Does Corruption Promote Emigration An Empirical Examination

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(完整word版)英语六级作文1200字：反腐败斗争(Anti Corruption Campaign)

英语六级作文1200字：反腐败斗争(Anti Corruption Campaign)corruption cases are frequently reported by news media. for eample, some high ranking officials help themselves to state fund illegally. for another eample, some leaders abuse power . whats more, malpractice, bribery and other corrupt behaviour do much harm. as a result, the healthy development of the economy is seriously affected.as china continues its reforms and opens wider to the outside world, anti corruption is a question of priorities. our government has realized the seriousness of corruption problems. corruption presents a dreadful threat to state interests. corruption cases seriously damage efforts to build a clean and honest government,undoubtedly dampen peoples enthusiasm and heavily affect stability.in the future, to cement the fruits that reform has borne, an even greater effort is needed in the battle against corrupt behaviour. governments at all levels should take more effective measures to combat corruption. laws already in effect must be strictly enforced . the implementation of anti corruption programs should target every part of china. anti corruption agencies should intensify crackdown on bribery, attach greater importance to the anti corruption campaign.。

关于腐败的英语论文

CorruptionThe report went out that The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has decided to remove Lei Zhifu from the position of Chongqing City District Committee Secretary. There are many press exposures that Lei Zhifu, who pressured an 18-year-old girl to maintain a sexual relationship with him has been charged with abusing his power for private gain, and helping people to fake retirement documents to receive pensions, selling public property at low prices and helping his relatives make illicit gains.Corruption has become such a serious problem in China. It must be accepted that harmfulness of the corruption is very greatly, especially in politics, it will hamper the public power to normally act, influence fair of the society, led to society contradiction become acute and it is an important element to destroy the society firm. All that said, corruption has already become a social public hazard and a domestic perplexed problem.While corruption has grown in scope and complexity in china, anti-corruption policies, on the other hand, have not changed much. Communist-style mass campaigns with anti-corruption slogans, moral exhortations, and prominently displayed miscreants, are still a key part of official policy, much as they were in the 1950s. This leniency ofpunishment has been the main reasons corruption is such a serious problem in China.Look around the world, in many countries systematic, anti-corruption measures include independent trade and professional associat ions, which help limit corruption by promulgating codes of ethics and imposing quick penalties, watchdog groups like NGOs, and a free media. In China, these measures do not exist as a result of the CCP’s means of rule. Developed foreign country has been setting an example with his own conduct. Why couldn’t our government learn from other countries’ strong points to offset the shortage of regulatory compliance? Strengthen education, develop democracy, improve the legal system, tighten supervision, make institutional innovation and incorporate counter-corruption in all our major policy measures. In a word, we must pursue several strategies at once so as to prevent and tackle corruption at its source.。

如何根除腐败 How to Eradicate Corruption 外国学生英语作文

How to Eradicate Corruption >How to Eradicate Corruption Essay:The term corruption is defined as a dishonest or deceitful act. Corruption in civil matters is often considered criminal. Corruption is mostly an act of fraudulence carried out by people who are in positions of authority. In India, corruption has been an issue of concern for years now.Corruption has been prevalent in society since the shifting of powers from the people to the opportunistic authorities. The British’s advent in India started to significantly affect the middleclass, who gradually started occupying essential jobs in the country with their education. This sudden change in power made them greedy and more prone to bribery.Long and Short Essays on How to Eradicate Corruption for Students and Kids in EnglishWe are providing students with essay samples on a long essay of 500 words and a short essay of 150 words on the topic of how to eradicate corruption.Long Essay on How to Eradicate Corruption 500 Words in EnglishLong Essay on How to Eradicate Corruption is usually given to classes 7, 8, 9, and 10.Corruption can be defined as a dishonest and fraudulent act, mostly practised by people of authority. It includes civil misconduct among opportunistic leaders. In India, corruption has been a norm for years now. Even the British called the Indian officials corrupt.Methods Of Corruption:Corruption can be of varied types.Bribery: Bribery is the most common form of corruption through which people in posts of authority misuse their power to direct services according to their interests. Many material and monetary gifts are offered by people to these high officials for running certain benefits to their advantages. These are mostly government officials who are susceptible to these fraudulent acts.Financial Fraud: Financial fraud is also called Embezzlement. This is the act of withholding assets of the public for theft.Corruption Of Politicians: This is one of the most notable types of corruption, where the people elected for public interests misuse their power for personal gains. There are little to no ways of ever identifying these corruptions in a broken system like India.Nepotism: Nepotism is a form of corruption where the people of authority reserve specific posts and places of high prestige for the people of either their own family or acquaintances.Steps To Eradicate Corruption:Increasing Salary: Since Government officials are the most susceptible to corruption, it is the Government’s responsibility to ensure maximum satisfaction of the employees so that they don’t engage in activities like these. It has been found out that this fraudulence occurs because of the low salary that is paid to the employees. It is often not enough for the officials, and hence they resort to illegal activities. Therefore, the Government should ensure a fair salary to its employees.Increasing The Number Of Employees: The lack of efficient workers in the governmentoffices often leads to slowing down the critical work. This little progress makes bribery to be the only solution for the fast delivery of work. If t hese employees’ workload is lessened by employing more numbers of employees, then the efficiency might be affected positively.Legislation: The Legislation of a country is the most crucial tool to fight corruption. The laws against corruption can be made more stringent to stop officials from corrupt activities. The punishment after breaking the law should also be more robust and harder to pay.Supervision- Installing cameras and increasing surveillance in government offices or places susceptible to corruption can also minimize the activities. Officials will have a fear of getting caught more often, and rise will mitigate corruption.Check Inflation- The Government should always keep inflation in check because as the price rises for bare essentials, many employees feel their salary to be less than what they deserve and indulge in corrupt activities.We also have to keep in mind the corrupt politicians who exercise their power even in thecourt of law and the entire judicial system. These types of corruption can only be stopped if people elect representatives based on their work and ethics rather than their political supremacy.Short Essay on How to Eradicate Corruption 150 Words in EnglishShort Essay on How to Eradicate Corruption is usually given to classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.Corruption is an act of fraudulence often practised by people with authority. These people misuse their power and control their interests. There are different types of corruption. Bribery isthe most common form of corruption visible where mostly the government officials take gifts and money from people as bribes to complete their desired works. Other forms are financial frauds, political frauds, and nepotism.You can now access more Essay Writing on this topicSteps To Eradicate Corruption-Varied steps can be taken to eradicate corruption. The Government can increase the employees’ salary since most corruption takes place due to the employees’ dissatisfaction.Some other steps which can be undertaken are strict legislation and strong judicial supervision increased surveillance on the employees and checking of inflation. It is the responsibility of the Government to take these steps to stop corruption. The Government should also try to ensure that the politicians in power do not endorse or associate themselves with corrupt activities.10 Lines on How to Eradicate Corruption Essay in English1. People of high authority are susceptible to corrupt activities.2. Bribery is the most commontype of corruption. 3. India has a high rate of corruption. 4. Politicians are often engaged in it.5. Strong legislation can curb fraud.6. Lack of ethics and morality is a cause of corruption.7. People are often discontented with the system and hence, resort to corruption.8. The Right to Information Act is a crucial one to stop corruption.9. Political Corruption is the worst. 10. Most of the financial frauds in the world are also from India.FAQ’s on How to Eradicate Corruption EssayQuestion 1.Can corruption be curbed?Answer:Yes, it is possible to curb corruption through vital measures.Question 2.Why does corruption take place?Answer:Corruption results from people’s growing discontentment with the available resources for which they become greedy.Question 3.Name Legislation on Corruption.Answer:The Right to Information Act is legislation that might help to curb corruption.Question 4.What is the essential thing required to have a corruption-free country?Answer:The essential thing required for a free corruption-free country is the necessary knowledge and awareness of moral and ethics.。

