基于本质安全的反应堆设计路径
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基于本质安全的反应堆设 计路径
经盟国家事故死亡频率 Fatality Frequencies in OECD Countries
• 比较1969-2000间经合组织国家能源事故导致死亡发生频率和死亡率 的曲线。核电系统的结果是根据核电厂中系统专职概率安全评价体系 得到的,它反映的是潜在死亡率。 Comparison of OECD data. Nuclear curve is based on safety assessment.
轻水堆失冷事故的工程化安全防护 Engineered Safeguard for LWRLOCA
• 反应堆停堆保障关停链式核裂变 Reactor trip to provide positive and continued shutdown of the nuclear chain reaction
• 失冷事故和堆芯应急冷却系统成为轻水堆安全讨论中的主 要话题 LOCA and ECCS have been major topics of public discussion of LWR safety
14
质疑ECCS完善性和AEC角色 ECCS Integrity and AEC Role Questioned
–沸腾传热 Boiling Heat Transfer
• 反应堆控制 Reactor Control
• 仪表 Instrumentation
• 水化学 Water Chemistry
• 屏蔽 Shielding • 安全壳 Containment
• 事故缓解 Accident Mitigation
12
15
三代加核电站设计目标 Generation III+ Plant Design Objectives
• 增加电站安全性 Increased Plant Safety
– 多冗余或非能动 Additional redundancy or passive features
– 减少操作员反应工作，更多时间 Reduced operator actions, more time
• 原子能委员会的反应堆安全研究开发了概率风险评估方法 Probabilistic Risk Assessment developed in AEC’s “Reactor Safety Study”
• 1979年3月28日，三里岛事故发生 March 28, 1979, TMI accident occurred
8
费米为CP-1建立的多重安全保护 Fermi’s Multiple Safeguard for CP-1 in
1942
• 3套“控制棒” 3 sets of “control rods”
– Primary set for control of chain reaction – 2nd automatic rod linked to high reading – 3rd manual control rod heavily weighted,
– defined its purpose as an instrument toward preventing any future loss of life in regular industrial operations
– believed a single accident in industrial reactor could wreck hopes for peaceful atom
– heeded lessons from Industrial Revolution that the final guide toward safety had to be experience in actual use
• 1949年美国反应堆试验基地建立 National Reactor Testing Station was established in Idaho in 1949
核电安全标准大幅提升 characteristics:
– 不可预测 It is unpredictable;
公众接受程度快速下降 – 后果严重广泛 it carries a massive impact;
– 事后人们会编出理由来解释，使之显得不那么随
机，更可预测 and, after the fact, we concoct an explanation that makes it appear less random, and more predictable, than it was.
Co
LN
al
G
Hydr o
Nucle
Ga
ar
s
(direct)
oi l
Nuclear (indirec t)
6
核能发展面临的挑战 Challenges in Nuclear Energy Expansion
• 安全：轻水堆有潜在小概率严重事故可能性 Safety: Small but none-zero severe accident probability
• 1971年初，在爱达荷测试设施早期设计的ECCS实验中发现失冷事故 时的高压蒸汽阻塞了来自ECCS的注水 Early 1971, tests of early ECCS design in Semi-Scale Facility at Idaho showed that the high pressure steam in LOCA blocked the flow of water from ECCS
11
反应堆安全研究焦点领域 Focus of Reactor Safety Research
• 厂址 Plant Siting
• 反应堆物理 Reactor Physics
• 堆芯设计 Core Design
–燃料元件设计 Fuel Element Design
–机械与热工设计 Mechanical and Thermal Design
• 西屋被引进建设 Westinghouse was recruited
10
美国反应堆安全顾问委员会 Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards
• 美国原子能委员会与1948年成立了反应堆安 全防卫咨询委员会 ACRS was established by AEC in 1948
• 1965-66年“中国症状”辩论聚集堆芯应急冷却系统 “China Syndrome” debates in 1965-66 brought ECCS into focus
• 监管重心转向采用设计正确的ECCS运行来防止事故恶化 到威胁安全壳的程度 Regulatory focus shifted to a properly designed and functioning ECCS to prevent accidents severe enough to threaten containment
LN G
Co
Hydr
al
o
Ga Nucle s Fukushima?
Oi l
ar
5
非经盟国家事故死亡频率 Fatality Frequencies in non-OECD
Countries
• 比较1969-2000间非经合组织国家能源事故发生导致死亡发生频率和 死亡率的曲线。
Comparison of non-OECD countries. Nuclear is based on Chernobyl data.
