Lewis_Structure_Rules
列维-斯特劳斯的结构模式分类
列维-斯特劳斯的结构模式分类下载提示：该文档是本店铺精心编制而成的，希望大家下载后，能够帮助大家解决实际问题。
文档下载后可定制修改，请根据实际需要进行调整和使用，谢谢!本店铺为大家提供各种类型的实用资料，如教育随笔、日记赏析、句子摘抄、古诗大全、经典美文、话题作文、工作总结、词语解析、文案摘录、其他资料等等，想了解不同资料格式和写法，敬请关注!Download tips: This document is carefully compiled by this editor. I hope that after you download it, it can help you solve practical problems. The document can be customized and modified after downloading, please adjust and use it according to actual needs, thank you! In addition, this shop provides you with various types of practical materials, such as educational essays, diary appreciation, sentence excerpts, ancient poems, classic articles, topic composition, work summary, word parsing, copy excerpts, other materials and so on, want to know different data formats and writing methods, please pay attention!列维-斯特劳斯的结构模式分类引言结构主义是20世纪中叶兴起的一种重要理论流派，它提供了一种全新的视角来理解社会、文化、语言等方面的现象。
刘少杰《国外社会学理论》笔记和课后习题详解(吉登斯的结构化理论)【圣才出品】
第二十三章吉登斯的结构化理论23.1 复习笔记【知识框架】【重点难点归纳】一、重建社会结构理论1．生平（1）吉登斯（Anthony Giddens）于1938年出生在英国伦敦北部的埃德蒙顿，18岁考入赫尔大学。
在大学期间受社会学教师沃斯利和心理学教师韦斯特比的影响，对社会学和心理学产生了深厚的兴趣。
（2）1959年大学毕业后，进入伦敦经济学院攻读硕士学位，1961年撰写了题为《当代英国的运动与社会》硕士学位论文，通过答辩并获硕士学位。
（3）获硕士学位后，吉登斯在莱斯特大学社会学系任教，讲授经典社会学理论和社会心理学等课程。
1966年，吉登斯离开莱斯特大学到温哥华附近的西蒙·弗拉塞尔大学任教，后又转至加州大学洛杉矶分校。
（4）1969年，吉登斯受剑桥大学之聘，由美洲返回英国，在皇家学院任高级讲师兼院士，同时攻读博士学位。
1974年，获剑桥大学博士学位。
（5）1983年，被选为英国社会学会执行委员会委员。
1984年，出版了代表著作《社会的构成》，他的学术影响随这部著作的出版而迅速扩大。
1985年被聘为剑桥大学社会学教授。
1996年被聘为伦敦经济学院院长。
2．著作吉登斯自70年代初以来发表了大量学术著作，主要有：《资本主义与现代社会理论》（1971）、《迪尔凯姆著作选》（译作，1972）、《发达社会的阶级结构》（1973）、《实证主义社会学》（1974）、《社会学方法的新规则》（1976）、《社会理论的中心论题》（1979）、《社会的构成》（1984）、《民族一国家与暴力》（1985）、《现代性的后果》（1990）、《现代性与自我认同》（1991）等。
3．思想渊源（1）马克思吉登斯非常重视马克思的历史唯物主义理论，他认为他的三部著作：《社会的构成》、《民族—国家与暴力》和《现代性与自我认同》，是关注“历史唯物主义与当代世界的关联”的三部曲。
马克思历史唯物主义深入剖析了资本主义社会的存在与发展问题。
其中摘选的来自列维斯特劳斯的结构人类学英文本第十二章页的笔记
其中摘选的来自列维斯特劳斯的结构人类学英文本第十二章页的笔记本文将围绕着《其中摘选的来自列维斯特劳斯的结构人类学英文本第十二章页的笔记》这个题目展开讨论。
该笔记来自于著名的人类学家列维斯特劳斯的著作，涉及到结构人类学的理论和方法。
对于人类学研究者来说，理解结构人类学的概念和方法是非常重要的，因为它对于人类学的发展和研究方法的改进有着重要的影响。
结构人类学是一种比较新的研究方法，它是从法国结构主义学派发展而来的。
结构人类学的核心思想是认为人类社会和文化是由各种符号、符号系统和结构组成的。
这些符号和结构构成了人类社会和文化的基础，影响着人类的思维方式、价值观和行为方式。
因此，结构人类学认为人类社会和文化是有内在结构和规律的，这些结构和规律可以通过分析符号和符号系统来揭示出来。
在《其中摘选的来自列维斯特劳斯的结构人类学英文本第十二章页的笔记》中，列维斯特劳斯详细解释了结构人类学的概念和方法。
他认为，结构人类学的核心是对符号和符号系统的分析。
他强调了符号在人类社会和文化中的重要性，认为符号是人类社会和文化的基本单元。
同时，他也指出了符号的复杂性和多样性，认为符号不仅仅是语言，还包括图像、音响、行为等多种形式。
列维斯特劳斯还强调了符号系统的重要性。
他认为，符号系统是由一组符号组成的，这些符号之间存在着内在的关系和规律。
通过对符号系统的分析，我们可以揭示出人类社会和文化的结构和规律。
他还提出了符号系统的对立和转化的概念，认为符号系统中的对立和转化是人类社会和文化演化的重要驱动力。
除了对符号和符号系统的分析，列维斯特劳斯还强调了比较研究的重要性。
他认为，通过比较不同文化和社会的符号和符号系统，我们可以揭示出它们之间的联系和差异。
这样可以帮助我们更好地理解人类社会和文化的多样性和复杂性。
总之，结构人类学是一种重要的人类学研究方法，它的核心是对符号和符号系统的分析。
在《其中摘选的来自列维斯特劳斯的结构人类学英文本第十二章页的笔记》中，列维斯特劳斯详细解释了结构人类学的概念和方法，强调了符号和符号系统的重要性，提出了符号系统的对立和转化的概念，以及比较研究的重要性。
英国功能主义学派功能结构论
第二节、拉得克利夫－布朗的结构功能理论一、生平及著述简介1、生平简介1881年出生于英国1901年进入剑桥三一学院，受里弗斯、哈登及梅厄斯等著名人类学家的影响而攻读人类学，是英国人类学的创始人之一1906-1908年，赴安达曼群岛进行田野调查，撰写出版了其第一部专著《安达曼岛人》。
20世纪30年代在美国芝加哥大学任教，1935年应燕京大学邀请到中国讲学1937年后主持牛津大学人类学系1939-1942年期间担任英国皇家人类学会会长。
2、著述拉的克利夫布朗的主要著作有：《安达曼岛人》、《原始社会的结构与功能》、《社会人类学方法》、《澳大利亚部落的社会组织》、《社会的自然科学》以及与福德合编的《非洲的亲属制度和婚姻制度》二、结构功能论1、强调社会结构的研究。
拉德克利夫布朗作为功能学派的代表人物，与马林诺夫斯基相比，他更强调社会结构的研究，并对马氏心理学倾向的研究提出批评，认为心理学与社会人类学的区别在于心理学是研究与个体有关的个体行为，而社会人类学则是研究群体的行为或与群体有关的个人的集合体。
1）“结构”与“社会结构”的定义。
布朗是从整体的角度对结构进行定义的，认为“结构这个概念是指某个较大的统一体中，各个部分的配置或相互之间的组合”社会结构是由相互联系的个人的配置而组成的，是人与人之间社会关系的总和。
2）社会结构的研究。
首先，他把人与人的一切社会关系都看成是社会结构的组成部分。
其次，按各自所扮演的社会角色而做的个人和阶级也包括在社会结构之内，研究社会结构时，所关注的具体事实是那种实际存在于某一时期，把某些人联结起来的一整套关系。
3）基于制度之上的社会结构。
制度—是指社会公认的规X体系或关于社会生活某些方面的行为模式，任何社会都存在一个人应遵守某些规则或行为模式的期望。
基于社会关系由制度支配，他最终将社会结构定义为“在由制度及社会上已确立的行为规X或模式所规定或支配的关系中，人的不断配置组合”2、对文化功能的研究。
2020高中化学路易斯共价键理论
Each Covalent Bond contains two electrons
Carbon has 4 valence electrons
H HCH
H methane
H HCH
H
HC
Ne Neon
Stable Octet required
Covalent Bonding – Atoms Share Electrons
NO2
Number of valence electrons = 17
ONO
ONO
ONO
Molecules and atoms which are neutral (contain no formal charge) and with an
unpaired electron are called Radicals
可以通过共用电子对形成分子，共价键，共价分子。 八隅体规则
Lewis Symbols
Represent the number of valence electrons as dots Valence number is the same as the Periodic Table Group Number
1. Odd Number of Electrons
NO
Number of valence electrons = 11
NO
NO
Resonace Arrows
Resonance occurs when more than one valid Lewis structure can be written for a particular molecule (i.e. rearrange electrons)
仪式过程：结构与反结构简介
维克多·特纳著：《仪式过程：结构与反结构》
本书是人类学的经典著作之一，堪称与列维-斯特劳斯的伟大作品同列。
作者在本书中通过对非洲恩丹布部落的田野考察，诠释了仪式在该群体社会中的重要地位，拓展了“阈限”与“交融”的概念，发展了传统的结构主义。
他把仪式放在社会过程的动态中加以考察，认为社会是一个“分化—阈限—再整合”的过程，亦即结构与反结构相互作用的结果，突破了传统静态的社会结构的研究。
由于他对过程的强调，特纳的观点曾被划规过程人类学。
但是，他更为人知的身份则是作为与格尔兹分庭抗礼的象征人类学家。
其中摘选的来自列维斯特劳斯的结构人类学英文本第十二章页的笔记
其中摘选的来自列维斯特劳斯的结构人类学英文本第十二章页的笔记摘要：列维斯特劳斯的结构人类学是一种在人类学研究中非常重要的理论框架。
本文摘选自他的著作《结构人类学》的第十二章。
这一章主要讨论了神话中的象征系统和人类社会的象征制度。
这些象征系统和象征制度是人类文化中的核心组成部分，对于理解人类行为和社会关系非常重要。
以下是本章的笔记摘要。
第十二章：象征系统和象征制度-象征系统是人类文化中的基本组成成分之一，它在语言、神话和仪式等方面表现出来。
这些象征系统是一种特殊的符号系统，通过语言和符号传递信息和意义。
-象征系统的结构是通过二元对立组成的。
例如，根据生与死、男与女、上帝与魔鬼等二元对立的象征系统，我们可以理解各种事物的意义和价值。
-象征系统与言语系统紧密相关，它们共同构成了人类文化的结构。
没有象征系统，人类是无法理解和交流的。
-象征系统不仅仅是表达信息的工具，还具有认知和理解的功能。
通过象征系统，人们可以理解世界、归纳经验、建立知识，并将其传递给后代。
-象征系统在不同的文化中具有不同的表达方式和形式。
例如，不同民族和社群有着不同的象征符号和仪式，它们反映了不同文化的价值观和信仰体系。
-象征制度是社会中的象征实践和制约规范的集合体。
它规定了象征符号的使用方式、社会角色的象征表达和仪式的进行方式，从而保持社会秩序和文化连续性。
-象征制度可以通过社会语言、礼仪规范、节日庆典等方式来实现。
它们在不同的社会中具有不同的形式和内容，但都起着维持社会秩序和文化传承的重要作用。
-在象征制度中，象征符号和象征行为的解释和使用都受到社会规范和社会角色的制约。
这些规范和角色的遵循对于社会成员的行为和交往至关重要。
-象征制度是社会秩序和文化遗产的重要组成部分。
文化的传承和发展离不开象征制度的继承和演变。
总结：本章主要讨论了象征系统和象征制度在人类社会和文化中的重要性。
象征系统是一种特殊的符号系统，在语言、神话和仪式等方面表现出来。
无机课-04 化学键理论概述 2-考研试题文档资料系列
电子对构型
分子构型
4
3
1
举例
SO2
NH3
4
2
2
H2O
电子对斥力大小：成对-成对 <成对-孤对 <孤对- 孤对
