薄煤层开采技术61页PPT
UBB公司薄煤层开采技术
UBB Report: A Failure of Basic Coal Mine Safety Practiceshe report to the Governor by the Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel led by J.Davitt McAteer on the Upper BigBranch explosion is subtitled A Failure of Basic Coal Mine S afetyPractices . This investigation, one of several, is thorough, but not entirely exhaustive because there are still questions which remain, in part,because of the force of the explosion destroyed much of the evidence. Twenty-nine miners died and one was seriously injured as the enor-mously powerful blast rocketed through two and one-half miles of underground workings nearly 1,000feet beneath the surface of the rugged mountains along the Coal River. The disaster has grave conse-quences for a mining company, for a community, and, most importantly,for the family members who lost men dear to them.The blast was actually a series of explosions created as the com-pressed air on the leading edge of the force caused the coal dust to become airborne. In this way, the explosion generated its own fuel with the air and dust mixture behav-ing like a line of gunpowder carrying the blast forward in multiple direc-tions toward the outside of the mine,deeper into the tailgate and along the longwall face toward Headgate 22, Tailgate 22, and 9 North.The line of explosion raced out of the Tailgate and through Crossover 21. While the main force was con-centrated in the track entry, it also spread through the crosscuts to the left and right as it encountered fresh coal dust. Once it crossed the con-nector, it traveled down the longwall headgate to North, up the 6 North belt entry and 7 North belt and onto Headgate 22, where it reached its strongest levels. When the force reached the end of the entry onHeadgate 22, it reversed course and raced back out, obliterating every-thing in its path.In the chapter entitled Events Leading up to the Explosion , the low volume of air in the mine was described by several witnesses. The subject of questionable anemome-ter readings taken underground is documented. There were problems with significant water accumula-tions. Accurate air readings and water levels in those key ventilation entries would provide a valuable his-tory of conditions in a critical part of the mine in the days and weeks prior to the explosion.There was some confusion in the Command Center after the explo-sion to which an entire chapter of the report is given. In the Command Center at UBB, the report says that “many things did not work well.” For example, notetaking was spotty and as a result, Command Center offi-cials failed to create an adequate written record to indicate how events transpired. Interviews with officials indicated that the phone calls to the Command Center from underground either were not recorded or were recorded munication from the media and families of the missing miners fil-tered into the Command Center and decisions were influenced by these events. The suggestion was made to use a digital recorder for phone calls which had been used during emer-gency response drills, but this sug-gestion was rejected. S ome mine rescue protocols were not carried out.A whole chapter is devoted to coal dust and rock dust. The senior mem-ber of the two-man dust crew indi-cated that on nights when he was not pulled off his dusting duties to do other jobs, he drove a motor that pulled or pushed a big orange trackduster with two pods that held about a ton and a half of rock dust. Mines the size of UBB typically use track-mounted tank or pod dusters about the size of this one. From the effi-cient use of track duster at a mine the size of UBB would have required drilling a borehole midway in the mine and not far from the working sections to allow a speedy delivery of bulk rock dust to refill the tank