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文献信息文献标题：Firm’s Size and Solvency Performance: Evidence from the Malaysian Public Listed Firms（公司规模和偿债能力：来自马来西亚上市公司的证据）文献作者：AK Ramin等文献出处：《Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences》,2017, 12(5): 1240-1244字数统计：英文3045单词，15732字符；中文4929汉字外文文献Firm’s Size and Solvency Performance: Evidence from theMalaysian Public Listed FirmsAbstract Firm solvency is one of the important indicators in measuring firm’s performance. Firm ability to grow and sustaining their business in the highly competitive business environment depends significantly on its cash flow management capacity that subsequently results to a business stay solvent at every phase of business life cycle. Early detection of financial distress is important for every firm of various sizes. Previous findings on firm’s size and solvency performance varies which tendency on agreeing to the assumption that larger firms have the advantages to avoid insolvency as compare to smaller firms. However, previous studies have also revealed that larger firms such as public listed company were not escape from facing financial distress which eventually lead to insolvency. Therefore, the study was aimed to mdentify the influence of firm’s size and solvency performance of public listed firms in Malaysia. A total of 149 firms were used to measure their financial data performance for a period between 2011 and 2014. Firm total assets and paid capital were used as a proxy to firm size. The current ratio and debt ratio were used as a proxy to measure the solvency performance. The study found that firm size measuredby total assets has moderately influence the solvency performance of firms indicated by the debt ratio and current ratio. However the firm size measured by paid-up capital has lesser influence on solvency performance measured by debt ratio and no influence on current ratio.Kev words: Current ratio, debt ratio, firm size. Insolvency, liquidity, SolvencyINTRODUCTIONIn any situation, firms should be able to meet short and long term obligation to achieve operational sustainability. In this situation, firms with operational sustainability were regarded as in the position of solvency. Insolvency occurs when a firm’s total liabilities exceeded a fair valuation of its total assets. Previous study by Brigham and Houston (2012) described technical insolvency as the position whereby firms were unable to meet their current obligations as they fall due (that is the firm’s current assets are lower than its current liabilities) despite having higher total assets than the total liabilities. Early detection of financial distress is important in avoiding insolvency. Public listed firms were relatively capable in managing liquidity to ensure that they remain in solvency position sustainably. Previous findings on the relation ship between firm’s size and solvency performance shows mixed result which tendency on agreeing to the assumption that large firms have the advantages over small firm to remain solvent. However, prior studies have also revealed that larger firms such as public listed companies were not immune from having financial distress which eventually leads to insolvency. Firm ability in servicing and repaying debts was the main indicator of the solvency position measurement of any firms (Zhang and Zhang, 2010). Earlier empirical studies by Coleman (2002), Obert and Olawale (2010) that focus on larger firm in various developed countries suggest that large firms showed that size have significant impact on the ability in serving debts lead to greater chances in sustaining their solvency position. This finding consistent with a study by Sahudin et al. (2011 ) in which larger firms allows a greater level of debt management towards their ability to sustain the solvency position. Despite many findings revealed that larger firms have an advantages over the smaller firms in managing their liquidity,there were cases particularly in which Practice Note (PN 17) was served to considerably large firms listed in Bursa Malaysia as a result of liquidity issues. PN 17 is the control procedure specifically for public listed companies which are facing financial distress and to be delisted from the stock exchange. There were 21 firms subjected to PN 17 as at first half of 2015 bringing the total listing of financial distress firms to 2.32% of the total listed firms on the stock exchange. Shareholders and investors continue to demand for healthy firms to ensure their investments. Solvency and liquidity of firms would remains significant elements for managers to manage for sustainability of the firms. It is pertinent for managers to understand about business failures, its causes and its possible remedies (Sulub, 2014). Therefore, the study was aimed to mdentify the influence of firm’s size on solvency performance of public listed firms on the Bursa Malaysia (BM).LITERIATURE REVIEWPast researchLun and Quaddus (2011 ) in their study among Hong Kong electronic industry propagated that firm size does influence the performance of business. In other findings suggested that smaller firms were more likely to issue equity while larger firms are more likely to issue debt rather than equity which influence the liquidity. Past study done by Cassar and Holmes (2003) and Esperanca et al. (2003) found a positive relationship between firm size and long-term debt but a negative relationship with short-term debt which eventually influence the liquidity. Other study suggested that firm size and capital structure strategy may influence firm’s solvency performances. Other finding by Beck et al. (2008) indicated that firms size influence the firm’s performance which includes the solvency and liquidity operation. Findings from Rajeev indicated that small firms were much faced higher risks of liquidity as compared to those larger firms. Therefore, these two findings show a risk versus return trade-off that exists at the firm performance level in relation to firm’s size. Justification of this findings propagated that larger firms have the advantages to access for better resources and skill competencies to better manage the firm. Otherproponent to this hypothesis added that economies of scale only can only be found at larger firms (Nguyen and Reznek, 1991). Despite many findings propagated that larger firms have better performance in term of solvency, there were findings which argued that smaller firms may also performance better in term of efficiency, growth and liquidity. Recent finding by Vithessonthi and Tongurai (2015), firm size does not influence the firm performances during the 2000-2009 Thailand financial crisis.Other finding by Campos and Sanchis (2015) firm’s size among agricultural industry in Spam does not influence the performance of liquidity and solvency of the industry. In general, performance of firms such as the productivity, firm size to be found in mix ed contribution towards firm’s productivity which could influence the financial health of the operation (Pompe and Bilderbeek, 2005). Earlier finding by Michaelas et al. (1999) also supported that a debt ratio and firm’s size could correlate depending on the other factors within the firms.Other findings by Bourlakis et al. (2014) suggest different small firm performed better in case of agriculture industry in Greek. Small firms preferred to opt for short-term finance as compared to larger firms and better performed as opposed to larger firms. It may caused small firms highly sensitive to short term economic environment as oppose to larger firms. It is concluded that the relationship between firm’s size and firms performance findings varies as many other fac tors may influence the both variables. It is therefore, continuous study on this issues remain relevant as economic factors continue to influence firms operation.Firm sizeFirm size has been widely used as a control variable in empirical research specifically to corporate finance. Firm size matter for many reasons, it is said that larger firms are better in managing their cash flow, therefore difficult to fail and liquidate (Shumway, 2001 ). Size can also be the proxy for the volatility of firm’s assets. Additionally, measurement of firm size varies according to the research perspective. Rajeev suggested that firm size is defined according to the value of a firm’s assets. In addition, Sahudin et al. (2011 ) propagated that the size of firm is defines as the logarithm of total assets of the firms used in business; Firm s= log e,Total asset. Previous scholar such as Kato and Honho and Sun preferred to use total assets value to represent firm’s size to measure liquidity and predictor for bankruptcy. While some researchers used asset value as the proxy to firm’s size, others have suggested alternative measurement such as paid up capital as a proxy for firm’s size. According to Allen paid-up capital for a firms company is the number of shares outstanding multiplies the face value of the shares. Kidanu defined paid-up capital as the amount of capital which is contributed/paid by owner(s) during the establishment of a firm adopting measurement of firm’s size using paid-up capital is a more stable measure of firm size (Ponnu and Okoth, 2009). Other researcher suggested that total assets as a proxy for firm size indicated the influence of firm’s size and solvency performance (Vithessonthi and Tongurai, 2015). In view of the widely adopted by other researcher, this