NBER WORKING PAPER 反腐运动对中国奢侈品进口的影响

The Impact of Xi Jinping’s Anti-CorruptionCampaign on Luxury Imports in China∗(Preliminary Draft)Nancy Qian†and Jaya Wen‡April2,2015AbstractThis paper investigates the eﬀects of a national anti-corruption pol-icy in China focused on reducing bribes and luxury consumption of gov-ernment oﬃcials.We document that it reduced the imports of luxurygoods that are easily observed by the public by approximately55%,194million2012USD,while having no eﬀect on goods that can be consumedaway from public view.Keywords:Corruption,Political Economy,DevelopmentJEL:P15,D73∗We thank Abhijit Banerjee,Ray Fisman and Mikhail Golosov and the economics faculty at Fudan University and SUFE for their insights.†Corresponding Author:nancy.qian@‡jaya.wen@1IntroductionIt is widely believed that corruption hinders growth(e.g.,Fisman and Svens-son2007;Mauro1995;Murphy,Shleifer and Vishny1993),and that the levels of bureaucratic corruption are higher in countries with non-democratic govern-ments because of weaker political competition and public pressure(La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,Shleifer and Vishny1999;Shleifer and Vishny1993)and when government revenues are high(e.g.,Brollo et al.2013).This can be par-ticularly problematic in transition economies where government oﬃcials have considerable discretion over determinants of economic activity,like privatiza-tion of state assets and access to licenses critical for entrepreneurial ventures (Shleifer1997).The main policy tool for combatting large-scale corruption is government policy.However,there is little evidence on the eﬀectiveness of such policies.1We address this important question by studying the eﬀectiveness of a na-tional anti-corruption campaign in China.China has been one of the world’s fastest growing economy for three decades as it transitioned from a planned to a market economy,and has all of the conditions for high corruption that we de-scribed earlier.Oﬃcial corruption in China is believed to be widespread,while enforcement is believed to be weak.2The odds of jail sentence for a corrupt oﬃcial is estimated to be less than three percent(Pei2007).3There is a con-1See the conclusion in the literature overview by?OlkenPande2012).2For example,the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection,the Communist Party’s anti-corruption group,found that106,000oﬃcials were guilty of corruption in2009(BBC (2010)),and the median bribe amount per case rose from$121,000in2000to$250,000in 2009(in constant2012U.S.Dollars).Pei(2007)estimated that the total direct costs of corruption in2007could total$86billion.3Prosecutions for corruption are uncommon,although there have been several prominent1sensus among academics and policymakers that corruption is one of China’s largest obstacles to continued economic growth,which has slowed down to 7.5in2015,the lowest pace since1990(e.g.,Oster,2014;Feldstein2012,Pei 2007).At the end of2013,Communist Party Secretary Xi Jinping introduced concrete measures for increasing the investigation of and the punishment for corruption.Relative to previous anti-corruption campaigns,this diﬀered in its focus on reducing corruption at all levels of government rather than focusing only on a few high-proﬁle cases of extreme corruption.This intensiﬁcation was viewed as a signiﬁcant policy shift and as the government making a concrete and long-run commitment against corruption.The number of investigations increased by around30%to182,000in just one year.The plan placed special emphasis on the types of corruption most likely to spark public protests,such as bribe-taking,waste and extravagance.This followed intense press coverage of government oﬃcials wearing expensive European luxury brands of items such as jewelry and clothing.4The success of the policy is unclear ex ante.On the one hand,unlike many countries with high corruption,China is know for its high state capacity.This makes the threats of investigation and punishment credible and facilitates the implementation of central government policies.On the other hand,detection and well-publicized cases.One prominent example is Bo Xilai,the ex-party chief of the city of Chongqing.He was charged for receiving over twenty million yuan in bribes and embezzling an additionalﬁve million yuan,and was sentenced to life in prison in September 2013(Reuters(2013)).Another example occurred in October2014.A retired commander of the People’s Liberation Army,Gen.Xu Caihou,confessed to taking bribes for favors and promotions(NYT(2014a)).4See Section2for a detailed background discussion.2is costly and it is diﬃcult for the government to conduct in-depth investiga-tions given that they are targeting such a large number of potentially corrupt oﬃcials.A modern proverb amongst government oﬃcials advises one to“eat quietly,take gently and play secretly”(Jacobs,2013).This suggest that oﬃ-cials may be able to evade detection by reducing only the most conspicuous corruption.The principal goal of this paper is to examine the eﬀectiveness of the in-tensiﬁcation of anti-corruption policies at the end of2013.Speciﬁcally,we examine whether the policy led to a diﬀerential reduction in conspicuous con-sumption.Given the limited availability of consumption data,we proxy for consumption with imports.We classify jewelry as conspicuous and other lux-ury goods known as common gifts given as bribes,but which can be consumed outside of the public eye as inconspicuous(e.g.,expensive foods and alcohol consumed at banquets,art,etc.).5To interpret the empirical results,we provide a simple conceptual frame-work,where anti-corruption policies are a tax on conspicuous consumption since they are more easily detected.The reform eﬀectively reduces income and the consumption of all goods.The relative tax increase on conspicuous goods also causes corrupt oﬃcials to substitute towards other forms of consump-tion.Thus,both the income and substitution eﬀect will reduce conspicuous consumption.The net eﬀects of the two forces on inconspicuous consump-tion is ambiguous.However,if inconspicuous consumption does not increase, 5Note that other goods such as high-end clothing and handbags are also conspicuous. Unfortunately,the categorization of the COMTRADE data are too crude for us to iden-tify high end times from other imports.See the Background and Data sections for more discussion.3then total corruption has most likely declined since inconspicuous consump-tion,especially inconspicuous luxury goods,are likely to be substitutes for conspicuous luxury goods.Our main empirical evidence is descriptive and similar to an event study, where we examine monthly import data before and after the intensiﬁcation of the anti-corruption campaign.Weﬁnd that the reform reduced the imports of jewelry.The reduction is immediate and persistent over time.In contrast, weﬁnd no change in total imports.To assess the magnitudes,we employ a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategy and estimate the diﬀerential decline of jew-elry imports after the policy change.The identiﬁcation assumes that the only change experienced by jewelry imports relative to other imports was the anti-corruption policy.We control for season eﬀects,commodityﬁxed eﬀects and yearﬁxed eﬀects.Weﬁnd that the reform reduced jewelry imports by ap-proximately55%,which is equivalent to a total reduction of approximately 194million2012USD over the seven months after the reform for which we have data.These results are consistent with the reform reducing conspicuous consumption and total corruption to the extent that jewelry and other imports are substitutes.There are two important caveats for interpreting these results as a reduc-tion in total corruption.First,all other imports include goods that are not substitutes for conspicuous consumption,such as industrial inputs.Second, like all studies of corruption,we cannot observe the entire consumption bas-ket,and in particular,the consumption of domestically produced goods.We address both of these concerns by separately examining the imports of incon-4spicuous luxury goods that are known to be common gifts for bribes.If one believes that these are substitutes for imported jewelry and as good or bet-ter substitutes for imported jewelry as domestically produced inconspicuous goods,thenﬁnding that the reform had no eﬀect on these imports would pro-vide stronger evidence that the reform reduced corruption.Indeed,weﬁnd no eﬀect on inconspicuous imports.We discuss other caveats in the paper after we present the results.Taken together,the results suggest that Xi’s commitment to root out cor-ruption has probably been eﬀective in reducing conspicuous consumption and total corruption.However,there is little eﬀect on less visible corruption and the reduction on total corruption is small in magnitude.For policymakers,our results provide a mixed message.On the one hand, the stark reduction in conspicuous imports is promising.On the other hand, the Chinese government has higher bureaucratic capacity and better ability to commit to investigations and punishments than most other governments of developing and transitional economies.That one of the most intense anti-corruption campaigns its ever undertaken has not spilled over to less conspic-uous forms of corruption is consistent with the concern that the detection of corruption is very diﬃcult.Our results contribute to the literature on corruption in developing coun-tries.Previous work has provided important evidence on how the level of cor-ruption can be inﬂuence by increased transparency and monitoring.6These 6Banerjee and Hanna(2012)conducts a randomized experiment andﬁnd that increas-ing information about candidate qualiﬁcation and past performance to voters reduces vote buying in Indian slums.Ferraz and Finan(2011)ﬁnd that politicians in Brazil who face re-election incentives steal less than those who do not.Olken(2007)shows that increased5studies typically focus on localized or regional interventions.We add to this literature by providing evidence from large scale national reform.In showing that imports can be used to detect corruption,our study also adds to the literature that measures corruption.7We also contribute to studies of corruption in China,which has only re-cently started to receive attention from researchers.For example,Fisman and Wei(2004)investigates tax evasion andﬁnd that the gap between reported exports from Hong Kong and reported imports from China is increasing in tariﬀrates.Fisman and Wang(2014)detects corruption in state asset sales auditing of road expenditure data reduces missing funds in Indonesia.Reinikka and Svens-son(2005)ﬁnd that the increase in information due to a newspaper campaign increased spending in schools and school enrollment in Uganda.Muralidharan et al.(2014)ﬁnds that the introduction of Smartcards reduces graft in Indias NREG program.Lewis-Faupel et al.(2014)ﬁnds that electronic procurement im-proves the quality,but has no eﬀect on the prices that governments pay for infrastructure development in India and Indonesia.Burgess et al.(2012)ﬁnds that in Indonesia,when revenues from oil increases,illegal loggin falls.Niehaus and Sukhtankar(2013)ﬁnd that an increase in the wages of daily workers reduced theft of piece rate jobs.Bai et al.(2013)ﬁnds that economic growth in Vietnam reduces corruption.Burgess et al.(2012)ﬁnd that as the number of bureucracies that can facilitate illegal loggin increases,loggin rates increase and prices decline.Olken and Barron(2009)ﬁnd that in Indonesia,the average price paid by trucks at road check is decreasing in the number of check points.7These have observed corruption by comparing changes in stock values of politically connected and unconnectedﬁrms(e.g.,Fisman2001,2006);comparing wages of public and private sector workers(Gorodnichenko and Peter,2007),by direct observation through audits(e.g.,Brollo et al.,2010;Ferraz and Finan,2008,2011),from expert surveys(e.g., Banerjee and Pande,2009),surveys of bribe payers(e.g.,Svensson,2003),direct observation (e.g.,Olken and Barron,2009;McMillan and Zoido,2004;Sequeira and Djankov,2010), by comparing government expenditure before and after corruption has presumably taken place(e.g.,Fisman and Wei,2004;Reinikka and Svensson,2004),by comparing the same measure of government provision from two diﬀerent surveys(e.g.,Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2010;Olken2006),and oﬃcial and market prices for oil(e.g.,Hsieh and Moretti,2006), and by examining whether public oﬃcials are more likely to beneﬁt from public transfers (e.g.Besley,2012;Niehaus et al.,2012;Olken,2007).Also,see Olken and Pande(2012)for an overview of the literature on measuring corruption and Zitzewitz(2012)for a review of the more general literature on detecting bad behavior.See Banerjee and Hanna(2012)for a framework for analyzing corruption of public bureaucrats.6by comparing prices of publicly traded assets to non-publicly traded assets. Fang et al.(2014)compares bureaucrat and non-bureaucrat purchasers of real estate andﬁnd that bureaucrats receive discounts in housing purchases and that the magnitude of the discount is increasing in the seniority of the oﬃ-cial.In examining luxury consumption,we are closely related to Fisman and Wei(2009),which examine the smuggling of art and cultural property from China.In examining import data,we add to Lan and Li(2013),which ex-amines political cycles in watch imports.Our results are consistent with the growing evidence that there is signiﬁcant corruption in China.We diﬀer from earlier studies in examining the eﬀectiveness of anti-corruption reforms,and in distinguishing between conspicuous and inconspicuous consumption.8 The paper is organized as follows.Section2discusses the background. Section3provides a simple model to illustrate how the anti-corruption reform could reduce the importation of luxury goods.Section4presents the event study.Section5presents the regression results.Section6concludes.2Background2.1Anti-CorruptionXi Jinping became the highest ranked leader,the Communist Party Secretary General,of China in ing to power in the aftermath of the internationally publicized Bo Xilai scandal,political analysts noted that 8Relative to Lan and Li(2013),which also uses COMTRADE data,our study diﬀers in that we examine a policy that explicitly targets corruption and we use monthly level instead of annual level data.The policy we examine has no eﬀect on watches.7Xi was politically obligated to take action against corruption(Buckley2014b).When Xi Jinping entered oﬃce,he announced several bans for bureau-crats and employees of state-ownedﬁnancial companies.These included the banning of extravagant house purchases(Reuters2012b),alcohol consump-tion at military functions(Reuters2012a),state-funded banquets for military oﬃcials(News2012)and radio and TV advertisements for luxury goods like watches and jewelry(Reuters2013).However,these announcements were not accompanied by any enforcement measures.Concrete actions for investigation and punishment were not taken until late 2013.We interpret two events as a critical intensiﬁcation of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption reform.On November15th,2013,the Third Plenum of the18th Communist Party of China(CPC)released a new manifesto,which introduced a host of social reforms and promised the Party would“root out corruption”(Denyer,2013).In his speech during the Third Plenum,Xi Jinping warned that the struggle to contain corruption would be diﬃcult,but the government “must not waver”(Blanchard and Li,2013).Over a month later,on December 25th,the CPC published aﬁve-year anti-graft plan(Blanchard and Li,2013, Xinhua,2013),in which it vowed to continue itsﬁght against corruption by implementing more investigations and greater punishments.The plan placed special emphasis on the types of corruption most likely to spark public protests, including bribe-taking,extravagance,and waste(Blanchard and Li,2013.Observers interpreted these two events as an intensiﬁcation of the anti-corruption drive,as well as a signal of the government’s long-term commitment to this area.A note released by Goldman Sachs in early2014stated that“the8anti-corruption language in the Third Plenum isﬁrmer and more comprehen-sive than previous comments from President Xi Jinping”and that“the recently released anti-corruptionﬁve-year plan adds more reform focus areas”(Shaﬀer, 2014).Ma Huaide,the vice president of China University of Political Science and Law,stated that theﬁve-year plan“showcases the Party’s resolution in combating corruption in the nextﬁve years”(Blanchard and Li,2013).And Deutsche Bank reported that“the impact of the government’s anti-corruption measures in2013[was]longer and bigger in scope than expected”(Dawson, 2014).Because these two events occurred in quick succession,We interpret the announcements in November and December of2013as a substantive intensiﬁcation of anti-corruption policies.Thus,our analysis will deﬁne the post reform period to be January2014and afterwards.Political analysts consider Xi’s anti-corruption drive to be“more far-reaching and lasting than any other”(Economist2014).According to Harvard Sinolo-gist and Political Scientist Anthony Saich,“This is the most ambitious anti-corruption campaign since at least Mao’s days”(Oster,2014).Previous eﬀorts have focused on isolated cases in which the target was one oﬃcial and close associates.For example,the well-publicized prosecution of Bo Xilai and his wife prior to Xi’s entry to oﬃce follows this pattern.In contrast,the new push by the General Secretary is characterized by a larger scope of investigation and a willingness to prosecute higher-level oﬃcials(Buckley2014b).Teams from the Communist Party’s Central Commission for Discipline In-spection have been sent on nation-wide audits are part of theﬁve-year plan against corruption(Oster,2014).The total number of corruption cases in-9creased signiﬁcantly to182,000,up by30%,under Xi(Economy2014).The large increase in the number of investigations is a mixed message with respect to the eﬀectiveness of the campaign.On the one hand,it is consistent with the view that Xi’s eﬀorts to root out corruption are sincere.On the other hand,the rapid increase and the sheer number of investigations can make it easy for corrupt oﬃcials to evade detection since it is impossible to conduct an in-depth and detailed investigation of each individual.Our analysis investigates this by examining whether the anti-corruption policy caused a relatively larger reduction in conspicuous corruption.2.2Luxury GoodsA major aspect of Chinese corruption is the exchange of favors for establishing personal ties;such favors frequently take the form of gifts and banquets.This practice is used to obtain privileged access to government services,ﬂatter im-mediate supervisors,maintain contractual relationships,and reinforce loyalty in protégées(Heidenheimer and Johnston2011).The giving and receiving of gifts to government oﬃcials has a long historical precedent(e.g.,Steidlmeier1999,Tatlow,2011,Asma,2014).Gifts are used to bribe politicians for future favors and to reward them for existing special treatment.Gifts are also frequently purchased with state money(Barboza, 2009),and are believed to comprise up to25percent of all luxury spending in China(Wen,2013).The practice takes place year-round but spikes during speciﬁc events,like the National People’s Congress,where Communist Party delegates who hope to establish special relationships with peers and superiors10will exchange(Barboza,2009).Precious metals and stones are frequently used as gifts.Gifts of gold often take the form of jewelry(Mukherji and Wang,2014).It has been observed that jewelry is“a favorite for people sending gifts to government oﬃcials”(Bar-boza,2009).The fact that jewelry is easily observed and hence conspicuous is important for our study.Other conspicuous gifts include expensive hand-bags,watches and clothing.However,because the data is too crude for us to measure these imports,we will not examine them as outcome variables.Other valuable items known to be given to oﬃcials as bribes are less observ-able.For example,artwork is another medium of Chinese corruption.Indeed, the use of art in“bribery of public oﬃcials is so widespread that the Chinese have coined a term to describe[it]...‘yahui’or‘elegant bribery”’(Barboza et al.,2013).After Wen Qiang,a former deputy police chief of Chongqing, was arrested for corruption,investigators found over one hundred works of art in his home,including ivory sculptures,a stone Buddha head,and valuable calligraphy scrolls(Barboza et al.,2013).Similarly,lavish banqueting,another well-known form of corruption among Chinese oﬃcials(Shaoting and Yunjie,2013,Spegele,2012,BBC,2012,is dif-ﬁcult for the public to observe since they mostly take place behind closed doors(Chow and Gu2014).In2012,it constituted eighty percent of food waste for all of China,which was estimated to have a value of$32billion U.S. dollars(Burkitt and Chin,2013).This totalﬁgure reﬂects both the extrava-gance of the banquets and the number of banquets given.A publicized and representative case is that of Wei Mingsheng,who,after promotion to a promi-11nent position in Shanxi province,“attended more than sixty farewell banquets, hosted by75work units,within51days”(Heidenheimer and Johnston2009). Banquets feature expensive seafood dishes like abalone,sharkﬁn,sea cucum-ber and imported beef steaks(Ge,2013,Carlson,2013)and imported alcohol such as wine and champagne(Reuters2012a).Based on interviews conducted by the authors,it is not uncommon for oﬃcials to host dinners which cost up to500,000RMB for ten people.In summary,the popularity of luxury European imports suggests that a reduction in corruption may be reﬂected by a reduction in the import of luxury goods.Moreover,the diﬀerence in observability between jewelry and other luxury goods such as art and banquets(i.e.,expensive foods)means that we can compare the imports of these two types of commodities to examine whether the anti-corruption policy had diﬀerential eﬀects according to the visibility of the consumption.Note that the luxury imports mentioned in the press correspond closely with the items banned by the government(e.g.,jewelry,alcohol,banquets). This is important for motivating our focus on these goods in the next section.Also note that the anecdotal evidence typically reports luxury items being given as bribes.It is also possible that bribes are given in the form of cash or kickbacks and conspicuous consumption reﬂects bureaucrats purchasing luxury imports.This does not aﬀect the interpretation of our analysis.123Conceptual FrameworkWe provide a simple model to help motivate and interpret the empirical anal-ysis.The goal of the model is to understand how to think about changes in total corruption in relation to changes in the imports of conspicuous and inconspicuous goods.Consider the general case below,where the bureaucrat maximizes his utility subject to a budget constraintmaxU(x,y,e)x,y,es.t.qx−we+y=0.x is non-conspicuous goods,y is conspicuous goods and e is eﬀort towards corruption.Let U be strictly concave,so that the maximum is unique.Let x∗,y∗,e∗be the optimal choices.q is the price of non-conspicuous goods and w is the wage of corrupt behavior(e.g.,bribe),the price of the conspicuous good,y,is normalized to1.Consider the introduction of the anti-corruption campaign.We assume that the probability of corruption being detected is p(y),where p is increasing in y.If the corruption is detected,the bureaucrat’s utility with punishment is U0,which we assume to be a small andﬁnite number.Now,the bureaucrat solves(1−p(y))U(x,y,e)+p(y)U0maxx,y,e13s.t.px−we+y=0.Let(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗)be the new equilibrium.Lemma1:y∗∗≤y∗with strict inequality if(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗)=(x∗,y∗,e∗).9At this level of generality,nothing can be said about behavior of x and e.Thereason is as follows.Since y decreases with corruption,holding everythingconstant,the bureaucrat will have higher income.Therefore,she would like toincrease both the consumption of x and consumption of leisure(i.e.,decreasee)due to the income eﬀect.On the other hand,the reduction of y mayeither increase or decrease the marginal utility of consuming x,depending onwhether x and y are substitutes or complements(the same comment appliesto leisure).This substitution eﬀect thus causes the net eﬀect of the reform tobe ambiguous.However,if consumption of x does not change,then we infer that eﬀort,i.e.,corruption,decreases.9Proof.Optimality impliesU(x∗,y∗,e∗)≥U(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗)(1−p(y∗∗))U(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗)+p(y∗∗)U0≥(1−p(y∗))U(x∗,y∗,e∗)+p(y∗)U0Therefore(1−p(y∗∗))U(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗)+p(y∗∗)U0≥(1−p(y∗))U(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗)+p(y∗)U0 p(y∗∗)[U0−U(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗)]≥p(y∗)[U0−U(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗)] (p(y∗)−p(y∗∗))[U(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗)−U0]≥0Since U0is low,[U(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗)−U0]>0and p(y∗)≥p(y∗∗).If(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗)= (x∗,y∗,e∗),then by the fact that there is a unique maximum,U(x∗,y∗,e∗)> U(x∗∗,y∗∗,e∗∗),and therefore all of the inequalities above become strict.14Lemma2:If x∗=x∗∗then e∗∗<e∗.10This model shows that an intensiﬁcation of anti-corruption policy will have in-come and substitution eﬀects.The reform acts as a tax on corruption,and thus reduces the income of the bureaucrat,which in turn reduces consumption of all goods.If conspicuous and inconspicuous goods are substitutes,then the sub-stitution eﬀect will further reduce the consumption of conspicuous goods and increase the consumption of inconspicuous goods.Thus,both forces reduces the consumption of conspicuous goods.Furthermore,we can infer the eﬀect of the policy on corruption from the consumption of inconspicuous goods.If it does not increase,then we know that the policy reduced corruption(assuming that the two types of goods are substitutes).Since we only observe imports and cannot observe the entire consumption bundle,inference about total corruption will depend on the relative substi-tutability of inconspicuous imports and conspicuous imports with respect to the substitutability of domestically produced goods and conspicuous imports. If inconspicuous goods are not less substitutable,then there will be no reason to think that the consumption of domestic goods respond to the reform when the consumption of inconspicuous goods does not.Thus,in that case,not observing and increase in inconspicuous imports will imply that the reform reduced corruption.The simple model provides two testable hypothesis.First,if it is easier to detect conspicuous consumption,then the intensiﬁcation of the anti-corruption campaign will reduce conspicuous imports.Second,if conspicuous and in-10Proof.Follows directly from the budget constraint.15conspicuous imports are substitutes,and inconspicuous imports are not less substitutable for conspicuous imports than domestically produced goods,then a reduction in corruption eﬀort will mean that the import of inconspicuous imports does not decline.4Descriptive EvidenceThe main evidence for our study is descriptive and similar to an event study. We will simply examine theﬂow of conspicuous and inconspicuous imports into China before and after the policy change at the end of2013.We use monthly COMTRADE data that are available at the monthly level. The main sample begins in January2011and ends in July2014,the last month for which there is complete data.We deﬁne the anti-corruption campaign to begin in January2014.Thus,we have36months of pre-reform data and six months of post reform data.The composition of importing countries change over time.Thus,we organized the data to a commodity-level panel.The main dependent variable is the value of imported goods.We deﬂate this so that it is measured in constant2012USD.Table1shows the mean import values for the categories that we examine,as well as for their subcate-gories.To test theﬁrst hypothesis,we plot the import of conspicuous goods over time.Our conspicuous good is four-digit COMTRADE category of jewelry,“Jewelry and parts,containing precious gems”.As we discussed earlier in Sec-tion2,jewelry is a common gift for bribing oﬃcials,oﬃcials can also purchase16。

