波兰的公司治理与财务绩效[文献翻译]

波兰的公司治理与财务绩效[文献翻译] Corporate Governance and Financial Performance of Companies in
Poland
Abstract
The research presented in the paper is aimed at examining the relationship between the level of corporate governance and the financial performance of listed companies in Poland. The corporate governance degree is expressed by the outcomes of a rating of 2003 performed by Polish Corporate Governance Forum. The attempted models are of ordered multinomial type. Endogenous variable represents the rating outcome (A-, B+, B, B-, and C+), while the exogenous variables include various financial indicators evaluated on the basis of the 2002 financial statements. The estimated ordered logit models show that the level of corporate governance of companies in Poland is associated with their ability to cope with the financial distress, as expressed by the degree of liquidity, profitability and the financial leverage variables. (JEL C10, O57, G30)
Corporate Governance Ratings for Polish Companies
From the perspective of a company, the corporate governance means: independent and efficient supervising body, transparent and accurate books, strong shareholders’rights and equal treatment of all owners groups. Mechanism of corporate governance minimizes the agency costs, i.e., reduces the company’s market value loss resulting from a potential conflict between the managers and the owners (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996).
Polish Corporate Governance Forum performed two ratings of the companies quoted on Warsaw Stock Exchange, the first in 2001 and the second in 2004 (Tamowicz et al., 2001; Dzierzanowski et al., 2004). These two ratings are not really comparable, since the authors significantly changed the scope and methodology for the second rating.
The last rating of 2004 was carried out for 53 companies with largest
capitalization on WSE. The data on legal standing of the companies’corporate governance issues were collected as of November 2003. According to the authors’description, the 2004 rating was based Bon the analysis of statutes, internal regulations (by-laws) concerning functioning of supervisory and management boards and shareholders’meetings and content of the companies’websites. The very important sources of information were the companies’declarations of compliance with the Warsaw Stock Exchange Code and especially the commentaries to particular rules.
Authors of PCFG rating indicate at least 60 characteristics that were taken into account for each company in order to obtain appropriate picture of company’s corporate governance level. The indicator variables for the rating were taken from the following areas:
position and competence of supervisory board incl. independent board
members
2.supervision over party-related transactions
3.general shareholders meeting accessibility
4.functioning of the management board
5.Auditor’s independence
ck of anti-takeover defences
7.regulations on trading in own shares
panies’declared goals and intentions
9.transparency arrangements, including information available from the
companies’websites.
The disclosed rating uses five categories from A- to C+. These were assigned to 53 companies. The authors indicate that the full range of categories include ratings from A to E. The rating is presented in Table 1. There are five companies rated C+, 17 companies with a B- rating, 14 companies with B, 13 with B+, and 4 with A-. Econometrics and the Corporate Governance
TABLE 1：PCFG 2004 Rating of Corporate Governance for the Companies Listed on WSE
The econometric research on corporate governance concerns mainly the relationships between various categories representing firm’s performance and the variables describing the governance level, such as ownership structure or the composition of supervising body. Surveys of such research are presented, e.g., in Bhagat and Jefferis (2002), Boersch-Supan and Koeke (2002), and Gugler (2001). Main factors influencing the corporate governance level, which are usually considered in empirical research, are:
position of the supervisory board (degree of dependence on
management, board＇s structure)
2.ownership structure (diluted ownership, concentration of ownership,
corporate owners, institutional owners, managerial ownership)
3.acquisitions (including managerial acquisitions) and CEO changing
4.equity structure (debt structure)
5.managerial compensation
Boersch-Supan and Koeke (2002) formulate a number of weak points of econometric research concerning corporate governance, such as:
1.Structural Reverse Causality: For example, it is not clear what is the
direction of causality between ownership structure and firm’s
performance; more concentrated ownership can improve firm
performance, but the reverse relation is also possibleYfirms well assessed
by the market could also attract investors.
2.Missing Variables: In the area of corporate governance it is customary that
major explanatory variables may not be included into the model;
moreover, the linear3.Specification of the equations excludes the presence
of higher order terms.
3.Sample Selectivity: Most empirical studies on corporate governance
analyze only the largest companies, usually the listed ones; such samples
are selected by the performance variable and Y in effect Y the studies have
sample selection bias.
4.Measurement Error in Variables: For example, the company’s
performance can be measured by different variables, such as market value,
ROA, ROE, EBIT, Tobin’s Q; these variables are sometimes uncorrelated,
i.e., they measure the same performance in different way.
To properly deal with some of these dangers of econometric modeling in corporate governance it is necessary to use panel data on companies. Boersch-Supan and Koeke (2002) indicate several such databases for Germany.
Corporate Governance and Economic Performance
