2014年12月号图解模式-拚图特刊-商业简报网-韩明文讲师

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韩沈军：“打造定制与成衣结合的定制模式”

往往逐渐被
．
国内毛纺企业产能 6 0 0 万平米的比比皆是
”
派朗迪在这方面有优势
我们有 3
，
家拥有多年外
消费者认可
形成主流形态的消费期待
。
最终
但是利润率和国外没法比
。
JD 贸贴牌／ T 经验的生产制造基地
一
．
标准化的服务
．
级定制的认识也需要
个过程
，
这期间需要很
一
面向日本
．
韩国客户提供高档
传统的手工作坊
．
由于缝制
多沟通
节
一
”
。
韩沈军特别提到翠微广场店的
个细
．
西装定制加工服务
掌握西装流行趋势的同时
与中国十大面料生产商之
，
并组建合
而雅派朗迪把把西服的多样化
．
个性化和
一
先例成为翠微广场第
于3 月1 日
一
一
一
个外装修品牌店
一
．
资公司金利昌辅料公司的面辅料的可控性
。
保证西装生产所需要
标准化结合得非常好既多样化地满足每
那就是打造定制与成衣结合的定制模式
。
力做好西装产品西装之外的领带皮鞋等配饰
做
“

商业简报设计技巧培训_PPT_2014

捷径三：快速从模板创建简报
统一简报整体风格的关键：
简报主题、母版与版式设计
1. 简报主题设计
• PowerPoint主题 = 颜色 + 字体 +图形效果 +背景样式 • 主题是一组关亍视觉设计元素的设定，它可以独立亍PowerPoint文档而存在
2. 母版
幻灯片母版的定义： 1. 幻灯片母版是用来控制简报整体视觉风格的最基本页面；幻灯片母版可以包括的内容主要有：页眉页脚、背景色、文本和对象占位符、图形对象、各个对象所在的页面位置、各类效果等；一个简报文件中可以包括多套幻灯片母版；
简单明了的字体颜色及样式
幻灯片字体选用原则
1. 清晰易读 2. 不超过三种
3. 系统字体
4. VI手册中的字体
幻灯片字体选用原则
1. 2. 3. 4.
宋体楷体黑体华文细黑
5. 微软雅黑 6. Arial 7. Times
幻灯片适用字体范例
让商业简报引人入胜的秘诀：
简报设计美工技巧
1. Office2007艺术图形效果
• 使用美观的图形迚行表述。 PowerPoint 让图形制作变得简单易行，这在过去需要多个应用程序才能实现。看看它给我们带来了什
柔和阴影映像
么，柔和阴影、映像、凹凸、三维，
还有更多更酷的图形!
பைடு நூலகம்
凹凸效果
用正确的图表让数字说话
商业演示图表制作技巧
1. 常见的PPT图表制作
调整为丏业的演示图表
商业简报设计技巧培训
顿氏学埻
透过现象看本质：
商业简报设计五大常见问题分析
本次培训内容安排
一、快速创建简报的三条捷径

汽车营销

• • • • •
项目七汽车分销策略单击此处编辑母版文本样式任务7.1 汽车分销的形式第二级任务 7.2 汽车分销渠道的设计与管理任务 7.3 汽车分销策略第三级项目八汽车促销策略第四级任务8.1 汽车广告策略第五级任务 8.2 汽车人员促销策略任务8.3 汽车营业推广策略任务8.4 公共关系策略任务8.5 销售促进策略
教学难点汽车市场营销的方式。 1、讲授，以教师讲解为辅。 2、以实践为主，学生分组交流演练。 3、根据所学内容，进行学后反思。 4、自评及小组互评。
教学建议自我评价优
良
及格
不及格
任务1.1 市场营销与汽车营销
• 【知识储备】单击此处编辑母版文本样式 • 在现代社会经济条件下，几乎所有的经济第二级现象与经济活动都与市场有关，几乎所有经 • 第三级济方面的学科都不同程度地涉及市场的概念， • 第四级汽车也不例外。市场营销作为“一门建立在 • 第五级经济科学、行为科学和现代管理理论基础上的应用科学”更是离不开市场。那么“市场” 该富有怎样的涵义呢？
• • • • •
单击此处编辑母版文本样式第二级第三级第四级第五级
• • • • •
五、当代营销观念的创新单击此处编辑母版文本样式（一）顾客满意第二级（二）绿色营销第三级（三）整合营销第四级（四）关系营销第五级（五）客户关系营销（六）网络营销与电子商务（七）营销道德
• •
第二级第四级
• • 本样式（一）汽车市场营销的功能第二级 1 、发现和了解消费者的需求第三级 2 、指导企业决策第四级 3 、开拓市场第五级 4、满足消费者的需要（二）汽车市场营销意义
任务1.2 现代市场营销观念的确立

《MFG模式解读》PPT课件

机制二：
• 通过佣金制鼓励20%的玩家积极为公司介绍客户来推动股价上涨的机制。
• 股价的上涨要靠人气的增加和股民的推动，怎样吸引更多的人参与到推动股价上涨的的活动中来呢? 公司古为今用，洋为中用，化腐朽为神奇，利用现代最具争议性和极具先进性的市场倍增营销模式，来集聚人气，推动股价上涨，从而实现玩家各尽所能，共同致富的终极目标。
• 这也可以说是一个普渡众生的生意，为什么这样说呢? 不管我们是否愿意，主观上，我们是为了赚更多的佣金，客观上，我们在赚佣金的同时，带进更多的资金，更多资金进入后，推动股价不断上涨，从而带动80%没有做任何市场的玩家致富。
• 雷锋同志说过，给予永远比拿快乐。马克思说过，要为全人类的解放而奋斗终身。今天，我们可以借助MFG全球投资有限公司的平台，为普天之下的平民从此远离贫穷努力付出。
• 而MFG电子股，在MFG全球投资有限公司的内部交易平台里只有唯一的一只。如果有庄家购入MFG电子股并赚了钱，他们必须拿出一部分赚了的钱重新购买MFG电子股，否则，公司以后的送股和上涨就跟他没有关系了。除非庄家再也不想赚这个钱了。如果还想在这个平台里赚钱，庄家没有选择，必须重新购买。所以，MFG电子股不会象股市上的股票那样，因为庄家将资金撤走后，导致该股票长期失血而大幅下跌。
相信—— 是打开机会之门的钥匙
• MFG全球理财有限公司成立于2012年9月，是一家建立在互联网基础上的金融理财科网企业，总部设在美国，分部设在香港和韩国，注册地分别在英属处女岛—塞舌尔群岛,香港。总裁威廉是一位资深的理财专家。
• 公司的理财团由包括投资顾问、会计师、成功学大师、财务管理顾问、商务顾问和风险投资专家等专业精英组成。该团队对于投资理财有着丰富的经验。

图表说服力(韩明文) 摘要

图表说服力Excel与PowerPoint的图表终极活用术目录第一章商业图表基本概念 (3)商业图表选择的六大因素 (3)数据变量组成 (3)数据数量多寡 (4)强调单个值还是整体趋势 (4)数据以绝对值或相对值方式呈现 (5)图表的综合决策 (5)图表制作工具 (6)第二章商业图表的类型与使用方式 (7)商业图表类型 (7)饼图 (7)从图解角度使用饼图和圆环图 (8)直方图 (8)柱形图，条形图 (8)排序长条图 (8)分组长条图 (9)堆积长条图 (9)百分比堆积长条图 (10)范围长条图 (10)镜像长条图 (11)重叠分组长条图 (11)参照长条图 (12)瀑布图 (12)面积图使用方式 (13)圆点图 (14)第三章图表的设计原则 (15)九大原则 (15)图表中常见的Lie Factor (15)图表中常见的Chart Junk (16)饼图制作原则： (17)长条图制作原则： (17)折线图制作原则： (18)面积图制作原则： (18)圆点图制作原则： (18)散点图制作原则： (18)第四章商业图表的构成元素 (19)色彩使用方案 (19)坐标轴 (19)坐标轴线 (20)网格线 (20)刻度线 (20)图例 (21)图表最佳宽高比 (21)数据标记 (21)图表4W (22)标题强调重点，重点呼应标题 (23)图说文字框 (24)使用动画效果 (24)图表中字体 (25)第五章商业图表的重点强调方式 (25)图表类型与重点强调 (25)饼图： (25)长条图 (25)折线图 (28)第六章商业图表的综合比较 (28)同级数据比较 (28)多个百分比比较 (28)母子数据比较 (29)前后数据比较 (30)部分与总和比较 (31)多个变量的数据比较 (31)第七章商业图表的风格与创意 (32)图表+图表 (32)图表+表格 (33)图表+图解 (33)图表+文字 (33)范例 (33)第八章图表查核表 (37)图表正确性查核表 (37)图表沟通效率查核表 (37)图表设计性查核表 (37)图表说服性查核表 (38)图表重点性查核表 (38)图表创造性查核表 (38)图表比较性查核表 (39)第一章商业图表基本概念商业图表选择的六大因素1、图标要呈现的关系2、数据变量的组成3、数据量的多寡4、强调单个值还是整体趋势5、追求图表沟通效率或视觉性6、数据以绝对值或相对值方式呈现数据变量组成数据数量多寡饼图能有效处理数据的数量约在5个，长条图约在12～15个，圆点图处理大数据。