stud y employed this variable as the proxy for firm’s size.SolvencyThe importance of knowing solvency through the optimal debt ratio could help policymakers and financial managers to formulate an appropriate financing policy that could prevent companies from going into financially distressed situation due to excessive level of debt (Ahmad and Abdullah, 2011). Previous researches works widely suggested that ‘Debt Ratio’ (DR) and ‘Debt to Equity Ratio’ (DER) be used as a proxy to solvency (Khidmat and Rehman, 2014). DR was widely used as its reflecting the company’ liability situation and has the best protection degree for borrower’s benefit and it is the basic ratio in translatmg financing structure as well as easy to define and calculate (Li and Jian, 2008). Other proponent on the use of DR was finding by Ahmad and Abdullah (2011) in which DR was consistent with trade-off theory which hypothesize that high debt ratio will lead to financial distress and thus deteriorate the firm value. Other measurement on solvency was based on performance of Current Ratio (CR). The CR measure a firm’s ability to pay current obligations on business such as operating and financial expenses is current ratio. Current ratio consists of cash and near-cash assets (together called “current” assets) of a business on one side and immediate payment obligations (current liabilities) on the other side. Using the CR to measure solvency enable firms to monitor paymentobligations include dues to suppliers, operating and financial expenses that must be paid shortly and maturing installments under long-term debt (Saleem and Rehman, 2011; Altman, 1968). It is therefore, CR and DR were adopted in this study as a proxy for solvency performance.MATERIALS AND METHODSThis study employs quantitative methodology involving collection of secondary audited financial data from 149 firms for a period between 2011 and 2014 representing a sample size of 16% from a total of 934 firms listed on Bursa Malaysia. Quantitative method based on secondary data was employed as simple random sampling technique was employed to select a sample representing type of sector and firm size. Table 1 shows industrial product accounts the largest number of the samples which were 47 firms (31 .5%) and followed by trade and service sector of 35 firms (23.5%). There were 25 firms or 16.8% representing consumer sector. Property sector accounts for 12.1 % or 18 sample firms. The remaining samples came from construction, plantation and technology and hotel industry. Detail breakdown of samples firms is depicted in Table 1 (Dhawan, 2001).Table I : Samples firms by sectorsSector Frequency PercentageIndustrial product 47 31.5Trade and service 35 23.5Consumer 25 16.8Property 18 12.1Construction 9 6.0Plantation 7 4.7Technology 5 3.4Finance 3 2.0Total 149 100.0Data observations covers annual reports from 149 firms for 4 years period were analysis using excel prior to further analysis using SPSS. Firm size was measure by total assets of the firms and paid up capital. Total assets were derived as:Fixed assets + Current assets (1) Debt ratios were calculated as:Total debt/total asset (2)Current ratios were calculated as:Total current assets/Total current liabilities (3)RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONDescriptive analysis on debt ratios and current ratio resulted in their respective mean scores of each firm’s size category as depicted in Table 2 mean score for DR varies according to firm’s size in which small f irms scored mean of 0. 259, medium size; 0.378 and larger firm scored mean of 0. 452. For the CR, small firm scored mean of 6.605, medium firm; 2.534 and larger firm scored 2.562. Correlation test on the relationship between firm size (total assets) and DR yielded p<0. 005 and r-value of 0.313 indicated that there was a moderate positive correlation between two variables as depicted in Table 3. Firm size (total assets) value correlate with the performance firm’s debt ratio indicating that as the asset value increase it will also resulted to moderate and significant increase in the firm’s DR.Table 2: Mean score of DR and CR for various firm’s sizeFrim size (total assets) Mean Debt Ratio (DR) Mean Current Ratio (CR) Small frim (TA<RM 100mil) 0.259 6.605 Medium frim (RM 100mil<TA<RM 499 mil) 0.378 2.534Large frim (TA>RM 499 mil) 0.452 2.562 Table 3: Correlation between total assets and debt ratio from year 2011 -2014 spearman's rho DR TADRCorrelation coefficient 1.000 0.313**Sig. (2-tailed)- 0.000N 149 149TACorrelation coefficient0.313** 1.000Sig. (2-tailed)0.000 -N 149 149* *Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)Further, test on the correlation between firm sizes (total assets) on CR yielded r-value of 0.194 and p-value of 0.018, p<0. 005 indicated that was a weak and significant positive correlation between the two variables as highlighted in Table 4.Table 4: Correlation between total assets and current ratio from years 2011-2014spearman's rho CR TACRCorrelation coefficient 1.000 0.194*Sig. (2-tailed)- 0.018N 149 149TACorrelation coefficient0.194* 1.000Sig. (2-tailed)0.018 -N 149 149* *Correlation is significant at the 0. 05 level (2-tailed)A test was also conducted on the relationship between firm size measures by paid-up capital against the DR. The finding indicated that there was a weak and significant positive correlationbetween paid-up capital and debt ratio, r = 0.299, p<0. 005 (Table 5 and 6).Table 5: Correlation between paid-up capital and debt ratio from years 2011-2014 spearman's rho DR Paid-up capitalDRCorrelation coefficient 1.000 0.299**Sig. (2-tailed)- 0.000N 149 149Paid-up capitalCorrelation coefficient0.299** 1.000Sig. (2-tailed)0.000 -N 149 149Table 6: Correlation between paid-up capital and current ratio from years 2011-2014 spearman's rho CR Paid-up capitalCRCorrelation coefficient 1.000 0.214**Sig. (2-tailed)- 0.009N 149 149Paid-up capitalCorrelation coefficient0.214** 1.000Sig. (2-tailed)0.009 -N 149 149The final test on the relationship between paid-up capital and current ratio yielded r = 0. 214, p<0. 009. The result indicated that there was a weak and significant positive correlation between the two variables. All in all, the correlation analysis indicates that there exist significant positive correlation between measure of firm sizeand solvency performance. Nevertheless, it is important to note the correlations are rather weak. With highest linear correlation at 0.313 it does suggest that firm size has quite minimum impact on firm’s solvency performance. The findings also support prior studies that the relationship between firm size and solvency performance is mixed.CONCLUSIONSummary of the findings can be concluded that firm’s size measured by total assets does influence the firm’s solvency performance for both measurement of debt ratio and current ratio. The ability to optimize higher assets value may help firm improve their liquidity. This findings was consistence with previous studies by Michaelas et al. (1999), Hall et al. (2000) and Sogorb-Mira (2005) in which a positive relationship between firm size (assets) and leverage and solvency measured in the ratio of total debt (long-term debt).As for the relationship between paid-up capital and solvency performance, the debt ratio found to be influence by the paid-up capital while current ratio showed no relationship with the size of paid-up capital. It was nature of paid-up capital which used as initial resources to start the business operation. Over the time paid up capital relatively experience fewer changes despite the need for additional resources. Firms are preferred to sources external funding as compare to equity financing. However, the use of debt can also increase the financial risk of a firm and lead to the insolvency. According to Coleman and Cohn (2002) and Coleman (2002), debt is one of the variables that can cause insolvency for most of firms. Failure rates in the range of 50-75% were commonly cited for smaller firms, making it difficult for smaller firms to raise external capital from either debt or equity providers. The weak of financial structure as reflected by the gearing (debt-equity ratio) has been found to be the key source of insolvency. Many firms were unable to keep up this high debt ratio and, later become insolvent. A high debt ratio in itself, does not make a firm insolvent as long as the firm is earning enough to cover interest and principal payments when it they come due. However, the more leveraged a firm is the more vulnerable it is tobankruptcy. Therefore, the flow of earnings and the ability of the firm to make interest and principal payments will determine whether the firm will actually become insolvent or otherwise (Kim and Lee, 2002). The prediction and prevention of financial distress is one of the major factors that should be analyzed in advance as an early warning signal and to avoid bankruptcy. In addition to the awareness that can make a company successful, it is also useful for managers to have an understanding of business failures and bankruptcy, its causes and its possible remedies. In conclusion, firm size does matter, although the impact is quite small in term of their influence towards solvency performance. However, equally important is the ability of the managers to leverage available resources within the firms to strive for healthy financial position and remain solvent all the time.中文译文公司规模和偿债能力：来自马来西亚上市公司的证据摘要企业偿债能力是衡量企业绩效的重要指标之一。