dusters. There was no such borehole at UBB. The age and poorly main-tained conditions of the dusting equipment, coupled with the fact that UBB did not have an estab-lished rock dust crew that adhered to a schedule like that of a produc-tion crew, indicated that rock dust-ing was not a priority at Upper Big Branch in the early days of 2010.This was illustrated by the fact that between March-April pre-shift reports indicated that of the 561rock dustings requested, only 65dustings were subsequently noted,or 11.6 percent of the time it was requested. Tests conducted by MS HA after the disaster support miners testimony that the UBB mine was poorly dusted. An analysis of 1,803 dust samples taken after the explosion, MS HA found that 78.92percent were out of compliance withthe federal standard.Small methane ignitions did not have to turn into a major explosion if the mine operators adhered to basic safety measures, such as maintain-ing adequate ventilation systems,removing explosive coal dust from mining operations, spreading required amounts of rock dust, and ensuring that water sprays on mining equipment are kept in good repair and function properly. The forensic soot and dust sampling that took place at UBB indicated there simply was not enough rock dust applied.One of the surviving miners,S tanley S tewart, who had been heading underground at the time of the explosion, said as he emerged from the mine he could see air “still whooshing out…it was still strong.”S tewart estimated that the wind blew for at least two minutes. The footprint left behind in the Upper Big Branch mine and the testimony of survivors supports the theory that the explosion started with methane and fed on coal dust as it tore through the mine. The report says that both evidence in the mine and testimonial evidence suggest that Massey Energy’s management failed to properly ventilate UBB because they did not have adequate resources, knowledge, and/or capa-bility to develop a sound, workable ventilation plan to address the par-ticular circumstances of UBB. The ventilation system for a mine with a history of methane infusions, such as those experienced at Upper Big Branch, must be capable of remov-ing even a large gas inundation. The troubled ventilation system at UBB was incapable of providing suffi-cient air to sections and to the long-wall, and certainly was not robust enough to handle a massive influx of natural gas or methane.In addition, the company did notplace enough emphasis on rock dusting and maintenance of equip-ment, even full compliance with fed-eral and state rock dusting stan-dards may not have prevented the initial ignition on the tail of the long-wall. However, a well-dusted mine would have put the brakes on a propagating explosion and the death toll would have been signifi-cantly less.Furthermore, investigators exam-ining the shearer on the head and tail drums found numerous missing plugs and poorly maintained water sprays. These sprays, when working properly, are vital to safe longwall operation. Effective water sprays create a mist that extinguish sparks generated when the cutting bits on the shearer strike rock adjacent to the coal seam; dilute or douse methane ignitions created when sparks come in contact with explo-sive methane gas; knock down dust generated by the shearers cutting action; and keep parts of the long-wall machinery cool as it cuts through coal and rock. Of the 23sprays on the head drum visible to investigators, nine were plugged; of the 30 sprays on the Tail Drum visi-ble to investigators, seven were totally missing. S ome other sprays were found to have been rendered ineffective because, in an effort to unclog them, the nozzle openings had been widened. When investiga-tors tested the water sprays on the longwall, there was not enough water pressure