第2章-电子商务商业模式-(2)ppt课件

《电子商务概论》（第2版）邵兵家主编高等教育出版社 2006版
10
2.2.4 电子商务主要模式分类
电子商务根据参与者的性质不同，可以分为： 1、B2B：企业与企业之间开展贸易活动的商业模式。 2. B2C：公司对消费者的业务，又称直接市场销售。 3．C2C：消费者个人对消费者个人的电子商务模式 4. B2G：政府与企业之间的通过网络所进行的交易活动 5. C2G：政府把电子商务扩展到对公民的相关商务活动
19
2.5 C2C商业模式
含义：消费者通过网络与消费者之间进行相互的个人交易，如个人拍卖等形式。
特点：
1、较低的交易成本
2、经营规模不受限制
3、便捷的信息搜集
4、加大的销售范围和销售力度
《电子商务概论》（第2版）邵兵家主编高等教育出版社 2006版
20
传统的销售渠道战略在目前的盈利模式中出现了新的问题：首先，越来越多的产品和服务呈现个性化的趋势；其次，物流和信息流成为商流的重要组成部分，流通环节的成本大大降低。
《电子商务概论》（第2版）邵兵家主编高等教育出版社 2006版
6
2.2.3 电子商务的经济规律
1.电子商务市场的主要组成:
《电子商务概论》（第2版）邵兵家主编高等教育出版社 2006版
14
2.3.4 交易经纪人
1.含义：通过电话或者电子邮件为消费者处理个人交易的网站。采运这种模式的最多的是金融服务、旅游服务以及职业介绍服务等。
2.赢利模式：通过向每次交易收取佣金获得收入。
《电子商务概论》（第2版）邵兵家主编高等教育出版社 2006版
4
3.电子商务商业模式必须包含的8个要素：
《电子商务概论》（第2版）邵兵家主编高等教育出版社 2006版

2014年人民网两会创新报道解读

三、时政新闻报道方式的创新
原创的内容通过互联网平台进行展示或者提供给其他用户；ＰＧＣ是专业生成内容的意思，两者都是互联网内容机制的产生和运营模式。在人民网２０１４的两会报道中，ＵＧＣ和ＰＧＣ在栏目中的交互使用很好的体现了ＵＧＣ负责内容广度，主要贡献流量和参与度，而ＰＧＣ维持内容深度，主要树立品牌、创造价值。以下以两个特色栏目来进行展示
今年人民网两会报道更加凸显贴近大众、亲民接地气的语态表达，很多小栏日都有体现。在不断创新语态的同时，也延续了２０１３年大数据形式的整合报道以及全媒体的联动形式。今年人民网连续第１３年推出两会热点调查，邀请网民共议国是。从２月１０日至２月２８日，调查已吸引近３４０万人次网民参与，收集了１０万余条意见建议。总结出 “ 社会保障” 、“ 反腐倡廉 ” 、“ 食品药品安全” 等网民最关心的十大两会热点问题，更好的体现以民为本。 “ 代表委员去哪儿” 栏目采访了多位在２０１３年引人关注的代表委员，了解他们这一年 “ 去哪儿” 了，都在忙些什么，如何履职以及今年他们的关注点，大大缩短了网民和代表委员之间的距离。 “ 我托省长书记捎句话” 则诚邀各地网民给即将进京参加全国两会的省委书记、省长留言。为家乡发展建言献策。大数据报道方面，以人民日报为纸媒平台依托，相继推出 “ 总理去哪了” 、“ 政务常务会议大数据 ” 等数据图，使得受众对整合后的数据信息一目了然，同时很好地适应了微博、微信等新媒体的传播方式，更能得到广泛的传播。全媒体联动方面，人民网今年携手了近３０家报纸和网站联合组建两会全媒体报道平台。其中 “ 名嘴有话说 ” 系列开设 “ 景行约会 ” 、说到底” 、“ 大Ｖ侃两会 ” 等版块。资深媒体人曹景行、 “ 沪上名嘴” 曹可凡、《最强大脑》节目主持人蒋昌建、原教育部新闻发言人王旭明等将通过不同形式与网民互动，点评两会热点话题。这种从与单位的合作到与个人的合作，从与专家学者的合作到与相关媒体人的合作都是一种态度上的开放和创新，能够很大程度为人民网这家官方网络媒体赢得掌声和公信力，同时对两会新闻也是在进行更加广泛、更有声势的传播。结语：总体来说，２０１４年人民网两会报道很好延续了２０１３年全媒体报道的创新特色，在其基础上整体版式更强调官媒的大气威严、在内容生产机制上尝试民间与官方舆论场的结合、在严肃的时政报道中寻求语态的再突破。官方新媒体要走的路还很长，本文只是笔者一些点状的解读，在当今更强调融媒体报道的时代，不断突破创新同时始终坚持自身的特色与竞争力，才能在开放、竞争激烈的媒体环境中树立权威、博

31页金融证券保险顾问式营销KYC九宫格实现高客营销专题培训课件

最好的工具给最认真的你Know Your CustomerCustomer ClassificationBuild your trustKYC Tools share ToolsKnow Your Customer了解你的客户行业时间更长认识客户更早产品设计更好了解客户真实需求客户并不关心“你”，更关心的是如何达到自己的需求重点目标了解客户对生活的愿望实现愿望的障碍引导客户做出决定达成愿望终极目标：成交，而不是为了获得更多的信息！Customer Classification8客户分类Customer Classification 重要性（客户的资产量）关系度（对你的专业信任度） A 类客户资产量大常能联系到在你这里配置过保单甚至不止一件愿意接受你的推荐 B 类客户资产量大主要来自于转介绍曾经沟通过但暂时找不到保险的销售点在你这里几乎没有配置保单 D 类客户资产量小与对方的沟通顺畅在你这里配置过保单甚至不止一件C 类客户资产量小很难与对方沟通上几乎没有接受你的销售或者出于人情做了一张小保单A类B类D类C类日常客户1、NBS专业化流程2、保单检视3、新产品上市4、节日、特殊节日礼品其他营销活动等1、了解保险在高净值客户财富管理中如何运用2、善于利用一些专题活动（资产配置、财富传承、税务筹划、资产保全）初步挖掘潜在客户的需求点大客户Build your trust如何建立信任不解决这些问题，无有效的KYCBuild Your Branding Message!关键要点：建立你的品牌信息从客户的角度看KYC•你是谁？你对我有什么帮助？•为什么问我这些信息？凭什么要告诉你这些信息？•你是要卖我什么保险产品？•你跟别人有什么不同？•你说的内容跟我有关系吗？从我们的角度看KYC•客户为什么购买我们的产品？哪一方面的需求？•吸引客户的到底是什么？满足了怎样的利益？•客户的消费能力如何？能不能持续购买？•是不是我们的目标群体？有没有条件成为我们的客户？暖场从家庭类、工作类、兴趣爱好类问题提问，从小事、具体的事情赞美；n有效的暖场切忌在客户擅长领域暴露你的不足；n勤思考多聆听面谈后还不知道客户的固定资产、工作收入等于没有进行KYC；n没有数据，等于没有KYC归纳后和客户确认，得到客户认可后给予解决方案；n 有信息无归纳，功亏一篑聆听数据归纳过去PAST现在PRESENT未来FUTURE个人PERSONAL1、在那里出生2、做过什么投资3、投资风格4、在哪里读书1、手上有哪些投资2、状况如何3、资产与负债（资产配置、长期负债、短期负债）1、财务目标2、期望收益3、何时退休事业PROFESSIONAL1、以前在哪里工作2、做了多久3、工作职位4、第一桶金如何来1、现在什么职位2、工作性质（行业现状、利润）3、公司盈余如何分配4、股权结构1、想再工作多久2、目标要多少钱退休3、公司要扩大到什么程度4、经营权的接班（家人/职业经理人？）家庭FAMILY1、何时结婚2、何时买房，在哪买3、家庭是否重组4、小孩是否同一父母1、有几个小孩，多大了2、家庭成员/现住哪里3、父母需要经济支柱吗4、家人的健康状况1、计划移民到哪里吗2、孩子想送去哪里读书3、想再要几个小孩吗4、所有权的接班时间轴提问法KYC Tools share15KYC Decmposition 客户一般做哪些金融产品的投资？了解客户的理财偏好，财商如何。

MOT课程说明(开发第01版)

问题1 问题1：Stephen在电话中又透露出哪些重要信息？问题2 问题2：如何判断项目的阶段和竞争信息
问题1 问题1： John Cameron 感觉到商机，也通过提问进行了探索？但为什么Stephen不满意？问题2 问题2：探索客户项目资讯的问题设计有哪些技巧？
举例说明：专业竞争者〉举例说明：〈专业竞争者〉案例研讨
鉴别
• 称呼、城市,
• 个人/单位、 • 有否买过XXX、您对XX的了解、现用何品牌 • 自用还是为家人/朋友配 • E-value • • 采购原因（扩充计划，更新） • 用途/需求 • 时间 • 预算 • 数量
交流内容
• 课程体系说明 • 与IBM版的区别特点 IBM版的区别特点 • 方案产品营销与服务工具包 • 讲师简介 • 建议
《客户价值营销与专业服务技巧(MOT)》 1.国际标准版权课程基础上二次开发的一门涉及客户关系管理、客国际标准版权课程基础上二次开发的国际标准版权课程基础上二次开发一门涉及客户关系管理、户价值营销、专业服务技能、服务品牌塑造于一体的综合性综合性、户价值营销、专业服务技能、服务品牌塑造于一体的综合性、实战性、案例式、情景式的培训课程的培训课程; 战性、案例式、情景式的培训课程; 2.该课程从企业整体角度出发， 2.该课程从企业整体角度出发，教授企业各个岗位人员如何与客户该课程从企业整体角度出发建立持久的客户忠诚关系，实现客户价值持续开发客户价值持续开发的建立持久的客户忠诚关系，实现客户价值持续开发的行为模式 . 3.该课程取材经典的实战案例，把涉及企业价值链的多个岗位与客 3.该课程取材经典的实战案例该课程取材经典的实战案例，户沟通过程的典型行为拍成案例录像，并从正反二个方面的进行户沟通过程的典型行为拍成案例录像并从正反案例录像，正反二个方面的进行对比分析，使学员在观摩研讨中达到身临其境的学习效应。身临其境的学习效应对比分析，使学员在观摩研讨中达到身临其境的学习效应。针对多个行业特点在保留继承了该课程整体课程体系架构、行业特点， 4. 针对多个行业特点，在保留继承了该课程整体课程体系架构、案例录像等精华部分的基础上,重新进行了课程的二次开发和设案例录像等精华部分的基础上,重新进行了课程的二次开发和设计，对该课程进行了大力改编和整合

