伯南克在普林斯顿大学的演讲

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伯南克在普林斯顿大学做毕业典礼演讲

伯南克周六在普林斯顿大学做毕业典礼演讲北京时间6月3日晚间，美联储主席伯南克周六在普林斯顿大学做毕业典礼演讲，他没有提及货币政策、没有暗示是否寻求连任，而是向毕业生提出“十大建议”。

以下为伯南克演讲主要内容：重返普林斯顿感觉不错，很难相信，我离开校园赴华盛顿已经11年了。

近期我向校方询问了我的教职问题，回信称：“很遗憾，普林斯顿收到很多更有才华的学者的求职信，而教职有限。

”我将在稍后献上对毕业生的最美好祝愿，首先我要恭喜在座的家长们。

作为父母，我知道这年头供孩子读完大学不容易，数年前，我的一个同事有3个孩子毕业于普林斯顿，尽管他们夫妻都不毕业于此，但我的同事常说，从财政角度讲，这如同每年买辆卡迪拉克，然后让车坠崖。

他总会补充说，他会毫不犹豫的选择重新来过。

所以，感谢你们的工作，母亲们，父亲们，及家人们。

这确实是做毕业典礼演讲的合适场合，我认为，在这一讲台上，每个精神导师都受到过“十诫”的教诲，我没有那样的信心，而且无论无何，觊觎邻居的驴牛已不是目前的问题，所以今年前几分钟我将提出“十个建议”，或称为对这个世界和你们毕业后的生活的十个观察。

请注意，这十点与利率毫无关系。

我之所以有资格提出这些建议和或观察，除了普林斯顿的善意邀请外，理由和你们讨厌的哥哥姐姐可以晚睡是一个道理：我比你们更老。

以下内容均经受过生活的检验，但以往表现并不能确保未来的结果。

1、“当代哲学家”阿甘曾讲到人生和巧克力的相似性，你不知道下一块巧克力的味道。

人生确实难以预料，任何一个认为知道10年后情况的毕业生，更不同说三十年了，我只能说他或她缺乏想象力。

看看我吧，12年前我一心教经济学入门课程，想着编造什么理由不去参加教学会议，结果我接到了来自华盛顿的电话。

如果你有机会与毕业25年、30年或40年的校友交谈，并能够让他们敞开心扉，他们将告诉你，他们对生活中哪些事满意或不满意，他们经历过的高潮和低谷。

但我敢打赌，他们的人生故事与预期相异。

经济危机中的伯南克发言

IN HIS Jackson Hole speech a year ago, Ben Bernanke wanted to leave no doubt that the Federal Reserve could and would act more aggressively to boost America’s flagging economy. This year he wanted to leave no doubt that the politicians could and should do more.The most highly anticipated central banker’s speech in months gave no hint of bold new initiatives from the Fed. He repeated the mantra that the “Fed has a range of tools that could be used to provide additional monetary stimulus”, but there was no discussion of them and not a whiff of imminent QE3, a third round of bond buying. Mr Bernanke promised that the Fed’s policy-setting committee would have a “fuller discussion” of other tools it could use atits September meeting, which has beenextended a day. But he chose to use thisspeech to give Washington a lecture onfiscal policy, arguing that while Americaurgently needed a credible plan to reducelong-term deficits, it shouldn’t overdothe short-term tightening.For investors who had been hoping for arepeat of August 2010, when MrBernanke’s signaling of QE2 sent stockssoaring, the speech was surely adisappointment. But it was hardlyunexpected. The hints from the Fed inrecent days were well-telegraph ed andunambiguous: Mr Bernanke wouldn’t besignaling new actions in Jackson Hole.From Mr Bernanke’s perspective, there isa clear logic to his reticence. Althoughthere are economic parallels between this year and last (things starting to look a lot worse during the summer), the central bank is in a rather different position. A year ago the Fed had taken relatively little action in response to the weakening economy. This year the central bank has only just signaled that short-term interest rates are likely to stay at zero until at least 2013. Since Mr Bernanke has already laid out other steps the Fed could take (for instance, in last year’s speech), discussing them again in detail now could be tantamount to launching them. That’s why he chose buy time by promising a fuller debate in September. T actically at least, that is understandable. Strategically, given the weakness of the economy, it may be a timid choice.Mr Bernanke’s decision to weigh in on fiscal policy is more obviously right. The Fed’s task is made considerably more difficult by Washington’s fiscal choices. America’s current trajectory—virtually no progress on medium-term deficit reduction and a hefty tightening next year unless temporary tax cuts are extended—is daft. And though he put it far more politely, Mr Bernanke’s basic message was just that. “Although the issue of fiscal sustainability must urgently be addressed, fiscal policymakers should not, as a consequencedisregard the fragility of the current recovery”, he said, adding that “the country would be well served by a better process for making fiscal decisions”.All eminently sensible. Nonetheless there is something a little disconcert ing about the Fed chairman talking to a gathering of the world’s top central bankers at a time of extraordinary uncertainty and focusing on fiscal policy. “Don’t rely on us alone” may be an accurate and important message to send, but given Washington’s recent record on fiscal negotiations, it is hardly a comforting one.Even more unnerving was the dissonance between Mr Bernanke’s focus and tone, and the palpable sense of nervousness amongst the Jackson Hole attendees. The mood in the meeting’s corridors is grim, largely thanks to the mess in the euro-zone (of which more in later posts). It’s not uncommon to hear that today’s situation is more dangerous, and intractable, than 2008. Mr Bernanke said virtually nothing about the financial risks from Europe. “I have confidence that our European colleagues fully appreciate what is at stake in the difficult issues they are now confronting and that, over time, they will take all necessary and appropriate steps to address those issues effectively and comprehensively”, he said. He mig ht just as wel l have said, “It’s a big mess and I’m crossing my fingers that they can sort it out”.。

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伯南克关于美国经济展望的讲话0607

伯南克关于美国经济展望的讲话0607日期：2011-06-11 11:27:002011-6-7感谢主办方再次邀请我参加国际货币会议。

我首先将简短更新关于美国经济的展望，随后讨论全球商品市场近期的发展，它们深刻地影响了美国经济和世界经济，最后谈一些关于货币政策的思考。

增长展望今年美国经济增长到现在为止看上去有些慢于预期。

一季度总产出年率仅仅增长1.8%，这个季度，日本地震和海啸导致的供应链中断将阻碍经济活动。

近几周来自劳动力市场的若干指标也显示，一些（经济增长的）动能丧失了。

当然，我们正在监测这些状况的演变。

这就是说，未来几个月随着日本灾难对制造业产出的影响逐渐消散，随着汽油价格适度回落，增长可能在今年下半年重拾升势。

总体上，经济复苏似乎以一种温和的步伐继续，尽管这种速度在不同部门间并不均匀，尽管在数百万失业和半失业工人看来，这种速度令人沮丧。

如通常那样，家庭支出的能力和意愿是未来几个季度经济扩张速度的一个重要决定因素。

目前，有许多正面和负面的因素影响着家庭的财务状况和支出意愿。

从正面情况来看，去年12月国会通过的工资税削减议案使得今年初以来劳动力市场条件得以改善，家庭收入得到提升。

家庭财富增加（主要反映在股权价值收益）和较低的债务负担也提高了消费者增加支出的意愿。

负面角度，家庭正面临一些显著的不利因素，包括食物和能源价格上涨，房屋价值下降，某些信贷市场的持续紧张，以及仍然高企的失业率，所有这些都会挫伤消费者信心。

劳动力市场的发展在设置家庭支出进程方面将显得特别重要。

如你所知，就业形势距正常情况尚远。

例如，一个关于劳动力投入的综合指标：生产工人总小时数，它反映人们兼职的程度、加班的机会以及就业人数，这个指标自最近的衰退开始到2009年10月已经显著下降近10个百分点。

