investment
investment的用法总结大全
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Chapter2investmentobjectives
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.11% and real of -- gulp!
-- 0.87%. Let's line this up with the S&P 500 over the
same period:
1980-2001 Housing S&P 500 (w/o div.)
45902.5 22,553
税后收入（万元） 21,132.08 1,633,000
14,388
12,460
18076.91
税前投资收益率 24.70%
36.00%
24.75%
21.03%
24.33%
49.13%
投资收益 评价
税后投资收益率
税前自有资金收 益率
税后自有资金收 益率
内部收益率
16.55%
根据募集说明书，本期公司债的发行规模40亿元，为期限10年 的固定利率附息债。债券票面利率在债券存续期内固定不变， 采取单利按年计息。
本期公司债由中国建设银行提供全额、不可撤销的连带责任保证担 保，经中诚信评估评定，公司主体信用等级为AAA，本期公司债券 信用等级为AAA。
公司债上市之后可在上交所竞价交易系统和固定收益证券 综合电子平台同时进行交易，实行净价交易、全价结算。
2.1%
房地产投资动因
• 不利因素
Investment Disadvantages and Risks
1. Illiquid
difficult to convert into cah quickly
2. Management burden
Much personal attention Severe mental and physical stress
投资洽谈英语口语
投资洽谈英语口语作为投资洽谈的英语口语，需要掌握一些专业术语和表达方式，以便更好地与合作伙伴进行沟通。
以下是一些常用的投资洽谈英语口语：1. We are interested in your project and would like to know more about it.我们对您项目很感兴趣，想了解更多信息。
2. Could you please explain the details of the project to us?能否请您向我们解释一下该项目的细节？3. What are the expected returns for this investment?这个投资的预期回报率是多少？4. How does the investment structure work?投资结构是如何运作的？5. What is the timeline for this investment?这个投资的时间表是什么？6. What is the total investment required for this project?这个项目需要的总投资额是多少？7. What is the role of our company in this investment?我们公司在这次投资中扮演什么角色？8. What are the risks associated with this investment?这个投资有哪些风险？9. How will the funds be used?资金将如何使用？10. Do you require any additional information from us?您是否需要我们提供其他信息？。
国际投资学(investment)
（4）国际投资中生产要素的流动要受到诸多因素的限制 投资必然是生产要素的投入。国际投资伴随着生产要素在各国 之间的流动。广义的生产要素包括：原材料、设备、资金、劳 动力、技术、土地等。在国内投资中，生产要素易于在各部门、 各地区之间流动。（地方保护主义除外）。商品经济越发达， 则流动渠道越畅通。与国内投资相比，国际投资中生产要素的 流动要困难得多。 解释：材料和设备的流动要受到投资国和东道国外贸政策（如 禁止进出口、进出口关税、产品配额限制等）、产品质量和运 输条件等因素的制约；在各生产要素中，资金的流动性最好但 仍受投资国和东道国对外经济政策、国内货币供求状况和汇率 等因素的影响；劳动力的流动要受其自身素质和许多法律的限 制（例如，澳洲对肥胖的人发放医疗保险金，因此，移民局对 体重超过84公斤的人禁止入境！）；技术的流动要受到输出国 的多外经济政策和技术对东道国适用程度的影响（消化），特 别是对于当代第一流技术，投资者及其政府往往采取各种严厉 措施，限制其输出，以便保持其垄断技术优势；土地则完全没 有流动性。 生产要素流动困难使得国际投资的运动过程要比国内投资的运 动过程复杂得多。
12
国际投资
涉及两类国家
投资国和东道国
分为两个部分
向国外投资（对投资国而言） 向国际筹资，即引进海外资金（对东道国而言）
13
国际资本流动与国际投资
国际资本流动：指资本在国际间的转移、输出或输入， 也就是资本的跨国界流动，即资本从一个国家（或地区） 转移到另一个国家（或地区）。 二者相同之处：
19
（3）国际投资具有多元的直接目标 投资目标可以分为直接目标与最终目标。 国内投资与国际投资的最终目标是一致的，即都是为了 追求盈利的最大化，但两者的直接目标有很大的区别。国内 投资的直接目标与最终目标是统一的，而国际投资的直接目 标与最终目标之间则有较大的差异。就国际直接投资而言， 具有多元直接目标，如：开拓和维护出口市场、转移污染、 降低产品成本、分散资产风险、学习国外先进技术，获得东 道国资源、援助东道国经济建设、改善投资国与东道国的双 边经济关系或政治关系为投资者得到其他有利可图的投资机 会做铺垫等；就国际间接投资而言，同样具有多元直接目标， 除获得高于国内投资的利润外，还有分散资产风险，为东道 国提供经济援助，解决国内“资本过剩”等。国际投资目标 多元化是国际投资的重要特点，因而，考察其整体效益要比 考察国内投资的整体效益复杂。
国际投资法
直接投资与间接投资的区别：对企业有无控制权 对企业有无控制权。 对企业有无控制权 由于控制权常与股权联系在一起，因此拥有多少股 权才是控制，并因而构成直接投资，各国立法解释 不一。美国《1976年国际投资调查法》规定：直接 投资是指个人直接或间接拥有或控制一定工商公司 10% 10%有表决权并能代表公司资本的股份（证券） 参阅余劲松《国际投资法》P1
（二）发展中国家的外资立法 1、大多数国家对外资进入设有审批规定； 2、与发达国家相比，对外资鼓励较多，限制也较多； 3、从限制走向逐步开放。
第四节 资本输出国海外投资法 一、资本输出国（投资母国）关于海外投资的法制 较为分散，没有一部统一的法律。 由于私人海外投资对其本国经济有利，如巨额海外 利润汇回，有助于增加国家的财政收入；有利于开拓 国外市场；利用本国经济、技术上的优势来加强国际 竞争力。因此，各国都鼓励海外投资。 二、鼓励与保护措施 1）税收。①税收抵免：在东道国已缴纳的税款， 可在本国报税时从应纳税额中加以扣减。许多国家 都有此规定。如美国《国内收入法》允许纳税人从 其在美国的应纳税款中扣除外国对该海外企业已征 的税款。许多国家还通过签订避免双重征税的双边 协定实行税收抵免 。
二、国际投资法 国际投资法：调整跨国（国际间）私人直接投 国际投资法 资关系的有关国内法和国际法规范的总称。 1、渊源 渊源：国内法与国际法渊源 渊源 ⑴ 国内立法： ①资本输入国的外国投资法； ②资本输出国的海外投资法。 ⑵国际条约： ①双边条约； ②多边公约（区域性、世界性）。关于国际投 资的世界性多边公约目前有：《解决国家与他国 国民间投资争端公约》（1966） 、《多边投资担 保机构公约》（1988 ）、《与贸易有关的投资措 施协定》（1994）。国ຫໍສະໝຸດ 经济法学叶才勇