电子对数 配体数
m
n
5
4
孤电子 对数
m-n 1
电子对构型
5
3
2
分子构型
变形四面体
举例
SF4
ClF3
5
2
3
I3-
6
5
1
6
4
2
四方锥
BrF5 XeF4
价层电子对互斥理论的局限性：
以中心原子为中心构筑分子结构 1）经验规定，不能说明键的形成原理和相对稳定性，
减去所带的电荷。
N2 ： 2*5 = 10
H2O 1*2 + 6 = 8
N2O： 5*2 + 6 = 16 NO3- 5+6*3+1=24
2. 计算分子或离子中所有原子形成惰性电子结构所需的电子总数n2。
N2 ：2*8 =16
H2O： 2*2+8 =12
N2O：3*8 =24
NO3- ： 8*4 = 32
画Lewis式的基本步骤： 方法1
1. 计算价电子数总数和成键电子对数 2. 画骨架结构，多重键确定，标出孤对电子 3. 形式电荷的计算 4. 检查，共振结构
画Lewis式的基本步骤： 方法2
1. 画出骨架，每个原子单键相连。 2. 计算价电子总数； 3. 计算孤电子个数： 总价电子数 - 成键电子数 4. 用孤电子使周边原子达到八电子结构，从电负性最大开始。 5. 如果还剩余孤电子则放在中心原子上。 6. 如果中心原子总电子数少于8，则从周边原子中移动一对
Lewis Structure
Shared Electrons are considered to contribute to the electron requirements of both atoms involved; thus, the electron pairs shared by H and O in the water molecule are counted toward both the 8-electron requirement of oxygen and 2-electron requirement of hydrogen. Double Bonds: 4 electrons contained(Carbon Dioxide);
Examples：
Cyanic acid, Isocyanic acid and fulminic acid
Applications of Lewis structure（Lewis structure的 应用）.
1. Judge the bonding stability of atoms in molecules.（判断分子中原子连接方式的 稳定性）。 N2O:
计算分子中原子之间的键级进而可以判断键能的大小和键长的长短
Yuwen Cui
CONTENTS
How to show Lewis structure（Lewis structure的表 示方法）? Determination of the numbers of bonds in covalent molecules（共价分子中成键数的确定）. Drawing Lewis structure（Lewis structure的画法）. Applications of Lewis structure（Lewis structure的 应用）. Special Cases（特殊情况）
结构主义学派
例4-4
（a）（（Poor）（John））（（ran）（away））
如果用树形图表示会更加简明：
（b）
Poor John ran away
\ / \ /
\/ \ /
\ /
\ /
现在的问题是：我们怎么知道切分的地方？为什么我们说Poor John和ran away是句子的直接成分？而不是poor和John ran away，或者poor John ran和away?答案，也就是这里运用的标准，是替换性：看一个词语的序列是否可以被一个单词替换而结构保持不变。在Poor John ran away里，Poor John可以被John替换，ran away可以被ran替换。替换前后的结构都是表示某人做某事。用索绪尔的术语，我们可以说poor John和John, ran away和ran分别处于聚合关系之中。从句法功能讲它们是同一的。但是John ran away、poor John ran不能被任何单词替换而不改变结构。
由一个符号和那些跟它处于组合关系中的符号形成的序列有时叫做更严格意义上的结构（structure）；处于聚合关系中的符号的类别叫做更严格意义上的系统（system）。现在，组合关系也叫做水平（horizontal）关系或链状（chain）关系；聚合关系也叫做垂直（vertical）关系或选择（choice）关系。
\ \ \ / \ \ \ / / /
\ \ \ / \ \ \ / / /
\ \ / \ \ / / / \ \ / \ \ / / /
\ / \ \ / /
\ / \ \ / /
\/ \ \/ /
如果我们给节点加上名词、动词、限定词、形容词、介词或名词性词组、动词性词组等标记，可以更清楚地解析歧义，并揭示出用其他方法不易揭示的歧义。
结构主义与列维-斯特劳斯
结构主义与列维-斯特劳斯一、列维-斯特劳斯的个人生平结构人类学的缔造者－－列维-斯特劳斯，1908年生于法国，是当代著名的哲学家、社会学家、神话学家和人类学家，也是法国结构主义的领袖人物。
他早年就读于巴黎大学，1935年到巴西圣保罗大学教授社会学，并用了4时间对巴西的原始部落进行民俗学、人种学的调查考察。
二战开始，他曾回法国服兵役，巴黎陷落后，他旅居美国，结识了俄国形式主义和捷克结构主义的领袖人物、结构主义语言学家罗曼·雅各布森，在他的影响下，列维·斯特劳斯把结构主义语言学方法运用于人类学和神话学研究，用语言学的模式来解释亲属关系和神话结构，从而对结构主义运动产生了不可忽视的影响。
他的大量著作；《亲属关系的基本结构》（1949）、《热带的忧郁》（1955）、《结构人类学》（1955）、《野性的思维》（1962）和《神话学》（四卷本）（1964－1971）奠定了把结构主义方法引入社会－文化研究的重要基石。
二、列维-斯特劳斯的理论1、结构主义的思想来源（1）现代语言学中的结构思想结构主义之父——索绪尔，将语言学理论引伸出来的一些普遍性的结构原则，在日后成为结构主义思潮的一些重要方法论的基础，也就是说这些普遍性的语言学原则包含有结构主义的基本思想，这就是索绪尔对结构主义的最主要贡献。
他把研究的重点转向语言的本质及其一般性结构，认为语言是一个完整的体系或系统，而构成着一系统的元素是各自独立而又相互制约的实体。
换言之，就是语言基本上是一个由对比和相互关联的元素构成的结构。
概括起来，结构主义从结构语言学那里主要继承了两个基本思想。
首先，索绪尔将语言区分为“语言”和“言语”。
前者是指语言的系统、组织语言的规则和用法，后者是指个体的话语。
第二，意义总是对立和结合关系相互作用的结果，这也是深层结构的作用。
这来自于索绪尔认为语言中包含着“符号”的思想，这种符号可被分为两部分：“能指”与“所指”。
hobr的路易斯结构式
hobr的路易斯结构式路易斯结构式，又称Hobr模型，是由美国心理学家罗伯特路易斯（Robert Louis）提出的一种结构化观点，旨在让心理学者们更好地理解行为解释（behavioral explanation）和心理解释（psychological explanation）之间的关系。
路易斯的构想是人的行为可以通过一系列的子系统（subsystems）和元素（elements）来解释。
路易斯模型的最初版本包括五个层次：一个最上层的行为反应层次，被称为“行为结果”（behavior outcome）；其后的四个子层次，表示决策和行为活动，依次称为“假设维度”（assumption dimension）、“决定性因素”（determining factor）、“行为历程”（behavioral process）和“决策性模式”（decisional pattern）。
首先，行为结果提供了一个客观的行为评价，即行为结果有多么好，或有多么接近预期。
在此基础上，假设维度就像是从每个行为可能的选择中建立出的预算一样，它提醒评估者在考虑行为之前，有必要了解这个行为的期望值，以及它可能带来的潜在影响。
接下来的决定性因素层次则提供了具体的建议，旨在提供心理学者和其他行为学家有助于准确地形成更好预期结果的有益信息。
此外，行为历程层次涉及个体在收集、处理信息后如何作出最终决策，以及这个决策如何影响行为反应，这是心理学家非常重视的一个问题。
最后，决策性模式层次则分析了在给定的某些条件下发生的行为，以及行为如何改变这些条件，其可以用于了解人们如何在其所置身的环境中进行决策。
此外，路易斯模型还可以用于研究如何改变一个人的行为，以及一个人如何应对新形势和挑战。
例如，可以分析一个人面对不同状态时，如何根据各种因素（如自身愿望、情境变量、情绪变量等）作出相应的行为反应，以及对其他意见的回应。
此外，路易斯模型可以用来帮助心理学者更好地理解涉及到认知行为疗法（CBT）的概念，以及可以采取哪些行动来改变不良行为。
lewis-structures
[
]
• A resonance structure can be drawn for any molecule in which a double bond can be formed from two or more identical choices • Resonance structures can be drawn 2 – – ways… O 1 H C H C O – O 2 H C • Resonance implies that the bond flips back and forth. Really, it lies between extremes • Read 7.7 (pg. 242). Do PE 8. O
Placing electrons around atoms
Compound 4) Octet for O Cl O peripheral 16 - 12 = 4 atoms 1) Skeletal 5) RemainO Cl O O Cl O –s on Structure ing e center atom 4 - 4 = 0 2) Count 7x1 + 6x2 6) Create electrons multiple +1 = 20 No need bonds? 3) Electron O Cl O Final O Cl O pairs in structure or 20 - 4 = 16 O Cl O bonds ClO2–
2 peripheral Lewis’ bonded to a central Lewis
Skeletal structures
• Because there are exceptions to the octet rule, we need a set of rules to determine how many electrons surround atoms • The first step is to determine how the atoms are bonded in a molecule • Generally, if there is only one of one element and multiple copies of another element, the unique element is central • Commonly, H is peripheral, bonded to O • Read 7.6 (pg. 236) up to PE5. Do PE5.
温特的《无政府状态是国家造就的》
这是社会建构主义的代表者亚历山大。
温特（明尼苏达大学教授）的成名之作，发表在《国际组织》上。
在这篇文章中温特对主流国际关系理论关无政府状态的论述，尤其是主流国际关系理论将无政府状态作为国际政治的第一推动，做了不同的理解。
温特认为，无政府状态不是别人，正是国家自己在互动的过程中建构的。
同时，国家所建构的这种无政府状态不只有一种逻辑。
它包括霍布斯文化，洛克文化，康德文化三种。
我们现在所处的国际社会实际上处于洛克文化的状态，在朝着康德文化的方向发展。
温特的著作：《国际政治的社会理论》，秦亚青译，上海人民出版社。
