关于公允价值会计的一个批判【外文翻译】

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金融危机下的公允价值会计——会计类毕业论文中英文翻译、外文翻译

附件9：XXX科技学院学生毕业设计（论文）外文译文院（系）专业班级学生姓名XXX学号XXX文章来源：玛利亚卡门惠安库扎大学，亚历山大雅西，罗马尼亚金融危机下的公允价值会计摘要：2008年9月的金融风暴直击美国经济核心，并且迅速蔓延到世界各地，引发了对使用外来衍生金融工具和公允价值会计的激烈辩论。

或多或少受此次危机影响的银行﹑保险管理人员，审计师和政界人士就这一主题多次在新闻头版发表不同意见，本文的目的是审查金融市场的现状，使我们了解到公允价值会计及衍生品在预防这些巨大的丑闻时的重要性，制定准则。

同时阐述支持或反对使用公允价值和信用衍生产品的意见并提出应对未来金融危机的解决办法。

关键词：次贷危机金融衍生产品公允价值一、引言安然危机震撼了美国经济的核心。

监管机构在2000年初发行规则，以方便投资者了解公司资产的价值，并减少（至少部分减少）结构性融资的复杂性。

当时，一个最佳的解决方案似乎是合理价值会计，它旨在披露更具相关性和有价值的报告。

监管机构认为，鼓励公平价值的透明度和可比性，将有助于恢复投资者对金融市场及其机构的信任。

安然事件之后，美国的标准制定者-财务会计标准委员会（ FASB ）已行使任务，发出的公允价值测量标准（联邦反垄断局第157条）。

根据这一标准，资产必须属于这三类之一，如何分类取决于其相对流动性：1级，包括最流动资产，其价值源于在活跃市场的价格;2级，包括使用可观察市场的市场数据;3级，包括最难计量的资产的公允价值计量不可观察，只有通过以内部模式和估算为基础的价格。

正是这个第三级别提高了在没有市场参考价时有关强制使用市场价值为交易或金融资产/负债的计价模式。

关于公允价值会计的争论再度引发了新闻界把责任归咎于彻底崩溃的住房抵押贷款证券的市场和住房信贷市场1由于缺乏市场流动性产生了上述银行家，责任再次放在公允价值会计，但奇怪的1因为没有流动性的市场，这里第三级最具争议，它有关强制使用以市场价值为交易、金融资产或负债。

财务会计公允价值中英文对照外文翻译文献

财务会计公允价值中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文：公允价值计量1.公允价值在国际财务报告准则中的规定在2005 年11月，国际财务会计准则理事会为注解准则发表了一个讨论意见,以财务会计为基础的公允价值的初始确认和计量，由加拿大会计准则委员会的全体职员编写。

虽然意见包含了对于公允价值的讨论，但它的主要目的是讨论哪些计量属性适合初始确认。

意见是不断更新的概念框架项目的一部分。

这个概念框架项目致力于构建一个为财务报表服务的计量概念。

因为意见范围和意图的不同，它不在此论文中讨论。

然而，关于那篇讨论意见的评论将会在国际财务报告准则的公允价值计量披露草案和美国财务会计准则概念框架计划的第1号第157条以及现行公允价值计量指南。

这篇讨论意见是关于公允价值计量的。

国际财务报告准则要求某些资产、负债和权益性工具应该在某些情况下用公允价值计量。

然而，指南在公允价值方面的要求通常被准则稀释了，并且准则在这方面的说明也并不是前后一致的。

国际会计准则理事会认为单一来源的那些准则中有关于公允价值方面的指南将会简化国际财务报告准则并且改善财务报表中公允价值的信息质量。

一个简明的公允价值的定义和一个适用于所有公允价值计量的前后一致的指南将会更清晰地表达公允价值的对象并且消除公众对于通过国际财务报告准则传播的指南方面的顾虑。

国际会计准则理事会强调公允价值计量项目并不是一种用来延伸公允价值在财务报表中应用的手段。

此外，项目的目标在于重新编写、明晰、简化在国际财务报告准则中广泛应用的现有指南。

然而，为了构建一个按准则要求对于所有公允价值的计量都能统一指南的单一标准，必须对现有的指南做出修改。

这些修改意见在第2号准则中做了进一步的讨论，这可能会使公允价值在某些标准下的计量和在准则要求下进行的解释和应用都做出调整。

在某些准则中，国际会计准则理事会（或其前身）有意识地纳入了一些计量指南。

这些指南会导致尽管它在公允价值的计量客体上并不是前后一致，但在这些客体的计量上仍被视为公允价值计量。

公允价值中英文对照外文翻译文献

公允价值中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Fair Value is here to stayThe fair value guidance in SFAS 157 Fair Value Measurements, does not represent, as many perceive, a radical departure from previous accounting rules. SFAS 157 is the result of a natural evolution that has been taking place for more than 30 years. SFAS 157 is the result of anatural evolution that has been taking place for more than 30 years.Many who oppose SFAS 157 do so because of the current economic environment. This current economy, during which many hedge funds and other institutional investors face significant other-than-temporary write-downs on illiquid assets, is, however, an anomaly. Any valuation method that does not require significant write-downs in the current environment would fail to provide a reasonable representation of fair value for those illiquid assets.When it was introduced in 2007, SFAS 157 amended, deleted, or otherwise affected more than 40 areas of accounting guidance, including SFAS 13, Accounting for Leases. SFAS 13, issued in 1976, introduced the fair value concept when it described an asset being sold in an "arm's length transaction between unrelated parties." Since then, the accounting framework has continued to move away from a historical cost model and toward a fair value model.Throughout this transition, accounting standards were issued that discussed fair value in different contexts. SFAS 157 was designed primarily to provide a uniform definition of fair value and a universal measurement framework. Contrary to popular perception, SFAS 157 does not require any new items to be measured at fair value; it specifies the framework to be used wherever other standards require that items be measured at fair value.Along the WayMany accountants were educated during an era when colleges taught the tenets of historical cost as part of the fundamental framework of accounting. To those watching the fair value model slowly supplant the cost model during the past 30 years, it may seem like a dramatic change in thinking has recently occurred, but much of this shift is attributable to the ongoing development of accounting standards and rules, rather than a change in approach.To those watching the fair value model slowly supplant the cost model during the past 30 years, it may seem like a dramatic change in thinking has recently occurred, but much of this shift is attributable to the ongoing development of accounting standards and rules, rather than a change in approach. Prior to SFAS 87,Accounting for Pensions, and SFAS 106, Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, many companies paid for these benefits on a pay-as-you go cash basis, with little attention given to the fair value of the plan assets that were needed to be set aside to cover the cost of such benefits or how to account for them on an accrual basis. SASs 87 and 106 required companies for the first time to factor in the fair value of plan assets when determining their benefit obligations.The next sweeping implementation of fair value took place when companies began to adopt SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivatives and HedgingActivities, in 1999. Prior to SFAS 133, companies were not required to put all derivatives on their balance sheet at fair value; derivatives were not even defined in the literature. For the first time, complex financial instruments, many of which were involved in hedging relationships, were subject to fair valuation. Soon after, SFAS 140, Transfers of Financial Assets, gave rise to difficult-to-value seductive financial assets, such as residential and commercial mortgage-hacked securities RMBS and CMBS, which in turn gave rise to collateralized debt obligationsCDO and other financial instruments. A barrage of valuation techniques based on higher math designed to account for securitization followed.SFAS 157 had a significant impact on fair value accounting for illiquid securities, which are typically among the most difficult assets to value. Prior to SFAS 157, companies often cherry-picked information to support valuations for illiquid positions, regardless of accuracy. Now, they are required to consider all "reasonably available" information and use the best data available to support their market assumptions and parameters.Even though SFAS 157 has been in effect for more than a year, many illiquid assets are still being valued based on previous methodologies that are clearly inaccurate.Today's EnvironmentIn the current economic environment, air value accounting facesintensified scrutiny, challenging situations, and significant opposition. Attention is especially focused on three areas:? Other-than-temporary write-downs,? Fresh-start accounting, and? Illiquid securities.Other-than-temporary write-downs.With Level 1 securities, determining when to record an other-than-temporary impairment can he as straightforward as deciding how much time has passed since an impairment began. When the tech bubble burst, for example, companies often realized after six to nine months that asset values weren't going to recover any time soon, if at all.But what about Level 2 or Level 3 assets that are valued using sophisticated modeling techniques? Prior to SFAS 157, companies and their auditors might have agreed to hold off or postpone making an adjustment, due to a lack of relevant and reliable information. SFAS 157 has driven companies to consider new types and sources of information, and to work harder to support valuations for Level 2 and Level 3 assets. Companies are now expected to support their Level 2 and Level 3 assets almost as if they were Level I assets.In evaluating goodwill for other-than temporary impairment, SFAS 157 suggests that a publicly traded stock price, if available, is the best indicator of fair value. But even when a stock price is available, other,more traditional methods of fair value, such as discounted cash flow, must also be considered. The challenge lies in supporting these other methods in the current environment of declining prices.With the release of FASB Staff Position FSP FAS 1 15-2 and FAS 124-2,Recognition and Presentation of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments, in April 2009, companies are able to bifurcate certain losses on debt securities classified as held-to-maturity or available-for-sale between the portion related to credit conditions and the portion related to noncredit conditions. The noncredit portion will be recognized on the balance sheet until the debt security matures or is sold. In many situations, the amount reclassified to the balance sheet will include losses previously recognized in other periods. This new rule has caused controversy among practitioners and standards setters, primarily because it delays the inevitable recognition of those losses in earnings when the debt security is sold or matures.Fresh-start accounting Companies petitioning for Chapter 11 bankruptcy need to know whether they will qualify for fresh start accounting based on their reorganization value according to the provisions of AICPA Statement of Position SOP 90-7, Financial Reporting by Entities in Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code.SOP 90-7 provides a two-step test. The first step requires a comparison of reorganization value with the value of postposition claimsand obligations immediately prior to court confirmation. This balance sheet solvency test is a moving target throughout a bankruptcy proceeding, because there may be large fluctuations in reorganization value and claims until the plan is implemented. The second step requires that holders of existing common shares immediately before court confirmation have, as a group, less than 50% of the new company's shares upon emergence from bankruptcy. The challenge here involves the negotiations that take place between debtor and creditor committees and the company, which are then subject to final court approval.Illiquid securities. When determining fair value, companies must consider the frequency with which securities are traded. Fair value is more readily supportable for a frequently traded security than for one that is thinly traded because SFAS 157 emphasizes the importance of observable prices.Today, a company's desire to hold a position, together with its requirement to value that position, is causing a unique anomaly in the valuation world, as securities that would otherwise trade normally are increasingly subject to write-downs. A good valuation model must take into account all facts and circumstances. For example, when the market is dry for a specific illiquid security, the valuation methodology must consider any widening credit spreads, liquidity premiums from the time of the last active trading activity to the then-current indications, and discountrates implicit in nonbinding broker quotes.With the finalization in April 2009 of FSP FAS 157-4, Determining Fair Value When the Volume and Level of Activity for the Asset or Liability Have Significantly Decreased and Identifying Transactions that Are Not Orderly, companies are now subject to additional disclosure requirements and must carefully support how observable prices from inactive markets areused in valuations. Companies may also need to explain significant differences between different inputs to value.FSP FAS 157-4 did not come about without opposition; it generated nearly 400 comment letters within a short period. The author is not aware of any other proposed accounting rule that generated so many comment letters within such a short time and that underwent such a drastic turn around before being finalized.Tomorrow's EnvironmentU.S. companies are facing a seemingly inevitable changeover to International Financial Reporting Standards IFRS. Fair value guidance under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles GAAP is primarily rules-based, while fair value guidance under IFRS is based on principles. Principles often evolve into rules, but, in this case, rules appear to be reverting back to their origin as principles.Fair value guidance under SFAS 157 and íFRS are different inseveral respects. For example, IFRS does not define the term "market participants," does not include the concepts of principal market or "highest and best use," and does not generally permit imaret pricing. While there will be convergence to eliminate many differences, companies will need to embrace and understand the principles based approach behind IFRS.Fair value will continue to generate challenges for accountants, especially if and when IFRS is adopted. The sooner companies come to grips with the impact of fair value accounting, the better, because fair value is here to stay.翻译:公允价值仍留在此处在美国财务会计准则委员会《财务会计准则公告第157号公允价值计量》(SFAS 157)的指导下,公允价值计量,并不代表尽可能多的感知,与以前的会计准则大相径庭。