Investment 4 投资学
shares purchased. Value” or “ NAV”.
The value of each share is called “ Net Asset Calculation:
4-6
NET ASSET VALUE: EXAMPLE 4.1
Consider a mutual fund that manages a portfolio
4-9
TYPES OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES
Managed Investment Companies Open-End funds
Fund issues new shares when investors buy and
redeems shares when investors cash out Priced at Net Asset Value (NAV) Do not trade on exchanges Investors buy and liquidate through the investment company at net asset value Mutual Funds are known as Unit Trusts in some countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia
Exchanged-traded funds(ETFs)
4-3
INVESTMENT COMPANIES
Financial intermediaries that collect funds
from individual investors and invest in a wide range of securities or other assets.
新视野大学英语4 Unit4词汇
antique [æ n'ti:k]
n. [C] sth. made long ago that is valuable or interesting 古董
recession [ri'seʃən]
n. [C] a period when the economy of a country is not successful, business conditions are bad, industrial production and trade are at a low level and there is a lot of unemployment 经济衰退
蒸气接触冷的表面就凝成水珠
词根记忆：con+dense（密集的）→变得密集的→压缩
con前缀： confuse 困惑
contribution 贡献
contract 合同
contact 联系
consume 消耗
convenient 方便的
intensive [in'tensiv]
a. involving a lot of activity, effort, or careful attention in a short period of time 密集的，集中的，加强的
transmission [træ ns'miʃən]
n.1.[U]the act or process of sending out an electronic signal or message or of broadcasting a radio or television program 播送；发射；传输
证券投资学(英文)
3. derivative security衍生证券 Such as options or future contracts. E.g. a call option on a share of Intel stock might turn out to be worthless if Intel’s share price remains below a threshold门槛 or exercise执行 price such as 20 dollars a share， but it can be quite valuable if the stock price rises above that level.
1. compensation plans tie the income of executives to the success of the firm. 2. boards of directors force out management teams that are underperforming. 3. security analysts and large institutional investors such as pension funds monitor the firm closely the poor performers. 4. takeover. 接管 Other firms can acquire the underperforming business and replace management with their own team.
Agency problems代理问题
Managers might engage in empire building or avoid risky projects to protect their own jobs or over-consume luxuries such as corporate jets. Instead, they are not in the best interest of shareholders.
商务英语听说(第三版)Lesson 25 Investment
II. Repeat the sentences you hear on the tape.
1. The Chinese government has done everything it can to attract foreign investment. 2. We lay out about 50% the total investment. 3. How long will it take for all these documents to be approved? 4. The registered capital of this JV is going to be one million US dollars. 5. This law applies to foreign investors only.
Part A Sample Conversation
Notes:
1. roughly speaking 大致说来，大体上说 Roughly speaking, there’re two possibilities. 大致说来，有两种可能性。 译： 粗略说来，大约有100人参观了展览。 Roughly speaking, about 100 people attended the exhibition. 译：大致说来，我们今年的营业额大约是6千万美元。 Roughly speaking, our turnover this year is about sixty million US dollars.
4. You have a very good point in … 你说的……有道理 point n. 意思 I didn’t get the point of that joke. 我没有听懂那个笑话的意思。 You’ve got a point there. 你说得有道理。 Please get to the point. 请说正题。 译： 你也许说的有道理。 You may have a point there. 译：恐怕你没听明白。 I'm afraid you've missed the point.