尽管工作的小时数自扩张以来已经上升，但这个指标仍然低于其衰退前水平约6.5个百分点。

作为一个比较，工作总小时数在1982-1982年深度衰退中的最大下降比这次要少6个百分点。

伯南克面临诸多挑战

维普资讯
利率上升，美元贬值，进口商品价格上涨透明度已经大为增加。过去，美联储调储蓄率，增加国内消费。在如何认识美并拉动国内通货膨胀。届时伯南克将面临整联邦基金利率时从不公开宣告，如今国的双赤字问题上，伯南克与他的前任经济衰退和通货膨胀双面夹击，其利率政则不仅即时公布利率决策，而且还强烈却大相径庭。伯南克认为，造成美国巨策也难有作为，因为刺激疲软的经济需要暗示近期政策趋势，决策会议记录也公额贸易赤宇的根本原因，在于其他国家
济就有陷入衰退的危险。但如果过早采取情况是，美国股票和债券价格大幅下跌，
传出格林斯潘发生车祸的消息，华尔街
股市三大股指闻声大幅下滑，以致美联
储不得不紧急辟谣。还有一次布什总统在回答记者提问时表示：“ 认为格林我斯潘应该再干一届。 ”话音刚落，华尔
获得哈佛大学经济学学士学位，取得过经数百万消费者、投资者和企业的金融活动
济学最优成绩，１７９９年在麻省理工学院产生举足轻重的影响。伯南克的最大挑战
获得博士学位。伯南克在普林斯顿大学工作了１７年，
就是何时停止升息。
第二个挑战是美国房地产市场面临降
美国国内市场的油价可以以惊人的速度飙提高透明度可以增强决策的可信性，促赤字改变了全球的资金流动方向，美国
升。飓风过后，墨西哥湾地区多处重要油进决策者与外界的建设性对话，减少金成为全球最大的净债务国，“ 发展中国家气设施被毁，原油价格达到每桶７Ｏ美元，

伯南克第一课英文讲义

伯南克第一课英文讲义时间3月21日凌晨，美联储主席伯南克稍早时在乔治-华盛顿大学商学院进行了针对该院学生系列讲座的第一讲，题目为：美联储的基本使命。

以下是伯南克本次讲座的英文讲义全文。

(资料来源于美联储)The Federal Reserve and the Financial CrisisOrigins and Mission of the Federal Reserve, Lecture 1George Washington University School of BusinessMarch 20, 2012, 12:45 p.m。

[Applause]President Steve Knapp: Well, good afternoon. I think the students here may know who I am but for those who are watching the broadcast, I'm Steve Knapp, President of George Washington University. And it's really a pleasure to welcome you to today's first class in the series entitled Reflections on the Federal Reserve and its place in today's economy, featuring the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Dr. Ben Bernanke. I'm pleased to acknowledge that we have with us two of the university's trustees, Nelson Carbonell and Mark Shenkman, and also a number of faculty members are here in the audience and some of them will be teaching later in the series. Today is the first university lecture series delivered by a sitting Chairman of the Federal Reserve. I think it does provide an extraordinary opportunity for the students who are here in the classroom, but also for those watching online. They have an opportunity to gain insight into the nation's central banking system and a wide range of issues that affect this country and the world. I do want to say that there are microphones available for the students, and certainly encourage you when the Chairman's lecture is over to avail yourself of those and we hope there'll be a lively exchange of questions and answers at the end of the lecture. It's now a distinct honor to introduce the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Dr. Ben Bernanke. Dr. Bernanke took office in 2006, and is now serving a second term as Chairman. He also serves as Chairman of the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee. Before his appointment as Chairman, Dr. Bernanke was involved with the Federal Reserve in several roles as a Member of the Board of Governors, as a visiting scholar, and as a member of the Academic Advisory Panel at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He also served as Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers from June 2005 to January 2006.Now Chairman Bernanke is no stranger to academia. He's been a faculty member at Princeton, Stanford and New York University, as well as the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology. He's held a Guggenheim and a Sloan Fellowship, and is a fellow of the Econometric Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Chairman Bernanke received a Bachelor of Arts from Harvard University and a PhD from MIT. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Dr. Ben Bernanke.[ Applause ]Chairman Ben Bernanke: Thank you very much, President Knapp. Gee, this is great. This is what I used to do before I got in this line of work for 23 years and I've always enjoyed engaging with college students. So thank you for being here, and I hope we do have a good conversation. Let me particularly thank President Knapp and Professor Fort and George Washington University. As everybody here knows, these lectures are part of a real course and after I get off the scene there will be other professors talking about other aspects of the Fed and you'll hear different points of view which is great. And you'll have to do some papers and all those kinds of things and I'm going to read a few of the paper. So, I look forward to doing that.So, I'll be talking from slides, which is in part for the purpose of making this available to others who might be interested. These slides will be posted on the Federal Reserve's website, , as we go through. And so, if you need extra copies, by all means do that. And as President Knapp said, I'm going to be talking for a while from the presentation but at the end, I hope we can have some questions and answers.So, let me get started. So what I want to talk about in these four lectures is the Federal Reserve and the financial crisis. Now, my thinking about this is very much conditioned by my experience as an economic historian. I think when you talk about the issues that just occurred of the last few years, it makes the most sense to think about it in the broader context of central banking as its taking place over the centuries. So, even though we're going to be focusing a good bit of the lectures, particularly next week, on the financial crisis and how the Fed responded. I think we need to go back and look at the broader context. So, as we talk about the Fed we'll be talking about the origin and mission of central banks in general, and we're looking at previous financial crises, most notably the Great Depression, and see how that informed the Fed's actions and decisions in the recent crisis. So let me just give you a roadmap of the four lectures. Today, lecture one, we won't touch on the current crisis at all. Instead, we'll talk about what central banks are, what they do, how central banking got started in the United States and we'll do some history. We'll talk about how the Fed engaged with its first great challenge, the Great Depression of the 1930s. The second lecture on Thursday, we'll take up the history. We'll review developments in central banking and with the Federal Reserve after World War II talking about the conquest of inflation, the great moderation and other developments that occurred after World War II. But we'll spend a good bitof time lecture two, in lecture two, talking about the build-up to the crisis and some of the factors that led to the crisis of 2008, 2009.Then next week, we'll get into the more recent events. In lecture three, we'll talk about the intense phase of the financial crisis, its causes, its implications, and particularly, the response to the crisis by the Federal Reserve and by other policymakers. And then, in the final lecture, lecture four, we'll look at the aftermath. We'll talk about the recession that followed the crisis, the policy response of the Fed including monetary policy, the broader response in terms of the changes in financial regulation, and a little bit of forward-looking discussion about how this experience will change how central banks operate and how the Federal Reserve will operate going forward. So this is our topic today is origins and missions of the Federal Reserve. So let's talk in general about what a central bank is. If you've had some background in economics you know that a central bank is not a regular bank, it's a government agency, and it stands at the center of the monetary and financial system of a country. Central banks are very important institutions, they have helped to guide the development of modern financial systems, modern monetary systems and they play a major role in economic policy. Now, we've had various arrangements over the years but today, virtually, all countries have central banks. The Federal Reserve in the United States, the Bank of Japan in Japan, Bank of Canada, and so on. The main exception is only cases where you have what's called a currency union where a number of countries collectively share a central bank. The most important example by far of that is the European Central Bank which is central bank to 17 European countries who share the common currency, the Euro. But even in that case, each of the participating countries does have its own central bank which is part of the overall system of the Euro. So central banks are now ubiquitous, even the smallest countries typically have central banks. Now, this is a very important theme here, what do Central Banks do? What is their mission? And as I'll discuss throughout the lectures, it's convenient to talk about two broad aspects of what central banks do. The first is to try to achieve macroeconomic stability. And by that, I generally mean stable growth in the economy, avoiding big swings, recessions and the like, and keeping inflation low and stable. So that's the economic function of a central bank. The other function of central banks, which is going to get a lot of attention, obviously, in these lectures, is the financial stability function. Central banks try to keep the financial system working normally and in particular, they either, they try to prevent or if unsuccessful in preventing they try to mitigate financial panics or financial crises. And I'll talk more about what those are. Now what are the tools that central banks use to achieve these two broad objectives? Very, in very simple terms, there are basically two broad sets of tools. On the economic stability side, the main tool as I'm sure everyone knows is monetary policy. In normal times, the Fed, for example, can raise or lower short-term interest rates. It does that by buying and selling securities in the open market. And again, in normal times, if the economy is growing too slowly or inflation is falling too low, the Fed can stimulate the economy by lowering interest rates. Lower interest rates feedthrough to a broad range of other interest rates that encourages spending, acquisition of homes for example, construction, investment by firms, borrowing. It just generates more demand, more spending and more investment in the economy, and that creates more thrust in growth so that to stimulate an economy, you lower interest rates. And similarly, if the economy is growing too hot, if inflation is becoming a problem, then the normal tool of central bank is to raise interest rates. So by raising the overnight interest rate, known in the United States as the federal funds rate, higher interest rates feed through the system and help to slow the economy by raising the cost of borrowing, of buying a house, of buying a car, or of investing in capital goods and that will slow the economy and reduce pressure of overheating. So, monetary policy is the basic tool that central banks have used for many, many years to try to keep the economy at a more or less even keel in terms of both growth and inflation.Now, a little less familiar is the main tool of central banks in dealing with financial panics or financial crises. And that tool is the provision of liquidity. So to address financial stability concerns and for reasons I'll explain, one thing that central banks can do is make short-term loans to financial institutions. As I'll explain, providing short-term credit to financial institutions during a period of panic or crisis can help calm the market, can help stabilize those institutions and can help mitigate or bring to an end a financial crisis. So this activity which is an old one, as I'll discuss, is known as the lender of last resort tool. So again, if financial markets are disrupted, financial institutions don't have alternative sources of funding, then the central bank stands ready to service the lender of last resort providing liquidity to the system and thereby helping to stabilize the financial system.Now, there's a third tool which the Fed has had from the beginning and most central banks have which is financial regulation and supervision. Central banks usually play a role in supervising the banking system, assessing the extent of risk on their portfolios, making sure their practices are sound, and in that way, trying to keep the financial system healthy. To the extent that financial system can be kept healthy and its risk-taking within reasonable bounds, then the chance of a financial crisis occurring in the first place is reduced. However, this activity, and I will come back to it, this is something which is not unique to central banks. In the United States, for example, there are a number of different agencies, like the FDIC or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency that work with the Fed in supervising the financial system. So this is not unique to central banks and so I'll be down playing this for the time being and focusing on the two principle tools, monetary policy and lender of last resort activities.Now, where do central banks come from? One thing people don't appreciate, I think, is that central banking is not a new development. It's been around for a very long time. The Swedes set up a central bank in 1668, three and a half centuries ago. TheBank of England was founded in 1694 and that of course for many decades or if not centuries was the most important and influential central bank in the world, and France in 1800. So, central bank theory and practice is, again, not a new thing. We have been thinking about these issues collectively as an economics profession and in other contexts for many, many years. Now, I've exaggerated slightly in a sense that, say, the Bank of England in 1694 wasn't set up from scratch, it's a full-fledged central bank, it was originally a private institution. And over time, it acquired some of the functions of a central bank such as issuing money or serving as lender of last resort. But over time, these central banks became essentially government agencies, government institutions as they all are today. Certainly, one important responsibility of central banks for much of the period that I'm talking about was to manage the gold standard to issue paper money that was backed by gold and I'll talk more about gold in a few moments.Now, the lender of last resort function, which I mentioned earlier, became important in the-- mostly in the 19th century. Early in the 19th century, the Bank of England was doing a lot of this type of activity and they became very good at it. And as we'll see, while the United States was suffering with banking panics in the latter part of the 19th century, banking panics in the United Kingdom were quite rare. So the Bank of England sort of set the pace in some sense. It was the most important central bank and it helped establish the practices and the approaches that we still use today. Now, I need to talk a little bit because it's less familiar about what a financial panic is. In general, a financial panic is sparked by a loss of confidence in an institution and I think the best way to explain this is to give a familiar example. How many of you have ever seen the movie "It's a Wonderful Life"? No? Less people are watching Christmas movies than they used to be, I guess [laughter]. Well, one of the problems that Jimmy Stewart runs into as a banker in “It’s a Wonderful Life” is a threatened run on his institution. And what is a run? Well, let's imagine a situation like Jimmy Stewart's situation before there was any deposit insurance, no FDIC. And imagine you have a bank on the corner, just a regular commercial bank, the first bank of Washington, D.C., and this bank makes loans to businesses and the like, and it finances itself by taking deposits from the public and deposits are demand deposits, which means that anybody can pull out their money anytime they want which is important because people use deposits for ordinary activities, like shopping.Now imagine what would happen if for some reason, a rumor goes around that this bank has made some bad loans and is losing money. As a depositor, you say to yourself, "Well, I don't know if this rumor is true or not。