会计公允价值财务外文翻译 3000多字译文 2013年

文献出处：Gîrbină M M. Lobbying towards IASB respondents’ influence on the Fair Value Option[J]. Analele Universităţii din Oradea, 2013, 16: 370-374.原文Lobbying towards IASB: respondent’s influenceOn the fair value option amendmentGîrbinăABSTRACT：The focus of our research is to analyze the environment in which IASB acts and to investigate its influence on the standard setting process using the theoretical framework of the institutional theory. We perform a case study illustrating the standard setting process for the amendments to IAS 39 after 2002 concentrating on the “Fair Value Option- amendment”. The examination is based on comments letters submitted, final standards and their basis for conclusion and pursues the dentification of the main parties involved, their opinions, incentives, interests and the arguments they use to support their position, the sources of controversies and also the reaction of the IASB to opposing arguments and the justification of its choices. Keywords: accounting standard setting, IASB, lobbying, fair value option1 IntroductionThere is a general presumption that accounting standards are intended to enhance the quality of accounting information and to reduce the asymmetry among market participants. Because the standards determine the information disclosed by companies and play an important role in the wealth distribution process, an accounting standard acceptable to all rarely exists. The affected parties will try to convince the standard setter to write rules to their advantage and the later will have to solve the inherent conflicts. In other words, accounting standard setting is not just about finding the “right solution” but is also about making choices among the views of different individuals and groups having conflicting interests.Private regulators develop their standards according to a due process which incorporates a formal public consultation by providing interested parties opportunities to express their views on debated issues before the adoption of the final standards. The standard setting is considered a political activity in which interested parties will seek to lobby the rule-making body.The study of the lobbying process is necessary because it gives insights into understanding the institutional features of standard setting. If prior research concentrated mainly on the work of standards setters from different countries, we considered that institutional particularities of IASB don’t justify thegeneralization of results.2 Literature ReviewAn important part of the literature on politics in standard setting identified interested parties their incentives and victories. Some research appealed economic models, the individual interest and the rationality of the actors to explain the standard setting process and the behavior of the actors. Other research studies classified participants and correlated their positions to accounting standard outcomes.In spite of the extensive literature on accounting standard-setting, few studies focused on the work of the IASB and its forerunner, IASC. A part of them analyzed the comment letters without focusing on characteristics of lobbyers. Kenny and Larson (1993) examined the comment letters on the Exposure Draft Financial Reporting of Interests in Joint Ventures and concluded that few individual firms lobby the IASC and that professional and trade organizations lobby on behalf of their constituents. Kenny and Larson (1995) analyzed also the comment letters on IASC proposals published between 1989 and 1992 and found that 40 organizations contributed about 60 % of all submitted responses. Larson (1997) tested empirically the applicability of ideas originating in the U.S.-based lobbying literature in an international context. Mac Arthur (1996) analyzed the content of the comment letters sent by companies to the IASC on ED 32 (comparability of financial statements) to test Gray's hypothesized linkages between accounting values and the cultural values identified by Hofstede. Later, MacArthur (1999) focused on the impact of cultural factors on the lobbying behavior of accounting bodies’ members on the IASC’s ED 32. The combined results suggested that cultural, accounting sub cultural and economic factors influence the preferences of accounting bodies’ members and corporate management. By exploring the effect of national characteristics on lobbying, Jorissen et al (2006) demonstrated that in countries with high levels of enforcement, with high judicial efficiency, and with a positive attitude towards tax compliance, companies engage more often in lobbying and that variables relating to domestic earnings management practices and the domestic information environment of the firm have no significant influence.3Research methodologyIn order to assess the influence of IASB’s institutional environment on its standard setting process we will examine the development of amendments to IAS 39 after 2002 concentrating on the “Fair Value Option-amendment”.4 The theoretical framework of the researchGrounded in social theory, institutional theory asserts that organizations adjust their structure, policies, and procedures to conform to norms, values, beliefs deemed legitimate in order to maintain credibility andsurvive. As Ritti and Silver (1986) suggest, the institutionalization of an organization and its success in gaining legitimacy depends on its ability to project myth about itself. Afterwards, the legitimacy is maintained by engaging in ritualistic enforcement to comply with institutional expectations and communicating the rational basis of these enforcement processes. In the case of IASB, actors with different national, professional background and diverging interests struggle to influence the process of rule setting. Given the variety of actors involved the diversity of their interests, traditions and languages it is somewhat surprising that the process of standard setting is still possible. It has been argued that the dominance of the expertise and professional discourse, the institutionalization of a due process which provided a coordination mechanism for actors with conflicting interests to collaborate in order to elaborate international standards transformed IASB in a legitimate mean of organizing contest all over the world ( Jorissen A. et al ,2006). Compromise is essential to maintain credibility in order to remain credible and survive.5 Case selectionConsidering that the case must be representative for the investigated phenomenon we decided that the study of the development of a standard which gave rise to much controversy is more likely to provide an insight into the standard setting process. This approach can be understood in terms of selecting an extreme case (Ryan et al, 2002). Issued in 1998, IAS 39 was the culmination of a long process aimed at defining and establishing recognition and measurement guidance for financial instruments. The negotiation process is far from the end having that, from its initial issuance in 1998, the standard has been amended seven times. Among the revisions to IAS 39 in 2002 was the introduction of an option that permitted entities to designate irrevocably on initial recognition any financial asset or financial liability to be measured at fair value with gains and losses recognized in profit or loss (the “fair value option”). Although many EU banks and insurers favored the fair-value option, banking regulators such as the European Central Bank (ECB) strongly opposed it and lobbied the European Commission which included the option in the 'carve-out'. This generated a situation where first time adopters outside the EU could use the full option, but EU listed companies could in theory only fair value assets, because the EU carve out excluded liabilities. Confronted with an unexpected problem, IASB decided to propose the limitation of the fair value option in an Exposure Draft issued in April 2004 (ED Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement: The Fair Value Option ).6 Data analysisIn order to study the lobbying behavior it is essential to know which opportunities are given by IASB to its constituents to participate in the lobbying process. A possible source of intrusion might come from EU screening mechanism. The constituents may also use informal channels for lobbying. Obtaining evidence ofinformal lobbying activity is difficult because it is not directly observable. For this reason, our examination will be based on comment letters, decision summaries, press releases and other public information. Georgioiu (2004) shown that there is a strong link between the use of comment letters and the use of other lobbying mechanisms, so we will focus mainly on the study of lobbying behavior using publicly available comment letters. The research population consisted of comment letters that were written between 2002 and 2005 in response to exposure drafts that amended IAS 39.The 478 comment letters were first classified in different categories, whereby each category represented a different constituent party: preparers, the accounting profession, users, national standard setters, stock exchanges, governments, individuals, academics and other interested parties. Our analysis supports the hypothesis developed by Sutton (1984) that preparers lobby more often than users, because they have greater exposure to the effects of regulations and they are able to bear the costs of lobbying. The second largest participating group is the accounting profession. Hussein and Ketz (1991) explain their participation as a proactive concern over legal liability. Also, Puro (1984) demonstrated empirically that accountants lobby as advocates of their clients. Lindalh (1987) advanced the idea that they use comment letters submission as a political resource to create the image of professionalism or as a form of advertising. The group of users of financial statements seems to be almost absent in this influencing process. The preparers, professionals and standard setters represent also the majority of SAC. We tested if the different constituent parties lobby to the same extent towards all documents issued by the IASB related to amendments to IAS 39 and the hypothesis was rejected with a high significance (Kruskal–Wallis, asymptotic significance being 0.0001). Many participants disagreed with the board’s reasons to amend the fair value option. Accounting professionals and preparers (banks and insurance companies) had the most reluctant position related to the limitation of the fair value option. Most comment letters were received from UK (22), Germany (11), Australia (9) Switzerland (7), New Zeeland (6), France (6) Japan (4) Denmark (4) Belgium (4).In order to observe if external actors influenced IASB via their comment letters we identified the main issues raised by constituents in their letters and verified if they were integrated in the final standard (the methodology was proposed by Weetman, 2001) and we analyzed situations for which IASB changed in the final standard its position expressed in the ED. Most comments received an answer in the final standard. The justification of standard setter in the basis for conclusion is more detailed if the final standard reflects a different view from the view of constituents. In order to assess the respondents’ influence each comment letter was coded based on its concordance with the outcome in the final standard. Specifically if the comment letter favored the outcome in the standard it was coded +1 for that issue; if the comment letter opposed the outcome it was coded -1 for the issue. Then we realized a binomial test of the preference with the IASB’s position.This analysis tentatively ind icated that the IASB is influenced by respondents’ preferences as expressed in their letters. To statistically test for the association between the predictor variable, constituents groups and the influence on accounting issues, a chi-square test was used. It revealed that banks influenced the elimination of the verifiability test from the final standard. Also, most banks agreed with fair valuing debts without separating the effect of own creditworthiness. With the purpose of examination of the positions taken in relation to the specific issues related to the use of fair value option we realized a content analysis of comment letters. The number of arguments and supporting arguments presented on an issue was considered as an indication of strength, the idea being that the more arguments and supporting arguments provided in a submission the stronger the position of the submission. Companies may also use different types of arguments and supporting arguments, such as economic consequences or conceptually based arguments, in an attempt to convince standard setters of their view (Tutticci et al., 1992). We also interpreted as a strength indicator the number of phrases considering that measures based on word counts and pages are problematic because of different writing styles and different page set-ups, graphics and font size. We determined that the longest justifications were received from preparers and the accounting profession and most constituents used conceptual based arguments.7 Conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future researchActions to find a solution for this short circuit in standard setting. It underlies the necessity of deploying strategies to maintain the standard setter legitimacy under circumstances of large institutional distance between pressure forces. Our conclusions are supported also by the latest actions of IASB to review its Constitution, due process and to enhance transparency, which we interpret as attempts to gain more legitimacy. The empirical part of the research demonstrated that the external actors influenced IASB’s decisions via their comment letters. The content analysis illustrated that most constituents used conceptually based arguments to strengthen their position when they disagreed with the opinion of the standard setter. This demonstrates also that constituents prefer to use socially accepted arguments and to and hide their real reasons for lobbying accentuating standard setter myths. This case-study illustrates how IASB exploits its due process ceremony to impose its values through manipulation of cognitive legitimacy. The most important limitation of the research is related to the fact that is based on comment letters and other publicly available material. Also, the content analysis conclusions might be affected by the subjectivity of the researcher in classifying arguments and choosing indicators of lobbying position.译文对国际会计准则委员会的游说：公允价值摘要：本文中我们研究的重点是分析IASB（国际会计准则委员会）行为的环境，探讨利用制度上的理论框架来制定标准制度过程中的影响。

公允价值会计外文文献翻译财务2014年译文3200字

文献出处：Barth M E, Landsman W R. The influence of fair value accounting on the banking industry [J]. Journal of banking & finance, 2014, 19(3): 577-605s（声明：本译文归百度文库所有，完整译文请到百度文库。

）原文The influence of fair value accounting on the banking industryBarth M E, Landsman W RAbstractSince the eighties of the twentieth century，FASB and IASB decided to spare no effort to promote the application of the fair value in accounting standards in order to reduce the financial risks from Financial derivatives. However, banking and financial regulatory authorities have questioned the reliability of fair value. In addition, they have thought that the application of the fair value will increase the volatility of financial situation and business performance; and then, it can affect the stability of financial system. In 2007, the outbreak of sub-prime mortgage crisis made fair value become a hot topic. Basic economic theory using fair value accounting for financial institutions for financial report provides a reasonable basis (Heaton et al., 2010).The so-called Fair Value (Fair Value) is in the process of trading assets or liabilities, familiar with the market situation of the voluntary exchange assets or debt liquidation identified price. As a relatively new measurement model, fair value can provide more real-time, useful information to market participants, and thus more valuable.Key words: Fair value; Banking; Financial instruments.1 IntroductionIn the traditional economic environment, historical cost has been in a leading position. In external market price is relatively stable, can generally accompanied by risks and rewards of complete transfer deals, the historical cost, despite of its rationality. And financial accounting emphasizes the fiduciary responsibility, pay more attention to the reliability of the accounting information authenticity, historicalcost measurement can meet the demand of this kind of information to a certain extent.Historical cost measurement, however, is not perfect, began in the late 60 s inflation, said with nominal currency non-monetary assets continue to rise, the market price of the book value is much lower than market price, therefore, on the basis of the historical cost financial statements to distort the real performance of enterprise management. Through further research, points out that after the 1980 s due to the rapid development of the financial instruments, financial assets and financial liabilities of price fluctuations is very intense, on the basis of the historical cost measurement model can't reflect the market fluctuations caused by price fluctuations, therefore, fair value accounting arises at the historic moment. In addition, from the fiduciary duty to decision-making useful accounting target also create conditions for the emergence of the fair value measurement.Different accounting objectives is different to the requirement of measurement, the decision-making useful concept requires fair value, the historical cost measurement and the concept of fiduciary duty requirement. About the causes of the fair value accounting, many scholars believe that fair value to the attention of the relevance of accounting information quality is the main reason. This is because, the usefulness of accounting information is a function of relevance and reliability. Different users of accounting information under the environment of there is a difference on the relevance and reliability requirements. When interest rates and asset values steady, the historical cost can be on the premise of guarantee the reliability of meet the relevant requirements. With the development of knowledge economy and the application of financial instruments, interest rate and asset values established stable this assumption is no longer, the correlation of accounting information users of accounting information demand.2 In the banking industry faced by the use of fair value accounting problemsThe application of fair value accounting in the banking sector after a from table to table, from simple to complex, from a specific financial instruments to the entire process, so that all assets and liabilities of financial instruments. But the application of fair value accounting is not plain sailing, bankers and regulators strongly opposed tothe fair value of sharply criticized the show the shortcomings in the practical application. Points out that, due to the use of fair value accounting, financial instruments during the surviving caused by changes in the profit and loss may not be able to provide very relevant information may even use personnel misleading statements.This view in the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008 for."Apocalypse of the us subprime crisis to our country the article mentioned that us financial giants blame said, according to the fair value of asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage backed securities (MBS) and collateralised debt obligation (CDO) measured grades: debt products, lead to financial institutions to confirm unrealized (unrealized) and no cash flow (non - cash flow) of huge losses. These paper losses caused investors panic to sell the stock holding subprime product financial institutions. This irrational speculation in turn forced financial institutions at any cost, reduce the risk of subprime products exposed positions in the account further confirm the impairment loss, the subprime crisis have been intensified. In addition to the pro-cyclical effect, the reliability of fair value accounting also has certain problem.3 The influence of fair value accounting for the banking industryBecause the United States have developed capital market and the perfect regulation system, relatively easy to eliminate the noise of other factors on the use of the fair value interference, therefore at present about the fair value of the empirical studies are mainly concentrated in the securities market. In general, the scholars on the research of the fair value on the banking industry can be roughly divided into the following three aspects: the fair value of the impact on the volatility of earnings and capital, the influence of fair value accounting on banking market behavior and the influence of fair value accounting for banking supervision behavior.Based on the concept of assets and liabilities, the fair value of assets and liabilities have been reflected on the balance sheet, and practice relation between financial statements determines the change of a report item is bound to cause another corresponding changes in the project, so the profit and loss account confirmation of unrealized profits inevitably affected by fair value.Hodder, Hopkins and wahlen (2006)to 202 American Banks of financial data from 1996 to 2004 as samples, to calculate the net income and comprehensive income (including the part of the fair value of financial instruments) and the fair value of the comprehensive income (including all of the fair value of financial instruments) of the three alternative income index fluctuation degree, and examined the different degree of volatility index of risk., according to the results of comprehensive income is twice the net income, and the fair value of income is three times under the comprehensive income, net income of 5 times. Barth (2004) should be based on economic substance behind the fluctuation of earnings volatility. Although some may question the volatility by factors such as the reliability of the valuation models and management manipulation, but the empirical research results show that the increase in earnings volatility to a certain extent, reflects the real business environment faced by firms, the risk early warning effect. While Plantin Sapra and Shin (2004) study put forward different views. Mark-to-market accounting they think will make the market price fluctuations under the influence of artificial factors. This volatility to reduce the information content of market prices, led to economic inefficiencies. For comments, the author thinks that, relative to the historical cost, fair value can more reflect the market value of bank assets and liabilities in a timely manner, and can be reflected in the income statement and balance sheet. In the normal operation of the external market, fair value can be more fair to reveal the bank's business performance, financial status and risk management information, increased the transparency of financial information, more conducive to investors to make decisions.Ernst & Young in 1993 and 1993, two years in a row against SFASll5 effect of questionnaire. In the questionnaire for the first time, more than half of the respondents believe that using SFAS115 will change their investment behavior, more than 95% claimed that can shorten the duration of the debt securities investment, about 40% think that increases the hedging activities, there are also some reply that may reduce the proportion of securities investment. The second questionnaire in the criterion has run after a period of time.60% of respondents claimed that actually has been changed the investment strategy, shortened the duration of the portfolio, and to reduce themortgage securities. Beatty (1995) study is in line with the results of the questionnaire. To cope with the due to the influence of SFAS115 implementation, Banks to reduce the proportion of holdings of securities investment, shorten the term securities, and when the bank average leverage and rights and interests of the average declines, the classified as available for sale securities held by the proportion of class will decline. Rule of the evidence suggests that the bank of the rights and interests of fluctuations caused by concerns led to the changes of bank portfolio management practices.Hara, m. (1993) focuses on the influence of market value accounting for loan maturity date, the study found that in the long-term of non-current assets fair value information asymmetry may result in an increase in long-term interest rates, Banks tend to make short-term loans to borrowers face excessive settlement problem.Hodder (2002) to 230 listed commercial Banks from 1993 to 1995 data as sample, the study found that, regardless of the implementation rule of SFAS115 successively, Banks into available for sale financial assets (AFS) was down; The early implementation of SFAS115 weak capital bank more assets to divide the available for sale financial assets, because this kind of bank intends to use securities regulatory capital unrealized gains. And when the regulatory capital falls, bank interest rate risk and credit risk according to modify portfolio holdings, which reduced portfolio, reduce the interest rate risk and credit risk; The interest rate of bank's loan portfolio risk after implementing SFAS115 increased. Securities management can not divided into AFS (for example, all securities classified as held-to-maturity) to eliminate the impact of regulation, but the division and the bank's liquidity.Under fair value accounting, conform to the requirements of the standards of financial instruments must be confirm measurement in the report, making it easier for the bank performance is affected by the capital market and presents the volatility, trigger regulatory intervention. For such situation, Banks tend to decompose and externalized the risk of those who belong to the traditional banking activities, through the hedging accounting, securitization, or transfer the risk to the customer (such as a floating interest rate or short-term loan contract) means of minimizing exposure risk positions in the fair value measurement, and at the expense of long-term customerrelationships and investment needs at the expense of the pursuit of short-term goals.译文公允价值会计对银行业的影响巴斯，兰兹曼摘要20 世纪80 年代以来，金融衍生工具大量出现，为了减少随之而来的金融风险，财务会计准则委员会（FASB）和国际会计准则理事会(IASB)决定不遗余力地推广公允价值在会计准则中的应用。

公允价值计量——一种新的会计评价方法【外文翻译】

外文翻译The Fair Value - A New Evaluation Method in Accounting ofCompanyMaterial Source:BulletinUASVMHorticulture,66(2)/2009 Author:Suceave，RomaniaAbstract. The fair value criterion is an evaluation method based on the supposit ion that the values expressed in the balance sheet reflect in every moment their exch ange value at the acquisition date, date at which the fair value and the historical cost are the same. But, in the following periods, the value of the assets and liabilities exp osed in the balance sheet is adjusted to a value equivalent to the value with which th e asset can be exchanged of the liability estimated, through a free transaction, betwe en 2 fully-aware parties, willing to make this operation. So, the exposed values base d on the fair value are current values, which might correspond to it in the conditions of a possible sale at that time. Certainly they are very useful values to the balance sh eet users, because they allow the approach to the entity’s economical capital quantifi cation. The problem is that the fair value quantification may not be credible for all th e posts in the balance sheet, because this parameter is often less likely to be docume nted about, or certain assets or liabilities do not have a market on which to obtain rea l quotations.The definition of the fair value is based on the supposition that an entity, in conditions of economical continuity, has no intention or necessity for liquidation, and as such is not interested in reducing relevantly its operations in disadvantageous conditions.INTRODUCTIONMaking abstraction of the initial evaluation of a received for good and valuable consideration, all the assessment measures enclosed in the balance are expressed in t he profit and loss account, influencing the result as income, respectively expense, he re counting the value modifications of assessment at the fair value at the date of the balance sheet and the income from the initial assessments of the assets produced. Th us the value modifications influenced by the market, as are the modifications of the physical substance that is due to biological transformations of the living animals and plants. The value modifications influenced due to the market influences are not sepa rately recognized in the profit and loss account, in the equity ownership, but they represent the result of the transaction in cause as well as the value modifications conditi oned by the transactions.The IAS 41 standard is one of the few standards that treat the accounting regul ations for one sector imposing in the first place the mandatory application of the fair value for the assets that are not classified as financial instruments as they are defined in IAS 39.The notion of fair value is based on the presumption that the company is contin uing its activity, without the intention or necessity to liquidate or limit significantly i ts activities and without the necessity to make a transaction in unfavorable condition s. Thus, the fair value is not the size that the company would receive or would pay w ith the cases of forced transactions or involuntary liquidation. The expression of fair value is formed out of two concepts:- Value- that comes from French an represents the sum of the quality that give p res to an object, a human being, a phenomenon;- Fair – that come from the French language and has more significations accor ding to the truth or the equity, according.According to the definition that we find in the International Standards of Financ ialReporting, the fair value represents the amount for which an asset could be will ingly transacted, between parties that are in conscience of cause, within a transaction with the price, where the price is determined objectively. From this definition we ca n identify the following general ideas about the fair value;- it represents a value equivalent, expressed more often in an amount of money;-it is an estimated value, that can undertake modifications in any moment;-the existence of a transaction between at least two parties that are in conscienc e of cause is mandatory;-the parties involved within the transaction, respectively the buyer and the selle r are supposed to have the sufficient information on the operation that is to take plac e.By determining the fair value within a contract each of the two parties can influenc e more the request-offer relation. We can emphasize the idea that the fair value result s from the comparison between the demand and the offer of biological assets, agricul ture products or additional biological assets.-The price concept is mentioned, from which we get the idea that we can add th e equal sign between the expressions of “fair value” and “fair price”.MATERIAL AND METHODSHowever the fair value reflects the credit risk of the instrument. On an active m arket, the fair value is determined when there are quoted prices on this market, such prices representing the best estimation of the fair value and they are used in order to measure the assets or the liabilities. A financial instrument is considered as being qu oted, on an active market, if the prices that reflect normal transactions on the market can be obtained rapidly and regularly, in the context of a stock exchange, of an inter mediary, of an assessment service or of a regulation agency. The quoted price adequ ate in the case of the assets detained or of the liabilities to issue is in general, the pric e asked. When the sale prices or the asked prices are not available, the fair value corr esponds to the price of the most recent transaction; if there have been no significant changes in the economic conditions, between the date of this transaction and the date of the assessment. If it is proved that the price of the most recent transaction is not t he fair value, then we proceed to the adjustment of the respective price. In the case where there is no active market, the fair value is determined by a special technique. The validation objectives of the assessment methods: the objective of the assessment techniques is to establish what would have been the price of an accomplished transa ction, at the date of the closure of the account that agree motivated by normal consid erations. Thus, the assessment includes all the factors that those active on the market would consider in determining the price, the hypothesis and the estimations retained must be coherent with the estimations and hypothesis that other participants would make on the market, for determining the price of the instrument.RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONSThe assessment methods susceptible to be used are: the assessment techniques established on the market, including the reference value existing on the market, of a similar instrument, the analysis of the future flows analyzed and the assessment met hods and options. The cost of depreciation and the method of the effective interest ra te。

