货物买卖法第一部分课程材料

国际货物买卖法第一部分课程材料
第二讲概述
一、有关国际货物买卖的国内立法、国际条约和国际贸易惯例
1、各国有关国际货物买卖的立法
各国有买卖法的形式和内容并不完全相同。

在英美法国家，没有民法和商法之分，英美法国家既没有民法典，也没有商法典，这些国家的货物买卖法大都以单行法的形式出现。

在英国，具有代表性的是1893年《货物买卖法》。

美国于1906年制定了《1906年统一买卖法》，后来，由于这部法律已不能适应美国经济发展的需要，1942年，美国统一州法协会和美国法学会联合制定了一部美国《统一商法典》，其中第二编就是买卖法的法律规定。

但这部法典并不是美国国会通过，而是由民间团体起草供各州自由采用的样板法。

按照美国宪法的规定，有关贸易的立法权原则上属于各州，所以各州对于是否采用《统一商法典》有完全的自主权。

但是这部法典比较能够适应美国的经济发展，所以除了路易斯安纳州外，所有的州均已通过立法采用了这部法典。

在大陆法国家，大都把买卖法纳入民法典，作为民法典的组成部分。

尽管大陆法和英美法在货物买卖法的立法形式上有所不同，但是有一点是相同，就是这些国家只有一种买卖法，它既适用于国内货物的买卖，也适用于国际货物买卖。

我国曾将国内货物买卖法和国际货物买卖法分别立法，分别制订了《经济合同法》和《涉外经济合同法》，但这种做法已不能适应社会主义市场经济的要求，因此，我国于1999年制定了统一的《合同法》，目前我国也只有一种买卖法。

2、国际立法
由于各国的货物买卖法有所不同，发生法律冲突再所难免，这对于发展国际贸易是不利的。

因此，统一调整国际货物买卖的法律规范一直是世界各国、各种贸易团体追求的目标。

目前，比较有代表性的是国际统一私法协会制定的《关于国际货物销售的统一法公约》、《关于国际货物销售合同成立的统一法公约》和联合国国际贸易法委员会制定的《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》。

《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》是联合国国际贸易法委员会在《关于国际货物销售的统一法公约》和《关于国际货物销售合同成立的统一法公约》的基础上，经过十多年酝酿起草的，于1980年通过。

截至2000年，已有56个国家批准或加入了该公约，占世界贸易额的三分之二。

我国也加入了该公约。

3、国际贸易惯例
国际贸易惯例是在国际贸易的长期实践中，在某一地区或一行业逐渐形成的为该地区或该行业所普遍认知、适用的商业做法或贸易习惯，作为确立当事人权利义务的规则对适用的当事人有约束力。

现在的国际贸易惯例经过人们的整理、编纂，表现为书面的成文形式。

某一组织、协会的标准合同文本，指导原则，业务规范，术语解释，都可以是国际贸易惯例。

国际
贸易惯例可以补充现有的法律不足，明确合同条款具体的含义，更好地确认当事人的意图和权利义务关系。

同时，国际贸易惯例促进了国际贸易规则的统一，减少了当事人可能产生的分歧和争议，方便了国际贸易的进行。

国际贸易中的国际惯例很多，涉及不同的种类和方面。

在贸易术语方面，有国际商会的《国际贸易术语解释通则》、《1932年华沙－牛津规则》和《美国1941年对外贸易定义修订》；在结算方面，有《托收统一规则》、《跟单信用证统一惯例》；要国际货物运输方面，有国际上使用广泛和提单文本、租船合同；保险方面，有保险协会的保险条款等等。

另外，国际统一私法协会制定的《国际商事合同通则》也是新的惯例。

二、国际货物买卖的法律适用
调整国际货物买卖的主要法律是合同法。

按照合同法契约自由的原则，当事人可以约定选择合同适用的法律。

因此在法律适用方面，无论是各国的国内立法还是国际公约，一般都规定，当事人可以约定选择合同适用的法律，只有在当事人没有约定的情况下，法院或者仲裁机构才会按照合同最密切联系原则，确定合同适用的法律。

