)5.1General Considerations (20)5.2Accident-Specific Assumptions (22)5.3Meteorology Assumptions (22)6.ASSUMPTIONS FOR EVALUATING THE RADIATION DOSES FOR EQUIPMENTQUALIFICATION (23)D.IMPLEMENTATION (23)REFERENCES (24)APPENDICESA.Assumptions for Evaluating the Radiological Consequences of a LWRLoss-of-Coolant Accident..................................................A-1 B.Assumptions for Evaluating the Radiological Consequences of a FuelFuel Handling Accident....................................................B-1 C.Assumptions for Evaluating the Radiological Consequences of a BWRRod Drop Accident........................................................C-1 D.Assumptions for Evaluating the Radiological Consequences of a BWR MainSteam Line Break Accident.................................................D-1 E.Assumptions for Evaluating the Radiological Consequences of a PWR MainSteam Line Break Accident.................................................E-1 F.Assumptions for Evaluating the Radiological Consequences of a PWR MainSteam Generator Tube Rupture Accident.......................................F-1 G.Assumptions for Evaluating the Radiological Consequences of a PWR LockedRotor Accident...........................................................G-1 H.Assumptions for Evaluating the Radiological Consequences of a PWR RodEjection Accident.........................................................H-1 I.Assumptions for Evaluating Radiation Doses for Equipment Qualification............I-1 J.Analysis Decision Chart....................................................J-1 K.Acronyms...............................................................K-1A.INTRODUCTIONThis guide provides guidance to licensees of operating power reactors on acceptable applications of alternative source terms;the scope,nature,and documentation of associated analyses and evaluations;consideration of impacts on analyzed risk;and content of submittals. This guide establishes an acceptable alternative source term(AST)and identifies the significant attributes of other ASTs that may be found acceptable by the NRC staff.This guide also identifies acceptable radiological analysis assumptions for use in conjunction with the accepted AST.In10CFR Part50,“Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,”Section 50.34,“Contents of Applications;Technical Information,”requires that each applicant for a construction permit or operating license provide an analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures,systems,and components of the facility with the objective of assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility.Applicants are also required by10CFR50.34to provide an analysis of the proposed site.In10CFR Part100,“Reactor Site Criteria,”Section100.11,1“Determination of Exclusion Area,Low Population Zone, and Population Center Distance,”provides criteria for evaluating the radiological aspects of the proposed site.A footnote to10CFR100.11states that the fission product release assumed in these evaluations should be based upon a major accident involving substantial meltdown of the core with subsequent release of appreciable quantities of fission products.Technical Information Document(TID)14844,“Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites”(Ref.1),is cited in10CFR Part100as a source of further guidance on these analyses.Although initially used only for siting evaluations,the TID-14844source term has been used in other design basis applications,such as environmental qualification of equipment under10CFR50.49,“Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants,”and in some requirements related to Three Mile Island(TMI)as stated in NUREG-0737,“Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements”(Ref.2).The analyses and evaluations required by10CFR50.34for an operating license are documented in the facility final safety analysis report(FSAR).Fundamental assumptions that are design inputs,including the source term,are to be included in the FSAR and become part of the facility design basis.2 Since the publication of TID-14844,significant advances have been made in understanding the timing,magnitude,and chemical form of fission product releases from severe nuclear power plant accidents.A holder of an operating license issued prior to January10,1997,or a holder of a renewed license under10CFR Part54whose initial operating license was issued prior to January 1Applicants for a construction permit,a design certification,or a combined license that do not reference a standard design certification who applied after January10,1997,are required by regulation to meet radiological criteria provided in10CFR50.34.2As defined in10CFR50.2,design bases means information that identifies the specific functions to be performed by a structure, system,or component of a facility and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for design.These values may be(1)restraints derived from generally accepted"state of the art"practices for achieving functional goals or(2)requirements derived from analysis(based on calculation or experiments or both)of the effects of a postulated accident for which a structure,system,or component must meet its functional goals.The NRC considers the accident source term to be an integral part of the design basis because it sets forth specific values(or a range of values)for controlling parameters that constitute reference bounds for design.10,1997,is allowed by10CFR50.67,“Accident Source Term,”to voluntarily revise the accident source term used in design basis radiological consequence analyses.In general,information provided by regulatory guides is reflected in NUREG-0800,the Standard Review Plan(SRP)(Ref3).The NRC staff uses the SRP to review applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants.This regulatory guide applies to Chapter15.0.1of the SRP.The information collections contained in this regulatory guide are covered by the requirements of10CFR Part50,which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),approval number3150-0011.The NRC may not conduct or sponsor,and a person is not required to respond to,a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.B.DISCUSSIONAn accident source term is intended to be representative of a major accident involving significant core damage and is typically postulated to occur in conjunction with a large loss-of-coolant accident(LOCA).Although the LOCA is typically the maximum credible accident,NRC staff experience in reviewing license applications has indicated the need to consider other accident sequences of lesser consequence but higher probability of occurrence.The design basis accidents (DBAs)were not intended to be actual event sequences,but rather,were intended to be surrogates to enable deterministic evaluation of the response of a facility’s engineered safety features.These accident analyses are intentionally conservative in order to compensate for known uncertainties in accident progression,fission product transport,and atmospheric dispersion.Although probabilistic risk assessments(PRAs)can provide useful insights into system performance and suggest changes in how the desired depth is achieved,defense in depth continues to be an effective way to account for uncertainties in equipment and human performance.The NRC’s policy statement on the use of PRA methods(Ref.4)calls for the use of PRA technology in all regulatory matters in a manner that complements the NRC’s deterministic approach and supports the traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.Since the publication of TID-14844(Ref.1),significant advances have been made in understanding the timing,magnitude,and chemical form of fission product releases from severe nuclear power plant accidents.In1995,the NRC published NUREG-1465,“Accident Source Terms for Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants”(Ref.5).NUREG-1465used this research to provide estimates of the accident source term that were more physically based and that could be applied to the design of future light-water power reactors.NUREG-1465presents a representative accident source term for a boiling-water reactor(BWR)and for a pressurized-water reactor(PWR).These source terms are characterized by the composition and magnitude of the radioactive material,the chemical and physical properties of the material,and the timing of the release to the containment.The NRC staff considered the applicability of the revised source terms to operating reactors and determined that the current analytical approach based on the TID-14844source term would continue to be adequate to protect public health and safety.Operating reactors licensed under that approach would not be required to re-analyze accidents using the revised source terms.The NRC staff also determined that some licensees might wish to use an AST in analyses to support cost-beneficial licensing actions.The NRC staff,therefore,initiated several actions to provide a regulatory basis for operating reactors to use an AST3in design basis analyses.These initiatives resulted in the development and issuance of 10CFR50.67and this regulatory guide.The NRC’s traditional methods for calculating the radiological consequences of design basis accidents are described in a series of regulatory guides and SRP chapters.That guidance was developed to be consistent with the TID-14844source term and the whole body and thyroid dose guidelines stated in10CFR100.11.Many of those analysis assumptions and methods are inconsistent with the ASTs and with the total effective dose equivalent(TEDE)criteria provided in10 CFR50.67.This guide provides assumptions and methods that are acceptable to the NRC staff for performing design basis radiological analyses using an AST.This guidance supersedes corresponding radiological analysis assumptions provided in other regulatory guides and SRP chapters when used in conjunction with an approved AST and the TEDE criteria provided in10CFR50.67.The affected guides will not be withdrawn as their guidance still applies when an AST is not used.Specifically, the affected regulatory guides are:Regulatory Guide1.3,“Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Boiling Water Reactors”(Ref.6)Regulatory Guide1.4,“Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors”(Ref.7)Regulatory Guide1.5,“Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Steam Line Break Accident for Boiling Water Reactors”(Ref.8)Regulatory Guide1.25,“Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors”(Ref.9)Regulatory Guide1.77,“Assumptions Used for Evaluating a Control Rod Ejection Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors”(Ref.10)The guidance in Regulatory Guide1.89,“Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plant.”(Ref.11),regarding the radiological source term used in the determination of integrated doses for environmental qualification purposes is superseded by the corresponding guidance in this regulatory guide for those facilities that are proposing to,or have already,implemented an AST.All other guidance in Regulatory Guide1.89 remains effective.This guide primarily addresses design basis accidents,such as those addressed in Chapter15 of typical final safety analysis reports(FSARs).This guide does not address all areas of potentially significant risk.Although this guide addresses fuel handling accidents,other events that could occur during shutdown operations are not currently addressed.The NRC staff has several ongoing3The NUREG-1465source terms have often been referred to as the“revised source terms.”In recognition that there may be additional source terms identified in the future,10CFR50.67addresses“alternative source terms.”This regulatory guideendorses a source term derived from NUREG-1465and provides guidance on the acceptable attributes of other alternative source terms.initiatives involving risks of shutdown operations,extended burnup fuels,and risk-informing current regulations.The information in this guide may be revised in the future as NRC staff evaluations are completed and regulatory decisions on these issues are made.C.REGULATORY POSITION1.IMPLEMENTATION OF AST1.1Generic ConsiderationsAs used in this guide,an AST is an accident source term that is different from the accident source term used in the original design and licensing of the facility and that has been approved for use under10CFR50.67.This guide identifies an AST that is acceptable to the NRC staff and identifies significant characteristics of other ASTs that may be found acceptable.While the NRC staff recognizes several potential uses of an AST,it is not possible to foresee all possible uses.The NRC staff will allow licensees to pursue technically justifiable uses of the ASTs in the most flexible manner compatible with maintaining a clear,logical,and consistent design basis.The NRC staff will approve these license amendment requests if the facility,as modified,will continue to provide sufficient safety margins with adequate defense in depth to address unanticipated events and to compensate for uncertainties in accident progression and analysis assumptions and parameter inputs.1.1.1Safety MarginsThe proposed uses of an AST and the associated proposed facility modifications and changes to procedures should be evaluated to determine whether the proposed changes are consistent with the principle that sufficient safety margins are maintained,including a margin to account for analysis uncertainties.The safety margins are products of specific values and limits contained in the technical specifications(which cannot be changed without NRC approval)and other values,such as assumed accident or transient initial conditions or assumed safety system response times.Changes,or the net effects of multiple changes,that result in a reduction in safety margins may require prior NRC approval.Once the initial AST implementation has been approved by the staff and has become part of the facility design basis,the licensee may use10CFR50.59and its supporting guidance in assessing safety margins related to subsequent facility modifications and changes to procedures.1.1.2Defense in DepthThe proposed uses of an AST and the associated proposed facility modifications and changes to procedures should be evaluated to determine whether the proposed changes are consistent with the principle that adequate defense in depth is maintained to compensate for uncertainties in accident progression and analysis data.Consistency with the defense-in-depth philosophy is maintained if system redundancy,independence,and diversity are preserved commensurate with the expected frequency,consequences of challenges to the system,and uncertainties.In all cases,compliance with the General Design Criteria in Appendix A to10CFR Part50is essential.Modifications proposed for the facility generally should not create a need