• 经济性：建造成本高、周期长、投资风险大
Economics: High capital costs, long construction time, large investment risks
7
核能发展面临的挑战 Challenges in Nuclear Energy Expansion
• 可持续性：Sustainability:
– 有限探明廉价铀资源，极低利用率 Limited U resource, very low utilization
– 废物：长寿命放射性 Waste: Long-life radioactivity
• 核扩散：特殊核原料，同位素富集、核燃料再处理中元素 分离技术 Proliferation: Special nuclear materials, enrichment and reprocessing technologies
• 事故后减少反应性以降低可能泄漏的放射性材料 Postaccident radioactivity removal (PARR) to reduce the radionuclide inventory available for release
• 保障安全壳完整性以限制放射性泄漏 Containment
LN G
Co
Hydr
al
o
Ga Nucle s
Oi l
ar
2
福岛事故突破了纵深防御 Fukushima Breached Defense-In-D Fukushima Accident a “Black Swan”?
• “黑天鹅”是具备以下三种特征的极低概 率事件 A BLACK SWAN is a highly improbable event with three principal
经盟国家事故死亡频率 Fatality Frequencies in OECD Countries
• 比较1969-2000间经合组织国家能源事故导致死亡发生频率和死亡率 的曲线。核电系统的结果是根据核电厂中系统专职概率安全评价体系 得到的,它反映的是潜在死亡率。 Comparison of OECD data. Nuclear curve is based on safety assessment.
tied by a rope to be cut by “Safety Control Rod Axe Man” in emergency (SCRAM)
• “液体控制队” “Liquid-control squad”
– Pouring a Cadmium-salt solution
9
Rickover上将与核海军 Admiral Rickover and Nuclear Navy
• 原子能委员会处理ECCS问题并同时担任核能推动者和监管者的双重 角色受到批评 AEC’s handling of ECCS issues and role as both promoter and regulator of nuclear were criticized
• AEC分成核监管委员会和联邦能源研究委员会（后成为能源部）AEC was split into NRC and FERC (later to DOE)
• 应急冷却堆芯防止燃料熔化 Emergency core cooling (ECC) to prevent or limit fuel melting
• 事故后散热以避免安全壳内压力过高 Post-accident heat removal (PAHR) to prevent containment overpressurization
• 实现将军的梦想需要高度重视安全 Rickover’s dream required a high regard for safety
• 核海军的经验帮助打造了美国和世界的核工 业 Trained personnel relied on experience gained from Nuclear Navy to build the nuclear industry in the US and overseas
integrity to limit radionuclide release
13
应急堆芯冷却系统（ECCS） Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
• 1960年代末前，原子能委员会认为安全壳是终极独立防 御线 Prior to end of 1960s, AEC viewed containment as the final independent line of defense
经盟国家事故死亡频率 Fatality Frequencies in OECD Countries
• 比较1969-2000间经合组织国家能源事故导致死亡发生频率和死亡率 的曲线。核电系统的结果是根据核电厂中系统专职概率安全评价体系 得到的,它反映的是潜在死亡率。 Comparison of OECD data. Nuclear curve is based on safety assessment.
轻水堆失冷事故的工程化安全防护 Engineered Safeguard for LWRLOCA
• 反应堆停堆保障关停链式核裂变 Reactor trip to provide positive and continued shutdown of the nuclear chain reaction
• 失冷事故和堆芯应急冷却系统成为轻水堆安全讨论中的主 要话题 LOCA and ECCS have been major topics of public discussion of LWR safety
14
质疑ECCS完善性和AEC角色 ECCS Integrity and AEC Role Questioned
–沸腾传热 Boiling Heat Transfer
• 反应堆控制 Reactor Control
• 仪表 Instrumentation
• 水化学 Water Chemistry
• 屏蔽 Shielding • 安全壳 Containment
• 事故缓解 Accident Mitigation
12
15
三代加核电站设计目标 Generation III+ Plant Design Objectives
• 增加电站安全性 Increased Plant Safety
– 多冗余或非能动 Additional redundancy or passive features
– 减少操作员反应工作，更多时间 Reduced operator actions, more time
• 原子能委员会的反应堆安全研究开发了概率风险评估方法 Probabilistic Risk Assessment developed in AEC’s “Reactor Safety Study”
• 1979年3月28日，三里岛事故发生 March 28, 1979, TMI accident occurred
8
费米为CP-1建立的多重安全保护 Fermi’s Multiple Safeguard for CP-1 in
1942
• 3套“控制棒” 3 sets of “control rods”
– Primary set for control of chain reaction – 2nd automatic rod linked to high reading – 3rd manual control rod heavily weighted,
– defined its purpose as an instrument toward preventing any future loss of life in regular industrial operations
– believed a single accident in industrial reactor could wreck hopes for peaceful atom
– heeded lessons from Industrial Revolution that the final guide toward safety had to be experience in actual use
• 1949年美国反应堆试验基地建立 National Reactor Testing Station was established in Idaho in 1949
核电安全标准大幅提升 characteristics:
– 不可预测 It is unpredictable;
公众接受程度快速下降 – 后果严重广泛 it carries a massive impact;
– 事后人们会编出理由来解释，使之显得不那么随
机，更可预测 and, after the fact, we concoct an explanation that makes it appear less random, and more predictable, than it was.