2012年6月7日伯南克讲话解读

在令人失望的美国就业数据及持续对欧元危机感到担忧之际，伯南克将于北京时间周四22:00在国会联合经济委员会上出席作证。

本报告将从伯南克其人入手，结合近期金融事件对伯南克在国会听证会上的言论作出预测，并对行情的操作提出相应建议。

一、伯南克其人伯南克是美联储主席，其一举一动一言一行受人瞩目，尤其在美联储货币政策上有绝对的发言权。

前几年，伯南克被市场人士冠名为黄金之友，因为其讲话均会给市场带来重大行情，尤其前两年，由于其不断强调量化宽松政策，成就了黄金上行之势。

伯南克的另一个外号叫“直升机”，因为他曾宣称必要时愿意站在直升机上撒钞票来救经济。

毫不夸张地说，作为世界上最有权力央行的掌门人，57岁的伯南克在全球任何一份评选全球最具影响力的金融决策者的榜单上数一数二。

二、今年前七次讲话引发行情震荡伯南克在2012年上半年发表讲话7次，基本都提及美国经济现状和美联储货币政策，除去国内休市一次，4次都带来较大的操作机会，平均每次270点行情。

其中今年2月29日引发黄金暴跌100美金，天通银下跌600点就是其经典杰作。

三、前期市场重点数据回顾：1、美国劳工部上周五(6月1日)公布的数据显示，美国5月非农就业人数增幅远不及预期，仅录得单位数增长，失业率有所回升，且非农前值大幅下修，暗示美国就业市场的回暖态势惨遭终结。

5月季调后非农就业人口上升6.9万，远不及预期的上升15.0万。

与此同时，美国5月失业率回升至8.2%，前值未作修正，仍为8.1%。

美国5月失业率为近一年以来首度走高。

自去年8月以来，美国失业率便持续大幅下滑，从当( )时的9.1%最低降至8.1%。

美国劳动力市场复苏乏力为该国经济蒙上阴影，也令美联储第三轮量化宽松的预期有所升温。

2、美联储最新发布的褐皮书表示，美国经济从4月初至5月底以温和速度增长。

之前的褐皮书称在2月中至3月底以温和至缓慢的速度增长。

联储对经济的看法更为乐观，美元一度支撑，打压黄金走软。

亚马逊创始人Jeff Bezos在普林斯顿大学2010年毕业典礼上的讲话

At that age, I'd take any excuse to make estimates and do minor arithmetic. I'd calculate our gas mileage -- figure out useless statistics on things like grocery spending. I'd been hearing an ad campaign about smoking. I can't remember the details, but basically the ad said, every puff of a cigarette takes some number of minutes off of your life: I think it might have been two minutes per puff. At any rate, I decided to do the math for my grandmother. I estimated the number of cigarettes per days, estimated the number of puffs per cigarette and so on. When I was satisfied that I'd come up with a reasonable number, I poked my head into the front of the car, tapped my grandmother on the shoulder, and proudly proclaimed, "At two minutes per puff, you've taken nine years off your life!"