for compensatory programmatic activities,such as reliance on manual operator actions.Proposed modifications that seek to downgrade or remove required engineered safeguards equipment should be evaluated to be sure that the modification does not invalidate assumptions made in facility PRAs and does not adversely impact the facility’s severe accident management program.1.1.3Integrity of Facility Design BasisThe design basis accident source term is a fundamental assumption upon which a significant portion of the facility design is based.Additionally,many aspects of facility operation derive from the design analyses that incorporated the earlier accident source term.Although a complete re-assessment of all facility radiological analyses would be desirable,the NRC staff determined that recalculation of all design analyses would generally not be necessary.Regulatory Position1.3of this guide provides guidance on which analyses need updating as part of the AST implementation submittal and which may need updating in the future as additional modifications are performed.This approach would create two tiers of analyses,those based on the previous source term and those based on an AST.The radiological acceptance criteria would also be different with some analyses based on whole body and thyroid criteria and some based on TEDE criteria.Full implementation of the AST revises the plant licensing basis to specify the AST in place of the previous accident source term and establishes the TEDE dose as the new acceptance criteria. Selective implementation of the AST also revises the plant licensing basis and may establish the TEDE dose as the new acceptance criteria.Selective implementation differs from full implementation only in the scope of the change.In either case,the facility design bases should clearly indicate that the source term assumptions and radiological criteria in these affected analyses have been superseded and that future revisions of these analyses,if any,will use the updated approved assumptions and criteria.Radiological analyses generally should be based on assumptions and inputs that are consistent with corresponding data used in other design basis safety analyses,radiological and nonradiological, unless these data would result in nonconservative results or otherwise conflict with the guidance in this guide.1.1.4Emergency Preparedness ApplicationsRequirements for emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants are set forth in10CFR 50.47,“Emergency Plans.”Additional requirements are set forth in Appendix E,“Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,”to10CFR Part50.The planning basis for many of these requirements was published in NUREG-0396,“Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants”4(Ref.12).This joint effort by the Environmental Protection Agency(EPA)and the NRC considered the principal characteristics(such as nuclides released and distances)likely to be involved for a spectrum of design basis and severe(core melt)accidents.No single accident scenario is the basis of the required preparedness.The objective of the planning is to provide public protection that would encompass a wide spectrum of possible events with a sufficient basis for extension of response efforts for unanticipated events.These requirements were issued after a long period of involvement by numerous stakeholders,including the Federal Emergency Management Agency,other Federal agencies,local and State governments(and in some cases,foreign governments),private citizens,utilities,and industry groups.Although the AST provided in this guide was based on a limited spectrum of severe accidents, the particular characteristics have been tailored specifically for DBA analysis use.The AST is not4This planning basis is also addressed in NUREG-0654,“Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants”(Ref.13).representative of the wide spectrum of possible events that make up the planning basis of emergency preparedness.Therefore,the AST is insufficient by itself as a basis for requesting relief from the emergency preparedness requirements of10CFR50.47and Appendix E to10CFR Part50.This guidance does not,however,preclude the appropriate use of the insights of the AST in establishing emergency response procedures such as those associated with emergency dose projections,protective measures,and severe accident management guides.1.2Scope of ImplementationThe AST described in this guide is characterized by radionuclide composition and magnitude, chemical and physical form of the radionuclides,and the timing of the release of these radionuclides. The accident source term is a fundamental assumption upon which a large portion of the facility design is based.Additionally,many aspects of facility operation derive from the design analyses that incorporated the earlier accident source term.A complete implementation of an AST would upgrade all existing radiological analyses and would consider the impact of all five characteristics of the AST as defined in10CFR50.2.However,the NRC staff has determined that there could be implementations for which this level of re-analysis may not be necessary.Two categories are defined:Full and selective implementations.1.2.1Full ImplementationFull implementation is a modification of the facility design basis that addresses all characteristics of the AST,that is,composition and magnitude of the radioactive material,its chemical and physical form,and the timing of its release.Full implementation revises the plant licensing basis to specify the AST in place of the previous accident source term and establishes the TEDE dose as the new acceptance criteria.This applies not only to the analyses performed in the application(which may only include a subset of the plant analyses),but also to all future design basis analyses.At a minimum for full implementations,the DBA LOCA must be re-analyzed using the guidance in Appendix A of this guide.Additional guidance on analysis is provided in Regulatory Position1.3of this guide.Since the AST and TEDE criteria would become part of the facility design basis,new applications of the AST would not require prior NRC approval unless stipulated by10 CFR50.59,“Changes,Tests,and Experiments,”or unless the new application involved a change to a technical specification.However,a change from an approved AST to a different AST that is not approved for use at that facility would require a license amendment under10CFR50.67.1.2.2Selective ImplementationSelective implementation is a modification of the facility design basis that(1)is based on one or more of the characteristics of the AST or(2)entails re-evaluation of a limited subset of the design basis radiological analyses.The NRC staff will allow licensees flexibility in technically justified selective implementations provided a clear,logical,and consistent design basis is maintained.An example of an application of selective implementation would be one in which a licensee desires to use the release timing insights of the AST to increase the required closure time for a containment isolation valve by a small amount.Another example would be a request to remove the charcoal filter media from the spent fuel building ventilation exhaust.For the latter,the licensee may only need to re-analyze DBAs that credited the iodine removal by the charcoal media.Additional analysis guidance is provided in Regulatory Position1.3of this guide.NRC approval for the AST(and the TEDE dose criterion)will be limited to the particular selective implementation proposed by the licensee.Thelicensee would be able to make subsequent modifications to the facility and changes to procedures based on the selected AST characteristics incorporated into the design basis under the provisions of 10CFR50.59.However,use of other characteristics of an AST or use of TEDE criteria that are not part of the approved design basis,and changes to previously approved AST characteristics,would require prior staff approval under10CFR50.67.As an example,a licensee with an implementation involving only timing,such as relaxed closure time on isolation valves,could not use10CFR50.59 as a mechanism to implement a modification involving a reanalysis of the DBA LOCA.However, this licensee could extend use of the timing characteristic to adjust the closure time on isolation valves not included in the original approval.1.3Scope of Required Analyses1.3.1Design Basis Radiological AnalysesThere are several regulatory requirements for which compliance is demonstrated,in part,by the evaluation of the radiological consequences of design basis accidents.These requirements include,but are not limited to,the following.+Environmental Qualification of Equipment(10CFR50.49)+Control Room Habitability(GDC-19of Appendix A to10CFR Part50)+Emergency Response Facility Habitability(Paragraph IV.E.8of Appendix E to10 CFR Part50)+Alternative Source Term(10CFR50.67)+Environmental Reports(10CFR Part51)+Facility Siting(10CFR100.11)5There may be additional applications of the accident source term identified in the technical specification bases and in various licensee commitments.These include,but are not limited to,the following from Reference2,NUREG-0737.+Post-Accident Access Shielding(NUREG-0737,II.B.2)+Post-Accident Sampling Capability(NUREG-0737,II.B.3)+Accident Monitoring Instrumentation(NUREG-0737,II.F.1)+Leakage Control(NUREG-0737,III.D.1.1)+Emergency Response Facilities(NUREG-0737,III.A.1.2)+Control Room Habitability(NUREG-0737,III.D.3.4)1.3.2Re-Analysis GuidanceAny implementation of an AST,full or selective,and any associated facility modification should be supported by evaluations of all significant radiological and nonradiological impacts of the proposed actions.This evaluation should consider the impact of the proposed changes on the facility’s compliance with the regulations and commitments listed above as well as any other facility-specific requirements.These impacts may be due to(1)the associated facility modifications or(2)the differences in the AST characteristics.The scope and extent of the re-5Dose guidelines of10CFR100.11are superseded by10CFR50.67for licensees that have implemented an AST.。
RG1.009 核电厂安全相关柴油发电机的应用与试验 2007
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com m ission (NRC) issues regulatory guides to describe and m ake available to the public m ethods that the NRC staff considers acceptable for use in im plem enting specific parts of the agency’s regulations, techniques that the staff uses in evaluating specific problem s or postulated accidents, and data that the staff need in reviewing applications for perm its and licenses. Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations, and com pliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions that differ from those set forth in regulatory guides will be deem ed acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings required for the issuance or continuance of a perm it or license by the Com m ission.This guide was issued after consideration of com m ents received from the public. The NRC staff encourages and welcom es com m ents and suggestions in connection with im provem ents to published regulatory guides, as well as item s for inclusion in regulatory guides that are currently being developed. The NRC staff will revise existing guides, as appropriate, to accom m odate com m ents and to reflect new inform ation or experience. W ritten com m ents m ay be subm itted to the Rules and Directives Branch, Office of Adm inistration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com m ission, W ashington, DC 20555-0001.Regulatory guides are issued in 10 broad divisions: 1, Power Reactors; 2, Research and Test Reactors; 3, Fuels and Materials Facilities;4, Environm ental and Siting; 5, Materials and Plant Protection; 6, Products; 7, Transportation; 8, Occupational Health; 9, Antitrust and Financial Review;and 10, General.Requests for single copies of draft or active regulatory guides (which m ay be reproduced) should be m ade to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com m ission,W ashington, DC 20555, Attention: Reproduction and Distribution Services Section, or by fax to (301) 415-2289; or by em ail to Distribution@ . Electronic copies of this guide and other recently issued guides are available through the NRC’s public W eb site under the Regulatory Guides docum entU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION March 2007Revision 4REGULATORY GUIDEOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCHREGULATORY GUIDE 1.9(Draft was issued as DG-1172, dated November 2006)APPLICATION AND TESTINGOF SAFETY-RELATED DIESEL GENERATORSIN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTSA. INTRODUCTIONGeneral Design Criterion 17, “Electric Power Systems,” of Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to Title 10, Part 50, of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50),“Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities” (Ref. 1), requires that onsite electric power systems have sufficient independence, capacity, capability, redundancy, and testability to ensure that(1) specified acceptable nuclear fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences, and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents,assuming a single failure.General Design Criterion 18, “Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems,” of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that electric power systems important to safety be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the systems and the condition of their components.Criterion III, “Design Control,” and Criterion XI, “Test Control,” of Appendix B, “QualityAssurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50 require that (1) measures be provided for verifying or checking the adequacy of design through design reviews,the use of alternative or simplified calculational methods, or the performance of a suitable testing program and (2) a test program be established to ensure that systems and components perform satisfactorily and that the test program include operational tests during nuclear power plant operation.10 CFR 50.63, “Loss of All Alternating Current Power,” requires that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant must be able to withstand and recover from a station blackout [i.e., loss of offsite and onsite emergency alternating current (ac) power systems] for a specified duration. The reliabilityof onsite ac power sources is one of the main factors contributing to the risk of core melt as a resultof a station blackout.Most onsite electric power systems use diesel generators as the chosen onsite emergency power source. This regulatory guide provides guidance that the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considers acceptable to comply with