但是，当事人选择适用的法律一般应当是实体法，而不包括冲突规范，以避免产生适用法律的不确定性。

而法院或者仲裁机构按最密切联系原则确定合同适用的法律一般也是实体法。

合同当事人选择用于处理合同争议适用的法律，可以是国际公约、某国的国内法，也可以是国际惯例。

由于合同内容的广泛，不同的问题可能有不同的适用规范，因此在一个合同中，可以同时选择适用国际公约、国内法和国际贸易惯例。

当前，《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》（以下简称公约）是国际贸易中适用最广泛的国际条约，该公约吸收了大陆法和英美法中买卖法的合理内容，结合当前国际贸易发展特点，所制定的一部能被不同法律制度和不同社会经济制度国家所接受的国际货物统一买卖法。

在国际贸易中正发挥是越来越重要的作用。

因此，本课程讲授的国际货物买卖合同法主要以该公约为主，并简要介绍其他国家法律和国际惯例有关买卖法的规定。

三、公约的结构
公约由序言和四个部分组成，共101条，187款。

公约的序言中规定了公约的宗旨：以建立新的国际经济秩序为目标，在确立有关国际货物销售合同的统一原则时，照顾到不同社会经济制度和法律制度的国家，以减少国际贸易的法律障碍，在平等互利的基础上发展国际贸易，促进各国间的友好关系。

公约正文的四部分分部是：
第一部分，“适用范围和总则”，规定了公约的适用范围和适用公约的基本原则。

第二部分，“合同的订立”，规定合同订立的程序、要约和承诺的规则。

第三部分，“货物销售”，是公约的主要部分，规定了买方和卖方的权利义务、违约和违约的救济方法，以及货物风险的转移等内容
第四部分，“最后条款”规定公约的签字、加入、生效、退出、允许保留事项，联邦条款，
以及公约正本的保管等一般性条款。

四、公约的适用范围
公约规定了适用公约的合同主体的范围和销售（即何种货物的买卖适用公约）的范围。

1、合同主体的范围
适用公约的合同主体，必须是营业地在不同国家的当事人，而且该当事人所在国必须是公约的缔约国。

如果当事人的所在国虽不是缔约国，但是因国际私法规则导致适用某一缔约国的法律，也适用公约。

国际私法规则就是冲突规范，是指明某种涉外民事法律关系应适用何国法律的规范。

“因国际私法规则导致适用某一缔约国的法律”，具体地说，就是合同当事人的所在国并不是缔约国，他们合同发生争议本不应适用公约，但是，按照国际私法规则，该合同争议的解决需要适用另一国的法律，而另一国却是公约的缔约国，那么无论是否当事人在该国有无营业所，该合同也适用公约。

公约的这一规定扩大了公约的适用范围，把公约适用到了非缔约国，同时也是对缔约国国内法适用的限制，所以，对于这一规定，公约允许缔约国在批准或加入时，作出保留。

公约还规定，确定本公约的适用时，当事人的国籍或合同的民事或商业性质，不予考虑。

由此可以看出，尽管合同的当事人的国籍可能是相同的，但是只要他们的营业所处于不同的国家，合同就适用该公约。

另外，公约允许当事人选择是否适用公约，对当事人之间已经确立的惯例，应依该惯例，所以，公约对当事人只具有相对的强制的效力。

2、公约适用的销售范围
公约规定，公约只适用于销售合同的订立和买方卖方因此种合同产生的权利义务。

对于哪些货物的销售适用于公约，公约没有明确规定，但是公约采用了列举的方式，规定了不适用于公约的销售。

（1）购供私人，家人或家庭使用的货物的销售，除非卖方在订立合同前任何时候或订立合同时不知道而且没有理由知道这些货物是购供任何这种使用。

（2）经由拍卖的销售。

（3）根据法律执行令状或其他令状的销售。

（4）公债、股票、投资证券、流通票据或货币的销售。

（5）船舶、船只、气垫船或飞机的销售
（6）电力的销售。

从这些规定，我们可以看出，公约主要适用以商业为目的的有形的动产销售。

船舶、船只、气垫船或飞机的销售在国际上主要按照不动产的销售对待，因此，它们虽为动产，也不适用公约。

公约还规定，供应货物的一方的绝大部分义务在于供应劳力或其他服务的合同，也不适用公约。

这类合同，实际上是属于服务贸易的范畴，所以公约也将其排除在外。

3、买卖
国际货物销售合同公约在第三条中规定：“（１）供应尚待制造或生产的货物的合同应视为销售合同，除非订购货物的当事人保证供应这种制造或生产所需的大部分重要材料。