商业条码

性小﹑平滑度及光洁度适中的材料。
第二节商品条码的印刷 §2、商业性条码的印制工艺特点
特（4）对油墨的要求。在油墨颜色的搭配时要考虑油墨的色偏。种由于条码印刷是实地印刷，其印刷所能达到的反射密度与油墨的光学特性与墨层厚度有关，在印刷过程中，印刷的反射密度是随印油墨厚度的增加而增加的，当油墨厚度达到一定值后，密度便达刷到饱和，因此要注意油墨的浓度和墨层的厚度。此外，还要注意
交错二五码
2、二维条码二维条码是针对一维条码信息容量小的缺点和缩小条码面积热提高抵抗污染的能力而研制出来的，它与一维条码的不同之处在于文字资料也可以条码化，其资料不仅可应用于英文、数字、汉字、记号、各字型甚至空白也可以处理，信息储存量可达1100数字（一维条码只有15个数字）。二维条码还可采用加密技术，使商品的防伪性能大幅度提高。
UPC码
(3) 三九码因为在9个码素中，三个码数是粗线，故名 “三九码”，除数字0-9外，还提供英文字母（A-Z)及特殊符号（﹢、﹣、＊、，、℅、$、·、Space）。三九码的特性：允许双向扫描，检查码可有可无，支援 44组条码，资料和资料的空白不代表码义，以*号作为起始码和终止码。主要应用：工业产品、商业产品、医院的保健资料、图书馆、录像带、出租业等。三九式
第一节条码的结构与原理 §2、条码的识读原理
之商业条码印刷
个大电流；当扫描至黑线条中时，反射光弱，检测器输出小电流，并根据黑线宽或窄作出时间长短不同的响应，随着条形码明暗的变化转变为大小不同的电流信号，经过放大后输送到译码器中去。通过译码器将信号翻译成数据，进行局部的检验和显示，并和键盘连接以及送往电子计算机进行数据处理。
特种印刷
之商业条码印刷

FEATURES...................................................................................