the Commission’s regulations for safety-related diesel generators intended for use as onsite emergency power sources in nuclear power plants — specifically, that the emergency diesel generators be selected with sufficient capacity, be qualified, and havethe necessary reliability and availability for design-basis events.This regulatory guide relates to information collections that are covered by the requirementsof 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 21, “Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance” (Ref. 2),which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approved under OMB control number 3150-0011 and 3150-0035, respectively. The NRC may neither conduct nor sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, an information collection request or requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.B. DISCUSSIONAn emergency diesel generator selected for use in an onsite electric power system should have the capability to (1) start and accelerate a number of large motor loads in rapid succession, while maintaining voltage and frequency within acceptable limits, (2) provide power promptly to engineered safety features if a loss of offsite power (LOOP) and a design-basis event occur during the same time period, and (3) supply power continuously to the equipment needed to maintain the plant in a safe conditionif an extended (e.g., 30-day period should be considered with refueling every 7 days) LOOP occurs.The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 387, “IEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel-Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations”(IEEE Std 387-1995), issued in 1995 (Ref. 3), delineates principal design criteria and qualificationand testing guidelines to ensure that selected diesel generators meet performance requirements. Working Group SC 4.2 of Subcommittee 4 (Auxiliary Power) of the IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee developed IEEE Std 387-1995, and the IEEE Standards Board approved the standardon December 12, 1995.A knowledge of the characteristics of each load is essential to establish the bases for selection of an emergency diesel generator that is able to accept large loads in rapid succession. The majorityof these emergency loads are large induction motors. At full voltage, this type of motor draws a starting current of five to eight times its rated full-load current. These sudden large increases in current drawn from the diesel generator as a result of the startup of induction motors can result in substantial voltage reductions. This lower voltage could prevent a motor from starting (i.e., accelerating its load to rated speed in the required time), or could cause a running motor to coast down or stall. Other voltage-sensitive loads might also be lost because of low voltage or if their associated contactors drop out. Recovery fromthe transient caused by starting large motors, or from the loss of a large load, could cause diesel engine overspeed that, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine (i.e., loss of the safety-related power source). These same consequences can also result from the cumulative effect of a sequence of more moderate transients if the system is not permitted to recover sufficiently between successive steps in a loading sequence.General industry practice is to specify a voltage reduction of 10–15 percent when starting large motors from large-capacity power systems, and a maximum voltage reduction of 25–30 percent when starting these motors from limited-capacity power sources such as diesel generators. Voltage reduction during load sequencing should be evaluated in light of the plant-specific equipment to preventload interruption. Large induction motors can achieve rated speed in less than 5 seconds when powered from adequately sized emergency diesel generators that are capable of restoring the bus voltageto 90 percent of nominal in about 1–2 second(s).Protection of the emergency diesel generator from excessive overspeed, which can result from an improperly adjusted control system or governor failure, is provided by the immediate operationof a diesel generator trip, which is usually set at 115 percent of nominal speed. Similarly, to prevent substantial damage to the generator, the generator differential current trip must operate immediately upon occurrence of an internal fault. Other protective trips can also safeguard the emergency diesel generators from possible damage. However, these trips could interfere with successful functioning of the diesel generators when they are most needed (i.e., during design-basis events).In addition, experience has shown that on numerous occasions, these protective trips have needlessly shut down emergency diesel generators because of spurious operation of a trip circuit. Consequently, it is important to take measures to ensure that spurious actuation of these other protective trips does not prevent the emergency diesel generators from performing their safety function duringthe emergency mode of operation.The uncertainties inherent in safety load estimates at an early stage of design or prior tothe combined license stage are sometimes of such magnitude that it is prudent to provide a reasonable margin in selecting the load capabilities of the emergency diesel generators. This margin can be provided by estimating the loads conservatively and selecting the continuous rating of the emergency diesel generators that exceeds the sum of the loads needed at any one time. A more accurate estimate of safety loads is possible during the operating license or combined license stages of review because detailed designs should have been completed and component test and preoperational test data are usually available. However, the design-basis event loads during the operating license or combined license stages should be within the continuous rating of the emergency diesel generators with sufficient margin (i.e., not less than 5 percent).The reliability of emergency diesel generators can be one of the main factors affecting the risk of core damage from a station blackout event. Thus, both attaining and maintaining the high reliability of emergency diesel generators at nuclear power plants contribute greatly to reducing the probabilityof station blackout. Regulatory Guide 1.155, “Station Blackout” (Ref. 4), calls for the use of the reliability of the diesel generator as one of the factors in determining the length of time a plant should be ableto cope with a station blackout. If all other factors (i.e., redundancy of emergency diesel generators, frequency of LOOP, and probable time needed to restore offsite power) remain constant, a higher reliability of the diesel generators will result in a lower probability of a station blackout,with a corresponding decrease in coping duration for certain plants.The design of the emergency diesel generators should also incorporate high operational reliability, and this high reliability should be maintained throughout their lifetime by initiating a reliability program that is designed to monitor, improve, and maintain reliability. Increased operational reliability can be achieved through appropriate testing and maintenance, as well as an effective root cause analysis of all emergency diesel generator failures.This guide provides explicit guidance in the areas of preoperational testing, periodic testing, reporting and recordkeeping requirements, and valid demands and failures. The preoperationaland periodic testing provisions set forth in this guide provide a basis for taking the corrective actions needed to maintain high inservice reliability of installed emergency diesel generators. The database developed will assist ongoing performance monitoring for all emergency diesel generatorsafter installation and during service.Clause 2 of IEEE Std 387-1995 references several industry codes and standards. If a referenced standard has been separately incorporated into the NRC’s regulations, licensees and applicants must comply with that standard as set forth in the regulations. Similarly, if the NRC staff has endorsed a referenced standard in a regulatory guide, that standard constitutes an acceptable method of meeting a regulatory requirement as described in the given regulatory guide. Conversely, if a referenced standard has been neither incorporated into the NRC’s regulations nor endorsed in a regulatory guide, licensees and applicants may consider and use the information in the referenced standard, if appropriately justified, consistent with regulatory practice.C. REGULATORY POSITIONConformance with the guidelines in IEEE Std 387-1995 (Ref. 3) constitutes an acceptable method for satisfying the Commission’s regulations with respect to the design, qualification, and periodic testing of diesel generators used as onsite electric power systems for nuclear power plants, subject tothe following exceptions.1.Design ConsiderationsThe following regulatory positions supplement the guidelines of IEEE Std 387-1995,as they relate to design considerations:1.1Clause 1.1.1, “Inclusions,” of IEEE Std 387-1995 should be supplemented to includediesel generator auto controls, manual controls, and diesel generator output breaker.1.2When the characteristics of the required emergency diesel generator loads are not accurately known,such as during an early stage of design, each emergency diesel generator selected for an onsite power supply system should have a continuous load rating (as defined in Section 3.2 of IEEEStd 387-1995) equal to the sum of the conservatively estimated connected loads (nameplate rating) that the diesel generator would power at any one time, plus a 10- to 15-percent margin.In the absence of fully substantiated performance characteristics for mechanical equipmentsuch as pumps, the electric motor drive ratings should be calculated using conservative estimates of these characteristics (e.g., pump runout conditions and motor efficiencies of 90 percent or less, and power factors of 85 percent or less).1.3During the operating license or combined license stages of review, the maximum design-basisloads should be within the continuous rating (as defined in Section 3.2 of IEEE Std 387-1995) of the diesel generator with sufficient margin (i.e., not less than 5 percent).1.4Clause 4.1.2 of IEEE Std 387-1995 pertains, in part, to the starting and load-accepting capabilitiesof the diesel generator. In conformance with Clause 4.1.2, each diesel generator should becapable of starting and accelerating to rated speed, in the required sequence, all the neededengineered safety features and emergency shutdown loads. The diesel generator should bedesigned such that the frequency will not decrease, at any time during the loading sequence,to less than 95 percent of nominal and the voltage will not decrease to less than 75 percentof nominal. (A larger decrease in voltage and frequency may be justified for a diesel generator that carries only one large connected load.) Frequency should be restored to within 2 percent of nominal in less than 60 percent of each load-sequence interval for a stepload increase,and less than 80 percent of each load-sequence interval for disconnection of the single largest load.Voltage should be restored to within 10 percent of nominal within 60 percent of eachload-sequence interval. The acceptance value of the frequency and voltage should be based on plant-specific analysis (where conservative values of voltage and frequency are measured)to prevent load interruption. (A greater percentage of the load-sequence interval may be used if it can be justified by analysis. However, the load-sequence interval should include sufficient margin for the accuracy and repeatability of the load-sequence timer.) During recovery fromtransients caused by disconnection of the largest single load, the speed of the diesel generator should not exceed the nominal speed plus 75 percent of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip set point, or 115 percent of nominal (whichever is lower). Furthermore, the transient following a complete loss of load should not cause the diesel generator speedto reach the overspeed trip set point.1.5Emergency diesel generators should be designed so that they can be tested as describedin Regulatory Position 2. The design should allow testing of the diesel generators to simulate the parameters of operation (e.g., manual start, automatic start, load sequencing, load shedding, operation time), normal standby conditions, and environments (e.g., temperature, humidity)that would be expected if actual demand were placed on the system. If prelubrication systems or prewarming systems designed to maintain lube oil and jacket water cooling at certaintemperatures (or both) are normally in operation, this would constitute normal standby conditions for the given plant.1.6Design provisions should include the capability to test each emergency diesel generatorindependently of the redundant units. Test equipment should not cause a loss of independence between redundant diesel generators or between diesel generator load groups. Testability should be considered in selecting and locating instrumentation sensors and critical components(e.g., governor, starting system components). Instrumentation sensors should be readily accessibleand designed so that their inspection and calibration can be verified in place. The overall design should include status indication and alarm features.1.7Clause 4.5.3.1 of IEEE Std 387-1995 pertains to status indication of diesel generatorunit conditions. The following paragraphs should supplement the guidance in this clause:1.7.1 A surveillance system should be provided with a remote indication in the control roomto display emergency diesel generator status (i.e., under test, ready-standby, lockout).A means of communication should also be provided between diesel generator testinglocations and the main control room to ensure that the operators know the statusof the diesel generator under test.1.7.2To facilitate the diagnosis of failure or malfunction, the surveillance system should indicatewhich of the emergency diesel generator protective trips has been activated first.1.8The following should supplement Clause 4.5.4 of IEEE Std 387-1995, which pertains tobypassing emergency diesel generator protective trips during emergency conditions:The emergency diesel generator should be tripped automatically on engine overspeedand generator-differential overcurrent. A trip should be implemented with two or moremeasurements for each trip parameter with coincident logic provisions for trip actuation.The design of the coincident logic trip circuitry should include the capability to indicate individualsensor trips. The design of the bypass circuitry should include the capability to (1) test the