融资租赁中英文对照外文翻译文献

融资租赁中英文对照外文翻译文献XXX LeasingSmall and medium-sized companies have XXX in the global economy。

In this article。

we will discuss the XXX.2.XXX LeasingXXX it provides them with a number of advantages。

One of the main XXX without having to make a large upfront investment。

This is particularly XXX that may not have access to the capital XXX.XXX it allows companies to keep up with the latest XXX。

which means that companies can stay up-to-date without having to make nal XXX.3.XXX LeasingXXX whether a small company will choose to lease or not。

One of the most important factors is the cost of leasing versus the cost of purchasing。

Small XXX associated with each n in order to make an XXX.Another factor that can XXX is the length of the XXX。

XXX.4.nIn n。

leasing XXX。

it is XXX.At the turn of the 20th century。

mass n methods neered by Ford Motor Company led people to believe that large-scale business enterprises were the way of the XXX well into the late20th century。

金融学融资融券中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照翻译Margin Trading Bans in Experimental Asset MarketsAbstractIn financial markets, professional traders leverage their trades because it allows to trade larger positions with less margin. Violating margin requirements, however, triggers a margin call and open positions are automatically covered until requirements are met again. What impact does margin trading have on the price process and on liquidity in financial asset markets? Since empirical evidence is mixed, we consider this question using experimental asset markets. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchasing and short selling is permitted, we ban margin purchases and/or short sales using a 2x2 factorial design to a allow for a comparative static analysis. Our results indicate that a ban on margin purchases fosters efficient pricing by narrowing price deviations from fundamental value accompanied with lower volatility and a smaller bid-ask-spread. A ban on short sales, however, tends to distort efficient pricing by widening price deviations accompanied with higher volatility and a large spread.Keywords: margin trading, Asset Market, Price Bubble, Experimental Finance1.IntroductionHowever, regulators can only have a positive impact on the life-cycle of a bubble, if they know how institutional changes affect prices in financial markets. Note that regulation is a double-edged sword since decision errors may lead from bad to worse. Given the systemic risk posed by speculative bubbles and their long history, it may be surprising how little attention bubbles have received in the literature and how little understood they are. This ignorance is partly due to the complex psychological nature of speculative bubbles but also due to the fact that the conventional financial economic theory has ignored the existence of bubbles for a long-time. But even if theories on bubble cycles have empirical relevance, it is clear that the issues surrounding the formation and the bursting of bubbles cannot be analyzed with pencil and paper. Conclusions on bubble cycles must be backed with quantitative data analysis. Given the limited number of observed empirical market crashes and their non-recurring nature, an experimental analysis of bubble formation involving controlled and replicable laboratory conditions seems to be a promising way to proceed.The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature, Section 0 presents the details of the experimental design and section IV reports the data analysis. In section V, we summarize our findings and provide concluding remarks.2. Leverage in asset marketsDo margin requirements have any effects on market prices? Fisher (1933) and also Snyder (1930) mentioned the importance of margin debt in generating price bubbles when analyzing the Great Crash of 1929. The ability to leverage purchases lead to a higher demand, ending up in inflated prices. The subsequently appreciated collateral allowed to leverage purchases even more. This upward price spiral was fueled by an expansion of debt. From the end of 1924, brokers’loans rose four and one-half times (by $6.5 billion) and in the final phase broker’s borrowings rose at more than 100% a year until the bubble crashed. Then, after the peak of the bubble, a debt spiral was initiated. Investors lost trust and started to sell assets. Excess supply deflated prices resulting in a depreciation of collateral. Triggered margin calls lead to forced asset sales pushing supply even further. An increase in defaults on debt, and short sales exacerbated supply and finally assets were being sold at fire sale prices. It only took 6 weeks to extinguish half of the total of brokers’credit. Finally, in 1934, the U.S. Congress established federal margin authority to prevent unjustifiable increases or decreases in stock demand since margin requirements can prevent dramatic price fluctuations by limiting leveraged trades on both sides of the stock market: extremely optimistic margin purchasers and extremely pessimistic short sellers.Recent experimental evidence suggests short sale constraints to increase prices. Ackert et al. (2006)and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) find prices to deflate–even below fundamental value in the latter study –while King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) find no effect. In a setting with information asymmetries, Fellner and Theissen (2006) find higher prices with short sale constraints but not depending on the divergence of opinion as predicted by Miller (1977). In a setting with smart money traders, Bhojraj, Bloomfield, and Tayler (2009) report short selling to exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. Hauser and Huber (2012) find short selling constraints with two dependent assets to distort price levels. Our design deviates from the previous studies in several but one important way: We use a more empirically relevant facility in that traders have to provide collateral facing the threat of margin calls.3. Implementing Margin Purchasing and Short SellingWe conducted four computerized treatments utilizing a 2x2 factorial design as displayed in Table II. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchases Traders execute margin purchases when they purchase shares by using loan, collateralized with shareholdings evaluated at the current market value.11 In this case, traders make a bull market bet, i.e. they borrow cash to buy shares, wait for the price to rise and sell them with a profit. However, a decline in prices depreciates collateral while keeping loan constant. When prices fall below a certain threshold, such that the loan exceeds the value of the shareholdings (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i) the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts selling shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or untilall shares have been sold.12 Traders execute short sales when they sell shares without holding them in their inventory, collateralized with sufficient cash at hand.13 In this case, traders make a bear market bet, i.e. they borrow shares to sell them in the market, wait for the price to decline, buy them back with a profit and return them. Note that the amount of debt equals the total amount the trader has to pay to buy back the outstanding shares. Thus, an increase in prices increases debt and reduces collateral (cash minus value of outstanding shares), simultaneously. When prices exceed a certain threshold, such that the amount to buy back outstanding shares exceeds collateral (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i)the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts buying shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or until all short positions have been covered. Note that short sellers have to pay dividends for their short positions at the end of each period.14 After period 15, both long and short positions are worthless.15 In any case, a margin callcan lead to bankruptcy. However, the consequences of a margin call hold even during bankruptcy, i.e. outstanding positions continuously being closed although subjects are bankrupt. This is different to any other asset market experiment considering leverage4. Margin traders tend to make less money than othersBy leveraging purchases and sales, traders take more risks to be able to make more money. But do margin traders make more money at all? To evaluate this question, we classify traders into types, i.e. margin traders, who trade on margin at least once, and others. Table X shows the average end- of round-earnings within types for each treatment along with the number of subjects. The spearman rank correlation between type and end of round earnings is negative in both rounds and in all three treatments. The coefficient is significantly different from zero only in MP|NoSS and NoMP|SS when subjects are once experienced . Subjects, who executed both margin purchases and short sales in MP|SS earned less than subjects who refrained from trading on margin. This is significant only for inexperienced subjects . One final note on the distribution of earnings. Comparing the treatments by evaluating the dispersion of earnings using the coefficient of variation , we find that the average CV in the NoMP|NoSS is lower than any other treatment Although not statistically significant, the results indicate that it is less risky to participate in markets with margin bans than in the markets where margintrading is permitted.5. ConclusionIn an attempt to halt the decline in asset values, recent regulatory measures temporarily banned short sales in financial markets. To assess the impact of banning leveraged trading on market mispricing is a complicated task when being reliant on data from real world exchanges only. it is unclear if possible price increases following a ban on short sales would come from new long positions or from covered short positions, and the announcement of such measures affects an uncontrolled reaction of the market. Owed to the uncontrolled uncertainties in the real world, asset mispricing can be measured only with weak confidence.In comparison to other experimental studies where limits to margin debt and short sales are rare, our design involves margin requirements comparable to the real world. Highly levered investors face margin calls that lead to forced liquidation of positions, affecting a reinforcement of the swings of the market. We have studied the impact of leverage on individual portfolio decisions to find an increase in risk taking characterized by higher concentrations of risky assets eventually resulting in individual bankruptcies. Thus, our experimental results are in line with theories of margin trading by Irvine Fischer (1933) and by recent heterogeneous agents models (Geanakoplos 2009) which conjecture such effects on asset pricing and portfolio decisions. As in any laboratory experiment, the results are restricted to the chosen parameters. The baselineSmith et al. (1988) asset market design has been challenged in recent studies (e.g. Kirchler et al. 2011), arguing that some subjects are confused about the declining fundamental value and believe that prices keep a similar level in the course of time. So it would also be interesting to investigate the effects of bans Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 05826 of margin purchases and short sales, to see if our treatment effects can be repeated in an environment with non-decreasing fundamental values. However, recent experiments by Hauser and Huber (2012) show similar effects using multiple asset markets with a complexsystem of fundamental values but without margin calls. It would also be interesting to see how margin requirements change performance in multiple sset markets. We leave these open questions to future research.ReferencesAbreu, D., and M.K. Brunnermeier, 2003, Bubbles and crashes, Econometrica 71, 173–204.Ackert, L., N. Charupat, B. Church and R. Deaves, 2006, Margin, Short Selling, and Lotteries in Experimental Asset Markets, Southern Economic Journal 73, 419–436. Adrangi, B. and A. Chatrath, 1999, Margin Requirements and Futures Activity: Evidence from the Soybean and Corn Markets, Journal of Futures Markets, 19, 433-455. Alexander, G.J, and M.A Peterson, 2008, The effect of price tests on trader behavior and market quality: An analysis of Reg SHO, Journal of Financial Markets 11, 84–111.Bai, Y., E.C Chang, and J. Wang, 2006, Asset prices under short-sale constraints, Mimeo. Beber, A., and M. Pagano, 2010, Short-Selling Bans around the World: Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers TI 10-106 / DSF 1.Bernardo, A. and I. Welch, 2002, Financial market runs, NBER Working Papers 9251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.Bhojraj, S., R.J Bloomfield, and W.B Tayler, 2009, Margin trading, overpricing, and synchronization risk, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2059–2085.Blau, B. M., B. F. Van Ness, R. A. Van Ness, 2009, Short Selling and the Weekend Effect for NYSE Securities, Financial Management 38 (No. 3). 603-630Boehmer, E., Z.R Huszar, and B.D Jordan, 2010, The good news in short interest, Journal of Financial Economic 96, 80–97.Boehme, R.D, B.R Danielsen, and S.M Sorescu, 2006, Short-sale constraints, differences of opinion, and overvaluation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 455–487.融资融券禁令在实验资产市场摘要在金融市场，因为专业的交易者杠杆交易允许以较少的保证金进行更大的交易。