D O C-0332-010,RE V ECSM12C32 Educational Module for Freescale MC9S12C321CONTENTSCAUTIONARY NOTES (4)FEATURES (5)REFERENCES (6)INTRODUCTION (6)GETTING STARTED (6)OPERATION (7)POWER (7)PWR (7)CONNECTOR J1 (7)PWR_SEL JUMPER (8)RESET SWITCH (8)LOW-VOLTAGE DETECT (8)TIMING (8)COMMUNICATIONS (9)COM CONNECTOR (9)CONNECTOR J1 (9)USER OPTIONS (10)SWITCHES (10)LED’S (10)DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (11)ASCII MONITOR OPERATION (11)MONITOR COMMANDS (11)MONITOR MEMORY MAP (11)INTERRUPT SUPPORT (12)INTERRUPT VECTOR TABLE (12)SERIAL MONITOR OPERATION (14)SERIAL MONITOR MEMORY MAP (14)BDM_PORT HEADER (14)MECHANICAL DETAILS...............................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. APPENDIX A..................................................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.BILL OF MATERIALS................................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.FIGURESFigure 1: PWR_SEL (8)Figure 2: COM Connector (9)Figure 3: MCU_PORT Connector (10)Figure 4: BDM_PORT (15)TABLESTable 1: Serial COM Signals (9)Table 2: User Option Jumper Settings (10)Table 4: Monitor Commands (11)Table 5: Monitor Memory Map (11)Table 6: MON12 Interrupt Vector Table (12)Table 7: Serial Monitor Memory Map (14)REVISIONFebruary 22, 2005B Update initial releaseApril 7, 2005C Updated monitor information. Differentiated betweenserial monitor and debug monitor. Updated docu-ment format. Removed BOM and Schematic.June 8, 2005D Updated installed monitor information. Added BOMto appendixJune 8, 2006E Removed BOM and Mechanical Dwg. Updated boardpart numberCAUTIONARY NOTES1) Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) prevention measures should be used when handling thisproduct. ESD damage is not a warranty repair item.2) Axiom Manufacturing does not assume any liability arising out of the application or use ofany product or circuit described herein; neither does it convey any license under patent rights or the rights of others.3) EMC Information on the CSM12C32 module:a) This product as shipped from the factory with associated power supplies and cables, hasbeen verified to meet with requirements of CE and the FCC as a CLASS B product.b) This product is designed and intended for use as a development platform for hardwareor software in an educational or professional laboratory.c) In a domestic environment, this product may cause radio interference in which case theuser may be required to take adequate prevention measures.d) Attaching additional wiring to this product or modifying the products operation from thefactory default as shipped may effect its performance and cause interference with nearby electronic equipment. If such interference is detected, suitable mitigating measures should be taken.TERMINOLOGYThis module uses option selection jumpers and cut-traces to setup default configuration. Ter-minology for application of the option jumpers is as follows:Jumper – a plastic shunt that connects 2 terminals electricallyJumper on, in, or installed - jumper is installed such that 2 pins are connected together Jumper off, out, or idle - jumper is installed on 1 pin only. It is recommended that jump-ers be idled by installing on 1 pin so they will not be lost.Cut-Trace – a circuit trace connection between component pads. The circuit trace may be cut using a razor knife to break the default connection. To reconnect the circuit, simply install a suitably sized 0-ohm resistor or attach a wire across the pads.FEATURESThe CSM12C32 is an educational module for the FREESCALE MC9S12C32 microcontroller. The included wall plug, DB9 serial cable, sample software tools, examples, and debug monitor makes application development quick and easy. A background DEBUG port is provided for development tool use and is compatible with HCS12 BDM interface cables and software. A monitor has also been preloaded into MCU Flash to provide the user with a simple develop-ment platform. The monitor is accessible through the COM connector. A 40-pin connector al-lows the CSM12C32 module to be connected to an expanded evaluation environment such as the Axiom Manufacturing, MCU Project Board - 2.Features:♦MC9S12C32 MCU, 48 QFP♦32K Byte Flash EEPROM♦2K Bytes RAM♦31 I/O lines♦ Timer/PWM♦SCI and SPI Communications Ports♦Key Wake-up Port♦BDM DEBUG Port♦CAN 2.0 Module♦ Analog Comparator♦8 MHz Internal Bus Operation Default♦25 MHz Bus Operation using internal PLL♦+3.3VDC to +5VDC operation♦40 pin connector provides access to most MCU I/O signals♦Power Input Selection Jumper♦On-board, regulated +5V power supply♦Optional power input from Connector J1♦Optional power output through Connector J1♦16 MHz Ceramic Resonator♦RS-232 Serial Port w/ DB9 Connector♦8-Ch, 10-bit, Analog Comparator with full rail-to-rail operation andexternal trigger capability♦8-Channel, 16-bit Timer with Input Capture, Output Compare,and PWM capabilities♦User Components Provided♦ 3 Push Button Switches: 2 User, RESET♦ 3 LED Indicators: 2 User, VDD♦ Jumpers♦Disable User Functions♦ Power Select♦ Connectors♦40-pin MCU I/O Connector♦ 2.0mm Barrel Connector Power Input♦DEBUG BDM Connector♦DB9 Communications Connector♦Supplied with DB9 Serial Cable, Documentation (CD), Manual, and Wall plug type power supply. Specifications:Module Size 2.2” x 1.6”Power Input: +9VDC @ 200 mA typical, +6 to +16VDC rangeREFERENCESReference documents are provided on the support CD in Acrobat Reader format. More infor-mation can be found in the Application Notes section of the Freescale Web site.CSM12C32_SCH_B.pdf CSM12C32 Module Schematic Rev BCSM12C32_UG_C.pdf CSM12C32 User Guide, Rev C (this document)9S12C32DGV1.pdf MC9S12C32 Device User Guide9S12C32_ZIP.zip Zip file containing Device Block User GuidesModule_QuickStart.pdf Educational Module Quick Start GuideAN2548.pdf Serial Monitor Program for HCS12 MCU’s INTRODUCTIONBefore using this module, the user should be familiar with the hardware and software operation of the target MCU. Refer to the MC9S12C32 User Manual and MC9S12C32 Reference Man-ual for details on MCU operation. The module’s purpose is to promote the features of the MC9S12C32 and to assist the user in quickly developing an application in a known working environment. Users should be familiar with memory mapping, memory types, and embedded software design for quick, successful, application development.The CSM12C32 Educational Module is a fully assembled, fully functional module supporting Freescale MC9S12C32 microcontroller. The module comes with a serial cable, power supply, and an embedded monitor for stand-alone operation. Support software for this module is pro-vided for Windows 95/98/NT/2000/XP operating systems.Application development may be performed by using the embedded monitor, or any compati-ble BDM cable with supporting host software. The embedded monitor provides an effective, low cost, debug method. Note that when a BDM cable is used for debugging, the BDM pod should be powered from an external supply.GETTING STARTEDPlease refer to the Educational Module Quick Start Guide to quickly setup the hardware and install the AxIDE terminal interface.OPERATIONThe CSM12C32 module provides input and output features designed to assist embedded ap-plication development. Access to MCU port signals is available through module the connector J1. This connector may also be used to input power to the module or to output power to at-tached modules. RS-232 communications signals may also be input through connector J1. Care must be exercised when using the J1 to power the module, as only regulated voltage in the range of +3.3V to +5V should be supplied to this connection. The on-board regulator pro-vides a fixed +5V voltage to the module.Five option jumpers and 3 cut-traces control module operation. Enabling a jumper option re-quires installing a shunt across the associated header pins. Removing the shunt disables the associated option. An option enabled by a cut-trace can be disabled by removing the circuit trace between the cut-trace component pads. Use a sharp knife to cut the embedded circuit trace. Be careful not to damage adjacent circuitry. To re-enable the option, simply install a 1206 sized 0-ohm resistor or piece of wire across the cut-trace component pads.PowerPower is supplied to the module through a 2.0mm barrel connector at location PWR for stand-alone operation. The module may also be powered through connector J1 when connected to the MCU Project Board. Power may be sourced off-module through connector J1 to external circuitry. Power routing on the module is determined by the PWR_SEL jumper.PWRThe PWR connector accepts a 2.1mm, center-positive, barrel plug that allows the module to be powered from a wall-plug transformer or from a desktop power supply. Input voltage should be limited to between +7V and +20V. Input voltage of +9VDC is typical. This input supplies the on-board +5V regulator that powers the module.Connector J1Power may be supplied to the module through the pins J1-1 and J1-2. Use of this option re-quires a regulated voltage input limited to the range of +3.3VDC to +5VDC. This input is con-nected directly to the module power and ground planes. Care should be exercised not to over-drive this input. Use of connector J1 to supply +3.3V to the module requires disabling the volt-age supervisor (LV1) by opening cut-trace CT-1. See the Low-Voltage Detect section below. To re-enable the low-voltage supervisor, install a 1206 sized 0-ohm resistor at CT1. Connector J1 may also be used to source +5V power from the on-board regulator to external modules attached to connector J1. The PWR_SEL option header determines how power is routed to the module.PWR_SEL JumperThe PWR_SEL jumper is a 4-position option header that configures power routing on the CSM12C32 module. The module may be powered by an external transformer connected to the PWR connector or through connector J1. The module may also source power to auxiliary modules connected to the connector J1. Damage may occur if the J1 power input pins are over-driven. Refer to the Table 3 below to determine correct PWR_SEL jumper setting. Figure 1: PWR_SEL12Source power input from barrel connector PWR.12Source power input from connector J1.1 2Source power from barrel connector PWR and supply power to external cir-cuitry connected to J1.Reset SwitchThe RESET switch provides an asynchronous reset input to the MCU. Pressing the RESET switch produces a low-voltage level on the RESET input to the MCU. The low-voltage supervi-sor (LV1) holds the RESET line low for approximately 150 ms after the pushbutton is released.Low-Voltage DetectA DS1813 (LV1) provides POR, low-voltage detect, and pushbutton reset services for the module. At power-on, LV1 holds the MCU in reset for 150 ms after V CC reaches approximately 4.35V. During normal operation, LV1 asserts RESET when V CC falls below 4.35V and holds RESET true for 150 ms after VCC returns to normal. The push-button operation is described in the paragraph above. Use of connector J1 to supply +3.3V to the module requires disabling LV1.LV1 may be disabled by opening the cut-trace CT1. Simply remove the circuit trace between the cut-trace pads to open the circuit. To restore the circuit functionality, install a 1206 size, 0-ohm, resistor or a short piece of wire across the cut-trace pads.TimingA ceramic resonator (Y1) provides a 16.0 MHz base operating frequency to the MCU. This supports a default 8.0 MHz internal operating frequency. Higher frequencies are possible us-ing the embedded PLL. The resonator output is routed to the MCU only and is not available at the MCU Port connector (J1). The MCU ECLK output is available to the user at connector J1 if enabled.CommunicationsThe CSM12C32 module provides a single RS-232 communications port. An RS-232 trans-ceiver (U2) provides RS-232 signal level to TTL/CMOS logic level translation. RS232 signals TXD and RXD are routed between the transceiver and the MCU. These signals are also routed to connector J1. RS-232 communication signals input on J1 must be TTL/CMOS logic levels; no translation support is provided through this path. The transceiver output may also be driven off-module if the signals are suitably buffered. As added development support, hardware flow control signals RTS and CTS are available on the logic side of U2. These sig-nals are routed to vias located near the transceiver (U2). RTS has been biased properly to support 2-wire RS-232 communications.Use of the J1 connector to input RS-232 signals requires disabling the on-board RS-232 trans-ceiver. Otherwise, signal corruption may occur. Disabling the on-board transceiver is accom-plished by opening cut-traces CT1, and CT2. Simply remove the circuit trace between the cut-trace pads to open the circuit. To restore the circuit functionality, install a 1206 size, 0-ohm, resistor or a short piece of wire across the cut-trace pads.Table 1: Serial COM SignalsCOM Signal MCU Port Connector DisableTXD PS1/TXD J1-5CT5RXD PS0/RXD J1-7CT4COM ConnectorA standard 9-pin Dsub connector provides external connections for the COM port. The COM port is configured as a DCE device. Component U2 provides RS-232 translation services. The figure below shows the DB9 connector.Figure 2: COM Connector16TXD27RTS RXD38CTS49NC GND5Female DB9 connector that interfaces to the DCE serial port via anRS232 transceiver. It provides simple 2-wire asynchronous serial com-munications without flow control. A straight-through serial cable may be connected to a DTE device such a PCPins 1, 4, and 6 are connected together.Connector J1Connector J1 provides access to CSM12C32 I/O port signals.Figure 3: MCU_PORT ConnectorV x12PE1/IRQ*Default Signal AssignmentsGND34RESET*MCU PORT Signal Disable PS1/TXD56MODC/BKGDPS0/RXD78NC PS1/TXD COM1 TXD CT-5PP5/KWP5910NC PS0/RXD COM1 RXD CT-4PE0/XIRQ*1112NC PE1/IRQ*SW1User1 PT0/PW0/IOC01314NC PP5/KWP5SW2User2PT1/PW1/IOC11516NC PA0LED1User3 PM4/MOSI1718PAD00/AN00PB4LED2User4PM2/MISO1920PAD01/AN01PM5/SCK2122PB4PM3/SS*2324PA0PE4/ELCK2526PM1/TXCAN Note: Default signal assignment should be disabled to use the signal at connector J1PE7/XCLKS2728PM0/RXCANPAD02/AN022930PT2/PW2/IOC2PAD03/AN033132PT3/PW3/IOC3PAD04/AN043334PT4/PW04/IOC4PAD05/AN053536PT5/IOC5PAD06/AN063738PT6/IOC6PAD07/AN073940PT7/IOC7User OptionsUser options include 2 LED’s, and 2 pushbutton switches. Each user option may be enabled individually using the USER option header. When the appropriate USER option jumper is in-stalled, the associated user option is enabled. Removing a jumper disables the associated user option.Table 2: User Option Jumper SettingsJumper On Off MCU SignalUser 1Enable SW1Disable SW1PE0/XIRQ*User 2Enable SW2Disable SW2PP5 /KWP5User 3Enable LED1Disable LED1PA0User 4Enable LED2Disable LED2PB4SwitchesTwo push button switches provide momentary, active low, input to the MCU for user applica-tions. Pressing a switch provides a momentary low logic level input tot the MCU. SW1 and SW2 provide input to MCUI/O ports PE0 and PP5 respectively.LED’sTwo LED’s provide active-low, visual output for user applications. A low voltage level driven out on the appropriate MCU port causes the LED to light. MCU ports PA0 and PB4 drive LED1 and LED2 respectively.DEVELOPMENT SUPPORTThe CSM12C32 ships from the factory with a serial monitor installed in FLASH. An ASCII monitor is also installed to provide quick and easy debug access to the user. The text monitor is available out of RESET. The serial monitor is available by pressing and holding SW1 as the module exits RESET. In the discussion below, the terms text and ASCII are used inter-changeably.ASCII Monitor OperationThe debug monitor provides a simple application development platform for developing applica-tion code. The debug monitor allows the user to quickly and easily develop and debug RAM based application code.The debug monitor is accessible through the COM port using an ASCII terminal program such as HyperTerminal or AxIDE. The terminal should be configured for 9600, 8, N, 1 with no flow-control. The monitor relocates the hardware interrupt vector table from 0xFF8A:0xFFFF to 0X0F8A:0x0FFF(see Table 3 below). The vectors remain in the same order as the default hardware table. The Reset vector is reserved; user should use autostart to start applications from reset.ASCII Monitor Memory MapTable 3: Monitor Memory Map$0000 -$03FFRegisters1K bytesReserved$0800 -$0DFFInternal RAM. 1.5K bytes$0E00 -$0F8BMonitor Reserved$0F8A -$0FFF Relocated Interrupt Vector Table512 bytes Reserved$8000 -$BFFFUser Program Memory16K bytes$C000 -$FFFFProtected Monitor Space16K bytesMonitor CommandsTable 4: Monitor CommandsBF <StartAddress> <EndAddress> [<data>]Block Fill memory range with data BR [<Address>]Set/Display user breakpoints CALL [<Address>]Call user subroutine at <Address>GO [<Address>]Begin/continue execution of user codeHELP Display the Mon12 command summaryLOAD [P]Load S-Records into memory, P = Paged S2 MD <StartAddress> [<EndAddress>]Memory Display BytesMM <Address>Modify Memory Bytes (8 bit values)MW <Address>Modify memory Words (16 bit values)MOVE <StartAddress> <EndAddress><DestAddress>Move a block of memoryRD Display all CPU registersOFFSET – [arg]Offset for downloadProceed Continue program executionRM Modify CPU Register ContentsSTOPAT <Address>Trace until addressT [<count>]Trace <count> instructionsNOTE: Items in Italics are not implemented at this time.Interrupt SupportAll interrupt services under are provided through the relocated vector table, see Table 5 below. Each location in the table is initialized to a value of $0000 to cause the trap of an unscheduled interrupt. Any nonzero value will allow the interrupt to proceed to the user's service routine that should be located at the address indicated. The interrupt service delay is +21 cycles over the standard interrupt service.To use vectors specified in the table, the user must insert the address of the interrupt service routine during software initialization into the ram interrupt table. For an example, for the IRQ vector, the following is performed:Example:IRQ Service routine label = IRQ_SRVRam Vector Table address is defined in table below, IRQ vector definition:VIRQ EQU $0FF2; define ram table vector locationPlace IRQ service routine address in the table:MOVW#IRQ_SRV,VIRQThis vector initialization will remain in effect until a RESET is invoked.Interrupt Vector TableTable 5: MON12 Interrupt Vector TableRam Interrupt Vector Address MCU Interrupt VectorAddressTRAP code VectorSource0F8A FF8A02LVI0F8C FF8C04PWME 0F8E FF8E06PTPI 0F90FF9008C4TX0F92FF920A C4RX0F94FF940C C4ERR0F96FF960E C4WU0F98FF9810C3TX0F9A FF9A12C3RX0F9C FF9C14C3ERR0F9E FF9E16C3WU0FA0FFA018C2TX0FA2FFA21A C2RX0FA4FFA41C C2ERR0FA6FFA61E C2WU0FA8FFA820C1TX0FAA FFAA22C1RX0FAC FFAC24C1ERR0FAE FFAE26C1WU0FB0FFB028C0TX0FB2FFB22A C0RX0FB4FFB42C C0ERR0FB6FFB62E C0WU0FB8FFB830FEPRG0FBA FFBA32EEPRG0FBC FFBC34SPI20FBE FFBE36SPI10FC0FFC038I2C0FC2FFC23A BDLC0FC4FFC43C CRGC0FC6FFC63E CRGL0FC8FFC840PACBO0FCA FFCA42MCNT0FCC FFCC44PTHI0FCE FFCE46PTJI0FD0FFD048ADC10FD2FFD24A ADC00FD4FFD44C SCI10FD6FFD64E SCI00FD8FFD850SPI00FDA FFDA52PACAI0FDC FFDC54PACAO0FDE FFDE56TOF0FE0FFE058TC70FE2FFE25A TC60FE4FFE45C TC50FE6FFE65E TC40FE8FFE860TC30FEA FFEA62TC20FEC FFEC64TC10FEE FFEE66TC00FF0FFF068RTI0FF2FFF26A IRQ0FF4FFF46C XIRQ0FF6FFF66E SWI0FF8FFF870TRAP0FFA FFFA72COP0FFC FFFC74CLM0FFE FFFE76RESERVEDSerial Monitor OperationA serial binary monitor is loaded in the MCU internal flash memory. Press and hold SW1 while pressing the RESET button or applying power. This section provides a brief description of this serial monitor operation. Refer to application note AN2548 for complete details on the serial monitor operation. This application note may be found on the Support CD received with the module or from the Freescale web site.Serial Monitor Memory MapTable 6: Serial Monitor Memory Map0x0000 –0x03FFRegisters1K bytesReserved0x3800 –0x3FFF Internal RAM(Relocated)2K bytes Reserved0x8000 –0xBFFF Fixed Flash EEPROM Block 1(visible at RESET)16K bytes0xC000 –0xF77F Fixed Flash EEPROM Block 213.8K bytes0xF780 –0xF7FF User Vectors (Relocated) User Reset Vector F7FE:F7FF0xF800 –0xFFFF Vectors (Protected)2.12K bytesNOTE: Although the monitor does not support external memory, the user can enable externalmemory accesses in the unfilled areas of the memory map.The 2K-byte serial monitor program provides an RS-232 serial interface to a host PC. Serial data rate is 115.2K bps. The monitor is compatible with Metrowerks CodeWarrior Develop-ment Studio and other serial monitor interface IDE’s. The serial monitor is not compatible with ASCII interface programs such as HyperTerm or AxIDE. The monitor supports 23 primitive commands to control the target MCU. To allow a user to specify the address of each interrupt service routine, this monitor redirects interrupt vectors to an unprotected portion of FLASH.To boot to the serial monitor, the user simply pressed and holds SW1 while pressing the RESET switch or applying power. The status of SW1 is read only during the rising edge of RESET. To load user application on start-up, the user is responsible for programming the pseudo-reset vector (0xF7FE:0xF7FF). Pressing SW1 after the MCU exits reset will not ac-cess the serial monitor. After exiting reset, pressing SW1 has effect as defined in the user ap-plication.BDM_PORT HeaderBDM access is gained through the BDM_PORT header. This is a 6-pin header that allows connection of a compatible HCS12 BDM cable. Refer to the documentation for the specificBDM cable used for details on its use. The figure below shows the pin-out for the DEBUG header.Figure 4: BDM_PORTMODC/BKGD12GND34RESET*56VDD See the HC12 Reference Manual for complete DEBUG documentation。