公允价值外文文献

公允价值计量属性与上市公司利润外文翻译翻译：银行业公允价值会计核算玛利亚·帕卡拉佩斯库联合工作组的标准制定金融工具在2000年12月发出题为“金融工具及其标准草案和结论的基础”类似的项目的咨询文件。

该标准草案的审查和评估的公允价值会计作为在银行的资产负债表所有的金融工具估值的基础被广泛使用。

联合工作组将"引入全面的公平价值的金融工具确认和计量会计框架"作为与国际会计准则委员会的长期战略合作。

该工作组从9月30日收集2001年所有对标准草案感兴趣的各种意见。

国际会计准则委员会将根据收到意见评估公允价值会计的长期前景。

这些都表明了欧洲中央银行（ECB）对的联合工作组在这方面提出的重要建议，即是公允价值会计在银行业的应用。

在审查了标准草案之后，重点说明关于与公允价值会计制度适用于银行业有关的关键问题，并提出一个可行的办法。

一、该标准草案对银行部门的主要创新目前这个会计规则在欧盟银行中用来区分交易性金融工具和那些打算持有至到期的银行账户。

这些金融工具持有的交易账户是按市场价格估价。

从交易账户中重估利润和亏损来确认损益帐户。

这个交易账户中的会计规则可以把一切市场风险（即价格风险，利率风险，外汇风险和流动性风险）都考虑在内。

相比之下，银行账户中资产负债表的历史成本比市场价值低。

而银行账上的一个工具损失转移到损益表，未实现的收益是无法识别，因此可以成为隐藏在资产负债表的储备。

因此，银行账的会计规则不考虑市场风险（外汇风险，在最终期限值通常适用于几乎所有的资产负债表项目除外）。

该标准草案建议规定所有的金融工具统一规则。

如果资产负债表中的资产和负债的市场价值是真实的，或者作为使用贴现的预计未来现金流量现值模型的市场价值近似公平价值计算。

对银行来说，这将意味着，贸易及银行账户将获得平等的会计处理方法，即在所有价值变动将被确认在资产负债表及转入4页损益表中的第2页。

不论是否盈利或亏损已经实现或者没有实现预期升值都适用，因为所有金融工具都是按市价或公平价值的估计。

外文翻译--金融工具公允价值会计银行监管的意义

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Fair value accounting for financial instrument：some implications for bank regulation外文出处Working paper, University of North Carolina.外文作者 Wayne R. Landsman原文：Fair Value Accounting for Financial Instruments: SomeImplications for Bank RegulationIntroductionAccounting standards setters in many jurisdictions around the world, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the European Union, have issued standards requiring recognition of balance sheet amounts at fair value, and changes in their fair values in income. For example, in the United States, the Financial Accounting Standards Board requires recognition of some investment securities and derivatives at fair value. In addition, as their accounting rules have evolved, many other balance sheet amounts have been made subject to partial application of fair value rules that depend on various ad hoc circumstances, including impairment (e.g., goodwill and loans) and whether a derivative is used to hedge changes in fair value (e.g., inventories, loans, and fixed lease payments). The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board (hereafter FASB and IASB) are jointly working on projects examining the feasibility of mandating recognition of essentially all financial assets and liabilities at fair value in the financial statements.In the US, fair value recognition of financial assets and liabilities appears to enjoy the support the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC). In a recent report prepared for a Congressional committee (SEC, 2005), the Office of the Chief Accountant of the SEC states two primary benefits of requiring fair value accounting for financial instruments. First, it would mitigate the use of accounting-motivated transaction structures designed to exploit opportunities for earnings management created by the current “mixed-attribute”—part historical cost, part fair values—accounting model. For example, it would eliminate the incentive to use asset securitization as a means to recognize gains on sale of receivables or loans. Second, fair value accounting for all financial instruments would reduce the complexity of financial reporting arising from the mixed attributed model. For example, with all financial instruments measured at fair value, the hedge accounting model employed by the FASB’s derivatives standard would all but be eliminated, making it unnecessary for investors to study the choices made by management to determine what basis of accounting is used for particular instruments, as well as theneed for management to keep extensive records of hedging relationships.But, as noted in the SEC report, there are costs as well associated with the application of fair value accounting. One key issue is whether fair values of financial statement items can be measured reliably, especially for those financial instruments for which active markets do not readily exist (e.g., specialized receivables or privately placed loans). Both the FASB and IASB state in their Concepts statements that they consider the cost/benefit trade off between relevance and reliability when assessing how best to measure specific accounting amounts, and whether measurement is sufficiently reliable for financial statement recognition. A cost to investors of fair value measurement is that some or even many recognized financial instruments might not be measured with sufficient precision to help them assess adequately the firm’s financial position and earnings potential. This reliability cost is compounded by the problem that in the absence of active markets for a particular financial instrument, management must estimate its fair value, which can be subject to discretion or manipulation.Assessing the costs and benefits of fair value accounting for financial reporting to investors and other financial statement users in particular reporting regimes is difficult. Assessing the costs and benefits of bank regulators mandating fair value accou nting for financial institutions for the purpose of assessing a bank’s regulatory capital is perhaps even more challenging. The purpose of this paper is to provide some preliminary views on the issues bank regulators face when assessing the costs and benefits of using fair value for determining regulatory capital and making other regulatory decisions. To this end, I begin by reviewing extant capital market studies that examine the usefulness of fair value accounting to investors. I then discuss implementati on issues of determining financial instruments’ fair values. In doing so, I again look to evidence from the academic literature. Finally, I discuss marking-to-market implementation issues that are of particular relevance to bank regulators as they consider the effects of fair value measurement on bank earnings and capital, and the attendant effects on real managerial decisions.Background of Fair Value Accounting in Standard SettingDefinition of Fair ValueThe FASB defines “fair value” as “the price at w hich an asset or liability could be exchanged in a current transaction between knowledgeable, unrelated willing parties” (FASB, 2004a).As the FASB notes, “the objective of a fair valuemeasurement is to estimate an exchange price for the asset or liability being measured in the absence of an actual transaction for that asset or liability.” Implicit in this objective is the notion that fair value is well defined so that an asset or liability’s exchange price fully captures its value. That is, the price at which an asset can be exchanged between two entities does not depend on the entities engaged in the exchange and this price also equals the value-in-use to any entity. For example, the value of a swap derivative to a bank equals the price at which it can purchase or sell that derivative, and the swap's value does not depend on the existing assets and liabilities on the bank’s balance sheet. For such a bank, Barth and Landsman (1995) notes that this is a strong assumption to make particularly if many of its assets and liabilities cannot readily be traded. I will return to the implications of this problem when discussing implementation of marking-to-market issues below.Applications to standard settingIn the US, the FASB has issued several standards that mandate disclosure or recognition of accounting amounts using fair values. Among the most significant in terms of relevance to financial institutions are those standards that explicitly relate to financial instruments. Two important disclosure standards are Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 107, Disclosures about fair value of financial instruments (FASB, 1991) and SFAS No. 119, Disclosure about derivative financial instruments and fair value of financial instruments (FASB, 1994). SFAS No. 107 requires disclosure of fair estimates of all recognized assets and liabilities, and as such, was the first standard that provided investors with estimates of the primary balance sheet accounts of banks, including securities, loans, deposits, and long-term debt. In addition, it was the first standard to provide a definition of fair value reflecting the FASB’s objective of obtaining quoted market prices wherever possible. SFAS No. 119 requires disclosure of fair value estimates of derivative financial instruments, including futures, forward, swap, and option contracts. It also requires disclosure of estimates of holding gains and losses for instruments that are held for trading purposes.Among the most significant fair value recognition standards the FASB has issued are SFAS No. 115, Accounting for certain investments in debt and equity securities (FASB, 1993), SFAS No. 123 (Revised), Share-based payments (FASB, 2004), and SFAS No. 133, Accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities (FASB, 1998). SFAS No. 115 requires recognition at fair value investments in equity and debtsecurities classified as held for trading or available-for-sale. Fair value changes for the former appear in income, and fair value changes for the latter are included as a component of accumulated other comprehensive income, i.e., are excluded from income. Those debt securities classified as held to maturity continue to be recognized at amortized cost. SFAS No. 123 (Revised) requires the cost of employee stock options grants be recognized in income using grant date fair value by amortizing the cost during the employee vesting or service period. This requirement removed election of fair value or intrinsic value cost measurement permitted under the original recognition standard, SFAS No. 123, Accounting for Stock-based Compensation (FASB, 1995). Until recently, most firms elected to measure the cost of employee stock options using intrinsic value. However, for such firms, SFAS No. 123 requires they disclose a pro forma income number computed using a fair value cost for employee stock option grants, as well as key model inputs they use to estimate fair values.SFAS No. 133 requires all freestanding derivatives be recognized at fair value. However, SFAS No. 133 retains elements of the existing hedge accounting model. In particular, fair value changes in those derivatives employed for purposes of hedging fair value risks (e.g., interest rate risk and commodity price risk) are shown as a component of income, as are the changes in fair value of the hedged balance sheet item (e.g., fixed rate loans and inventories) or firm-commitments (i.e., forward contracts). If the so-called fair value hedge is perfect, the effect on income of the hedging relationship is zero. In contrast, fair value changes in those derivatives employed for purposes of hedging cash flow risks (e.g., cash flows volatility resulting from interest rate risk and commodity price risk) are shown as a component of accumulated other comprehensive income because there is no recognized off-setting change in fair value of an implicitly hedged balance sheet item or anticipated transaction.Outside of the US, standards issued by the IASB are often accepted or required as generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in many countries. For example, the European Union generally requires member country firms to issue financial statements prepared in accordance with IASB GAAP beginning in 2005. IASB GAAP comprises standards issued by its predecessor body, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), as well as those it has issued since its inception in 2001. The IASC issued two key fair value standards, both of which have been adopted bythe IASB, IAS 32: Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation (IASB, 2003), IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IASB, 2003). The former standard is primarily a disclosure standard, and is similar to its US GAAP counterparts, SFAS Nos. 107 and 119. IAS 39 describes how particular financial assets and liabilities are measured (i.e., amortized cost or fair value), and how changes in their values are recognized in the financial statements. The scope of IAS 39 roughly encompasses accounting for investment securities and derivatives, which are covered under SFAS Nos. 115 and 133, although there are some minor differences between IAS and US GAAP.The IASB has also issued a key fair value standard, International Financial Reporting Standard 2, Accounting for Share-based Payment (IASB, 2004). IFRS 2 is very similar to SFAS No. 123 (Revised) (FASB, 2004) in requiring firms to recognize the cost of employee stock option grants using grant date fair value.As part of their efforts to harmonize US and international accounting standards, the IASB and FASB recently issued related proposed or finished standards pertaining to disclosure of financial instruments fair values, Exposure Draft: Fair Value Measurements (FASB, 2004a) and International Financial Reporting Standard 7, Financial Instruments: Disclosures (IASB, 2005). The US Exposure Draft describes a hierarchy of preferred approaches to fair value measurement for all assets and liabilities measured at fair value under other FASB pronouncements, ranging from quoted market prices for the specific asset or liability to use of models to estimate fair values. Both the Exposure Draft and IFRS 7 require disclosure of fair value amounts at the end of each accounting period (year, quarter), how the fair values are determined, and the effect on income arising from each particular class of assets or liabilities (i.e., separate disclosure of recognized and unrecognized gains and losses). IFRS 7 is more comprehensive than the Exposure Draft in that it requires disclosure of detailed information for recognized financial instruments, both those measured at fair value and those that are not, as well as qualitative information relating to financial instruments’ liquidity, credit, and market risks.Valuation TechniquesAs noted above, in its Exposure Draft: Fair Value Measurements, the FASB describes a hierarchy of preferences for measurement of fair value. The preferred level 1 fair value estimates are those based on quoted prices for identical assets and liabilities, and are most applicable to those assets or liabilities that are actively traded(e.g., trading investment securities). Level 2 estimates are those based on quoted market prices of similar or related assets and liabilities. Level 3 estimates, the least preferred, are those based on company estimates, and should only be used if level 1 or 2 estimates are not available. With the emphasis on market prices, the FASB emphasizes that firms should base their estimates on market prices as model inputs wherever possible (e.g., use of equity market volatility estimates when employing the Black-Scholes valuation model to estimate the fair value of employee stock options). Fair value estimates can be constructed using entity-supplied inputs (e.g., discounted cash flow estimates) if other models employing market inputs are not available.Source: Wayne R. Landsman.2005. “Fair Value Accounting for Financial Instruments: Some Implications for Bank Regulation”. Working paper, University of North Carolina.译文：金融工具公允价值会计:银行监管的意义介绍近期，包括美国、英国、澳大利亚和欧盟在内许多地区的会计准则制定者发布了一项标准，即要求对资产负债表项目按公允价值计量并且将其变动计入公允价值变动。