on the tail drum to even produce a reading.UBB pumped water into the mine from the nearby Coal River and from the underground wells nearby.Modest efforts were made to design a new filter to screen out sediment,but like other maintenance tasks,the filters were neglected, and testi-mony with physical evidence indicat-TUBB ReportShearer Tailgate Cutting Drum Sandstone Top and Floor Heavinged that the screen and sock filters were frequently plugged so much that the sprays were clogged. If all the water sprays had been properly maintained and functioning, and if rock dust had been properly applied, any ignition of methane that occurred would likely have been extinguished at its source, says the report.An interesting chapter in thereport entitled The Massey Way describes the culture at Massey Energy. This chapter concludes,“This history of inadequate commit-ment to safety coupled with a win-dow dressing safety program and a practice of spinning information to Massey’s advantage works against the public statement put forth by the company that the April 5, 2010explosion was a tragedy that couldnot have been anticipated or pre-vented.”The report concludes that “ulti-mately, the responsibility for the explosion at the Upper Big Branch mine lies with the management of Massey Energy. The company broke faith with its workers by frequently and knowingly violating the law and blatantly disregarding mine safety practices while creating a publicperception. This operation unheed-ed industry safety standards. The story of Upper Big Branch is a cau-tionary tale of hubris. A company that was a towering presence in the Appalachian coalfields operated its mines in a profoundly reckless man-ner, and 29 coal miners paid with their lives for the corporate risk-tak-ing. The April 5, 2010 explosion was not something that happened out ofthe blue, an event that could not have been anticipated or prevented.It was, to the contrary, a completely predictable result for a company that ignored basic safety standards and put too much faith in its own mythology.”Editor’s Note:The photographs below were taken at UBB but are not part of this report.The Role of MSHA at UBBhe role of MSHA is not over-looked and a chapter is devot-ed to this. According to the report, “despite MSHA’s consider-able authority and resources, its col-lective knowledge and experience,the disaster at the Upper Big Branch mine is proof positive that the agency failed in its duty as the watch dog for coal miners.”The report draws attention to the fact that high-ranking MSHA offi-cials apparently were aware that the agency was falling short in its responsibilities. On March 25,2010, less than two weeks beforethe disaster, MSHA Chief Joe Main submitted a required report to the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, which outlined wide-spread lapses in enforcement. An audit of 25 field offices during 2009conducted by MSHA’s Accountability Office found incom-plete inspections, failure to monitor mines liberating high amounts of methane, and inadequate supervi-sory actions. Auditors found that in 21 of the 25 field offices, supervi-sors failed to conduct in-depth reviews to make sure enforcement levels and actions were in accor-dance with the agency’s policies and procedures. In 20 field offices, the auditors found inadequate evalua-tion of the gravity and negligence of the health and safety violations issued against operators. In 15offices, auditors found that inspec-tors failed to adequately document findings so that enforcement actions would be able to withstand legal challenges.The Upper Big Branch mine was a gassy mine, liberating about 1 mil-lion cubic feet of methane per 24-hour period, and as a result was sub-ject to federal spot inspections.More significantly, the UBB mine had experienced at least three