企业偿债能力分析外文文献

外文文献原稿与译文原稿IntroductionAlthough creditors can develop a variety of protective provisions to protect their own interests, but a number of complementary measures are critical to effectively safeguard their interests have to see the company's solvency、Therefore, to improve a company's solvency Liabilities are on the rise、On the other hand, the stronger a company's solvency the easier cash investments required for the project, whose total assets are often relatively low debt ratio, which is the point of the pecking order theory of phase agreement、Similarly, a company's short-term liquidity, the stronger the short-term debt ratio is also lower, long-term solvency, the stronger the long-term debt ratio is also lower 、Harris et al、Well, Eriotis etc、as well as empirical research and Underperformance found that the solvency (in the quick ratio and interest coverage ratio, respectively, short-term solvency and long-term solvency) to total debt ratio has significant negative correlation、Taking into account the data collected convenience, this paper represents short-term solvency ratios and to study the long-term solvency by the quick ratio and cash flow impact on the real estate debt capital structure of listed companies、Listed Companies Solvency AnalysisWhen companies need money, the choice of financing preference order, namely in accordance with retained earnings, issuance of bonds, financing order issued shares、According to this theory, strong corporate profitability, retained earnings more For financing first will consider retained earnings、Therefore, the profitability of the total debt ratio should be negatively correlated debt avoidance theory based natural surface that under otherwise identical conditions, a highly profitable company should borrow more debt, because they use avoidance of the need for greater debt, and therefore higher debt ratio、rapid growth of the company's financial leverage without the support, based on this, toselect 378 samples from the 500 largest US companies, the researchers found that regardless of whether there is an optimal capital structure, the company's liabilities are directly correlated with growth、Growth is the fundamental guarantee company solvency, so whether short-term loans or long-term loans and creditors, as the company's growth as a positive signal, so the listed companies in recent years of growth, the higher its rate and short-term assets The higher rate of long-term assets and liabilities, total assets and liabilities naturally higher, but the impact on growth of real estate companies listed on a smaller debt ratio (coefficient is small)、The risk of firm size and capital structure affect the growth has a similar conclusion, it appears that creditors, especially banks that the company scale is a measure of credit risk is an important consideration index, the greater the company size, the more stable cash flow, bankruptcy it is smaller, the creditors are more willing to throw an olive branch large-scale enterprises、The actual controller of the listed companies category to total debt ratio of the impact factor of a 0、040017, indicating that non-state-controlled listed company's total assets and liabilities higher than the state-owned holding companies、The reason for this phenomenon may be non-state-controlled listed companies pay more attention to control benefits, do not want to dilute their control over equity financing, and therefore more inclined to debt financing, which may also explain the non-state-controlled listed companies better use of financial leverage enterprises bigger and stronger impulses、In addition, the actual control of listed companies category short-term impact on asset-liability ratio is a 2、3 times its impact on long-term debt ratio, which shows the non-state-controlled listed companies prefer to take advantage of short-term debt to expand its operations、Current research on factors affecting capital structure point of view there are many factors in various industries concerned is not the same, according to industry characteristics and particularity, we mainly focus on the following aspects to analyze the factors industry capital structure、The article explained variable - capital structure for the asset-liability ratio, generally refers to the total debt ratio, but for more in-depth study of capital structure of listed companies, the paper from the total debt ratio, short-term assets and liabilities and long-term debt ratio of three angles of Capital structure explanatory、At present, domestic and foreign scholars analyzed factors on capital structure mostly used multiple linear regression, as usual statistical regression function in the form of their choice is often subjective factors, but ordinary regression methods to make function with average resistance, most such functions excellent and objectivity are often difficult to reflect、base stochastic frontier model (Stochastic Frontier) in data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, estimate the effective production frontier using mathematical programming method, namely the experience of frontier production function, overcome DEA method assumes that there is no random error term, the better to reflect the objectivity and optimality ¨J function, currently in the field of economic management, sociology and medicine, began to get more and more applications、Therefore, in this paper, stochastic frontier model data on the capital structure factors listed real estate companies conducted a comprehensive analysis, in order to provide a better scientific basis for the study of the optimal capital structure of real estate enterprises、Listed company's solvency and overall asset-liability ratio was significantly negatively correlated with short-term liquidity has a decisive influence on the short-term asset-liability ratio、Similarly, long-term solvency also has a decisive influence on long-term assets and liabilities、Industry higher total debt ratio particularly high proportion of short-term debt is one of the main business risks, thus increasing solvency of listed companies, especially short-term liquidity (that is, to obtain a stable short-term cash flow)、reduce its asset liability ratio and effective risk management choice ROA of listed companies is much greater influence than ROE of asset-liability ratio, and affect the relationship is inconsistent, ROE is higher, the higher the total debt ratio, while the ROA high, the lower the rate of the total assets and liabilities, and short-term liabilities ROA more obvious, this difference is mainly due to the special structure of listed companies due to the nature of the capital, and therefore need to improve the capital structure of listed companies, namely to reduce the total assets and liabilities rate debt structure and the need to reduce the proportion of short-term debt in particular, in order to enhance the company's profitability ROA、growth and company size has a significant positive impact on the capital structure, which is mainly due to the growth of the company's solvency is fundamental, The size of the company is the main indicator to measure the bankruptcy creditor risk、Therefore, listed companies shouldbe radically to grow through continuous growth and development of enterprises, so that the total debt ratio has a high margin of safety, through growth to continue to resolve the financial risk than non-state-owned holding companies controlling more use of financial leverage motivation and apparently relied on short-term liabilities, which may lead to more serious financial risk especially short-term business risks, so that the non-state-owned holding listed companies should establish more strict risk prevention system、译文介绍虽然债权人可以通过制定各种保护性条款来保障自己的利益,但都就是一些辅助性的措施,能够有效保障她们利益的关键还得瞧公司的偿债能力。