Anarchy Is What States Make of ItALEXANDER WENDTClassical realists such as Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans J. Mor- genthau attributed egoism and power politics primarily to human nature, whereas structural realists or neorealists emphasize anarchy. The difference stems in part from different interpretations of anarchy's causal powers. Kenneth Waltz's work is important for both. In Man, the State, and War, he defines anarchy as a condition of possibility for or "permissive" cause of war, arguing that "wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them."1 It is the human nature or domestic politics of predator states, however, that provide the initial impetus or "efficient" cause of conflict which forces other states to respond in kind...But... In Waltz's Theory of international Politics... the logic of anarchy seems by itself to constitute self-help and power politics as necessary features of world politics.2 . . .Waltz defines political structure in three dimensions: ordering principles (in this case, anarchy), principles of differentiation (which here drop out), and the distribution of capabilities.3 By itself, this definition predicts little about state behavior. It does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers, and so on. These factors, which are fundamentally intersubjective, affect states' security interests and thus the character of their interaction under anarchy.…Put more generally, without assumptions about the structure of identities and interests in the system, Waltz's definition of structure cannot predict the content or dynamics of anarchy. Self-help is one such intersubjective structure and, as such, does the decisive explanatory work in the theory. The question is whether self-help is a logical or contingent feature of anarchy. In this section, I develop the concept of a "structure of identity and interest" and show that no particular one follows logically from anarchy.A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which. U.S. military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba, despite their similar "structural"Excerpted/abridged from "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Polities," by Alexander Wendt from International Organization, V ol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 395-410.Copyright ~ 1992 by the World Peace Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Portions of the text and some footnotes have been omitted.positions, just as British missiles have a different significance for the United States than do Soviet missiles. The distribution of power may always affect states" calculations, but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the "distribution of knowledge," that constitute their conceptions of self and other.4 If society "forgets" what a university is, the powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist; ff the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, "the Cold War is over." It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions.Actors acquire identities--relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self--by participating in such collective meanings. Identities are inherently relational: "Identity, with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a specific, socially constructed world," Peter Berger argues.5 Each person has many identities linked to institutional roles, such as brother, son, teacher, and citizen. Similarly, a state may have multiple identities as "sovereign," "leader of the free world," "imperial power," and so on. The commitment to and the salience of particular identities vary, but each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the structure of the social world.Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a "portfolio" of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests on the process of defining situations Sometimes situations are unprecedented in our experience, and in these cases we have to construct their meaning, and thus our interests, by analogy or invent them de novo. More often they have routine qualities in which we assign meanings on the basis of institution-allydefined roles. When we say that professors have an "interest" in teaching, research, or going on leave, we are saying that to function in the role identity of "professor," they have to define certain situations as calling for certain actions. This does not mean that they will necessarily do so (expectations and competence do not equal performance), but if they do not, they will not get tenure. The absence or failure of roles makes defining situations and interests more difficult, and identity confusion may result. This seems to be happening today in the United States and the former Soviet Union: Without the cold war's mutual attributions of threat and hostility to define their identities, these states seem unsure of what their "interests" should be.An institution is a relatively stable set or "structure" of identifies and interests. Such structures are often codified in formal rules and norms, but these have motivational force only in virtue of actors" socialization to and participation in collective knowledge. Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors" ideas about how the world works. This does not mean that institutions are not real or objective, that they are "nothing but" beliefs. As collective knowledge, they are experienced as having an existence "over and above the individuals who happen to embody them at the moment."6 In this way, institutions come to confront individuals as more or less coercive social facts, but they are still a function of what actors collectively "know." Identities and such collective cognitions do not exist apart from each other; they are "mutually constitutive." On this view,institutionalization is a process of internalizing new identities and interests, not something occurring outside them and affecting only behavior; socialization is a cognitive process, not just a behavioral one. Conceived in this way, institutions may be cooperative or conflictual, a point sometimes lost in scholarship on international regimes, which tends to equate institutions with cooperation. There are important differences between conflictual and cooperative institutions to be sure, but all relatively stable self-other relations--even those of "enemies"--are defined intersubjectively.Self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy. Processes of identity formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation or "security" of the self. Concepts of security therefore differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other, and, I want to suggest, it is upon this cognitive variation that the meaning of anarchy and the distribution of power depends. Let me illustrate with a standard continuum of security systems.At one end is the "competitive" security system, in which states identify negatively with each other's security so that ego's gain is seen as alter's loss. Negativeidentification under anarchy constitutes systems of "realist" power politics: risk-averse actors that infer intentions from capabilities and worry about relative gainsand losses. At the limit--in the Hobbesian war of all against all--collective actionis nearly impossible in such a system because each actor must constantly fear beingstabbed in the back.In the middle is the "individualistic" security system, in which states are indifferent to the relationship between their own and others" security. This constitutes "neoliberal" systems: States are still self-regarding about their security but are concerned primarily with absolute gains rather than relative gains. One's position in the distribution of power is less important, and collective action is more possible(though still subject to free riding because states continue to be "egoists").Competitive and individualistic systems are both "self-help" forms of anarchy in the sense that states do not positively identify the security of self with that of others but instead treat security as the individual responsibility of each. Given the lack of a positive cognitive identification on the basis of which to build security regimes, power politics within such systems will necessarily consist of efforts to manipulate others to satisfy self-regarding interests.This contrasts with the "cooperative" security system, in which states identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all. This is not self-help in any interesting sense, since the "self" in terms of which interests are defined is the community; national interests are international interests. In practice, of course, the extent to which states identify with the community varies from the limited form found in "concerts" to the full-blown form seen in "collective security" arrangements. Depending on how well developed the collective self is, it will produce security practices that are in varying degrees altruistic or prosocial. This makes collective action less dependent on the presence of active threats and less prone to free riding. Moreover, it restructures efforts to advance one's objectives, or "power politics," in terms of shared norms rather than relative power.On this view, the tendency in international relations scholarship to view power andinstitutions as two opposing explanations of foreign policy is therefore misleading, since anarchy and the distribution of power only have meaning for state action in virtue of the understandings and expectations that constitute institutional identities and interests. Self-help is one such institution, constituting one kind of anarchy but not the only kind. Waltz's three-part definition of structure therefore seems underspecified. In order to go from structure to action, we need to add a fourth: the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system.This has an important implication for the way in which we conceive of states in the state of nature before their first encounter with each other, Because states do not have conceptions of self and other, and thus security interests, apart from or prior to interaction, we assume too much about the state of nature if we concur with Waltz that, in virtue of anarchy, "international political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units."7 We also assume too much if we argue that, in virtue of anarchy, states in the state of nature necessarily face a "stag hunt" or "security dilemma." s These claims presuppose a history of interaction in which actors have acquired "selfish" identities and interests; before interaction (and still in abstraction from first- and second-image factors) they would have no experience upon which to base such definitions of self and other. To assume otherwise is to attribute to states in the state of nature qualities that they can only possess in society. Self-help is an institution, not a constitutive feature of anarchy.What, then, is a constitutive feature of the state of nature before interaction? Two things are left if we strip away those properties of the self which presuppose interaction with others. The first is the material substrate