statusand operability of the bypass circuits, (2) trigger alarms in the control room for abnormal valuesof all bypass parameters (common trouble alarms may be used), and (3) manually reset the tripbypass function. The capability to automatically reset the bypass function is not acceptable.Clause 4.5.4(b) of IEEE Std 387-1995, which pertains to retaining all protective devicesduring emergency diesel generator testing, does not apply to periodic tests [safety injectionactuation system (SIAS), combined with SIAS and LOOP, and protective trip bypass]that demonstrate diesel generator system response under simulated design-basis events.1.9Clause 4.5.2.2 of IEEE Std 387-1995 should be modified to read as follows:Upon receipt of an emergency start-diesel signal, the automatic control system shall provideautomatic startup and automatic adjustment of speed and voltage to a ready-to-load conditionin the emergency (isochronous) mode.2.Diesel Generator TestingClauses 3, 5, 6, and 7 of IEEE Std 387-1995 should be supplemented as discussed below.2.1DefinitionsFigure 1 illustrates those components and systems that should be considered to be withinthe emergency diesel generator boundary when evaluating failures. Systems that support the emergency diesel generator and perform other plant functions are depicted as being outside this boundary.IEEE Std 387-1995 provides similar definitions of components and system boundaries and may also be used as guidance; however, generator breakers should be considered as part of the diesel generator boundary.The following definitions apply to the regulatory positions that address testing, recordkeeping, and reporting of emergency diesel generator performance:Start demands: All valid and inadvertent start demands, including all start-only demands and all start demands that are followed by load-run demands, whether by automatic or manual initiation, are start demands. In a start-only demand, the emergency diesel generator is started, but no attempt is madeto load the emergency diesel generator (see the exceptions below).Start failures: Any failure within the emergency diesel generator system that prevents the generator from achieving a specified frequency (or speed) and voltage within specified time allowance is classified as a valid start failure. (For monthly surveillance tests, the emergency diesel generator can be brought to rated speed and voltage in the time recommended by the manufacturer to minimize stress and wear.) Any condition identified during maintenance inspections (with the emergency diesel generatorin the standby mode) that would definitely have resulted in a start failure if a demand had occurred should count as a valid start demand and failure.Load-run demands: To be valid, the load-run attempt should follow a successful start and meetone of the following criteria (see the exceptions below):• a load-run of any duration that results from a real (i.e., not a test) automatic or manual signal • a load-run test to satisfy the plant’s load and duration test specifications•other operations (e.g., special tests) in which the emergency diesel generator is planned to run for at least 1 hour with at least 50 percent of design loadLoad-run failures: A load-run failure should be counted when the emergency diesel generator starts but does not pick up the load and run successfully. Any failure during a valid load-run demand should count (see the exceptions below). (For monthly surveillance tests, the emergency diesel generator can be loaded at the rate recommended by the manufacturer to minimize stress and wear.) Any condition identified during maintenance inspections (with the emergency diesel generator in the standby mode) that definitely would have resulted in a load-run failure if a demand had occurred should count asa valid load-run demand and failure.Exceptions: Unsuccessful attempts to start or load-run should not count as valid demands or failures when they can definitely be attributed to any of the following:•any operation of a trip that would be bypassed in the emergency operation mode(e.g., high cooling-water temperature trip)•malfunction of equipment that is not required to operate during the emergency operating mode(e.g., synchronizing circuitry)•intentional termination of the test because of alarmed or observed abnormal conditions(e.g., small water or oil leaks) that would not have ultimately resulted in significant damageor failure of the emergency generator•component malfunctions or operating errors that did not prevent the emergency diesel generator from being restarted and brought to load within 5 minutes (i.e., without corrective maintenanceor significant problem diagnosis)• a failure to start because a portion of the starting system was disabled for test purposes, if followed by a successful start with the starting system in its normal alignmentEach diesel generator valid failure that results in declaration of the emergency diesel generator as being inoperable should count as one demand and one failure. Exploratory tests during correctiveor preventive maintenance should not count as demands or failures. However, the successful testthat is performed to declare the emergency diesel generator operable should count as a demand.2.2Test DescriptionsThe table on site testing from the standard is repeated in this guide as Table 1 to address supplementary guidance when required. The following test descriptions should be used in conjunction with the preoperational and surveillance testing described in the table. The licensee should have detailed procedures for each test described herein. The procedures should identify special arrangements or changes in normal system configuration that must be made to put the emergency diesel generator under test. Jumpers and other nonstandard configurations or arrangements should not be usedafter initial equipment startup testing.2.2.1Starting TestClause 7.2.1.1 of IEEE Std 387-1995 should be supplemented as follows:The acceptance criteria for frequency and voltage should be equal to or higher than the minimumrequired voltage and frequency within specified time allowance for the safety-related loads.2.2.2Slow-Start TestClause 7.5.1 of IEEE Std 387-1995 should be supplemented as follows:This test involves demonstrating proper startup from standby conditions, and verify thatthe required design voltage and frequency are attained. For this test, the emergency diesel generatorcan be slow-started and reach rated speed on a prescribed schedule to minimize stress and wear.*IEEE Std 387-19952.2.3Load Run (Load Acceptance) TestClause 7.5.2 of IEEE Std 387-1995 should be supplemented as follows:This test involves demonstrating 90–100 percent of the continuous rating of the emergency dieselgenerator, for an interval of not less than 1 hour and until attainment of temperature equilibrium.This test may be accomplished by synchronizing the generator with offsite power. The loading and unloading of an emergency diesel generator during this test should be gradual and based ona prescribed schedule that is selected to minimize stress and wear on the diesel generator.2.2.4Rated Load TestClause 7.2.1.3 (a) of IEEE Std 387-1995 should be supplemented as follows:If the design-basis event loads are higher than the continuous rating of the emergency dieselgenerator, the test should be conducted at the worst case design-basis event loads.2.2.5LOOP TestClause 7.5.4 of IEEE Std 387-1995 should be supplemented as follows:This test involves simulating a LOOP to demonstrate that (1) the emergency buses are deenergizedand the loads are shed from the emergency buses, and (2) the emergency diesel generator startson the autostart signal from its standby conditions; attains the required voltage and frequency,and energizes permanently connected loads within acceptable limits and time; energizes allautoconnected shutdown loads through the load sequencer; and operates for greater than or equal to5 minutes. If the required safety loads are not available, one or more equivalent load(s) may be used. 2.2.6Combined SIAS and LOOP TestClause 7.5.6 of IEEE Std 387-1995 should be modified to read as follows:This test involves demonstrating that emergency diesel generator can satisfactorily respond toa LOOP in conjunction with SIAS in whatever sequence they might occur [e.g., loss-of-coolantaccident (LOCA) followed by delayed LOOP or LOOP followed by LOCA]. A simultaneousLOOP/LOCA event would be demonstrated by verifying that the diesel generator unit starts onthe auto-start signal from its standby conditions, attains the frequency and voltage within acceptable limits and time, energizes the auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencerwithin the acceptable limits of pump start time, and operates for a minimum of 5 minutes.2.2.7Largest Load Rejection TestClause 7.5.7 of IEEE Std-1995 should be supplemented as follows:This test involves demonstrating the emergency diesel generator’s capability to reject a loadequal to loss of the largest single load while operating at its design load power factor and verifythat the frequency and voltage requirements are met and the unit will not trip on overspeed.。
核电厂仪表和控制系统法规标准体系概述
第30卷 第11期2023年11月仪器仪表用户INSTRUMENTATIONVol.302023 No.11核电厂仪表和控制系统法规标准体系概述孙 娜,吴 茜,宿俊海(华龙国际核电技术有限公司,北京 100036)摘 要:国内核电厂仪控设计遵循的法规标准基本从IEC 及IEEE、IAEA 等标准转化而来,经过多年的完善及技术积累,标准体系基本完善,内容基本完整,但仍存在部分标准版本较早,某些设计要点无参考标准、技术水平滞后的情况。
本文对国内外现有的核电厂仪控系统设计依据的法规标准进行分析,总结出国内当前核电厂仪控系统设计的法规标准体系,用于指导华龙一号电厂初步设计工作。
关键词:核电厂;仪控系统;标准体系中图分类号:TL48 文献标志码:AOverview of the Regulatory Standard Architecture of Instrumentationand Control System for Nuclear Power PlantSun Na ,Wu Qian ,Su Junhai(Hualong Nuclear Power T echnology Co., Ltd., Beijing, 100036, China )Abstract:The regulatory standards for instrumentation and control system design and implementation of nuclear power plants in China are basically transformed from IEC, IEEE, IAEA and other standards. After years of combing and technical accumulation, the standard architectural is basically perfect and the content is basically complete, but there are still some earlier versions of standards, some design points have no reference standards, and the technical level is lagging behind. In this paper, the existing domestic and foreign nuclear power plant instrument control system design based on the regulations and standards are analyzed, summed up the regulations and standards of the current unclear power plant instrument and control system design, which can be used to guide the preliminary design work of HPR1000 nuclear power plant.Key words:nuclear power plant ;instrumentation and control system ;regulatory standards architecture收稿日期:2023-06-14作者简介:孙娜(1980-),女,辽宁人,硕士,高级工程师,从事核电厂仪表和控制系统设计。
核电地震仪表系统的测试分析
核 电地 震 仪 表 系 统 的 测 试 分 析
周林兵 吴雄伟 李道 忠
( 中 国 地震 局 地震 研究 所 ( 地震大地测量重点实验室 ) , 武汉 4 3 0 0 7 1 )
摘 要 以某核电站正在运行的地震仪表系统为例, 介绍核电地震仪表系统( K I S ) 的基本原理、 组成结构以及性
I NS TRUM ENT S YS TEM
Zh o u Li n b i n g, Wu Xi o n g we i a n d L i Da o z h o ng
( K e y L a b o r a t o r y o fE a r t h q u a k e G e o d e s y , I n s t i t u t e fS o e i s m o l o g y , C E A, W u h a n 4 3 0 0 7 1 ) Abs t r a c t T a k i n g t h e s e i s mi c i n s t r u me n t s y s t e m w h i c h w a s u s e d i n a n o c l e a r p o w e r s t a t i 0 n a s a n e x a m p l et he
集 成 在一起 形成 中心 信息处 理 机柜 。
… …
磊
l
… …
l
,
厂
l 多 串 口 卡 互 连 I
LCD l
文着 重介 绍一 款地 震 仪 器 仪 表 系 统 , 该 系 统通 过 对 地 面振 动加速 度 的监测 , 能 及时 、 快速 地产 出综 合信
收 稿 日期 : 2 0 1 3 - 0 7 - 3 0
核电站地震仪表系统[发明专利]
专利名称:核电站地震仪表系统
专利类型:发明专利
发明人:郭唐永,陈志高,邹彤,项大鹏,周云耀,倪焕明,张光正,吴雄伟,李道忠,李欣,王培源
申请号:CN200910061939.8
申请日:20090506
公开号:CN101656114A
公开日:
20100224
专利内容由知识产权出版社提供
摘要:本发明涉及一种地震仪表系统,主要用于监视核电站厂区、设备及反应堆结构厂房的震动状况及响应,向核电站运行人员提供地震信息,做进一步操作的决策。
本发明利用布设于核电站厂区及反应堆结构厂房不同部位的多台传感器,连续不断地采集、监测反应堆厂房的震动状况,一旦检测到有地震发生,立刻发出报警信号,通知运行人员采取应急操作,避免和降低地震造成的损害,保证核电站的运行安全。
同时,系统记录地震发生过程中的完整数据,可分析、评估厂房的结构安全,为下一阶段运行决策提供依据。
申请人:中国地震局地震研究所
地址:430071 湖北省武汉市武昌区洪山侧路40号
国籍:CN
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RG1.165 地震源的识别及其特性以及安全停堆地震地震动的确定 1997
March 1997Regulatory Guide 1.165 Identification and Characterization of Seismic Sources and Determination of Safe Shutdown Earthquake GroundMotion(Draft issued as DG-1032)[ Division Index | Regulatory Guide Index | NRC Home Page ] Publication InformationA. INTRODUCTIONIn 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria," Section 100.23, "Geologic and Seismic Siting Factors," paragraph (c), "Geological, Seismological, and Engineering Characteristics," requires that the geological, seismological, and engineering characteristics of a site and its environs be investigated in sufficient scope and detail to permit an adequate evaluation of the proposed site, to provide sufficient information to support evaluations performed to arriveat estimates of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion (SSE), and to permit adequate engineering solutions to actual or potential geologic and seismic effects at the proposed site. Data on the vibratory ground motion, tectonic surface deformation, nontectonic deformation, earthquake recurrence rates, fault geometry and slip rates, site foundation material, and seismically induced floods, water waves, and other siting factors will be obtained by reviewing pertinent literature and carrying out field investigations.In 10 CFR 100.23, paragraph (d), "Geologic and Seismic Siting Factors," requires that the geologic and seismic siting factors considered for design include a determination of the SSE for the site, the potential for surface tectonic and nontectonic deformations, the design bases for seismically induced floods and water waves, and other design conditions.In 10 CFR 100.23, paragraph (d)(1), "Determination of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion," requires that uncertainty inherent in estimates of the SSE be addressed through an appropriate analysis, such as a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis or suitable sensitivity analyses.This guide has been developed to provide general guidance on procedures acceptable to the NRC staff for (1) conducting geological, geophysical, seismological, and geotechnical investigations, (2) identifying and characterizing seismic sources, (3) conducting probabilistic seismic hazard analyses, and (4) determining the SSE for satisfying the requirements of 10 CFR 100.23.This guide contains several appendices that address the objectives stated above. Appendix A contains a list of definitions of pertinent terms. Appendix B describes the procedure used to determine the reference probability for the SSE exceedance level that is acceptable to the staff. Appendix C discusses the development of a seismic hazard information base and the determination of the probabilistic ground motion level and controlling earthquakes. Appendix D discusses site-specific geological, seismological, and geophysical investigations. Appendix