企业偿债能力分析外文文献[精品文档]

北京化工大学北方学院毕业设计（论文）——外文文献原稿和译文外文文献原稿和译文原稿IntroductionAlthough creditors can develop a variety of protective provisions to protect their own interests, but a number of complementary measures are critical to effectively safeguard their interests have to see the company's solvency. Therefore, to improve a company's solvency Liabilities are on the rise. On the other hand, the stronger a company's solvency the easier cash investments required for the project, whose total assets are often relatively low debt ratio, which is the point of the pecking order theory of phase agreement. Similarly, a company's short-term liquidity, the stronger the short-term debt ratio is also lower, long-term solvency, the stronger the long-term debt ratio is also lower .Harris et al. Well, Eriotis etc. as well as empirical research and Underperformance found that the solvency (in the quick ratio and interest coverage ratio, respectively, short-term solvency and long-term solvency) to total debt ratio has significant negative correlation. Taking into account the data collected convenience, this paper represents short-term solvency ratios and to study the long-term solvency by the quick ratio and cash flow impact on the real estate debt capital structure of listed companies.Listed Companies Solvency AnalysisWhen companies need money, the choice of financing preference order, namely in accordance with retained earnings, issuance of bonds, financing order issued shares. According to this theory, strong corporate profitability, retained earnings more For financing first will consider retained earnings. Therefore, the profitability of the total debt ratio should be negatively correlated debt avoidance theory based natural surface that under otherwise identical conditions, a highly profitable company should borrow more debt, because they use avoidance of the need for greater debt, and therefore higher debt ratio.北京化工大学北方学院毕业设计（论文）——外文文献原稿和译文rapid growth of the company's financial leverage without the support, based on this, to select 378 samples from the 500 largest US companies, the researchers found that regardless of whether there is an optimal capital structure, the company's liabilities are directly correlated with growth.Growth is the fundamental guarantee company solvency, so whether short-term loans or long-term loans and creditors, as the company's growth as a positive signal, so the listed companies in recent years of growth, the higher its rate and short-term assets The higher rate of long-term assets and liabilities, total assets and liabilities naturally higher, but the impact on growth of real estate companies listed on a smaller debt ratio (coefficient is small). The risk of firm size and capital structure affect the growth has a similar conclusion, it appears that creditors, especially banks that the company scale is a measure of credit risk is an important consideration index, the greater the company size, the more stable cash flow, bankruptcy it is smaller, the creditors are more willing to throw an olive branch large-scale enterprises. The actual controller of the listed companies category to total debt ratio of the impact factor of a 0.040017, indicating that non-state-controlled listed company's total assets and liabilities higher than the state-owned holding companies. The reason for this phenomenon may be non-state-controlled listed companies pay more attention to control benefits, do not want to dilute their control over equity financing, and therefore more inclined to debt financing, which may also explain the non-state-controlled listed companies better use of financial leverage enterprises bigger and stronger impulses. In addition, the actual control of listed companies category short-term impact on asset-liability ratio is a 2.3 times its impact on long-term debt ratio, which shows the non-state-controlled listed companies prefer to take advantage of short-term debt to expand its operations.Current research on factors affecting capital structure point of view there are many factors in various industries concerned is not the same, according to industry characteristics and particularity, we mainly focus on the following aspects to analyze the factors industry capital structure. The article explained variable - capital structure for the asset-liability ratio, generally refers to the total debt ratio, but for more in-depth study of capital structure of listed companies, the paper from the total debt ratio, short-term assets and liabilities and北京化工大学北方学院毕业设计（论文）——外文文献原稿和译文long-term debt ratio of three angles of Capital structure explanatory.At present, domestic and foreign scholars analyzed factors on capital structure mostly used multiple linear regression, as usual statistical regression function in the form of their choice is often subjective factors, but ordinary regression methods to make function with average resistance, most such functions excellent and objectivity are often difficult to reflect. base stochastic frontier model (Stochastic Frontier) in data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, estimate the effective production frontier using mathematical programming method, namely the experience of frontier production function, overcome DEA method assumes that there is no random error term, the better to reflect the objectivity and optimality ¨J function, currently in the field of economic management, sociology and medicine, began to get more and more applications. Therefore, in this paper, stochastic frontier model data on the capital structure factors listed real estate companies conducted a comprehensive analysis, in order to provide a better scientific basis for the study of the optimal capital structure of real estate enterprises.Listed company's solvency and overall asset-liability ratio was significantly negatively correlated with short-term liquidity has a decisive influence on the short-term asset-liability ratio. Similarly, long-term solvency also has a decisive influence on long-term assets and liabilities. Industry higher total debt ratio particularly high proportion of short-term debt is one of the main business risks, thus increasing solvency of listed companies, especially short-term liquidity (that is, to obtain a stable short-term cash flow). reduce its asset liability ratio and effective risk management choice ROA of listed companies is much greater influence than ROE of asset-liability ratio, and affect the relationship is inconsistent, ROE is higher, the higher the total debt ratio, while the ROA high, the lower the rate of the total assets and liabilities, and short-term liabilities ROA more obvious, this difference is mainly due to the special structure of listed companies due to the nature of the capital, and therefore need to improve the capital structure of listed companies, namely to reduce the total assets and liabilities rate debt structure and the need to reduce the proportion of short-term debt in particular, in order to enhance the company's profitability ROA. growth and company size has a significant positive impact on the capital structure, which is mainly北京化工大学北方学院毕业设计（论文）——外文文献原稿和译文due to the growth of the company's solvency is fundamental, The size of the company is the main indicator to measure the bankruptcy creditor risk. Therefore, listed companies should be radically to grow through continuous growth and development of enterprises, so that the total debt ratio has a high margin of safety, through growth to continue to resolve the financial risk than non-state-owned holding companies controlling more use of financial leverage motivation and apparently relied on short-term liabilities, which may lead to more serious financial risk especially short-term business risks, so that the non-state-owned holding listed companies should establish more strict risk prevention system.北京化工大学北方学院毕业设计（论文）——外文文献原稿和译文译文介绍虽然债权人可以通过制定各种保护性条款来保障自己的利益，但都是一些辅助性的措施，能够有效保障他们利益的关键还得看公司的偿债能力。