of agency, including its intrinsic capabilities. For human beings, this is the body; for states, it is an organizational apparatus of governance. In effect, I am suggesting for rhetorical purposes that the raw material out of which members of the state system are constituted is created by domestic society before states enter the constitutive process of international society, although this process implies neither stable territoriality nor sovereignty, which are internationally negotiated terms of individuality (as discussed further below). The second is a desire to preserve this material substrate, to survive. This does not entail "self-regardingness," however, since actors do not have a self prior to interaction with another; how they view the meaning and requirements of this survival therefore depends on the processes by which conceptions of self evolve.This may all seem very arcane, but there is an important issue at stake: Are the foreign policy identities and interests of states exogenous or endogenous to the state system? The former is the answer of an individualistic or undersocialized systemic theory for which rationalism is appropriate; the latter is the answer of a fully socialized systemic theory. Waltz seems to offer the latter and proposes two mechanisms, competition and socialization, by which structure conditions state action.9 The content of his argument about this conditioning, however, presupposes a self-help system that is not itself a constitutive feature of anarchy. As James Morrow points out, Waltz's two mechanisms condition behavior, not identity and interest (10)If self-help is not a constitutive feature of anarchy, it must emerge causally from processes in which anarchy plays only a permissive role. This reflects a second principle of constructivism: that the meanings in terms of which action is organized arise out of interaction…Consider two actors---ego and alter--encountering each other for the first time.11 Each wants to survive and has certain material capabilities, but neither actor has biological or domestic imperatives for power, glory, or conquest.., and there is no history of security or insecurity between the two. What should they do? Realists would probably argue that each should act on the basis of worst-case assumptions about the other's intentions, justifying such an attitude as: prudent in view of the possibility of death from making a mistake. Such a possibility always exists, even in civil society; however, society would be impossible ff people made decisions purely on the basis of worst-case possibilities. Instead, most decisions are and should be made on the basis of probabilities, and these are produced by inter-action, by what actors do.In the beginning is ego's gesture, which may consist, for example, of an advance, a retreat, a brandishing of arms, a laying down of arms, or an attack. For ego, this gesture represents the basis on which it is prepared to respond to alter. This basis is unknown to alter, however, and so it must make an inference or "attribution" about ego's intentions and, in particular, given that this is anarchy, about whether ego is a threat. The content of this inference will largely depend on two considerations. The first is the gesture's and ego's physical qualities, which are in part contrived by ego and which include the direction of movement, noise, numbers, and immediate consequences of the gesture. The second consideration concerns what alter would intend by such qualities were it to make such a gesture itself. Alter may make an attributional "error" in its inference about ego's intent, but there is also no reason for it to assume a priori-before the gesture--that ego is threatening, since it is only through a process of signaling and interpreting that the costs and probabilities of being wrong can be determined. Social threats are constructed, not natural.Consider an example. Would we assume, a priori, that we were about to be attacked if we are ever contacted by members of an alien civilization? I think not. We would be highly alert, of course, but whether we placed our military forces on alert or launched an attack would depend on how we interpreted the import of their first gesture for our security--if only to avoid making an immediate enemy out of what may be a dangerous adversary. The possibility of error, in other words, does not force us to act on the assumption that the aliens are threatening: Action depends on the probabilities we assign, and these are in key part a function of what the aliens do; prior to their gesture, we have no systemic basis for assigning probabilities. If their first gesture is to appear with a thousand spaceships and destroy New York, we will define the situation as threatening and respond accordingly. But if they appear with one spaceship, saying what seems to be "we come in peace," we will feel "reassured" and will probably respond with a gesture intended to reassure them, even if this gesture is not necessarily interpreted by them as such.This process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a "social act"and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings. It advances the sameway. The first social act creates expectations on both sides about each other'sfuture behavior: potentially mistaken and certainly tentative, but expectations! nonetheless. Based on this tentative knowledge, ego makes a new gesture, again signifying the basis on which it will