钱颖一：理解经济学原理

钱颖⼀：理解经济学原理作者：钱颖⼀经济学家，清华⼤学⽂科资深教授，曾任清华⼤学经济管理学院院长全⽂15230字，预计阅读需30分钟。

经济学原理为什么重要？钱颖⼀说：经济学原理是经济学家之间的最⼤共识，它是⽤最简单的逻辑来解释复杂的经济现象，它追本溯源，探求最根本的因。

他在清华⼤学只开⼀门课，就是《经济学原理》。

⼀、为什么经济学原理重要？14年前的2002年，我受聘为清华⼤学经济管理学院特聘教授。

当时不只我⼀个⼈，⽽是⼀共有15位在海外⼤学任教的经济学教授受聘为特聘教授，每⼈在清华经管学院开设⼀门课程。

绝⼤部分特聘教授开的是博⼠⽣课程，⽽我⾃告奋勇开设本科⼀年级两个学期的《经济学原理》。

2002年9⽉我在清华第⼀次上这门课时的情景，⾄今历历在⽬。

那是在清华⼤学的主楼后厅，⼤概有500个座位。

也许是因为第⼀次开这样的课，所以吸引了很多学⽣，除了清华经管学院2002级和2001级本科⽣外，也有清华其他院系和清华外的同学来听课。

在过去的14年间，我⼀直坚持在清华经管学院开这门课，是同另外⼀位教师⼀起开。

在2004—2005学年和2005—2006学年，我还同时在北京⼤学经济学院开设了这门课。

现在北京⼤学经济学院也⼀直在开这门课。

在我开设这门课之前，两个学期的《经济学原理》在中国的⼤学中或者不存在，或者只是⼀个学期的《经济学基础》。

中国学⽣更重视《中级微观经济学》和《中级宏观经济学》，因为通常认为中国学⽣的数学基础⽐较好，可以直接学习中级经济学，⽽《经济学原理》不⽤数学，太浅，不需要教。

2002年秋季在清华开这门课的时候，我坚持⼀定要两个学期。

现在回过头来想，这是做对了的⼀件事。

尽管我本⼈在清华本科念的是数学专业，数学对于我学习经济学很有帮助，但是我强烈地感觉到，即使在今天，在国内⼤学⽣和研究⽣的经济学整体⽔平提⾼得很快的情况下，《经济学原理》仍是不可或缺的⼀门课。

这门课看上去简单，没有⽤任何数学，但它是经济学中最重要的基础，因为它传授基本概念、分析思路，特别是培养学⽣的经济学直觉。

金融的本质：伯南克四讲美联储(中英双语版)的读后感

金融的本质：伯南克四讲美联储（中英双语版）的读后感金融是现代社会发展的重要支撑，而美联储作为全球最具影响力的中央银行之一，其所掌握的货币政策阐述着金融本质的核心。

在2021年初，由美国前联邦储备委员会主席伯南克主讲的一系列在线讲座中，他深入探讨了美联储的职能、运作以及货币政策。

以下是对伯南克四讲的读后感。

金融是为社会经济发展服务的必须要素，而美联储作为全球最重要的中央银行，其所承担的角色和使命也非常重要。

在伯南克的讲座中，他清晰阐述了美联储的职能，重点关注了货币政策，而这正是美联储的核心使命。

美联储的职能旨在维护货币和金融稳定，这可以通过货币政策等手段实现。

为了达到这个目的，美联储使用两种基本工具：利率政策和量化宽松政策。

利率政策通过改变联邦基金利率来影响市场利率，从而影响整个经济体。

而量化宽松政策则通过购买金融资产来增加货币供应量并降低长期利率。

在伯南克的讲座中，他提到了美国经历的20世纪初期和20世纪初叶的金融危机。

它们的主要原因是金融机构的过度杠杆。

为了规避这种情况，美联储制定了强有力的监管政策，包括强制性准备金和资本要求。

这些政策旨在保证银行的稳健性，并防止市场的过度波动。

尽管在金融危机后，美联储采取了一些非常规的政策措施，比如量化宽松，但这些政策对美国经济的增长和通胀率的维护产生了积极的影响。

美国当前的经济形势也很好，主要归功于美联储的稳健政策。

总之，在伯南克的四讲中，他清晰地表述了美联储的职能，以及其在金融市场的作用和特权。

他详细介绍了货币政策和监管政策，并强调这些政策的作用是为了维护经济和金融稳定。

此外，他还强调了美联储是独立的机构，不受政治干预的影响。

通过这些讲座，我们对美联储和其对美国经济运作的影响有了更深入的理解。

伯南克：首要目标是控制通胀

波兰经济学家克Ｌ仆多大・别尼近Ｌ在的府对措施。】Ｊ《和国报》撰义说，欧盟时中国产品征收反
的妄想。
他说，来自中国的竞争使欧洲广大消费
会损害他们的利益。而，正是冈为来自中国
ห้องสมุดไป่ตู้
倾销税效有限，刈这种做法绝／应抱有人多者深受其益，中国产品征收惩罚性关税无疑１刈别人认为，欧越来越担心中国廉价商的廉价商品，三全球范内小仅仅是牡类产品的
维普资讯
一
周要闻
伯南克：首要目标是控制通胀
７全２】任内首个政策会议上调高息率。８Ｌ、美国联储备局主席伯南克近Ｕ在普林２斯顿大学发表讲话，示央行必须将通胀维持表定目标。伯南克指出，公众有信心联储局可控制在低化，以达到高就业率及温和长期利率的法通胀，可造成 “良性循环 ” ，抵销了近年油价
品的涌入，ｂ员国越来越多的１业部门在与价格得以平抑。＿经济学家们／妨从这样的角度１远东的竞争中处于劣势。欧盟埘中国一些产看问题：１但今界经济未出通货膨胀的威
品征收反倾销税最多会延迟而能避免来自胁，这恰恰应该感激中国。
中国的竞争。欧盟委员会Ｕ前建议埘中国产皮
别尼认为，洲应该做的是，发展科技含欧

美联储主席伯南克在普林斯顿的演讲(节选)

确信对方没有很多的肠道寄生虫。不要误解我，我也为美丽、浪漫和性感所吸引，
毕业生们，恭喜你们！去大显身手吧！（司志政摘自《英语广场・美文》）
Ｔｅｅｎａｇｅｒｓ２０１３／１７下
经有１１年了。
今天我想利用这几分钟时间谈谈自己的
接到了一个电话 …… 谁想在故事的开篇就
十点建议或是感悟，谈谈这个世界，以及你们
从普林斯顿毕业后的生活。请注意，这十点与利率毫无关系。我之所以有资格提出这些建议
第一，诗人罗伯特・彭斯曾说过 “ 无展过程。你们的家人、朋友和你在普林斯顿论你准备得有多么充分，事情还是会经常的时光已经为你们打下了良好的基础，你将出错 ” 。一位离我们更近的哲学家，阿甘也如何利用它们呢？你们会不断学习、竭力思曾讲到人生和巧克力的相似性，你永远不索、对至关重要的问题持批判态度吗？你会
知道结局呢？让故事
上演。无需惧怕。
第二，人生具有很
大偶然性这一事实是
否意味着小的决定和
或感悟，除了是受到蒂尔曼校长的善意邀请行动无足轻重，不需要规划和奋斗呢？当然
外，还有一个理由，这个理由和你们讨厌的不是。无论未来人生有什么在等着你们，你哥哥姐姐可以晚睡是一个道理：我比你们年们每个人都有—个宏大的人生规划有待完成。长。以下内容均经受过现实生活的检验。这是你们作为有意识的人类本该有的自我发