major methane-related events. The first occurred in January 1997, another in July 2003, and a third in February 2004. All took place in longwall mining sections. Witnesses, too,and investigators of the 1997 inci-dent included a number of individu-als who remain employed by MSHA,the West Virginia Office of Miners’Health Safety and Training, and Massey Energy. MSHA technical experts who investigated the 2003and 2003 outbursts indeed did rec-ommend special precautions, but officials at MSHA’s Mt. Hope District Office did not compel UBB manage-ment to implement those recom-mendations.The Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel found four fail-ures of MSHA. One, disregarding the documented risk of methane out-bursts at UBB. Two, overlooking the deadly potential of a precarious ven-tilation system. Three, neglecting to use its regulatory authority to force technological improvements to advance miners safety. Four, allow-ing the U.S. mine safety system to deteriorate.TThe State Responsibility at UBBhe West Virginia Office of Miners Health Safety and Training (WV OMHST) was also criticized in the report. Records indi-cate that, even with the limited staffing and resources, state mine inspectors spent a considerable amount of time at UBB. Inspectors were on site for at least 70 days in 2009 and for another 15 days in the three months preceding the April 5,2010 explosion. They wrote more than 330 violations and assessed $154,600 in penalties.One of the state inspectors with 16years of experience with the agency,and 35 years in the mining industry,had some strong opinions as to how the state might have been able to do a better job at UBB, says the report.“A couple of guys should be assigned to that mine,” he said. “It’s a very expensive mine, very large mine, just to be able to go in all directions at one time, every couple or three weeks or something. That’s my opinion.” The inspector was referring to the physi-cal area that had to be examined,rather than the coal production. He admitted that quarterly inspections were not always completed and appeared to have limited knowledge about UBB’s ventilation system. He also did not appear to have a great knowledge about MSHA’s action with regard to ventilation at UBB.The state official does not have dedicated ventilation specialist inspectors, and as the result, instead of offering an independent layer ofsafety for miners, West Virginia, like most other states, relies on MSHA to flag ventilation problems in mines,usually following the federal lead as to whether ventilation systems meet code.As for rock dusting, the state inspector said he did not write many cleaning and dusting violations, but during his last quarterly inspection,he wrote violations for cleaning and dusting on Four and Five Ellis belts,Four North Belts head areas, areas from the longwall switch to Headgate 22, and the Headgate 22 section belt.After the explosion, based on extensive tests, investigators deter-mined that inadequate rock dusting was a significant contributing factorto the size and intensity of the explo-sion. Unfortunately, the WV OMHST failed to recognize that the mine was not adequately rock dusted, in part,because inspectors relied on visual inspections. Perhaps inspectors rec-ognized the need for rock dusting, but did not grasp the severity of the prob-lem at UBB. More likely, the officials did not connect the dots so as to see the complete picture and recognize the overall heightened danger pre-sented by each independent viola-tion. The report concluded that state mine inspectors failed to recognize faulty ventilation and inadequate rock dusting because they lack suffi-cient training to develop specialized expertise in ventilation, because they do not have an adequate inspectionforce and because they rely on visual