会计专业外文翻译--公允价值测量1

外文原文：Fair Value Measurements1 In February 2006 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) published a Memorandum of Understanding reaffirming their commitment to the convergence of US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and to their shared objective of developing high quality, common accounting standards for use in the world’s capital markets. The convergence work programme set out in the Memorandum reflects the standard-setting context of the ‘roadmap’ developed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in consultation with the IASB, FASB and European Commission for the removal of the reconciliation requirement for non-US companies that use IFRSs and are registered in the US. The work programme includes a project on measuring fair value.2 The FASB has recently issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 Fair Value Measurements (SFAS 157), on which work was well advanced before the Memorandum of Understanding was published. SFAS 157 establishes a single definition of fair value together with a framework for measuring fair value for US GAAP. The IASB recognised the need for guidance on measuring fair value in IFRSs and for increased convergence with US GAAP. Consequently, the IASB decided to use the FASB’s standard as the starting point for its deliberations. As the first stage of its project, the IASB is publishing in this discussion paper its preliminary views on the principal issues contained in SFAS 157.3 The IASB plans to hold round-table meetings on this discussion paper in conjunction with the development of an exposure draft. Please indicate in your response to this Invitation to Comment if you are interested in taking part in a round-table meeting. Please note that, because of timing and space constraints, not all of those indicating an interest may be able to take part.4 The IASB will consider responses to this Invitation to Comment and the related round-table discussions in developing an exposure draft of an IFRS on fair value measurement. The exposure draft will be prepared specifically for application to IFRSs. Although provisions of SFAS 157 may be used in the preparation of an exposure draft, they may be reworded or altered to be consistent with other IFRSs and to reflect the decisions of the IASB. The IASB plans to publish an exposure draft by early 2008.5 In November 2005 the IASB published for comment a discussion paper, Measurement Bases for Financial Accounting – Measurement on Initial Recognition, written by the staff of the Canadian Accounting Standards Board. Although that paper contained a discussion of fair value, its primary purpose was to discuss which measurement attributes were appropriate for initial recognition. That paper is part of the ongoing Conceptual Framework project that seeks to establish, among other things, a framework for measurement in financial reporting. Because of the different scope and intent of that paper, it is not discussed in this discussion paper. However, comments on that discussion paper relatingto the measurement of fair value will be considered in the development of the exposure draft of an IFRS on fair value measurement as well as in the Conceptual Framework project. Issue 1. SFAS 157 and fair value measurement guidance in current IFRSs6 IFRSs require some assets, liabilities and equity instruments to be measured at fair value in some circumstances. However, guidance on measuring fair value is dispersed throughout IFRSs and is not always consistent. The IASB believes that establishing a single source of guidance for all fair value measurements required by IFRSs will both simplify IFRSs and improve the quality of fair value information included in financial reports. A concise definition of fair value combined with consistent guidance that applies to all fair value measurements would more clearly communicate the objective of fair value measurement and eliminate the need for constituents to consider guidance dispersed throughout IFRSs.7 The IASB emphasises that the Fair Value Measurements project is not a means of expanding the use of fair value in financial reporting. Rather, the objective of the project is to codify, clarify and simplify existing guidance that is dispersed widely in IFRSs. However, in order to establish a single standard that provides uniform guidance for all fair value measurements required by IFRSs, amendments will need to be made to the existing guidance. As discussed further in Issue 2, the amendments might change how fair value is measured in some standards and how the requirements are interpreted and applied.8 In some IFRSs the IASB (or its predecessor body) consciously included measurement guidance that results in a measurement that is treated as if it were fair value even though the guidance is not consistent with the fair value measurement objective. For example, paragraph B16 of IFRS 3 Business Combinations provides guidance that is inconsistent with the fair value measurement objective for items acquired in a business combination such as tax assets, tax liabilities and net employee benefit assets or liabilities for defined benefit plans. Furthermore, some IFRSs contain measurement reliability criteria. For example, IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment permits the revaluation model to be used only if fair value can be measured reliably This project will not change any of that guidance. Rather, that guidance will be considered project by project. However, the IASB plans to use the Fair Value Measurements project to establish guidance where there currently is none, such as in IAS 17 Leases, as well as to eliminate inconsistent guidance that does not clearly articulate a single measurement objective.9 Because SFAS 157 establishes a single source of guidance and a single objective that can be applied to all fair value measurements, the IASB has reached the preliminary view that SFAS 157 is an improvement on the disparate guidance in IFRSs. However, as discussed in more detail below, the IASB has not reached preliminary views on all provisions of SFAS 157.Issue 2. Differences between the definitions of fair value in SFAS 157 and in IFRSs10 Paragraph 5 of SFAS 157 defines fair value as ‘the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.’Bycomparison, fair value is generally defined in IFRSs as ‘the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction’ (withsome slight variations in wording in different standards). Thedefinition in SFAS 157 differs from the definitionin IFRSs in three important ways:(a)The definition in SFAS 157 is explicitly an exit (selling) price. Thedefinition in IFRSs is neither explicitly an exit price nor an entry (buying) price.(b)The definition in SFAS 157 explicitly refers to market participants. The definition in IFRSs refers to knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction.(c)For liabilities, the definition of fair value in SFAS 157 rests on the notion that the liability is transferred (the liability to the counterparty continues; it is not settled with the counterparty). The definition in IFRSs refers to the amount at which a liabilitycould be settled between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction.11 These differences are discussed in more detail below.Issue 2A. Exit price measurement objective12 The Basis for Conclusions of SFAS 157 includes the following discussion:C26The transaction to sell the asset or transfer the liability is a hypothetical transaction at the measurement date, considered from the perspective of a market participant that holds the asset or owes the liability. Therefore, the objective of a fair value measurement is to determine the price that would be received for the asset or paid to transfer the liability at the measurement date, that is, an exit price. The Board [FASB] concluded that an exit price objective is appropriate because it embodies current expectations about the future inflows associated with the asset and the future outflows associated with the liability from the perspective of market participants. The emphasis on inflows and outflows is consistent with the definitions of assets and liabilities in FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial INVITATION TO COMMENT Statements. Paragraph25 of Concepts Statement 6 defines assets in terms of future economic benefits (future inflows). Paragraph 35 of Concepts Statement 6 defines liabilities in terms of future sacrifices of economic benefits (future outflows).13 Paragraph 49 of the IASB’s Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements similarly defines assets and liabilities in terms of inflows and outflows of economic benefits. The majority of IASB members believe that a fair value measurement with an exit price objective is consistent with these definitions and is appropriate because it reflects current market-based expectations of flows of economic benefit into or out of the entity.14 Other IASB members agree with this view, but in their view an entry price also reflects current market-based expectations of flows of economic benefit into or out of the entity. Therefore, they suggest replacing the term ‘fair value’ with terms that are more descriptive of the measurement attribute, such as ‘current entry price’ or ‘current exit price’.15 An entry price measurement objective would differ from the exit price objective in SFAS 157 in that it would be defined as the price that would be paid to acquire an asset or received to assume a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. Some members of the IASB are of the view that an entry price and an exit price would be the same amount in the same market, assuming that transaction costs are excluded. However, an entity might buy an asset or assume a liability in one market and sell that same asset or transfer that same liability (ie without modification or repackaging) in another market. In such circumstances, the exit price in SFAS 157 would be likely to differ from the entry price.16Some fair value measurements required by IFRSs might not be consistent with an exit price measurement objective. In particular, the IASB observes that this might be the case when fair value is required on initial recognition, such as in:(a)IFRS 3,(b)IAS 17 for the initial recognition of assets and liabilities by a lessee under a finance lease, and(c)IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement for the initial recognition of some financial assets and financial liabilities.17In developing an exposure draft, the IASB may propose a revised definition of fair value. If so, it will complete a standard-by-standard review of fair value measurements required in IFRSs to assess whether each standard’s intended measurement objective is consistent with the proposed definition. If the IASB concludes that the intended measurement objective in a particular standard is inconsistent with the proposed definition of fair value, either that standard will be excluded from the scope of the exposure draft or the intended measurement objective will be restated using a term other than fair value (such as ‘current entry value’). To assist in its review, the IASB would like to understand how the fair value measurement guidance in IFRSs is currently applied in practice. It therefore requests respondents to identify those fair value measurements in IFRSs for which practice differs from the fair value measurement objective in SFAS 157.Issue 2B. Market participant view18SFAS 157 emphasises that a fair value measurement is a market-basedmeasurement, not an entity-specific measurement. Therefore, a fairvalue measurement should be based on the assumptions that marketparticipants would use in pricing the asset or liability. Furthermore, evenwhen there is limited or no observable market activity, the objective ofthe fair value measurement remains the same: to determine the pricethat would be received to sell an asset or be paid to transfer a liability inan orderly transaction between market participants at the measurementdate, regardless of the entity’s intention or ability to sell the asset ortransfer the liability at that date.19Paragraph 10 of SFAS 157 defines market participants as buyers andsellers in the principal (or most advantageous) market for the asset orliability who are:(a)Independent of the reporting entity; that is, they are not related parties(b)Knowledgeable, having a reasonable understanding about the asset or liability and the transaction based on all available information, including information that might be obtained through due diligence efforts that are usual and customary(c)Able to transact for the asset or liability(d)Willing to transact for the asset or liability; that is, they are motivated but not forced or otherwise compelled to do so.20In comparison, the definition of fair value in IFRSs refers to‘knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction’.Paragraphs 42-44 of IAS 40 Investment Property provide a description of this concept:42The definition of fair value refers to ‘knowledgeable, willing parties’.In this context, ‘knowledgeable’ means that both the willing buyer and the willing seller are reasonably informed about the nature and characteristics of the investment property, its actual and potential uses, and market conditions at the balance sheet date. A willing buyer ismotivated, but not compelled, to buy. This buyer is neither over-eager nor determined to buy at any price. The assumed buyer would not pay a higher price than a market comprising knowledgeable, willing buyers and sellers would require.43A willing seller is neither an over-eager nor a forced seller, prepared to sell at any price, nor one prepared to hold out for a price not considered reasonable in current market conditions. The willing seller is motivated to sell the investment property at market terms for the best price obtainable. The factual circumstances of the actual investment property owner are not a part of this consideration because the willing seller is a hypothetical owner (ega willing seller would not take into account the particular tax circumstances of the actual investment property owner).44The definition of fair value refers to an arm’s length transaction.Anarm’s length transaction is one between parties that do not have a particular or special relationship that makes prices of transactions uncharacteristic of market conditions. The transaction is presumed to be between unrelated parties, each acting independently.21The IASB’s preliminary view is that the market participant view is generally consistent with the concepts of a knowledgeable, willing party in an arm’s length transaction that are currently contained in IFRSs. However, in the IASB’s view, the proposed definition more clearly articulates the market-based fair value measurement objective in IFRSs.中文译文：公允价值测量1 在 2006 年二月，国际会计准则委员会 (IASB) 和美国财务会计标准委员会 (FASB) 公布了再断言他们对美国公认会计原则 (GAAP) 和国际的金融报告标准 (IFRSs) 的集中承诺的一个备忘录和对他们的发展中高级质量的被分享的目的, 公共的为全球的使用资本市场的会计准则。

外文翻译--公允价值和国际会计准则财务会计准则概念框架项目另一种观点

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Fair Value and the IASB/FASB Conceptual Framework Project : An Alternative View 外文出处 ABACUS外文作者 Whittington, Geoffrey原文：Fair Value and the IASB/FASB Conceptual Framework Project: AnAlternative ViewThis paper analyses various controversial issues arising from the current project of the IASB and FASB to develop a joint conceptual framework for financial reporting standards. It discusses their possible implications for measurement and, in particular, for the use of fair value as the preferred measurement basis. Two competing world views are identified as underlying the debate: a Fair Value View, implicit in the IASB’s public pronouncements, and an Al ternative View implicit in publicly expressed criticisms of the IASB’s pronouncements. The Fair Value View assumes that markets are relatively perfect and complete and that, in such a setting, financial reports should meet the needs of passive investors and creditors by reporting fair values derived from current market prices. The Alternative View assumes that markets are relatively imperfect and incomplete and that, in such a market setting, financial reports should also meet the monitoring requirements of current shareholders (stewardship) by reporting past transactions and events using entity-specific measurements that reflect the opportunities actually available to the reporting entity. The different implications of the two views are illustrated by reference to specific issues in recent accounting standards. Finally, the theoretical support for the two views is discussed. It is concluded that, in a realistic market setting, the search for a universal measurement method may be fruitless and a more appropriate approach tothe measurement problem might be to define a clear measurement objective and to select the measurement method that best meets that objective in the particular circumstances that exist in relation to each item in the accounts. An example of such an approach is deprival value, which is not, at present, under consideration by the IASB.Key words:Conceptual framework; Fair value; Financial reporting;International accounting standards; Measurement.The project by the IASB and FASB to develop a joint conceptual framework,derived from their existing frameworks, is likely to influence the development of accounting standards for many years to come. It is therefore not surprising that the first discussion papers resulting from the project have attracted much fiercer criticism than the standard setters seem to have anticipated, or that much of this criticism has come from within the European Union, which is committed to adopting the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) of the IASB.The issue that seems likely to attract most controversy is that of measurement,which has not yet reached discussion paper stage within the conceptual framework project. In particular, the IASB’s perceived preference for fair value as a measurement objective is likely, if expressed in the conceptual framework discussions, to be strongly contested. This issue has already been raised by an earlier discussion paper issued (but not endorsed) by the IASB, and authored by staff of the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (2005), which praised the positive properties of fair value.Controversy has been stirred further by the IASB’s publication, as a discussion paper (November 2006), of the FASB’s SFAS 157 (2006), which attempts to prescribe the interpretation of fair value within FASB standards as being a current market sale price, ignoring transaction costs and free of entity specific assumptions. Many critics feel that the adoption of this within IASB standards would change present practice significantly and adversely, because IFRS apply fair value more widely to non-financial assets than do FASB standards. Sale prices are seen as less relevant and less reliable in the case of non-financial rather than financial assets.Although fair value is a focus for much of the recent cr iticism of the IASB’sstandards and is also likely to be so for its conceptual framework project, the reasons for the criticism lie in other elements of the framework. Critics of fair value are, in fact, offering an alternative world view of financial reporting, although this view is usually not well articulated. Nor, for that matter, is the fair value world view well articulated: the argument is usually conducted on the basis of accepting a few simple assumptions that make fair value seem to be an obvious choice, whereas the assumptions themselves should be under discussion.The objective of this paper is to make some progress towards identifying these alternative world views and therefore to clarify the nature of the dispute about the conceptual framework in general and fair value in particular. The perspective is that of the IASB, of which the author was a member from 2001 to 2006, rather than the FASB, which is its partner in the project. The author’s own experiences in writing a number of alternative views to IASB drafts and standards inform the discussion. These were written piecemeal, but gradually a more coherent pattern began to be apparent, which expressed a different set of assumptions, or world view, described here as the Alternative View. This is in contrast with the view that is implicit in many of the IASB’s pronouncements, described here as the Fair Value View. This account is likely to be subjective and incomplete, and there are likely to be many other world views. However, when there is such a fierce debate between supporters and opponents of a view, it must surely help understanding to identify the main sources of disagreement. It must also be acknowledged that some of the contentious issues arise within the existing conceptual frameworks, but, as the frameworks are being revised, it is appropriate to question them.The paper proceeds as follows. First, a description is given of the current project to develop a joint conceptual framework for the IASB and FASB, including its motivation and objectives. Next, there is a discussion of the controversial aspects of the first two draft chapters of the new framework, on the purpose of financial reporting and the desirable properties of accounting information, which have already been issued in discussion paper form. This is followed by a discussion of the issues raised by the subsequent chapters of the new framework that are currently in variousstages of development, including definition of the elements of accounts, recognition and measurement. An attempt is then made to identify the two competing world views represented by opposing sides of the arguments on specific issues. We then consider how these competing views have been reflected in past IASB pronouncements, and in alternative views expressed on them. We conclude by considering the theoretical support for the Alternative View.THE IASB/FASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK PROJECTBoth the FASB and the IASB already have conceptual frameworks. The FASB’s was the first, dating mainly from the 1970s, and consists of seven substantial concepts statements, each published separately.The IASB’s Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements (1989) is a much briefer single document of 110 paragraphs, dating from 1989. Its content shows a strong affinity with the FASB’s earlier work, although there are important differences of detail. One important similarity is that, like the FASB framework, it lacks a treatment of measurement and is therefore incomplete. This is a legacy of the fierce and unresolved debates that took place particularly in the 1970s, when standard setters struggled unsuccessfully to achieve a solution to the inflation accounting problem that would be accepted by both users and preparers of accounts. Another legacy of the pressures and controversies of that period is that both frameworks emphasize decision usefulness, particularly to investors in capital markets, as the primary focus of general purpose financial statements. This was a bold step at the time, sweeping away the traditionalist view that accounting is primarily for legal and stewardship purposes, with decision usefulness as a useful possible additional benefit. It is argued later that this change of focus may be carried too far by the current revision of the frameworks.A primary motivation for the joint project is to converge the frameworks of the two boards in order to provide a consistent intellectual foundation for the convergence of the two sets of standards, to which both boards committed themselves in the Norwalk Agreement of 2002. Convergence is not, however, the only motivation: Improvement is equally important.There are two aspects to improvement: filling gaps to achieve completeness,and removing internal contradictions to improve consistency.The most obvious gap that needs to be filled is to develop guidance on measurement. There are many aspects of the coherence of the IASB’s framework that need improvement. An area that has given particular difficulty recently is the definition of a liability and especially the distinction between a liability and equity.The joint project started in 2005. Its planned sequence of topics and current achievements is listed in Table 1. The working papers for the project are developed by a joint IASB/FASB staff team, there being a different staff team for each stage. FASB’s greater staff resources mean that they are usually in the majority, although staff from the Canadian standard-setting body are currently developing the proposals on elements and recognition. Each paper is discussed by both boards, usually separately but sometimes in joint meetings. Thus, the project is truly a joint one, although the greater bulk of the FASB’s existing framework and its strong staff input mean that the starting point tends to be the FASB’s existing d ocument rather than the IASB’s. In most aspects, there is little difference between the current IASB and FASB frameworks, so that the FASB’s distinct influence is seen mainly in the bulk and style of exposition and argument (which may be politely described as ‘thorough’) in the two draft chapters and working papers that have appeared to date. The present paper is, however, written from the IASB perspective, and this means that some matters which look like changes from that perspective are the result of conv erging with the FASB’s existing position.OBJECTIVES AND QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICSThe first stage of the revision project (Phase A in Table 1) was initially considered to be so uncontroversial that it was intended that the first publication would be an exposure draft, which would be the only public consultation. However, wiser counsel prevailed and it was decided that the first stage would be (as with all subsequent stages of the revision) a discussion paper, which would be followed later by an exposure draft.This Preliminary Views paper, entitled The Objective Of Financial Reporting And Qualitative Characteristics Of Decision-useful Financial Reporting Information, was published in July 2006, with the comment period ending on 3 November. The comments received have demonstrated that the proposals arecontroversial and have justified the decision to issue a discussion paper, allowing further consultation on the subsequent exposure draft. They were originally conceived as being uncontroversial because they substantially reiterate much of the material that is in the existing frameworks. However, they do contain some significant reconstruction of the form and argument, certainly relative to the IASB’s currently slender document, and these contain the seeds of controversy. Moreover, the retention of some of the concepts in the existing framework is also controversial, particularly in those countries that are recent adopters of IFRS and that were not involved in the original development of the framework.The Objective of Financial ReportingChapter 1 of the Discussion Paper, on the objective of financial reporting, is fundamental to the remainder of the Framework. It reiterates the existing concern to produce general purpose financial statements , that is, ones that meet the needs of all external users who do not have privileged access to the entity’s internal information. It also continues the present policy of selecting investors and creditors as the focus group for establishing needs. This includes potential as well as present investors and lenders as well as equity investors. The needs of investors are assumed to be to make resource allocation decisions , which will be served by providing‘information to help present and potential investors and creditors and others to assess the amounts, timing and uncertainty of the entity’s future cash inflows and outflows’(para. OB3).Source:ABACUS,2008:139-144译文：公允价值和国际会计准则/ 财务会计准则概念框架项目:另一种观点本文分析了各种各样的国际会计准则与财务会计准则有争议的问题，从而形成标准的财务报告联合概念框架，讨论了他们对计量的影响，特别是以公允价值为基础的计量。

公允价值的解释及其利益关系[外文翻译]