Investment, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Ownership
THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE•VOL.LXVII,NO.3•JUNE2012Investment,Idiosyncratic Risk,and Ownership VASIA PANOUSI and DIMITRIS PAPANIKOLAOU∗ABSTRACTHigh-powered incentives may induce higher managerial effort,but they also exposemanagers to idiosyncratic risk.If managers are risk averse,they might underinvestwhenfirm-specific uncertainty increases,leading to suboptimal investment decisionsfrom the perspective of well-diversified shareholders.We empirically document that,when idiosyncratic risk rises,firm investment falls,and more so when managersown a larger fraction of thefirm.This negative effect of managerial risk aversion oninvestment is mitigated if executives are compensated with options rather than withshares or if institutional investors form a large part of the shareholder base.I N FRICTIONLESS CAPITAL MARKETS,only the systematic component of risk is rele-vant for investment decisions.By contrast,idiosyncratic risk should not affect the valuation of investment projects,as long asfirm owners are diversified and managers maximize shareholder value.However,the data indicate that there is a significant negative relation between idiosyncratic risk and investment for publicly tradedfirms in the United States.In addition,executives in publicly tradedfirms across the world hold a substantial stake in theirfirms,consistent with the predictions of agency bining these two observations sug-gests that,since investment decisions are undertaken by managers on behalf of shareholders,poorly diversified managers may cut back on investment when uncertainty about thefirm’s future prospects increases,even if this uncertainty is specific to thefirm.In this paper,we argue that managerial risk aversion induces a negative rela-tion between idiosyncratic volatility and investment.Wefind that the negative relation between investment and idiosyncratic risk is stronger when managers own a larger fraction of thefirm.This difference in investment–risk sensitivi-ties acrossfirms is economically large.For instance,idiosyncratic uncertainty increased during the2008to2009financial crisis.During this period,firms with higher fractions of insider ownership reduced investment by8%of their ∗Panousi is with the Federal Reserve Board,and Papanikolaou is with the Kellogg School of Management.We thank the editors and two anonymous referees for insightful comments and sug-gestions.We are grateful to George-Marios Angeletos;Janice Eberly;Jiro Kondo;Harald Uhlig; Toni Whited;and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Board,the Chicago Fed,the Kel-logg School of Management,the London School of Economics,the University of South California, Michigan State University,and MIT for useful comments and discussions.We are grateful to Valerie Ramey for sharing her data.Dimitris Papanikolaou thanks the Zell Center forfinancial support.The views presented in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or its staff members.11131114The Journal of Finance Rexisting capital stock,compared to2%forfirms with a more diversified share-holder base.Our results suggest that forcing managers to bearfirm-specific risk induces a wedge between manager and shareholder valuations of investment opportuni-ties and may lead to underinvestment from the perspective of well-diversified shareholders.Shareholders can mitigate this effect through effective monitor-ing or by providing a convex compensation scheme using stock option grants. Wefind that the effect of insider ownership on the investment–risk relation is weaker forfirms with higher levels of institutional ownership.This is con-sistent with the notion that institutional investors are more effective monitors than individual shareholders.In addition,wefind that,controlling for the level of insider ownership,firms with more convex compensation contracts,which therefore increase in value with uncertainty,have lower investment–risk sen-sitivity.In fact,proponents of option-based compensation have used this argu-ment to justify providing executives with downside protection as a compromise between supplying incentives and mitigating risk-averse behavior.We estimatefirm-specific risk using stock return data,where we decom-pose stock return volatility into a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component.Ourfirst concern is that idiosyncratic volatility is endogenous and could be correlated with thefirm’s investment opportunities.If Tobin’s Q is an imperfect measure of investment opportunities,this would lead to omitted variable bias.We address this issue by considering alternative measures of growth opportunities,as well as estimation methods that directly allow for measurement error in Tobin’s Q.In addition,we instrument for idiosyncratic risk with a measure of thefirm’s customer base concentration.Our intuition is thatfirms selling to only a few customers are less able to diversify demand shocks for their product across customers and thus will be riskier.Wefind that idiosyncratic volatility remains a statistically significant predictor of in-vestment,even after addressing these endogeneity concerns.We consider this to be evidence supportive of a causal relation between idiosyncratic risk to investment.Our second main concern is that insider ownership is endogenous and could be correlated withfirm characteristics that might be affecting the investment-uncertainty relation.For instance,insider ownership may be correlated with costs of externalfinance:if afirm is unable to attract outside investors,then insiders will be forced to hold a substantial stake in thefirm.In this case, convex costs of externalfinance will lead to a negative relation betweenfirm-specific uncertainty and investment through a precautionary saving motive. Alternatively,insider ownership may be correlated with the degree of indus-try competition,since a competitive product market could serve as a substi-tute for high-powered incentives.Imperfect competition may then affect the investment-uncertainty relation through the convexity of the marginal product of capital.We address these concerns by comparing the investment offirms