What is corruption corrupting A philosophical viewpoint

What is corruption corrupting?A philosophical viewpointMichel DionFaculte´d’administration,Universite ´de Sherbrooke,Sherbrooke,Canada AbstractPurpose –The purpose of this paper is to see to what extent philosophers (from Plato to Rousseau)have described the phenomenon of corruption in a way that is relevant for corrupt practices in globalized markets.Design/methodology/approach –The paper analyzes ﬁve levels of corruption from a philosophical viewpoint:corruption of principles (“ontic/spiritual/axiological corruption”),corruption of moral behavior (“moral corruption”),corruption of people (“social corruption”),corruption of organizations (“institutional corruption”),and corruption of states (“national/societal/cultural corruption”).Findings –The paper ﬁnds that actual forms of corruption are basically grounded in prior phenomena of corruption,whether it is the corruption of principles,the corruption of moral behavior,the corruption of people,the corruption of organizations,or the corruption of states.In each case,philosophers have described the deep and broad effects of corruption.Their criticism is quite close to the way the social impact of corruption is presently circumscribed.Originality/value –The paper addresses the issue of corruption in a philosophical way,and then tends to enhance the social relevance of philosophical discourse when dealing with corrupt practices.Keywords Corruption,Philosophy,International marketingPaper type Conceptual paper IntroductionWaldman (1974)deﬁned corruption as including the following components:(1)a public ofﬁcial,(2)who misuses his authority,position,or power,and as a result,(3)violates some existing,legal norm in his or her particular country.The corrupt act is (4)usually done in secret and (5)is for personal gain in wealth or status or in preferment of family,friends,ethnic or religious groups.In collusive forms of corruption,(6)an outside party is involved (e.g.foreign businessmen).However,it is self-evident that the main agent of corruption is not always a public ofﬁcial.The phenomenon of corruption implies three possible combinations of actors:public (corrupt agent)-private (corrupting agent),private (corrupt)-private (corrupting),public (corrupt)-public (corrupting).That is why most of authors focus on the act of corruption itself rather than the agents who are involved in this phenomenon.Budima (2006,p.410)deﬁnes corruption simply as “a private gain at public expenses”.Okogbule (2006,p.102)mentioned that the public sector often creates the opportunities for public ofﬁcers to be involved in corrupt activities,so that we should never consider corruption only from the perspective of public ofﬁcials.Moreover,Okogbule (2006,p.94)said that most of deﬁnitions of corruption converge on one point:corruption is:[...]a device or strategy usually employed to sway people away from the right course of action,duty or conduct either in the performance of their ofﬁcial duties or in activities relating to economic or political matters.The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at/1368-5201.htmWhat is corruption corrupting?45Journal of Money Laundering Control Vol.13No.1,2010pp.45-54q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1368-5201DOI 10.1108/13685201011010209Although Okogkule (2006,p.95)recognized that corruption is a universal phenomenon,he analyzed the Nigerian situation as implying an amoral perspective towards any corrupt practice.Okogbule (2004,p.70)presented corruption as a social construct.In other words,the perception of corruption can vary over time and place.Corruption is always detrimental to the collective well-being,said Okogbule (2006,p.95).Magnouloux (2006,pp.41-55)explained that corruption has a lot of economicconsequences:.On the allocation of resources (in goods and services as well as in human capital)..On the economic environment,and then on the way economic decision makers will analyze different courses of action..Corruption could reduce the pace and extent of economic activities.Magnouloux believed that there is a negative correlation between the level of corruption and the level of economic growth..Corruption negatively affects the level of trust between people so that in the long term,it endangers the stability of social and political institutions.However,few authors described very precisely the phenomenon of corruption,while keeping an operational deﬁnition of corruption.Aguilera and Vadera (2008)have succeeded in providing a typology of corruption that reﬂects the complexity and the various levels of corrupt practices around the world.However,their deﬁnition of organizational corruption remains quite dependent on Weber’s notion of authority.Aguilera and Vadera (2008,pp.433-4)deﬁned “organizational corruption”as “the crime that is committed by the use of authority within organizations for personal gain”.Most of the time,organizational corruption is committed for personal gain,they believed.But there could be some cases where the corruption is committed also for the beneﬁt of the organization itself.Aguilera and Vadera (2008)presented three types of organizational corruption:(1)Procedural corruption:[...]when employees at all or some levels of the organization do not follow or are not mandated to follow (ethical)procedures of business conduct,the corrupt outcome is deﬁned as procedural corruption (p.441).(2)Schematic corruption:[...]if the organizational environment requires frequent bribery and pay-offs to politicians and bureaucrats for conducting daily business,corruption will become part of the modus operandi (p.442).(3)Categorical corruption:[...]suppose there is a large multinational corporation consisting of several subsidiaries that are highly diversiﬁed geographically.In the case of subsidiaries located in countries with an expectation that unethical or corrupt means will be used to survive,corruption is likely to be concentrated in only those particular subsidiaries.Therefore,one observes concentrated or categorical acts of corruption in such multinational corporations (p.443).Now,the philosophical viewpoint on corruption is rarely addressed,although there are many clear connections between the perspectives of some philosophers overJMLC 13,146corruption,on one hand,and the way we deﬁne corruption at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century,on the other hand.Zekos(2004)discussed many aspects of corruption in the context of globalization.We could gather those components of corruption in the following manner:.Corruption of principles.According to Zekos(2004,p.644),only the harmonization of ethical principles in business could contribute to stop the use of corruption methods.In other words,the corruption of principles could only be annihilated through the introduction of universal ethical principles..Corruption of moral behavior.Zekos(2004,p.641)mentioned the ethical dilemma business corporations have to deal with:either,business leaders as well as their employees are choosing the most proﬁtable course of action,although it implies unethical behavior,or they conform themselves to their personal and organizational ethical norms.In both cases,there is a high risk that their choice could“drive their company out of business”.In theﬁrst case,because of the legal pursuits against the company;in the second case,because of the loss of its competitiveness on the globalized markets..Corruption of people.Zekos(2004,p.644)said that small-scale corruption will be very difﬁcult to stop..Corruption of organizations.Zekos(2004,p.639)said that in business corporations,corruption creates more uncertainties about the expected level of proﬁts,so that business leaders tend to undertake“loss-avoiding behaviours”which are either expensive,or inefﬁcient,or both.Indeed,as rightly said Zekos (2004),corruption reduces competitiveness.Only those competitors who can pay large bribes can actually compete.The other potential competitors are automatically excluded from the market.Corruption is an anti-trust behaviour.Zekos(2004,p.641)added that corruption erodes public conﬁdence in the market.Theﬁnal effect is that people no longer trust business leaders and, progressively,any other representative of social authority..Corruption of states.According to Zekos(2004,pp.639-41),in corrupt societies, government bureaucrats are only focusing on their growing economic power,so that their competence is no longer developed as it should be.He deﬁned “transnational corruption”as the bribery of government ofﬁcials by foreign businesses.He said that such corruption makes national economies less efﬁcient.People are thus no longer trusting their political leaders and public servants. In this paper,we will analyze thoseﬁve levels of corruption(corruption of principles, corruption of moral behavior,corruption of people,corruption of organizations,corruption of states)from a philosophical viewpoint.Thoseﬁve levels of corruption constitute what we call the“architecture of corruption”.We will see to what extent philosophers from Plato to Rousseau have discussed the issue of corruption out of various perspectives.We will observe that many of their opinions about corruption are now reﬂected in the way we perceive the phenomenon of corruption in the globalized markets.Corruption of principles(“ontic/spiritual/axiological corruption”)The corruption of principles is expressed through a corruption of soul,a corruption of human nature,or a corruption of political principles.What is corruption corrupting?47First,the corruption of soul (“ontic corruption”).In his 114th Letter to Lucilius,Seneca (1954,pp.225-39)talked about the corruption of language throughout history.Sometimes,the language used during a given era is reproducing the collective and historical moral rules and values which were enhanced in those years.Corruption of “ways of life”is sometimes very well accepted in the society,particularly among the wealthiest.Seneca then criticized the way rich people welcome various human vices as different forms ofblessing.Seneca added that wrong ways of life (modes of living as modes of being)will be disastrous for a given soul which is not in a state of equilibrium.In other words,a weak soul will be much more hurt by wrong ways of life than a strong spirit.Seneca believed that we should focus our attention on our soul rather than our way of life.Healing our soul will make possible for us to get rid of wrong ways of life.Healing our soul implies to conform ourselves to basic virtues and thus to get rid of any vice we could have.Second,the corruption of human nature (“spiritual corruption”).Plato (1967,p.342)said that evil is what corrupts and destroys,while good is what beneﬁts and preserves.Aristotle (1943,pp.58-9)used the term “corruption”when he discussed a given state of things or bodies.In “corrupted natures”,he said,it seems that the body is often ruling over the soul.According to Aristotle,it is possible because such beings are put in an evil and because there are unnatural conditions.Aristotle (1951,pp.35-6)said that generation is a corruption of non-being,while corruption is a generation of non-being.A given thing is corrupted when it is transformed in non-being.The term “corruption”is then used in order to explain change in living and sensitive beings.Corruption is only possible for beings which could “not-to-be”.Generation,as well as corruption,is only available to those beings which are able to be and not to be (Aristotle,1951,p.135).According to Augustine (1964,p.134),what is subjected to corruption can never be good.Only God is incorruptible:Every nature that can become less good is good,and every nature becomes less good when it is corrupted.For either corruption does it no harm,in which case it is not being corrupted,or else it is indeed corrupted,in which case the corruption does in fact harm it.And if corruption harms it,it diminishes its goodness to some extent and thus makes it less good.If corruption leaves it bereft of any good at all,then whatever is left cannot be corrupted.For corruption can inﬂict no further harm,since there is no goodness left for it to take away.But if corruption cannot harm a nature,that nature cannot be corrupted,and if a nature cannot be corrupted,it is incorruptible.This leads to the absurd conclusion that a nature becomes incorruptible by undergoing corruption.Therefore,we must say that every nature is good insofar as it is a nature.For every nature is either corruptible or incorruptible.If it is an incorruptible nature,it is better than a corruptible nature;and if it is a corruptible nature,it is undoubtedly good,since corruption makes it less good.Therefore,every nature is good (Augustine,1993,p.96).Pascal (1962,p.221)said that the nature of human beings is corrupted from God,because of the Fall.Fall is then symbolizing that human being has lost God’s presence.Owing to the Fall,human beings have a corrupted nature,that is,an imperfect nature which is the direct consequence of God’s absence.Fall then represents the universal corruption of humanity (Pascal,1962,p.324).Third,the corruption of political principles (“axiological corruption”).According to Montesquieu (1970,pp.116-117),when the principles are corrupted,honour is lost.Even the moral quality of citizens is decreasing,so that the political system is entering into a phase of progressive self-destruction.Most of the time,the corruption of a given state was preceded by the corruption of political principles.Those principles areJMLC 13,148presented as principles of government.Indeed,they reﬂected basic values such as equality,mutual respect,and social justice.That is why we could call that phenomenon the“axiological corruption”:.The principle of democracy.Such principle is corrupted when we loss the spirit of equality between all human beings,but also when followers claim the same privileges that their leaders actually hold..The principle of aristocracy.It is corrupted when the power of nobility becomes arbitrary..The principle of monarchy.It is corrupted when monarchs loose the respect of their people,or when they become much less concerned by social justice than by their own political power.The principle of monarchy is also corrupted when people no longer feel their imputability towards their nation(loss of patriotism)..The principle of a despotic government.That principle is continuously corrupted since it is corrupted by its own nature.According to Montesquieu,when the principles of government are corrupted,even the best laws become the worst ones.Such laws are negating the integrity of the state,so that the state itself is subjected to corruption(Montesquieu,1970,pp.133-48).Finally,the corruption of principles,as it is expressed through a corruption of the soul, a corruption of human nature,or a corruption of political principles.It remains the basis for any further corrupt behavior,whether it is in business or in public administration.The origin of any act of corruption is the fact that some basic principles have become corrupt.Corruption of moral behavior(“moral corruption”)Moral corruption includes the corruption of practices and customs.The corruption of morality is basically due to the corruption of the reason and the perversion of the heart. It is also expressed in the various forms of perverted government.The corruption of the reason creates unethical parameters,so that any unethical behavior is then perceived as quite normal or unavoidable.Pascal(1962,p.280)made a basic link between the corruption of the reason and various unethical behaviors. Such illicit conducts actually follow from the corruption of the reason.Aristotle applied the notion of perversion to human passions.He then described the“perversion of the heart”.Aristotle(1943,p.160)used the term in order to reveal the situation where we are the slave of our own emotions or passions,such as angry,hatred or jealousy. In such situation,said Aristotle,our judgment becomes“perverted”.Aristotle(1943, p.163)argued that passion actually perverts the mind of rulers,although they were the best of men.Spinoza(1954,pp.302-330),as well as Aristotle,was focusing on a“free human being”,that is,a human being who is not the slave of any of his/her passions.Plato(1967,p.317)rightly asked the following question:[...]can it proﬁt a man to take money unjustly,if he is thereby ensalving the best part of his nature to the vilest?No amount of money could make it worth his while to sell a son or daughter as slaves into the hands of cruel and evil men;and when it is a matter of ruthlessly subjugating all that is most godlike in himself to whatsoever is most ungodly and despictable,is not the wretch taking a bribe far more disastrous than the necklace Eriphyle took as the price of her husband’s life?What is corruption corrupting?49From the corruption of the reason and the perversion of the heart follows the corruption of morality.Rousseau (1977,p.15)said that belief in God actually makes society more peaceful and morals less corrupted.Moreover,he suggested that the progress of arts and sciences had corrupted social and personal morality (Rousseau,1977,p.24).Machiavelli (1985,p.119)believed that even well educated persons could be corrupted and could practice different forms of vice.Finally,when morality is corrupt,government is perverted.Aristotle (1943,pp.138-9)used the term “perversion”to reﬂect given forms of government in which community is no longer a society of free persons.Those forms of government which are focusing on the interests of the ruler and/or his friends and relatives (or any other speciﬁc social group)are perverted forms of government.Aristotle called them “despotic forms of government”.Perverted forms of government have unjust laws,he said (Aristotle,1943,p.149).Corruption of people (“social corruption”)The corruption of people is manifested in a threefold manner:either through crimes,or through greed,or even through the “love of power”.First,the arising of criminal conducts.Plato (1967,p.46)said that the highest form of injustice is actualized “when we seem just while we are not”.There should never be any case where someone has apparently pure or virtuous reputation,while committing the worst crimes.When most of people are law-abiding in a given country,there could be a small number of people who commit low-scale crimes,such as thieves,pickpockets and kidnappers.Such crimes,said Plato (1967,p.300),are not a very important matter until the number of criminals remains quite low.As soon as their number is growing,even small-scale crimes become a deep social concern,believed Plato.Aristotle (1943,p.143)strongly asserted that any state is established in order to prevent crimes and to favour social and economic exchanges.He said that rich people own many goods and advantages,so that they have high propensity to protect them by all means,including crimes (Aristotle,1943,p.185).A good ruler is incorruptible,said Aristotle (1943,p.161).According to Montesquieu (1970,p.120),crimes destroy all virtues.However,when some individuals do not have an exemplary conduct,or when they neglect to accomplish their duties,or undertake some illicit actions,they actually represent “seeds of corruption”,so that virtues are continuously destroyed by their actions.Montesquieu seem to share Augustine’s (1993,p.68)viewpoint according to which virtues dwell incorruptibly in the common truth and wisdom.Hegel (1940,p.131)said that a crime is the ﬁrst constraint exerted as violence by a free being who concretely hurts the existence of freedom.It is then a violation of law (Hegel,1940,p.135).Some actions are morally and universally wrong,so that those who undertake them actually know (or must know)that what they are doing is morally wrong and universally considered as illicit.Such actions are indeed violating inner principles or external conducts of piety or justice (Hegel,1940,p.180).Second,greed.Rousseau believed that luxury corrupts both rich and poor:rich are corrupted by possession,while the poor are corrupted by covetousness (Rousseau,1977,p.217).Very often in Asian countries,bribery is linked to a “gift-giving ethos”,so that bribery is not really perceived as a wrong,unethical behavior.Bribes are then no longer a phenomenon of corruption,but rather the way friendship and social harmony are developed.According to Tian (2008,p.443),it is particularly the case in China:JMLC 13,150The lines between gifts and bribes are often blurred.It has been argued that gift giving is not to blame because it is only part of a big picture of Guanxi[“belonging to a network of relationships”]in China.In Chinese culture,gift giving is a natural dynamic of any relationship:it shows that a relationship is valued and is a means of expressing respect and honor for the other person.Chinese are very socially and situationally dependent and this may result in their special way of gift giving.As social principle,reciprocity consists of permanent relations of interdependence between persons,families,and clans.These relationships are binding and[if formed between families or clans]potentially eternal.Reciprocity is often described in terms of gift giving,and reciprocal relationships are ideally friendships comprised of exchanges of gifts and favors.This is mainly because Chinese consider that it follows that principle of Li,i.e.Confucian ritual action.Montesquieu(1970,p.51)said that people could be corrupted when they are too strongly attached to money and material goods.They are then no longer deeply involved in their business or profession.They have even very few social or political concerns.Money has become the origin of their meaning of life.Finally,social corruption can be observed in the way people focused on the power they actually hold.Strauss(1954,p.148)believed that the exercise of power actually corrupt some individuals,while it can improve the personality of some others. According to Rousseau(1977,p.26),the problem is that power is on one side,and knowledge/understanding on the other.In other words,princes(political authorities) hold power and do not deepen their knowledge and understanding of reality.Learned people do not have any political or social power.As long as that situation remains the same,people will continue to be“mean,corrupt and miserable”,he said.The problem is that in the long-run,the corruption of people will progressively extend to the government(Rousseau,1977,p.128).Corruption of organizations(“institutional corruption”)When people are corrupted,even the best social institutions can no longer be socially useful,said Machiavelli(1985,p.78).Bentham(1962)was quite prophetic when he talked about the minimum wages public servants should receive,given that they are submitted to various temptations of corruption.In many developing countries,we face that problem for more than50years now:In employments which expose the public functionary to peculiar temptations,the emoluments ought to be sufﬁcient to preserve him from corruption.Setting aside all considerations of the happiness of the individual,the interest of the public requires,that in all employments which afford the means of illicit gain,the individuals employed should be placed above want.If this important consideration be neglected,we ought not to be surprised that men urged on by perpetually recurring wants should abuse the powers they possess.Under such circumstances,if they are found guilty of extortion or peculation,they are less deserving of blame than government which has spread the snare into which it was scarcely possible that their probity should not fall.Placed between the necessity of providing the means of subsistence,and the impossibility of providing them honestly,they will naturally be led to regard peculation and extortion as a lawful supplement,tacitly authorized by the government(p.244).A salary proportionate to the wants of the functionary operates as a kind of moral antiseptic,or preservative.It fortiﬁes a man’s probity against the inﬂuence of sinister and seductive motives.The fear of losing it will in general be more than equivalent to the ordinary temptations held out by illicit gains(p.245).What is corruption corrupting?51A greater or less portion of this antiseptic must be employed,in proportion as there exists agreater or less proclivity towards corruption (p.245).Corruption of states (“national/societal/cultural corruption”)According to Machiavelli (1985,p.66),every ruler must keep religion,particularly religious rituals and ceremonies,as “pure”as possible.They must safeguard suchtraditions if they want to be free of any corruption.When a state is basically corrupted,rulers can no longer exert their own political freedom.No law can stop a universal corruption,since laws require the respect of basic moral rules and norms.And those rules and norms also require laws to be reinforced.So,if corruption has become a universal phenomenon,then social morality is implicitly justifying ws cannot stop corruption when social morality is universally justifying such phenomenon (Machiavelli,1985,p.78).When there is no honesty,we cannot expect any good to be actualized.Then,we should never expect any right action from corrupted states (Machiavelli,1985,p.138).In some states,corruption has made easier for any radical/extremist group to annihilate any freedom in the state and to set up a true tyranny (Machiavelli,1985,p.275).In such states,when corruption cannot be stopped by laws,Machiavelli recommended monarchy.Only a powerful King could exert an absolute power and then get rid of a corrupted nobility (Machiavelli,1985,p.140).We should remember Montesquieu (1970,p.61):when laws are not applied,the whole political system becomes corrupted,so that the state itself is lost.In that context,it is thus important to observe that political will and commitment constitute the ﬁnal cause of any real social change.According to McCormick and Paterson (2006,p.191),the most important factor in any strategy against public corruption,at least when development and commercial banks are concerned,remains the political will and commitment.The authors are wondering about the real will of governments,IFIs and commercial banks,ﬁrst to publicly recognize the scope of public corruption and money laundering and,second,to take collection action in order to reduce all kinds of damages following from that phenomenon.They particularly referred to reputational damages.ConclusionAccording to Okogbule (2004,p.74),the following phenomena are correlated to corruption:poverty,unemployment,greed,institutional weakness,inefﬁcient and ineffective law enforcement,disrespect for the rule of law,lack or moral standards and codes.They are symptoms rather than causes of corruption.The real causes of corruption are grounded in socio-cultural practices as well as political and economic systems,said Okogbule.According to Okogbule (2004,p.84),the most important cause of corruption is the lack of political will to deal with corruption.The author looked at corruption as being a basic threat to the stability of societies and to the maintenance of the rule of law.Okogbule said that corruption actually reduces economic development in the long-run.But we should also remember that actual forms of corruption are basically grounded in prior phenomena of corruption,whether it is the corruption of principles,the corruption of moral behavior,the corruption of people,the corruption of organizations,or the corruption of states.In each case,philosophers have described the deep and broad effects of corruption.Their criticism is quite close to the way we presently circumscribe the social impact of corruption.We could then draw twoJMLC 13,152。