inspections rather than scientific testing to determine whether rock dusting is complaint with state law.The report says there are within the WV OMHST many dedicated, commit-ted, and safety conscientious inspec-tors and supervisors who are not afraid to issue citations or provide tough enforcement. However, the overwhelming scope of the job, the economic circumstances of a boom-ing coal industry, the pressure to get along, the recognition of the impor-tance of mining jobs within the state are factors that place immense pres-sures on state inspectors, pressures which make the regulatory enforce-ment process difficult to carry out.TExplosion Force Bent Roofbolt Plate and Shows DirectionExplosion Underground Bent the TrackUBB Report: Findings and Recommendationhe report has 11 findings including the following:• The disaster at UBB was man-made and could have been prevent-ed;• The mine explosion occurred because of failures of three basic safety practices with regard to venti-lation, rock dusting standards, prop-er maintenance of safety features on mine machinery;• Twenty-first century coal mine safety practices have failed to keep up with twenty-first century produc-tion practices;• The pre-shift/on-shift exanima-tion system has in many instances become a meaningless exercise;• MSHA and WV OMHST inspectors and their supervisors must craft enforcement strategies which match the compliance approach of the mining company;• Federal and state mine safety laws allow mine operators to use administrative or judicial review to avoid or delay paying citations and penalties;• The emergency response at U BB raised concerns about how decision-making was conducted in the Command Center and the manner in which mine rescue teams were deployed;• Investigations of major mining disasters must be conducted in an open, independent, and transparent manner;• SCSR training BB miners received was not effective;• The prevalence of coal workers’pneumoconiosis among the deceased U BB miners is both sur-prising and troubling.The report also contains 52 rec-ommendations and among them are the following:• Each mine should be required to maintain and continuously update records of the amount of rock dust purchased and used daily;• WV OMHST and MSHA should undertake reorganization on their ventilation approval system;• “Black box” technology must be instituted for mining equipment,including shearers, continuous min-ers, roof bolters, shuttle cars,motors, conveyors, and shields,proving information regardingmethane, oxygen, carbon monoxide,and coal dust levels;• There must immediate implemen-tation of a computerized, real-time electronic personnel recording sys-tem to formerly identify and locate all personnel underground;• Each mine must be required to institute a “Communication and Information Recording Center” to provide instantaneous communica-tion to MSHA state agencies, com-pany officials, and state and county emergency management officials regarding safety and health;• Current monitors for methane,carbon monoxide, and coal dust must be upgraded to include memo-ry chips;• Operators must be required to use real-time continuous monitoring for explosive methane gas and res-pirable dust;• Mechanized rock dusting must be conducted in all portions of under-ground mines;• Operators must assess the ade-quacy of rock dust through direct readout explosibility meters;• The system for writing violationsshould be converted from paper and pencil to a computerized system and digital photographs should be used;• Regulatory agencies should use ventilation simulation models as part of their plan approval process;• MSHA and NIOSH should develop an approved rescue vehicle;• Federal and state agencies should undertake an aggressive campaign to undermine the “safety myths” or inaccuracies that emerged