书目信息表

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经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济
经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济
59 46 45 49 55 59 59 4959 45 48 49 45 59 49 59.9 59 49 59 45 45 45 45 59 49 49 58 59.9 58 58 59 49.8 46 49 59 59 59 59 49 59 69 40 45 45 68
书目信息表
序号 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 书别经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济经济书名供应链管理-高成本.高库存.重资产的解决方案销售转型:让战略直达销售舌尖上的经济学数据时代的经济学:对网络智能时代机遇和风险的再思考亲历2015股指期货-市场观测者的交易和复盘手记微商3.0-移动电商实战社群众筹-传统众筹模式的升级与重构移动医疗-智能化医疗时代的来临平台经济互联网+2.0-供给侧改革与企业转型升级路线图知识管理如何改变商业模式转危为安家族企业创新-代际传承,基业长青与众不同-极度竞争时代的生存之道大并购时代-超级并购带来超级增长与超常回报精益研发2.0-面向中国制造2025的工业研发产品心经-产品经理应该知道的60件事(第2版) 价值革命-重构商业模式的方法论货币围城图解精益管理标杆共享经济:如何迎合商业、社会和环境需求及获取竞争优势场景时代:构建移动互联网新商业体系汽车维修企业管理实务(永续发展篇) 第2版粉丝营销:社群时代营销新玩法物流与供应链改善互联网+时代的IT战略.架构与治理-传统企业信息...设计营销-人人都需要的一门课行政办公管理规范化操作全案丰田模式(实践手册篇)-实施丰田4P的实践指南(珍藏版) 招标采购代理规范(2016年版) 丰田文化-复制丰田DNA的核心关键(珍藏版) 丰田人才精益模式(珍藏版) 大数据银行-创新者.颠覆者.企业家们正在重塑银行业农业互联网-产业互联网的最后一片蓝海数据资产管理-盘活大数据时代的隐形财富重新定义组织-用户如何与企业联盟狙杀黑马-实盘操作的36个擒杀术行业风险与信贷案例创业成功范式-硅谷创业教父的忠告赢得死亡游戏-破解华为的创新之道高利润销售-颠覆移动互联网时代的营销秘笈企业创新方法论互联网新商业模式-传统商业模式颠覆与重构中国制造2025-产业互联网开启新工业革命组织设计-寻找实现组织价值的规律组织与管理财务管理规范化操作全案人力资源管理规范化操作全案生产管理规范化操作全案互联网金融-重塑金融生态价格 59 45 59 65 59 49 49.8 59.8 49 69 40 69 40 49 69 69 69 49.9 59 69 49 49 55 49 59 56 49 54.6 69 46 65 45 59 49 59 49 49 59 69 49 55 58 42 49 49 40 55 58.6 53.8 42

韩都衣舍的管理模式分析PPT

6 阿米巴模式催生多品牌
1 公司管理出发点
公司6个合伙人的管理团队，均为70后，唯有一人懂互联网。为什么不找互联网行业的人呢？
“最早的出发点：
一家企业对于人性研究、管理研究、激发员工的研究更重
要，所以是找情商比较高的人，我们致力于人性的研究和
员工潜能的激发。
”
2 从组织角度，激发员工动力
正三角管理结构 VS 倒三角管理结构
（完）
6 阿米巴模式催生多品牌
阿米巴模式进化：由产品小组做大、做强，进而孵化成为子品牌
➢ 范例：男装AMH品牌
发展：负责人从组员成长为品牌老总，品牌业绩超过1个亿元员工和团队可以再孵化出去创造新的子品牌
权利：参与净利分成，有更大的经营决策权具备独立运营的能力
多品牌运营的关键点：
1
要做好多品牌，需要两方面：一是自下而上的愿望和能力，二是自上而下的引导扶持。
过去：金字塔式职能管理结构
管理者
• 内部博弈
• 分数分薪、分资源
• 为企业干
层层
• 流程以企业为中心
传递
正三角管理结构 VS 倒三角管理结构
创新：以客户为中心的自主经营体
为客户创造价值客户1 客户2 客户3 客户4 客户5 自主经营体
矩阵团队为一线经营体提供支持资源
管理者
• 开放共赢 • 挣薪挣资源 • 为自己干活 • 流程以客户为中心
1、大组：3-5个小组构成，产品部：3-5个大组构成 2、每个小组相对专业化（品类包） 3、每个部门覆盖全品类 4、部门内的竞争和合作 5、大组主管和部门经理的绩效考核
267个产品小组，每个小组由1~3名成员组成负责产品选款、页面制作、货品管理等非标准化环节