THE NORMALIZATION OF CORRUPTION IN ORGANIZATIONS

THE NORMALIZATION OF CORRUPTION IN ORGANIZATIONS Blake E.Ashforth and Vikas AnandABSTRACTOrganizational corruption imposes a steep cost on society,easily dwarﬁng that of street crime.We examine how corruption becomes normalized,that is, embedded in the organization such that it is more or less taken for granted and perpetuated.We argue that three mutually reinforcing processes underlie normalization:(1)institutionalization,where an initial corrupt decision or act becomes embedded in structures and processes and thereby routinized;(2) rationalization,where self-serving ideologies develop to justify and perhaps even valorize corruption;and(3)socialization,where na¨ıve newcomers are induced to view corruption as permissible if not desirable.The model helps ex-plain how otherwise morally upright individuals can routinely engage in cor-ruption without experiencing conﬂict,how corruption can persist despite the turnover of its initial practitioners,how seemingly rational organizations can engage in suicidal corruption and how an emphasis on the individual as evil-doer misses the point that systems and individuals are mutually reinforcing.I will never believe I have done anything criminally wrong.I did what is business.If I bentany rules,who doesn’t?If you are going to punish me,sweep away the system.If I am guilty, there are many others who should be by my side in the dock(on trial).–an architect,convicted of corrupt practices(Chibnall&Saunders,1977,p.142). Research in Organizational BehaviorResearch in Organizational Behavior,Volume25,1–52Copyright©2003by Elsevier Ltd.All rights of reproduction in any form reservedISSN:0191-3085/doi:10.1016/S0191-3085(03)25001-212BLAKE E.ASHFORTH AND VIKAS ANANDINTRODUCTIONWhat comes to mind when you think about criminals and crime?Odds are that you picture a burglar breaking into a home,a pusher dealing drugs,or some related image.Odds are,in short,that you picture a lone individual engaged in street crime(Collins,1998;Ermann&Lundman,1996).In fact,Clinard(1979, p.16)concluded that“Far more persons are killed through corporate criminal activities than by individual criminal homicides,”and the U.S.Department of Justice estimates that the economic costs of corporate crime are seven to25 times greater than that of street crime(Donziger,1996).As Darley(1996,p.13) argues,“the typical evil action is inﬂicted...by individuals acting within an organizational context”rather than by“evil actors carrying out solitary actions.”Moreover,Edwin Sutherland(1949),who coined the term white collar crime and pioneered early research,argued that corporate misdeeds tear the social fabric more so than street crime because they corrode trust in authorities and institutions. An even more troubling trend in white-collar crime is that these crimes appear increasingly to be perpetrated through the actions of numerous employees in the organization as opposed to being the actions of a single misguided individual.A glance at today’s headlines illustrates the point.Enron’s senior executives are accused of hiding the company’s precariousﬁnancial position while cashing out their stocks and shredding incriminating documents(Eichenwald&Henriques, 2002),U.S.Catholic Church ofﬁcials admit that several key administrators systematically covered up the predatory behaviors of pedophile priests(Miller &France,2002)and Merrill Lynch agreed to pay the State of New York$100 million to settle accusations that its employees gave its investors misleading and over-optimistic research reports about the stock of its investment banking clients (Gasparino&Smith,2002).In this paper,we develop a model that explains how corruption becomes normalized in an organization.We deﬁne corrupt acts as the misuse of authority for personal,subunit and/or organizational gain(cf.Sherman,1980).Because we will argue that corruption often becomes institutionalized in organizations,it is important to note that“misuse”refers to societal norms.We focus on relatively severe or“morally intense”(Jones,1991)forms of corruption(e.g.self-dealing versus sleeping on the job)because these are more difﬁcult to normalize.We in-clude corruption on behalf of the organization(e.g.price-ﬁxing,bribing outsiders to win contracts)and against the organization(e.g.theft,nepotism)(Coleman, 1987),often referred to as corporate/organizational crime and occupational crime, respectively(Clinard&Quinney,1973).Our model examines collective corruption(Brief,Buttram&Dukerich,2001)–acts that require cooperation among two or more individuals.Our analysis isThe Normalization of Corruption in Organizations3 conﬁned to the group level(throughout the paper,we use the term group to refer to a collective,such as a workgroup,department,or organization):we do not examine individual differences in susceptibility to corruption.Further,we focus largely on groups that are housed within an organization rather than distributed across organizations(as in,for example,bid rigging).Additionally,our interest is not in the antecedents of corrupt acts–the primary focus of much previous research(e.g.Baucus,1994;Brass,Butterﬁeld&Skaggs,1998)–but in how such acts become normalized,that is,become embedded in organizational structures and processes,internalized by organizational members as permissible and even desirable behavior,and passed on to successive generations of members(cf.Brief et al.,2001;Zucker,1977).We propose that there are three pillars that contribute to the normalization of corruption in an organization:(1)institutionalization,the process by which corrupt practices are enacted as a matter of routine,often without conscious thought about their propriety;(2)rationalization,the process by which individuals who engage in corrupt acts use socially constructed accounts to legitimate the acts in their own eyes;and(3)socialization,the process by which newcomers are taught to perform and accept the corrupt practices.As shown in Fig.1,the three pillars are mutually reinforcing and reciprocally interdependent;once established in an organization,the pillars create a situation where corruption is practiced collectively by employees and may endure indeﬁnitely.Our analysis suggests an answer to the intriguing question of how a person who is a loving parent,thoughtful neighbor and devout churchgoer is able to engage in workplace corruption.Theﬁrst three sections of the paper describe each of the pillars in detail.The fourth section focuses brieﬂy on how institutionalization,rationalization and socialization interact to cement normalization.Finally,we discuss the implications of our model for research and practice.Fig.1.The Three Pillars of Normalization.4BLAKE E.ASHFORTH AND VIKAS ANAND INSTITUTIONALIZING CORRUPTION In1996,the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission(EEOC)charged Mitsubishi Motors in the U.S.with creating conditions that led to over700women being sexually harassed over a period of several years.According to the EEOC charge,the women had been subjected to groping,sexual grafﬁti,abusive comments and having lewd photos pasted on their cars.The EEOC further charged that the harassment resulted from the tacit and explicit acts of numerous individuals at all levels in the organization.Additional investigations revealed that the United Auto Workers(UAW),an external agency that could and should have intervened,did not take strong action in response to the repeated complaints that it received from female workers.Further,Mitsubishi’s policies required that before any employee ﬁled a complaint,she needed to engage in a lengthy procedure to settle the complaint with the accused individuals;a process that many of the aggrieved employees chose not to go through.Mitsubishi responded to these accusations by strongly refuting the EEOC allegations.They paid3,000workers a day’s wages to facilitate them picketing the EEOC ofﬁces and set up phone lines on the shopﬂoor to enable workers to call legislators to protest the EEOC’s actions.These responses further alienated public opinion and Mitsubishiﬁnally settled the case for$34 million,making this the largest settlement in the legal history of sexual discrimination.This sum was in addition to the private settlements that were paid to individual employees who had sued the company(Elstrom&Updike,1996;Miller,1998;Sharpe,1996;Weimer&Thornton, 1997).Institutionalized organizational behaviors have been deﬁned as stable,repetitive and enduring activities that are enacted by multiple organization members with-out signiﬁcant thought about the propriety,utility,or nature of the behavior(cf. Greenwood&Hinings,1988;Oliver,1992;Zucker,1977,1988).In institution-alized corruption,the impetus for and apparatus of corruption are external to any one person:corruption is a property of the collective.As the Mitsubishi case illus-trates,institutionalized corrupt behaviors can pervade multiple subunits and levels in an organization.They can become an integral part of day-to-day activities to such an extent that individuals may be unable to see the inappropriateness of their behaviors.Gross(1978,p.56)argues that“all organizations are inherently criminogenic”–that is,prone to criminality(or at least corruption)–although not inevitably criminal.We view collective corruption as a slippery slope where initial,idiosyn-cratic corrupt practices become institutionalized over time.As shown in Fig.2, the institutionalization process appears to consist of three major phases:(1)the initial decision or act;(2)embedding corruption in structures and processes; and(3)routinizing corruption.It should be noted,however,that it is far from inevitable that idiosyncratic corruption will slide into collective corruption:later, under“Implications for Research and Practice,”we brieﬂy consider means of reversing normalization.The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations5Fig.2.Institutionalizing Corruption.Phase1:The Initial Decision or ActMuch of the literature on organizational corruption has focused on the genesis of corruption(e.g.Baucus,1994;Brass et al.,1998;Cohen,1995;Coleman,1998; Finney&Lesieur,1982;Geis&Salinger,1998;Poveda,1994;Shover&Bryant, 1993;Szwajkowski,1985;Yeager,1986);thus,we will keep our overview brief. This literature argues that the motivation and opportunity to engage in corruption are the product of various environmental(e.g.strong competition,lax legal and regulatory enforcement),organizational(e.g.poor performance,structural complexity)and,to a far lesser extent,personal factors(e.g.cognitive moral development,fear of failing).An implicit assumption seems to be that corruption is usually the product of strong situations that override individual differences or that ordinary people populate the ranks of the corrupt;indeed,Coleman(1998, p.178)states that“Almost all the studies have agreed on one point:White-collar offenders are psychologically‘normal.’”In particular,many scholars have linked corruption to a permissive ethical cli-mate at the societal,industry,or organizational levels.Major organizational goals are often tied to resource procurement andﬁnancial success and a constellation of values extolled in business is conducive to an amoral and even immoral pursuit of those goals:free enterprise(minimal regulation),individualism,competitive achievement,proﬁtability,efﬁciency,pragmatism and so on(e.g.Jackall,1988; Mills,1956).Brief et al.(2001)argue that belief in the sanctity of the corporation6BLAKE E.ASHFORTH AND VIKAS ANAND is so strong that managers tend to believe that by serving the corporation’s interests they are also serving the public’s interests:what’s good for Microsoft is good for the country.Thus,ethical issues often are not perceived or are subordinated to or reframed as economic,legal,public relations,or other kinds of“business”issues, leaving managers free to engage in amoral reasoning(Jones&Ryan,1998).For example,Brenner and Molander(1977,p.62)surveyed Harvard Business Re-view(HBR)readers and found that nearly half agreed that“the American business executive tends not to apply the great ethical laws immediately to work.He is preoccupied chieﬂy with gain.”According to the rational choice perspective in criminology(Cornish&Clarke, 1986),individuals are thought to engage in“an assessment,however crude or incomplete,of options and the potential risks and payoffs of each”(Shover& Bryant,1993,p.153),along with the skills,planning,time needed and so on. Given a permissive ethical climate,an emphasis onﬁnancial goals(with com-mensurate rewards for success),and an opportunity to act amorally or immorally, the ends may soon come to justify the means,leading to a decision to engage in corruption.Further,the leniency and low frequency of formal sanctioning by governments and professional associations often makes corruption economically rational(Braithwaite,1989;Leaf,2002):it appears that crime often does pay. Finally,as we argue later under“Rationalizing Corruption,”groups often provide self-serving accounts to neutralize the countervailing force of morals and ethics. To be sure,there are other routes to corruption besides amoral and immoral calculation,including principled disagreement with public policy and laws, managerial incompetence,and the unintended consequences of myriad actors and actions ricocheting within complex systems and contexts.However,we believe, following Vaughan(1992)and others,that amoral or immoral calculation is the most common route–in part because such a calculation is often necessary for a given act of corruption to continue and become institutionalized,regardless of its genesis.LeadershipLeadership plays a potentially huge role in the institutionalization process.Leaders not only control many of the levers of institutionalization,but are very potent role models for organizational members.Baumhart(1961)and Brenner and Molander (1977)asked HBR readers to rankﬁve factors according to their inﬂuence on unethical decisions(the1977survey included a sixth factor,“society’s moral climate,”which rankedﬁfth).In both surveys,the“behavior of superiors”was ranked as the most inﬂuential factor,followed by a cluster of factors–“formal policy or lack thereof,”“industry ethical climate,”and“behavior of one’s equals in the company”;tellingly,“one’s personalﬁnancial needs”came last.The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations7 Leaders do not have to actually engage in corruption to serve as role models: rewarding,condoning,ignoring,or otherwise facilitating corruption–whether intentionally or not,or explicitly or not–often sends a clear signal to employees (Baucus,1994;Ermann&Lundman,1996).Brief et al.(2001)argue that an emphasis on ends rather than means,supported by high standards and strong rewards(punishments)for attaining(not attaining)them,creates a permissive ethical climate.For example,Sims and Brinkmann(2002)discuss the role of CEO John Gutfreund in helping to foster an unethical climate at Salomon Brothers. Gutfreund focused on and rewarded short-term results,modeled aggressive and Machiavellian behavior,failed to punish employees who broke laws in the pursuit of those results,lied about and covered up ethical and legal lapses, promoted like-minded employees,andﬁred others capriciously,encouraging conformity.In addition to serving as role models,leaders–as the legitimate agents of the organization–authorize corruption(Kelman,1973;cf.displacement of responsibility,Bandura,1999;sanctioning,Brief et al.,2001).As with role modeling,authorizing need not be formal and explicit:a manager who informally encourages or tacitly condones corruption can also be said to be authorizing it.The subordinate,as a designated role occupant,is expected to execute the authorized acts,not to second-guess them:the normative duty to obey is expected to trump personal preferences,particularly in rigidly hierarchical organizations(Hamilton &Sanders,1992).As illustrated by Milgram’s(1974)obedience experiments,the reﬂexive impulse to obey authorityﬁgures–the“habit of obedience”(Hamilton& Sanders,1992,p.72)–is so strong and pervasive that most people have a difﬁcult time actively defying orders they do not condone.In any event,because the individuals who perform the corrupt acts“are not the actual agent of their actions, they are spared self-condemning reactions”(Bandura,1999,p.196).Further,the relative powerlessness often associated with subordination may induce individuals to abdicate responsibility for moral issues:“‘Let the people making the high salaries tackle the difﬁcult ethical decisions’seems to be a widely held view among occupants of lower echelon corporate positions”(Jones&Ryan,1998,p.440). Twoﬁnal notes regarding leadership and corruption are in order.First,the situ-ational power of ofﬁce may be complemented(or even supplanted)by the personal power of charisma.The more charismatic the authorityﬁgure(s),the greater the identiﬁcation,trust and reﬂexive obedience that he or she is likely to engender among subordinates(Conger&Kanungo,1998).Charisma speaks to a quality of the person,not the mission,and a charismatic leader can use the allegiance of others for benign ends or corrupt ends(Howell,1988).The cult of personality that arose around Michael Milken enabled him to assemble a force of like-minded disciples at Drexel Burnham Lambert(Stone,1990).8BLAKE E.ASHFORTH AND VIKAS ANANDSecond,organizational structures and processes are often contrived to insulate senior managers from blame,thereby further encouraging corruption.For example,a focus on performance goals rather than on means or the use of verbal and general(i.e.ambiguous)orders regarding means,coupled with minimal oversight and documentation,afford the managers“strategic ignorance”(Katz, 1979,p.297)and therefore“plausible deniability”(Braithwaite,1989;Browning, 1989,p.1).Baker and Faulkner(1993)found that top executives involved in two decentralized priceﬁxing networks were less likely to be found guilty than top executives in a centralized priceﬁxing network,and Braithwaite(1984)reports that pharmaceuticalﬁrms instituted a“vice-president responsible for going to jail,”namely,the only executive who needed to know about corrupt activities.Similarly, isolating subunits allows senior managers to be“willfully blind”(Braithwaite, 1989,p.351)to corrupt practices(e.g.the independent cells of the Maﬁa).Thus,the managers can claim that they neither knew of nor approved the corrupt action. Phase2:Embedding Corruption in Organizational Structures and ProcessesOrganizational memory is the metaphor used to describe the process through which an organization acquires,stores and uses the knowledge that is applied to its activities(Anand,Manz&Glick,1998).In its quest for efﬁciency,an organization tends to commit a promising activity to its memory(and thus institutionalize it)when it has been performed repetitively in the immediate past(Yates,1990). Activities stored in organizational memories are often performed through the execution of a series of inter-related routines.The outputs of one routine trigger the initiation of the next routine in the sequence.Thus,entire activities can be performed without any one individual knowing them in their entirety(Levitt& March,1988;Nelson&Winter,1982;Weick&Roberts,1993).Once a corrupt decision or act produces a positive outcome and is included in organizational memory,it is likely to be used again in the future.When similar issues confront other managers,and if solutions are not readily obvious,answers are sought from the memory because:(1)past decisions and acts are assumed to have been made for rational reasons;and(2)following a precedent helps legitimate the decision and act(Henisz&Delios,2001;Ocasio,1999;Simon, 1976).For instance,Ermann and Lundman(1996,pp.23–24)describe how Gulf Oil laundered and distributed corporate funds illegally to American politicians: After the comptroller who helped develop the system left,three other people sequentially occupied his position.None of them had to make any difﬁcult decisions,much less consciously involve themselves in criminal activities.They merely were told that they would receive requests for money...Easy to do and easy to live with.The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations9 The use of previous unethical decisions is especially signiﬁcant because individ-uals often do not consider the contextual issues(including ethics)surrounding the decision or act;the past success of such practices is assumed to validate the process through which it was determined(ler,1993).And if the renewed corrupt practice results in a positive outcome an even stronger precedent is set for the future. The organization comes to expect and then depend on the payoffs from corruption. In time,goals,budgets,informationﬂows,rewards and punishments and so on may be skewed to support the practices.Eichenwald(2000),for instance,discusses the bureaucratic machinery and processes that evolved to support price-ﬁxing by Archer Daniels Midland and its competitors.The result is institutionalized corrup-tion:personal behaviors become impersonal norms,emergent practices become tacit understandings and idiosyncratic acts become shared procedures.Moreover, the increasingly casual practice of corruption tends to further degrade the ethical climate of the organization.In short,micro and macro practices are mutually reinforcing,encouraging further corruption(Cialdini,1996;Vaughan,1992). CultureAs the repertoire of corrupt practices becomes embedded in the ongoing routines of the organization,a deviant culture(or subculture,in the case of localized corruption)tends to emerge to normalize the corruption.Assumptions,values and beliefs,perhaps drawing on the business values noted above,evolve to rationalize the corrupt practices in ways that neutralize the stigma of corruption.(Later, under“Rationalizing Corruption,”we discuss the types of accounts through which this is accomplished.)Indeed,the culture may come to valorize the corruption and promulgate recipes for corruption.For instance,Kappeler,Sluder and Alpert (1994)describe subcultural norms that support police corruption:don’t give up another cop;if you get caught,don’t implicate anybody else;don’t get involved in another cop’s affairs;don’t trust new cops until they’ve been checked out;and don’t tell anybody more than they need to know.Deviant(sub)cultures insulate actors from the wider culture with its counter-vailing norms and beliefs.Indeed,Hollinger and Clark(1983,p.126)concluded from their study of employee theft that“employee deviance is more constrained by informal social controls present in primary work-group relationships than by the more-formal reactions to deviance by those in positions of authority within the formal organization.”Accordingly,a premium is placed on socializing with insiders and on secrecy and obfuscation regarding outsiders(as well as condemning any condemners;Sykes&Matza,1957).Strong(sub)cultures are more likely to emerge where there is high within-group task interdependence and low between-group interdependence,accountability for performance goals but not means,group-based versus individual-based rewards,member stability10BLAKE E.ASHFORTH AND VIKAS ANAND and cohesion,peer-based socialization,and physical proximity(e.g.Trice& Beyer,1993).How can a group hold a worldview so at odds with the wider culture and not appear to be greatly conﬂicted by it?The answer may lie in the distinction between particularism and universalism.An individual develops social identities speciﬁc to the social domains,groups and roles–and accompanying subcultures –that he or she occupies(e.g.manager,mother,parishioner,sports fan).Given the diversity of social domains,groups and roles one typically occupies,one’s social identities tend to be correspondingly quite diverse.In order not to compromise the utility of identities tailored to particular contexts,individuals often cognitively compartmentalize their identities(Ashforth&Mael,1989;Settles,Sellers& Damas,2002).In a real sense,then,to change social domains,groups and roles is to change selves.Derry(1987),for instance,argues that because managers value efﬁciency and effectiveness,they may use different moral yardsticks at work than at home.The double standard is locally adaptive even as it’s morally repugnant from a more generalized perspective.1Thus,an individual typically responds to the press of a given context by invoking the localized social identity and culture. As a result,actions tend to be particularistic rather than universalistic;that is,they tend to be tailored to local demands and favor local actors who share one’s group membership,identity and culture.In the case of corruption,this myopia means that an otherwise ethically-minded individual may forsake universalistic or dominant norms about ethical behavior in favor of particularistic behaviors that favor his or her group at the expense of outsiders(Aubert,1952;cf.ethnocentrism,LeVine&Campbell,1972;Ryan& Bogart,1997).Indeed,if a social identity is chronically more important to the individual,particularism can metastasize into what Banﬁeld(1958)calls“amoral familism,”that is,a tendency to display morality only with regard to one’s“family”(ingroup).This tendency to always put the ingroup above all others clearly paves the way for collective corruption.Extreme examples include the Maﬁa and street gangs:members of these groups tend not to see themselves as corrupt but as faithfully serving themselves,their ingroup and perhaps their neighborhood;the wider society exists as a counterpoint to be exploited(e.g.Jankowski,1991).In sum,because life is lived in concrete settings,localized social identities and cultures tend to be highly salient.Thus,the individual may bend his or her general commitment to ethics under the press of local circumstances.As Bandura(1999, p.206)put it,“Most everyone is virtuous at the abstract level.”Beyond the OrganizationCorrupt practices within an organization may be disseminated throughout the industry via both micro(e.g.individual mobility)and macro(e.g.imitation)The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations11 processes(Darley,1996;Vaughan,1983;Zucker,1988)and given impetus by competitive pressure.Industry level corruption is more likely in mature indus-tries,where time and stability facilitate dissemination(Baucus,1994).Examples abound:Clinard and Yeager(1980)concluded that corporate crime among Fortune 500companies is most prevalent in the oil,automobile and pharmaceutical indus-tries;Pizzo,Fricker and Muolo(1991)document how a network of individuals spread knowledge of fraudulent techniques throughout the U.S.savings and loan industry;more recently,the U.S.utility industry was accused of indulging in round trip sales(where aﬁrm sells electricity to a dummyﬁrm and buys the same amount of electricity back)to artiﬁcially boost revenues(Berman,Angwin&Cummins, 2002).Brenner and Molander(1977,p.60)asked HBR readers,“In every industry there are some generally accepted business practices.In your industry,are there practices which you regard as unethical?”Excluding the“don’t know”responses, two-thirds agreed.Often,an important factor in industry wide corruption is that governing bodies that are responsible for,or have the capacity to monitor,industry behavior may themselves become part of the institutionalized system of corruption(Braithwaite, 1989;Sherman,1980).As in the example of the UAW’s role in the Mitsubishi case described earlier,or as in the case of Arthur Andersen vis-`a-vis Enron and Salomon Smith Barney’s telecom analysts vis-`a-vis Global Crossing(Creswell &Prins,2002),outside agencies may become co-opted by organizations and develop tacit agreements to turn a blind eye–particularly if the individuals anticipate or have been through the“revolving door”to employment in the industry.2Phase3:RoutinizingAs corrupt practices become institutionalized and repeatedly enacted,they become routinized and habitual.Kelman(1973,p.46)deﬁnes routinizing as“transforming the action into routine,mechanical,highly programmed operations.”Routinizing neutralizes the salience of corruption in four ways.First,by embedding corruption in ongoing processes,routinizing removes discrete(strategic)decision points that might trigger reﬂective thought and creates a momentum that sustains action without the necessity for thought(Kelman,1973;Staw,1980;cf.ritualism, Ashforth&Kreiner,2002).As an antitrust violator put it,“It was a way of doing business before we even got into the business.So it was like why do you brush your teeth in the morning or something...It was part of the everyday”(Benson, 1985,p.591).Once corruption is ongoing,it takes more conscious effort to dis continue it than to continue it.。