伯南克第三课英文讲义

伯南克第三课英文讲义北京时间3月28日凌晨，美联储主席伯南克稍早时在乔治-华盛顿大学商学院进行了针对该院学生系列讲座的第三讲，题目为：美联储应对金融危机。

以下是伯南克本次讲座的英文讲义全文。

(资料来源于美联储网站)The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis The Federal Reserve's Response to the Financial Crisis, Lecture 3 George Washington University School of Business March 27, 2012, 12:45 p.m.[Applause]Chairman Bernanke: Hello, welcome back. So, as Professor Fort says today we want to talk about the Federal Reserve's response to the financial crisis. Now let me--in the last couple of lectures I've mentioned a key theme of the lectures which is the two main responsibilities of central banks, financial stability and economic stability. Let me turn it around just a bit and talk about the two main tools. For financial stability, the main tool the central banks have is lender of last resort powers by providing short-term liquidity to financial institutions, replacing lost funding. Central banks as they have for, you know, number of centuries, can help calm a financial panic. For economic stability, the principal tool is monetary policy, of course in normal times, that involves adjusting the level of short-term interest rates.Now, today I will be focusing primarily on the intense phase of the financial crisis in 2008, 2009, and so I'll be focusing primarily in the lender of last resort function of the central bank. I'll come back to monetary policy in the final lecture when we talk about the aftermath and recovery.Now, last time, this is just a repeat from last time, I talked about some of the vulnerabilities in the financial system that transformed the decline in housing prices which by itself seemed no more threatening than the decline in dot-com stock crisis. But because of these vulnerabilities, that decline in housing prices led to obviously a very severe crisis. The vulnerabilities I talked about last time were private sector vulnerabilities including the excessive debt taken on perhaps because of the period of the Great Moderation. Very importantly, the banks' inability to monitor their own risks, excessive reliance on short-term funding which as a bank in the 19th century would tell you makes it vulnerable to a run as short-term funding is pulled away, and increased use of exotic financial instruments like credit default swaps and others that concentrated risk in particular companies or in particular markets. So that was the private sector.The public sector had its own vulnerabilities including gaps in a regulatory structure. Important firms and markets did not have adequate oversight. Where there was adequate oversight at least in law, sometimes the supervisors and regulators didn't do a good enough job. For example, there wasn't enough attention paid to enforcing banks to do a better job of monitoring and managing their risks. And finally, an important gap that we've really begun to look at since the crisis is that with individual agencies looking at different parts of the system, there was notenough attention being paid to the stability of the financial system taken as a whole.Let me talk just a moment more about another important public sector vulnerability, and these were the so called government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Now, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not only private corporations, they have shareholders and a board, but they were established by Congress in support of the housing industry and they're known as government-sponsored enterprises or GSEs. Now Fannie and Freddie, as they're called, don't make mortgages. You can't go to Fannie's headquarters and get a mortgage. What they do instead is they are the middleman so to speak between the originator of the mortgage and the ultimate holder of the mortgage. So if you're a bank and you make a mortgage loan, if you like, you can take the mortgage that you made and you can sell it to Fannie or Freddie. They will in turn take all the mortgages that they collect, put them together into mortgage-backed securities, so called MBS. So, a mortgage-backed security is just a security which is a combination of hundreds or thousands of underlying mortgages, and then sell that to the--to the investors. That's a process called securitization. And Fannie and Freddie pioneered this--this basic approach to getting funding from mortgages. In particular, the GSEs, Fannie and Freddie, when they sell their mortgage-backed securities, they provide guarantees against credit loss. So if mortgages go bad, Fannie and Freddie make the investor whole. Now, Fannie and Freddie were permitted to operate within adequate capital. So in particular, they were at risk in a bad situation where there were a lot of mortgage losses. They didn't have enough capital to pay off, make good those guarantees that they have promised. And while many aspects of the financial crisis were not well anticipated, this one was. And going back for at least a decade before the crisis, the Fed and many other people, you know, said that the--Fannie and Freddie just didn't have enough capital and that they were in fact a danger to the stability of the financial system. What made the situation even somewhat worse was that Fannie and Freddie besides selling these mortgage-backed securities to investors, they also purchased on their own account large amounts of mortgage-backed securities, both their own and some that were issued by the private sector. So they made profits from holding those mortgages, but again, that created an additional to the extent that those mortgages were not insured or protected, they were vulnerable to losses and again, without enough capital they were at risk. Now an important trigger, and I'll come back to all these issues, but an important trigger that I talked about a little bit last time, to say a little bit more about it. Again, it wasn't just the house price boom and bust but it was the mortgage products and practices that went along with the house price movements that was particularly damaging.There were a lot of exotic mortgages, by which I mean sort of nonstandard, you know, standard mortgages is 30-year prime fixed rate mortgage. There are all different other kinds of mortgages being offered and often to people with weaker credit. Now, one feature that many of these mortgages had was that in order for them to be repaid, you had to have ongoing increases at house prices. So for example, you might be a mortgage borrower who would buy an adjustable rate mortgage, an ARM, where the initial interest rate was say 1 percent which meant that you could afford the payment for the first year or two. Now, after 2 years, the mortgage might go up to 3 percent, then after 4 years 5 percent and then higher and higher. So in order to avoid that, you had to at some point refinance into a more standard mortgage. And as long as house prices were going up, creating equity for homeowners, then it was possible to do that refinance. But oncehome prices stopped rising and by 2006, they're already declining quite sharply, borrowers were finding themselves rather than having building equity, they found themselves underwater, they couldn't refinance and they found themselves stuck with these increasing payments on their mortgages.Here are some examples of bad mortgage practices, I won't go through all of them, but they all have the characteristic, take for example the second one, an option ARM, that's an adjustable rate mortgage and the option is the borrower's option to vary how much they pay. They could pay less in the full amount and what they didn't pay just got rolled back into the mortgage. So most of these mortgages had the feature that they reduced monthly payments at least early in the mortgage but allowed mortgage payments to rise over time. The other aspect of bad mortgage practices like no-doc loans for example was that there was very little underwriting, which means very little analysis to make sure that the borrower was credit worthy and was able to make the payments on the mortgage.Here are some advertisements from the period that can illustrate some of the issues. I like the one on the right. We took the name of the company off. And let's look at the features that they're offering here. One percent low start rate. Start rate, that's what you pay the first year, we don't tell you about the next year. Stated income, that means you tell us what your income is, we write it down, that's all the checking we do. No documentation, well, that's evident. A hundred percent finance, no down payment in other words. Interest-only loans, which means that you pay the interest but you don't have to pay any principle back. And debt consolidation, this was an interesting thing which meant that you could go to the mortgage company and say, "Well, not only do I want to borrow money to buy the house, but I want to add in all my credit card debt and everything else I owe and put that into one big mortgage payment and, you know, and I'll pay for that with the 1 percent start rate." So you can see that there are obviously some very problematic practices here.So now the mortgage companies and banks and savings and loans and the variety of other different kinds of institutions made these mortgages, but where did they go? How are they financed? You know some of them were kept on the balance sheet of the mortgage originator, but many or most of these exotic or subprime mortgages were packaged in securities and sold off into the market. So for example, some of the securities were relatively simple. If the mortgages were sold to Fannie and Freddie and they had to meet Fannie and Freddie's underwriting standards, Fannie and Freddie would combine them into mortgage-backed securities and sell them with a guarantee as I described before. And