网店视觉营销最新版精品教学课件第4章

4.2 促销商品主图设计
4.2 促销商品主图设计
当客户通过关键词或者类目搜索商品时，首先展示给客户的第一张图片就是商品主图。商品主图是展示商品的重要窗口，它很好的向目标人群传达着有关商品的活动、利益点，是引流和增加点击率的重要方式。一张有创意的主图，能够在众多商品图片中脱颖而出，吸引客户关注商品，进而点击商品主图进入店铺，从而带来更多流量和利润。因此，商品主图的优劣是影响客户关注以及影响客户点击的重要因素，商品主图的素材选择、主图创意设计方法和主图营销元素的展现，在商品主图设计中尤为重要。
商品素材曝光正确
商品素材曝光不准确
4.1促销图视觉营销设计要点
3．商品素材展现角度合理促销图片中的商品素材展现角度合理，不仅能够增强商品的立体感，同时可以让消费者更加清晰的看到商品的全貌。 4．商品完整性好在保证商品角度合理的情况下，尽量展现出商品的多个侧面，这样可以让消费者通过一张主图获取商品的更多信息。
几款化妆品的直通车推广图
4.3.1直通车推广图类型
2．店铺直通车推广图店铺推广也是直通车推广方式，其主要特点是通过推广某一个导航页面、商品集合页以及自定义页面的方式来推广更多的商品。店铺推广的特点是将流量引入目标页面，然后通过页面内展示的商品分流到达各个商品详情页面里。
全店活动推广方式
商品展现角度合理
商品完整性好
4.1.2商品构图创意
一个促销图片是否好看、能否促进消费者产生购买欲望，这与商品构图紧密相关。构图是刻画促销图主题的手段，不同的构图方法会有不同的视觉关注点，同时也能够营造出不同的商品营销氛围。
常用的商品构图方法有六种： • 直线式构图 • 三角形构图 • 对角线构图 • 渐次式构图 • 辐射式构图 • 框架式构图

《商业情报分析方法》课件

商业情报发展趋势和挑战
商业情报发展的趋势和方向
智能化：利用人工智能和大数据技术，提高商业情报的准确性和实时性跨界融合：与其他行业领域进行跨界合作，拓展商业情报的应用范围安全合规：加强数据安全和隐私保护，确保商业情报的合法性和合规性国际化：随着全球化的深入，商业情报需要更加注重国际市场的变化和需求
数据整理：对收集到的信息进行整理，分类、筛选、剔除无效信息
分析处理：运用各种分析方法对数据进行处理，如 SWOT分析、 PEST分析等
结果呈现：将分析结果以图表、报告等形式呈现，便于理解和决策
情报处理的质量控制和保障
确保情报来源的可靠性和准确性采用科学的情报处理方法和技术建立完善的情报处理流程和标准定期对情报处理结果进行评估和反馈
收集数据：通过各种渠道收集相关商业数据
数据处理：对收集到的数据进行清洗、整理和转换
分析与解读：运用各种分析方法和工具对数据进行深入分析和解读
报告撰写：将分析结果整理成报告，提供决策支持
反馈与优化：根据报告反馈进行优化和调整，提高商业情报分析的准确性和效率
YOUR LOGO
商业情报分析方法
PPT,a click to unlimited possibilities
汇报人：PPT 汇报时间：20X-XXXX
添加目录标题商业情报处理
商业情报分析概述
商业情报分析技术
商业情报收集商业情报的定义和重要性
商业情报：指企业通过收集、分析、评估和利用各种信息，以支持决策、提高竞争力和实现商业目标的过程。
重要性：商业情报可以帮助企业了解市场趋势、竞争对手、技术发展、法律环境等，从而制定更有效的战略和决策。