E describes a method to confirm the adequacy of existing seismic sources and source parameters as the basis for determining the SSE for a site. Appendix F describes procedures to determine the SSE. The information collections contained in this regulatory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.B. DISCUSSIONBACKGROUNDA probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) has been identified in 10 CFR 100.23 as a means to determine the SSE and account for uncertainties in the seismological and geological evaluations. The rule further recognizes that thenature of uncertainty and the appropriate approach to account for it depend on the tectonic regime and parameters such as the knowledge of seismic sources, the existence of historical and recorded data, and the level of understanding of the tectonics. Therefore, methods other than probabilistic methods such as sensitivity analyses may be adequate for some sites to account for uncertainties.Appendix A, "Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 100 is primarily based on a deterministic methodology. Past licensing experience in applying Appendix A has demonstrated the need to formulate procedures that quantitatively incorporate uncertainty (including alternative scientific interpretations) in the evaluation of seismic hazards. A single deterministic representation of seismic sources and ground motions at a site may not explicitly provide a quantitative representation of the uncertainties in geological, seismological, and geophysical data and alternative scientific interpretations.Probabilistic procedures were developed during the past 10 to 15 years specifically for nuclear power plant seismic hazard assessments in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) (the area east of the Rocky Mountains), also referred to as the Stable Continent Region (SCR). These procedures provide a structured approach for decisionmaking with respect to the SSE when performed together with site-specific investigations. A PSHA provides a framework to address the uncertainties associated with the identification andcharacterization of seismic sources by incorporating multiple interpretations of seismological parameters. A PSHA also provides an evaluation of the likelihood of SSE recurrence during the design lifetime of a given facility, given the recurrence interval and recurrence pattern of earthquakes in pertinent seismic sources. Within the framework of a probabilistic analysis, uncertainties in the characterization of seismic sources and ground motions are identified and incorporated in the procedure at each step of the process for estimating the SSE. The role of geological, seismological, and geophysical investigations is to develop geosciences information about the site for use in the detailed design analysis of the facility, as well as to ensure that the seismic hazard analysis is based on up-to-date information.Experience in performing seismic hazard evaluations in active plate-margin regions in the Western United States (for example, the San Gregorio-Hosgri fault zone and the Cascadia Subduction Zone) has also identified uncertainties associated with the characterization of seismic sources (Refs. 1-3). Sources of uncertainty include fault geometry, rupture segmentation, rupture extent, seismic-activity rate, ground motion, and earthquake occurrence modeling. As is the case for sites in the CEUS, alternative hypotheses and parameters must be considered to account for these uncertainties.Uncertainties associated with the identification and characterization of seismic sources in tectonic environments in both the CEUS and the Western UnitedStates should be evaluated. Therefore, the same basic approach can be applied to determine the SSE.APPROACHThe general process to determine the SSE at a site includes:1. Site- and region-specific geological, seismological, geophysical, and geotechnical investigations and2. A probabilistic seismic hazard assessment.CENTRAL AND EASTERN UNITED STATESThe CEUS is considered to be that part of the United States east of the Rocky Mountain front, or east of Longitude 105 West (Refs. 4, 5). To determine the SSE in the CEUS, an accepted PSHA methodology with a range of credible alternative input interpretations should be used. For sites in the CEUS, the seismic hazard methods, the data developed, and seismic sources identified by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) (Refs. 4-6) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) (Ref. 7) have been reviewed and accepted by the staff. The LLNL and EPRI studies developed data bases and scientific interpretations of available information and determined seismic sources and source characterizations for the CEUS (e.g., earthquake occurrence rates, estimates of maximum magnitude).In the CEUS, characterization of seismic sources is more problematic than in the active plate-margin region because there is generally no clear association between seismicity and known tectonic structures or near-surface geology. In general, the observed geologic structures were generated in response to tectonic forces that no longer exist and have little or no correlation with current tectonic forces. Therefore, it is important to account for this uncertainty by the use of multiple alternative models.The identification of seismic sources and reasonable alternatives in the CEUS considers hypotheses presently advocated for the occurrence of earthquakes in the CEUS (for example, the reactivation of favorably oriented zones of weakness or the local amplification and release of stresses concentrated around a geologic structure). In tectonically active areas of the CEUS, such as the New Madrid Seismic Zone, where geological, seismological, and geophysical evidence suggest the nature of the sources that generate the earthquakes, it may be more appropriate to evaluate those seismic sources by using procedures similar to those normally applied in the Western United States.WESTERN UNITED STATESThe Western United States is considered to be that part of the United States that lies west of the Rocky Mountain front, or west of approximately 105 West Longitude. For the Western United States, an information base of earthscience data and scientific interpretations of seismic sources and source characterizations (e.g., geometry, seismicity parameters) comparable to the CEUS as documented in the LLNL and EPRI studies (Refs. 4-7) does not exist. For this region, specific interpretations on a site-by-site basis should be applied (Ref. 1).The active plate-margin region includes, for example, coastal California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska. For the active plate-margin region, where earthquakes can often be correlated with known tectonic structures, those structures should be assessed for their earthquake and surface deformation potential. In this region, at least three types of sources exist: (1) faults that are known to be at or near the surface, (2) buried (blind) sources that may often be manifested as folds at the earth's surface, and (3) subduction zone sources, such as those in the Pacific Northwest. The nature of surface faults can be evaluated by conventional surface and near-surface investigation techniques to assess orientation, geometry, sense of displacements, length of rupture, Quaternary history, etc.Buried (blind) faults are often associated with surficial deformation such as folding, uplift, or subsidence. The surface expression of blind faulting can be detected by mapping the uplifted or down-dropped geomorphological features or stratigraphy, survey leveling, and geodetic methods. The nature of the structure at depth can often be evaluated by core borings and geophysical techniques.Continental United States subduction zones are located in the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. Seismic sources associated with subduction zones are sources within the overriding plate, on the interface between the subducting and overriding lithospheric plates, and in the interior of the downgoing oceanic slab. The characterization of subduction zone seismic sources includes consideration of the three-dimensional geometry of the subducting plate, rupture segmentation of subduction zones, geometry of historical ruptures, constraints on the up-dip and down-dip extent of rupture, and comparisons with other subduction zones worldwide.The Basin and Range region of the Western United States, and to a lesser extent the Pacific Northwest and the Central United States, exhibit temporal clustering of earthquakes. Temporal clustering is best exemplified by the rupture histories within the Wasatch fault zone in Utah and the Meers fault in central Oklahoma, where several large late Holocene coseismic faulting events occurred at relatively close intervals (hundreds to thousands of years) that were preceded by long periods of quiescence that lasted thousands to tens of thousand years. Temporal clustering should be considered in these regions or wherever paleoseismic evidence indicates that it has occurred.C. REGULATORY POSITION1. GEOLOGICAL, GEOPHYSICAL, SEISMOLOGICAL, AND GEOTECHNICAL INVESTIGATIONS1.1 Comprehensive geological, seismological, geophysical, and geotechnical investigations of the site and regions around the site should be performed. For existing nuclear power plant sites where additional units are planned, the geosciences technical information originally used to validate those sites may be inadequate, depending on how much new or additional information has become available since the initial investigations and analyses were performed, the quality of the investigations performed at the time, and the complexity of the site and regional geology and seismology. This technical information should be utilized along with all other available information to plan and determine the scope of additional investigations. The investigations described in this regulatory guide are performed primarily to gather information needed to confirm the suitability of the site and to gather data pertinent to the safe design and construction of the nuclear power plant. Appropriate geological, seismological, and geophysical investigations are described in Appendix D to this guide. Geotechnical investigations are described in Regulatory Guide1.132, "Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants" (Ref. 8). Another important purpose for the site-specific investigations is to determine whether there are new data or interpretations that are not adequately incorporated in the existing PSHA data bases. Appendix E describes a method for evaluating new information derived from the site-specific investigations in the context of the PSHA.These investigations should be performed at four levels, with the degree of their detail based on distance from the site, the nature of the Quaternary tectonic regime, the geological complexity of the site and region, the existence of potential seismic sources, the potential for surface deformations, etc. A more detailed discussion of the areas and levels of investigations and the bases for them is presented in Appendix D to this regulatory guide. The levels of investigation are characterized as follows.1. Regional geological and seismological investigations are not expected to be extensive nor in great detail, but should include literature reviews, the study of maps and remote sensing data, and, if necessary, ground truth reconnaissances conducted within a radius of 320 km (200 miles) of the site to identify seismic sources (seismogenic and capable tectonic sources).2. Geological, seismological, and geophysical investigations should be carried out within a radius of 40 km (25 miles) in greater detail than the regional investigations to identify and characterize the seismic and surface deformation potential of any capable tectonic sources and the seismic potential of seismogenic sources, or to demonstrate that such structures are not present. Sites with capable tectonic or seismogenic sources within a radius of 40 km (25 miles) may require more extensive geological and seismological investigations and analyses (similar in detail to investigations and analysis usually preferred within an 8-km (5-mile) radius).3. Detailed geological, seismological, geophysical, and geotechnical investigations should be conducted within a radius of 8 km (5 miles) of the site, as appropriate, to evaluate the potential for tectonic deformation at or near the ground surface and to assess the ground motion transmission characteristics of soils and rocks in the site vicinity. Investigations should include monitoring by a network of seismic stations.4. Very detailed geological, geophysical, and geotechnical engineering investigations should be conducted within the site [radius of approximately 1 km (0.5 miles)] to assess specific soil and rock characteristics as described in Regulatory Guide 1.132 (Ref. 8).1.2 The areas of investigations may be expanded beyond those specified above in regions that include capable tectonic sources, relatively high seismicity, or complex geology, or in regions that have experienced a large, geologically recent earthquake.1.3 It should be demonstrated that deformation features discovered during construction, particularly faults, do not have the potential to compromise the safety of the plant. The two-step licensing practice, which required applicants to acquire a Construction Permit (CP), and then during construction apply for an Operating License (OL), has been modified to allow for an alternative procedure. The requirements and procedures applicable to NRC's issuance of combined licenses for nuclear power facilities are in Subpart C of 10 CFR Part 52. Applying the combined licensing procedure to a site could result in theaward of a license prior to the start of construction. During the construction of nuclear power plants licensed in the past two decades, previously unknown faults were often discovered in site excavations. Before issuance of the OL, it was necessary to demonstrate that the faults in the excavation posed no hazard to the facility. Under the combined license procedure, these kinds of features should be mapped and assessed as to their rupture and ground motion generating potential while the excavations' walls and bases are exposed. Therefore, a commitment should be made, in documents (Safety Analysis Reports) supporting the license application, to geologically map all excavations and to notify the NRC staff when excavations are open for inspection.1.4 Data sufficient to clearly justify all conclusions should be presented. Because engineering solutions cannot always be satisfactorily demonstrated for the effects of permanent ground displacement, it is prudent to avoid a site that has a potential for surface or near-surface