The Corruption Trap

The Corruption TrapEmerging markets are where money is to be made: pent up consumer demand, cheap labour, few regulations. But just under the surface lies the murky world of corruption, ready to derail even the most scrupulous businessperson. Now what?By Angela Garvey Hammond“Moscow, it's a web of illogical bureaucracy, which can best be described as a moving target. Once you get a handle on the processes involved, someone in the administration gets fired, the rules change, and you start again. We found ourselves often being forced to take two steps back because of this. However, you persevere, and you launch,” so says Alex Shrifin, a Canadian entrepreneur selling soup on the streets of Moscow. He came up with the canny idea of selling soup on-the-go three years ago and, with a small team of investors, eventually managed to open his first street kiosk in April last year. He knows Moscow well and the Russian way of doing business, as he describes it “the trickle-down effect of corruption”.“Deep infrastructural corruption tends to affect larger operations than ours. Corruption leads to massive inefficiencies, lack of vision on the part of regulators, and a general state of cynicism. While we've had to deal with the occasional corrupt small official, the biggest problem is that there is truly little in the way of helping small business get off the ground and survive.”Alex is shrewd. He can see the opportunities in Russia but he is under no illusions about the risks. The anti-corruption watchdog, Transparency International rates Russia as one of the most corrupt countries in the world - giving it a score of 2.1 out of 10. At the other end of the ‘corruption scale” is Alex’s home country Canada with a score of 8.9 - one of the cleanest nations.It’s not o nly RussiaOf course Russia is not the only country tainted by the practice. Travel around the world and China and India are on a par with the former Soviet state.So what makes one country clean and honest and another not? If one looks at the various definitions of corruption and bribery the general consensus is the abuse of public or official power for personal gain. But it is a two-way process.For every corrupt official demanding a bribe, there is a business or investorready to pay it to get things done his way. Many argue it’s this “supply chain” of individuals and companies wi th their huge slush funds that is exacerbating the problem.Then there is the West which can hardly claim to be squeaky clean.N. Craig Smith, INSEADChaired Professor of Ethics and Social Responsibility, highlights the case of Siemens. For years the German industrial and engineering giant paid bribes to foreign officials – a practice which was not illegal under German law and was considered a necessary cost of doing business abroad.“The company, in a sense, continued with a practice that had been in place for many years but didn’t realise the ramifications of the introduction of the OECD convention against bribery and the laws put in place that governed it as a German company. Historically it was tax deductible - the cost of bribing a foreign government official.”As a result of the OECD legislation, in 2008 Siemens had to pay a hefty penalty of up to 5 billion euros. The scandal damaged its reputation and business and 50 of its top executives were sacked. Siemens has cleaned up its act and learned its lesson. Russia is making moves in the same direction. The country is taking steps to bec ome a member of the OECD’s anti-bribery Convention. The treaty demands signator y countries to address the “supply side”of corruption in international business dealings by banning the practice of foreign companies lining the pockets of local government officials. Participating countries are regularly screened by fellow nations and have to account for any lapses in their anti-bribery legislation and implementation. Such goals and agreements are commendable but with Russia’s track record are they really achievable?Can corruption be contained?INSEAD’s Professor Douglas Webber has his doubts. An expert in political science he predicts “two factors will make it very hard for this kind of agreement to bite in Russia. One is the Russian economy’s heavy dependence on natural resources and particularly oil and gas, where state plays a dominant role, and the other is the generally central role of state intervention in the Russian economy.”Bribery, kick-backs, grafts, back-handers whatever way you phrase it - the practice is ancient and embedded in almost every society and culture. As I was investigating this issue I met, by chance, an Indian philosophy lecturer teaching at a British University. He was very proud and insightful about India. Within seconds of our conversation he had listed a string of personal incidents from the flight home to customs and jumping the airport queues which automatically required an unofficial payment.Add up all these “unofficial payments” and corruption is having a crippling effect on the country. Global Financial Integrity, a task forcewhich aims to curtail the cross border flow of illegal money estimates that more than 16 billion US dollars in illicit money leaves India every year. Ordinary Indian households may not be aware of the exact figures but know all too well what is going on. A string of major corruption scandals in the telecoms sector and the alleged fraud surrounding the Commonwealth Games in Delhi last year has outraged thousands particularly those who have benefitted from India’s economic boom. They have turned their frustrations into support for the anti-corruption campaigner Anna Hazare who is pushing for a new anti-corruption ombudsman with the right to investigate every level of society and government.Some positive signsThe movement is being closely followed by members of India’s highly-skilled business community working abroad like BhavinDalal. He is an IT specialist with a very successful career in North America. He left India as a young professional in his early twenties. Now in his late 30s he can see huge changes in his home country.“Corruption has been prevalen t in India even before its indepen dence from the British. That’s for socio-economic reasons as well as cultural ones - under the pretext of religion, patriotism or "the greater good." Between the time I grew up in India and went on to start my early professional life, until today, a lot has changed. The literacy rate has grown immensely and is at about 75 percent today, a far cry from less than 30 percent when I was growing up. While corruption is visible, there is a part of the society which openly rejects it.”Professor N. Craig Smith points to other glimmers of hope; Tata, the Indian conglomerate whose chairman, Ratan N. Tata, has admitted to losing out on big contracts because he refused to slip the right person “a graft”. In spite of that Tata is still a vast and highly profitable business.“There are companies who are successful in taking a stance against bribery. In India Tata has been able to build a reputation for itself for not paying. It took a non-corruption stance at some considerable cost.”Calculating the exact cost of corruption to the global economy is impossible because, by its very nature, the illicit flows of money are well hidden and involve a complex web at all levels of society.Journalist MishaGlennyhas spent years investigating the darker side of societies around the world and the underground global economy after 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. He points to the surge in a whole new area of employment; the “protection services to new businessmen”. Then there is the emergence of a “huge legal grey area as to what is licit business and what is illic i t business” which has opened up in Eastern Europe and the BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China following their breakneck economic transition. “The fact that China and East Asia counterfeit huge amounts of goods whose intellectual property rights reside primarily in the United States, Western Europe and Japan…is a big big issue between the major forces of the global economy.”For his latest book,McMafia, he spoke to lawyers, criminals, gangsters, police officers, businesses, government officials, and journalists around the world and suggests “it’s impossible to extract co rruption from the activity of organised crime. Corruption is a vast industry....I also have to include a large part of what goes on in the offshore banking sector because despite the almost divine deference given to the offshore banking sector by the licit world, governments have to understand that this is a carte blanche for money launderers and for people seeking to get money out of the black economy and into the white economy”.There is no shortage of international institutions and government organisations trying to tackle this labyrinth but success is a long way off. Reading the findings of the 2010 Global Corruption Barometer does not offer much cheer either.Corruption has increased over the last three years, say six out of 10 people around the world.One in four people report paying bribes in the last year. The Barometer captures the experiencesand views of more than 91,000 people in 86 countries and territories. Views on corruption weremost negative in Western Europe and North America, where more than two-thirds of peoplethought corruption had increased over the last three years.Corruption and humanitarian aidThe global banking crisis gets part of the blame, while news headlines detail the corruptionendemic in so many humanitarian aid missions to disaster zones. INSEAD’s Professor ofOperations Management, Luk Van Wassenhove, has investigated why corruption plagues somany missions.“There are essentially three sources of corruption depending on your definition. The first andweakest one is because of lack of truly professional systems, people, and processes. For instance,poor purchasing procedures could lead to high expenses and therefore waste of money thatcould have been used to buy more goods. Or, allowing truck drivers to steal fuel for personal useinstead of paying and controlling them properly. A second source of corruption is food beingstolen in conflict areas and ending up on local markets. This is sometimes very hard to avoid. For instance, we know that food aid to Somalia is partially going to end up with the militia and serveto buy more weapons. But is this a reason not to send food to the starving people? A thirdsource is with service providers like chartered airplanes. It is possible that a plane delivering foodaid comes back with a load of arms or drugs. Again, better controls can help. Humanitarianswork in extremely difficult conditions sometimes. They are not corrupt but can be subject tocorruption forces. We should support them fully.”Risk consultancy groups who specialise in offering companies advice when operating in high risk regions of the world all have list of recommendations on how to avoid the bribery trap. Many of the steps they suggest are simple and obvious but clearly needed. Whether companies or individuals actually follow them is ultimately down to individual’s own integrity and perception of what constitutes an abuse of power and what doesn’t.Can Ethics Be Taught?It’s a question that is debated time and time again at business management schools around the globe. Ethics and social responsibility are crucial components to many leadership and management programmes. Some schools have their fireside chats; others, visiting lectures from former white collar criminals. INSEAD Professor N. Craig Smith says his job is not to teach students to be ethical business leaders but rather to encourage them “to think about the ethical issues they will face in their business lives to better understand what the various consequences might be and their obligations. At the end of the day it is their judgement which will determine what they do”.That may well raise a wry smile in many business circles but others like BhavanDalal are more sanguine. “I am an optimist. The last few years have resonated a fair possibility of change in India. I realise that it won't be quick but considering how long bribery has prevailed, the rate of change is fast.”ENDS。

经济学人9月精选

A second factor concerns divisions within the CNDD itself. Captain Camara continues to surround himself with loyalists such as General Sékouba Konaté, the minister of defence. General Konaté is said to have a moderating influence on the CNDD, but there is also a hard-line faction represented by the increasingly influential Captain Claude Pivi, the minister for presidential security, whose troops have been acting on their own. Internal tensions in the CNDD or the desire to seize back power by the previous military leadership could lead to a counter-coup and a change in leadership, or could be used as another argument for Captain Camara retaining power (so as to preserve national stability).
最后一项因素，令人民信任的总统大选和国会改选的发生条件尚不存在。因此，国会和总统大选的投票日期很可能因准备不及和行政问题而推迟，包括缺乏资金和选民登记不完整。推迟过久可能引起社会动乱，例如催化更具实力的工会走上街道要求回归宪政统治。社会动乱亦可能因恶化的经济气候而升高，国家民主暨发展委员会最后可能要动用武力对付。

新中国反腐立法的宏观解读_英文_

Punishing and preventing corruption is a serious social problem in the world． Law can be the powerful weapon against it． Using legal measures to fight against corruption is an effective choice that many countries employ，and it is an inevitable choice under the rule of law and a rational requirement for social development． Anticorruption legislation forms the prerequisite and foundation for using the law as a weapon against corruption． It complies with the demands of a particular age，and experienced several stages of development． Scientific，authoritative and elaborate are the descriptive terms that turned out to be the trend in the development of China’ s anticorruption legislation．
THE MACＲO INTEＲPＲETATION OF ANTICOＲＲUPTION LEGISLATION IN THE PEOPLE’ S ＲEPUBLIC OF CHINA

corruption英文作文

corruption英文作文下载温馨提示:该文档是我店铺精心编制而成，希望大家下载以后，能够帮助大家解决实际的问题。

文档下载后可定制随意修改，请根据实际需要进行相应的调整和使用，谢谢!并且，本店铺为大家提供各种各样类型的实用资料，如教育随笔、日记赏析、句子摘抄、古诗大全、经典美文、话题作文、工作总结、词语解析、文案摘录、其他资料等等，如想了解不同资料格式和写法，敬请关注!Download tips: This document is carefully compiled by theeditor. I hope that after you download them,they can help yousolve practical problems. The document can be customized andmodified after downloading,please adjust and use it according toactual needs, thank you!In addition, our shop provides you with various types ofpractical materials,such as educational essays, diaryappreciation,sentence excerpts,ancient poems,classic articles,topic composition,work summary,word parsing,copyexcerpts,other materials and so on,want to know different data formats andwriting methods,please pay attention!Corruption is like a virus that infects every aspect of society. It's like a cancer that eats away at the fabric of our communities. It's a stain that tarnishes the reputation of our leaders and institutions. It's a poison that undermines trust and erodes the foundations of our society.Corruption comes in many forms. It can be the police officer who takes bribes to look the other way. It can be the politician who lines his pockets with public funds. It can be the business executive who engages in shady dealings to gain an unfair advantage. It can be the everyday person who cheats on their taxes or takes advantage of others for personal gain.The effects of corruption are far-reaching. It leads to injustice and inequality, as those with money and power are able to manipulate the system to their advantage. It breeds a culture of mistrust and suspicion, as people become cynical about the motives of those in positions ofauthority. It hinders economic development, as resourcesare siphoned off for personal gain rather than being usedfor the common good.Combatting corruption requires a multi-faceted approach. It involves creating and enforcing laws and regulationsthat hold people accountable for their actions. It requires building a culture of transparency and accountability,where people are encouraged to speak out against corruption and hold their leaders to a higher standard. It alsoinvolves educating people about the corrosive effects of corruption and empowering them to demand better from their leaders.In the end, the fight against corruption is a fight for the soul of our society. It's a battle to ensure that our communities are built on a foundation of honesty, fairness, and integrity. It's a struggle to create a world where everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed, and where the public good is valued above personal gain. We must all do our part to root out corruption and build a better futurefor ourselves and the generations to come.。

corruption英语作文

corruption英语作文Corruption is a pervasive issue that affects the fabric of society, undermining the principles of justice and fairness. It is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, which can manifest in various forms such as bribery, extortion, and embezzlement. This essay will explore the causes of corruption, its impact on society, and potential solutions to combat it.Causes of CorruptionThe roots of corruption are multifaceted, often stemming from a lack of transparency and accountability in governance. When systems are opaque and officials are not held accountable for their actions, opportunities for corruption arise. Additionally, poverty and economic inequality can drive individuals to engage in corrupt practices to secure their livelihoods. The absence of a strong legal framework and enforcement mechanisms also contributes to a culture of corruption.Impact on SocietyCorruption has far-reaching consequences that extend beyond the immediate financial loss. It erodes public trust in institutions, leading to a general sense of disillusionment and cynicism. It can also lead to an inefficient allocation of resources, as funds intended for public services may besiphoned off by corrupt officials. Moreover, corruption can hinder economic development by discouraging foreign investment and creating an uneven playing field for businesses.Combating CorruptionAddressing corruption requires a multi-pronged approach. Firstly, strengthening legal frameworks and ensuring their enforcement is crucial. This includes establishing clear laws against corruption and ensuring that those who break these laws are prosecuted and punished. Secondly, promoting transparency and accountability in government operations can deter corrupt practices. This can be achieved through measures such as open bidding processes for contracts and public disclosure of government budgets.Moreover, education plays a vital role in combating corruption. By fostering a culture of integrity and ethical behavior, societies can create a generation that values honesty and fairness. Additionally, empowering citizens through civic education and encouraging them to participatein governance can lead to greater oversight and a reductionin corrupt practices.ConclusionCorruption is a complex problem that requires a concerted effort to overcome. By understanding its causes and implementing comprehensive strategies to address them, societies can work towards a more just and equitable future.It is the collective responsibility of individuals, communities, and governments to stand against corruption and uphold the values of transparency, accountability, and integrity.。