those are relatively simple securities that are made up of basically just hundreds or thousands of underlying mortgages. But some of the securities that we're creating were very complex and very hard to understand. An example would be a collateralized debt obligation or CDO. This would often be a security to combine mortgages and other kinds of types of debt together in one package. And it could be sliced in different ways so that you would sell to one investor the most safe part of the security and to another investor the most risky part of the security. So they were very complicated, took of a lot analysis.Now one reason that many investors are willing to buy these securities were because they hadthe comfort of the rating agencies whose job it is to rate the quality of bonds and other securities giving triple A ratings to many of these securities, essentially saying that they're very, very safe and therefore you don't have to worry about the credit risk of these securities. So again, many of the securities were sold to investors including pension funds, insurance companies, foreign banks, even in some cases, wealthy individuals. But also the financial institutions that either made these loans or created these securities often retain some of them as well. For example, sometimes they would create an accounting fiction, an off-balance-sheet vehicle, which would hold these securities and finance itself by cheap short-term funding like commercial paper. So, some of the securities went to investors, some of them stayed with the financial institutions themselves. In addition, we had companies like AIG that were selling insurance. They were using various kinds of credit derivatives to basically to say, "Well, pay us a premium and if the mortgages in your mortgage-backed security go bad, we'll make you good, we'll make you whole." And that makes it triple A rated. Of course, these practices made the underlying securities no better and--what they basically did was they created a situation where risks could be spread throughout the system.So here's a little bit of a diagram showing how a subprime mortgage securitization might work. On the left here, where it's the box says low quality mortgages, you might have a mortgage company or a thrift company making the loans. This thrift company or the mortgage company doesn't care too much about the qualities of loan because they're going to sell it anyway. So they take the mortgages and they sell them to large financial firms who take those mortgages and maybe other securities as well, combine them into a security which is essentially an amalgamation of all the underlying mortgages and other securities.Now, the financial firm that created the security might negotiate with the credit rating agency to say, "Well, what do we have to do to get triple A rating?" And there will be negotiations and discussion and in the end, the security will be rated triple A. The financial firm would then take the security, could cut it up in different ways or to sell it as it is, sell it to investors like a pension fund or some other type of investor. But in addition, again, financial firms kept many of these securities on their own books or in related investment vehicles. And finally, you had over here on the right, you had credit insurers like AIG and other mortgage insurance companies that for a fee provided insurance in case the underlying mortgages went bad. So this is kind of this basic structure. In actuality, I've seen some diagrams of the complete flowchart and they're incredibly complex. This is a very simplified version but the basic idea is here.Okay, now remember, what is a crisis? A crisis or a financial panic occurs when you have any kind of financial institution. Think of a bank, which has illiquid assets like long-term loans for example but liquid short-term liabilities like deposits. And in a classic bank panic, if bank depositors lose faith in the quality of the assets held by the bank, they run, pull out their money, the bank can't pay off everybody because they can't change their loans into cash fast enough and so the run on the bank is self-fulfilling. The bank will either fail or it will have to dump all of its long-term assets quickly in the market and take big losses.So that's what a panic basically is in the context say of a banking system. Well, the crisis of 2008, 2009 was basically a classic financial panic but in a different institutional setting. Not in thebank setting, but in a broader financial market setting. So in particular, as house prices fell in 2006 and 2007, for the reasons I described as with house prices falling, people who borrowed on a subprime mortgage, we're not able to make the payments. It was increasingly evident and more and more than we're going to be delinquent or default and that was going to impose losses on the financial firms, the investment vehicles they created and also on credit insurers like AIG. Unfortunately, the securities were so complex and the monitoring of the financial firms at their own risks was not sufficiently strong that there was a--it wasn't just the losses. I mean I think a very striking fact is that if you took all the subprime mortgages in the United States and put them all together and assume they were all worthless, the total losses to financial system will be about the size of one bad day at the stock market, they just weren't that big. But what was the problem was, was that they were distributed throughout different securities and different places and nobody really knew where they were and who was going to bear the losses. So there was a lot of uncertainty created in the financial markets. And as a result, wherever you had short-term funding, whether it was commercial paper or other types of short-term funding, we had all kinds of funding that was not deposit insured, it was so called wholesale funding, it came from finan--investors and other financial firms. Whenever there was a doubt about a firm, just like in a standard bank run, the investors, the lenders, the counterparties would pull back their money quickly because of the same reason that a depositor would pull their money out of a bank that was thought to be having trouble. So there was a whole series of runs which generated huge pressures on key financial firms as they lost their funding and were forced to sell their assets quickly and many important financial markets were badly disrupted. Now in the depression of the '30s, there were thousands of bank failures but the great--almost all of the banks that failed in the '30s, at least in the United States, were small banks and there were some larger banks that failed in Europe. The difference in 2008 was there were many small banks that failed in the United States but there were also intense pressures on quite a few of the largest financial institutions in the United States. And the next two pages are just a short list of some of the firms that came out during intense pressure. Bear Stearns which is a broker-dealer came under very intense pressure in the short-term funding markets in March of 2008. It was sold to JP Morgan with Fed assistance in March. Things calmed down a bit after that and over the summer there was some hope that the financial crisis would moderate but then in the late summer, things really began to pick up.In September 7th of 2008, Fannie and Freddie clearly were insolvent. They didn't have enough capital to pay the losses on their mortgage guarantees. The Federal Reserve worked with Fannie and Freddie's regulator and with the Treasury to determine the size of the shortfall and over the weekend, the Treasury with Fed's assistance came in and took those firms and put them into a form of limited bankruptcy called conservatorship. And the same time, the Treasury got authorization from Congress to guarantee all of the Fannie and Freddie obligations. So if you held a Fannie and Freddie mortgage-backed security, the company itself was now sort of in a partial bankruptcy but the U.S. government now guaranteed. So that protected those investors. That had to be done or else it would have been an enormous intensification of the crisis because investors all over the world held literally hundreds and billions of those--of those securities.Famously, the middle of September, Lehman Brothers, a broker-dealer, and I'll talk more about this, I have a case study in this coming up, had severe losses. It came under great pressure, itcouldn't find either anybody to buy it or provide capital for it. And so in September 15th, it filed for bankruptcy. On the same day, Merrill Lynch, another big broker-dealer was acquired by the Bank of America, again basically saving the firm from potential collapse.On September 16th, the next day, AIG with the largest multidimensional insurance company in the world had--which remember had been selling the credit insurance, came under enormous attack from the people demanding cash either through margin requirements or through short-term funding. The Fed provided emergency liquidity assistance for AIG and prevented the firm from failing, and again, I'll come back to this as well.Washington Mutual was one of the biggest thrift companies, a big provider of subprime mortgages. It was closed by regulators later of September. After parts of the company were taken off, J.P. Morgan acquired this company as well. October 3rd, Wachovia, 1 of the 5 biggest banks in the United States, again, came under a serious of pressure. It was acquired by Wells Fargo, another large mortgage provider.So this just gives you some sense of--these are some of the--all these firms I'm talking about were among the top 10 or 15 financial firms in the United States and similar things were happening in