during the U BB investiga-tion;• Existing laws and regulations must be stringently and effectively enforced;• When either state or federal agen-cies recognize a significant or per-sistent problem at a mine,the agency should coordinate their responses;• The mining industry, MSHA, and West Virginia should adopt the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command Model to improve coordination;• Protocols should be established and followed with regard to mine rescue and recovery;• MSHA and West Virginia should require digital recording of the activ-ities and communications in a mine emergency Command Center;• WV OMHST, NIOSH, MSHA, and the mining industry should adopt before the end of 2011 rules to reduce the permissible exposure limit (PEL) for coal mine dust to 0.09mg/m3 and reduce the PEL for crys-talline silica to 0.05 mg/m3; and mandate continuous dust monitor-ing.It should be noted that 17 individ-uals invoked the Fifth Amendment right and declined to be interviewed by investigators examining the explosion at UBB. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides an indi-vidual from self-incrimination. Self-incrimination includes act or decla-rations either as testimony at trial or prior to trial by which one implicates himself in a crime. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the govern-ment from requiring a person to be a witness against himself involuntarily or to furnish evidence against him-self.TForensic soot and dust sampling has indicated that soot and coke created by the explosion and burning of coal dust shows the le vels of burn, low to high.There are sections where no burn is indicated where one would expect the explosion and burn to have taken place, ie.., across the # 7 North connector. When the explosion reaches extremely high speeds, a phenomenon occurs where there is no burn because the explosion is traveling too fast to create a burn. At UBB, 1,803 samples were collected by teams of at least 30 individuals. A large number of samples showed high flame and coke. Th e report says that there was simply not enough rock dust applied at UBB.。
薄煤层自动化开采介绍
PPT文档演模板
薄煤层自动化开采介绍
◆我国刨煤机发展现状
•
与德国DBT公司相比，国产刨煤机从价格和服务上有其固有的优
势。如引进的刨煤机系统（包括刨煤机、刮板输送机及自动控制系统）
高达600～800万欧元，备件及维修费用更高，而且不能得到及时供
给。而国内同类设备价格只相当于其价格的1/3～1/2，技术服务和备
件供应也快捷得多，如果国产刨煤机性能及可靠性能达到或接近引进
刨煤机的水平，用户自然会优先选用国产刨煤机。
中煤张家口煤矿机械有限责任公司从20世纪50年代末开始研制
刨煤机，是我国最早的刨煤机生产厂，通过和科研院所的合作，在早
期产品试验的基础上，经过多次改进，逐步得到发展。如：20世纪
70年代初推出的MBJ—2A拖钩刨，八十年代初研制的HⅡ—26滑行
PPT文档演模板
薄煤层自动化开采介绍
我国刨煤机应用案例
• 2000年9月，德国DBT公司与国内科研单位 及煤机厂家合作,中国第一套综合自动化薄 煤层无人工作面在铁法小青煤矿诞生。
• 2003年8 月，山西焦煤集团马兰矿也投产 了一套全自动刨煤机系统，实现薄煤层无 人工作面开采，煤层厚度为0.8~1.4m，工 作面长度200m，截止2003年10月8 日!累计 生产原煤66817t，最高日产为6280t。
PPT文档演模板
薄煤层自动化开采介绍
◆国外刨煤机的发展状况
• 刨煤机采煤自20世纪40年代在德国问世以来，很快就得到推广
和发展，成为薄煤层采煤机械化的强大支柱。原欧洲的主要产煤国德 国、波兰、俄罗斯、法国、西班牙等，使用刨煤机开采的煤炭产量占 总产量的50％以上。在德国，1.6m以下的薄煤层中，几乎全部采用 刨煤机采煤，在1.6 ～2.2 m中厚煤层中也大部分用刨煤机采煤，当 煤层厚度超过2.5m时，滚筒采煤机才占主要位置。据介绍，德国薄 煤层1.8m以下的30多个高产工作面中，只有1个滚筒采煤机工作面， 其余全是刨煤机工作面，刨煤机的日产量可达5000 t以上，年产量达 200万t以上。在波兰，每年使用刨煤机的工作面平均65个。在俄罗斯， 每年使用刨煤机的工作面达到150多个。澳大利亚、南非等主要产煤 国薄煤层工作面也都使用了全自动化刨煤机。使用刨煤机效率最高的 是美国，它的薄煤层刨煤机工作面年产量可达300万t以上。
11薄煤层开采技术与装备研究20121105课件
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谢 谢！
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人有了知识，就会具备各种分析能力， 明辨是非的能力。 所以我们要勤恳读书，广泛阅读， 古人说“书中自有黄金屋。 ”通过阅读科技书籍，我们能丰富知识， 培养逻辑思维能力； 通过阅读文学作品，我们能提高文学鉴赏水平， 培养文学情趣； 通过阅读报刊，我们能增长见识，扩大自己的知识面。 有许多书籍还能培养我们的道德情操， 给我们巨大的精神力量， 鼓舞我们前进。
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薄煤层采煤机的总体设计上主要分为两种形式。一种是传统的骑输送机 的方式。该方式最低采高不可能太低（基本大于1米），同时由于考虑机身 厚度等原因，牵引电机的功率不可能太大。采高主要适用于1米到2米的煤层 为主。采高1米左右的薄煤层采煤机主要有MG100/245-BW型采煤机。机面最 低高度为700左右，最小采高为0.85米。整个机身为一体化设计，配套630刮 板。
（2）支架压力：用图形实时地显示各个液压支架立柱压力大小；
（3）设备启停状态：用文字和图形动画实时显示各设备的启停状态，当 设备处于运行状态时相应图形会闪烁；
（4）设备控制：功能与主控制器相同，包括手自动切换、急停、对刮板 机、刨头、转载破碎、乳化泵、清水泵的启停操作。