外文翻译Explanation and Benefits of Fair Value AccountingMaterial Source: international securities industry association rules1. DefinitionFair value is an estimate of the price an entity would realize if it were to sell an asset, or the price it would pay to relieve a liability. Familiar with the situation of buyers and sellers in fair trading conditions are determined, and the price of the parties or association in fair trade under the conditions of an asset can be buying and selling price. In the fair value measurement, the assets and liabilities in the fair transaction, according to the circumstance with asset exchange between parties or the amount of liabilities. Many financial instruments – such as shares traded on an exchange, debt securities (U.S. Treasury bonds), and derivatives are measured and reported at fair value.2. Use of Fair ValueFair value is a required measure for many financial instruments. Determining whether a financial instrument should be recorded at fai r value in a company’s financial statements depends in part on what type of institution owns the instrument and the intended use of that instrument. For example, in the case of a broker-dealer, a high percentage of its assets typically are traded and must therefore be accounted for at fair value. Other institutions record financial instruments at fair value depending on what their intent is for holding the instrument or the nature of the business activity. If an institution decided to hold a U.S. Treasury bond to maturity, for example, the bond can be shown at its original cost. If the institution purchases another identical Treasury bond that it intends to sell in the near future, that bond would be accounted for at fair value.In addition to using fair value measures to comply with public reporting requirements, companies measure their financial instruments at fair value for a number of internal processes, including: making investing and trading decisions, managing and measuring risks, determining how much capital to devote to various lines of business, and calculating compensation. The use of fair value measurements is deemed to be relevant in these areas.Adoption of fair value financial reporting not only will be of little value to any constituent, but it would make financialinformation both more opaque and of less utility to financial managers. What may be required for external reporting is not necessarily better for internal controls and performance measurement.3. Determining Fair ValueThe process of valuing an instrument to its fair value depends on how easy it is to determine a price for that instrument. Since fair value is the price at which a willing buyer and seller agree to trade, finding the right price is the key to valuation. In the simplest case, a firm can find the price or value of an instrument in a newspaper or other quotation system. These prices typically reflect the last price reported to the secondary market. This usually works very well because listed prices are generally available for such securities. Listed, published prices are not available, however, for all financial instruments. In those cases, some estimation is often required to determine fair value. Firms use valuation models that take into account a variety of relevant data, such as current economic forecasts, general market conditions, the price of similar financial instruments, etc. to measure fair value. For example, corporate bonds typically trade in a well-defined range over Treasury securities of a similar maturity. Contemporaneous transaction prices in such instruments will generally be very helpful in estimating the fair value of similar securities. In most cases, some verifiable market data exists to bolster the objective determination of fair value through modeling. Firms rely primarily on judgment only for the very complex instruments where market parameters and prices do not exist.4. Ensuring AccuracyAlthough judgment is involved in the fair valuation process, most firms have a robust internal control process for ensuring valuations are reasonable and consistent. Management review and oversight key to ensuring accuracy. Valuation models are subject to independent review as part of the internal control process to ensure that they reflect underlying market conditions; moreover, they cannot be changed without approvals. In addition, estimates generated by the models are compared to actual trades to determine the reasonableness of the estimates. Firms also employ other means of independent verification, such as comparing estimates to the value of the instrument at termination.These transactions in matters of the fair and equitable value measurement model, overcome by using the cost for the pattern of valuation of enterprise assets value and the defects, which can be underestimated more reflect the enterprise value of the assets and business performance.Financial institutions, regulators and finance ministers worldwide have, thisyear, been pressing the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to relax its rules on fair-value accounting. The rules force banks and others to value their assets at current market prices. Asset holders argue that in times of illiquid and falling markets it is difficult or impossible to value assets accurately. Fair-value accounting is resulting in assets being valued at distressed sale prices, rather than at their fundamental value, creating a downward spiral. The IASB has countered that any relaxation in the fair value rules would cloud the picture for investors and regulators and could sow the seeds of the next crisis. But last month it made a significant amendment to the rules.5. BenefitsFair value provides important information about financial assets and liabilities as compared to values based only on their historical cost (original price paid or received). Since fair value reflects current market conditions, it provides comparability of the value of financial instruments bought at different times. In addition, financial disclosures that use fair value provide investors with insight into prevailing market values, further helping to ensure the usefulness of financial reports.Regardless of whether financial instruments are reported at fair value on the face of a firm’s balance sheet, the financial statement footnotes contain information about the fair values of all a firm’s financial instruments. These footnotes provide details on how such values are determined. Quoted prices, comparison to similar instruments, other valuation models, etc. In addition, firms will begin highlighting thei r most critical accounting policies in the Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of their financial statements for years ended 2001. Many view the fair valuation process as one of those critical policies.Such as the enterprise to make full use of idle capital, to make for the purpose of buying from a secondary market shares, bonds, funds, Be like again, not as effective hedging instrument enterprise of derivatives, such as long-term contracts, futures contract, exchange and options, etc. In addition, the enterprise can be based on risk management needs or for the elimination of financial assets or financial liabilities in accounting recognition and measurement are inconsistent, direct assigned certain financial assets or financial liabilities to the fair value measurement. These are listed as the fair value measurement instruments, its value is to report the market value, and its change directly included in the current profits and losses. This also means that, if the enterprise can grasp the market and the trend of performance,which varies with the changes in the fair value "increased profits", Conversely, if the enterprise's investment strategy and market, the current conflicted profits will suffer damage. Therefore, the fair value measurement attribute can be considered a "double-edged sword", and "old standards suffer not only good news", thus make financial instruments often underestimated the value of report of gething lower is quite different.6. Glossary of TermsQuotation System: A quotation system can include: newspaper quotes, broker quotes, electronic systems where prices of Treasuries and other securities can be viewed, or subscription services that provide price data for specific instruments Secondary Market: When a security is initially purchased from the firm issuing it, that transaction takes place in the primary market. Subsequent transactions in that security take place in what is sometimes called the after- market or the secondary market. This is what most people mean when they refer to "the market.”Valuation Model: Statistical techniques that take into account various factors so as to provide an estimate of the value of a financial instrument. These are often called pricing or valuation models. These models are regularly subject to rigorous review by the firms employing them to ensure that they accurately reflect current market realities.译文公允价值的解释及其利益关系资料来源:国际证券行业协会条例1．公允价值的定义公允价值是当一项资产将要被出售时或者一项负债被清偿时所要得到的对价或因此而减轻的责任。

公允价值会计不应成为金融危机的替罪羊

公允价值会计不应成为金融危机的替罪羊刘志洋【摘要】Since the 2008 financial crisis,criticism about fair value accounting has always been there.Howev-er,fair value accounting contributes little to the eruption of the financial crisis,on the contrary,it unintendedly pre-vents the deterioration of the financial crisis.It is meaningless to let fair value accounting be the scapegoat.The dis-advantage of fair value accounting can not be denied,but it is also not wise to dispose fair value accounting.It is meaningful to improve the limitation of fair value accounting while keeping the advantage of it.%2008年金融危机爆发后，对公允价值会计的批评不绝于耳。

然而分析表明，公允价值会计不但对于2008年金融危机的“贡献度”有限，相反还起到了抑制金融危机恶化的作用。

忽略导致金融危机爆发的核心因素，把“罪责”强加于公允价值会计是避重就轻，舍本逐末。

不能否认公允价值会计存在“盯模”等不完善的制度缺陷，但是一味否定公允价值会计也不是明智的选择。

最大限度发挥公允价值会计的优势，改进其劣势，应是金融危机爆发后完善会计准则的应有之义。

【期刊名称】《首都经济贸易大学学报》【年(卷),期】2015(000)006【总页数】8页(P106-113)【关键词】公允价值会计;金融危机;盯模;盯市【作者】刘志洋【作者单位】东北师范大学经济学院，吉林长春 130117【正文语种】中文【中图分类】F8302008年金融危机爆发后，对公允价值会计的指责声音不绝于耳。

关于会计公允价值量的英语作文

关于会计公允价值量的英语作文The IAS emphasizes that fair value measurement items are not a means to extend the application of fair value in financial statements.In addition, the project aims to rewrite, clarify, and simplify existing guidelines widely used in IFRS.However, in order to construct a single standard that unifies the guidelines for all measures of fair values as required by the guidelines, modifications to the existing guidelines must be made.These amendments are further discussed in Rule 2, which may make adjustments to both the measurement of fair value under certain standards and to the interpretation and application made under the guidelines requirements.In some guidelines, the IAL Accounting Standards Board (or its predecessor) has consciously incorporated some measurement guidelines.These guidelines can lead to having it measured as fair value, although it is not consistent in the measurement of fair value.For example, the object of fair value measurement in the guide to paragraph 16 of Standard 3 is inconsistent with assets or liabilities for items involved in the merger, such as tax assets, tax liabilities, and employee benefits in a specific earnings plan.Furthermore, someguidelines contain criteria for the reliability of the measurement.For example, fixed assets at IA16 can be measured in fair mode only when the fair value can be reliably determined.。

公允价值的披露,告诉我更多【外文翻译】

外文文献翻译译文原文：Fair Value Disclosures—Tell Me MoreOn benefit plans’financial statements, footnotes about the fair value of plan investments are becoming longer and more complex just as market volatility and alternative investments make it more difficult to determine fair value. The call for more transparency is resulting in further guidance from the Financial Accounting Standards Board that may make those footnotes even longer. The author provides a history of how fair value has been defined and recent updates to accounting standards, and discusses what lies ahead.D o you think you’ve had about enough of the fair value disclosures that your benefit plan makes? Brace yourself. In 2010, two more updates were released that may require even more lengthy and complex footnotes to the financial statements than ever before.A Little HistoryBecause there were different definitions of fair value and limited guidance for applying those definitions that were dispersed through many accounting pronouncements, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) worked for some time to update its guidance on fair value.The end result was Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements (now codified under the FASB Accounting Standards Codification as ASC 820). It was issued in September 2006 and became effective in November 2007.The new standard defined fair value. Simple, right? There were no new requirements to report items at fair value, just a useful definition when an item is required to be reported at fair value under another accounting standard. FASB’s efforts were intended to clarify how to measure fair value so that financial statements were consistent and comparable across the board. Although the new standard retained the exchange price notion in earlier definitions of fair value, it clarified that the exchange price is the price in an orderly transaction between market participants tosell the asset. The definition focused on the price that would be received to sell the asset, not the price that would be paid to acquire the asset. Furthermore, the standard emphasized that fair value measurement was market-based and not entity-based. In other words, the fair value measurement of an asset should be based on the assumptions of a market participant (buyer) and not the assumptions of the entity holding the asset.Through SFAS No. 157, FASB also aimed to help financial statement readers discern just how subjective the process was to arrive at fair value. The standard was designed to create disclosures informing the reader that not all fair values are the same. FASB asserted that being educated about those differences would help the reader make better decisions about the information presented. Thus, the fair value hierarchy (Levels 1, 2 and 3) was born. The end result was a clarifying standard that simplified and fused the various definitions of fair value found throughout the accounting literature, while at the same time provided readers with improved and expanded disclosures.The Markets in CrisisHowever, not long after the fair value measurements accounting standard was issued in 2006, turmoil began to spread throughout the financial markets. By the time public companies and financial institutions had adopted SFAS No. 157, the subprime mortgage market crisis was in full swing. Because many write downs of assets were being reported to conform to fair value accounting, FASB was under a significant amount of pressure and scrutiny regarding its fair value guidance. Was the accounting standard at least partially to blame for the economic fallout? There were market commentators calling for the rescission or suspension of SFAS No. 157. In March 2009, FASB Chairman Robert Herz testified before the U.S. House of Representatives, answering questions about how FASB develops accounting standards, the role of accounting standard setters and the definition of fair value.Chairman Herz emphasized that fair value accounting was nothing new; SFAS No. 157 served only to unite and simplify disparate guidance throughout the literature. Furthermore, the role of FASB, Herz asserted, was to focus primarily on providingtransparent, neutral information in financial statements to aid the reader in decision making. While acknowledging that financial reports affect market behavior, Herz contended that it is not the role of FASB to try to dampen or counter such effects, but it is the role of the regulators to create sound markets. Herz likened blaming fair value accounting for the market crisis to blaming the doctor for telling you that you are sick. Updates in 2009.Although FASB held firm in upholding the new fair value standard, three updates to the guidance were issued the next month to appease some critics. The updates mainly addressed the valuations being assigned to securities in increasingly distressed and inactive markets and the determination of impairment. They were effective almost immediately. Although their effect was initially thought to be minimal for plan financial statements, implementing one of the updates (FASB Staff Position FAS 157-4) did require expanded disclosures of securities held at the major category level based on the nature and risk of the security. This meant that, for example, showing “common stock”as a Level 1 item in the fair value disclosure would not be transparent enough; the footnote table would now have to list the major concentrations of stock held by the plan, and common stock would need to be segregated by its nature or risk, such as business sector (e.g., consumer staples, energy, information technology, etc.) or investment objective or company size.Why the call for expanded categories? In one word: transparency. True, through the eyes of the financial statement preparer, each update to the accounting standards renders the fair value disclosures more lengthy and complex than before. The intention is not to overwhelm or confuse, however. Through the eyes of the financial statement reader, FASB’s updates provide more information and enable better decision making based on the details presented.Driving some of the additional clarification and implementation guidance is the advisory board established by FASB, the Valuation Resource Group (VRG). Composed of a cross-section of industry representatives including financial statement preparers, auditors, users and valuation experts, VRG assesses whether and to what extent additional and more specific guidance is needed for financial reporting, beyondFASB ASC 820 (formerly SFAS No. 157). Although nonauthoritative, VRG advises FASB on valuation issues, diversity in practice and alternative views throughout the industry.Based on recommendations by VRG and other constituents, FASB added a project to its agenda in 2009 on applying fair value accounting standards to interests in alternative investments. The result was the issuance in September 2009 of Accounting Standards Update (ASU) No. 2009-12, Investments That Calculate Net Asset Value Per Share (Or Its Equivalent). This update became effective for periods ending after December 15, 2009 and impacts the financial statements of plans holding such investments as common collective trust funds, hedge funds, private equity funds, limited partnerships and real estate funds. These alternative investments do not have readily determinable fair values; that is, they are not listed on national exchanges or over-thecounter markets. Once the plan buys into the fund, it can exit (redeem its investment or receive distributions) only through the fund manager and not a secondary market. These redemptions typically are at times specified under the terms of the investment fund’s governing documents.When FASB issued its original guidance on fair value measurements, there were many uncertainties about just how it applied to these alternative investments. Typically for plans, an investment fund statement or report provides the net asset value (NA V) per share, and the plan administrator or accountant uses this amount to estimate the fair value of the alternative investment. Many financial statement preparers questioned which attributes of the investment would cause an adjustment to the NA V. Some of the features of these funds in question involved restrictions on redemptions such as gates, notice periods and lockup periods.One of the concerns had to do with liquidity. (If the NA V was $5 at year-end but the plan can’t redeem its shares for at least 12 months, is the fund really worth less than $5 per share right now?) Some had to do with fund closures. (If the plan bought into the investment fund at a NA V of $10 per share but the fund has ceased accepting subscriptions at year-end, would a potential buyer pay more than $10 per share right now for the privilege of getting into the fund?) Because of these complexities andpractical difficulties in estimating the fair value of alternative investments, FASB issued ASU No. 2009-12 to allow the use of NA V per share as a practical expedient and to provide guidance on when an adjustment to NA V per share would be appropriate. In other words, preparers were permitted the use of NA V as representing fair value, provided:•The investment fund calculated NA V in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles at the measurement date.•The financial statements included disclosures about the attributes of the investment funds, such as the nature of any restrictions on the ability to redeem its investments at the measurement date, any unfunded commitments and investment strategies of the investment fund.In order to assist in the implementation of ASU No. 2009-12, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in December 2009 issued no less than ten technical practice aids on the following subjects:•Applicability of Practical Expedient•Unit of Account•Determining Whether NA V is Calculated Consistent With ASC 946, Financial Services-Investment Companies•Determining Whether an Adjustment to NA V Is Necessary•Adjusting NA V When It Is Not as of the Reporting Entity’s MeasurementDate•Adjusting NA V When It Is Not Calculated Consistent With FASB ASC 946 •Disclosures—Ability to Redeem Versus Actual Redemption Request•Impact of “Near Term”on Classification Within Fair Value Hierarchy•Categorization of Investments for Disclosure Purposes•Determining Fair Value of Investments When the Practical Expedient Is Not Used or Is Not Available.Included in these technical practice aids is a glossary of investment fund features to assist in understanding these complicated investment structures. This update to the FASB ASC and the numerous practice aids only bear witness to the sophistication andcomplexity related to valuing alternative investments. Stanley Feldman, chief valuation officer of Axiom Valuation Solutions, urges plan fiduciaries to demand more transparency from the managers of its alternative investments. Plan trustees should be asking for more detailed disclosures about a fund’s underlying investments from their investment fund managers and then use this information to analytically verify that selfreported investment values are consistent with fair value financial reporting standards, ERISA fiduciary requirements and their social responsibilities to all plan stakeholders, asserts Feldman.2010 UpdatesAt the time this article was written, halfway through 2010, we already have two more updates calling for even greater transparency regarding fair value. In January 2010, FASB issued ASU No. 2010-06, Improving Disclosures About Fair Value Measurements. Although not effective until periods beginning after December 15, 2009, this update requires financial statement footnotes to show the transfers between Levels 1 and 2 as well as Level 3 (and the reasons for such transfers). Furthermore, for fair value measurements categorized as Levels 2 and 3 under the fair value hi- erarchy, financial statement preparers are required to include quantitative information about the valuation inputs used and to describe the nature and characteristics of the asset. For example, a footnote would need to convey some of the major attributes regarding residential mortgage-backed securities, such as the types of underlying loans, a description of the collateral, guarantees or other credit enhancements, the seniority level of the tranches of securities, the year of issuance, the weighted-average coupon rate, the maturity of underlying loans, the geographical concentration or the credit ratings of the loans.ASU No. 2010-06 also requires disclosures about how third-party information such as broker quotes, pricing services, NA Vs and relevant market data was considered in fair value measurements categorized within Levels 2 and 3.Yet there was more to be said about fair value measurements. On June 29, 2010, FASB released a proposed Accounting Standards Update, Amendments for Common Fair Value Measurements and Disclosure Requirements. Although the final versionmay ultimately differ from this exposure draft, the proposed requirements reveal how the demand for even more transparency continues. Working to converge definitions and disclosures under both U.S. generally accepted accounting standards and international accounting standards, FASB is proposing changing the wording used to describe the principles and requirements for measuring fair value. These changes are meant to improve comparability between financial statements prepared under either set of standards; however, financial statement preparers should not see great effects on how they apply current fair value measurement standards.Although the changes to the measurement principles should not significantly affect benefit plan financial statements, the proposed standard also requires additional disclosures that would further expand the fair value measurements footnote in the financial statements. It appears that FASB has been receiving requests from users of financial statements for more information on the measurement uncertainty inherent in Level 3 measurements. For example, one of the expanded disclosures is the so-called sensitivity disclosure. This would describe the effect of changing one or more of the unobservable inputs that could have been reasonably used to measure fair value in the circumstances. Implementing this new update would require that the plan calculate the effect on the fair value measurement of changing one or more of the unobservable inputs used in the fair value measurement with the different inputs available as reasonable alternatives.AICPA also issued more technical practice aids in June 2010, including:•Certificates of Deposit and FASB ASC 820, Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures•Applicability of Fair Value Disclosure Requirements and Measurement Principles in FASB ASC 820, Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures, to Certain Financial Instruments.FASB documents including proposed standards can be found at , and AICPA publications are available at .When all is said and done, the expanding fair value measurement disclosures, although difficult and time-consuming for many financial statement preparers, helpinvestors understand just how an asset’s value was determined.It just so happens that at the same time that accounting standards are forcing all of us to get more informed about plan investments, the financial markets are behaving unevenly and plans are facing funding deficits, forcing plan fiduciaries to seek higher returns in nontraditional investments that maximize inefficiencies in the market.Yet an unintended result of holding these “hard-to-value”investments is that the more complex the investment, the lengthier and more complicated the financial statement footnotes become. Alvin Toffler, author of Future Shock, said, “You can use all the quantitative data you can get, but you still have to distrust it and use your own intelligence and judgment.”After sifting through all the hefty disclosures, plan trustees, administrators and professionals still have to ask, for each investment, how fair is this fair value?Source: Brassil, Eileen. Fair Value Disclosures—Tell Me More. Benefits & Compensation Digest, Oct2010, V ol. 47 Issue 10, p36-40, 5p一、翻译文章译文：公允价值的披露，告诉我更多在有关福利计划的财务报表的作用下，公允价值计划投资的脚注正在变得更长、更复杂，就像市场波动和另类投资一样，使它更难以确定公允价值。