（２）本公约不适用于供应货物一方的绝大部分义务在于供应劳力或其它服务的合同”。

其中第（1）款主要目的是排除对加工贸易的适用。

第二款用于排除服务贸易合同。

而根据第（２）款所提出的“绝大部分义务”标准似乎与美国统一商法典第一个案例的标准有些相似，但各国在解释中又有不同。

在确定合同的标的是货物之后，要适用货物买卖法还需要确定买卖的概念。

因为货物在不同人之间的转移除买卖外还可能存在其他性质的交易，比如租赁、抵押。

此外在一笔交易中如果同时存在买卖或其他种类的交易，应当适用货物买卖法还是其他法规是一个重要的问题。

比如在装修合同中，承包方除了提供服务外还会同时提供部分材料，而其收取的价款中既有服务的成分也有货物的成分，那么是否有买卖的性质呢。

在美国由于美国统一商法典中有专门的货物买卖法，而没有针对服务的法规。

因此，如果法官认定该争议的合同属于货物买卖，则可以适用美国统一商法典的货物买卖法部分；如果法官认定该争议的合同不属于货物买卖，则要适用普通法的合同法。

而由于美国统一商法典对于传统的普通法合同法进行了很多革新和补充，因而还是有很多不同之处。

这就使争议双方在诉讼中，经常就法律适用问题进行争论。

Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.
706 F.2d 456 , C.A.Md.,1983.
Washington Plate Glass Company had a contract "to furnish and install aluminum and glass curtain wall and store front work" [FN3] on a building located in Lanham, Maryland being built by Coakley & Williams, Inc., the plaintiff. To accomplish its contractual undertaking, Washington purchased the glass spandrel required from the defendant, Shatterproof Glass Corp. Still other materials needed for the project, predominantly aluminum, it appears were acquired in part at least elsewhere.
The contract price under the Coakley and Washington agreement amounted to $262,500, subsequently increased by amendment to $271,350. The glass purchased by Washington from Shatterproof cost $87,715.00, with the proviso that units were "to be properly marked for field installation."
The work progressed and the contract for the aluminum and glass curtain wall and storefront work was completed in March of 1974. Discoloration of the glass ensued, and Coakley complained. To remedy the situation, Washington agreed to replace the glass at no cost to Coakley, and did in fact replace a substantial portion of the glass. Shatterproof supplied the replacement glass and
reimbursed Washington for the cost of re-installation, accomplished in April of 1977.
By December of 1977, the glass had again discolored, and complaints began to flow from Coakley to Washington and Shatterproof in or about December 1978. Shatterproof declined to replace a second time. On January 14, 1981, Coakley filed suit against Shatterproof in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland alleging breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Reliance was placed on certain provisions of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code, Annotated Code of Maryland, § 1-101 et seq. Removal to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland followed, and Shatterproof sought dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
A hearing on the 12(b)(6) motion followed at which Shatterproof contended (1) that the U.C.C. was inapplicable, (2) that lack of privity was fatal to the claim, and (3) that the statute of limitations had run prior to commencement of the action. We now have the case before us on appeal from an order granting the 12(b)(6) motion and dismissing the case solely on the grounds that the U.C.C. was not applicable.
Whether the U.C.C. applies turns on a question as to whether the contract between Washington and Coakley involved principally a sale of goods, on the one hand, or a provision of services, on the other. U.C.C. § 2-314 creates an implied warranty "that the goods shall be merchantable" to be "implied in a contract for their sale." Section 2-315 establishes an implied warranty "that the goods shall be fit" for a *459 particular purpose, "[w]here the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know [the] particular purpose." (Emphasis added.)
Consequently, unless there has been a buyer of goods, the U.C.C. warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular use do not apply. Furthermore, unless there has been a buyer of goods, the elimination of a requirement of privity would not have been achieved. Accordingly, both questions (1) as to the availability of the warranties and (2) as to the amenability of Shatterproof, who was not in privity with Coakley, to suit by Coakley, come down to whether the transactions between Washington and Coakley was a sale of goods or the provision of services.
To resolve that question, we must address ourselves to a welter of cases reaching varying results depending on the considerations deemed to predominate in each particular case. It should not pass unnoticed that all were decided at summary judgment *460 or beyond. No case involving the issue appears to have been disposed of at the Rule 12(b)(6) or demurrer stage. They emphasize, in particular, three aspects which may, or may not, constitute indicia of the nature of the contract: (1) the language of the contract, (2) the nature of the business of the supplier, and (3) the intrinsic worth of the materials involved.
A distillation of the cases outlined in the foregoing notes 11-14 produces an inescapable conclusion that, on the facts in their present pro-plaintiff posture, a reasonable viewing of them would permit a factfinder to conclude that the contract between Washington and Coakley predominantly concerned a sale of goods, and consequently was governed by the U.C.C. A Rule *461 12(b)(6) motion simply cannot serve to dispose of the case.