respond to alter, and again alter responds, adding to the pool of knowledge each has about the other, and so on over time. The mechanism here is reinforcement; interaction rewards actors for holding certain ideas about each other and discourages them from holding others. If repeated long enough, these "reciprocal typifications" will create relatively stable concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in the interaction.12Competitive systems of interaction are prone to security "dilemmas," in which the efforts of actors to enhance their security unilaterally threatens the security of the others, perpetuating distrust and alienation. The forms of identity and interest that constitute such dilemmas, however, are themselves ongoing effects of, not exogenous to, the interaction; identities are produced in and through "situated activity."13 We do not begin our relationship with the aliens in a security dilemma; security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature.The mirror theory of identity formation is a crude account of how the process of creating identities and interests might work, but it does not tell us why a system of states---such as, arguably, our own--would have ended up with self-regarding and not collective identities. In this section, I examine an efficient cause, predation, which, in conjunction with anarchy as a permissive cause, may generate a self-help system. In so doing, however, I show the key role that the structure of identities and interests plays in mediating anarchy's explanatory role.The predator argument is straightforward and compelling. For whatever reasons-biology, domestic politics, or systemic vietimization-some states may become predisposed toward aggression. The aggressive behavior of these predators or "bad apples" forces other states to engage in competitive power politics, to meet fire with fire, since failure to do so may degrade or destroy them. One predator will best a hundred pacifists because anarchy provides no guarantees. This argument is powerful in part because it is so weak: Rather than making the strong assumptionthat all states are inherently power-seeking (a purely reductionist theory of power politics), it assumes that just one is power-seeking and that the others have to follow suit because anarchy permits the one to exploit them.In making this argument, it is important to reiterate that the possibility of predation does not in itself force states to anticipate it a priori with competitive power politics of their own. The possibility of predation does not mean that "war may at any moment occur"; it may in fact be extremely unlikely. Once a predator emerges, however, it may condition identity and interest formation in the following manner.In an anarchy of two, if ego is predatory, alter must either define its security in self-help terms or pay the price The timing of the emergence of predation relative to the history of identity formation in the community is therefore crucial to anarchy's explanatory role as a permissive cause. Predation will always lead victims to defend themselves, but whether defense will be collective or not depends on the history of interaction within the potential collective as much as on the ambitions of the predator. Will the disappearance of the Soviet threat renew old insecurities among the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? Perhaps, but not if they have reasons independent of that threat for identifying their security withone another. Identities and interests are relationship-specific, not intrinsic attributes of a "portfolio"; states may be competitive in some relationships and solidary in others……The source of predation also matters. If it stems from unit-level causes that areimmune to systemic impacts (causes such as human nature or domestic polities taken in isolation), then it functions in a manner analogous to a "genetic trait" in the constructed world of the state system. Even if successful, this trait does not select for other predators in an evolutionary sense so much as it teaches other states to respond in kind, but since traits cannot be unlearned, the other states will continue competitive behavior until the predator is either destroyed or trans-formed from within. However, in the more likely event that predation stems at least in part from prior systemic interaction--perhaps as a result of being victimized in the past (one thinks here of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union)--then it is more a response to a learned identity and, as such, might be transformed by future social interaction in the form of appeasement, reassurances that security needs will be met, systemic effects on domestic polities, and so on. In this ease, in otherwords, there is more hope that process can transform a bad apple into a good one……This raises anew the question of exactly how much and what kind of role human nature and domestic politics play in world polities. The greater and more destructive this role, the more significant predation will be, and the less amenable anarchy will be to formation of collective identities. Classical realists, of course, assumed that human nature was possessed by an inherent lust for power or glory. My argument suggests that assumptions such as this were made for a reason: An unchanging Hobbesian man provides the powerful efficient cause necessary for a relentless pessimism about world polities that anarchic structure alone, or