with different levels of insider ownership but with similar size,financial constraints, market power,industry competition,and degree of investment irreversibil-ity.Controlling for thesefirm characteristics,wefind thatfirms with higherInvestment,Idiosyncratic Risk,and Ownership1115 insider ownership display higher sensitivity of investment to idiosyncratic risk.The rest of the paper is organized as follows.Section I reviews the related research.Section II provides a simple model illustrating how idiosyncratic risk can affect capital investment.Section III documents empirically the negative relation between idiosyncratic risk and investment.Section IV shows how this relation varies with levels of insider ownership,convexity of executive com-pensation schemes,and institutional ownership.Section V addresses concerns about endogeneity of idiosyncratic volatility and insider ownership.Section VI explores whether our results hold out of sample,particularly during thefinan-cial crisis of2008to2009.Section VII concludes.Details on data construction are delegated to the Appendix.I.Related ResearchIn traditional economic theory,there is no role for managerial characteristics infirm decisions.However,several recent papers provide empirical evidence to the contrary.Bertrand and Schoar(2003)find a role for managerialfixed effects in corporate decisions.Malmendier and Tate(2005)construct a measure of overconfidence based on the propensity of CEOs to exercise options early andfind greater investment–cashflow sensitivity infirms with overconfident ing psychometric tests administered to corporate executives,Graham, Harvey,and Puri(2010)show that traits such as risk aversion,impatience,and optimism are related to corporate policies.Various studies indicate that the identity of afirm’s shareholders may be important.Himmelberg,Hubbard,and Love(2002)document that,even in publicly tradedfirms,insiders hold a substantial share of thefirm.In a cross-country analysis,theyfind that countries with higher levels of investor protec-tion are characterized by lower levels of insider ownership.Admati,Pfleiderer, and Zechner(1994)illustrate theoretically that large investors exert monitor-ing effort in equilibrium,even when monitoring is costly.Gillan and Starks (2000)and Hartzell and Starks(2003)provide empirical evidence supporting the view that institutional ownership can lead to more effective corporate gov-ernance.The theoretical research in real options has extensively examined the sign of the relation between investment and total uncertainty.The theoretical con-clusions are rather ambiguous,as the sign depends,among other things,on assumptions about the production function,the market structure,the shape of adjustment costs,the importance of investment lags,and the degree of invest-ment irreversibility.An incomplete list includes Hartman(1972),Abel(1983), and Caballero(1991).More recently,Chen,Miao,and Wang(2010)and De-Marzo et al.(2010)explore the effect of managerial risk aversion and idiosyn-cratic risk on investment decisions in dynamic models.The previous papers focus on thefirm’s partial equilibrium problem,while Angeletos(2007)and Bloom(2009)investigate the general equilibrium effects of an increase in un-certainty on investment.1116The Journal of Finance RMost of these theoretical papers make no distinction between idiosyncratic and systematic uncertainty.By contrast,we differentiate between idiosyncratic and systematic uncertainty,because managers can hedge exposure to system-atic but not to idiosyncratic risk.For instance,Knopf,Nam,and Thornton (2002)find that managers are more likely to use derivatives to hedge system-atic risk when the sensitivity of their stock and stock option portfolios to stock price is higher and the sensitivity of their option portfolios to stock return volatility is lower.Several empirical studies explore the predictions of real option models.An in-complete list includes Leahy and Whited (1996),Guiso and Parigi (1999),Bond and Cummins (2004),Bulan (2005),and Bloom,Bond,and VanReenen (2007).With the exception of Bulan (2005),these papers focus on the relation between investment and total or systematic uncertainty facing the firm.This branch of research mostly finds a negative relation between uncertainty and investment,though results appear to be somewhat sensitive to the estimation method.We contribute to this research by showing that managerial risk aversion may be an important channel behind the investment–uncertainty relation.II.ModelHere,we propose a simple two-period model that demonstrates how idiosyn-cratic risk can affect capital investment in the absence of adjustment costs or other investment frictions.We abstract from such frictions because we are in-terested in a different channel:investment decisions are taken by risk-averse managers who hold undiversified stakes in their firm.We focus on the idiosyn-cratic rather than the total uncertainty facing the firm because,as long as managers have access to the same hedging opportunities as shareholders,the presence of systematic risk need not lead to distorted investment decisions from the shareholders’perspective.By contrast,since top executives are not permit-ted to buy put options or short their own company’s stock,they cannot hedge away their exposure to firm-specific risk.Thus,idiosyncratic risk introduces a wedge between managers’and shareholders’optimal decisions.A firm starts with cash C at t =0and produces output at t =1according toy =X √K +e ,(1)where e is managerial effort,K is installed capital,and X ∼N (μ,σ2)is a shock specific to the firm.For simplicity,we assume that there is no aggregate uncer-tainty.The manager owns a fraction λof the firm,while the remaining shares are held by shareholders who are risk averse but hold the market portfolio.We assume that the manager cannot diversify his stake in the firm.The manager derives utility from consumption (c 0,c 1)and disutility from effort (e ):U 0=u (c 0)−v (e )+βE 0u (c 1).