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扭 矩 曲 线 调速技术的种类 1.TTT(调速型液力偶合器)JOY公司的核心技术 2.CST（液粘离合器） DBT公司的核心技术 3.VSD（变频调速）SANY的核心技术
双列行星 轮
《煤矿开采技术》课件
总结
煤矿安全生产技术的发展对煤矿生产安全起到了至关重要的 作用，只有不断完善安全管理体系、加强通风与气体控制、 防治地质灾害、推动信息化建设，才能有效预防煤矿事故， 保障矿工安全生产。
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第四章 煤矿环境保护技术
煤矿环境影响评 价
在煤矿项目建设之前，必须进行环境影响评价，评估项目 对周围环境的影响程度。煤矿开采会对水资源、土地和空 气等环境产生一定影响，因此评价标准和方法至关重要。
海洋煤矿开采技术
海底煤矿资源 的开发现状和
挑战
分析海底煤矿资源 的潜力和挑战
海洋煤矿环境 保护和可持续
发展策略
探讨海洋煤矿开采 对环境的影响和可
持续发展路径
海底煤矿采矿 技术的突破与
创新
介绍海底煤矿采矿 技术的最新进展
01 煤矿采空区治理的重要性和难点
解析煤矿采空区治理的关键问题
02 采空区治理的技术手段和方法
煤矿开采技术国际合作与交流
中国煤矿开采 技术的国际影
响力
合作项目覆盖多个 国家
煤矿开采技术 国际交流与合
作的意义
共同推动行业发展
国际煤矿技术 合作项目介绍
技术交流促进全球 进步
煤矿开采技术趋势展望
未来煤矿开采技术 发展趋势分析
智能化设备广泛应用
绿色环保理念深入人心
技术创新不断推进
煤矿开采技术创新 与突破点预测
煤矿通风与气体控制
煤矿通风系统 的设计原理
重点优化矿井内空 气流动，确保矿工
安全
煤矿爆炸事故 防范措施
采取爆破控制技术， 预防爆炸事故
煤矿气体监测 与预警技术
实时监测有毒气体 浓度，防止中毒事
故发生
薄煤层安全高效开采技术(PPT123页)
国有重点煤矿薄煤层的开采情况
1985～1997年国有重点煤层薄煤矿开采情况如表。
从表中可以看出，国有重点煤矿中薄煤层回采煤量的比例总的 倾势是下降的，特别是在1993年以后，国有重点煤矿开展建设安全 高效矿井活动，机械化、综合机械化生产的比例不断上升，综合机械 化生产煤量不断上升的时候，薄煤层的产量和产量所占比例却是不 断下降的，而且薄煤层工作面的平均月产量也是下降的.。
掘进率高，工作面接替紧张； 长壁机械化工作面投入产出比高，单产、工效及 经济效益低。 由于薄煤层开采的特殊性。造成薄煤层长壁机械 化开采开展缓慢，目前主要以炮采和机采为主。薄煤层 机械化开采较成熟的工艺主要有长壁式开采、螺旋钻机 开采、连续采煤机房柱式开采、急倾斜煤层钢丝锯开采。
1.3 薄煤层开采条件
使用滚筒采煤机的综合机械化开采技术是大局部厚度在 1．0 m以上薄煤层的技术途径，这是因为滚筒采煤机的适应 性强。但是，目前我国的滚筒采煤机最薄可采到1·1～1．2 nl 厚，最小厚度采到1．0 m的滚筒采煤机正处在研究中。
煤层越薄，滚筒采煤机的装煤效果越不好，要靠刮板输 送机协助装煤。
大同煤业集团有限责任公司下属晋华宫 矿综采三队2003年使用国产薄煤层滚筒式 MG200/450-WD采煤机,最高日产量为6766 t, 最高月产量为160309 t,年产量101万t,创国 产薄煤层同类型设备产量新纪录。
2.3 中国薄煤层开采技术现状
中国薄煤层的开采经历了三个开展阶段：
20世纪50年代主要使用炮采工艺；
20世纪60年代开始使用深截深截煤机掏槽,爆 破落煤,平面环行式薄煤层输送机运煤,人工装煤, 木支护顶板,回柱绞车放顶；
20世纪70年代以来,鸡西、淄博等矿区在改装 爬底式薄煤层采煤机的基础上,1974年开始研新型 薄煤层采煤机；
煤矿开采技术1共56页PPT58页
26、要使整个人生都过得舒适、愉快，这是不可能的，因为人类必须具备一种能应付逆境的态度。——卢梭
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27、只有把抱怨环境的心情，化为上进的力量，才是成功的保证。——罗曼·罗兰
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28、知之者不如好之者，好之者不如乐之者。——孔子
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29、勇猛、大胆和坚定的决心能够抵得上武器的精良。—盲人，倚靠在明眼的跛子肩上。——叔本华
煤矿开采技术1共56页
31、园日涉以成趣，门虽设而常关。 32、鼓腹无所思。朝起暮归眠。 33、倾壶绝余沥，窥灶不见烟。
34、春秋满四泽，夏云多奇峰，秋月 扬明辉 ，冬岭 秀孤松 。 35、丈夫志四海，我愿不知老。
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谢谢！
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煤矿开采技术1共56页PPT文档58页
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29、勇猛、大胆和坚定的决心能够抵得上武器的精良。——达·芬奇
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30、8
煤矿开采技术1共56页
31、别人笑我太疯癫，我笑他人看不 穿。(名 言网) 32、我不想听失意者的哭泣，抱怨者 的牢骚 ，这是 羊群中 的瘟疫 ，我不 能被它 传染。 我要尽 量避免 绝望， 辛勤耕 耘，忍 受苦楚 。我一 试再试 ，争取 每天的 成功， 避免以 失败收 常在别 人停滞 不前时 ，我继 续拼搏 。
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26、要使整个人生都过得舒适、愉快，这是不可能的，因为人类必须具备一种能应付逆境的态度。——卢梭
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27、只有把抱怨环境的心情，化为上进的力量，才是成功的保证。——罗曼·罗兰
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28、知之者不如好之者，好之者不如乐之者。——孔子
33、如果惧怕前面跌宕的山岩，生命 就永远 只能是 死水一 潭。 34、当你眼泪忍不住要流出来的时候 ，睁大 眼睛， 千万别 眨眼!你会看到 世界由 清晰变 模糊的 全过程 ，心会 在你泪 水落下 的那一 刻变得 清澈明 晰。盐 。注定 要融化 的，也 许是用 眼泪的 方式。
35、不要以为自己成功一次就可以了 ，也不 要以为 过去的 光荣可 以被永 远肯定 。
薄煤层开采技术
薄煤层开采技术我国煤炭资源丰富，储存量大，且赋存多样化。
由于受采煤机械化程度低、效率低、掘进率高、开采成本高等因素的影响，我国薄煤层采出率很低。
近年来，受矿井产量保持长期稳定、企业有投入资金的能力、国内煤机制造水平提高、保护资源的意识提高等因素的影响，我国薄煤层开采技术取得了积极进展。
1、薄煤层资源现状我国薄煤层分布广、煤质好、资源丰富、开采条件相对较好。
据统计，我国薄煤层的储量占全国可采储量的20%，保有工业储量98.3亿吨，可采储量61.5亿吨。
尽管有较好的储存条件，但由于受劳动强度大、机械化程度低、安全系数低、工作效率低等“一大三低”影响，每年从薄煤层中采出的煤量仅占全国总储量的10.4%，而且还有继续下降的趋势，造成大量的优质煤炭资源浪费，大大缩短了矿井的服务年限。
特别是各矿区在投产初期从提高经济效益出发，优先开采中厚煤层和厚煤层，造成生产接续和资源平衡开采之间的矛盾日益突出。
2、薄煤层开采技术现状发达国家的薄煤层开采机械化程度较高，液压支架、滚筒采煤机、刮板运输机、刨煤机等设备在结构及设计理念上都有了重大发展，使薄煤层生产能力、工效都达到较好水平，实现了安全、高产、高效。
采煤机采用了多电机牵引技术，有的实现了滚筒自动导向；液压支架应用电液控制技术，使支架的动作自动连续进行，大大提高了移架速度，基本实现了工作面的智能自动化生产；刮板运输机实现了高速度、高可靠性和大功率发展。
国内薄煤层大都采用长壁采煤，效率低、经济效益差，成为制约薄煤层资源开采和利用的瓶颈。
有的矿井虽然采用了综采设备，但由于三机装备配套性能不佳，没有发挥出设备应用的功效，工作面生产能力很低。
我国薄煤层机械化长壁工作面采煤存在如下问题：一是采掘比大，采煤工作面接替紧张。
二是采高低、工作环境差，设备移动困难。
三是煤层厚度变化、断层等地质构造，造成薄煤层工作面布置困难。
四是投入产出比高，单产和效率一般只有中厚煤层综采工作面的一半左右。
薄煤层开采技术