As to the first of the emphasized aspects, the contract between Washington and Coakley speaks in terms of furnishing and installing a wall and performing storefront work. Clearly, at the very outset of performance Washington had the responsibility to bring to the affected premises the materials which ultimately would form the glass curtain wall and store front. The U.C.C. in §2-105 defines "goods" as "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Title 8) and things in action." (Emphasis added.) That at least creates an uncertainty to be resolved only by a full factual presentation to determine whether the nature of the Washington business was predominantly the provision of goods or the furnishing of services. The fact that Coakley was a building contractor specializing in construction is not sufficient to provide a completely definitive answer. While often, and perhaps customarily, a contractor is engaged in the provision of services, the scope of a contractor's work is not necessarily monolithic and, in the present circumstances, it becomes a question of unresolved fact whether Coakley, for the purposes of the single relationship to which we are restricted, was a buyer of goods.
In this connection, it is not irrelevant that Coakley has alleged that the purchases by Washington from Shatterproof included anchor clips and field fasteners. At the early stage at which we find ourselves, the allegation requires us to indulge the inference urged by counsel for Coakley that putting the glass in place was a simple snap-on process requiring little expenditure of time or labor. One can readily imagine, without the advantage of specificity deriving from a full trial on the merits, that the contract largely contemplated the provision of pre-cast panels as goods, without the installation being nearly so extensive or significant as the supplying of the glass itself.
The fact that the contract does not follow a standard, routine or regularized form, coupled with the plaintiff's contention that standard form contracts are virtually universal for construction (i.e., generally, service) contracts, operates to leave open the possibility of a finding that the contract is more one for goods than would be the customary construction contract.
Turning to the second point, the nature of Washington's business, the fact that Washington was a dealer and not a manufacturer does not have any particularly dispositive significance. Many retailers of goods function in the role of middleman. Shatterproof sold Washington materials in a transaction which unquestionably, on the sparse record before us at the preliminary stage at which we find ourselves, was a sale of goods, and the question comes down essentially to whether those materials or the services which Washington also provided under its contract with Coakley predominated. Without full consideration of as yet unascertained facts that question is simply not ripe for resolution. It is one of fact, not law; at least it is at this early stage.
Third, the complaint affords no realistic, and certainly no dispositive, information as to the value of the spandrels et al. in case of breakup into the component parts of the glass curtain wall and store front work. That can only be determined by further development of the record, and is, in all events, but one of several factors which must be evaluated in conjunction with all the others in resolving the ultimate factual issue: did Washington and Coakley deal primarily with goods or services?
Accordingly, Coakley has alleged enough to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. *462 12(b)(6). Nor, at the other extreme, has it alleged too much, permitting sure ascertainment that services, not goods, were the gravamen of the transaction. Coakley should, therefore, be permitted to show, unless the statute of limitations bars recovery, that it was a buyer of goods and, therefore, entitled to proceed under the U.C.C. provisions.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
思考题
1、简单归纳本案基本事实
2、本案提出的区分是否构成买卖交易的标准是什么？
3、本案标准是否合理?
4、是否存在更合理的标准？
讨论案例
案例一AUSTRIA: Arbitral Tribunal - Vienna 15 June 1994, SCH-4318
An Austrian seller and a German buyer concluded a contract for the sale of rolled metal sheets. The goods were to be delivered in installments "FOB Rostock", specially packaged for export. Immediately after receiving the first two deliveries, the buyer sold the goods to a Belgian company which shipped them to a Portuguese manufacturer. The manufacturer found that the goods were defective and refused to accept the rest of them. The German buyer sent to the Austrian seller notice of non-conformity of the goods with contract specifications, but the seller refused to pay damages, alleging that the notice was not timely. The buyer commenced arbitral proceedings pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in its contract with the seller.
The buyer had sent to the seller written notice of the defects, together with an expert statement by and internationally recognized company, only six months after delivery, while, according to the contract, it should have done so immediately after delivery of the goods (or at the least within two months after delivery).
However, after receiving the notice the seller had continued to ask the buyer to provide information on the status of the complaints and had pursued negotiations with a view to reach a settlement. The buyer argued that seller had repeatedly made statements to the buyer from which the latter could reasonably infer that the seller would not set up the defense of late notice and that, in reliance upon this, buyer refrained from taking legal action not only against its own customer, but also against seller.
问题：卖方在诉讼中是否可以以买方未根据索赔期限提出索赔为由拒绝赔偿
第三讲货物买卖法法中的诚信原则
大陆法系的律师认为诚实信用和公平交易原则是法律体系的核心，而普通法系的律师却把此原则作为其法律体系的新近改革。