deformation. Such sites normally will require extensive additional investigations.1.5 For the site and for the area surrounding the site, the lithologic, stratigraphic, hydrologic, and structural geologic conditions should be characterized. The investigations should include the measurement of the static and dynamic engineering properties of the materials underlying the site and an evaluation of physical evidence concerning the behavior during prior earthquakes of the surficial materials and the substrata underlying the site.The properties needed to assess the behavior of the underlying material during earthquakes, including the potential for liquefaction, and the characteristics of the underlying material in transmitting earthquake ground motions to the foundations of the plant (such as seismic wave velocities, density, water content, porosity, elastic moduli, and strength) should be measured.2. SEISMIC SOURCES SIGNIFICANT TO THE SITE SEISMIC HAZARD2.1 For sites in the CEUS, when the EPRI or LLNL PSHA methodologies and data bases are used to determine the SSE, it still may be necessary to investigate and characterize potential seismic sources that were previously unknown or uncharacterized and to perform sensitivity analyses to assess their significance to the seismic hazard estimate. The results of investigations discussed in Regulatory Position 1 should be used, in accordance with Appendix E, to determine whether the LLNL or EPRI seismic sources and their characterization should be updated. The guidance in Regulatory Positions 2.2 and 2.3 below and in Appendix D of this guide may be used if additional seismic sources are to be developed as a result of investigations.2.2 When the LLNL and EPRI methods are not used or are not applicable, the guidance in Regulatory Position 2.3 should be used for identification and characterization of seismic sources. The uncertainties in the characterization of seismic sources should be addressed as appropriate. Seismic source is ageneral term referring to both seismogenic sources and capable tectonic sources. The main distinction between these two types of seismic sources is that a seismogenic source would not cause surface displacement, but a capable tectonic source causes surface or near-surface displacement. Identification and characterization of seismic sources should be based on regional and site geological and geophysical data, historical and instrumental seismicity data, the regional stress field, and geological evidence of prehistoric earthquakes. Investigations to identify seismic sources are described in Appendix D. The bases for the identification of seismic sources should be documented. A general list of characteristics to be evaluated for a seismic source is presented in Appendix D.2.3 As part of the seismic source characterization, the seismic potential for each source should be evaluated. Typically, characterization of the seismic potential consists of four equally important elements:1. Selection of a model for the spatial distribution of earthquakes in a source.2. Selection of a model for the temporal distribution of earthquakes in a source.3. Selection of a model for the relative frequency of earthquakes of various magnitudes, including an estimate for the largest earthquake that could occur in the source under the current tectonic regime.4. A complete description of the uncertainty.For example, in the LLNL study a truncated exponential model was used for the distribution of magnitudes given that an earthquake has occurred in asource. A stationary Poisson process is used to model the spatial and temporal occurrences of earthquakes in a source.For a general discussion of evaluating the earthquake potential and characterizing the uncertainty, refer to the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee Report (Ref. 9).2.3.1 For sites in the CEUS, when the LLNL or EPRI method is not used or not applicable (such as in the New Madrid Seismic Zone), it is necessary to evaluate the seismic potential for each source. The seismic sources and data that have been accepted by the NRC in past licensing decisions may be used, along with the data gathered from the investigations carried out as described in Regulatory Position 1.Generally, the seismic sources for the CEUS are area sources because there is uncertainty about the underlying causes of earthquakes. This uncertainty is due to a lack of active surface faulting, a low rate of seismic activity, and a short historical record. The assessment of earthquake recurrence for CEUS area sources commonly relies heavily on catalogs of observed seismicity. Because these catalogs are incomplete and cover a relatively short period of time, it is difficult to obtain reliable estimates of the rate of activity. Considerable care must be taken to correct for incompleteness and to model the uncertainty in the rate of earthquake recurrence. To completely characterize the seismic potential for a source it is also necessary to estimate the largest earthquake magnitude that a seismic source is capable ofgenerating under the current tectonic regime. This estimated magnitude defines the upper bound of the earthquake recurrence relationship.The assessment of earthquake potential for area sources is particularly difficult because the physical constraint most important to the assessment, the dimensions of the fault rupture, is not known. As a result, the primary methods for assessing maximum earthquakes for area sources usually include a consideration of the historical seismicity record, the pattern and rate of seismic activity, the Quaternary (2 million years and younger), characteristics of the source, the current stress regime (and how it aligns with known tectonic structures), paleoseismic data, and analogues to sources in other regions considered tectonically similar to the CEUS. Because of the shortness of the historical catalog and low rate of seismic activity, considerable judgment is needed. It is important to characterize the large uncertainties in the assessment of the earthquake potential.2.3.2 For sites located within the Western United States, earthquakes can often be associated with known tectonic structures. For faults, the earthquake potential is related to the characteristics of the estimated future rupture, such as the total rupture area, the length, or the amount of fault displacement. The following empirical relations can be used to estimate the earthquake potential from fault behavior data and also to estimate the amount of displacement that might be expected for a given magnitude. It is prudent to use several of these different relations to obtain an estimate of the earthquake magnitude.∙Surface rupture length versus magnitude (Refs. 10-13),∙Subsurface rupture length versus magnitude (Ref. 14),∙Rupture area versus magnitude (Ref. 15),∙Maximum and average displacement versus magnitude (Ref. 14),∙Slip rate versus magnitude (Ref. 16).When such correlations as References 10-16 are used, the earthquake potential is often evaluated as the mean of the distribution. The difficult issue is the evaluation of the appropriate rupture dimension to be used. This is a judgmental process based on geological data for the fault in question and the behavior of other regional fault systems of the same type.The other elements of the recurrence model are generally obtained using catalogs of seismicity, fault slip rate, and other data. In some cases, it may be appropriate to use recurrence models with memory. All the sources of uncertainty must be appropriately modeled. Additionally, the phenomenon of temporal clustering should be considered when there is geological evidence of its past occurrence.2.3.3 For sites near subduction zones, such as in the Pacific Northwest and Alaska, the maximum magnitude must be assessed for subduction zone seismic sources. Worldwide observations indicate that the largest known earthquakes are associated with the plate interface, although intraslab earthquakes may also have large magnitudes. The assessment of plate interface earthquakes can be based on estimates of the expected dimensions of rupture or analogies to other subduction zones worldwide.3. PROBABILISTIC SEISMIC HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCEDURESA PSHA should be performed for the site as it allows the use of multiple models to estimate the likelihood of earthquake ground motions occurring at a site, and a PSHA systematically takes into account uncertainties that exist in various parameters (such as seismic sources, maximum earthquakes, and groundmotion attenuation). Alternative hypotheses are considered in a quantitative fashion in a PSHA. Alternative hypotheses can also be used to evaluate the sensitivity of the hazard to the uncertainties in the significant parameters and to identify the relative contribution of each seismic source to the hazard. Reference 9 provides guidance for conducting a PSHA.The following steps describe a procedure that is acceptable to the NRC staff for performing a PSHA. The details of the calculational aspects of deriving controlling earthquakes from the PSHA are included in Appendix C.1. Perform regional and site geological, seismological, and geophysical investigations in accordance with Regulatory Position 1 and Appendix D.2. For CEUS sites, perform an evaluation of LLNL or EPRI seismic sources in accordance with Appendix E to determine whether they are consistent with the site-specific data gathered in Step 1 or require updating. The PSHA should only be updated if the new information indicates that the current version significantly underestimates the hazard and there is a strong technical basis that supports such a revision. It may be possible to justify a lower hazard estimate with an exceptionally strong technical basis. However, it is expected。
美国核标准
RG1.097事故监控仪表的准则1980.pdf
RG1.097事故监控仪表的准则1983.pdf
RG1.097事故监控仪表的准则2006.pdf
RG1.098沸水堆中放射活性废气排放系统潜在放射性后果评价所使用的假设1976.pdf
RG1.099反应堆压力容器材料的放射性脆化1988.pdf
RG1.083 PWR SG传热管的在役检查1975.pdf
RG1.084 ASME第III卷设计制造和材料规范案例可接受性1989.pdf
RG1.084 ASME第III卷设计制造和材料规范案例可接受性1994.pdf
RG1.084 ASME第III卷设计制造和材料规范案例可接受性1999.doc
RG1.060抗震设计的设计反应谱1973.pdf
RG1.061核电厂扩展设计阻尼值1973.pdf
RG1.061核电厂扩展设计阻尼值2007.pdf
RG1.062保护措施的手动启动1973.pdf
RG1.063安全壳结构中的电气贯穿件1987.pdf
RG1.065反应堆容器封口螺栓的材料与检查1973.pdf
美国核管会法规NRC\01 NRC法规导则-RG
RG1.001 ECC和安全壳热排除系统泵的净压头1970.pdf
RG1.003 BWR LOCA的潜在辐射后果评估所用的假设1974.pdf
RG1.004评价LOCA的潜在放射性后果所使用的假设1974.pdf
RG1.005 BWR蒸汽管线破裂的潜在辐射后果评估所用的假设1971.pdf
RG1.054 I, II, III级防护涂层2000.pdf
RG1.056沸水堆水纯净度的维护1978.pdf
RG1.012 核电厂地震仪表 1997
Revision 2March 1997Regulatory Guide 1.12 Nuclear Power Plant InstrumentationFor Earthquakes(Draft issued as DG-1033)[ Division Index | Regulatory Guide Index | NRC Home Page ] Publication InformationA. INTRODUCTIONIn 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," licensees are required to make every reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable. Paragraph IV(a)(4) of Appendix S, "Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires that suitable instrumentation must be provided so that the seismic response of nuclear power plant features important to safety can be evaluated promptly after an earthquake. Paragraph IV(a)(3) of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50requires shutdown of the nuclear power plant if vibratory ground motion exceeding that of the operating basis earthquake ground motion (OBE) occurs.1This guide describes seismic instrumentation that is acceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the requirements of Part 20 and Appendix S to Part 50. The information collections contained in this regulatory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.B. DISCUSSIONWhen an earthquake occurs, it is important to take prompt action to assess the effects of the earthquake at the nuclear power plant. This assessment includes both an evaluation of the seismic instrumentation data and a plant walkdown. Solid-state digital time-history accelerographs installed at appropriate locations will provide time-history data on the seismic response of the free-field, containment structure, and other Seismic Category I structures. The instrumentation should be located so that the response may be compared and evaluated with the design basis and so that occupational radiation exposures associated with their location, installation, and maintenance are maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).Instrumentation is provided in the free-field and at foundation level and at elevation in Seismic Category I structures. Free-field instrumentation data will be used to compare measured response to the engineering evaluations used to determine the design input motion to the structures and to determine whether the OBE has been exceeded (see Regulatory Guide 1.166). The instruments located at the foundation level and at elevation in the structures measure responses that are the input to the equipment or piping and will be used in long-term evaluations (see Regulatory Guide 1.167, "Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event"). Foundation-level instrumentation will provide data on the actual seismic input to the containment and other Seismic Category I structures and will be used to quantify differences between the vibratory ground motion at the free-field and at the foundation level. Instrumentation is not located on equipment, piping, or supports since experience has shown that data obtained at these locations are obscured by the vibratory motion associated with normal plant operation.The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.166 is based on the assumption that the nuclear power plant has operable seismic instrumentation, including the equipment and software needed to process the data within 4 hours after an earthquake. This is necessary to determine whether plant shutdown is required. This determination will be made by comparing the recorded data against OBE exceedance criteria and by evaluating the results of the plant walkdown inspections that take place within 8 hours of the event.It may not be necessary for identical nuclear power units on a given site to each be provided with seismic instrumentation if essentially the same seismic response at each of the units is expected from a given earthquake.An NRC staff evaluation of seismic instrumentation noted that instruments have been out of service during plant shutdown and sometimes during plant operation. The instrumentation system should be operable and operated at all times. If the seismic instrumentation or data processing hardware and software necessary to determine whether the OBE has been exceeded is inoperable, the guidelines in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.166 should be used.The characteristics, installation, activation, remote indication, and maintenance of the