Co
LN
al
G
Hydr o
Nucle
Ga
ar
s
(direct)
oi l
Nuclear (indirec t)
6
核能发展面临的挑战 Challenges in Nuclear Energy Expansion
• 安全：轻水堆有潜在小概率严重事故可能性 Safety: Small but none-zero severe accident probability
• 1971年初，在爱达荷测试设施早期设计的ECCS实验中发现失冷事故 时的高压蒸汽阻塞了来自ECCS的注水 Early 1971, tests of early ECCS design in Semi-Scale Facility at Idaho showed that the high pressure steam in LOCA blocked the flow of water from ECCS
11
反应堆安全研究焦点领域 Focus of Reactor Safety Research
• 厂址 Plant Siting
• 反应堆物理 Reactor Physics
• 堆芯设计 Core Design
–燃料元件设计 Fuel Element Design
–机械与热工设计 Mechanical and Thermal Design
• 西屋被引进建设 Westinghouse was recruited
10
美国反应堆安全顾问委员会 Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards
• 美国原子能委员会与1948年成立了反应堆安 全防卫咨询委员会 ACRS was established by AEC in 1948
• 1965-66年“中国症状”辩论聚集堆芯应急冷却系统 “China Syndrome” debates in 1965-66 brought ECCS into focus
• 监管重心转向采用设计正确的ECCS运行来防止事故恶化 到威胁安全壳的程度 Regulatory focus shifted to a properly designed and functioning ECCS to prevent accidents severe enough to threaten containment
LN G
Co
Hydr
al
o
Ga Nucle s Fukushima?
Oi l
ar
5
非经盟国家事故死亡频率 Fatality Frequencies in non-OECD
Countries
• 比较1969-2000间非经合组织国家能源事故发生导致死亡发生频率和 死亡率的曲线。
Comparison of non-OECD countries. Nuclear is based on Chernobyl data.
• 经济性：建造成本高、周期长、投资风险大
Economics: High capital costs, long construction time, large investment risks
7
核能发展面临的挑战 Challenges in Nuclear Energy Expansion
• 可持续性：Sustainability:
– 有限探明廉价铀资源，极低利用率 Limited U resource, very low utilization
– 废物：长寿命放射性 Waste: Long-life radioactivity
• 核扩散：特殊核原料，同位素富集、核燃料再处理中元素 分离技术 Proliferation: Special nuclear materials, enrichment and reprocessing technologies
• 事故后减少反应性以降低可能泄漏的放射性材料 Postaccident radioactivity removal (PARR) to reduce the radionuclide inventory available for release
• 保障安全壳完整性以限制放射性泄漏 Containment
LN G
Co
Hydr
al
o
Ga Nucle s
Oi l
ar
2
福岛事故突破了纵深防御 Fukushima Breached Defense-In-D Fukushima Accident a “Black Swan”?
• “黑天鹅”是具备以下三种特征的极低概 率事件 A BLACK SWAN is a highly improbable event with three principal
经盟国家事故死亡频率 Fatality Frequencies in OECD Countries
• 比较1969-2000间经合组织国家能源事故导致死亡发生频率和死亡率 的曲线。核电系统的结果是根据核电厂中系统专职概率安全评价体系 得到的,它反映的是潜在死亡率。 Comparison of OECD data. Nuclear curve is based on safety assessment.
tied by a rope to be cut by “Safety Control Rod Axe Man” in emergency (SCRAM)
• “液体控制队” “Liquid-control squad”
– Pouring a Cadmium-salt solution
9
Rickover上将与核海军 Admiral Rickover and Nuclear Navy
• 原子能委员会处理ECCS问题并同时担任核能推动者和监管者的双重 角色受到批评 AEC’s handling of ECCS issues and role as both promoter and regulator of nuclear were criticized
• AEC分成核监管委员会和联邦能源研究委员会（后成为能源部）AEC was split into NRC and FERC (later to DOE)
• 应急冷却堆芯防止燃料熔化 Emergency core cooling (ECC) to prevent or limit fuel melting
• 事故后散热以避免安全壳内压力过高 Post-accident heat removal (PAHR) to prevent containment overpressurization
• 实现将军的梦想需要高度重视安全 Rickover’s dream required a high regard for safety
• 核海军的经验帮助打造了美国和世界的核工 业 Trained personnel relied on experience gained from Nuclear Navy to build the nuclear industry in the US and overseas
integrity to limit radionuclide release
13
应急堆芯冷却系统（ECCS） Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
• 1960年代末前，原子能委员会认为安全壳是终极独立防 御线 Prior to end of 1960s, AEC viewed containment as the final independent line of defense