外文翻译--公允价值会计和经融危机：信差还是贡献者

本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目：Fair Value Accounting and the Financial Crisis：Messenger or Contributor?出处：Serie Scientifique Scientific Series作者：Michel Magnan原文：Fair Value Accounting and the Financial Crisis:Messenger or Contributor?Did fair value accounting play a role in the current financial crisis? This appendix explores the issue. Fair value accounting implies that assets and liabilities get measured and reflected on a firm`s financial statements at their market value, or close substitutes. Extensive academic research done over the past 20 years shows that financial statements that reflect the market values of assets or liabilities provide information that is relevant to investors. In other context, fair value accounting is just a messenger carrying bad news. In contrast, there is also another research stream which is quite critical of the perceived merits of fair value accounting, and which worries about how it undermines what constitutes the core of financial reporting. More specifically, it is argued that fair value accounting is difficult to verify, may be based on unreliable assumptions or hypotheses and provides management with too much discretion into the preparation of financial statements. Hence, according to this view, fair value accounting is not necessarily a neutral or unbiased messenger. Moreover, fair value accounting creates a circular dynamic in financial reporting, with markets providing the input for the measurement of many assets, thus affecting reported ear nings which are then used by analysts and investors to assess a firm’s market value. If markets become volatile, as has been the case in recent months, reported earnings also become more volatile, thus feeding investors apprehensions. Therefore, since fair value accounting is associated with more volatile and less conservative financial statements and, it may have allowed managers to delay the day of recognition as well as distorted investors and regulators’ perceptions of financial performance and stability at the end of the financial bubble. However, once the economic pendulum swung back, fair value accounting may have magnified their views as to the severity of the current financial crisis, hence accelerating some negative trends.The purpose of the Appendix is to provide additional insights into the role played by fair value accounting in the financial crisis. Since the crisis is still ongoing, there is no direct or formalempirical evidence about such role, which may be perceived, actual or potential. However, by analyzing the conceptual and empirical foundations of fair value accounting, it may be possible to draw some inferences and to assess if and how fair value accounting underlies some of the recent turmoil in financial markets. In that regard, the Appendix aims to achieve the following objectives. First, I intend to provide a brief overview of fair value accounting, including its impact onfinancial statements. The overview includes a summary of the opposite viewpoints on the merits of fair value accounting. Second, I present and discuss the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of fair value accounting. Thirdly, I analyze the measurement and valuation challenges that arise from the use of fair value accounting. Finally, on the basis of the above analyses, I sketch a tentative framework to understand fair value accounting's role and potential contribution to the financial crisis. While fair value accounting can conceptually apply to all aspects of a firm's financial statements, I will purposefully focus on its application to financial instruments and financial institutions.Fair value is defined as the price at which an asset could be exchanged in a current transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties. For liabilities, fair value is defined as the amount that would be paid to transfer the liability to a new debtor. Under fair value accounting (FVA), assets and liabilities are categorized according to the level of judgment (subjectivity) associated with the inputs to measure their fair value, with three (3) levels being considered. At level 1, financial instruments are measured and reported on a firm's balance sheet and income statement at their market value, which typically reflects the quoted prices for identical assets or liabilities in active markets. It is assumed that the quoted price for an identical asset or liability in an active market provides the most reliable fair value measurement because it is directly observable to the market (« mark-to-market »). However, if valuation inputs are observable, either directly or indirectly, but do not qualify as Level 1 inputs, the Level 2 fair value assessment of a financial instrument will reflect a) quoted prices for similar financial instruments in active markets, b) quoted prices for identical or similar financial instruments in markets that are not active, c) inputs other than quoted prices but which are observable (e.g., yield curve) or d) correlated prices. Finally, certain financial instruments which, for example, are customized or have no market, will be valued by a reporting entity on the basis of assumptions that presumably reflect market participants' views and assessments (e.g., private placement investments, unique derivative products, etc.). Such valuation is deemed to be derived from Level 3 inputs and iscommonly referred as "mark-to- model" since it is often the outcome of a mathematical modelling exercise with various assumptions about economic, market or firm-specific conditions. In all cases, any unrealized gain (or loss) on financial instruments held by an institution translates into an increase (decrease) in its stockholders' equity and, consequently, an improvement (deterioration) in its capitalization ratios.Detractors, among them David Dodge, the former Governor of the Bank of Canada, argue vehemently that FV A has accelerated and amplified the current financial crisis. Their argument can be summarized as follows.Starting in 2007, the drop in the price of many types of financial instruments led financial institutions to mark down the asset values reported on their balance sheets, thus weakening their capitalization ratios (let's think about the first write-offs following the start of the subprime crisis). To improve their financial profile and to enhance their safety zone with respect to regulatory capital requirements, these institutions started to sell securities or close down positions on some financial instruments in markets that were increasingly shallow as a result of the emergence of a liquidity crisis. These sales magnified the downdraft in quoted prices, thus bringing additional devaluations, etc. Along these lines, William Isaac, former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, argues that "mark-to-market accounting has been extremely and needlessly destructive of bank capital in the past year and is a major cause of the current credit crisis and economic downturn".However, FVA can count on broad support from the accounting profession, standard setters and regulators. For instance, in a recent speech, Nick Le Pan, Canada's former Superintendent of Financial Institutions, argued that FVA is only a messenger and should not be criticized for merely reflecting the poor underlying economic outlook. Barbara Roper, from the Consumer Federation of America, argues that sound accounting principles, such as FVA,led to the exposure of underlying problem assets. In her view, FV A provides more accurate, timely and comparable information to investors than any other accounting alternative.Theoretical and Empirical Foundations Underlying FV AFAV’s theoretical and empirical premises are relatively solid. In fact, it is one of the few accounting standard that can be traced back directly to accounting-based scientific research. More specifically, there is consistent empirical evidence, accumulated over the past 20 years, that a firm's stock price is more closely associated with the market value of its underlying financial or real assets than with their historical cost, i.e., their purchase price plus related expenses. Thesuperior relevance of market-derived values is even more obvious in the case of financial derivatives which historical cost is often close to zero but which market value can fluctuate widely. In other words, fair values, or marked to market values, have been found to be more relevant indicators of firm value than traditional historical cost-based figures.An interesting early study on the relevance and implications from FVA was performed by Bernard, Merton and Palepu (1995). For many years, Denmark's accounting standard-setting and banking regulatory authorities have relied on mark-to-market valuation for the assets of their commercial banks. Bernard, Merton and Palepu find that Danish banks' book values, which reflect mark-to-market valuations, seem to provide more reliable information to investors than historical cost-based figures then provided by U.S. banks. Moreover, they do not find evidence that Danish bank executives manipulate mark-to-market numbers to circumvent regulatory capital ratios. However, they also point out that that the Danish and U.S. apital markets are not quite similar and that their findings may not completely hold in a U.S. setting.Measurement and Valuation ChallengesDespite its many tangible or perceived benefits to investors, the adoption and use of FVA undermines several critical foundations of financial reporting to which we have become accustomed. More specifically, the implementation of FV A explicitly confirms the primacy of financial markets and of investors in the determination of accounting standards. Essentially, the broader social issues and implications arising from accounting standards for stakeholders beyond investors are assumed away.The potential danger of relying on capital markets-based findings to directly prescribe accounting standard has been highlighted more than 30 years ago by Gonedes and Dopuch.Following a irst wave of capital markets-based studies that mapped their findings directly into standard-setting issues, Gonedes and Dopuch explain that observing an empirical relation between accounting amounts and equity prices or returns does not provide sufficient evidence about the desirability or effects of a particular standard,even if markets are informational efficient. Their conclusion rests on the fact that accounting standards are essentially a public good. Therefore, standard setters' mandate and responsibility is to develop standards after making the appropriate social welfare trade-offs, which do involve more parties than just investors. Hence, deciding about a particular accounting standard requires that social preferences be specified. From a different perspective, Holthausen and Watts (2001) put forward theargument that the value-relevance literature has little to say about standard-setting issues. In their view, without an underlying theory that explains, predicts and links accounting, standard setting, and valuation, value-relevance studies simply report associations.FVA and the Financial Crisis: Some ThoughtsIt is still too early to conclude on FVA's role in the current financial crisis: not all data is available, additional analyses must be completed and all its consequences cannot be observed. However, relying on prior research findings and on available data, it is possible to draw some inferences about thecontribution of FVA to the financial crisis.More Volatile Financial ResultsMost prior research shows that the adoption of FVA translates into more volatile financial results (earnings). Hence, financial markets' extreme volatility over the past two years has contributed to raise financial institutions' volatility, potentially amplifying the perception by investors, regulators and governments as to the seriousness of the crisis. More practically, the drop in reported earnings is even more dramatic in light of the record earnings reported in prior years, with FVA pushing down earnings in the current period but boosting earnings in prior years. Two examples illustrate the potential impact of FVA on the volatility of reported earnings.Crédit Suisse: Within the context of the subprime crisis, the stock market value of most financial institutions depends extensively upon investors' assessment of their direct and indirect exposure to subprime-related loans or derivatives. The valuation information disclosed by financial institutions that evolve in the same markets largely influences such an assessment, with more recent market quotes driving such valuation. In that regard, the saga surrounding Crédit Suisse's release of its 2007 earnings is quite enlightening. On February 12, 2008, Crédit Suisse reports record income from continuous operations of 8.5 billion Swiss Francs. On February 19, 2008.Crédit Suisse announces that some additional control processes have led to the repricing of certain asset-backed positions in its Structured Credit Trading business, with the current total fair value reduction of these positions being reduced by an estimated $U.S. 2.85 billion. Finally, on March 20, 2008, Crédit Suisse reports that its 2007 operating income has been revised downward by 1.18 billion Swiss Francs (789 million Swiss Francs after tax), close to a 10% difference with the initially reported figure. The Crédit Suisse story illustrates the difficulty of pinning down the fair value of many assets when the underlying valuation methodology is complex and subject toshifting hypotheses and assumptions about the future. Crédit Suisse`s experience also shows that reported results for a given period may be subject to a wide margin of error, or discretion, or even restated.Lehman Brothers: In its last reported financial statements before it went bankrupt, Lehman Brothers reported a loss of $U.S. 2.4 billion for the first six months ended May 31, 2008 (vs. a net income of $U.S. 2.4 billion for the first six months ended May 31, 2007). The shift of $U.S. 4.8 billion in net income is largely driven by a dramatic fall of $U.S. 8.5 billion in Lehman's revenues from principal transactions, which include realized and unrealized gains or losses from financial instruments and other inventory positions owned. A significant portion of the downward shift in principal transactions revenues is actually explained by unrealized losses of $U.S. 1.6 billion in the first semester of 2008 vs. unrealized gains of $U.S. 200 million in the first semester of 2007. Thus, accounting at fair value for some financial assets amplified Lehman's downward earnings performance.Hence, it can be put forward that FVA, through its magnifying impact on earnings volatility, may have contributed to aggravate investors', regulators' and governments' perceptions with respect to the severity of the crisis, itself characterized by record volatility in the prices of many securities and goods.On a related note, the increased volatility brought forward by FVA is conducive to the use of equity-based compensation, especially stock options, which value is then enhanced (according to the Black-Scholes model, volatility is one of the key inputs in option valuation). Prior research suggests that there is a strong association between performance volatility and the use of stock options. Through FVA, the outcomes from aggressive risk-taking in investment and financing strategies will directly flow into reported earnings, thus further leveraging the potential gains to be derived from stock options and other incentives. Many financial institutions involved in the current crisis made extensive use of stock options and other incentives, allowing unrealized gains on assets to be converted into cold hard cash..译文：公允价值会计和经融危机：信差还是贡献者公允价值会计在这次金融危机中是否起了重要作用？本文来探讨这个问题。