债务杠杆财务报表分析外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Financial Statement Analysis of Leverage and How It Informs About Protability and Price-to-Book RatiosAbstractThis paper presents a ﬁnancial statement analysis that distinguishes leverage that arises in ﬁnancing activities from leverage that arises in operations. The analysis yields two leveraging equations, one for borrowing to ﬁnance operations and one for borrowing in the course of operations. These leveraging equations describe how the two types of leverage affect book rates of return on equity. An empirical analysis shows that the ﬁnancial statement analysis explains cross-sectional differences in current and future rates of return as well as price-to-book ratios, which are based on expected rates of return on equity. The paper therefore concludes that balance sheet line items for operating liabilities are priced differently than those dealing with ﬁnancing liabilities. Accordingly, ﬁnancial statement analysis that distinguishes the two types of liabilities informs on future proﬁtability and aids in the evaluation of appropriate price-to-book ratios.Keywords: financing leverage; operating liability leverage; rate of return on equity; price-to-book ratioLeverage is traditionally viewed as arising from ﬁnancing activit ies: Firms borrow to raisecash for operations. This paper shows that, for the purposes of analyzing proﬁtability and valuing ﬁrms, two types of leverage are relevant, one indeed arising from ﬁnancing activities but another from operating activities. The paper supplies a ﬁnancial statement analysis of the two types of leverage that explains differences in shareholder proﬁtability and price-to-book ratios.The standard measure of leverage is total liabilities to equity. However, while some liabilities—like bank loans and bonds issued—are due to ﬁnancing, other liabilities—like trade payables, deferred revenues, and pension liabilities—result from transactions with suppliers, customers and employees in conducting operations. Financing liabilities are typically traded in well-functioning capital markets where issuers are price takers. In contrast, ﬁrms are able to add value in operations because operations involve trading in input and output markets that are less perfect than capital markets. So, with equity valuation in mind, there are a priori reasons for viewing operating liabilities differently from liabilities that arise in ﬁnancing.Our research asks whether a dollar of operating liabilities on the balance sheet is priced differently from a dollar of ﬁnancing liabilities. As operating and ﬁnancing liabilities are components of the book value of equity, the question is equivalent to asking whether price-to-book ratios depend on the composition of book values. The price-to-book ratio is determined by the expected rate of return on the book value so, if components of book value command different price premiums, they must imply different expected rates of return on book value. Accordingly, the paper also investigates whether the two types of liabilities are associated with differences in future book rates of return.Standard ﬁnancial statement analysis distinguishes shareholder proﬁtability that arises from operations from that which arises from borrowing to ﬁnance operations. So, return on assets is distinguished from return on equity, with the difference attributed to leverage. However, in the standard analysis, operating liabilities are not distinguished from ﬁnancing liabilities. Therefore, to develop the speciﬁcations for the empirical analysis, the paper pre sents a ﬁnancial statement analysis that identiﬁes the effects of operating and ﬁnancing liabilities on rates of return on book value—and so on price-to-book ratios—with explicit leveraging equations that explain when leverage from each type of liability is favorable or unfavorable.The empirical results in the paper show that ﬁnancial statement analysis that distinguishes leverage in operations from leverage in ﬁnancing also distinguishes differences in contemporaneous and future proﬁtability among ﬁrms. L everage from operating liabilities typically levers proﬁtability more than ﬁnancing leverage and has a higher frequency of favorable effects.Accordingly, for a given total leverage from both sources, ﬁrms with higher leverage from operations have higher price-to-book ratios, on average. Additionally, distinction between contractual and estimated operating liabilities explains further differences in ﬁrms’ proﬁtability and their price-to-book ratios.Our results are of consequence to an analyst who wishes to forecast earnings and book rates of return to value ﬁrms. Those forecasts—and valuations derived from them—depend, we show, on the composition of liabilities. The ﬁnancial statement analysis of the paper, supported by the empirical results, shows how to exploit information in the balance sheet for forecasting and valuation.The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 outlines the ﬁnancial statements analysis that identiﬁes the two types of leverage and lays out expressions that tie leverage measures to proﬁtab ility. Section 2 links leverage to equity value and price-to-book ratios. The empiricalanalysis is in Section 3, with conclusions summarized in Section 4.1. Financial Statement Analysis of LeverageThe following ﬁnancial statement analysis separates the effects of ﬁnancing liabilities and operating liabilities on the proﬁtability of shareholders’ equity. The analysis yields explicit leveraging equations from which the speciﬁcations for the empirical analysis are developed. Shareholder proﬁtability, return on common equity, is measured asReturn on common equity (ROCE) = comprehensive net income ÷common equity (1) Leverage affects both the numerator and denominator of this proﬁtability measure. Appropriate ﬁnancial statement analysis disentangles the effects of leverage. The analysis below, which elaborates on parts of Nissim and Penman (2001), begins by identifying components of the balance sheet and income statement that involve operating and ﬁnancing activities. The proﬁtability due to each activ ity is then calculated and two types of leverage are introduced to explain both operating and ﬁnancing proﬁtability and overall shareholder proﬁtability.1.1 Distinguishing the Protability of Operations from the Protability of Financing ActivitiesWith a f ocus on common equity (so that preferred equity is viewed as a ﬁnancial liability), the balance sheet equation can be restated as follows:Common equity =operating assets＋financial assets－operating liabilities－Financial liabilities (2) The distinction here between operating assets (like trade receivables, inventory and property,plant and equipment) and ﬁna ncial assets (the deposits and marketable securities that absorb excess cash) is made in other contexts. However, on the liability side, ﬁnancing liabilities are also distinguished here from operating liabilities. Rather than treating all liabilities as ﬁnancing debt, only liabilities that raise cash for operations—like bank loans, short-term commercial paper and bonds—are classiﬁed as such. Other liabilities—such as accounts payable, accrued expenses, deferred revenue, restructuring liabilities and pension liabilities—arise from operations. The distinction is not as simple as current versus long-term liabilities; pension liabilities, for example, are usually long-term, and short-term borrowing is a current liability.Rearranging terms in equation (2),Common equity = (operating assets－operating liabilities)－(financial liabilities－financial assets)Or,Common equity = net operating assets－net financing debt (3) This equation regroups assets and liabilities into operating and ﬁnancing ac tivities. Net operating assets are operating assets less operating liabilities. So a ﬁrm might invest in inventories, but to the extent to which the suppliers of those inventories grant credit, the net investment in inventories is reduced. Firms pay wages, but to the extent to which the payment of wages is deferred in pension liabilities, the net investment required to run the business is reduced. Net ﬁnancing debt is ﬁnancing debt (including preferred stock) minus ﬁnancial assets. So, a ﬁrm may issue bonds to raise cash for operations but may also buy bonds with excess cash from operations. Its net indebtedness is its net position in bonds. Indeed a ﬁrm may be a net creditor (with more ﬁnancial assets than ﬁnancial liabilities) rather than a net debtor.The income statement can be reformulated to distinguish income that comes from operating and ﬁnancing activities:Comprehensive net income = operating income－net financing expense (4) Operating income is produced in operations and net ﬁnancial ex pense is incurred in the ﬁnancing of operations. Interest income on ﬁnancial assets is netted against interest expense on ﬁnancial liabilities (including preferred dividends) in net ﬁnancial expense. If interest income is greater than interest expense, ﬁnancing activities produce net ﬁnancial income rather than net ﬁnancial expense. Both operating income and net ﬁnancial expense (or income) are after tax.3 Equations (3) and (4) produce clean measures of after-tax operating proﬁtability and the borrowing rate:Return on net operating assets (RNOA) = operating income ÷net operating assets (5) andNet borrowing rate (NBR) = net financing expense ÷net financing debt (6) RNOA recognizes that proﬁtability must be based on the net assets invested in operations. So ﬁrms can increase their operating proﬁtability by convincing suppliers, in the course of business, to grant or extend credit terms; credit reduces the investment that shareholders would otherwise have to put in the business. Correspondingly, the net borrowing rate, by excluding non-interest bearing liabilities from the denominator, gives the appropriate borrowing rate for the ﬁnancing activities.Note that RNOA differs from the more common return on assets (ROA), usually deﬁned as income before after-tax interest expense to total assets. ROA does not distinguish operating and ﬁnancing activities appropriately. Unlike ROA, RNOA excludes ﬁnancial assets in the denominator and subtracts operating liabilities. Nissim and Penman (2001) report a median ROA for NYSE and AMEX ﬁrms from 1963–1999 of only 6.8%, but a median RNOA of 10.0%—much closer to what one would expect as a return to business operations.1.2 Financial Leverage and its Effect on Shareholder ProtabilityFrom expressions (3) through (6), it is straightforward to demonstrate that ROCE is a weighted average of RNOA and the net borrowing rate, with weights derived from equation (3): ROCE= [net operating assets ÷common equity× RNOA]－[net financing debt÷common equity ×net borrowing rate (7) Additional algebra leads to the following leveraging equation:ROCE = RNOA＋[FLEV× ( RNOA－net borrowing rate )] (8) where FLEV, the measure of leverage from ﬁnancing activities, isFinancing leverage (FLEV) =net financing debt ÷common equity (9) The FLEV measure excludes operating liabilities but includes (as a net against ﬁnancing debt) ﬁnancial assets. If ﬁnancial assets are greater than ﬁnancial liabilities, FLEV is n egative. The leveraging equation (8) works for negative FLEV (in which case the net borrowing rate is the return on net ﬁnancial assets).This analysis breaks shareholder proﬁtability, ROCE, down into that which is due to operations and that which is due t o ﬁnancing. Financial leverage levers the ROCE over RNOA, with the leverage effect determined by the amount of ﬁnancial leverage (FLEV) and the spread between RNOA and the borrowing rate. The spread can be positive (favorable) or negative (unfavorable).1.3 Operating Liability Leverage and its Effect on Operating ProtabilityWhile ﬁnancing debt levers ROCE, operating liabilities lever the proﬁtability of operations, RNOA. RNOA is operating income relative to net operating assets, and net operating assets areoperating assets minus operating liabilities. So, the more operating liabilities a ﬁrm has relative to operating assets, the higher its RNOA, assuming no effect on operating income in the numerator. The intensity of the use of operating liabilities in the investment base is operating liability leverage:Operating liability leverage (OLLEV) =operating liabilities ÷net operating assets (10) Using operating liabilities to lever the rate of return from operations may not come for free, however; there may be a numerator effect on operating income. Suppliers provide what nominally may be interest-free credit, but presumably charge for that credit with higher prices for the goods and services supplied. This is the reason why operating liabilities are inextricably a part of operations rather than the ﬁnancing of operations. The amount that suppliers actually charge for this credit is difﬁcult to identify. But the market borrowing rate is observable. The amount that suppliers would implicitly charge in prices for the credit at this borrowing rate can be estimated as a benchmark:Market interest on operating liabilities= operating liabilities×market borrowing ratewhere the market borrowing rate, given that most credit is short term, can be approximated by the after-tax short-term borrowing rate. This implicit cost is benchmark, for it is the cost that makes suppliers indifferent in supplying cred suppliers are fully compensated if they charge implicit interest at the cost borrowing to supply the credit. Or, alter natively, the ﬁrm buying the goods or services is indifferent between trade credit and ﬁnancing purchases at the borrowin rate.To analyze the effect of operating liability leverage on operating proﬁtability, w e deﬁne: Return on operating assets (ROOA) =(operating income＋market interest on operating liabilities)÷operating assets(11)The numerator of ROOA adjusts operating income for the full implicit cost of trad credit. If suppliers fully charge the implicit cost of credit, ROOA is the return of operating assets that would be earned had the ﬁrm no operating liability leverage. suppliers do not fully charge for the credit, ROOA measures the return fro operations that includes the favorable implicit credit terms from suppliers.Similar to the leveraging equation (8) for ROCE, RNOA can be expressed as:RNOA = ROOA＋[ OLLEV ×(ROOA－market borrowing rate )] (12) where the borrowing rate is the after-tax short-term interest rate.Given ROOA, the effect of leverage on proﬁtability is determined by the level of operating liability leverage and the spread between ROOA and the short-term after-tax interest rate. Like ﬁnancing leverage, the effect can be favorable or unfavorable: Firms can reduce their operating proﬁtability through operating liability leverage if their ROOA is less than the market borrowing rate. However, ROOA will also be affected if the implicit borrowing cost on operating liabilities is different from the market borrowing rate.1.4 Total Leverage and its Effect on Shareholder ProtabilityOperating liabilities and net ﬁnancing debt combine into a total leverage measure:Total leverage (TLEV) = ( net financing debt＋operating liabilities)÷common equityThe borrowing rate for total liabilities is:Total borrowing rate = (net financing expense＋market interest on operating liabilities) ÷net financing debt＋operating liabilitiesROCE equals the weighted average of ROOA and the total borrowing rate, where the w eights are proportional to the amount of total operating assets and the sum of net ﬁnancing debt and operating liabilities (with a negative sign), respectively. So, similar to the leveraging equations (8) and (12):ROCE = ROOA ＋[TLEV×(ROOA －total borrowing rate)] (13) In summary, ﬁnancial statement analysis of operating and ﬁnancing activities yields three leveraging equations, (8), (12), and (13). These equations are based on ﬁxed accounting relations and are therefore deterministic: Th ey must hold for a given ﬁrm at a given point in time. The only requirement in identifying the sources of proﬁtability appropriately is a clean separation between operating and ﬁnancing components in the ﬁnancial statements.2. Leverage, Equity Value and Price-to-Book RatiosThe leverage effects above are described as effects on shareholder proﬁtability. Our interest is not only in the effects on shareholder proﬁtability, ROCE, but also in the effects on shareholder value, which is tied to ROCE in a straightforward way by the residual income valuation model. As a restatement of the dividend discount model, the residual income model expresses the value of equity at date 0 (P0) as:B is the book value of common shareholders’ equity, X is comprehensive income to common shareholders, and r is the required return for equity investment. The price premium over book value is determined by forecasting residual income, Xt –rBt-1. Residual income is determined in part by income relative to book value, that is, by the forecasted ROCE. Accordingly, leverage effects on forecasted ROCE (net of effects on the required equity return) affect equity value relative to book value: The price paid for the book value depends on the expected proﬁtability of the book value, and leve rage affects proﬁtability.So our empirical analysis investigates the effect of leverage on both proﬁtability and price-to-book ratios. Or, stated differently, ﬁnancing and operating liabilities are distinguishable components