even structure plus intermittent predation, cannot supplyAssuming for now that systemic theories of identity formation in world polities are worth pursuing, let me conclude by suggesting that the realist-rationalist alliance "retries" self-help in the sense of treating it as something separate from the practices by which it is produced and sustained. Peter Berger and Thorpas Luckmann define reification as follows: "[It] is the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something else than human products--such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. The reified world is ... experienced by man as a strange facticity, an opus alienum over which he has no control rather than as the opus proprium of his own productive activity."14 By denying or bracketing states' collective authorship of their identities and interests, in other words, the realist- rationalist alliance denies or brackets the fact that competitive power polities help create a very "problem of order" they are supposed to solve---that realism is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Far from being exogenously given, the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes competitive identities and interests is constructed every day by processes of "social will formation."15 It is what states have made of themselves.1. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959),p. 232.2. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979).3. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 79-101.4. The phrase "distribution of knowledge" is Barry Barnes's, as discussed in his work The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); see also Peter Berger and ThomasLuckrnann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).5. Berger, "Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge," European Journal ofSociology, 7, 1 (1966), 111.6. Berger and Luckmann, p. 58.7. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 91.8. See Waltz, Man, the State, and War; and Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Secu rity Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978), 167-214.9. waltz, Theory of lnternational Politics, pp. 74-77.10. See James Morrow, "Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics," World Politics 41 (October 1988), 89.11. This situation is not entirely metaphorical in world polities, since throughout history states have "discovered" each other, generating an instant anarchy as it were. A systematic empirical study of first contacts would be interesting.12. On "reciprocal typifications," see Berger and Luckmann, pp. 54--58.13. See C. Norman Alexander and Mary Glenn Wiley, "Situated Activity and Identity For mation," in Morris Rosenberg and Ralph Turner, eds., Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives (New York: Basic Books, 1981), pp. 269-89.14. See Berger and Luekmann, p. 89.15. See Richard Ashley, "Social Will and International Anarchy," in Hayward Alker andRichard Ashley, eds., After Realism, work in progress, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, and Arizona State University, Tempe, 1992.文章评论共0条回复Powered by PHPWind政治与公共管理学院。
路易斯结构理论与路易斯结构式
资料范本本资料为word版本，可以直接编辑和打印，感谢您的下载路易斯结构理论与路易斯结构式地点：__________________时间：__________________说明：本资料适用于约定双方经过谈判，协商而共同承认，共同遵守的责任与义务，仅供参考，文档可直接下载或修改，不需要的部分可直接删除，使用时请详细阅读内容路易斯结构理论与路易斯结构式由于对简单的非过渡元素分子或离子，通过观察即可写出其路易斯结构式，所以路易斯结构理论实际上是中学化学中最重要的结构理论。
虽然人们因其不能解释PCl5等类物质的结构，而常对其加以质疑，但仍无法撼动其在化学中的地位。
以至于现在有相当一部分大学化学教材和教学参考书，还是用路易斯结构来讨论分子中的成键情况和性质。
一、路易斯理论介绍（一）路易斯理论路易斯结构理论是一个关于共价键的理论。
它认为分子中的原子都有形成稀有气体电子构型的趋势，以求得到自身的稳定。
所以又称为八隅体理论。
分子达到稳定结构要通过原子共用电子对来实现。
每种原子提供的价电子数，是按元素周期表的族数给出的。
它解释了大部分非过渡元素以共价键构成的化学物质的成键情况。
并给出分子的路易斯结构式、进而给出有关分子结构的某些较详细的情况。
路易斯结构的表示方法为，在两原子间用一对“电子点”或短线，表示由共价键相联结。
（二）路易斯结构的推断在中学化学教学的范围内，那些简单的分子或离子通常通过观察即可确定出路易斯结构式。
所谓的“观察”，就是在确定出哪个原子是中心原子的基础上（当分子中无环时），再一个、个的从配原子的角度讨论是否达到了稳定结构。
对H2O分子，有6个价电子的O原子为中心原子。
当它与一个配原子H结合时，与H要各提供1个电子用于成对。
O原子与另一配原子H也是这样结合的。
这样O原子享有的电子数为8，其中有2个孤电子对，有两个电子对分别与2个H原子共用、成σ键。
两个H原子各用1个电子与O原子组成电子对。
每个H原子享有的电子数为2。
社会人类学
普理查德的《论社会人类学》·代译序梁永佳爱德华•埃文思-普里查德，《论社会人类学》，世界图书出版公司，2009年版。
埃文思-普里查德笔锋一向明晰，从不卖弄，《论社会人类学》便以此著称。
寥寥六讲，短短百页，一门学科的精髓跃然纸上，既不失概论的周全，又不乏整理的创见。
多年来，英语界的同名教材虽层出不穷，上乘佳作如此者，终究难得一见。
1950年，英国广播公司(BBC)把埃文思-普里查德请来做系列讲座，后来整理成册，是为该书。
时距英国殖民体系崩溃不远，国人堪忧，把这门为英国殖民政策立下汗马功劳的学科搬上电台，用意耐人寻味。
果然，埃文思-普里查德一开篇就直白地说：“据我所知，涉猎广泛的人，也不大熟悉这门学科”，一副从零讲起的架势。
从几个学科与社会人类学的比较入手，整理把社会人类学界定为研究原始社会制度的学科，它“研究以制度为背景的社会行为，例如家庭、亲属制度、政治组织、法律程序，宗教信仰等制度以及这些制度之间的关系，它既研究当代社会，也研究材料充分、研究可行的历史上的社会”“原始”仅意味着规模小、专门化程度低的简单社会，而不是指“离猿猴更近”的社会。
社会人类学研究它，在于学科的整体论关怀。
社会学可以研究一个复杂社会的某个问题并试图加以操纵，而人类学则必须体察对象的方方面面，但不关心如何改造社会。
原始社会以其简单而成为社会人类学与社会学的分工根据。
作为新功能主义奠基人之一，埃文思-普里查德重点区分了社会和文化的差异及其对社会人类学方法的影响。
英国人进教堂脱帽不必脱鞋，阿拉伯人进清真寺脱鞋不必脱帽，这是文化差异，但在社会上，两者可视为同一种行为——表达敬意。
文化和社会是同一事实的不同抽象，社会人类学以研究“社会”为主。
研究什么呢?答曰：“结构。
”整理说，任何社会都是有序的、成体统的，它比人生大部分变幻不定的事物更持久。
结构(structure)就是制度，“这些制度或结构里的社会活动被组织在婚姻、宗教、家庭、市场、酋长等制度中，我们所说的功能就是指它们在维持结构中所扮演的角色。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