seismic instrumentation are described in this guide to help ensure (1) that the data provided are comparable with the data used in the design of the nuclear power plant, (2) that exceedance of the OBE can be determined, and (3) that the equipment will perform as required.It is important that all the significant ground motion associated with an earthquake is recorded. This is accomplished by specifying how long before and after the actuation of the seismic trigger the data should be recorded. Settings for the instrumentation's pre-event memory should be correlated with the maximum distance to any potential epicenter that could affect a specific site. The "P" wave may not be recorded with only a 3-second memory setting. Also, when an event occurs at some distance and the trigger threshold limit is not exceeded until 15 or 20 seconds into the event, a part of the record,although at low amplitude, is lost. A 30-second value may be more appropriate and is within the capabilities of current digital time-history accelerographs at no additional cost.The appendix to this guide provides definitions to be used with this guidance.C. REGULATORY POSITIONThe type, locations, operability, characteristics, installation, actuation, remote indication, and maintenance of seismic instrumentation described below are acceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and Paragraph IV(a)(4) of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50 for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants.1. SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION TYPE AND LOCATION1.1 Solid-state digital instrumentation that will enable the processing of data at the plant site within 4 hours of the seismic event should be used.1.2 A triaxial time-history accelerograph should be provided at the following locations:1. Free-field.2. Containment foundation.3. Two elevations (excluding the foundation) on a structure inside the containment.4. An independent Seismic Category I structure foundation where the response is different from that of the containment structure.5. An elevation (excluding the foundation) on the independent Seismic Category I structure selected in 4 above.6. If seismic isolators are used, instrumentation should be placed on both the rigid and isolated portions of the same or an adjacent structure, as appropriate, at approximately the same elevations.1.3 The specific locations for instrumentation should be determined by the nuclear plant designer to obtain the most pertinent information consistent with maintaining occupational radiation exposures ALARA for the location, installation, and maintenance of seismic instrumentation. In general:1.3.1 The free-field sensors should be located and installed so that they record the motion of the ground surface and so that the effects associated with surface features, buildings, and components on the recorded ground motion will be insignificant.1.3.2 The in-structure instrumentation should be placed at locations that have been modeled as mass points in the building dynamic analysis so that the measured motion can be directly compared with the design spectra. The instrumentation should not be located on a secondary structural frame member that is not modeled as a mass point in the building dynamic model. 1.3.3 A design review of the location, installation, and maintenance of proposed instrumentation for maintaining exposures ALARA should be performed by the facility in the planning stage in accordance with Regulatory Guide 8.8, "Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational RadiationExposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will Be As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable."1.3.4 Instrumentation should be placed in a location with as low a dose rate as is practical, consistent with other requirements.1.3.5 Instruments should be selected to require minimal maintenance andin-service inspection, as well as minimal time and numbers of personnel to conduct installation and maintenance.2. INSTRUMENTATION AT MULTI-UNIT SITESInstrumentation in addition to that installed for a single unit will not be required if essentially the same seismic response is expected at the other units based on the seismic analysis used in the seismic design of the plant. However, if there are separate control rooms, annunciation should be provided to both control rooms as specified in Regulatory Position 7.3. SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITYThe seismic instrumentation should operate during all modes of plant operation, including periods of plant shutdown. The maintenance and repair procedures should provide for keeping the maximum number of instruments in service during plant operation and shutdown.4. INSTRUMENTATION CHARACTERISTICS4.1 The design should include provisions forin-service testing. The instruments should be capable of periodic channel checks during normal plant operation.4.2 The instruments should have the capability for in-place functional testing.4.3 Instrumentation that has sensors located in inaccessible areas should contain provisions for data recording in an accessible location, and the instrumentation should provide an external remote alarm to indicate actuation.4.4 The instrumentation should record, at a minimum, 3 seconds oflow-amplitude motion prior to seismic trigger actuation, continue to record the motion during the period in which the earthquake motion exceeds the seismic trigger threshold, and continue to record low-amplitude motion for a minimum of 5 seconds beyond the last exceedance of the seismic trigger threshold.4.5 The instrumentation should be capable of recording 25 minutes of sensed motion.4.6 The battery should be of sufficient capacity to power the instrumentation to sense and record (see Regulatory Position 4.5) 25 minutes of motion over a period of not less than the channel check test interval (Regulatory Position 8.2). This can be accomplished by providing enough battery capacity for a minimum of 25 minutes of system operation at any time over a 24-hour period, without recharging, in combination with a battery charger whose line power is connected to an uninterruptable power supply or a line source with an alarm that is checked at least every 24 hours. Other combinations of larger battery capacity and alarm intervals may be used.4.7Acceleration Sensors4.7.1 The dynamic range should be 1000:1 zero to peak, or greater; for example, 0.001g to 1.0g.4.7.2 The frequency range should be 0.20 Hz to 50 Hz or an equivalent demonstrated to be adequate by computational techniques applied to the resultant accelerogram.4.8Recorder4.8.1 The sample rate should be at least 200 samples per second in each of the three directions.4.8.2 The bandwidth should be at least from 0.20 Hz to 50 Hz.4.8.3 The dynamic range should be 1000:1 or greater, and the instrumentation should be able to record at least 1.0g zero to peak.4.9Seismic TriggerThe actuating level should be adjustable and within the range of 0.001g to 0.02g.5. INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLATION5.1 The instrumentation should be designed and installed so that the mounting is rigid.5.2 The instrumentation should be oriented so that the horizontal components are parallel to theorthogonal horizontal axes assumed in the seismic analysis.5.3 Protection against accidental impacts should be provided.6. INSTRUMENTATION ACTUATION6.1 Both vertical and horizontal input vibratory ground motion should actuate the same time-history accelerograph. One or more seismic triggers may be used to accomplish this.6.2 Spurious triggering should be avoided.6.3 The seismic trigger mechanisms of the time-history accelerograph should be set for a threshold ground acceleration of not more than 0.02g.7. REMOTE INDICATIONTriggering of the free-field or any foundation-level time-history accelerograph should be annunciated in the control room. If there is more than one control room at the site, annunciation should be provided to each control room.8. MAINTENANCE8.1 The purpose of the maintenance program is to ensure that the equipment will perform as required. As stated in Regulatory Position 3, the maintenance and repair procedures should provide for keeping the maximum number of instruments in service during plant operation and shutdown.8.2 Systems are to be given channel checks every 2 weeks for the first 3 months of service after startup. Failures of devices normally occur during initial operation. After the initial 3-month period and 3 consecutive successful checks, monthly channel checks are sufficient. The monthly channel check is to include checking the batteries. The channel functional test should be performed every 6 months. Channel calibration should be performed during each refueling outage at a minimum.D. IMPLEMENTATIONThe purpose of this section is to provide guidance to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this regulatory guide.Except in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with the specified portions of the Commission's regulations, this guide will be used in the evaluation of applications for construction permits, operating licenses, combined licenses, or design certification submitted after January 10, 1997. This guide will not be used in the evaluation of an application for an operating license submitted after January 10, 1997, if the construction permit was issued prior to that date. Holders of an operating license or construction permit issued prior to January 10, 1997, may voluntarily implement the methods described in this guide in combination with the methods in Regulatory Guides 1.166, "Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Postearthquake Actions," and 1.167, "Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event." Other implementation strategies, such as voluntary implementation of portions of the cited regulatory guides, will be evaluated by the NRC staff on a case-by-case basis.APPENDIXDEFINITIONSAcceleration Sensor. An instrument capable of sensing absolute acceleration and transmitting the data to a recorder.Accessible Instruments. Instruments or sensors whose locations permit ready access during plant operation without violation of applicable safety regulations, such as those of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or regulations dealing with plant security or radiation protection safety.Channel Calibration (Primary Calibration). The determination and, if required, adjustment of an instrument, sensor, or system such that it responds within a specific range and accuracy to an acceleration, velocity, or displacement input, as applicable, or responds to an acceptable physical constant.Channel Check. The qualitative verification of the functional status of the instrument sensor. This check is an "in-situ" test and may be the same as a channel functional test.Channel Functional Test (Secondary Calibration). The determination without adjustment that an instrument, sensor, or system responds to a known input of such character that it will verify the instrument, sensor, or system is functioning in a manner that can be calibrated.Containment--See Primary Containment and Secondary Containment. Nonaccessible Instruments. Instruments or sensors in locations that do not permit ready access during plant operation because of a risk of violating applicable plant operating safety regulations, such as OSHA, or regulations dealing with plant security or radiation protection safety.Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion (OBE). The vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain functional. The value of the OBE is set by the applicant.Primary Containment. The principal structure of a unit that acts as the barrier, after the fuel cladding and reactor pressure boundary, to control the release of radioactive material. The primary containment includes (1) the containment structure and its access openings, penetrations, and appurtenances, (2) the valves, pipes, closed systems, and other components used to isolate the containment atmosphere from the environment, and (3) those systems or portions of systems that, by their system functions, extend the containment structure boundary (e.g., the connecting steam and feedwater piping) and provide effective isolation.Recorder. An instrument capable of simultaneously recording the data versus time from an acceleration sensor or sensors.Secondary Containment. The structure surrounding the primary containment that acts as a further barrier to control the release of radioactive material. Seismic Isolator. A device (for instance, laminated elastomer and steel) installed between the structure and its foundation to reduce the acceleration of the isolated structure, as well as the attached equipment and components. Seismic Trigger. A device that starts the time-history accelerograph.Time-History Accelerograph. An instrument capable of sensing and permanently recording the absolute acceleration versus time. The components of the time-history accelerograph (acceleration sensor, recorder, seismic trigger) may be assembled in a self-contained unit or may be separately located.Triaxial. Describes the function of an instrument or group of instruments oriented in three mutuallyorthogonal directions, one of which is vertical.REGULATORY ANALYSISA separate regulatory analysis was not prepared for this regulatory guide. The regulatory analysis, "Revision of 10 CFR Part 100 and 10 CFR Part 50," was prepared for these amendments, and it provides the regulatory basis for this guide and examines the costs and benefits of the rule as implemented by the guide. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC, as Attachment 7 to SECY-96-118.[ Division Index | Regulatory Guide Index | NRC Home Page ] Footnotes1Regulatory Guide 1.166, "Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Postearthquake Actions," provides criteria for plant shutdown after an earthquake.。
核电站仪表与控制:第1章 核电厂仪表和控制系统概述
转速和振动的测量系统等。
1.1 核电厂仪表与控制系统的组成和功能
(1)安全级设备
安全级(简称1E级)的仪表及其供电设备,是完成反 应堆安全停堆、安全壳隔离、堆芯冷却以及从安全壳核反 应堆排出热量所必需的,或者是防止放射物质向环境过量 排放所必需的。
(2)安全有关的设备
安全有关(简称SR)的设备,在实现或保持核电厂安全 方面起补充、支持或间接地作用,因此有可能避免触发安 全级系统和设备,也可能避免或缓解假定始发事件的后果, 或者改善安全级设备功能的效果。
核电站仪表与控制
第1章 核电厂仪表和控制系统概述
1.1 核电厂仪表与控制系统的组成和功能 1.2 核电厂仪表和控制系统的工作特点 1.3 核电厂仪表与控制系统的安全分级
1.1 核电厂仪表与控制系统的组成和功能 1.1.1 系统的组成
1.1 核电厂仪表与控制系统的组成和功能
1.1.1 系统的组成
(3)非安全重要设备
非安全重要(简称NS)仪表及其供电设备,在实现或 保持电厂安全方面无明显作用。
噪比。 2)多数核探测器都有很高的内阻,可以把它看成一
个电流源。要求测量电路具有高的输入阻抗。 3)要测量的中子注量率范围宽,用一种探测器和测
量电路难于满足要求,须采用多种探测器。 4)信号电缆长,工作环境恶劣,要求具有耐高温、抗
辐照、抗干扰、低噪声和高绝缘等特性。
1.3 核电厂仪表与控制系统的安全分级
我国核电厂抗震设计反应谱和RG1.60设计反应谱的比较分析
我国核电厂抗震设计反应谱和RG1.60设计反应谱的比较分
析
李亮;杨宇;赵雷;詹佳硕;覃锋;路雨
【期刊名称】《核安全》
【年(卷),期】2016(015)002
【摘要】设计反应谱对评价核电厂在地震作用下的安全性极为重要.本文从统计核电厂抗震设计标准反应谱时选取的强震数据及统计方法两个方面,分析比较了美国RG 1.60设计反应谱和我国核电厂抗震设计规范反应谱的异同.通过对比分析,深入理解核电厂抗震设计反应谱的提出需考虑的关键因素,为核电厂抗震设计和审评工作提供参考.