Europe. So, this was not a situation where only small banks were being affected, I mean that was a problem too of course. But here we had the biggest, largest, most complex international financial institutions at the brink of failure.Now, the lessons with the Great Depression, going back, part two. First, remember the Fed did not do enough to stabilize the banking system in the 1930s and so the lesson there is that in the financial panic, the central bank has to lend freely according to Bagehot's rules to halt runs and to try to stabilize the financial system. And the second lesson of the Great Depression, the Fed did not do enough to prevent deflation and contraction of the money supply, so the second lesson of the Great Depression is you need to have accommodative monetary policy to help the economy avoid a deep depression. So, and heeding those lessons, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Government did take vigorous actions to stop the financial panic, worked with other agencies and worked internationally with foreign central banks and governments.Now, one aspect of the crisis that, I think, maybe doesn't get quite enough attention is the fact that this really was, first of all, a global crisis. In particular, Europe as well as the U.S. was suffering very severely from the crisis. But it was also a very impressive example of international cooperation. And one particular date that I have singled out here is October 10th, 2008. As it happened on that day, there was a previously scheduled meeting of the G7 industrial countries that happened to take place here in Washington. The G7 are the 7 largest industrial countries, and the central bank governors and the finance ministers of those 7 countries came and met in Washington. Now, I'll tell you a deep, dark secret which is these big high-profiled international meetings are usually a terrible bore because the--much of the work is done in advance by the staff, and we have a discussion but there's a communiqué which has been written already by the staff and, you know, it's simply fairly routine in most cases. This was not one of those boring meetings. We essentially tore up the agenda and we sat down and we talked about what are we going to do? How are wegoing to work together to stop this crisis which was threatening the global financial system? And in the end, we came up with a statement that was written from scratch based actually on some Fed proposals and was circulated, and there were a number of principles and statements involved in that. But among those were first, that we were going to work together to prevent the failure of anymore systemically important financial institutions. This was after Lehman Brothers had failed. We were going to make sure that banks and other financial institutions had access to funding from central banks and capital from governments. We were going to work to restore depositor confidence and investor confidence, and then we were going to cooperate as much as possible to normalize credit markets. So this was a global agreement and subsequent to this agreement, just in the following week, the UK was the first to announce a comprehensive program to stabilize its banking system. The U.S. announced major steps to put capital into our banks and so on. So a lot really happened in just the next couple of days after this meeting. Now, just to show you that this worked, this shows you--this graph shows you the interest rate charged on loans between banks. This is the interbank interest rate so bank A lends to bank B overnight, this is the interest rate that was charge.Now, normally, the interest--the overnight interest rate between banks is extremely low, way less than 1 percent because banks, you know, they need some place to park their money overnight and they have a lot of confidence that it's safe to lend to another large bank overnight. Well, as you can see, starting in 2007, banks lost confidence in each other and that's shown by the increase in the rates they charged to each other to make loans. So for example, in 2007, you begin to see the pressures as house prices begin to fall and there were increasing concerns about the quality of the mortgage securities and the quality of the firms. In March of 2008, you could see another little peak there which is around Bear Sterns and that was a--it doesn't look like much, I guess, in comparison but that was a pretty tough period. It was a period of quite sharp movements in financial markets and in funding markets. Now, look what happened when Bear Sterns happened. There was just an enormous spike in these interbank market rates and probably, not much lending was taking place even at those high rates. What this was indicative of was that suddenly there was no trust whatsoever even between the largest financial institutions because nobody knew who was going to be next, who was going to be--who was going to fail, who was going to come under funding pressure. Look what happened after the international announcements.Within a few days, the--we began to see a reduction in the pressure and by the end of the year, in early January, there was an enormous improvement in the funding pressures in the banking system. So this, I think, is a great example of international cooperation and it illustrates the point that this was not just a U.S. phenomenon, it was not just U.S. policy, it was not just the Federal Reserve, it really was a global cooperative effort, particularly between the United States and Europe.Now, the Fed played an important role, however, in providing liquidity, in making sure that the panic was controlled. Let me just talk briefly about this in general and I'll do 2 case studies that will illustrate some of the issues. Now, the Federal Reserve has a facility called the discount window, which it uses routinely to provide short-term funding to banks, maybe a bank which just finds itself short of funding at the end of day. It wants to borrow overnight. It has collateral withthe Fed. Based on that collateral, it can borrow overnight at what's called the discount rate which is the interest that the Fed charges. So the discount window which allows the Fed to lend to banks is always there. It's always operative. No extraordinary steps were needed to lend to banks. The Fed always lends to banks. We did make some modifications in order to reassure banks about the availability of credit. And to get more liquidity into the system, we extended the maturity discount window loans, which were normally overnight loans. We made them longer term and we had auctions of discount window funds where firms bid on how much they would pay, and the idea there was by having a fixed amount that we were auctioning, we would at least assure ourselves that we got a lot of cash into the system.Anyway, the point here is that the discount window which is the Fed's usual lender of last resort facility lending to banks was operative and we used it aggressively to make sure that the banks had access to cash to try to calm the panic. But our financial system is a lot more complicated than the one that existed when the Fed was created in 1913. We have many other different kinds of financial institutions in markets now. And as I said, the crisis was like an old time bank crisis, but it was appearing in all different kinds of firms and different kinds of institutional contexts. So the Fed had to go beyond the discount window. We had to create a whole bunch of other programs, special liquidity and credit facilities that allowed us to make loans to other kinds of financial institutions, again, on the Bagehot principle that providing liquidity to firms that are suffering from loss of funding is the best way to calm a panic. Now, all these loans were secured by collateral. We weren't taking chances with taxpayer money, and I'll talk about that when we come back. But the cash was going not just to banks, but more broadly into the system. Again, the purpose of this was to enhance stability of the financial system and get credit flows moving again. And just to emphasize, this is the traditional lender of last resort function of central banks that has been around for hundreds of years. What was different was that it took place in a different institutional context than just the traditional banking context.Here are some of the institutions and markets that we addressed through our special programs. Banks, of course, were covered by the discount window. But another class of financial institutions, broker-dealers, which are financial firms that deal in securities and derivatives, were also facing very serious problems that included Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and others and we provided cash or lend--short-term lending to those firms on a collateralized basis as well. As I'll talk about commercial paper borrowers, received assistance, as did money market funds, I'll come back, I'm going to do a little case study on those two, and finally, the asset-backed securities market. In the modern economy, modern financial system, a lot of the funding that you get for, not just mortgages, but auto loans, credit cards, all different kinds of consumer credit are funded through the securitization process, that is, a bank might take all of its credit card receivables, bundle them together to a security and then sell them in the market to investors, much the same way that mortgages were sold, and that's called the asset-backed securities market. The asset-backed securities market pretty much dried up during the crisis and the Fed created some new liquidity programs to help get it started again which we were successful in doing.Now I should mention that while the banks were lending through the discount window, this。