在所有普通法系国家，只有美国在关于合同的履行方面有一套发展相对比较完善的诚实信用和公平交易原则。

从国际层面上看，《维也纳销售公约》也没有有效地规定诚实信用原则，而是将普通法和大陆法的有关规则做了并不高明的折衷。

国际统一私法协会的《国际商事通则》反映了大陆法的观点，不仅在合同的履行，并且在合同的订立中也给当事人施加了诚实信用和公平交易的义务。

1、大陆法系
有关诚实信用的最著名的立法规定是《德国民法典》242条，其规定：“债务人有义务依诚实和信用，并参照交易习惯，履行给付。

”（德国法的规定：§ 242 Leistung nach Treu und Glauben，Der Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu bewirken, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern.）这简短的条文衍生了大量的判例法规则，并派生了对其的注释，这些都大大超过了法律规定本身。

2、普通法系
在英美法发展过程中很长的时间里并没有诚实信用原则。

因为从传统上讲，英美法中的商法起源于商人习惯法，而在最早的商人习惯法中由于部分不诚实商人的作证，没有引入诚实信用原则，而是引入了“买者自慎”制度。

而这个传统在英美法中保持了相当长的时间。

美国统一商法典第一次在美国法中明确的引入了诚实信用的原则。

与大多数美国统一商法典的任意性规则不同，诚实信用的原则不得通过当事人选择排除，但并不与当事人的合同明示规定相抵触。

诚实信用原则对于合同解释和合同履行的指导具有极为重要的作用。

英国法在最近几十年中也开始引入诚实信用原则，但并不像美国统一商法典这样彻底。

美国统一商法典§2-103(b) 关于诚实信用原则的解释是“‘Good faith’in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade“。

从这个定义可以看出，对于商人诚实信用的要求是事实上的诚实和遵循合理的商业标准。

在其中引入了合理商业标准的概念。

3、《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》
正如前面所介绍的，诚实信用原则在大陆法系是民商事法律关系的基础原则，而在英美法系中却没有这样的传统。