(2)Investment,Idiosyncratic Risk,and Ownership 1117Utility over consumption takes the form u (c )=−e −Ac ,where A is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion,and the disutility of labor is an increasing convex function,where v >0,v >0,and v (0)=v (0)=0.The manager’s contract consists of a choice of ownership,λ,and an initial transfer,T .Given the contract,the manager will then choose how much to invest in capital,K ,how much effort to provide,e ,and how much to save in the riskless asset,B ,to maximize (2),subject to (1)and the two following budget constraints:c 0=λ(C −K )−B +T(3)c 1=λ(X √K +e )+R B .(4)We assume that the principal cannot write contracts on K ,e ,or B .The as-sumption that K is not contractible may seem odd at first,since in practice capital expenditures are observable and reported by the firm.Note,however,that even though the level of investment may be observable,the amount of idiosyncratic risk undertaken is not,and what K captures here is the amount of risky investment.We could extend the model to allow for two types of capital,one risky and one riskless.We could then have the principal write contracts on the total investment undertaken by the firm,but not on the capital stock chosen.Nonetheless,doing so would not change our results,given that the manager can also save in the private market.P ROPOSITION 1:The manager’s optimal choice of capital ,K ∗,bonds ,B ∗,and effort ,e ∗,are such thatK ∗= μ2R +λA σ22,(5)R v (e ∗)=λu (c 0),(6)u (c ∗0)=βR E 0u (c ∗1).(7)The elasticity of investment to idiosyncratic risk is∂log K ∂log σ2=−λA σ2R +12λA σ2,(8)and is decreasing in λ,A ,and σ2.The first thing to note is that,as long as λ>0,the manager will underin-vest from the perspective of the shareholders,who are diversified and thus behave as if risk neutral with respect to X .Their optimal capital choice equals1118The Journal of Finance RK f b=μ2/(2R)2.By contrast,the manager holds an undiversified stake in the firm,and therefore his choice of capital stock will depend on the level of the idiosyncratic risk of thefirm,σ2.Ifλwere optimally chosen,it would depend,among other things,on the level of idiosyncratic risk and on the manager’s risk aversion and cost of effort.1 When the principal choosesλ,she faces a tradeoff:increasingλinduces higher effort on the part of the manager,but also leads to underinvestment,since the manager is risk averse.This is similar to the classic incentives versus insurance tradeoff.The difference here lies in the cost of providing incentives. For instance,in Holmstr¨o m(1979)the cost of providing incentives is simply the utility cost to the agent,whereas here there is an additional cost,namely, underinvestment in capital.In the following sections,we investigate two testable implications of the model:•PREDICTION1:Firm-level investment displays a negative relation with idiosyncratic risk.•PREDICTION2:The negative relation between investment and idiosyn-cratic risk is stronger forfirms with higher levels of insider ownership.In our empirical results,we take the variation in insider ownership as given. In reality,there are many reasons why shares of insider ownership may vary acrossfirms.The concern would then be thatλvaries endogenously with some unobservablefirm characteristics that are actually responsible for the negative investment–risk relation.Afirst candidate is risk aversion.We can obtain some intuition from the model regarding the effect of risk aversion on the endogeneity ofλ.Given that we do not observe the manager’s risk aversion,our results will be biased toward rejecting the second prediction,even if the model is true.For instance,suppose thatλis exactly inversely proportional to A,so that less risk-averse managers are given higher stakes in thefirm.Then the investment–risk relation will beflat along levels of insider ownership.There are,however,some additional candidates that are outside the model. Insider ownership may be correlated with the degree offinancial constraints, or it could be endogenously related to the level of competition in the product market.In Sections V.B and V.C,we explore these possibilities in more detail.III.Investment and Idiosyncratic RiskIn this section,we examine thefirst prediction of our model,namely,the response of investment to the volatility of idiosyncratic risk,controlling for several factors that might affect this relation.1In our numerical solution,provided in the Appendix,wefind that the optimalλis decreasing with the level of idiosyncratic risk and the manager’s risk aversion because in that case the cost of underinvestment is lower,and is increasing with the marginal cost of effort.This is consistent with the empiricalfindings of Graham,Harvey,and Puri(2010).Nonetheless,this decrease inλdoes not completely undo the effect of managerial risk aversion.In equilibrium,investment is more sensitive to risk infirms where managers are more risk averse.Investment,Idiosyncratic Risk,and Ownership1119 A.Data and ImplementationWe construct our baseline measure of idiosyncratic volatility using weekly data on stock returns from CRSP.2To estimate afirm’s idiosyncratic risk,we need to remove systematic risk factors that the manager can insure against. Therefore,for everyfirm i and every year t,we regress thefirm’s return on the value-weighted market portfolio,R MKT,and on the corresponding value-weighted industry portfolio,R IND,based on the Fama and French(1997) 30-industry classification.Our measure of yearly idiosyncratic investment volatility forfirm i is the volatility of the residuals across the52weekly observations.Thus,we de-compose the total weekly return of afirm i into a market-,industry-,and firm-specific or idiosyncratic component as followsR i,τ=a1,i+a2,i F i,τ+εi,τ,(9) whereτindexes weeks and F i,τ=[R MKT,R IND].Our measure of idiosyncratic risk is the log volatility of the regression residualslog(σi,t)=logτ∈tε2iτ.