世界史上最著名的十大演讲

世界史上最著名的十大演讲NO.1：丘吉尔，我们将战斗到底，演讲时间：1940年6月4日丘吉尔，二战期间出任英国首相。

上任后他首先访问法国，惊讶地得知法国即将投降，但是他向法国领导人表明，即使法国被打败，英国仍将继续战斗。

5月26日，丘吉尔下令撤出在法的英军，代号为“发电机计划”的敦刻尔克大撤退开始。

在短短8天中，被围困在敦刻尔克周围一小块地区的盟军奇迹般地撤出33万多人。

1940年6月4日丘吉尔在下院通报了敦刻尔克撤退成功，但是也提醒“战争不是靠撤退打赢的。

”随后丘吉尔旋即发表了他在二战中最鼓舞人心的一段演说。

演讲中丘吉尔高度赞扬了英勇作战的士兵，成为鼓舞和安慰英国民众的重要支撑。

NO.2：亚伯拉罕林肯，葛底斯堡演说，演讲时间：1863年11月19日林肯总统为黑人解放运动的贡献自不用多说，作为美国历史上最受美国人爱戴的总统之一，葛底斯堡演说是林肯总统演说中最著名的一篇，也是在美国历史中最常被引用的演说。

这篇演说时值美国南北战争，距北方军击败南方叛军的葛底斯堡决定性战役仅4个半月;而演说的场所则是在宾夕法尼亚州葛底斯堡国家公墓的致辞典礼。

NO.3：马丁路德金，我有一个梦想，演讲时间：1963年8月28日1963年8月23日，马丁·路德·金组织了美国历史上影响深远的“自由进军”运动。

他率领一支庞大的游行队伍向首都华盛顿进军，为全美国的黑人争取人权。

他在林肯纪念堂前向25万人发表了著名的演说《我有一个梦想》，为反对种族歧视、争取平等发出呼号。

这篇演讲，对美国乃至世界的影响都非常巨大，甚至被我国编入中学教程。

NO.4：纳尔逊·曼德拉，我是第一个被指控的人，演讲时间：1964年纳尔逊·曼德拉于1994年至1999年间任南非总统，是首位黑人总统，被尊称为南非国父。

曼德拉在40年来获得了超过一百项奖项，其中最显著的便是1993年的诺贝尔和平奖。

2004年，其被选为最伟大的南非人。

金融的本质

美林证券被美国银行收购。
美联储为美国国际集团提供了紧急流动性援助，从而使其免于破产。
华盛顿互惠银行被摩根大通收购。
（2）应对举措
2008年10月10日，七国集团例行峰会在华盛顿举行，会议拟定了一份国际申明，根据这些原则，各国将会共同采取措施来避免那些具有系统重要性的金融机构破产。
美联储通过贴现窗口工具为银行提供短期融资。此次危机中，为了将更多的流动性注入金融体系，延长了贴现窗口贷款到期时间。（通常是隔夜到期），并且还对贴现窗口资金进行招标，让企业通过竞标决定其贷款利率。
金融危机和恐慌往往发生在这样的情况下：各类金融机构资产负债表的资产端往往都是低流动性资产（如长期贷款），而负债端都是高流动性的短期负债（如储蓄存款）。在这种情形下，人们一旦对金融机构失去信心，便会发生挤兑。这次金融危机带来的损失规模之所以这么大关键在于这些住房抵押贷款分布于不同的证券中，并在不同的市场上进行流动，没有人真正知道这些证券在哪儿，也没有人知道谁将会遭受损失。
（3）金融恐慌
金融系统都是建立在信念之上的。金融危机就是显而易见的银行挤兑，是对整个金融系统的挤兑。人们对资金安全失去信心—无论是股东还是债券持有者，无论是机构投资者还是鳏寡孤独—他们从金融系统中暴走挤兑是体系的钱更加不安全，也是每一个人失去信心，而人类惯于恐慌。
解决这一问题有个“白芝浩原则”。沃尔特•白芝浩是一名记者，他认为在恐慌时期，中央银行应当大量放款，只要找上门来的人有抵押物。这些抵押物必须是优质安全的，否则贷款就必须进行打折计算，同时央行应征收惩罚性的利率，这样人们才不会利用恐慌局势占便宜。
2、“二战”后的美联储
（1）货币政策与通货膨胀
20世纪五六十年代，美联储主要关注的是维持宏观经济稳定。美联储当时试图遵循所谓的“逆风向”货币政策。即经济过热时，采取紧缩性的货币政策，经济增长缓慢时，采用扩张性的货币政策。

英语展示：伯南克在普林斯顿大学的演讲

endowment n.捐赠捐款；才能天资 an endowment fund 捐赠的基金 men of great endowments 极有才能的人
Ben Bernanke 本· 伯南克
• Ben Bernanke served two terms as chairman of the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States from 2006 to 2014. During his term as chairman, Bernanke oversaw(管理监督) the Federal Reserve's response to the financial crisis. Obama said it was Bernanke's courage and creativity that helped to prevent another Great Depression in 2008.
The Eighth Suggestion
Nobody likes to fail, but failure is an essential part of life and of learning. If your uniform isn't dirty, you haven't been in the game.
minority n.少数，少数派 The Suggestion be in a Seventh minority 占少数 be in a minority of one 孤家寡人 majority 多数，多数党 • I'm not goingn. to tell you that money doesn't

unit 7 the Role of the Academy in Times of Crisis

The opportunity to receive higher education is a privilege that brings with it responsibilities. The President of Princeton University talks about this in her inaugural speech.Unit 7 THE ROLE OF THE ACADEMY IN TIMES OF CRISIS1 Today the academy holds a highly privileged place in American society because of a about the long-standing national consensus about the value of education. One of my predecessors, President Harold Dodds, said in his inaugural address in 1933 that "No country spends money for education, public or private, so lavishly as does the United States. Americans have an almost childlike faith in what formal education can do for them." That faith is based on a conviction that the vitality of the United States, its creative and diverse cultural life, its is national security and the robustness of its democratic institutions owe much to the quality of institutions of higher education.2 Our society’s confidence in its institutions of higher education is expressed through the generous investments of the federal and state government in basic and applied research investment that wisely couple support for research with support for graduate education. It is also expresses through federal and state investments that subsidize the cost of higher education for those who cannot afford to pay, investments by private foundations and charities who see colleges and universities as the best routes for achieving their strategic goals, and investments by individuals and by the private sector, who see universities as the incubators of future health and prosperity. In return for this broad support, society rightfully expects certain things from us. It expects the generation of new ideas and the discovery of new knowledge, the exploration of complex issues in an open and collegial manner and the preparation of the next generation of citizens and leaders. In times of trouble, it is especially important that we live up to these expectations.3 The medieval image of the university as an ivory tower, with scholars turned inward in solitary contemplation, immunized from the cares of the day, is an image that has been superseded by the modern university constructed not of ivory, but of a highly porous material, one that allows free diffusion in both directions. The academy is of the world, not apart from it. Its ideas, crafted over many generations, are meant to suffuse the national consciousness. Its scholars and teachers are meant to move in and out of the academy in pursuit of opportunities to use their expertise in public service, in pursuit of creative work that will give us illumination and insight and in pursuit of ways to turn laboratory discoveries into useful things. Our students engage the world with a strong sense of civic responsibility, and when they graduate they become alumni who do the same. This is as it should be.4 The search for new ideas and knowledge is not and cannot be motivated by utilitarian concerns. Rather it depends on the ability to think in new and creative ways. When the Nobel laureate John Nash developed the mathematical concepts underlying non- cooperative game theory8 as a graduate student at Princeton, he could not foresee that those concepts would be used today to analyze election strategies and the causes of war and to make predictions about how people will act. When Professor of Molecular Biology Eric Wieschaus' set out as a young scientist to identify genes that pattern the body plan of the fruit fly embryo, he could not know that he would identify genes that play a central role in the development of human cancer. We have learned that we cannot predict with any accuracy how discoveries and scholarship will influence future generations. We also have learned that it is unwise to search only in predictable places, for new knowledge often depends upon preparing fertile ground in obscure places where serendipity and good luck, as well as deep intelligence, can sprout. Freedom of inquiry, which is one of our most cherished organizing principles, is not just a moral imperative, it is a practical necessity.5 Just as we have an obligation to search widely for knowledge, so we also have an obligation to ensure that the scholarly work of the academy is widely disseminated, so that others can correct it when necessary, or build on it, or use it to make better decisions, develop better products or construct better plans. In the days ahead, I hope that our country's decision-makers will draw on the knowledge that resides on our campuses, on historians who can inform the present through deep understanding of the past, philosophers who can provide frameworks for working through issues of right and wrong, economists whose insights can help to get the economy back on track, engineers who know how to build safer buildings, scientists who can analyze our vulnerabilities to future attack and develop strategies for reducing those vulnerabilities, and scholars in many fields who can help us understand the motivations of those who would commit acts of terrorism here and throughout the world.6 Let me now turn to the third obligation that we have to society: the education of the next generation of citizens and leaders. Princeton's view of what constitutes a liberal arts education was expressed well by Woodrow Wilson, our 13th President, whose eloquent words I read at Opening Exercises:"What we should seek to impart in our colleges, is not so much learning itself as the spirit of learning. It consists in the power to distinguish good reasoning from bad, in the power to digest and interpret evidence, in the habit of catholic observation and a preference for the non-partisan point of view, in an addiction to clear and logical processes of thought and yet an instinctive desire to interpret rather than to stick to the letter of reasoning, in a taste for knowledge and a deep respect for the integrity of the human mind."7 Wilson, and the presidents who followed him, rejected the narrow idea of a liberal arts education as preparation for a profession. While understanding the importance of professional education, they made it clear that at Princeton we should first and foremost cultivate the qualities of thought and discernment in our students in the belief that this will be most conducive to the health of our society. Thus we distinguish between the acquisition of information, something that is essential for professional training, and the development of habits of mind that can be applied in any profession. Consequently we celebrate when the classics scholar goes to medical school, the physicist becomes a member of Congress, or the historian teaches primary school. If we do our job well as educators, each of our students will take from a Princeton education a respect and appreciation for ideas and values, intellectual openness and rigor, practice in civil discourse and a sense of civic responsibility. During these troubled times, our students and our alumni will be called upon to exercise these qualities in their professions, their communities and their daily lives. By so doing, and through their leadership, their vision and their courage, they will help to fulfill Princeton's obligation to society and bring true meaning to our motto, "Princeton in the nation's service and in the service of all nations."Critical thinking1. What do you think is the purpose of education?2. Do you think the idea of a liberal arts education as preparation for a profession is a narrow one? Why? Why not?3. The search for new ideas and knowledge is not and cannot be motivated by utilitarian concern. Do you agree?普林斯顿大学校长在其任职演说中提到：与接受高等教育这项权利相伴的是各种义务。