因此，国际货物销售合同公约在制定中考虑到两大法系的分歧，只能采用了折衷的规定。

在公约第七条第（１）款规定“在解释本公约时，应考虑到本公约的国际性质和促进其适用的统一以及在国际贸易上遵守诚信的需要”。

这句话的含义是，各国司法机构在解释公约时，应当考虑“促进其适用的统一”以及“遵守诚信的需要”，但并不要求各国司法机构在审理案件中必需采用诚实信用原则。

因此，如果在有诚实信用原则的大陆法国家，司法机构当然可以适用诚实信用原则。

而如果在没有诚实信用原则的英美法国家，司法机构就没有义务必需采用诚实信用标准来审理
案件。

但是，如在第一节中已经介绍的，由于英美法国家逐渐引入了诚实信用原则，有关问题在各国之间的差异已经不十分明显了。

主讲案例
Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc.
408 N.E.2d 1370 Mass., 1980.
We are concerned here with the question whether Dairy Mart, Inc. (Dairy Mart), lawfully undertook to terminate a franchise agreement under which the Zapathas operated a Dairy Mart store on Wilbraham Road in Springfield. The Zapathas brought this action seeking to enjoin the termination of the agreement, alleging that the contract provision purporting to authorize the termination of the franchise agreement without cause was unconscionable and that Dairy Mart's conduct was an unfair and deceptive act or practice in violation of G.L. c. 93A. The judge ruled that Dairy Mart did not act in good faith, that the termination provision was unconscionable, and that Dairy Mart's termination of the agreement without cause was an unfair and deceptive act. We granted Dairy Mart's application for direct appellate review of a judgment that stated that Dairy Mart could terminate the agreement only for good cause and that the attempted termination was null and void.We reverse the judgments.
Mr. Zapatha is a high school graduate who had attended college for one year and had also taken college evening courses in business administration and business law. From 1952 to May, 1973, he was employed by a company engaged in the business of electroplating. He rose through the ranks to foreman and then to the position of operations manager, at one time being in charge of all metal finishing in the plant with 150 people working under him. In May, 1973, he was discharged and began looking for other opportunities, in particular a business of his own. Several months later he met with a representative of Dairy Mart. Dairy Mart operates a chain of franchised "convenience" stores. The Dairy Mart representative told Mr. Zapatha that working for Dairy Mart was being in business for one's self and that such a business was very stable and secure. Mr. Zapatha signed an application to be considered for a franchise. In addition, he was presented with a brochure entitled "Here's a Chance," which made certain representations concerning the status of a franchise holder.
Dairy Mart approved Mr. Zapatha's application and offered him a store in Agawam. On November 8, 1973, a representative of Dairy Mart showed him a form of franchise agreement, entitled Limited Franchise and License Agreement, asked him to read it, and explained that his wife would have to sign the agreement as well.
Under the terms of the agreement, Dairy Mart would license the Zapathas to operate a Dairy Mart store, using the Dairy Mart trademark and associated insignia, and utilizing Dairy Mart's "confidential" merchandising methods. Dairy Mart would furnish the store and the equipment and would pay rent and gas and electric bills as well as certain other costs of doing business. In return Dairy Mart would receive a franchise fee, computed as a percentage of the store's gross sales. The Zapathas would have to pay for the starting inventory, and maintain a minimum stock of saleable
merchandise thereafter. They were also responsible for wages of employees, related taxes, and any sales taxes. The termination provision, which is set forth in full in the margin, *287 allowed either party, after twelve months, to terminate the agreement without cause on ninety days' written notice. In the event of termination initiated by it without cause, Dairy Mart agreed to repurchase the saleable merchandise inventory at retail prices, less 20%.
The Dairy Mart representative read and explained the termination provision to Mr. Zapatha. Mr. Zapatha later testified that, while he understood every word in the provision, he had interpreted it to mean that Dairy Mart could terminate the agreement only for cause. The Dairy Mart representative advised Mr. Zapatha to take the agreement to an attorney and said "I would prefer that you did." However, he also told Mr. Zapatha that the terms of the contract were not negotiable. The Zapathas signed the agreement without consulting an attorney. When the Zapathas took charge of the Agawam store, a representative of Dairy Mart worked with them to train them in Dairy Mart's methods of operation.
In 1974, another store became available on Wilbraham Road in Springfield, and the Zapathas elected to surrender the Agawam store. They executed a new franchise agreement, on an identical printed form, relating to the new location.
In November, 1977, Dairy Mart presented a new and more detailed form of "Independent Operator's Agreement" to the Zapathas for execution. Some of the terms were less favorable to the store operator than those of the earlier form of agreement. Mr. Zapatha told representatives of Dairy *288 Mart that he was content with the existing contract and had decided not to sign the new agreement. On January 20, 1978, Dairy Mart gave written notice to the Zapathas that their contract was being terminated effective in ninety days. The termination notice stated that Dairy Mart "remains available to enter into discussions with you with respect to entering into a new Independent Operator's Agreement; however, there is no assurance that Dairy Mart will enter into a new Agreement with you, or even if entered into, what terms such Agreement will contain." The notice also indicated that Dairy Mart was prepared to purchase the Zapathas' saleable inventory.
The judge found that Dairy Mart terminated the agreement solely because the Zapathas refused to sign the new agreement. He further found that, but for this one act, Dairy Mart did not behave in an unconscionable manner, in bad faith, or in disregard of its representations. There is no evidence that the Zapathas undertook to discuss a compromise of the differences that led to the notice of termination.
On these basic facts, the judge ruled that the franchise agreement was subject to the sales article of the Uniform Commercial Code (G.L. c. 106, art. 2) and, even if it were not, the principles of unconscionability and good faith expressed in that article applied to the franchise agreement by analogy. He further ruled that (1) the termination provision of the agreement was unconscionable because it authorized termination without cause, (2) the termination without cause violated Dairy Mart's obligation of good faith, and (3) the termination constituted "an unfair method of competition and unfair and deceptive act within the meaning of G.L. c. 93A, s 2."。