(10)Our measure of idiosyncratic risk is highly persistent,even though it is con-structed using a nonoverlapping window:The pooled autocorrelation of log(σi,t) is78%in the1970to2005sample.We also examine the robustness of our re-sults to alternative definitions of the volatility measure.As afirst alternative,we use the volatility of thefirm’s raw returns,σtotalt ,which does not isolate anyidiosyncratic risk.As a second alternative,we use the volatility of the resid-uals from a market model regression offirm returns on the market portfolioalone,σrmktt ,where F i,τ=[R MKT].As a third alternative,we use the volatilityof the residuals from a regression offirm returns on the Fama and French(1993)three factors,σr f f3t ,where F i,τ=[R MKT,R HML,R SMB].All three volatil-ity measures are highly correlated(in excess of95%)and lead to qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.We estimate the response of investment to idiosyncratic risk using the fol-lowing reduced-form equation:I i,tK i,t−1=γ0+βlog(σi,t−1)+γ1Z i,t−1+ηi+g t+v i,t,(11)2In the absence of any microstructure effects,using higher frequency data yields more precise estimates of volatility.Thus,when estimating volatility,in principle one should use the highest frequency data available(daily or even intraday).However,since not all stocks trade every day, using daily data would bias down our estimates of covariance with the market and other factors, thus yielding upward-biased estimates of idiosyncratic volatility.In addition,this bias would vary with the liquidity of thefirm’s traded shares.Given that most stocks trade at least once a week, we view weekly data as a compromise between getting more precise estimates and being free of microstructure effects.1120The Journal of Finance Rwhere the dependent variable is the firm’s investment rate (I t /K t −1)and Z i ,t is a vector of controls:(i)log Tobin’s Q ,defined as the ratio of a firm’s mar-ket value to the replacement cost of capital (log(V t /K t ))and measured as in Fazzari,Hubbard,and Petersen (1988);(ii)the ratio of cash flows to capital (C F t /K t −1),computed as in Salinger and Summers (1983);(iii)log firm size,measured as the firm’s capital stock,scaled by the total capital stock to ensurestationarity (log ˆK t =log(K i ,t /1N f N f i K i ,t ));(iv)the firm’s own stock return (R t );and (v)log firm leverage,measured as the ratio of equity to assets (log(E t /A t )).We control for variables that could jointly affect volatility and investment in order to address biases due to omitted variables.In papers focusing on invest-ment,it is standard to control for Tobin’s Q and cash flows.We control for firm size because smaller firms tend to be more volatile and to grow faster;we control for stock returns because volatility and stock returns are negatively correlated,and we want to ensure that we are picking up the effect of volatility rather than a mean effect due to news about future profitability;and we con-trol for firm leverage because equity volatility increases with leverage,while highly levered firms might invest less due to debt overhang (Myers (1977)).More details about the data construction are provided in the Appendix.We use a semi-log specification to capture the possibility that the investment-Q (or investment-σ)relation is not linear,as,for example,in Eberly,Rebelo,and Vincent (2008).Our results are robust to a linear specification for either Q or idiosyncratic volatility.Depending on the specification,we include firm dum-mies (ηi )or time dummies (g t ).Finally,the errors (v i ,t )are clustered at the firm level.Our sample includes all publicly traded firms in Compustat over the period 1970to 2005,excluding firms in the financial (SIC code 6000–6999),utilities (SIC code 4900–4949),and government-regulated industries (SIC code >9000).We also drop firm-year observations with missing SIC codes,with missing val-ues for investment,Tobin’s Q ,cash flows,size,leverage,stock returns,and with negative book values of capital.We also drop firms with fewer than 40weekly observations in that year.Our sample includes a total of 104,646firm-year observations.Finally,to eliminate the effect of outliers,we winsorize our data by year at the 0.5%and 99.5%levels in all specifications.B.Effect of Idiosyncratic Risk on InvestmentOur estimates of equation (11)are reported in Table I .The first column shows that,when we include only idiosyncratic volatility and firm fixed ef-fects,the coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility is −3.5%and statistically signif-icant.The second column presents the results of the benchmark estimation for equation (11),in which case the coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility is −2%and statistically significant.In the third column,we allow the time effects to vary by industry so as to capture any unobservable component varying at the industry level.In this case,identification comes from differences between a firm and its industry peers.To keep the number of fixed effects manageable,Investment,Idiosyncratic Risk,and Ownership1121Table I Idiosyncratic Risk and InvestmentTable I reports estimation results of equation (11),where the dependent variable is the investment rate (I t /K t −1).Our baseline measure of risk,σi ,t −1,is constructed from a regression of weekly firm-level returns on the CRSP VW index and the corresponding industry portfolio.Additional regressors include lagged values of:Tobin’s Q (Q t −1)defined as in Fazzari,Hubbard,and Petersen (1988);operating cash flows (C F t −1/K t −2)defined as the ratio of operating income (item 18)to the replacement cost of capital,computed as in Salinger and Summers (1983);the firm’s size (log(ˆK t −1))defined as the log value of its replacement cost of capital,scaled by average capital across all firms;the firm’s stock return (R t −1);leverage (E t −1/A t −1)defined as the ratio of book equity (item 216)to book assets (item 6);and systematic volatility (log(σsyst t −1))defined as the (log of the)square root of the difference between the firm’s total variance and its idiosyncratic variance.Item refers to Compustat items.The sample period is 1970to 2005.Here,F denotes firm fixed effects,T denotes time fixed effects,and I ×T denotes industry-time fixed effects.The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level,and t -statistics are reported in parentheses.I t /K t −1No Controls BENCH IND ×T Syst log(σi ,t −1)−0.0346−0.0196−0.0197−0.0244−(13.78)−(8.44)−(8.32)−(9.94)log(σsyst t −1)0.0063(5.51)log(Q t −1)0.06990.06920.0690(45.05)(43.41)(44.31)C F t −1/K t −20.02220.02180.0220(9.91)(9.88)(9.84)log(ˆKt −1)−0.1179−0.1243−0.1188−(31.80)−(31.67)−(32.09)R t −10.01460.01310.0148(8.66)(7.47)(8.75)log(E t −1/A t −1)0.03520.03460.0346(14.13)(13.82)(13.96)Observations104,646104,646104,646104,619R 20.3990.5630.5690.563Fixed effectsF F ,T F ,I ×T F ,T Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS we use the two-digit SIC classification.In this specification,the coefficient on log(σi ,t −1)remains mostly unaffected at −2%.Our estimates imply that the sensitivity of investment to idiosyncratic risk is economically significant.The standard deviation of log idiosyncratic volatility in our sample is 49%,so a one-standard-deviation increase in log σis associated with a 1%to 1.75%decrease in the investment–capital ratio.This is a substan-tial drop,as the mean investment–capital ratio in our sample is approximately 10%.One concern is that idiosyncratic volatility may be positively correlated with systematic volatility,and thus the negative coefficient on idiosyncratic volatil-ity may simply capture the effect of time variation in systematic risk premia on investment.To address this issue,we include lagged systematic volatility1122The Journal of Finance Ras an additional regressor in the fourth column of Table I.3The coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility is still negative and significant(−2.4%),whereas the coefficient on systematic volatility is positive and significant(0.6%).The coef-ficient on systematic volatility is economically small.Given that the standard deviation of systematic volatility is73%in the sample,these estimates imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in systematic volatility is associated with a0.45%increase in the investment–capital ratio.The positive sensitivity of investment to systematic volatility might seem puzzling.All else equal,an increase in systematic volatility increases thefirm’s cost of capital and therefore should lead to a decrease in investment.Here,note that our measure of systematic volatility depends on thefirm’s systematic risk exposures(beta)as well as the amount of market risk(market and industry volatility).Hence,our results are consistent with Bloom(2009),whofinds a negative relation between investment and the volatility of the market portfo-lio.Furthermore,afirm’s exposure to systematic risk depends on its asset mix between investment opportunities and assets in place.In general,growth op-portunities have greater exposure to systematic risk than assets in place,and hencefirms with better investment opportunities will have higher systematic risk and also invest more on average(e.g.,Kogan and Papanikolaou(2010a)). If Tobin’s Q is not a perfect measure of investment opportunities,the resulting omitted variable problem could bias our results toward a positive coefficient on systematic volatility.We explore this possibility in Section V.A.IV.Managerial Ownership and Risk AversionIn this section,we explore the second prediction of our model,namely,that the effect of idiosyncratic risk on investment is stronger forfirms where managers hold a larger share in thefirm.We also examine two related predictions that are outside the model.First,over the last20years,severalfirms have switched to option-based pensating executives with options,rather than shares,pro-vides managers with a convex payoff whose value increases in the volatility of thefirm.Thus,all else equal,increasing the convexity of the compensation package should mitigate the effect of risk aversion on investment(Ross(2004)). We test this prediction by examining the investment–risk sensitivity forfirms with different levels of convexity in their compensation schemes.We expect that the negative effect of idiosyncratic risk on investment will be smaller for firms with more convex compensation schemes.Second,if the investment–risk relation is due to poor managerial diversi-fication,then managers are possibly destroying shareholder value by turning down high idiosyncratic risk but positive net present value projects.To mitigate this loss in value,shareholders may start monitoring managerial investment 3We compute systematic volatility as total volatility minus idiosyncratic volatility,that is,logσsysti,t−1≡log(σtotali,t−1)2−σ2i,t−1.Note that systematic volatility varies in the cross-section due tocross-sectional dispersion in betas with the market and industry portfolios.。
宏观经济学之投资理论Investment(精品PPT课件共30页)
This scatterplot shows that inventory investment is high in years when real GDP rises and low in years when real GDP falls.
N = ßY I = N = ßY
N是经济的存货量, I 是存货投资—是存货量的变动N
Second, there are various causes of shifts in the investment function. An improvement in the available technology raises the marginal product of capital and raises business fixed investment.
Inventory investment (存货投资) The change in the quantity of goods that firms hold in
storage, including materials and supplies, work in process (加工中的产品), and finished goods. Neoclassical model of investment
国际投资头寸名词解释
国际投资头寸名词解释
国际投资头寸(International Investment Position)是一个经济学家常用的术语,用于描述一个国家或地区所拥有的国际投资资产和负债之间的关系。
国际投资头寸通常由一个国家或地区所拥有的国际投资资产和
负债构成。
资产包括国外投资、证券、债券、现金等,负债则包括外国贷款、信用贷款、长期负债等。
国际投资头寸的值越高,表示一个国家或地区拥有的国际投资越多,反之亦然。
国际投资头寸反映了一个国家或地区在国际上的投资能力和风
险承受能力。
当一个国家或地区需要对外借款或投资时,需要考虑其国际投资头寸的情况,以确保其对外债务和资产的合法性和有效性。
国际投资头寸也是投资者进行投资决策时需要考虑的一个因素。
投资者可以通过调整其国际投资头寸来影响其投资组合,包括调整其对外债务和资产的比例,以适应不同的经济和社会环境。
商务英语案例展示-Investment
shareholders
Investment
Tips from Buffett
“I would rather be certain of a good result than hopeful of a great one.” 但与其两鸟在林，还不如一鸟 在手。 ――1996 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders
[经] 分股投资公司 ; 公司型基金
Alternative investment 另类投资
Investment
Definition-History
1700 B.C. The Code of Hammurabi(汉谟拉比法典) 1700 B.C. provided a legal framework（法律体制） for investment， establishing a means for the pledge of collateral（抵押品） by codifying（编 2003 纂） debtor(债务人) and creditor rights（债权） in regard to pledged land. Punishments for breaking financial obligations （债务） were not as severe as those for crimes involving injury or death. In the early 1900s purchasers of stocks, bonds, 1900s and other securities were described in media, academia, and commerce as speculators. By the 1950s the term investment had been co-opted by financial brokers（经纪人） and their advertising agencies to promote speculation.