corruption and democracy

E c o n o m i c &S o c i a l A f f a i r sDESA Working Paper No. 55 ST/ESA/2007/DWP/55August 2007Corruption and DemocracyMichael T. RockMichael T. Rock is Harvey Wexler Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics, Bryn Mawr College, 101 N. Merion Ave, Bryn Mawr, PA, USA 19010. E-mail: mrock@. Comments should be addressed by e-mail to the author.AbstractWhat is the impact of democracy on corruption? In most models, analysts assume a negative rela-tionship, with more democracy leading to less corruption. But recent theoretical developments and case evidence support an inverted U relationship between corruption and democracy. By drawing on a panel data set covering a large number of countries between 1996 and 2003, substantial empiri-cal support is found for an inverted U relationship between democracy and corruption. The turning point in corruption occurs rather early in the life of new democracies and at rather low per capita incomes.JEL Classification: O12, D72, D73, H11, H77, K42Keywords: corruption, electoral democracy, consolidated democracy, rule of law, government effectivenessUN/DESA Working Papers are preliminary documents circulated in a limited number of copies and posted on the DESA website at /esa/desa/papers to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The views and opinions expressed herein are those of theauthor and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Secretariat. The designations and terminology employed may not conform to United Nations practice and do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Organization.Typesetter: Leah McDavid United NationsDepartment of Economic and Social Affairs2 United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-1428 New York, N.Y. 10017, USATel: (1-212) 963-4761 • Fax: (1-212) 963-4444 e-mail: esa@/esa/desa/papersContentsCorruption and Democracy: What We Know (2)Data and Hypothesis Tests (4)Data (4)Hypothesis tests (10)Conclusions (16)References (17)Corruption and DemocracyMichael T. RockWhat is the impact of democracy or its polar opposite, autocracy, on corruption? Existing econometric evi-dence is mixed. Ades and Di Tella (1999: 987) and Fisman and Gatti (2002: 336-338) fail to find any posi-tive association between the political and/or civil rights associated with democracy and corruption. In fact, as Ades and Di Tella (1998: 987) state, “If anything, the lack of political rights seems to be associated with less corruption”. On the other hand, Goel and Nelson (2005: 127 and 130) find that corruption declines with the degree of civil liberties associated with democracy, Chowdhury (2004: 96, 98) finds that corruption declines with Vanhanen’s (1992) democracy index, while T riesman (2000: 417) finds that the duration of de-mocracy, defined as the number of uninterrupted years in which a country is democratic, reduces corruption.These results hardly inspire confidence. They are also inconsistent with a growing body of case evidence which suggests that corruption rises, at least initially, in newly democratizing countries, before falling as democracies become consolidated. Mohatdi and Roe (2003: 445), among others, comment on this phenomenon in Russia, T urkey and Latin America. Knowledgeable observers in Indonesia (McLeod 2005, Robison and Hadiz 2004, Rock 2003) and Thailand (Case 2002, Hicken 2001, Rock 2000, Pasuk and Baker 1998, Ammar 1997) agree that corruption rose in both countries following democratization as the collapse of centralized networks of corruption gave way to more corrosive and decentralized corruption free for alls. What accounts for this apparent rise in corruption following democratization and is there broader evidence to suggest that it subsequently falls with the consolidation of democracy, yielding an inverted U pattern?Mohatdi and Roe (2003) provide theoretical support for why corruption might follow an inverted U relationship with democracy. Case evidence presented below for Indonesia and Thailand, which is broadly consistent with their theoretical argument, suggests why this might be so, at least, in these economies.This still leaves open the question, is there robust empirical support for an inverted U relationship between democracy and corruption as depicted in figure 1, which plots the relationship between corruption and what Schneider and Schmitter (2004: 84) label the consolidation of democracy?1 If so, which aspects of democracy matter: electoral competition,2 rule of law,3 effective governance4 or the behaviour, attitudes and1 Schneider and Schmitter (2004: 67-68, 84) develop an empirical index of the consolidation of democracy for25 countries between 1974 and 2000. This index is based on the ratings of country experts for 11 items. Theirmeasure has an electoral bias, but it also includes a number of elements that go beyond free, fair, regular, andcontested elections such as agreement on rules governing association formation and behaviour, territorial divisionof competencies, and rule of ownership and access to the media (Schneider and (Schmitter 2004: 68). Figure1 plots the relationship between this measure of consolidated democracy (CoD) and a World Bank measure ofcorruption taken from (Kaufmann, et al. 2007). The World Bank measure has been rescaled so that an increasein the variable implies more corruption. The predicted value for corruption in figure 1 is based on the followingsimple OLS regression equation. CORRWB = -9.73 + 6.76 Log (CoD) – 1.07 Log (CoD)2 . Both regressioncoefficients are statistically significant at the .01 level (t = 3.16 and 3.63) as is the equation F statistic (F = 16.48).Adjusted R2 is .56.2 Schneider and Schmitter label this Dahl’s procedural minimum (2004: 63), while Karl (1986: 9-36) labels it an‘electoralist fallacy’.3 Linz and Stephan (1996: 10) identify the rule of law as one of five interacting arenas that must be in place fordemocracy to be consolidated. Diamond (1999: 111-112) also includes it as an important element in the consolidationof democracy.4 Both Linz and Stephan (1996: 10-11) and Diamond (1999: 93-96) stress the importance of effective government. AsLinz and Stephan (1996: 11) state, “Modern democracy…needs the effective capacity (of government) to command,regulate, and extract. For this it needs a functioning state and a state bureaucracy considered useable by the newdemocratic government.2D E S A W o r k i n g P a p e r N o.55norms of political actors?5 These questions are answered by using a panel data set for 1996-2003 to dem-onstrate that after controlling for the other factors affecting corruption, corruption follows an inverted U relationship with more process oriented definitions of democracy, but not with the electoral aspect of democ-racy. The argument proceeds in three steps. The next section assembles the theoretical and case evidence in support of the inverted U hypothesis. The following section tests for this empirical relationship in a panel of data that controls both for other variables affecting corruption and for endogeneity. The final section closes by drawing implications.Corruption and Democracy: What We KnowBoth theory and case evidence provide compelling support for a democratization breeds corruption hypoth-esis, at least up to a point. At the theoretical level, Mohtadi and Roe (2003) model corruption as the mo-nopolistically competitive behaviour of private sector agents who can either invest in productive activity or in rent-seeking (corruption). In their model, young democracies suffering from insufficient checks and bal-ances and lack of transparency, provide rent-seekers with greater access to public officials and hence greater opportunities for collecting public sector rents, at least up to a point, without making the corrupt acts of rent-seekers and officials open to public scrutiny. Because of free entry into rent-seeking, competition among rent-seekers ultimately reduces returns to individual rent seekers even as it drives aggregate rents up. But as5 Schneider and Schmitter (2004: 68) emphasize the behaviours of political actors; Linz and Stephan (1996: 6)emphasize behaviours and attitudes, while Diamond (1999: 69) emphasizes the behaviours, norms and beliefs ofpolitical actors. All three emphasize the importance of the time it takes for actors to learn democracy and becomehabituated to it.Corruption and Democracy 3 the institutions of transparency and accountability in new democracies rise as they mature, aggregate rentsand corrupt activity fall because rents per rent seeker fall and because the cost of rent-seeking (including theprobability of getting caught and punished) to rent-seekers and the government officials, who accept bribes,rises. Taken together, this combination implies an inverted U pattern between corruption and the durabilityor maturity of new democracies.The case evidence, at least from Indonesia and Thailand, is broadly consistent with this picture. Inboth polities, corrupt networks were more or less tightly controlled by political elites in government, the bu-reaucracy and the army (Rock 2003, Rock 2000, Rock and Bonnett, 2004). As Rock (1994, 2000) and Rockand Bonnett (2004) argue with respect to Thailand’s bureaucratic polity, democratization led to the break-upof a centralized corruption network between political elites, senior bureaucrats and senior army officials onthe one hand and the Sino-Thai entrepreneurs who drove the growth process following the growth coalitionassembled by General Sarit in 1960. In this centralized network, government officials, including army of-ficers, provided protectionist rents to a surprisingly small number of Sino-Thai entrepreneurs in exchange forkickbacks. As in Indonesia, the government protected private property and extracted rents at a low enough‘tax’ rate to entice entrepreneurs to invest, which they did.A combination of rapid growth and democratization ultimately led to at least a semi-democraticpolity by the early 1980s (Chai-Anan 1990). For a while, during the time Prem was the prime minister(1980-88), Thailand’s bureaucratic polity evolved toward both a broker polity (Ramsay 1985) and a North-east Asian style developmental state (Anek 1988) as core economic agencies, peak business associations, andkey business leaders regularly met in a high level Joint Public Private Sector Consultative Committee to workour problems associated with Thailand’s policy shift which favoured the export of manufactures.But this transformation did not last as unscrupulous up-country provincial politicians subsequentlycaptured both the legislature and the prime minister’s office (Girling 1997; Callahan and McCargo 1996;King 1996). They used their control of both to carry out a frontal and corrupt assault on the state to re-ward their supporters and build their coffers for the next election (King 1996: 136-137).6 They did so, by among other things, politicizing the core institutions of macroeconomic policy—the Ministry of Finance,the Central Bank, and the national planning agency, the National Economic and Social Development Board(Rock 2000: 197-198; Murray 1996). This led at least one long time analyst to ask whether new democraciescould manage their macro-economies (Ammar 1997). The rise of shadowy provincial businessmen in politicsand their corrupt frontal assault on the state ultimately led bureaucratic and political elites in Bangkok to tryand slow the spread of corruption by enacting a new constitution in the late 1990s designed to reign in thecorruption associated with money politics and rural vote buying (Callahan 2005).7 Although it is difficultto know whether the new constitution reduced corruption in Thailand, the new constitution re-centralizedpolitics by significantly reducing the number of political parties (Hicken 2006). One outcome of this processwas the rise of another provisional businessman Thaksin Shinawata, who became prime minister in a govern-ment that for the first time in Thai history captured a majority in parliament for his Thak Rai Thai Party(McCargo and Ukrist 2005).6 McCargo and Ukrist (2005: 73-74) describe this process as related to the factional basis of Thai politics in whichpolitical parties and faction leaders within them are allocated cabinet positions and jobs on the basis of their electoralstrength. Those holding cabinet posts are obliged to reward the faction leaders in their parties, usually through corruptmeans.7 They did so because corruption had become endemic as at least one Thai cabinet came to be described as little morethan a ‘Mafia Cabinet” (Murray 1996: 372).4D E S A W o r k i n g P a p e r N o.55Similar developments are visible in Indonesia. As McLeod (2005) argues during the country’s NewOrder government, President Soeharto managed a ‘franchise system’ that provided strong positive and nega-tive incentives for public officials in political parties, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the military, the police,and in state owned enterprises, to pursue growth oriented policies that enabled those who played by Soe-harto’s rules to enrich themselves through corrupt activities. In this model, rents were collected by simpleextortion and by public sector policies that enabled the regime’s cronies to amass protectionist rents. Govern-ment officials—in political parties, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the military, and Soeharto and his familyparticipated in this franchise system through kickbacks, awards of government contracts and through thegranting of monopolies to cronies. Soeharto’s franchise system both protected private property and ‘taxed’economic activities at a low enough rate to encourage private sector actors to invest in productive activity.Democratization witnessed the collapse of the franchise system, the rise of money politics and there-emergence of franchise actors as participants in Indonesia’s newly democratic polity (Robison and Hadiz2004: 223-249). Even though Indonesia’s post-Soeharto democratic governments were able to break some ofmost obvious elements of the franchise system such as Bob Hasan’s plywood monopoly, ‘Tommy’ Soeharto’sclove monopoly and national car project, and Bulog, the national logistics agency’s monopoly control ofthe distribution of a number of commodities that rewarded both the Soeharto family and a favourite cronycapitalist (Liem Sioe Liong) (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 200-201), because of decentralization and democra-tization, old franchise actors in the bureaucracy, judiciary, political parties and in the army have re-emergedas central players in a more or less corruption free for all in democratic Indonesia.8 Thus the judiciary, which extracted large bribes from bank defaulters, played a key role in protecting those defaulters from Indonesia’sBank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) (McLeod 2005: 374). With the emergence of a confrontational relation-ship between newly empowered legislatures and embattled presidents, members of parliament, who neededample war chests to win re-election, used their new political powers to extort funds from the bureaucracy(McLeod 2005: 373). Following decentralization, local officials also participated in extorting and taxing pri-vate firms (Rock 2003: 45-46, Siregar 2001: 300, Athukorala 2002: 147). And turf wars between the armyand the police that look like the gang wars of the prohibition era in the U.S have emerged over control ofillegal activity—particularly prostitution, gambling and drug running (McLeod 2005: 376-377). This com-bination has led McLeod (2005) to argue that Indonesia’s chief problem is restoring effective government.Without it he doubts that Indonesia will be able to return to the high growth rates achieved by the NewOrder. Without it, it is difficult to see how the government’s interaction with rent-seekers can be made moretransparent or how they can be made more accountable to the publics that elected them.Data and Hypothesis TestsDataHypothesis testing of an inverted U relationship between corruption and democracy is motivated by thetheoretical and case literature reviewed in section 2, by data availability, and by the literature (Goel and Nel-son 2005, Chowdhury 2004, Xin and Rudel 2004, Fishman and Gatti 2002, T riesman 2000, Ades and DiTella 1999) on the other causes of corruption. The key argument that emerges from the theoretical and caseliteratures in section 2 is that the impact of democracy on corruption depends on how quickly newly demo-cratic governments can build the institutions of trust, transparency and accountability governing the rentseeking activities of private sector actors and the government officials they seek to bribe following the demise8 As Hadiz and Robison (2005: 231) say, “…it is the reorganization of the old predatory power relationships within anew system of parties, parliaments and elections that has been the central dynamic of power in the post-Soeharto era”.Corruption and Democracy 5 of authoritarian regimes and the rise of democracy. The sooner this happens, the sooner the cost of corruptactivities rises for both rent-seekers and government officials and, following Mohtadi and Roe (2004), thesooner the turning point between corruption and democracy is reached.Unfortunately, there is no large scale and consistent cross country data set by which to measure thedegree to which new (and old) democracies have built and sustained transparent and accountable institutionsto control corruption.9 What there are, are a number of measures of the degree or quality of democratic and autocratic governments in the world. For some time, Freedom House (2007a) has been compiling annualratings (on scales varying from 1 to 7) on the degree of political rights and civil liberties in countries—eachcaptures a different aspect of democracy or what Dahl (1998) labels polyarchy. A number of researchers(Ades and Di Tella 1999, Fisman and Gatti 2002, Goel and Nelson 2005) have used one or the sum of bothto test the hypothesis that more democratic countries are less corrupt.While the Freedom House data are attractive simply because they exist for a large number of coun-tries over time, there is a major problem with these data. Both indices are contaminated by including assess-ments of the degree of corruption within them. This is particularly true of the political rights variable whichincludes an extensive assessment of the degree of corruption within a country (Freedom House 2007b).10 While it might be attractive to simply use Freedom House’s civil liberties variable as a measure of democracy,as several researchers have done, there are two problems with this variable. It fails to capture major elementsof the electoral or procedural aspects of democracy that is captured in Freedom House’s political rights vari-able and it too includes aspects of corruption within it.11 Because of these problems, particularly the latter problem, using either Freedom House variable as an independent variable in a regression equation on cor-ruption is tantamount to regressing corruption on itself.Fortunately several good alternatives exist in the Polity IV data set maintained by the Universityof Maryland (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) and in the governance data set maintained by the World Bank(Kaufmann, et al. 2007a, 2007b). The Polity IV data set codes countries by their authority characteristics(Marshall and Jaggers 2002: 1). Polity IV has three attractive political variables—an institutionalizationof democracy variable, an institutionalization of autocracy variable, and the age or durability of political9 Researchers at the World Bank (Kaufmann, et al. 2007a) have developed a measure of the degree to which governmentscontrol corruption, but this measure is really a measure of the perception of corruption within a country.10This is no simple problem as Freedom House says one aspect of political rights is “Is the government free from pervasive corruption?” T o answer this question, Freedom House asks: “Has the government implemented effectiveanticorruption laws or programs to prevent, detect, and punish corruption among public officials, including conflictof interest? Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements, or other controlsthat increase opportunities for corruption? Are there independent and effective auditing and investigative bodies thatfunction without impediment or political pressure or influence? Are allegations of corruption by government officialsthoroughly investigated and prosecuted without prejudice, particularly against political opponents? Are allegations ofcorruption given wide and extensive airing in the media? Do whistleblowers, anticorruption activists, investigators,and journalists enjoy legal protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of bribery and corruption?What was the latest T ransparency International Corruption Perceptions Index score for this country (Freedom House2007b)?11 The major procedural aspects of democracy included in the political rights index are: a competitive multi-partysystem, universal adult suffrage, regularly contested elections, major political party access to the media so they canreach the electorate, and a significant opposition with a chance to win elections (Freedom House 2007b)? Corruptionenters Freedom House’s Civil Liberties Index in two places (Freedom House 2007b). Under the right to own privateproperty, Freedom House asks: Are bribes or other inducements needed to obtain the necessary legal documents tooperate private businesses? Under equality of opportunity aspects of civil liberties, Freedom House asks: Is entrance toinstitutions of higher education or the ability to obtain employment limited by widespread nepotism and the paymentof bribes?6D E S A W o r k i n g P a p e r N o.55regimes (democracy, DEM or autocracy, AUT). The World Bank governance data set has two additionally attractive political variables—a government effectiveness variable (GE)12 and a rule of law variable (ROL).13The institutionalization of democracy (DEM) variable, which ranges from 0 to 10, is conceived, as Marshall and Jaggers (2002: 13) state,“…as three essential interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and proceduresthrough which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders.Second, is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of the power of the execu-tive. Third, is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.”Because DEM does not include coded data on civil liberties, it is best thought of as a measure of electoral or procedural democracy. As such, a country’s score on DEM depends on the degree to which the chief executive is chosen through competitive elections, the degree to which chief executives faces substan-tial legislative and judicial constraints on their authority, and on the degree to which citizen preferences for policy and leadership are based on “…relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level… (Marshall and Jaggers 2002: 26).Autocracy (AUT) is defined as a political system in which political participation is sharply restricted or repressed and where a chief executive, designated by a political elite, exercises power with few institutional constraints (Marshall and Jaggers 2002: 14).14 More precisely, a country’s score on AUT, which also var-ies from 0 to 10, depends on the degree to which the chief executive is chosen, rather than elected, on the degree to which the chief executive has unlimited authority, on the degree to which “…significant groups, issues and/or types of conventional participation are…” restricted (Marshall and Jaggers 2002: 25), and on the degree to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership are politically repressed.Because Schneider and Schmitter (2004), Diamond (1999) Linz and Stephan (1996), O’Donnel and Schmitter (1986) and O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) view democratization as a process with at least three distinct, but interrelated aspects—liberalization of autocracy, transition to democratic rule, and consolidation of democracy—they, among others (Karl 1986) are critical of simply defining democ-racy in electoral terms. Instead, they emphasize both the contingent and learned nature of democracy. For example, Linz and Stephan (1996: 3) consider the transition to democracy complete when,“…sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected govern-ment , when a government comes to power that is the result of a free and popular vote, when thisgovernment has de facto authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies dejure.”12 Kaufmann, et al. (2007a: 3) define Government effectiveness as “…measuring the quality of public services, the qualityof the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formation andimplementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies…”13 Kaufmann, et al. (2007a: 4) define the rule of law to include “…the extent to which agents have confidence in andabide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well asthe likelihood of crime and violence.”14 Neither the definition nor the measurement of autocracy overlaps with the definition or measurement of democracy inPolity IV. As Marshall and Jaggers (2002: 15) state, “… the two scales do not share any categories in common.Corruption and Democracy 7For them, democracy is consolidated behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally“when no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant re-sources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to vio-lence or foreign intervention to secede from the state; … when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life;…(and) when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike…become subjected to and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutionssanctioned by the new democratic process (Linz and Stephan 1996: 6).Or as Diamond (1996: 69) says, for democracy to be consolidated, elites must come to believe that democracy is the best form of government and they must act this way by eschewing violence, obeying laws, and avoiding rhetoric that incites their followers to violence. For their part, organizations in civil society need to enshrine the legitimacy of democracy in their charters and they must avoid seeking to overthrow democracy (Diamond 1999: 69). And a significant majority of the mass public must consistently believe that democracy is the best form of government, eschew violence, fraud or other unconstitutional means to achieve their ends, and they must not support any significant anti-democratic actors (Diamond 1999: 69).For Linz and Stephan (1996: 7), successful consolidation of democracy depends, first and foremost, on the existence of a state with monopoly control over the use of force. In addition, consolidated democra-cies “…need to have in place five interacting areas to reinforce one another” (Linz and Stephan 1996: 7). These are a free and lively civil society, a relatively autonomous and valued political society, a rule of law,15 a state bureaucracy that is effective16 and an institutionalized economic society (Linz and Stephan 1996: 9)But how do the actors in new democracies come to change their norms, beliefs, attitudes, and be-haviours? Diamond (1999)17 and Linz and Stepan (1996)18 have a straight-forward answer to this question—they do so through their actual practice and experience with democracy. Said another way, the consolidation of democracy as manifest by changes in norms, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours among elites, organizations in civil society and mass publics, takes time. While the procedural aspects of electoral democracy matter, what ultimately matters, if democracy is to be consolidated, is the degree to which elites, organizations in civil society, and mass publics learn from their positive experiences with democracy to trust it as the “…only political game in town” (Linz and Stephan 1996: 5).Requisite levels of trust require democratic deepening, political institutionalization, and strong regime performance (Diamond 1996: 74). Deepening depends on greater accountability of chief executives15 Linz and Stephan (1996: 10) argue that in consolidated democracies, all significant actors respect and uphold the lawand a “…clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system …supported by a strong legal culture incivil society” exists.16 As Linz and Stephan (1996: 11) say, “T o protect the rights of citizens and to deliver the other basic services thatcitizens demand, a democratic government needs to be able to exercise effectively its claim to the monopoly of thelegitimate use of force… Even if the state had no other functions …, it would have to tax compulsorily. Moderndemocracy, therefore, needs the effective capacity to command, regulate, and extract. For this it needs a functioningstate and a state bureaucracy usable by the new democratic government.”17 Diamond (1999: chapter 5) emphasizes how the successful practice and experience of democracy contributes tochanges in political culture that are supportive of democracy.18 Linz and Stephan (1996: 3-7) emphasize how successful experiences in reaching agreement on the forms of democracy(federalism versus a unitary state, republicanism versus a constitutional monarchy) contribute to changes in behaviourand attitudes that reinforce support for democracy. They also emphasize how successful experiences with democracyhabituate all political actors to resolve political conflict through democracy. In this was democracy is routinized anddeepened.。