The recent survey of corporate governance in OECD countries (Corporate governance, 2004) indicates that Bstudies that are considered to be best practice econometric techniques indicate that the corporate governance is an important determinant of performance (...).Survey authors quote three studies showing significant association between the level of governance and the firms’performance.
In another study, Bøhren and Ødegaard (2001) analyze the relationship between Tobin’s Q for the companies quoted on Oslo stock exchange in 1989Y1997 (217 companies by the end of 1997) and several variables representing corporate governance. Their results indicate e.g., that ownership concentration has negative effect on performance, while the effect of insider ownership is positive. Increasing board size and the use of nonvoting shares decrease performance. The direct ownership has stronger effect on performance than institutional or state ownership.
Similar outcomes are presented in a study by Lehman and Weigand (2000) for
the sample of 361 German companies in 1991Y1996. In their research, company’s performance measured by ROA is related to a number of corporate governance variables. The panel regression results confirmed that ownership concentration has negative effect on ROA, while the positive impact of ownership concentration is found for firms with financial institutions as large shareholders.
Corporate governance indices constructed for various countries also have been examined with respect to their association both with economic and market performance of companies. The examples may be found in Gruszczynski (2003). In the next section, an attempt is made towards examining the relationship between the corporate governance rating and company’s financial performance.
Ordered Logit
The corporate governance rating represents a typical dependent variable suitable for ordered response models. The categories are ranked in ascending order and the distances between neighboring categories are not set as equal. For the exposition we assume that the observed corporate governance rating variable y can be equal to one of five rating categories, as appearing in the 2003 Polish rating.
It is assumed that this ordinal variable y is related to the continuous latent variable y* that indicates the company’s degree of corporate governance. The values of y* are unknown.
The values of y* determine the outcome represented by y in the following manner:
y i =1 or C+ ifτ0≤y i * <τ1
y i =2 or B- ifτ1≤y i * <τ2
y i =3 or B ifτ2≤y i * <τ3
y i =4 or B+ ifτ3≤y i * <τ4
y i =5 or A- ifτ4≤y i * <τ5
The τ’s are thresholds (cutpoints), with the values for exteme categories equal toτ0 =-∞andτ5=∞.
The linear model for the unobserved y* is as follows:
yi *=xiτβ+εi
where xi is typical [(k + 1) *1] vector of values on k explanatory variables (plus constant
term) for the ith observation (ith company).
The use of the observed y values requires the assumption about distribution of errors εi. Let F be the cumulative distribution function (cdf). The probability of outcome y = m (m = 1, ..., 5) can be written as:
P(y i=m│x i, β, τ)=F(τm- x iτβ)-F(τm-1- x iτβ) whereτis the vector of cutpoints. In the equation for P(y i=m│x i, β, τ), the second term on the right-hand side is equal 0. Also, in P(y i=m│x i, β, τ), the first term equals 1.
For the ordered probit model, errorεis distributed normally with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. For the ordered logit model, errorεhas logistic distribution. For the sake of model’s identification, either constant term orτ1 is set as equal 0. In the ordered logit:
F(τm- x iτβ)=eτm- xiτβ/(1+ eτm- xiτβ)
The probability pi for each category of y for the ith company (i = │1,2,...,n) is equal to:
P(y i=1│x i, β, τ) if y=1
…
pi= P(y i=m│x i, β, τ) if y=m
…
P(y i=5│x i, β, τ) if y=5
The pi’s lead to form the likelihood function, the max I mum of which is attained for the ML estimates of vectorsβandτ.
Sample and Models
For the purpose of explaining corporate governance rating y of Polish listed
companies, the ordered logit models were specified. Since the rating of 2004 was based on the November 2003 legal standing, the explanatory variables for financial performance were calculated on the basis of financial statements for the year 2002.
The sample includes 37 out of 53 rated companies. As many as 16 companies have been excluded from the sample: Eight banks, one other financial institution, two companies with the first quotation after January 1, 2002, and five companies excluded for other reasons (data not accessible, financial statements with missing information).
The endogenous variable y has been defined as:
(1)variable CG with all five ranking categories appearing in original
sample;
(2)variable CG1 with only three categories (first two and the last two
have been combined).
The reason for considering also simpler ranking CG1 is the small size of the sample as compared to the number of parameters to be estimated in the logit model.
There are 20 financial ratios that have been considered as explanatory variables. The ratios, calculated on the basis of the co mpanies’ 2002 financial statements are as follows:
Profitability ratios: P102 gross profit from sales margin, P202 operating profit margin, P302 gross profit margin, P402 net profit margin, ROE02 return on equity, and ROA02 return on assets.
Liquidity ratios: L102 current ratio, L202 quick ratio, and L302 acid test.
Activity ratios: A102 amount due turnover, A202 inventory turnover, A302 operating cycle, A402 liabilities turnover, A502 cash conversion cycle, A602 current assets turnover, and A702 assets turnover.
Debt ratios: D102 fixed assets cover ratio, D202 debt margin, D302 EBITDA/ financial expenses, and D402 debt/EBITDA.
Source: Markek Gruszczynski*,“2006.Corporate Governance and Financial
Performance of Companies in Poland”. International Advances in Economic Research, vol.12,pp. 251–259.
二、翻译文章
译文：
波兰的公司治理与财务绩效
摘要
本文目的是研究波兰上市公司的治理水平与财务业绩之间的关系。