外文翻译--公允价值会计与金融危机：信使者或贡献者？

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文出处Accounting Perspectives外文作者Michell.Magnan原文：Fair Value Accounting and the Financial Crisis: Messenger orContributor?Fair value accounting is neither a novel concept nor a new practice. In the late 19th century and early 20th century, it was common for firms to value their capital assets using appraised values (i.e., estimates of the net realizable values that the assets would bring in the market). Many early economists also believed that the exit value, or the amount a firm would realize by selling an asset in the market, was the only appropriate basis to construct financial statements (see, among others, Diewert, 2005). However, by the 1930s, abusive valuation practices by some managers led to the enactment of more formal accounting standards by the accounting profession. As a result, historical cost emerged as the dominant practice for reporting most assets and liabilities. Nevertheless, fair value accounting remained an attractive concept to many accounting theorists who formalized its appeal and form over the years. For instance, Staubus (1961), Chambers (1964), and Sterling (1970) argue for the use of exit values in financial reporting (i.e., the net realizable value for the asset).Although FVA was kept as a default option in accounting for some assets (i.e., lower of cost and market), it effectively reentered U.S. firms' financial statements only in 1993 through SFAS No. 115 (FASB). Going beyond prior fair value disclosure requirements, SFAS No. 115 mandates that some securities be accounted for at their fair value, thus directly affecting a firm's balance sheet and income statement. The main rationale underlying SFAS No. 115 is the reduction of gains trading by financial institutions' managers (i.e., the ability to choose how and when unrealized securitiesportfolio gains are recognized into the income statement). Other accounting pronouncements followed, reinforcing fair value accounting's reach within financial statements, culminating with the enactment of SFAS No. 157 (FASB 2006a). SFAS No. 757 formally defines fair value and frames its measurement and disclosure. The evolution of standards in Canada closely parallels that in the United States with the enactment of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants' Handbook section 3860 and, more recently, section 3855.The initial implementation of FVA focused on financial instruments such as debt and equity securities (SEAS No. 115) as well as derivatives {SFAS No. 133) (FASB, 2008b). For the purpose of SFAS No. 115, the appropriate measurement method depends upon management's intention, which leads to the identification of three types of securities.' However, while accounting treatments between the three types of securities differ, fair value accounting directly or indirectly underlies the measurement of all three. First, debt securities that an enterprise has the positive intent and ability to hold to maturity are classified as held-to-maturity securities and reported at amortized cost. However, if these securities suffer a decline in fair value below the amortized cost basis that is other than temporary, their accounting cost must be written down to that value and the write-down must be included in net earnings as a realized loss. Once written down, held-to-maturity securities cannot be written up. Second, debt and equity securities that are bought and held principally for the purpose of selling in the near term are classified as trading securities and reported at fair value, with unrealized gains and losses included in income. Finally, debt and equity securities not classified as either held-to-maturity securities or trading securities are classified as available-for-sale securities and reported at fair value, with unrealized gains and losses excluded from earnings and reported in a separate component of shareholders' equity (other comprehensive income).Two comprehensive commentaries provide a nuanced interpretation of the role of FVA in the 2008 financial crisis and are consistent in their conclusions with the findings reported by the SEC in December 2008. Ryan (2008) concludes that fair value accounting did not contribute to the crisis because it provided investors withneeded accurate and complete information concerning sub prime positions. However, he concedes that there is a need for additional guidance as to what is an orderly transaction, because the use of inputs for fair value accounting is driven by conditions at the measurement date.Laux and Leuz (2009) conclude that FVA probably did not contribute to the crisis to such a large extent but was also not merely a messenger. In their opinion, the FVA debate is a new version of the relevance versus reliability argument. Moreover, there are legitimate concerns about marking asset values to market prices in times of financial crises because they are tied to various contracts and regulations (e.g., capital ratio regulations for banks). However, the standards do allow for some flexibility and deviation from market prices under these conditions. They consider that the implementation of FVA may lead to some disruptions from the standards' initial intent. For instance, SEC enforcement actions can imply that auditors and firms abide by certain rules or practices, not using the judgment initially envisioned in the standards. In contrast, too much managerial discretion in the determination of fair values may translate into manipulations. The challenge for standard-setters is to find an appropriate balance between the potential contagion effects from using fair value accounting and investors' needs to receive timely information about impairments. Overall, FVA may be pro-cyclical, accentuating the magnitude of earnings in booms and of losses in busts. Hence, the use of fair value accounting information needs to be adapted, but the underlying accounting standards do not need to change. They also observe that historical cost accounting is unlikely to solve problems of market inefficiency and that its use for loans contributed to the securitization rush that led to the crisis.The findings from Allen and Carietti (2008a) and Plantin et al. (2008) suggest that the reliance on FVA for long-lived senior assets induces suboptimal decisions by managers when markets are illiquid. Moreover, in illiquid markets, price information is itself affected by the use of FVA and may become an unreliable value measure. Finally, under conditions of illiquidity, the use of FVA facilitates the propagation of distorted values into financial institutions' balance sheets, potentially inducing failurecontagion. Both studies suggest that the use of historical cost accounting alleviates some of these problems and may be a better measurement tool under some conditions.FVA for financial instruments is part of a broader trend in accounting standard setting to move away from "accounting" toward estimating expected future cash flows and incorporating into financial statements (i.e., "fore counting") (Magnan and Cormier, 2005). The trend undermines decades, if not centuries, of accounting practices and concepts such as conservatism and verifiability, and requires a complete set of valuation skills and knowledge from accountants. The current crisis constitutes the first serious challenge to this trend, and to FVA in particular, and is likely to generate abundant empirical research over the next few years, which will allow us to better assess the pros and cons of fair value accounting.In a commentary in the Financial Post, Thornton (2009) argues that, as accountants, "We need to start with a clean sheet of paper in revising the accounting so that it clearly and credibly distinguishes lemons from cream puffs." In reviewing the market conditions during the crisis, he notes that auditors ought to drill down into bank assets to assess their underlying value, more specifically by verifying expected future cash flow projections. If market prices diverge from underlying or intrinsic values for lack of liquidity reasons, then such an audit would validate management's claim. Otherwise, the securities being held are probably "lemons", similar to used cars sold by unscrupulous car salespeople, and should be marked to market in the absence of audited verification of level 3 inputs. Thornton's perspective on fair value is a call for accountants to regain control over the financial reporting process instead of passively relaying market-induced values. His views are also consistent with Allen and Carletti's (2008b) view that knowledge of underlying markets is critical for reporting purposes. Moreover, his suggestion is also consistent with empirical findings that the valuation of fair value assets is enhanced when higher-quality auditors or expert audit committees are involved (see Kolev, 2008; Goh et al., 2009; Song et al., 2009). The intervention of external parties such as auditors to drill down into the parameters underlying fair value figures also breaks the endogenously loop referred to by Macintosh et al. (2000). However, he offers a major challenge to ourprofession to retool itself and rethink how auditors work, especially when markets are experiencing liquidity or other crises. Thus, the market crisis has provided the accounting and auditing profession with a rare opportunity to take a leadership role in managing the transition of financial statements toward FVA. The future of the profession rests on its success in managing such a transition.Source：Michell. Magnan. Fair Value Accounting and the Financial Crisis: Messenger or Contributor?[J]. Accounting Perspectives, 2009, 8(3) :189-213译文：公允价值会计与金融危机：信使者或贡献者？公允价值会计既不是一个崭新的概念，也不是新的实践。

外文翻译--公允价值会计,金融经济和可靠性重塑

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文出处Accoiinling and Business Research，InternationalAccounting Policy Forum外文作者Michael Power原文：Fair value accounting, financial economics and the transformationof reliabilityFair value and the reshaping of reliabilityThe concept of fair value measurement emerged in financial accounting and was accepted in the abstract long before it was a subject of analysis and dispute (Bromwich, 2007). Further more, fair value is not itself a single measurement methodology but encompasses a variety of approaches for the estimation of an exit value. So it is hardly surprising that many of the arguments which have been developed for and against the use of fair values in accounting are not well-supported by evidence; disputants often talk past each other. However, the relative absence of justifications by standard-setters is also responsible for the power of fair value accounting as a reference point in debate. As with operational risk, policy concepts can be articulated in the abstract by regulators and accepted by industry before complex and messy issues of implementation come into play(Power, 2005).Definitions of fair value vary in subtle ways that may end up mattering in law but from afar, and to the untutored eye, they look similar. FAS 157(FASB, 2006) defines fair value as: 'the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfera liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date'. LASB (2009)reproduces this as a core principle.This definition, which has existed in various slightly modified forms for many years, might appear uncontentious. Yet, it is a complex hybrid of ideas and assumptionswhich point to the estimated prices that might be received in a market, one which turns out to have specific and assumed characteristics. This causes several commentators to remark on the 'fictional' and 'imaginary' nature of fair values (e.g. Casson and Napier, 1997) and to bemoan their 'subjectivity' and potential for manipulation and bias. Indeed, Bromwich (2007)outlines how many assumptions underlie the production of fair values and draws the conclusion that the understanding of fair value may vary considerably.Regardless of whether these criticisms have substance, it is also the case that if enough people believe in fictions, then they can play a role in constituting markets. Mackenzie and Millo (2003)argue in the context of the development and institutionalisation of option pricing models that simplifying assumptions began life as being no descriptive of pricing processes, then came to be the preferred and dominant methodology. Once accepted, the Black-Scholes model contributed to the development of the depth and liquidity of the market, although Mackenzie and Millo note how this relationship was looser again after the 1987crash. The general message is that if key communities accept the usefulness of fictions, they have real consequences and can become regarded as real.Proponents of fair values in accounting often appeal to notions of telling things as they are and of improving transparency. They point to areas such as pension accounting or the savings and loans industry in North America where fair values would have made problems (deficits, poor performing loans) visible much earlier, thereby enabling corrective action. An often heard trope is that one should not shoot the messenger of poor asset quality. Yet sceptics argue that fair value accounting has created a false short-term visibility in the case of pension funding and hastened the demise of defined benefit schemes (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009). More generally, critics argue that the financial crisis demonstrates the pro-cyclicality of fair values when accounting is tightly coupled to prudential regulatory systems, and the unreliability of marking to model in less than liquid asset markets, especially for assets which are being held for the long term.According to Laux and Leuz (2009) the fair value debate should not be polarised. The use of fair values is neither responsible for the financial crisis nor entirely innocent.Furthermore, arguments against fair value do not automatically translate into arguments for historical cost rmation about current values, or best estimates of those current values, is likely to be useful for management and market analysts in conjunction with lots of other bits of information. Contracts and covenants may be highly sensitive to mark to market strategies in a crisis, where breathing space may be valued over short-term volatility in contractual and regulatory compliance. This is echoed by the analysis in Plantin et al. (2004) of the different winners and losers from the shift to mark to-market for financial instruments in general, and helps to explain the intensity of the politics of fair value accounting, even prior to the financial crisis.While much of the heat generated by fair value concerns the politics of reporting discretion for banking institutions, Laux and Leuz (2009) suggest that the polarisation in the debate is founded primarily on different views about the goals of accounting. In parallel but somewhat differently, it can be argued that the debate is also driven by different, almost unconscious, views about what it is for an estimated accounting value to be reliable.One ofthe explicit motivations for the expanded significance ofthe use of fair values is its perceived potential to minimise the freedom to manipulate accounting numbers (CFA, 2007). Market-based values are, almost by definition, a non-management based referent and this is consistent with early standards on audit evidence quality hierarchies which prioritise sources of evidence which are independent of both auditee and auditor. So an important aspect of the 'fair value' concept is to establish distance from entity views of value and to locate reliability as far as possible in the collective judgment of the market.Reliability is one of the fundamental qualitative characteristics of accounting information as articulated in early conceptual fi-ameworks (FASB, 1980). Yet the reliability of accounting numbers is not a given: it is always founded on a consensus whose strength is an empirical and not a conceptual fact. The consensus is often implicit and taken for granted, but becomes more problematic at times of conflict and competition when questions of power and authority become visible. Ideas ofaccounting reliability may change over time, may have relative rather than absolute significance, and may only be grounded in the fiction of an ideal consensus among a community of reasonable measurers.Barth challenges the transactionally based view of reliability by arguing that it is no longer to be identified with verifiability but has to do essentially with faithful representation: just because an amount can be calculated precisely, it is not necessarily a faithful representation of the real-world economic phenomena it purports to represent. This statement, and others like it, constitute a reframing of the concept of reliability, essentially collapsing reliability into relevance. Against a transactionally grounded conception of reliability involving audit trails linking accounting events to reporting, Barth's conception shifts the centre of gravity for thinking about reliability to markets and the values they produce.This new conception of accounting reliability takes as its benchmark the most liquid, orderly markets, those typically associated with financial assets and liabilities. This benchmark, and the idea of reliability it embodies, is extended to analogies and models which simulate market prices using accepted economic methodologies' - the so-called levels 2 and 3 in the fair value hierarchy of valuation methods. It is not unusual for policy solutions in one setting to migrate fi-om their original context and expand their application in this way.It should be remembered that accounting policy discussions have visited the issue of measurement reliability many times before. For example, in the late 1980s, brand valuers using a mix of analogical and model-based reasoning challenged the prevailing prohibition against valuing internally generated brands. The debate, while conducted in technical terms, was highly sensitive to the credibility of valuation expertise proposed by non-accountant valuers (e.g. Interbrand). The UK Accounting Standards Committee sought to undermine the analogy between accepted practice of reliance on chartered surveyors and brand valuers, but they were on increasingly weak ground, especially when accounting firms developed their own brand valuation capacity (Power, 1992a).The brand accounting debate reminds us that conceptions of reliability in financial reporting can change as bodies of valuation knowledge become accepted as a basis fortransactions. In turn, market liquidity may be increased by the credibility of such methodologies which further increases their credibility in a virtuous performative circle (Napier and Power, 1992). Just as with the brand debate of the late 1980s, level 2 and 3 fair values pose resource and expertise challenges both for audit firms who must draw on valuation specialists trained in financial economics, and for global regulatory bodies in addressing the need for guidance on how to find evidence for estimates (IAASB, 2008).^ The model dependency of level 3 fair values poses knowledge problems for auditors who must gain confidence about the input, assumptions, and parameters of valuation modelsOne common mechanism for the creation of auditor confidence is the outsourcing of opinion or reliance on other experts (Power, 1996). In this respect the re-emergence of the International Valuation Standards Council (IVSC) in 2009 is significant.^ Created originally to provide guidance on property valuation, the IVSC has developed closer relations with IASB with a view to providing guidance on the valuation of financial instruments. Significantly, IVSC criticised the IASB exposure draft on fair value measurement for being too narrowly prescriptive about the range of possible valuation methods. It argued that accounting standard- setters should prescribe at the level of principle and leave space for the development of detailed valuation methods (IVSC, 2009).The implication is that fair valuation might move offshore in relation to accounting standard-setters leaving accountants as compilers rather than valuers. From this point of view, fair value can be understood as a potentially radical change programme for the expertise base of accounting. Far from being traded off against one another, reliability is progressively collapsed into relevance (Whittington, 2008) with clear implications for the need for external valuation expertise.This change programme has been contested by proponents of other current value measurement bases, such as replacement cost within a deprival value decision logic. These critics of fair value argue that they are subject to the very forms of management manipulation which they are intended to correct: 'discounting cash flows to derive a fair value invites deception' (Ronen, 2008). Fair values are never real market values butonly estimates of market prices which would or could be obtained. They are necessarily 'as if or fictional constructs which depend on critical assumptions about orderly markets (Bromwich, 2007).Nevertheless, many critics of the subjectivity of fair values miss the real point of Barth's challenge; the very idea of reliability is being reconstructed in front of their eyes by shifting the focus from transactions to economic valuation methods, and by giving these methods a firmer institutional footing. Deep down the fair value debate seems to hinge on fiindamantally different conceptions of the basis for reliability in accounting, making it less of a technical dispute and more one of the politics of acceptability. Indeed, the apparent threelevel hierarchy of reliability is much 'flatter' than might be immediately apparent. Under level 1, accounting systems are, in theory, passive observers of prices. Under level 3, accounting is a market value discovery system with the help of methodologies from financial economics. Yet once it is admitted that market prices may not reveal fiandamental value, due to liquidity issues or other reasons, then it can be argued that the real foundation of fair value lies in economic valuation methodologies; level 3 methods are in fact the engine of markets themselves, capable of discovering values for accounting objects which can only be sold in 'imaginary markets'. It follows that the hierarchy is more of a liquidity hierarchy than one of method, but overall it expresses the imperative of market alignment which informs fair value enthusiasts.The sociology of reliability to emerge from these arguments suggests that subjectivity and uncertainty can be transformed into acceptable fact via strategies which appeal to broader values in the institutional environment which even opponents must accept. Accounting 'estimates' can acquire authority when they come to be embedded in taken for granted routines - hence the significance of the IVSC and similar bodies. So long as a suflicient consensus holds, and asset markets are orderly and generally liquid, then the circle which links models and markets is virtuous and broadly performative. In this way fair values, for all their fictionality and apparent intellectual incoherence (Ravenscroft and Williams, 2009), could define what it is to be reliable at a point in time. Market liquidity would be the effect of consensus - the flipside of reliability. However, even before the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the consensus supporting the use of fair value measurement beyond highly liquid financial asset markets was problematic, thus making its social and institutional foundations more visible than they might ordinarily be.In summary, it has been argued that different conceptions of what it is for an accounting estimate to be reliable underlie the fair value debate as it has taken shape in the last decade. The language of subjectivity and objectivity is unhelpful in characterising what is at stake; it is more usefial to focus on. the question of how certain valuation technologies do or don't become institutionally accepted as producing facts (Napier and Power, 1992). This is a sociological question which will be further explored below. The analysis which follows is less concerned to adjudicate on the rights and wrongs of fair value and more focused on understanding the deep conditions of possibility for fair values to be widely promoted. From this point of view, the use of fair values in accounting represents a new basis for accounting fact production which, as we shall see, is grounded in the cultural authority of financial economics.Source:Michael Power．Fair value accounting, financial economics and the transformation of reliability[J]．Accounting and Business Research，International Accounting Policy Forum，2010，40(3)：197-210．译文：公允价值会计，金融经济和可靠性重塑公允价值与可靠性重塑公允价值的计量概念出现在财务会计，它在成为分析和争端的焦点之前，长期以抽象概念存在。