【总页数】6页(P58-63)
【作者】李亮;杨宇;赵雷;詹佳硕;覃锋;路雨
【作者单位】环境保护部核与辐射安全中心,北京100082;环境保护部核与辐射安全中心,北京100082;环境保护部核与辐射安全中心,北京100082;环境保护部核与辐射安全中心,北京100082;中广核工程有限公司,深圳518000;环境保护部核与辐射安全中心,北京100082
【正文语种】中文
【中图分类】P315
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Revision 2March 1997Regulatory Guide 1.12 Nuclear Power Plant InstrumentationFor Earthquakes(Draft issued as DG-1033)[ Division Index | Regulatory Guide Index | NRC Home Page ] Publication InformationA. INTRODUCTIONIn 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," licensees are required to make every reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable. Paragraph IV(a)(4) of Appendix S, "Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires that suitable instrumentation must be provided so that the seismic response of nuclear power plant features important to safety can be evaluated promptly after an earthquake. Paragraph IV(a)(3) of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50requires shutdown of the nuclear power plant if vibratory ground motion exceeding that of the operating basis earthquake ground motion (OBE) occurs.1This guide describes seismic instrumentation that is acceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the requirements of Part 20 and Appendix S to Part 50. The information collections contained in this regulatory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.B. DISCUSSIONWhen an earthquake occurs, it is important to take prompt action to assess the effects of the earthquake at the nuclear power plant. This assessment includes both an evaluation of the seismic instrumentation data and a plant walkdown. Solid-state digital time-history accelerographs installed at appropriate locations will provide time-history data on the seismic response of the free-field, containment structure, and other Seismic Category I structures. The instrumentation should be located so that the response may be compared and evaluated with the design basis and so that occupational radiation exposures associated with their location, installation, and maintenance are maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).Instrumentation is provided in the free-field and at foundation level and at elevation in Seismic Category I structures. Free-field instrumentation data will be used to compare measured response to the engineering evaluations used to determine the design input motion to the structures and to determine whether the OBE has been exceeded (see Regulatory Guide 1.166). The instruments located at the foundation level and at elevation in the structures measure responses that are the input to the equipment or piping and will be used in long-term evaluations (see Regulatory Guide 1.167, "Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event"). Foundation-level instrumentation will provide data on the actual seismic input to the containment and other Seismic Category I structures and will be used to quantify differences between the vibratory ground motion at the free-field and at the foundation level. Instrumentation is not located on equipment, piping, or supports since experience has shown that data obtained at these locations are obscured by the vibratory motion associated with normal plant operation.The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.166 is based on the assumption that the nuclear power plant has operable seismic instrumentation, including the equipment and software needed to process the data within 4 hours after an earthquake. This is necessary to determine whether plant shutdown is required. This determination will be made by comparing the recorded data against OBE exceedance criteria and by evaluating the results of the plant walkdown inspections that take place within 8 hours of the event.It may not be necessary for identical nuclear power units on a given site to each be provided with seismic instrumentation if essentially the same seismic response at each of the units is expected from a given earthquake.An NRC staff evaluation of seismic instrumentation noted that instruments have been out of service during plant shutdown and sometimes during plant operation. The instrumentation system should be operable and operated at all times. If the seismic instrumentation or data processing hardware and software necessary to determine whether the OBE has been exceeded is inoperable, the guidelines in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.166 should be used.The characteristics, installation, activation, remote indication, and maintenance of the seismic instrumentation are described in this guide to help ensure (1) that the data provided are comparable with the data used in the design of the nuclear power plant, (2) that exceedance of the OBE can be determined, and (3) that the equipment will perform as required.It is important that all the significant ground motion associated with an earthquake is recorded. This is accomplished by specifying how long before and after the actuation of the seismic trigger the data should be recorded. Settings for the instrumentation's pre-event memory should be correlated with the maximum distance to any potential epicenter that could affect a specific site. The "P" wave may not be recorded with only a 3-second memory setting. Also, when an event occurs at some distance and the trigger threshold limit is not exceeded until 15 or 20 seconds into the event, a part of the record,although at low amplitude, is lost. A 30-second value may be more appropriate and is within the capabilities of current digital time-history accelerographs at no additional cost.The appendix to this guide provides definitions to be used with this guidance.C. REGULATORY POSITIONThe type, locations, operability, characteristics, installation, actuation, remote indication, and maintenance of seismic instrumentation described below are acceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and Paragraph IV(a)(4) of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50 for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants.1. SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION TYPE AND LOCATION1.1 Solid-state digital instrumentation that will enable the processing of data at the plant site within 4 hours of the seismic event should be used.1.2 A triaxial time-history accelerograph should be provided at the following locations:1. Free-field.2. Containment foundation.3. Two elevations (excluding the foundation) on a structure inside the containment.4. An independent Seismic Category I structure foundation where the response is different from that of the containment structure.5. An elevation (excluding the foundation) on the independent Seismic Category I structure selected in 4 above.6. If seismic isolators are used, instrumentation should be placed on both the rigid and isolated portions of the same or an adjacent structure, as appropriate, at approximately the same elevations.1.3 The specific locations for instrumentation should be determined by the nuclear plant designer to obtain the most pertinent information consistent with maintaining occupational radiation exposures ALARA for the location, installation, and maintenance of seismic instrumentation. In general:1.3.1 The free-field sensors should be located and installed so that they record the motion of the ground surface and so that the effects associated with surface features, buildings, and components on the recorded ground motion will be insignificant.1.3.2 The in-structure instrumentation should be placed at locations that have been modeled as mass points in the building dynamic analysis so that the measured motion can be directly compared with the design spectra. The instrumentation should not be located on a secondary structural frame member that is not modeled as a mass point in the building dynamic model. 1.3.3 A design review of the location, installation, and maintenance of proposed instrumentation for maintaining exposures ALARA should be performed by the facility in the planning stage in accordance with Regulatory Guide 8.8, "Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational RadiationExposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will Be As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable."1.3.4 Instrumentation should be placed in a location with as low a dose rate as is practical, consistent with other requirements.1.3.5 Instruments should be selected to require minimal maintenance andin-service inspection, as well as minimal time and numbers of personnel to conduct installation and maintenance.2. INSTRUMENTATION AT MULTI-UNIT SITESInstrumentation in addition to that installed for a single unit will not be required if essentially the same seismic response is expected at the other units based on the seismic analysis used in the seismic design of the plant. However, if there are separate control rooms, annunciation should be provided to both control rooms as specified in Regulatory Position 7.3. SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITYThe seismic instrumentation should operate during all modes of plant operation, including periods of plant shutdown. The maintenance and repair procedures should provide for keeping the maximum number of instruments in service during plant operation and shutdown.4. INSTRUMENTATION CHARACTERISTICS4.1 The design should include provisions forin-service testing. The instruments should be capable of periodic channel checks during normal plant operation.4.2 The instruments should have the capability for in-place functional testing.4.3 Instrumentation that has sensors located in inaccessible areas should contain provisions for data recording in an accessible location, and the instrumentation should provide an external remote alarm to indicate actuation.4.4 The instrumentation should record, at a minimum, 3 seconds oflow-amplitude motion prior to seismic trigger actuation, continue to record the motion during the period in which the earthquake motion exceeds the seismic trigger threshold, and continue to record low-amplitude motion for a minimum of 5 seconds beyond the last exceedance of the seismic trigger threshold.4.5 The instrumentation should be capable of recording 25 minutes of sensed motion.4.6 The battery should be of sufficient capacity to power the instrumentation to sense and record (see Regulatory Position 4.5) 25 minutes of motion over a period of not less than the channel check test interval (Regulatory Position 8.2). This can be accomplished by providing enough battery capacity for a minimum of 25 minutes of system operation at any time over a 24-hour period, without recharging, in combination with a battery charger whose line power is connected to an uninterruptable power supply or a line source with an alarm that is checked at least every 24 hours. Other combinations of larger battery capacity and alarm intervals may be used.4.7Acceleration Sensors4.7.1 The dynamic range should be 1000:1 zero to peak, or greater; for example, 0.001g to 1.0g.4.7.2 The frequency range should be 0.20 Hz to 50 Hz or an equivalent demonstrated to be adequate by computational techniques applied to the resultant accelerogram.4.8Recorder4.8.1 The sample rate should be at least 200 samples per second in each of the three directions.4.8.2 The bandwidth should be at least from 0.20 Hz to 50 Hz.4.8.3 The dynamic range should be 1000:1 or greater, and the instrumentation should be able to record at least 1.0g zero to peak.4.9Seismic TriggerThe actuating level should be adjustable and within the range of 0.001g to 0.02g.5. INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLATION5.1 The instrumentation should be designed and installed so that the mounting is rigid.5.2 The instrumentation should be oriented so that the horizontal components are parallel to theorthogonal horizontal axes assumed in the seismic analysis.5.3 Protection against accidental impacts should be provided.6. INSTRUMENTATION ACTUATION6.1 Both vertical and horizontal input vibratory ground motion should actuate the same time-history accelerograph. One or more seismic triggers may be used to accomplish this.6.2 Spurious triggering should be avoided.6.3 The seismic trigger mechanisms of the time-history accelerograph should be set for a threshold ground acceleration of not more than 0.02g.7. REMOTE INDICATIONTriggering of the free-field or any foundation-level time-history accelerograph should be annunciated in the control room. If there is more than one control room at the site, annunciation should be provided to each control room.8. MAINTENANCE8.1 The purpose of the maintenance program is to ensure that the equipment will perform as required. As stated in Regulatory Position 3, the maintenance and repair procedures should provide for keeping the maximum number of instruments in service during plant operation and shutdown.8.2 Systems are to be given channel checks every 2 weeks for the first 3 months of service after startup. Failures of devices normally occur during initial operation. After the initial 3-month period and 3 consecutive successful checks, monthly channel checks are sufficient. The monthly channel check is to include checking the batteries. The channel functional test should be performed every 6 months. Channel calibration should be performed during each refueling outage at a minimum.D. IMPLEMENTATIONThe purpose of this section is to provide guidance to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this regulatory guide.Except in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with the specified portions of the Commission's regulations, this guide will be used in the evaluation of applications for construction permits, operating licenses, combined licenses, or design certification submitted after January 10, 1997. This guide will not be used in the evaluation of an application for an operating license submitted after January 10, 1997, if the construction permit was issued prior to that date. Holders of an operating license or construction permit issued prior to January 10, 1997, may voluntarily implement the methods described in this guide in combination with the methods in Regulatory Guides 1.166, "Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Postearthquake Actions," and 1.167, "Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event." Other implementation strategies, such as voluntary implementation of portions of the cited regulatory guides, will be evaluated by the NRC staff on a case-by-case basis.APPENDIXDEFINITIONSAcceleration Sensor. An instrument capable of sensing absolute acceleration and transmitting the data to a recorder.Accessible Instruments. Instruments or sensors whose locations permit ready access during plant operation without violation of applicable safety regulations, such as those of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or regulations dealing with plant security or radiation protection safety.Channel Calibration (Primary Calibration). The determination and, if required, adjustment of an instrument, sensor, or system such that it responds within a specific range and accuracy to an acceleration, velocity, or displacement input, as applicable, or responds to an acceptable physical constant.Channel Check. The qualitative verification of the functional status of the instrument sensor. This check is an "in-situ" test and may be the same as a channel functional test.Channel Functional Test (Secondary Calibration). The determination without adjustment that an instrument, sensor, or system responds to a known input of such character that it will verify the instrument, sensor, or system is functioning in a manner that can be calibrated.Containment--See Primary Containment and Secondary Containment. Nonaccessible Instruments. Instruments or sensors in locations that do not permit ready access during plant operation because of a risk of violating applicable plant operating safety regulations, such as OSHA, or regulations dealing with plant security or radiation protection safety.Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion (OBE). The vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain functional. The value of the OBE is set by the applicant.Primary Containment. The principal structure of a unit that acts as the barrier, after the fuel cladding and reactor pressure boundary, to control the release of radioactive material. The primary containment includes (1) the containment structure and its access openings, penetrations, and appurtenances, (2) the valves, pipes, closed systems, and other components used to isolate the containment atmosphere from the environment, and (3) those systems or portions of systems that, by their system functions, extend the containment structure boundary (e.g., the connecting steam and feedwater piping) and provide effective isolation.Recorder. An instrument capable of simultaneously recording the data versus time from an acceleration sensor or sensors.Secondary Containment. The structure surrounding the primary containment that acts as a further barrier to control the release of radioactive material. Seismic Isolator. A device (for instance, laminated elastomer and steel) installed between the structure and its foundation to reduce the acceleration of the isolated structure, as well as the attached equipment and components. Seismic Trigger. A device that starts the time-history accelerograph.Time-History Accelerograph. An instrument capable of sensing and permanently recording the absolute acceleration versus time. The components of the time-history accelerograph (acceleration sensor, recorder, seismic trigger) may be assembled in a self-contained unit or may be separately located.Triaxial. Describes the function of an instrument or group of instruments oriented in three mutuallyorthogonal directions, one of which is vertical.REGULATORY ANALYSISA separate regulatory analysis was not prepared for this regulatory guide. The regulatory analysis, "Revision of 10 CFR Part 100 and 10 CFR Part 50," was prepared for these amendments, and it provides the regulatory basis for this guide and examines the costs and benefits of the rule as implemented by the guide. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC, as Attachment 7 to SECY-96-118.[ Division Index | Regulatory Guide Index | NRC Home Page ] Footnotes1Regulatory Guide 1.166, "Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Postearthquake Actions," provides criteria for plant shutdown after an earthquake.。