on corruption英语作文

on corruption英语作文Corruption is a widespread problem in many countries around the world. It can take many forms, from bribery and embezzlement to nepotism and cronyism. It undermines the rule of law and erodes public trust in government institutions.Corruption often flourishes in environments where there is little transparency and accountability. It can be especially damaging in developing countries, where resources are scarce and the impact of corruption on public services and infrastructure can be devastating.Corruption not only harms the economy by diverting funds away from important projects and services, but it also perpetuates inequality by favoring the wealthy and connected over the average citizen. This can lead to widespread disillusionment and resentment among the population.Efforts to combat corruption must be multifaceted, involving strong legal frameworks, independent oversight institutions, and a commitment to transparency and accountability. It also requires a cultural shift, where corruption is no longer tolerated or seen as a means to an end.Ultimately, the fight against corruption requires the collective efforts of government, civil society, and the private sector. It is a complex and ongoing battle, but one that is essential for the health and prosperity of any society.。

corruption. a study in political economy -回复

corruption. a study in political economy -回复题目：Corruption: A Study in Political EconomyIntroduction:Corruption has long been recognized as a major obstacle to economic and social development worldwide. It undermines the foundations of democratic governance, distorts market mechanisms, and stifles innovation and investment. This article aims to explore the phenomenon of corruption through a political economy lens, examining its causes, consequences, and potential solutions.I. Definition and Forms of Corruption (200-300 words):To understand corruption, it is crucial to define it accurately. Corruption can be described as the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain, often involving acts of bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, and favoritism. It manifests in various forms, such as grand corruption which involves high-level public officials, and petty corruption which occurs at lower levels of public administration.II. Causes of Corruption (400-500 words):Corruption arises from a complex interplay of factors. Firstly, weak institutions and governance structures provide fertile ground for corruption to thrive. Low salaries and inadequate human resource management in the public sector can incentivize officials to engage in corrupt practices. Additionally, weak checks and balances, lack of transparency and accountability, and limited access to justice may discourage individuals from reporting corruption and provide an environment conducive to its persistence.Secondly, economic factors play a significant role in fostering corruption. When income inequality and poverty prevail, corruption can be seen as a survival strategy for many people in positions of power. The promise of personal gain outweighs the risks of punishment or the potential benefits of serving the public interest.Moreover, political factors are intertwined with corruption. The concentration of power in the hands of a few can lead to a monopolization of resources and decision-making processes,creating opportunities for corrupt practices. Politicians and their cronies may engage in rent-seeking behavior, using their positions to extract wealth from the economy.III. Consequences of Corruption (400-500 words):The consequences of corruption extend beyond mere economic costs. Social cohesion and trust in institutions erode when corruption becomes rampant, undermining the legitimacy of the state. Corruption diverts resources from vital public services like healthcare and education, resulting in lower living standards for citizens.Furthermore, corruption perpetuates inequality as it reinforces advantages for the already wealthy and well-connected, exacerbating income disparities within societies. It discourages investment and job creation, hindering economic growth and development.IV. Combating Corruption: Potential Solutions (400-500 words):Addressing corruption requires a multi-dimensional approach.Strengthening institutions and governance is paramount. Governments must invest in capacity-building, ensuring public officials are well-paid, trained, and held accountable for their actions. Enhancing transparency and independent oversight mechanisms can also foster a culture of accountability.Civil society plays a crucial role in fighting corruption by demanding transparency, blow the whistle on corrupt practices, and advocating for legal and policy reforms. In addition, leveraging technology and digital platforms can enhance accountability and reduce opportunities for corruption.Furthermore, international cooperation is essential in combating corruption. By establishing and enforcing stringent anti-corruption frameworks, countries can work together to tackle transnational corruption and money laundering.Conclusion:Corruption remains a global challenge that requires an interdisciplinary approach to address its complex causes andconsequences. By understanding corruption through a political economy lens, policymakers and stakeholders can adopt effective measures to curb corruption, thereby promoting inclusive economic growth, social justice, and sustainable development.。

2022年考研考博-考博英语-中国财政科学研究院考试全真模拟易错、难点剖析B卷(带答案)第83期

2022年考研考博-考博英语-中国财政科学研究院考试全真模拟易错、难点剖析B卷（带答案）一.综合题(共15题)1.翻译题41.我们必须全面深化改革，以释放市场活力对冲经济下行压力。

42.尽管财政收入增速放缓，支出压力加大，但我们要坚持以人为本，持续增加民生投入。

43.在基础设施、公共事业等领域，应积极推广政府和社会资本合作模式。

44.我们要全面推进依法治国，加快建设法治政府、创新政府、廉洁政府和服务型政府。

45.中国节能环保市场潜力巨大，它可以成为新兴的支柱产业。

【答案】41. In order to invigorate the market to offset downward economic pressure, we must comprehensively deepen reform.42. Despite the slowdown in the growth of government revenue and increased pressure on expenditures, we must continue to put people first, sustaining increases to spending in areas that are important to improving standards of living.43. Efforts should be made to promote Public-Private-Partnership in infrastructure, public utilities and other areas.44. We will fully promote the law-based governance of the country; move more swiftly to build an innovative, clean, service-oriented rule of law government.45. There is enormous potential in China’s market for energy conservation and environmental protection; energy conservation and environmental protection industry can develop into a new pillar of the economy.2.单选题We held a meeting to sum up our experience ______ we finish the work.问题1选项A.incidentallyB.whileC.immediatelyD.before【答案】C【解析】考查词义辨析。

OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY OF ILLEGAL PROCEEDS OF CORRUP

OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY OF ILLEGAL PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION CRIME STIPULATED IN “THEUNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINSTCORRUPTION”Pei Zhaobin*“The United Nations Convention against Corruption” is the mostprofound and authoritative international convention on the recovery ofcorruption crime proceeds. The convention systematically stipulatescorruption assets recovery mode. This paper aims to illustrate thecorruption assets recovery modes systematically, and provide examples forrecovery of illegal proceeds of corruption crime.I NTRODUCTION (696)I.T HE C ONCEPT AND THE O BSTACLES OF THE D IRECT R ECOVERY (696)A. The Concept of the Direct Recovery (696)B. The Feature of the Direct Recovery (697)C. The Advantage and the Problems of Direct Recovery (697)II.T HE C ONCEPT AND THE C ONTENT OF THE I NDIRECT R ECOVERY (698)A. The Concept and the Characteristics of Indirect Recovery (698)All Rights Reserved.B. The Content Related to Confiscation Regime (698)C ONCLUSION (700)I NTRODUCTIONRecovery of illegal proceeds of corruption crime is the most effective way in curbing the criminal’s intent in potential corruption crimes. “TheUnited Nations Convention against Corruption” systematically stipulates thecorruption assets recovery modes, which are direct mode and indirect mode.I.T HE C ONCEPT AND THE O BSTACLES OF THE D IRECT R ECOVERYA.The Concept of the Direct RecoveryThe so-called direct recovery means that between the Parties to the* Vice Dean of Humanities and Law School, Dalian Ocean University; Postdoctoral researcher, EastChina University of Political Science and Law. Research field: Administrative Law, Procedural Law,International Criminal Law & Forensic System.Fund project: This paper is the staged result of China Postdoctoral Science Fund Assistance Project(No.2012M520864), and Liaoning Social Science Planning Fund Project (L13DFX027).6962014 OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY OF ILLEGAL 697Convention, if a Party State found its assets are transferred to another StateParty due to corruption offenses, the country of origin of the assets may bepermitted by the Convention in some way to claim the rights to the countrywhere the assets will be the asset recovery. Article 53 of “the UnitedNations Convention against Corruption” provides three measures for directrecovery of assets, which are to permit another State Party to initiate civilaction in its courts, to permit its courts to order those who commit crimes topay compensation or damages compensation to another State Party victims,to permit its courts or competent authorities of another State Party torecognize the advocated legitimate ownership of property obtained in thecrimes.B.The Feature of the Direct RecoveryDirect recovery of assets has the following obvious legal characteristics: First, the main body of direct recovery is the sovereign state. Second, themeasures for direct recovery is generally in the case of the requesting Statehas not carried out the confiscation of proceeds of corruption offenses. Third,the direct recovery way is that the requested country recover the proceeds ofcorruption offenses by ensuring the requesting country’s ownership of theAll Rights Reserved.proceeds. Fourth, in terms of procedure, direct recovery is that requestingState initiate litigation to the requested State through civil, criminal or otherforms, to prosecute indeed right, this approach does not require directrecovery through forfeiture proceedings.C.The Advantage and the Problems of Direct RecoveryDirect recovery way has its advantages, which are determined by its features. First, due to the existence civil way of direct recovery measures, itis easily to get a direct legal basis for litigation. Second, from timeliness ofthe rights guaranteed, civil way is better. Third, a civil action may be tried inabsentia.1Although the direct recovery of property has its advantage, it will face some problems in practice:One is a matter of principle—national sovereignty. In the three measures for direct recovery of the provisions of the Convention, the firstmeasure is that the corruption asset origin country files a lawsuit to thecorruption asset existing country. But this civil action is quite different from1 Wu Gaoqing (吴高庆), Guoji Xingshi Sifa Hezuo de Guize yu Shijian (国际刑事司法合作的规则与实践) (Beijing 2008), at 158.698 US-CHINA LAW REVIEW Vol. 11: 696the general civil litigation.Second is the nature of the case. While the Convention provides that States may recover the assets by way of civil action, but in practical lawsuitthe judicial system issue must be taken into consideration. Since not all thecorruption assets recovery cases are considered as civil cases in every Parties,in some of which are taken as criminal cases. Meanwhile, the nature of thecase will directly affect the litigation process, especially its key burden ofproof, and these problems will directly affect the final outcome of the case.Third is the main body of the lawsuit. Lawsuit proceedings are bound to have a clear plaintiff and defendant, the defendant needless to say, whilewho should be the plaintiff? Is it the State Council, the Procuratorate, or theunit of where corruption elements? The problems are to be identified andregulated by relevant domestic law.In summary, as for our country, direct way is not necessarily the most efficient and effective way to recover the proceeds of corruption offenses.II.T HE C ONCEPT AND THE C ONTENT OF THE I NDIRECT R ECOVERYA.The Concept and the Characteristics of Indirect RecoveryAll Rights Reserved.In addition to Article 53 of the Convention that provides the direct recovery measures, the corresponding provisions in Article 54 of theindirect measures of corruption assets, namely “indirect corruption assetrecovery measure is an assets retreating measure, that when a State Party inaccordance with national law enforces a confiscation order issued by thecourt of another Contracting State, and confiscate the proceeds of crimeassets transferred within their territory after corruption, and then return it toanother Contracting State”. From the definition of the Convention on therecovery of indirect measures, the indirect recovery mode has the followingtwo characteristics: First, the indirect recovery must go through twoprograms, one is confiscation procedures; and another is the return process.Second is the core of the two programs is confiscation proceedings.2B.The Content Related to Confiscation Regime1. The Concept of ConfiscationConfiscation refers to permanent deprivation of the ownership of2Huang Feng & Zhao Linna (黄风 & 赵琳娜), Guoji Xingshi Sifa Hezuo (国际刑事司法合作)(Beijing 2009), at 141.2014 OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY OF ILLEGAL 699corruption offenses proceeds. Convention also defines what is confiscated,which means the implementation of the permanent confiscation of propertydeprivation in the name of a court or other competent authority, whichincludes forfeiture in appropriate cases. Confiscation proceeding is the keyof indirect recovery of corruption crime. Early in 1988, the confiscationregime is formally provided in the “Convention against Drugs”, after whichthe confiscation regime also provides in several other conventions.2. The Objects of ConfiscationThe first paragraph of Article 31 of the Convention were more clearly defined: Each State Party shall take the greatest extent possible within itsdomestic legal system, such measures as may be necessary to enableconfiscation of: (a) Proceeds of crime derived from offences established inaccordance with this Convention or property the value of which correspondsto that of such proceeds; (b) Property, equipment or other instrumentalitiesused in or destined for use in offences established in accordance with thisConvention.3. The Legal Basis for the ConfiscationAll Rights Reserved.From the current realities of international cooperation, the confiscation of proceeds of corruption offenses is provided in conventions. The firstparagraph of Article 54 of the Convention states: Each State Party, in orderto provide mutual legal assistance pursuant to Article 55 of this Conventionwith respect to property acquired through or involved in the commission ofan offence established in accordance with this Convention, shall, inaccordance with its domestic law.4. Asset Confiscation MeasuresThe second paragraph of Article 54 provides three ways for the Contracting Parties:(a) To confiscate assets upon a freezing or seizure order issued by therequesting Party.(b) To freeze or seize property in accordance with the request ofanother contracting Party.(c) To consider taking additional measures to permit its competentauthorities to preserve property for confiscation, such as on the basis of aforeign arrest or criminal charge related to the acquisition of such property.700 US-CHINA LAW REVIEW Vol. 11: 696C ONCLUSIONAs a developing country, China is the country where corruption crime proceeds flow out, so the fight against corruption a crime, so recovery theproceeds of corruption offenses is a arduous task for China. Although inrecent years China has made some achievements in the recovery of proceedsof corruption offenses, but because of the concept and system lag, resultingin the failure to establish related systems. Therefore, in order to fight againstcorruption crimes, drawing on the practical experiences of internationalsociety and developed countries, combining with China’s reality, Chinashould promptly update the concept, and establish its own recovery mode, toestablish judicial ruling system, recognition and enforcement of foreigncriminal forfeiture verdict censorship, absentia system and set up a specialfund to promote the recovery of proceeds of corruption offenses.All Rights Reserved.。