trade

Journal of Economic Theory 144(2009)1489–1520/locate/jetTrade,inequality,and the political economyof institutionsQuy-Toan Do a ,Andrei A.Levchenko b ,c ,∗a The World Bank,United Statesb Department of Economics,University of Michigan,Ann Arbor,MI 48109,United Statesc International Monetary Fund,United States Received 12September 2006;ﬁnal version received 21May 2008;accepted 21November 2008Available online 25December 2008AbstractThis paper investigates the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic insti-tutions.We model institutions as ﬁxed costs of entry,in a framework that has two key features.First,preferences over entry costs differ across ﬁrms and depend on ﬁrm rger ﬁrms prefer to set higher costs of entry,in order to reduce competition.Second,these costs are endogenously determined in a politi-cal economy equilibrium.Trade opening can lead to higher entry costs when it changes the political power in favor of a small elite of large exporters,who in turn prefer to install high entry barriers.©2008Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved.JEL classiﬁcation:F12;P48Keywords:Institutions;Entry barriers;International trade;Heterogeneous ﬁrms;Political economy1.IntroductionEconomic institutions,such as quality of contract enforcement,property rights,rule of law,and the like,are increasingly viewed as key determinants of economic performance (Acemoglu,Johnson,and Robinson [1]).While it has been established that institutions are important in ex-plaining income differences across countries,what in turn explains those institutional differences is still an open question,both theoretically and empirically.*Corresponding author at:Department of Economics,University of Michigan,611Tappan Street,Ann Arbor,MI 48109,United States.E-mail addresses:qdo@ (Q.-T.Do),alev@ (A.A.Levchenko).0022-0531/$–see front matter ©2008Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.0071490Q.-T.Do,A.A.Levchenko/Journal of Economic Theory144(2009)1489–1520 This paper investigates how exposure to international trade affects a country’s institutions. This is an important question because it is widely hoped that greater openness could improve institutional quality through a variety of channels,including reducing rents,creating constituen-cies for reform,and inducing specialization in sectors that demand good institutions(IMF[21]; Johnson,Ostry,and Subramanian[23]).While trade openness does seem to be associated with better institutions in a cross-section of countries,in practice the relationship between institutions and trade is likely to be much more nuanced.1As documented by both historians and economists, in many instances international trade contributed to concentration of political power in the hands of groups that were interested in setting up,or perpetuating,bad institutions.2Thus,it is im-portant to understand under what conditions greater trade openness results in a deterioration of institutions,rather than their improvement.The goal of this paper is to provide a framework rich enough to incorporate both positive and negative effects of trade on institutions.We build a model in which institutional quality is determined in a political economy equilibrium,and then compare outcomes in autarky and trade.The production side of the economy is based on the Melitz[26]model of trade with heterogeneousﬁrms and monopolistic competition.Firms differ in their productivity,faceﬁxed costs to production and foreign trade,and have some market power.For a givenﬁxed cost of entry,only sufﬁciently productiveﬁrms operate.Similarly,only the most productiveﬁrms export. Heterogeneous productivity implies that proﬁts differ acrossﬁrms,generating wealth inequality across agents.In our model we interpret institutional quality as theﬁxed cost of production.When this cost is high,institutions are bad,and fewerﬁrms can operate.3The imperfectly competitive nature of the economy provides scope for rent seeking behavior.In the model,every producer has to pay the sameﬁxed cost.Weﬁrst illustrate how preferences over institutional quality depend onﬁrm size.Each producer has a preferred level of theﬁxed cost,which increases withﬁrm productivity:the larger theﬁrm,the worse it wants institutions to be.Why would not everyone prefer the lowest possibleﬁxed cost?On the one hand,a higherﬁxed cost decreases proﬁts one for one,and same for everyone.On the other hand,setting a higherﬁxed cost prevents entry by the lowest-productivityﬁrms,which reduces competition and increases proﬁts.This second effect is more pronounced forﬁrms with higher productivity.More productiveﬁrms would thus prefer higher entry barriers–worse institutions.41See,e.g.,Rodrik,Subramanian and Trebbi[31],Rigobon and Rodrik[29],and Levchenko[25].2In the1700s,for example,the economies of the Caribbean were highly involved in international trade,but trade expansion in that period coincided with the emergence of slave societies and oligarchic regimes(Sokoloff and Engerman [34]Rogozinski[32]).During the period1880–1930,Central American economies and politics were dominated by large fruit-exporting companies,which destabilized the political systems of the countries in the region as they were jockeying to install regimes most favorable to their business interests(Woodward[38]).In the context of oil exporting countries,Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian[20]argue that trade in natural resources has a negative impact on growth through worsening institutional quality rather than Dutch disease.3Narrowly,thisﬁxed cost can be interpreted as a bureaucratic or corruption-related cost of starting and operating a business.For instance,Djankov et al.[15]document large differences in the amount of time and money it requires to start a business in a large sample of countries.More broadly,it can be a reduced-form way of modeling any impediment to doing business that would prevent someﬁrms from entering or producing efﬁciently.For example,it could be a cost of establishing formal property rights over land or other assets.Or,in the Rajan and Zingales[27]view of the role of ﬁnancial development,the institutional quality parameter can be thought of as a prohibitive cost of externalﬁnance.4This feature of the model corresponds to the increasingly common view that largeﬁrms are less affected by bad institutions than small and medium sizeﬁrms.Beck,Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic[8]ﬁnd that bad institutions have a greater negative impact on growth of smallﬁrms than largeﬁrms.Furthermore,Rajan and Zingales[27,28]argueQ.-T.Do,A.A.Levchenko/Journal of Economic Theory144(2009)1489–15201491 Barriers to entry are determined endogenously in a political economy equilibrium.The key assumption is that political power is positively related to economic size:the larger theﬁrm, the more political weight it has.5We adopt the political economy framework of Bénabou[9], which modiﬁes the median voter model to give wealthier agents a higher voting weight.These ingredients are enough to characterize the autarky and trade equilibria.Firms decide on theﬁxed costs of production common to all,a decision process in which largerﬁrms receive a larger weight.Production takes place and goods markets clear.We use this framework to compare equilibrium institutions under autarky and trade,in order to illustrate the effects of opening.In particular,Melitz[26]shows that access to foreign markets allows the most productive ﬁrms to grow to a size that would not have been possible in autarky.At the same time,increased competition in the domestic markets reduces the size of non-exportingﬁrms and their proﬁts. The distribution of proﬁts becomes more unequal than it was in autarky:largerﬁrms grow larger, while smallerﬁrms become smaller or disappear under trade.Thus,greater trade exposure can potentially result in an economy dominated by a small elite of large exporters.This leads to two effects through which trade affects institutional quality.Theﬁrst is the foreign competition effect.The presence of foreign competition generally implies that eachﬁrm would prefer better institutions under trade than in autarky.The second is the political power effect.As the largestﬁrms export under trade and grow larger while the smallerﬁrms shrink, political power shifts in favor of big exportingﬁrms.Because largerﬁrms want institutions to be worse,this effect acts to lower institutional quality.The political power effect drives the key result of the paper.Greater exposure to international markets can worsen institutions when it increases the political power of a small elite of large exporters,who prefer to maintain bad institutions.When is the political power effect stronger than the foreign competition effect?The com-parative statics show that when a country captures only a small share of world production in the industry subject to rent seeking,or if the country is relatively large,the foreign competition effect of trade predominates.Thus,while the power does shift to largerﬁrms,theseﬁrms still prefer to improve institutions after trade opening.On the opposite end,institutions are most likely to deteriorate when the country is small relative to the rest of the world,but captures a relatively large share of world trade in the industry subject to rent seeking.Intuitively,if a country pro-duces most of the world’s supply of the rent-bearing good,the foreign competition effect will be weakest.Furthermore,having a large trading partner allows the largest exportingﬁrms to grow unchecked relative to domestic GDP,giving them a great deal of political power.This framework can help explain why,contrary to expectations,more trade sometimes fails to have a disciplining effect and improve institutional quality.At the same time,it is important to emphasize that this paper does not argue–or deliver the analytical result–that institutions always deteriorate after trade opening.Indeed,such a prediction would be clearly counterfactual. Instead,a more nuanced set of comparative statics emerges,in which theﬁnal outcome depends that largerﬁrms may actually prefer to make institutions worse,ceteris paribus,in order to forestall entry and decrease competition in both goods and factor markets.These authors argue thatﬁnancial development languished in the interwar period and beyond partly because large corporations wanted to restrict access to externalﬁnance by smallerﬁrms in order to reduce competition.5There is a body of evidence that individuals with higher incomes participate more in the political process(Bén-abou[9]).There is also evidence that largerﬁrms engage more in lobbying activity(see,for example,Bombardini[11]).1492Q.-T.Do,A.A.Levchenko/Journal of Economic Theory144(2009)1489–1520on country characteristics.6Moreover,the two conﬂicting effects in the model are interesting in themselves,whether or not they lead to an ultimate deterioration of institutions.Note that the paper does not attempt to endogenize trade opening.Endogenous trade policy has been the subject of a large literature,and remains beyond the scope of this paper.7Nonethe-less,we believe that our exercise is still well worth pursuing.First,in many instances changes in trade openness have indeed been exogenous,driven by technological shocks or changes in colonial regimes.Second,many other factors besides ensuing institutional change contribute to the formation of trade policy.Thus,it could be that even when trade openness is endogenous,it is driven by factors unrelated to those we are modeling.Finally,in order to analyze trade opening and endogenous institutions simultaneously,it is important toﬁrst understand how the former affects the latter.This model is a step in that direction.This paper is part of a growing literature on the impact of trade openness on domestic ing different theoretical frameworks,Segura-Cayuela[33],Stefanadis[35],and Dal Bóand Dal Bó[14]demonstrate that economic institutions and policies can deteriorate as a result of trade opening in countries with weak political institutions.By contrast,Levchenko[25]shows that trade opening can lead to institutional improvement due to a foreign competition effect. None of the papers above model the changes in the balance of political power central to this pa-per.Without using a formal theoretical framework,Acemoglu,Johnson,and Robinson[2]argue that in some West European countries,Atlantic trade during the period1500–1850engendered good institutions by creating a merchant class,which became a powerful lobby for institutional improvement.This paper shows that the newly powerful groups need not favor better institutions under trade,and thus trade opening will not necessarily lead to institutional improvement.In focusing on the interaction of trade and domestic political economy,our paper is related to Bardhan[7]and Verdier[37].These authors suggest that trade may shift domestic political power in such a way as to prevent efﬁcient or equitable redistribution.Finally,our work is also related to the literature on the political economy dimension of the natural resource curse(see, e.g.Tornell and Lane[36]Isham et al.[22]).The rest of the paper is organized as follows.Section2describes preferences,technology,and the equilibrium resource allocation in autarky and under trade for a given level of institutional quality.Section3lays out the political economy setup and characterizes the political economy equilibria.Section4presents the main result of the paper,which is a comparison of equilibrium institutions in autarky and under trade.It begins with an analytic discussion of the conditions under which institutions may deteriorate with trade opening.Then,it presents the results of a numerical simulation of the model,with which we perform the comparative statics.Section5 concludes.Proofs of propositions are collected in Appendix A.2.Goods and factor market equilibrium2.1.The environmentConsider an economy comprised of two countries,the North(N)and the South(S),and two sectors.One of the sectors produces a homogeneous good z,while the other sector produces a6The comparative statics are suggestive of the experience of the Caribbean in the18th century,or Central America in the late19th–early20th:these were indeed small economies that had much larger trading partners,and captured large shares of world trade in their respective exports.7See,e.g.,Rodrik[30],and Grossman and Helpman[18].Q.