薄煤层开采技术摘要对于我国资源储量比较大的薄煤层来说，随着国内外采矿设备制造水平的提高，在采用大功率、高可靠性工作面设备的基础上，应根据当地的煤层赋存情况，因地制宜地选择采煤机械，并采用合理的采煤方法，努力实现薄煤层的高产高效开采。
关键词薄煤层开采工艺分析回采技术发展趋势支护技术现状我国把厚度小于1.3 m的煤层划归为薄煤层，厚度小于0.8 m的煤层属于极薄煤层。
我国薄煤层资源丰富，分布面广，而且煤质好。
据统计，全国薄煤层的储量占全部可采储量的20％，在近80个矿区中的400多个矿井中就有750多层为薄煤层。
其中，厚度在0.8 m~1.3 m的共占86.02%，小于0.8 m的占13.98%，0.8 m~1.3 m的缓倾斜煤层占73.4%，开采条件相对较好。
一些地区薄煤层储量比重很大。
贵州省占37%，山东省占52%，四川省占60%。
尽管有较好的储存条件，但由于受“劳动强度大、机械化程度低、安全系数低、工作效率低”的“一大三低”影响，每年从薄煤层中采出的煤量仅占全国总储量的10.4%，而且还有继续下降的趋势，产量与储量的比例严重失调，造成国家资源的浪费，矿井服务年限。
我国从20世纪60年代起始对薄煤层工作面综合机械化开采技术与装备展开研究，先后研制并生产了多种类型薄煤层工作面综采配套设备，但没有解决关键性技术装备问题，薄煤层开采成本高、单产低、效益差、工人劳动强度高等问题，一直未能得到有效解决。
一、薄煤层开采的特点目前我国薄煤层多数采用普采，高档普采，效率低，经济效益差，一直制约着薄煤层资源的开采和利用。
一些矿井虽然使用了综合采煤设备，但是三机装备配套性能不佳，生产效率低，工作面生产能力很低。
薄煤层由于其开采厚度较小，与中厚及厚煤层相比，开采主要存在以下特点：煤层薄、采高低、煤质硬、劳动效益低煤层厚度多在1.3 m以下，并且煤层硬度多大于3~4，使得人员进入或在工作面内作业以及设备移动都十分困难。
薄煤层安全开采技术
薄煤层安全开采技术1 发展现状：我国煤层赋存条件比较复杂, 煤炭资源分布地域辽阔,地质条件复杂多样。
在中国, 当煤层厚度大于0.8m 小于1.3m 时,我们称之为薄煤层, 当煤层厚度小于0.8m 时, 我们称之为极薄煤层。
我国薄煤层可采储量约占全国煤炭总储量的18% , 而产量只占总产量的7.3% , 远远低于储量所占的比例, 并且这个比例还有进一步下降的趋势。
薄煤层在我国分布较广, 有些地区的煤质也比较好。
经过多年开采, 不少矿井中厚煤层已近枯竭, 薄煤层的开采正规模化地进行, 而且也得到了充分重视。
就当前的资源情况看,发展薄煤层机械化开采对于开发利用煤炭资源, 延长矿井开采年限和实现高效开采都具有十分重要的意义。
我国薄煤层开采主要采用长壁采煤法, 但由于开采煤层厚度小(小于1.3m) , 与中厚及厚煤层相比, 薄煤层机械化长壁工作面主要有以下问题:（1）采高低, 工作条件差, 设备移动困难。
特别是薄煤层综采工作面, 当最小采高降到1.0m以下时, 人员出入工作面或在工作面内作业都非常困难。
而且薄煤层采煤机械和液压支架受空间尺寸限制, 设计难度大。
液压支架立柱通常要双伸缩甚至三伸缩, 增加了制造成本。
（2）采掘比大、掘进率高, 采煤工作面接替困难。
随着长壁机械化采煤技术的发展, 工作面推进速度大大加快,但由于薄煤层工作面回采巷道为半煤岩巷, 巷道掘进手段没有多大的变化, 仍以打眼放炮、人工装煤为主, 掘进速度很慢, 造成薄煤层综采工作面接替紧张。
（3）煤层厚度变化、断层等地质构造对薄煤层长壁工作面生产影响比开采中厚及厚煤层工作面大, 造成薄煤层长壁综采或机采工作面布置困难。
（3）薄煤层长壁机械化采煤工作面的投入产出比高, 经济效益不如开采厚及中厚煤层工作面。
一个薄煤层综采工作面的设备投资不比设备装机功率、支架工作阻力相当的中厚煤层综采工作面少, 但薄煤层综采工作面的单产和效率一般只有中厚煤层综采工作面一半, 甚至更低。
《煤矿开采技术》PPT课件
采用充填法管理顶板后的直接顶，相当于用全部垮
落法的裂隙带。因此，采用充填法时的采高M。相当于同 样条件下使用全部垮落法的垮落带高度Σh加上采高M，即 M。=（Kp/ Kp一1）M，也就是说，用充填法时的采高M。 相当于用全部垮落法时的采高的（Kp/ Kp一1）倍。或者 说垮落法的采高相当于采用充填法的采高的（Kp一1/ Kp）；采用充填法的采高相当于采用垮落法时的采高缩 小了[1一(Kp一1/ Kp)]。顶板下沉量与采高成正比关系。 因此，采用充填法时的顶板下沉相当于垮落法时的（Kp 一1/ Kp）。
当直接顶的厚度大于（1/Kp一1）倍采高时， 垮落矸石充满采空区，其上覆岩层在断裂 下沉中易于形成平衡岩层结构，位于平衡 岩层之上的煤层将缓慢下沉，有利于上行 开采。
当顶板赋存有节理裂隙发育的石灰岩或
坚硬砂岩时，这些岩层在下沉过程中易于 形成缓慢下沉。显然，上覆岩（煤）层将 均匀下沉，有利于上行开采。
表2 厚煤层分层开采时导水断裂带高度计算公式 Table 2. The Formula of the height of the fracture Zone in Thick
Slicing Seams
岩性
计算公式/m
Hale Waihona Puke 计算公式/m坚硬Hd=
100M 8.9 1.2M2.0
Hd 30M10
中硬
Hd =
Hk=2.110M0M 162.5 Hk=4.710M0M 192.2
软弱（10-20，泥岩，泥质砂岩）
Hk=6.210M0M 321.5
H = 极软弱（<10，铝土岩，风化泥岩，粘土，砂质粘土）
k 100M 1.2
7.0M63
注：——累计采厚，单层采厚1-3m，累计采厚不超过15m，±号项为中误差。
薄煤层安全高效开采技术
保障开采过程的 安全性，减少事 故发生率
优化煤炭资源利 用，提高资源回 收率
促进企业可持续 发展，增强市场 竞争力
推广方式：通过技术交流会、现场演示和技术支持，向煤炭企业和相关机构推广薄煤层安全 高效开采技术。
改进建议：根据实际应用情况，对薄煤层安全高效开采技术进行持续改进和优化，提高采煤 效率和安全性。
,
汇报人：
CONTENTS
PART ONE
PART TWO
பைடு நூலகம்
厚度：薄煤层 通常是指厚度 在1.3米以下的
煤层
特点：薄煤层 开采难度较大， 但资源丰富， 具有较高的开
采价值
开采技术：薄 煤层安全高效 开采技术是实 现薄煤层开采
的重要手段
适用范围：薄 煤层开采技术 适用于各种地 质条件下的薄
煤层开采
● 2.通风系统设计：根据矿井实际情况，合理设计通风系统，确保矿井内空气流通，降低瓦斯浓度，提高开 采安全性。
防治水害：采用注浆、疏水降压等措施，降低薄煤层开采过程中的水害风险 环境保护：合理利用资源，减少对环境的破坏，实现绿色开采
PART FIVE
山西焦煤集团某 矿区应用薄煤层 安全高效开采技 术，实现安全生 产和经济效益双 提升。
PART FOUR
采煤工艺的分类与 特点
薄煤层采煤工艺的 特殊性
采煤工艺的选择原 则与依据
采煤工艺的优化方 法与实践
采煤机械的合理配置：根 据煤层厚度、地质条件等 因素，选择合适的采煤机 械，确保开采效率与安全。
采煤工艺的优化：采用 合理的采煤工艺，如短 壁开采、放顶煤开采等， 提高开采效率。
薄煤层开采难度大，容易发生安全事故 安全高效开采技术可以提高矿工的安全保障水平 保障矿工生命安全是煤炭行业的首要任务 薄煤层安全高效开采技术是实现矿工生命安全的重要手段
《薄煤层开采技术》PPT课件
平均采高2.1m，煤层平均倾角31゜，5个月共产煤11.84万t，平均月产超过2 万t。 • 国内首个薄煤层刨煤机综采无人工作面2010年在大同煤矿集团公司晋华官 矿一次性投产成功。根据监测，该工作面最高日产将达到6185吨。
美国开发的微 机控制液压钻 车
悬臂式掘进机
巷道的综合机械化掘进配套技术
• 配套转载技术：运输技术的落后是制约掘进技术发展的重 要因素之一。目前，国内掘进机通过采用桥式转载机与皮 带机的配套使用，实现了掘进机的连续性工作。
第四节 薄煤层滚筒采煤机综 采技术
• 薄煤层采煤机技术上从电机单一纵向布置向多电机横向布置发展，由液压 牵引向电牵引发展，由箱体之间有传动关系向无传动关系的积木式发展， 由有底托架向无底托架发展，并逐渐研制出了具有双截割电机摇臂、适用 于大倾角开采的四象限调速系统、中压机载等技术的交流电牵引采煤机。
• 垂直煤壁正面
单轴式侧 面钻进螺 旋钻机
• 带有一个钻杆
双轴式侧 面钻进螺 旋钻机
•带有二个钻杆
采煤主要设备--螺旋钻机，美国、前苏联 均研制和采用综合螺旋钻机
• 螺旋钻采煤工艺可以分为单向钻进或双向钻进两种，在 采用单向钻进采煤方式时，钻机沿回采平巷的一侧钻进 回采，在本侧采完后再退回回采平巷另一侧的煤炭；也 可以向平巷的两侧钻进采煤。
• 二是刨煤机的适用范围不断扩大，刨煤机不但用于采煤，还用于开采其他矿 物质，效果明显。
我国应用现状
• 铁煤集团与德国 DBT合作,分别于2000年9月和2002年9月引进了我国第一套