公司治理的水平由2003年波兰公司治理论坛进行的评级来表示。

本模型为复合式模型。

内生变量表示评级结果（A-, B+, B, B-, 与 C+），而外生变量为以2002年财务报表为基础的各类财务指标。

多元Logit模型的估计结果显示，波兰上市公司的企业治理水平是与他们应对财务逆境的能力、盈利能力及财务杠杆变量有关联。

（J ELC10，O57，G30）
波兰上市公司的公司治理评级
从一个公司的角度来看，公司治理是指：强大的股东权利与平等待遇的所有业主群体构成的机构对公司独立与高效的监督。

公司治理机制的代理成本最小化，即减少了公司的管理人员与业主之间由于市场价值缺失而造成的潜在冲突（Shleifer与Vishny，1996）。

波兰公司治理论坛对华沙证券交易所进行了两次公司评级，第一次在2001年，第二次在2004年（Tamowicz 等,2001；Dzierzanowski 等, 2004年）。

这两个级别中并没有真正可比性，由于提交的第二次评级，大大改变了范围与方法。

2004年的最后评级是对华尔街上最大市值的53家公司所进行的。

这些对公司的管治事项的法律地位的数据收集时间为2003年11月。

根据作者的描述，2004年的排名是基于法规的分析、内部规定（附例）中关于监督与管理董事会的运作与股东大会与公司网站的内容。

非常重要的信息来源是公司的声明与华沙证券交易所守则，特别是特定规则的评注。

波兰公司治理论坛的创始人的评级说明，为了获得公司的企业管治水平相应的图像，每个公司至少有60个特征被送往考虑。

评级的指标变量是从下列几个方面：
1.债务重组协议与监事会能力，独立董事成员
2.党有关的交易监督
3.通常股东大会的可达性
4.运作管理委员会
5.审计的独立性
6.反收购防御的缺乏性
7.购买自己股票的规定
8.公司声明的目标与意图
9.透明安排，包含信息公司的网站查阅。

公开披露的评级有五类，从A-到C+。

这些被使用到53家公司。

作者指出，信用评级的门类齐全，包含从A至E的等级评分。

有五家公司的评级为C+，17家是B-的评级，另外还有14家是B，13家是B+，4家是A-。

计量经济学与公司治理
表1：2004年在华尔街上市的公司治理评级
对公司治理的经济学研究涉及各方的代表公司各类的业绩水平与变量描述的治理水平之间的要紧关系，如股权结构，或者监督机构的构成。

这些研究调查多次被提出，比如，在Bhagat与Jefferis(2002)，Boersch-Supan与Koeke（2002）与Gugler（2001）。

影响公司治理水平要紧因素，通常认为在实证研究中被证实，要紧有：
1.监事会的构成（对管理层，董事会的结构依靠度）
2.所有权结构（稀释后的所有权，所有权集中，企业业主，机构投资人，
管理权）
3.收购（包含经理收购）与首席执行官变化
4.产权结构（债务结构）
5.经理薪酬
Boersch-Supan与Koeke（2002）制定的关于公司薄弱治理的计量研究，有这几个问题：
1.反向结构因果关系：比如，目前还不清晰股权结构与公司业绩的因果关系的方向是什么，较集中的所有权能够提高公司绩效，但反向关系也可能广受市场评估，也能够吸引投资者。

2.缺失变量：在公司治理方面的习惯，要紧是解释变量可能不被纳入模型中；此外，该方程linear
3.的规格排除了高阶项的存在。

3.样品选择性：大多数公司治理的实证研究通常只分析上市的大公司，这样的样本会选择有效的业绩变量与选择研究样本偏差。

4.测量中的变量错误：比如，该公司的表现可通过不一致的变量，就像市场价值，资产报酬率，净资产收益率，税前利润，托宾Q值；这些变量有的时候是不有关的，也就是说，他们用不一致的方式衡量相同的性能。

要正确处理在公司治理中的这些计量经济模型的危险，务必使用公司的面板部分数据。

Boersch-Supan与Koeke（2002）说明了德国几个这样的数据库。

公司治理与经济绩效
最近在经合组织国家对公司治理的调查(企业管理，2004)说明，学习那些计量技术被认为是最好的实践，而计量经济学方法是公司治理性能的一个重要决定因素。