-T.Do,A.A.Levchenko/Journal of Economic Theory144(2009)1489–15201493 continuum of differentiated goods x(v).Consumer preferences over the goods are governed by the utility functionU=v∈V x(v)αdvβαz(1−β),where V is the set of available varieties of good x.In country i=N,S,utility maximization leads to the following demand functions,given total expenditure E i and goods prices p i z and p i(v):z i=(1−β)E ip i zandx i(v)=βE iv∈V ip i(v)1−εdvp i(v)−ε,(1)∀v∈V i,whereε=1/(1−α)>1.The only factor of production is labor,with country endowments L N and L S.The homoge-neous good z is produced with a linear technology that requires one unit of L to produce one unit of z.For the sake of tractability,we assume that z can be traded costlessly.This assumption is also adopted by Helpman,Melitz,and Yeaple[19],and Chaney[13],and greatly simpliﬁes the analysis.This is because as long as both countries produce some z,wages are equalized in the two countries.We normalize the price of z,and therefore the wage,to1.Eachﬁrm in the differentiated sector is able to produce a unique variety of good x.Country i=N,S is endowed with aﬁxed mass n i of these varieties.Firms in this sector have heteroge-neous productivity.In particular,eachﬁrm is characterized by a marginal cost parameter a,which is the number of units of L that it requires in order to produce an additional unit of good x.Each ﬁrm with marginal cost a is free not to produce.If it does decide to produce,it must pay aﬁxed cost common acrossﬁrms.Let f be theﬁxed cost of production in the South,and f N in the North.We assume that theﬁxed cost in the South can take on the values in the interval[f,f], and below we endogenize it in a political economy equilibrium.In this section,we derive the main results regarding the equilibrium production allocation for a given value of South’s f.Aﬁrm that decides to incur theﬁxed cost then faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its unique variety given by(1)in country i=N,S.As is well known,isoelastic demand gives rise to a constant markup over marginal cost.Aﬁrm based in the South with marginal cost a serving the domestic market maximizes proﬁt by setting the price equal to a/α,and its resulting domestic proﬁt can be written as:πS D(a)=(1−α)βE Sv∈V Sp(v)dvaα1−ε−f,(2)with a corresponding expression in the North.Good x can be traded,but international trade is subject to bothﬁxed and per unit costs.In particular,in order to export,a producer of good x must pay aﬁxed cost f X,and a per-unit iceberg costτ.We assume that these trade costs are the same for the two countries.If theﬁrm with marginal cost a decides to pay theﬁxed cost of exporting,its effective marginal cost of1494Q.-T.Do,A.A.Levchenko /Journal of Economic Theory 144(2009)1489–1520serving the foreign market is τa ,and thus it sets the foreign price equal to τa/α.Export proﬁts for a Southern ﬁrm are then:πS X (a)=(1−α)βE N v ∈VN p N (v)1−εdv τa α 1−ε−f X ,(3)with a similar expression for a Northern ﬁrm exporting to the South.The distribution of a across ﬁrms is characterized by the cumulative distribution func-tion G(a).Following Helpman,Melitz,and Yeaple [19],we assume that labor productivity,1/a ,follows the Pareto distribution.This implies that the distribution of marginal cost is given by G(a)=(ba)k ,for 0<a 1/b .Using the Pareto distribution of productivities leads to a Pareto distribution of ﬁrm sales,which approximates well the distribution of ﬁrm sales in the U.S.econ-omy.Appendix A describes it in detail,and presents closed-form solutions to the autarky and trade equilibria when 1/a is Pareto.8To set the stage for the political economy analysis below,we now compare the equilibrium production allocations in autarky and under trade.2.2.AutarkyTo determine the autarky equilibrium production structure requires ﬁnding the cutoff level of marginal cost,a A ,such that all ﬁrms above this marginal cost decide not to produce.(Here and in the Political Economy section below,we omit the country superscripts whenever that creates no ambiguity.)In this model,the ﬁrms’marginal cost takes values on the interval (0,1b ].We assume that the parameter values are such that the least productive ﬁrm does not operate,and thus the equilibrium is interior (a A <1b ).A sufﬁcient restriction on parameter values for this to hold is:f >(1−α)β[k −(ε−1)]Lnk [1−(1−α)βε−1k ].(4)The ﬁrm with marginal cost a A makes zero proﬁt in equilibrium,a condition that can be written as:(1−α)βE nV (a A )a 1−εA=f,(5)where V (y)≡ y 0a 1−εdG(a).9The equilibrium value of E is found by imposing the goodsmarket-clearing condition that expenditure must equal income:E =L +na A0πA (a)dG(a),(6)where πA (a)is the autarky proﬁt of a ﬁrm with marginal cost a ,given by (2).There is no free entry in the model,that is,the mass of potential producers (but not actual ones)is ﬁxed.This 8The use of the Pareto distribution in the heterogeneous ﬁrms models is becoming increasingly common.See,among others,Ghironi and Melitz [17],Chaney [13],and Arkolakis [5].9This notation is useful for writing the integrals of prices: v ∈V p(v)1−εdv =n a A 0(a α)1−εdG(a)=n α1−εV (a A ),leading to Eq.(5).Q.-T.Do,A.A.Levchenko /Journal of Economic Theory 144(2009)1489–15201495Fig.1.Proﬁts in autarky and under trade.means that total income,given by the equation above,is the sum of total labor income and the proﬁts accruing to all ﬁrms in the economy.10The two equations (5)and (6)in two unknowns E and a A characterize the autarky equilib-rium in this economy,illustrated in Fig.1.On the horizontal axis is a ,the ﬁrm’s marginal cost parameter (thus,the most productive ﬁrms are closest to zero).On the vertical axis is ﬁrm proﬁt.The zero proﬁt cutoff,a A ,is deﬁned by the intersection of the proﬁt curve with the horizontal axis.All ﬁrms with marginal cost higher than a A do not produce.For the producing ﬁrms,proﬁtincreases in productivity.Higher f means that in equilibrium,fewer ﬁrms operate:∂a A ∂f <0.Thatis,the higher is f ,the more productive a ﬁrm needs to be in order to survive.2.3.TradeSolving for the trade equilibrium involves ﬁnding the production cutoffs a i D ,and the exporting cutoffs a i X ,for the two countries i =N,S .The cutoff values for production and exporting in the South are characterized by:(1−α)βE Sn S V (a D )+n N τ1−εV (a X) a S D 1−ε=f,(7)and(1−α)βE Nn N V (a N D )+n S τ1−εV (a S X ) τa S X 1−ε=f X ,(8)with a corresponding pair of conditions in the North.11Comparing these to the autarky demand(5),we see that the denominators in these expressions reﬂect the fact that some varieties of good 10The assumption of a ﬁxed mass of potential producers is made for analytical tractability,as well as for adapting the model to the political economy setup.It has also been used by Eaton and Kortum [16],Chaney [13],and Arkolakis [5].11Each ﬁrm with productivity a serving the domestic market sets the price of a/α.Foreign ﬁrms set the price τa/α.In the South,only ﬁrms with marginal cost below a S D operate in equilibrium,and only Northern ﬁrms with marginal cost be-low a N X sell in the South,thus v ∈V S p S (v)1−εdv =n S a S D 0(a α)1−εdG(a)+n N a N X 0(τa α)1−εdG(a)=n S α1−εV (a S D )+n N (τα)1−εV (a N X ),using the V (a)notation.1496Q.-T.Do,A.A.Levchenko/Journal of Economic Theory144(2009)1489–1520x consumed in each country are imported from abroad.The model is closed by imposing the condition that expenditure equals income in both countries.In particular,total income is the sum of labor income and all proﬁts accruing toﬁrms from selling in the domestic and export markets:E i=L i+n ia i Dπi D(a)dG(a)+n ia i Xπi X(a)dG(a),(9)i=N,S,with domestic and foreign proﬁts given by(2)and(3)for both countries.Eqs.(7)–(9)determine the equilibrium values of a i D,a i X,and E i.How does the trade equilib-rium differ from the autarky equilibrium for given levels of f?For the political economy effects we wish to illustrate,the trade equilibrium has two key features.First,not allﬁrms for whom it is proﬁtable to produce domesticallyﬁnd it worthwhile to export.Thus only the most productive ﬁrms export and grow as a result of trade opening.This comes from assuming a sufﬁciently large ﬁxed cost of exporting(f X)as introduced by Melitz[26].It has become a standard feature in the large subsequent literature on trade with heterogeneousﬁrms.Second,domestic proﬁts decrease as a result of trade opening.The following lemma describes the conditions under which this takes place.Lemma1(The Melitz effect).Equilibrium thresholds satisfy a S D<a A if:f f N k−(ε−1)ε−1>(1−α)β(ε−1)kL NL Sn Sn N2.This condition is satisﬁed if one or more of the following properties hold:1.f is sufﬁciently large relative to f N;2.Eitherβ,n S/n N,and/or L N/L S are sufﬁciently small.Fig.1illustrates the impact of trade opening.As drawn,ﬁrms with marginal cost higher than a D do not produce at all.Firms with marginal cost between a X and a D produce only for the domestic market,while the rest of theﬁrms serve both the domestic and export markets.When countries open to trade,the least productiveﬁrms drop out,ﬁrms with intermediate productivity suffer a decrease in total proﬁts,and only the most productiveﬁrms are better off compared to autarky.The distribution of proﬁts is more unequal under trade.123.Political economyIn this paper,theﬁxed cost of production f is the parameter that captures institutional quality. In our view,it reﬂects one of the key consequences of bad institutions,namely that they are entry barriers forﬁrms to operate or join the formal economy.As shown above,a high level of f acts to prevent entry by someﬁrms,and thus we consider higher f to be a symptom of a lower quality of institutions.A narrow interpretation of f could be actual corruption or red-tape costs that an 12The Melitz effect does not obtain for all parameter conﬁgurations because,unlike Melitz[26],this model has asym-metric countries andﬁxed n N and n S.Nonetheless,as the condition in Lemma1makes clear,the Melitz effect takes place unambiguously in this model when countries are symmetric(L N=L S;n N=n S;and f N=f)–the assumptionmaintained in the original Melitz[26]contribution.Q.-T.Do,A.A.Levchenko /Journal of Economic Theory 144(2009)1489–15201497entrepreneur needs to pay to start or operate a business.More broadly,one can think of f as an assessment of the investment climate as a whole.It could be argued that the various aspects of a poor institutional environment (ineffective judicial system,high expropriation risk,prohibitive cost of external ﬁnance,etc.)to some extent act to restrict entry,and are hence summarized by the parameter f .The quality of institutions in the South,f ,is determined endogenously through a political economy mechanism in which entrepreneurs participate;for simplicity we abstract from the par-ticipation of L in the political process.13Throughout,we assume that institutions in the North f N remain exogenous and ﬁxed.In order to characterize the equilibrium outcome,this section speciﬁes entrepreneurs’preferences,and the political economy mechanism through which insti-tutional quality is determined.In this framework,preferences are equated with entrepreneurs’wealth,and wealthier entrepreneurs prefer to have worse institutions.For this,the connection to the production side of the model is essential.First,the imperfectly competitive nature of the differentiated goods sector provides scope for rent seeking behavior.And second,when a ﬁrm’s wealth is positively related to its proﬁts,it is indeed the case that larger ﬁrms prefer worse insti-tutions.When it comes to the political economy mechanism,the effect we would like to capture is that agents with higher incomes have a higher weight in the policy decision.For instance,Bombar-dini [11]documents that larger ﬁrms are more involved in lobbying activity,and thus one would expect them to have a higher weight in the determination of policies.Rather than assuming a spe-ciﬁc bargaining game,this paper adopts a reduced-form approach based on Bénabou [9].This approach modiﬁes the basic median voter setup to allow for a connection between income and the effective number of votes.This section describes the political economy environment,deﬁnes an equilibrium,and proves a set of propositions showing its existence and stability.The next section presents the main result of the paper,which is the comparison between the autarky and trade equilibrium institutions.As the rest of the analysis focuses on a single country –the South,to save on notation we omit the country superscripts unless they are needed.3.1.The setupFirms participate in a political game that determines the level of barriers f ∈[f ,f ].14Since f is now endogenous,all equilibrium values discussed in the previous section are functions of f .An agent is characterized by her wealth w .For the rest of the paper,we assume that wealth is derived from proﬁts,so that for any entrepreneur with marginal cost a ∈(0,1b ],it can be expressed as w r (a,f ),where r =A,T refers to a particular regime that occurs in the economy,that is,autarky or trade.More speciﬁcally,wealth is given by:w A (a,f )= πA (a,f )if a <a A (f ),0if a a A (f )(10)13This simpliﬁcation does not affect the results.To include labor in the political process,one can for example assume that each entrepreneur supplies L/n units of bor is paid a nominal wage equal to 1so that entrepreneurs get paid L/n in addition to their proﬁts.While this alternative modeling choice will make each agent prefer better institutions,it does not affect the way preferences depend on ﬁrm size,and,most importantly,how trade opening changes preferences.The nature of the political economy game will also not be altered.14As will become clear below,the quality of institutions,f ,must be restricted to a bounded interval in order to ensure that a non-degenerate equilibrium exists (see Proposition 3).。

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