此次金融危机归咎于公允价值是否公平？【外文翻译】

原文：Is It Fair to Blame Fair Value Accounting for the Financial Crisis?Robert C. PozenWhat was the primary cause of the current financial crisis? Subprime mortgages, credit default swaps, or excessive debt? None of those, says Steve Forbes, chairman of Forbes Media and sometime political candidate. In his view, mark-to-market accounting was “the principal reason” that the U.S. financial system melted down in 2008.Do accounting rules actually pack such a wallop? For readers not schooled in financial jargon, marking to market is the practice of revaluing an asset quarterly according to the price it would fetch if sold on the open market, regardless of what was actually paid for it. Because the practice allows for no outdated or wishful-thinking valuations, it is a key component of what is known as fair value accounting. And it is at the center of the hottest accounting debate in decades.Many bankers pilloried fair value accounting when the sudden seize-up of credit markets in the fall of 2008 drove the clearing prices for key assets held by their institutions to unprecedented lows. Economist Brian Wesbury represented the views of that group when he declared, “Mark-to-market accounting rules have turned a large problem into a humongous one. A vast majority of mortgages, corporate bonds, and structured debts are still performing. But because the market is frozen, the prices of these assets have fallen below their true value.” Wesbury and Forbes argue that marking to market pushed many banks toward insolvency and forced them to unload assets at fire-sale prices, which then caused values to fall even further. Persuaded by such arguments, some politicians in the United States and Europe have called for the suspension of fair value accounting in favor of historical cost accounting, in which assets are generally valued at original cost or purchase price.Yet mark-to-market accounting continues to have its proponents, who are equally adamant. Lisa Koonce, an accounting professor at the University of Texas, wrote in Texas magazine: “This is simply a case of blaming the messenger. Fair valueaccounting is not the cause of the current crisis. Rather, it communicated the effects of such bad decisions as granting subprime loans and writing credit defaul t swaps.… The alternative, keeping those loans on the books at their original amounts, is akin to ignoring reality.” Shareholder groups have gone even further, asserting that marking to market is all the more necessary in today’s environment. The investment advisory group of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) stressed that “it is especially critical that fair value information be available to capital providers and other users of financial statements in periods of market turmoil accompanied by l iquidity crunches.” In this view, if banks did not mark their bonds to market, investors would be very uncertain about asset values and therefore reluctant to help recapitalize troubled institutions.Which camp has the right answer? Perhaps neither. We do not want banks to become insolvent because of short-term declines in the prices of mortgage-related securities. Nor do we want to hide bank losses from investors and delay the cleanup of toxic assets—as happened in Japan in the decade after 1990. To meet the legitimate needs of both bankers and investors, regulatory officials should adopt new multidimensional approaches to financial reporting.Before we can begin to implement sensible reforms, though, we must first clear up some misperceptions about accounting methods. Critics have often lambasted the requirement to write down impaired assets to their fair value, but in reality impairment is a more important concept for historical cost accounting than for fair value accounting. Many journalists have incorrectly assumed that most assets of banks are reported at fair market value, rather than at historical cost. Similarly, many politicians have assumed that most illiquid assets must be valued at market prices, despite several FASB rulings to the contrary. Each of these myths bears close examination.Myth 1: Historical Cost Accounting Has No Connection to Current Market ValueFair value proponents argue that historical costs of assets on a company’s balance sheet often bear little relation to their current value. Under historical cost accountingrules, most assets are carried at their purchase price or original value, with minor adjustments for depreciation over their life (as in the case of buildings) or for appreciation until maturity (as in the case of a bond bought at a discount to par). A building owned by a company for decades, therefore, is likely to appear on the books at a much lower value than it would actually command in today’s market.However, even under historical accounting, current market values are factored into financial statements. U.S. regulators require all publicly traded companies to scrutinize their assets carefully each quarter and ascertain whether they have been permanently impaired—that is, whether their market value is likely to remain materially below their historical cost for an extended period. If the impairment is not just temporary, the company must write the asset down to its current market value on its balance sheet— and record the resulting loss on its income statement.Permanent impairments of assets happen frequently under historical cost accounting. In 2008 alone, Sandler O’Neill & Partners reports, U.S. banks wrote down more than $25 billion in goodwill from acquisitions that were no longer worth their purchase price. In an example outside the banking field, Cimarex Energy declared a loss for the first quarter of 2009, despite an operating profit, owing to a noncash impairment charge of more than $500 million (net of taxes) against its oil and gas properties.The point is that, even under historical cost accounting, financial institutions are ultimately forced to report any permanent decrease in the market value of their loans and securities, albeit more slowly and in larger lumps than under fair value accounting. Most bank executives resist such write-downs, arguing that the impairment of a given loan or mortgage-backed bond is only temporary. However, as the financial crisis drags on and mortgage default rates continue to rise, bankers will face increasing pressure from their external auditors to recognize losses on financial assets as permanent.Myth 2: Most Assets of Financial Institutions Are Marked to MarketThose who heap blame on the head of fair value accounting like to imply that financial institutions saw a majority of their assets marked to the deteriorating market.In fact, according to an SEC study in late 2008, only 31% of bank assets were treated in this fashion, and the rest were accounted for at historical cost.Why? Under fair value accounting, management must divide all loans and securities into a maximum of three asset categories: those that are held, those that are traded, and those that are available for sale. If management has the intent and ability to hold loans or securities to maturity, they are carried on the books at historical cost. Most loans and many bonds are held to maturity; they will be written down only if permanently impaired.By contrast, all traded assets are marked to market each quarter. Any decrease in the fair market v alue of a bank’s traded assets reduces the equity on its balance sheet and flows through its income statement as a loss. As a simple illustration, suppose a bank buys a bond for $1 million, and the bond’s market price declines to $900,000 at the end of the next quarter. Although the bank does not sell the bond, the left side of its balance sheet will show a $100,000 decrease in assets, and the right side will show a corresponding $100,000 decrease in equity (before any tax effects). This decrease will also flow through the bank’s income statement and be reported as a $100,000 pretax quarterly loss.The accounting treatment of the third asset category—assets available for sale—is more complex. Although debt securities in this category are marked to market each quarter, any unrealized gains or losses on them are reflected in a special account on a bank’s income statement (where it is called other comprehensive income, or OCI) and aggregated over time on its balance sheet (where it is called accumulated OCI). Because of this special treatment, unrealized losses on them do not r educe the bank’s net income or its regulatory capital. (Held-for-sale loans, meanwhile, must be booked at the lower of cost or market value, with any decline reported as a loss on the income statement. But they make up a very small percentage of this category.) The SEC found in its study that nearly a third of those 31% of bank assets marked to market were available-for-sale debt securities. Accordingly, the percentage of assets for which marking to market affected the bank’s regulatory capital or income was just 22% in 2008—far from a majority.Myth 3: Assets Must Be Valued at Current Market Prices Even If the Market for Them Is IlliquidFair value accounting would be straightforward if all financial assets were what FASB deems Level 1—highly liquid and easy to value at direct market prices. Since they do not always have these characteristics, however, FASB created a standard, FAS 157, which allows for two other levels.Whenever possible, the standard states, assets should be valued according to the Level 1 method: on the basis of observable market prices. But the standard recognizes that market prices are not always available, in which case it allows financial executives to value assets by using observable market inputs, the Level 2 method. These inputs could include, for instance, trading prices and discounts for securities similar or related to the ones being valued. When not even such inputs are available, as with, say, an investment in a private equity fund, the asset should be valued under Level 3.When trading assets are classified as Level 3, because of illiquid markets or for other reasons, financial executives are allowed to value them by “marking to model” instead of marking to market. In marking assets to model, executives may use their own reasonable assumptions to estimate fair market value.When the debt markets froze during the fall of 2008, FASB released a staff paper clarifying the application of fair value accounting to illiquid markets. That paper emphasized the flexibility of standard 157 and made companies aware that they could reclassify trading assets from Level 2 to Level 3 as markets became more illiquid. FASB also stressed that companies did not have to use prices from forced or distressed sales to value illiquid assets.However, these rulings did not provide enough comfort for bankers watching the market value of their toxic assets plummet; they complained loudly to their elected representatives, who threatened to legislate accounting standards unless FASB provided more relief. As a result, in April 2009 FASB quickly proposed and adopted a new rule, which detailed criteria for determining when a market is illiquid enough to qualify for mark-to-model valuation. The rule was designed to allow more securitiesto be valued by bank models instead of by market indicators. On the same day, FASB issued yet another rule on how to account for securities when they were permanently impaired. The rule said that only the credit-loss portion of such impairments would af fect a bank’s income and regulatory capital, with the rest going into the special account for other comprehensive income.Those two retroactive rulings made it possible for large U.S. banks to significantly reduce the size of write-downs they took on assets in the first quarter of 2009. The rulings improved the short-term financial picture of these banks, although they also led bank executives to resist sales of toxic assets at what investors believed to be reasonable prices.Three Recommendations for Realistic ReportingOnce we get beyond the mythmaking and arm waving, it becomes clear that historical cost and fair value accounting are much closer to each other than people think. Nevertheless, the differences between the two forms of accounting may be significant for a particular bank on a specific reporting date. In these situations, the bank executives’ understandable desire to present assets in the best light is likely to conflict with investors’ legitimate interest in understanding the bank’s potential exposures. So let us consider how banks might issue financial reports that would capture the complex realities of their financial situations.1.Enhance the credibility of marking to model.As Warren Buffett has pointed out, mark to model can degenerate into “mark to myth.” This is sure to give rise to real investor skepticism about the accuracy of bank valuations of troubled assets.How can we counter that skepticism and keep valuations defensible? To help investors understand how it arrived at values for assets marked to model, a bank should disclose a supplemental schedule listing Level 3 assets and summarizing their key characteristics. Most important, a bank should disclose enough detail about the assumptions underlying its models to allow investors to trace how it reached valuations.2.Unlink accounting and capital requirements.The most fundamental criticism of fair value accounting is that it drives banks to the brink of insolency by eroding their capital base. In the view of many bankers, fair value accounting has forced an “artificial” reduction in asset values that are likely to rebound after the financial crisis subsides. To inestors, on the other hand, nothing is more artificial than proclaiming that an asset is worth a price no one is actually willing to pay. The typical investor, moreover, is less confident that decreases in the market value of many bank assets are the temporary result of trading illiquidity, not the lasting result of rising defaults.3. Calculate earnings per share both ways.Even if regulators were to further unlink bank capital calculations from financial results under fair value accounting, bankers would still be concerned about the volatility of quarterly earnings. A bank whose total net revenue—from fees and net interest income—was quite stable might see its overall earnings fluctuate significantly from quarter to quarter, thanks to changes in the current market values of its actively traded bonds and other assets. And that volatility might depress the bank’s stock price if not fully understood by investors looking for stable earnings.Source: Harvard Business Review，2009（V ol. 87 Issue 11）：84-92译文：此次金融危机归咎于公允价值是否公平？波森，罗伯特C什么是当前金融危机的主要原因？次级抵押贷款、信贷违约掉期、或者过度的债务？主席福布斯与某个政治候选人认为这些都不是。

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外文翻译原文：Fair Value Accounting: A CritiqueFair value accounting, introduced formally in 1993 by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), was intended to make financial statements easier to compare and balance sheets more reflective of real values. Instead, as applied by accountants in the current credit crunch, it has been the principal cause of an unprecedented decline in assetvalues and an unprecedented rise in instability among financial institutions. The system has to be rethought, not only because of its contribution to financial instability but also because its procyclicality tends to create asset bubbles and exacerbate the effects of their collapse.This is an essay about accounting, but that is not a good reason to stop reading. It has been more than a year since the credit crisis began, and it is now becoming clear that accounting—specifically, what is called fair value accounting—is at the core of it. If you think accounting is simply a way of recording numbers, think again. Accounting is a highly conceptual art in which many objectives compete for priority. And as in politics, appearance is often the same thing as reality. The financial condition of a company may appear strong or weak depending on the accounting theory that is used to value its assets. Trillions of dollars in worldwide investor losses—and the immense losses perhaps still to come—testify to the power of accounting concepts to shape reality.A wide range of culprits has been implicated in the conventional analysis of today’s c redit crisis.Subprime mortgage brokers unconcerned about the quality of their loans, subprime borrowers taking loans they knew they could not repay, sloppy under-writing by lenders, condo-flippers hoping to sell their properties before the mortgage reset, impenetrably complex securitized instruments created by financial whiz kids, poor rating agency models, shoddy risk management at banks, laziness or inattention by investors, irresponsible sales practices by securities firms, and ineffective supervision by regulators are all elements that are properly cited ascontributing causes. But for $500 billion in bad subprime debt to cause a year-long crisis in a financial market with global assets of $140 trillion, something else had to be at work.That something else is fair value accounting—a sensible system in some respects and for some limited purposes, but not well designed for the challenges it has faced in the subprime meltdown, when it has been applied woodenly and without concern for the larger issues of systemic effect.FASB, the private group that establishes financial accounting policy, introduced the basic elements of fair value accounting in 1993 and currently has underway a long-term project, known as the “measurement framework,” to determine how the various ways to measure asset values should apply to different types of business activities. It might have been better if this study had been completed before fair value accounting was offered as the conventional way to value assets.Fair value accounting rests on two underlying concepts: first, asset valuations should be consis-tently applied across industries so that companies can be more easily compared, and second, where there is a market price for an asset, it should under ordinary circumstances be car ried on a company’s balance sheet at that price. As general rules, theseare unexceptionable, but in practice they are in conflict and in some cases unworkable. Not all companies follow the same business model, even within the same industry. Some primarily hold assets to maturity, while othersactively trade assets and liabilities. These different business models can result in significantly different asset valuations, and in some cases similar valuations for widely different business models. This can make companies in the same industry difficult to compare, especially because there is currently no way to make clear to investors or analysts what percentage of a company’sassets are valued under each method. In addition, market-based movements in asset values can create substantial volatility in balance sheets and earnings reports—again,depending on a company’s business model. Finally, where there is no observable market price, other valuation methods must be used, and these can vary from company to company—again, calling comparability into question. The key underlying issue—which should be addressed in FASB’s measurement framework—isthe reason for fair valuing assets. Why, for example, is market price important? What does it tell investors orcreditors if there is no intention to sell an asset at that price? It is clear that some nonmarket valuation method must be used when there are no observable market prices for an asset, but what rule applies when there is a limited market for an asset or when the market is not functioning normally? In the limited or abnormal market case, as discussed below, a strong argument can be made that the market price is misleading rather than informative. It is true that valuations based on the initial cost of an asset—although simple to apply—can be misleading as conditions change over time, but it appears that the mark-to-marketapproach favored by fair value accounting can be equally misleading in some circumstances and, in the market conditions today, affirmatively harmful to a full understanding of a company’s financial condition.1.The Basics of Fair Value AccountingThe foundational ideas associated with fair value accounting were adopted by FASB in Statement of FinancialAccounting Standards (FAS) 115.1 The rule divided financial assets into three categories—those held “to maturity,”those held “for trading purposes,” and those “available for sale.” Each of these categories is treated slightly differently. Assets held to maturity are valued at amortized cost; assets held for trading are marked to market, with unrealized gains or losses included in earnings; and assets deemed available for sale are marked to market, with unrealized gains or losses excluded from earnings but included in shareholders’ equity.Obviously, these three categories provide many opportunities for the manipulation of earnings. For example, a management that wanted to increase earnings during a reporting period could transfer appreciated assets from the available-for-sale category to the trading category, where the appreciation would add to the bottom line; in the same way, moving a depreciated asset from the trading category to the available-for-sale group would reduce reported losses. To preventthis kind of manipulation, FAS 115 contains a number of rules about how assets are to be valued when moved from one category to another. The held-to-maturity category is particularly difficult for accountants and auditors to police because its key element is an assessment of management’s intent, which is always difficult todetermine. For that reason, FAS 115 contains a number of stringent rules about when an asset may not be treated as held-to-maturity; these prohibit held-to-maturity treatment, for example, if the asset might be sold to meet the company’s need for liqui dity or if there were changes in funding terms or currency risk. If an asset is excluded from the held-to-maturity category, it is automatically carried in the available-for-sale group—and in that case it is supposed to be marked to market.Because of the restrictive rules on when an asset could be considered held to maturity, it is likely that many commercial banks carried large portfolios of asset-backed securities as available for sale, even though the purpose of these assets was to produce cash flows. Investment banks, on the other hand, because their business model involved trading, probably carried proportionately more assets in their trading accounts, where the rise or fall in market value directly affected their earnings. In both cases,how to mark these assets to market became a highly complex and controversial matter, especially when increases or decreases in value on a mark-to-market basis could directly affect earnings. Accordingly, in 2006, FASB adopted FAS 157 in order to provide accountants and preparers with more guidance on how marking to market was supposed to be done.2.The Effect of Mark-to-Market Accounting on Asset ValuesAs losses mounted in subprime mortgage portfolios in mid-2007, lenders demanded more collateral. If the companies holding the assets did not have additional collateral to supply, they were compelled to sell the assets. These sales depressed the market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and also raised questions about the quality of the ratings these securities had previously received. Doubts about the quality of ratings for MBS raised questions about the quality of ratings for other asset-backed securities (ABS). Because of the complexity of many of the instruments out in the market, it also became difficult to determine where the real losses on MBS and ABS actually resided. As a result, trading in MBS and ABS came virtually to a halt and has remained at a standstill for almost a year. Meanwhile, continued withdrawal of financing sources has compelled the holders of ABS to sell them at distressed or liquidation prices, even though the underlying cash flows of these portfolios have notnecessarily been seriously diminished. As more and more distress or liquidation sales occurred, asset prices declined further,and these declines created more lender demands for additional collateral, resulting in more distress or liquidation sales and more declines in asset values as measured on a mark-to-market basis. A downward spiral developed and is still operating.What Now?Assets held for trading should be valued at the market, if the market is weak, illiquid, or not functioning normally. That is one of the risks a company takes in holding assets for trading purposes. But assets held for sale—that is, not held to maturity—are a different matter.There is no good reason to mark these assets to market,even if there is a market. A better means of valuation—one more in line with what investors want to know about companies—is to value these assets for balance sheet purposes based on the discounted value of their cash flows.To be sure, there are opportunities here for manipulation by managements. The choice of a discount rate can have important effects, as well as other factors, but every system—including the system set up by FAS 115—presents opportunities for management manipulation.Indeed, each major element of an income statement—as most accountants will admit—is nothing more than an estimate by management about the future.What we should be looking for in an accounting system is a regime that represents reality, not one that is easy for accountants to administer. If asset-backed securities and loans, even those held for sale, were valued on the basis of their cash flows, there would be elements of contention between auditors and managements, but there would also be far less procyclicality in the result. Cash flows do not change as rapidly as market values, and asset valuations based on cash flows would not foster bubbles as rapidly as a valuation system based on marking to market. Gains and losses in this category would, as today, be reflected in the equity account and not in earnings, as is currently the rule under FAS 115. This would also have a salutary effect in reducing the procyclicality of fair value accounting.Finally, the standards for counting assets as held to maturity should be eased so that financial institutions could hold more assets in this category. This would alsosignificantly reduce the procyclicality problem associated with fair value accounting. It will be objected that this opens a large loophole for management manipulation, because assets that are falling in value have less of an impact on a company’s financial position if they are deemed to be held to maturity and thus not marked to market. Our first objective here, however, should not be preventing manipulation but instead making sure that our accounting system does not foster destructive financial bubbles. If manipulation is occurring—and even if it is not—it would be good policy for financial disclosure toinclude a footnote in which management records the transfers of assets among the various FAS 115 categories—trading, held-for-sale, and held-to-maturity—and the effect these have had on the financial statements.Source: PJ Wallison Financial Services Outlook.”Fair Value Accounting: A Critique”.2008,(7):50-58译文：关于公允价值会计的一个批判1993年正式引进美国财务会计准则委员会（FASB），是为了使财务报表更容易比较和资产负债表反映更多的实际价值。