三项研究显示，公司治理水平与企业的经营状况之间存在着有关性。

在另一项研究，Bøhren与Ødegaard（2001）分析了在奥斯陆证券交易所上市的公司在1989到1997年的托宾Q值与代表公司治理的几个变量之间的关系（到1997年底的217家公司）。

他们的研究结果说明，比如，股权集中度对性能产生负面影响，而内部人持股的影响是积极的。

提高董事会规模能减少股份使用性能。

直接所有权在性能上的影响要远远大于对机构或者国家所有制的影响。

类似的结果被发表于一份1991年到1996年由雷曼兄弟与韦根（2000）关于361德国企业的抽样调查中。

在他们的研究，公司的业绩由资产报酬率来衡量有关的公司治理变数。

该小组回归结果证实，股权集中度对资产报酬率有负面影响，而所有权集中的积极影响是作为大股东的公司与金融机构发现的。

构建了各国公司治理的指标，也已审查了其与经济与市场的公司业绩。

这些例子被发现于Gruszczynski (2003)。

在下一节中，将尝试实现在企业之间的治理
评级与财务绩效的关系。

排序多元化
公司治理评级是一个典型的因变量，适合有序反应模型。

设置升序排名的类别与邻国之间距离的类别并不相同。

关于假设的论述，我们所观察到的公司治理评级变量y能够等于五个等级类别之一，如在2003年波兰出现的评级。

据推测，这个有序变量y是关系到连续潜变量y *，它表示该公司的企业管治的程度。

这个y *是已知的。

y*的值确定了下列方式y为代表的结果：
y i =1 or C+ ifτ0≤yi * <τ1
y i =2 or B- ifτ1≤yi * <τ2
y i =3 or B ifτ2≤yi * <τ3
y i =4 or B+ ifτ3≤yi * <τ4
y i =5 or A- ifτ4≤yi * <τ5
这个τ的值是阈值（切点），它的值相当于τ0 =-∞与τ5=∞。

这个没有确定的线形模型如下：
y i *=x iτβ+εi
其中x i是典型的[(k + 1) *1]向量的k解释变量（加长期常数）为第i个的值（第i个公司）。

观测到的y值的使用需要对误差分布的εi进行假设。

设F是累积分布函数（CDF），概率y=m （m= 1，...，5）能够写成：
P(y i=m│x i,β, τ)=F(τm- x iτβ)-F(τm-1- x iτβ)
其中τ为切点向量。

在方程的P（y i=m│x i,β, τ），使右边的第二项等于0。

此外，在P（y i=m│x i,β, τ），第一项等于1。

关于有序反应模型，误差εi的分布式通常用均值0与方差为1来表示。

关于排序多元反应模型，误差ε根据物流来配送。

关于模型的识别，不管是常数项还是τ1设定为0的缘故。

在有序反应中：
F(τm- x iτβ)=eτm- xiτβ/(1+ eτm- xiτβ)
第i公司的y值的每个类别的概率（i=│1,2 ,..., n）是相等的：
P(y i=1│x i,β, τ) if y=1
…
pi= P(y i=m│x i,β, τ) if y=m
…
P(y i=5│x i,β, τ) if y=5
在P i的影响下，形成了相似函数，其最大值达到了分母向量β，τ的ML 估计值。

样品与模型
为了更好地解释波兰上市公司的公司治理评级y的目的，与有序反应模型的指定。

2004年评级是建立在2003年11月的法律地位的基础之上，以2002年财务绩效的解释变量计算的财务报表为基础。

样本包含37家公司中的53个评级。

多达16个公司已经被排除在样本之外：第八银行，其他金融机构之一，2002年1月1日后两个首次报价公司，与五家排除了其他原因的公司（数据无法访问，缺少信息的财务报表）。

内生变数y已被定义为：
股东变量，与在样本中出现的所有五个等级类别；
第一大股东变量，只有三个类别（前两个与最后两个已被合并）。

为第一大股东简单排名的原因是与小规模样品相比，参数的数量在有序反应模型中是估计值。

有20个解释变量已被考虑作为财务比率。

对公司2002年财务比率计算如下：盈利能力比率：P102销售利润率，P202营业利润率，P302毛利率，P402净利率，ROE02股东权益回报，ROA02总资产回报利润。

流淌比率：L102流淌比率，L202速动比率。

速动比率：A102款项周转率，A202存货周转率，A302营业周期，A402负债额，A502现金转换周期，A602流淌资产周转率，A702资产与营业额。

负债比率：D102固定资产负债率，D202债务保证金，D302的息税前利润/财务费用，D402债务/息税前利润。

出处:Markek Gruszczynski.波兰的公司治理与财务绩效.国际经济进展研究,2006(12):251-259.。