Rules for Lewis Structures1. Write the skeletal structure.-Hydrogen cannot be central.-Atoms that occur once are usually central.Example: CBr4-The least electronegative atom is central.-Use chemical intuition.2. Sum the total number of valence electrons of all atoms.Special - Polyatomic ions:Add one electron for each negative charge.Subtract one electron for each positive charge.In the following steps subtract electrons used from this total.3. Make single bonds between atoms in skeletal structure.4. Make octets on outer atoms by placing lone pairs. (Except hydrogen)5. Place remaining electrons on central atom(s) to make octets.6. If the central atom(s) do not have an octet then make double or triple bonds.7. Look for ambiguities in structure such:Hydrogen with more than 2 valence e-Atoms without typical number of bondsAtoms with more than an octet8. For ions place brackets: [ ] around the structure and the charge as a superscript following. For example: [Mg]2+9. Sometimes you can consider more than one possible structure. When this is the case consider:-Formal charges-Electronegativity-Are there multiple resonance structures?Examples:1. N22. CO23. Cl2COResonance StructuresIn some cases there are multiple Lewis structures that are equally plausible.Each of the Lewis structures is a resonance structure.The real molecule is a combination of each of these resonance structures and is referred to as a resonance hybrid.Resonance forms differ in placement of electrons but not atom arrangements. Example: O3Formal ChargeThe formal charge of an atom in a molecule is the difference between the number of valence electrons in the free atom and the number of valence electrons "owned" by the atom in the molecule.Formal Charge = C f = E v - (E u + 1/2E b)E v = number of valence electrons in free atom.E u = number of unshared electrons owned by the atom.E b = number of bonding electrons owned by the atom.Uses of formal charge:1. To determine the correct Lewis structure from multiple possibilities2. To determine when conventional Lewis structures based on the octet rule are incorrect.Another way to determine formal charge on each atom is to count valence electrons “owned” by an atom and compare to the number of valence electrons in the atom by itself. There are two type of counting valence electrons and each method is for a different purpose:1. Counting for the octet rule: the two electrons in a bonding pair both count when determining whether the octet rule is satisfied.2. Counting for formal charge: All non-bonding “lone pairs” count as “owned” when determining formal charge. However only one electron in a bonded pair is considered “owned” when counting for formal charge determination.Exceptions to the octet rule1. Radicals - odd electron speciesIn some cases there is no way to draw a Lewis structure in which all atoms have an octet. Example: NO, NO22. Incomplete octets - Compounds with central atoms with fewer tan eight valence electrons.Example: BF3, BeCl23. Expanded valence - Compounds with a central atom that has more than eight valence electrons. The central atom is a nonmetal of the third, fourth or fifth period.- Elements in the third period or higher can have more than eight valence electrons and so are capable of expanded valence.- Because of expanded valence some noble gases are capable of forming compounds.- Use the formal charge concept to see that expanded valence still allows for stable Lewis structures.Examples: PCl5 , SF6 , XeF4 , ClF3Note: some people use expanded valence for molecules such as SO42-Shapes of Molecules from Lewis Structures (VSEPR)When we speak of the shape, or molecular geometry, of a small molecule we mean the three dimensional arrangement of atoms about the central atom. For larger molecules, the same idea applies but the molecular geometry refers to the arrangement of atoms about any particular atom, rather than the geometry of the entire molecule.To consider the molecular geometry about an atom it must be connected to more than one other atom. Diatomic molecules must be linear by definition.With three or more atoms attached the assignment of a molecular geometry is not so clear. For example consider the two molecules ammonia, NH3, and formaldehyde,CH2O. Both have a central atom connected to three other atoms and yet different molecular geometries. Formaldehyde is described as having a trigonal planar molecular shape with all four atoms in the same plane. Ammonia is not a flat molecule. Instead the three hydrogen atoms are in a plane with the nitrogen atom above (or below depending on your perspective) the plane and the molecular geometry is described as being trigonal pyramidal.Even though the molecular geometry about an atom only describes the arrangement of connected atoms, according to VSEPR theory the lone pairs of electrons must be considered to correctly identify the shape.VSEPR (valence shell electron pair repulsion) theory basically states that all regions of electron density directed out and away from an atom repel each other. The lowest energy state is one in which all regions of electron density are as far apart from each other as possible.The geometry about an atom is found by looking at the Lewis structure. What are regions of electron density directed away from an atom in VSEPR theory? There are two types: bonds and lone pairs. The molecular geometry can be found by counting bonded atoms and lone pairs about a central atom.Sometimes VSEPR is explained as a consideration of the number of “electron pairs” about an atom with a “pair” being a bond or lone pair. Multiple bonds can be hard to deal with because a double bond for instance is two pairs but both pairs must be directed away from the central atom in the same direction (towards the other atom). So in terms of VSEPR a multiple bond is only one “pair”. This is why it is better to count “bonded atoms plus lone pairs” instead of “pairs”. A bonded atom counts once regardless of bond order (single, double or triple bond).。