Political corruption

Political corruptionFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to: navigation, searchWorld map of the 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, which measures "the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians". High numbers (green) indicate less perception of corruption, whereas lower numbers (red) indicate higher perception of corruption.Political corruption is the use of legislated powers by government officials for illegitimate private gain. Misuse of government power for other purposes, such as repression of political opponents and general police brutality, is not considered political corruption. Neither are illegal acts by private persons or corporations not directly involved with the government. An illegal act by an officeholder constitutes political corruption only if the act is directly related to their official duties.Forms of corruption vary, but include bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement. While corruption may facilitate criminal enterprise such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, it is not restricted to these activities.The activities that constitute illegal corruption differ depending on the country or jurisdiction. For instance, certain political funding practices that are legal in one place may be illegal in another. In some cases, government officials have broad or poorly defined powers, which make it difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal actions. Worldwide, bribery alone is estimated to involve over 1 trillion US dollars annually.[1]A state of unrestrained political corruption is known as a kleptocracy, literally meaning "rule by thieves".Contents[hide]1 Effectso 1.1 Effects on politics, administration, and institutionso 1.2 Economic effectso 1.3 Environmental and social effectso 1.4 Effects on Humanitarian Aido 1.5 Other areas: health, public safety, education, trade unions, etc.∙ 2 Typeso 2.1 Briberyo 2.2 Governmental corruption of judiciaryo 2.3 Trading in influenceo 2.4 Patronageo 2.5 Nepotism and cronyismo 2.6 Electoral fraudo 2.7 Embezzlemento 2.8 Kickbackso 2.9 Unholy allianceo 2.10 Involvement in organized crime∙ 3 Conditions favorable for corruptiono 3.1 Relation to economic freedomo 3.2 Size of public sector∙ 4 Governmental corruption∙ 5 Fighting corruption∙ 6 Whistleblowers∙7 Campaign contributions∙8 Measuring corruption∙9 See also∙10 References∙11 Further reading∙12 External links[edit] Effects[edit] Effects on politics, administration, and institutionsDetail from Corrupt Legislation (1896) by Elihu Vedder. Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C.Corruption poses a serious development challenge. In the political realm, it undermines democracy and good governance by flouting or even subverting formal processes. Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies reduces accountability and distorts representation in policymaking; corruption in the judiciary compromises the rule of law; and corruption in public administration results in the inefficient provision of services. More generally, corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government as procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and public offices are bought and sold. At the same time, corruption undermines the legitimacy of government and such democratic values as trust and tolerance.[edit] Economic effectsSee also: Corporate crimeCorruption undermines economic development by generating considerable distortions and inefficiency. In the private sector, corruption increases the cost of business through the price of illicit payments themselves, the management cost of negotiating with officials, and the risk of breached agreements or detection. Although some claim corruption reduces costs by cutting red tape, the availability of bribes can also induce officials to contrive new rules and delays. Openly removing costly and lengthy regulations are better than covertly allowing them to be bypassed by using bribes. Where corruption inflates the cost of business, it also distorts the playing field, shielding firms with connections from competition and thereby sustaining inefficient firms.Corruption also generates economic distortions in the public sector by diverting public investment into capital projects where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful. Officials may increase the technical complexity of public sector projects to conceal or pave the way for such dealings, thus further distorting investment. Corruption also lowers compliance with construction, environmental, or other regulations, reduces the quality of government services and infrastructure, and increases budgetary pressures on government.Economists argue that one of the factors behind the differing economic development in Africa and Asia is that in the former, corruption has primarily taken the form of rent extraction with the resulting financial capital moved overseas rather than invested at home (hence thestereotypical, but often accurate, image of African dictators having Swiss bank accounts). In Nigeria, for example, more than $400 billion was stolen from the treasury by Nigeria's leaders between 1960 and 1999.[2] University of Massachusetts researchers estimated that from 1970 to 1996, capital flight from 30 sub-Saharan countries totaled $187bn, exceeding those nations' external debts.[3] (The results, expressed in retarded or suppressed development, have been modeled in theory by economist Mancur Olson.) In the case of Africa, one of the factors for this behavior was political instability, and the fact that new governments often confiscated previous government's corruptly-obtained assets. This encouraged officials to stash their wealth abroad, out of reach of any future expropriation. In contrast, Asian administrations such as Suharto's New Order often took a cut on business transactions or provided conditions for development, through infrastructure investment, law and order, etc.[edit] Environmental and social effectsCorruption facilitates environmental destruction. Corrupt countries may formally have legislation to protect the environment, it cannot be enforced if officials can easily be bribed. The same applies to social rights worker protection, unionization prevention, and child labor. Violation of these laws rights enables corrupt countries to gain illegitimate economic advantage in the international market.The Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen has observed that "there is no such thing as an apolitical food problem." While drought and other naturally occurring events may trigger famine conditions, it is government action or inaction that determines its severity, and often even whether or not a famine will occur. Governments with strong tendencies towards kleptocracy can undermine food security even when harvests are good. Officials often steal state property. In Bihar, India, more than 80% of the subsidized food aid to poor is stolen by corrupt officials.[4] Similarly, food aid is often robbed at gunpoint by governments, criminals, and warlords alike, and sold for a profit. The 20th century is full of many examples of governments undermining the food security of their own nations – sometimes intentionally.[5][edit] Effects on Humanitarian AidThe scale of humanitarian aid to the poor and unstable regions of the world grows, but it is highly vulnerable to corruption, with food aid, construction and other highly valued assistance as the most at risk.[6]Food aid can be directly and physically diverted from its intended destination, or indirectly through the manipulation of assessments, targeting, registration and distributions to favour certain groups or individuals.[6]Elsewhere, in construction and shelter, there are numerous opportunities for diversion and profit through substandard workmanship, kickbacks for contracts and favouritism in the provision of valuable shelter material.[6]Thus while humanitarian aid agencies are usually most concerned about aid being diverted by including too many, recipients themselves are most concerned about exclusion.[6] Access to aid may be limited to those with connections, to those who pay bribes or are forced to give sexual favours.[6] Equally, those able to do so may manipulate statistics to inflate the number beneficiaries and syphon of the additional assistance.[6][edit] Other areas: health, public safety, education, trade unions, etc.See also: Police corruptionCorruption is not specific to poor, developing, or transition countries. In western European countries, there have been cases of bribery and other forms of corruption in all possible fields: under-the-table payments made to reputed surgeons by patients willing to be on top of the list of forthcoming surgeries, bribes paid by suppliers to the automotive industry in order to sell poor quality connectors used for instance in safety equipment such as airbags, bribes paid by suppliers to manufacturers of defibrillators (to sell poor quality capacitors), contributions paid by wealthy parents to the "social and culture fund" of a prestigious university in exchange for it to accept their children, bribes paid to obtain diplomas, financial and other advantages granted to unionists by members of the executive board of a car manufacturer in exchange for employer-friendly positions and votes, etc. Examples are endless. These various manifestations of corruption can ultimately present a danger for the public health; they can discredit certain essential institutions or social relationships.Corruption can also affect the various components of sports activities (referees, players, medical and laboratory staff involved in anti-doping controls, members of national sport federation and international committees deciding about the allocation of contracts and competition places).There have also been cases against (members of) various types ofnon-profit and non-government organisations, as well as religious organisations.Ultimately, the distinction between public and private sector corruption sometimes appears rather artificial and national anti-corruption initiatives may need to avoid legal and other loopholes in the coverage of the instruments.[edit] Types[edit] BriberyMain article: BriberyA bribe is a payment given personally to a government official in exchange of his use of official powers. Bribery requires two participants: one to give the bribe, and one to take it. Either may initiate the corrupt offering; for example, a customs official may demand bribes to let through allowed (or disallowed) goods, or a smuggler might offer bribes to gain passage. In some countries the culture of corruption extends to every aspect of public life, making it extremely difficult for individuals to stay in business without resorting to bribes. Bribes may be demanded in order for an official to do something he is already paid to do. They may also be demanded in order to bypass laws and regulations. In addition to using bribery for private financial gain, they are also used to intentionally and maliciously cause harm to another (i.e. no financial incentive). In some developing nations, up to half of the population has paid bribes during the past 12 months.[7]In recent years, efforts have been made by the international community to encourage countries to dissociate and incriminate as separate offences, active and passive bribery. Active bribery can be defined for instance as the promising, offering or giving by any person, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage [to any public official], for himself or herself or for anyone else, for him or her to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions.(article 2 of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) of the Council of Europe). Passive bribery can be defined as the request or receipt [by any public official], directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage, for himself or herself or for anyone else, or the acceptance of an offer or a promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions (article 3 of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173)). Thereason for this dissociation is to make the early steps (offering, promising, requesting an advantage) of a corrupt deal already an offence and, thus, to give a clear signal (from a criminal policy point of view) that bribery is not acceptable. Besides, such a dissociation makes the prosecution of bribery offences easier since it can be very difficult to prove that two parties (the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker) have formally agreed upon a corrupt deal. Besides, there is often no such formal deal but only a mutual understanding, for instance when it is common knowledge in a municipality that to obtain a building permit one has to pay a "fee" to the decision maker to obtain a favourable decision. A working definition of corruption is also provided as follows in article 3 of the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 174): For the purpose of this Convention, "corruption" means requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the prospect thereof.[edit] Governmental corruption of judiciaryGovernmental corruption of judiciary includes governmental spending on the courts, which is completely financially controlled by the executive in many transitional and developing countries. This undermines the principle of checks and balances and creates a critical financial dependence on the judiciary. It covers latent governmental spending on the judiciary in the form of privileges –cars, country houses,expenses. Such a system is completely outside the realm of transparency and creates a precedent for the corruption of the judiciary by executive authorities.[edit] Trading in influenceTrading in influence, or influence peddling in certain countries, refers to the situation where a person is selling his/her influence over the decision process involving a third party (person or institution). The difference with bribery is that this is a tri-lateral relation. From a legal point of view, the role of the third party (who is the target of the influence) does not really matter although he/she can be an accessory in some instances. It can be difficult to make a distinction between this form of corruption and certain forms of extreme and poorly regulated lobbying where for instance law- or decision-makers can freely "sell" their vote, decision power or influence to those lobbyists who offer the highest retribution, including where for instance the latter act on behalf of powerful clients such as industrial groups who want to avoid the passingof certain environmental, social, or other regulations perceived as too stringent, etc. Where lobbying is (sufficiently) regulated, it becomes possible to provide for a distinctive criteria and to consider that trading in influence involves the use of "improper influence", as in article 12 of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) of the Council of Europe.[edit] PatronageMain article: PatronagePatronage refers to favoring supporters, for example with government employment. This may be legitimate, as when a newly elected government changes the top officials in the administration in order to effectively implement its policy. It can be seen as corruption if this means that incompetent persons, as a payment for supporting the regime, are selected before more able ones. In nondemocracies many government officials are often selected for loyalty rather than ability. They may be almost exclusively selected from a particular group (for example, Sunni Arabs in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the nomenklatura in the Soviet Union, or the Junkers in Imperial Germany) that support the regime in return for such favors. A similar problem can also be seen in Eastern Europe, for example in Romania, where the government is often accused of patronage (when a new government comes to power, in a few months time it changed most of the officials in the public sector).[edit] Nepotism and cronyismMain articles: Nepotism and CronyismFavoring relatives (nepotism) or personal friends (cronyism) of an official is a form of illegitimate private gain. This may be combined with bribery, for example demanding that a business should employ a relative of an official controlling regulations affecting the business. The most extreme example is when the entire state is inherited, as in North Korea or Syria. A milder form of cronyism is an "old boy network", in which appointees to official positions are selected only from a closed and exclusive social network –such as the alumni of particular universities – instead of appointing the most competent candidate.Seeking to harm enemies becomes corruption when official powers are illegitimately used as means to this end. For example, trumped-up charges are often brought up against journalists or writers who bring uppolitically sensitive issues, such as a politician's acceptance of bribes.In the Indian political system, leadership of national and regional parties are passed from generation to generation creating a system in which a family holds the center of power, some examples are most of the dravidian parties of south India and also the largest party in India - Congress.[edit] Electoral fraudMain article: Electoral fraudElectoral fraud is illegal interference with the process of an election. Acts of fraud affect vote counts to bring about an election result, whether by increasing the vote share of the favored candidate, depressing the vote share of the rival candidates, or both. Also called voter fraud, the mechanisms involved include illegal voter registration, intimidation at polls, and improper vote counting.[edit] EmbezzlementMain article: EmbezzlementEmbezzlement is outright theft of entrusted funds. It is a misappropriation of property.Another common type of embezzlement is that of entrusted government resources; for example, when a director of a public enterprise employs company workers to build or renovate his own house.[edit] KickbacksA kickback is an official's share of misappropriated funds allocated from his or her organization to an organization involved in corrupt bidding. For example, suppose that a politician is in charge of choosing how to spend some public funds. He can give a contract to a company that is not the best bidder, or allocate more than they deserve. In this case, the company benefits, and in exchange for betraying the public, the official receives a kickback payment, which is a portion of the sum the company received. This sum itself may be all or a portion of the difference between the actual (inflated) payment to the company and the (lower) market-basedprice that would have been paid had the bidding been competitive. Kickbacks are not limited to government officials; any situation in which people are entrusted to spend funds that do not belong to them are susceptible to this kind of corruption. Kickbacks are also common in the pharmaceutical industry, as many doctors and physicians receive pay in return for added promotion and prescription of the drug these pharmaceutical companies are marketing. (See: Anti-competitive practices, Bid rigging.)[edit] Unholy allianceAn unholy alliance is a coalition among seemingly antagonistic groups, especially if one is religious,[8]for ad hoc or hidden gain. Like patronage, unholy alliances are not necessarily illegal, but unlike patronage, by its deceptive nature and often great financial resources, an unholy alliance can be much more dangerous to the public interest. An early, well-known use of the term was by Theodore Roosevelt (TR):"To destroy this invisible Government, to dissolve the unholyalliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics is the first task of the statesmanship of the day." – 1912 Progressive PartyPlatform, attributed to TR[9]and quoted again in his autobiography[10]where he connects trusts and monopolies(sugar interests, Standard Oil, etc.) to Woodrow Wilson, Howard Taft, and consequently both major political parties.[edit] Involvement in organized crimeAn illustrative example of official involvement in organized crime can be found from 1920s and 1930s Shanghai, where Huang Jinrong was a police chief in the French concession, while simultaneously being a gang boss and co-operating with Du Yuesheng, the local gang ringleader. The relationship kept the flow of profits from the gang's gambling dens, prostitution, and protection rackets undisturbed.The United States accused Manuel Noriega's government in Panama of being a "narcokleptocracy", a corrupt government profiting on illegal drug trade. Later the U.S. invaded Panama and captured Noriega.[edit] Conditions favorable for corruptionThis section is in a list format that may be better presented using prose.You can help by converting this section to prose, if appropriate.Editing help is available. (December 2009)It is argued that the following conditions are favorable for corruption: ∙Information deficitso Lack of government transparency.o Lacking freedom of information legislation. The Indian Right to Information Act 2005 has "already engendered massmovements in the country that is bringing the lethargic,often corrupt bureaucracy to its knees and changing powerequations completely."[11]o Lack of investigative reporting in the local media.o Contempt for or negligence of exercising freedom of speech and freedom of the press.o Weak accounting practices, including lack of timelyfinancial management.o Lack of measurement of corruption. For example, using regular surveys of households and businesses in order to quantify thedegree of perception of corruption in different parts of anation or in different government institutions may increaseawareness of corruption and create pressure to combat it.This will also enable an evaluation of the officials who arefighting corruption and the methods used.o Tax havens which tax their own citizens and companies but not those from other nations and refuse to disclose informationnecessary for foreign taxation. This enables large scalepolitical corruption in the foreign nations.[12][citation needed]∙Lacking control of the government.o Democracy absent or dysfunctional. See illiberal democracy.o Lacking civic society and non-governmental organizations which monitor the government.o An individual voter may have a rational ignorance regarding politics, especially in nationwide elections, since eachvote has little weight.o Weak civil service, and slow pace of reform.o Weak rule of law.o Weak legal profession.o Weak judicial independence.o Lacking protection of whistleblowers.o Lack of benchmarking, that is continual detailed evaluation of procedures and comparison to others who do similar things,in the same government or others, in particular comparisonto those who do the best work. The Peruvian organizationCiudadanos al Dia has started to measure and comparetransparency, costs, and efficiency in different governmentdepartments in Peru. It annually awards the best practiceswhich has received widespread media attention. This hascreated competition among government agencies in order toimprove.[13]∙Opportunities and incentiveso Individual officials routinely handle cash, instead of handling payments by giro or on a separate cashdesk—illegitimate withdrawals from supervised bankaccounts are much more difficult to conceal.o Public funds are centralized rather than distributed. For example, if $1,000 is embezzled from a local agency that has$2,000 funds, it is easier to notice than from a nationalagency with $2,000,000 funds. See the principle ofsubsidiarity.o Large, unsupervised public investments.o Sale of state-owned property and privatization.[citation needed]o Poorly-paid government officials.o Government licenses needed to conduct business, e.g., import licenses, encourage bribing and kickbacks.o Long-time work in the same position may create relationships inside and outside the government which encourage and helpconceal corruption and favoritism. Rotating governmentofficials to different positions and geographic areas mayhelp prevent this; for instance certain high rank officialsin French government services (e.g. treasurer-paymastersgeneral) must rotate every few years.o Costly political campaigns, with expenses exceeding normal sources of political funding, especially when funded withtaxpayer money.o Less interaction with officials reduces the opportunities for corruption. For example, using the Internet for sendingin required information, like applications and tax forms, andthen processing this with automated computer systems. Thismay also speed up the processing and reduce unintentionalhuman errors. See e-Government.o A windfall from exporting abundant natural resources may encourage corruption.[14](See Resource curse)o War and other forms of conflict correlate with a breakdown of public security.∙Social conditionso Self-interested closed cliques and "old boy networks".o Family-, and clan-centered social structure, with atradition of nepotism/favouritism being acceptable.o A gift economy, such as the Chinese guanxi or the Soviet blat system, emerges in a Communist centrally planned economy.o In societies where personal integrity is rated as less important than other characteristics (by contrast, insocieties such as 18th and 19th century England, 20th centuryJapan, and post-war western Germany, where society showedalmost obsessive regard for "honor" and personal integrity,corruption was less frequently seen)[citation needed]o Lacking literacy and education among the population.o Frequent discrimination and bullying among the population.o Tribal solidarity, giving benefits to certain ethnic groups [edit] Relation to economic freedomAccording to a study of the conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation, lack of economic freedom explains 71% of corruption[15]: the poorer the Index of Economic Freedom, the more corruption there is in a country. Below is a list of examples of governmental activities that limit economic freedom, create opportunities for corruption (incentives for individuals and/or companies to buy privileges or favors worth of money, from politicians or officials), and have in recent economic history also led to corruption:∙Licenses, permits, etc.∙Foreign trade restrictions. Officials may then, e.g., sell import or export permits.∙Credit bailouts.∙State ownership of utilities and natural resources. 'In analyzing India's state-run irrigation system, professor Shyam Kamath - -wrote: Public-sector irrigation systems everywhere are typically plagued with cost and time overruns, endemic inefficiency, chronic excess demands, and widespread corruption and rent seeking.' ∙Access to loans at below-market rates. In Chile, '$4.6 billion was awarded to government banks in direct subsidies through "soft"loans' between 1940 and 1973.[15][edit] Size of public sectorIt is a controversial issue whether the size of the public sector per se results in corruption. As mentioned above, low degree of economic freedom explains 71% of corruption. The actual share may be even greater, as also。

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IZA Discussion Paper No. 8094 Aprruption Promote Emigration? An Empirical Examination
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between corruption and the emigration of those with high, medium and low levels of educational attainment. The empirical results indicate that as corruption increases the emigration rate of those with high levels of educational attainment also increases. The emigration rate of those with middle and low levels of educational attainment, however, increases at initial levels of corruption and then decreases beyond a certain point. Splitting the sample by income inequality suggests that increased inequality reduces the ability to emigrate. The policy conclusion is, that government actions should focus on controlling corruption, which in turn would lead to funds being channeled more productively into education and also lead to a fall in inequality which would reduce emigration.
2
1. Introduction Neo-classical migration theory views emigrants as individual, rational players who decide to move on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation. This theory perceives migration as leading to an optimal allocation of resources through which wages are equalised across countries due to the movement of labour, from surplus to scarce countries. Structuralists critique the neoclassical theory stating that individuals do not have a free choice to move as they are fundamentally constrained by structural forces or alternatively, are forced to move due to economic and political reasons (de Haas 2007). Dependency theorists argue that migration is not necessarily an overall beneficial process as it leads to an extraction of labour from the periphery to core deepening the vicious cycle of poverty in the periphery and accelerating growth of the core. There are however, a number of push and pull forces brought about by demographic change, globalization, political conflict, institutions and climate change that have increased migration pressures both within and across borders (de Haas, 2007) 1 .
Corresponding author: Friedrich Schneider Department of Economics Johannes Kepler University of Linz Altenbergerstrasse 69 4040 Linz Austria E-mail: friedrich.schneider@jku.at
JEL Classification: Keywords:
O17, O5, D78, H2, H11, H26
corruption, emigration, educational attainment, government expenditures, income inequality, labor markets
1
See de Haas (2007) for a survey of the literature. Much of the theoretical work on remittances has been devoted to the primary motive of migrants to remit. Among the motives put forward are, altruism (Banerjee 1984), insurance (Rosenzweig, 1988), investment (Lucas and Stark 1985), inheritance (Hoddinott 1994), risk diversification (Stark and Levhari 1982).
In the present study, we focus on corruption as a push factor for labour emigration. The existence of corruption could lower the returns to education slowing down the process of economics growth acting as a push factor for out-migration (Dimant et al. 2013). In the presence of corruption, jobs are not granted based upon merit but political connections. This could lead to higher levels of unemployment and/or underemployment, lowering the returns to the stock of human capital. Corruption has been also been found to change the size and composition of public expenditure away from vital sectors such as health and education (Mauro 1998, Wei 2001) toward sectors which involve greater secrecy and less transparency such as defence. Gupta et al. (2002, 2000) argue that corruption affects the provision of
Johannes Kepler University of Linz and IZA
Discussion Paper No. 8094 April 2014
IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180 E-mail: iza@
Does Corruption Promote Emigration? An Empirical Examination
Arusha Cooray
University of Wollongong and CAMA, Australian National University
Friedrich Schneider
SERIES
IZA DP No. 8094
PAPER
Does Corruption Promote Emigration? An Empirical Examination
Arusha Cooray Friedrich Schneider
DISCUSSION
April 2014
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.