collective investment scheme集体投资计划
collective investment scheme集体投
资计划
集体投资计划（collective investment scheme）是一种集合多个投资者的资金，由专业管理人员进行投资和管理的投资工具。
它通常以基金、信托或其他集合投资形式出现，旨在为投资者提供多样化的投资组合和专业的投资管理服务。
集体投资计划的主要特点包括：
1. 集合资金：多个投资者将资金汇集到一起，形成一个更大的投资池，以实现规模效应和分散投资风险。
2. 专业管理：集体投资计划由专业的投资管理人员或团队进行管理，他们根据投资目标和策略来选择和管理投资组合。
3. 多样化投资：通过汇集多个投资者的资金，可以实现投资组合的多样化，降低单个投资的风险。
4. 流动性：集体投资计划通常提供一定程度的流动性，投资者可以在一定时间内赎回或卖出其份额。
5. 监管和透明度：集体投资计划受到监管机构的监管，要求管理人提供透明的信息披露，以保护投资者的利益。
集体投资计划可以包括多种类型，如股票基金、债券基金、货币市场基金、房地产基金等。
投资者可以根据自己的风险承受能力、投资目标和时间框架来选择适合的集体投资计划。
investment assets会计科目
investment assets会计科目下载温馨提示：该文档是我店铺精心编制而成，希望大家下载以后，能够帮助大家解决实际的问题。
文档下载后可定制随意修改，请根据实际需要进行相应的调整和使用，谢谢!并且，本店铺为大家提供各种各样类型的实用资料，如教育随笔、日记赏析、句子摘抄、古诗大全、经典美文、话题作文、工作总结、词语解析、文案摘录、其他资料等等，如想了解不同资料格式和写法，敬请关注!Download tips: This document is carefully compiled by the editor. I hope that after you download them, they can help you solve practical problems. The document can be customized and modified after downloading, please adjust and use it according to actual needs, thank you!In addition, our shop provides you with various types of practical materials, such as educational essays, diary appreciation, sentence excerpts, ancient poems, classic articles, topic composition, work summary, word parsing, copy excerpts, other materials and so on, want to know different data formats and writing methods, please pay attention!投资资产是公司在财务会计中非常重要的一项科目，其在公司财务报表中扮演着至关重要的角色。
公共投资名词解释
公共投资名词解释
公共投资（Public Investment）是指由政府进行的投资，其目的是为了提供公共品和准公共产品，以及实现其他公共利益。
公共投资的范围广泛，包括科技、教育、文化、卫生、体育、环保等事业的投资，公、检、法、司等政权机关的建设投资，政府机关、社会团体办公设施以及社会基础设施等的投资。
公共投资是政府调节经济的主要工具之一，它与私人投资相对，私人投资是由非政府部门进行的投资。
公共投资可以推动经济增长，增加就业机会，促进技术进步，提高国民福利。
具体来说，政府通过投资道路、桥梁、港口等基础设施，可以提高社会的运输效率，降低交易成本，为企业的经营活动提供便利；通过投资科学研究、教育、医疗等，可以提高整个社会的知识和技术水平，为经济增长提供持久的动力；通过投资环境保护和治理，可以提高人们的生活质量，促进社会的可持续发展。
然而，公共投资也面临着一些挑战和问题。
例如，公共投资项目往往需要大量的资金，可能会给政府带来较大的财政压力；公共投资项目通常具有较大的外部性，需要政府进行有效的监督和管理，防止出现贪污腐败和资源浪费等问题；公共投资项目的效果往往难以量化，需要政府进行科学合理的评估和审计。
因此，政府在进行公共投资时，需要充分考虑项目的必要性、经济效益和社会效益等方面，科学决策、合理安排预算和监管机制。
只有这样，公共投资才能发挥最大的效用，促进社会经济的可持续发展。
investment形容词
investment形容词【释义】investmentn.投资；值得买的东西；（时间、精力的）投入；<旧>包围，封锁复数investments【短语】1investment casting机熔模铸造;精密铸造;失模铸造;包模铸造法2investment bank金融投资银行;投行资讯;投行;期望从事行业3Investment Banking投资银行;投资银行业;投行业务;投资银行理论与实务4European Investment Bank欧洲投资银行;向欧洲投资银行;已获得欧洲投资银行;及欧洲投资银行5Investment income投资收益;加投资收益;怼6foreign direct investment外商直接投资;金融外国直接投资;直接投资;对外直接投资7return on investment投资报酬率;投资回报率;回报8risk investment金融风险投资;风险;险投资9Liquid investment金融短期投资;短期;流动资金【例句】1Training is an investment not a cost.培训是一种投资而不是一种花费。
2Investment is all about running risks.投资就是要冒风险。
3Investment is becoming a chancy business.投资正在成为一项冒险的事业。
4The investment is little more than a punt.这项投资无异于一场赌博。
5Let's talk just about investment generally.咱们只一般性地谈谈投资吧。