of book value, so the question is whether the pricing of book values depends on the composition of book values. If this is the case, the different components of book value must imply different proﬁtability. Indeed, the two analyses (of proﬁtability and price-to-book ratios) are complementary.Financing liabilities are contractual obligations for repayment of funds loaned. Operating liabilities include contractual obligations (such as accounts payable), but also include accrual liabilities (such as deferred revenues and accrued expenses). Accrual liabilities may be based on contractual terms, but typically involve estimates. We consider the real effects of contracting and the effects of accounting estimates in turn. Appendix A provides some examples of contractual and estimated liabilities and their effect on proﬁtability and value.2.1 Effects of Contractual liabilitiesThe ex post effects of ﬁnancing and operating liabilities on proﬁtability are clear from leveraging equations (8), (12) and (13). These expressions always hold ex post, so there is no issue regarding ex post effects. But valuation concerns ex ante effects. The extensive research on the effects of ﬁnancial leverage takes, as its point of departure, the Modigliani and Miller (M&M)(1958) ﬁnancing irrelevance proposition: With perfect capital markets and no taxes or information asymmetry, debt ﬁnancing has no effect on value. In terms of the residual income valuation model, an increase in ﬁnancial leverage due to a substitution of debt for equity may increase expected ROCE according to expression (8), but that increase is offset in the valuation (14) by the reduction in the book value of equity that earns the excess proﬁtability and the increase in the required equity return, leaving total value (i.e., the value of equity and debt) unaffected. The required equity return increases because of increased ﬁnancing risk: Leverage may be expected to be favorable but, the higher the leverage, the greater the loss to shareholders should the leverage turn unfavorable ex post, with RNOA less than the borrowing rate.In the face of the M&M proposition, research on the value effects of ﬁnancial leverage has proceeded to relax the conditions for the proposition to hold. Modigliani and Miller (1963) hypothesized that the tax beneﬁts of debt incr ease after-tax returns to equity and so increase equity value. Recent empirical evidence provides support for the hypothesis (e.g., Kemsley and Nissim, 2002), although the issue remains controversial. In any case, since the implicit cost of operating liabi lities, like interest on ﬁnancing debt, is tax deductible, the composition of leverage should have no tax implications.Debt has been depicted in many studies as affecting value by reducing transaction and contracting costs. While debt increases expected bankruptcy costs and introduces agency costs between shareholders and debtholders, it reduces the costs that shareholders must bear in monitoring management, and may have lower issuing costs relative to equity. One might expect these considerations to apply to operating debt as well as ﬁnancing debt, with the effects differing only by degree. Indeed papers have explained the use of trade debt rather than ﬁnancing debt by transaction costs (Ferris, 1981), differential access of suppliers and buyers to ﬁnancin g (Schwartz,1974), and informational advantages and comparative costs of monitoring (Smith, 1987; Mian and Smith, 1992; Biais and Gollier, 1997). Petersen and Rajan (1997) provide some tests of these explanations.In addition to tax, transaction costs and agency costs explanations for leverage, research has also conjectured an informational role. Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) characterized ﬁnancing choice as a signal of proﬁtability and value, and subsequent papers (for example, Myers and Majluf, 1984) have carried the idea further. Other studies have ascribed an informational role also for operating liabilities. Biais and Gollier (1997) and Petersen and Rajan (1997), for example, see suppliers as having more information about ﬁrms than banks and th e bond market, so more operating debt might indicate higher value. Alternatively, high trade payables might indicate difﬁculti es in paying suppliers and declining fortunes.Additional insights come from further relaxing the perfect frictionless capital markets assumptions underlying the original M&M ﬁnancing irrelevance proposition. When it comes to operations, the product and input markets in which ﬁrms trade are typically less competitive than capital markets. Indeed, ﬁrms are viewed as adding value prima rily in operations rather than in ﬁnancing activities because of less than purely competitive product and input markets. So, whereas it is difficult to ‘‘make money off the debtholders,’’ ﬁrms can be seen as ‘‘making money off the trade creditors.’’ In operations, ﬁrms can exert monopsony power, extracting value from suppliers and employees. Suppliers may provide cheap implicit ﬁnancing in exchange for information about products and markets in which the ﬁrm operates. They may also beneﬁt from efﬁciencies in the ﬁrm’s supply and distribution chain, and may grant credit to capturefuture business.2.2 Effects of Accrual Accounting EstimatesAccrual liabilities may be based on contractual terms, but typically involve estimates. Pension liabilities, for example, are based on employment contracts but involve actuarial estimates. Deferred revenues may involve obligations to service customers, but also involve estimates that allocate revenues to periods. While contractual liabilities are typically carried on the balance sheet as an unbiased indication of the cash to be paid, accrual accounting estimates are not necessarily unbiased. Conservative accounting, for example, might overstate pension liabilities or defer more revenue than required by contracts with customers.Such biases presumably do not affect value, but they affect accounting rates of return and the pricing of the liabilities relative to their carrying value (the price-to-book ratio). The effect of accounting estimates on operating liability leverage is clear: Higher carrying values for operating liabilities result in higher leverage for a given level of operating assets. But the effect on proﬁtability is also clear from leveraging equation (12): While conservative accounting for operating assets increases the ROOA, as modeled in Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Zhang (2000), higher book values of operating liabilities lever up RNOA over ROOA. Indeed, conservative accounting for operating liabilities amounts to leverage of book rates of return. By leveraging equation (13), that leverage effect ﬂows through to shareholder proﬁtability, ROCE.And higher anticipated ROCE implies a higher price-to-book ratio.The potential bias in estimated operating liabilities has opposite effects on current and future proﬁtability. For example, if a ﬁrm books higher deferred revenues, accrued expenses or other operating liabilities, and so increases its operating liability leverage, it reduces its current proﬁtability: Current revenues must be lower or expenses higher. And, if a ﬁrm reports lower operating assets (by a write down of receivables, inventories or other assets, for example), and so increases operating liability leverage, it also reduces current proﬁtability: Current expenses must be higher. But this application of accrual accounting affects future operating income: All else constant, lower current income implies higher future income. Moreover, higher operating liabilities and lower operating assets amount to lower book value of equity. The lower book value is the base for the rate of return for the higher future income. So the analysis of operating liabilities potentially identiﬁes part of the accrual reversal phenomenon documented by Sloan (1996) and interprets it as affecting leverage, forecasts of proﬁtability, and price-to-book ratios.3. Empirical AnalysisThe analysis covers all ﬁrm-year observations on the combined COMPUSTAT (Industry and Research) ﬁles for any of the 39 years from 1963 to 2001 that satisfy the following requirements: (1) the company was listed on the NYSE or AMEX; (2) the company was not a ﬁnancial institution (SIC codes 6000–6999), thereby omitting ﬁrms where most ﬁnancial assets and liabilities are used in operations; (3) the book value of common equity is at least $10 million in 2001 dollars; and (4) the averages of the beginning and ending balance of operating assets, net operating assets and common equity are positive (as balance sheet variables are measured in the analysis using annual averages). These criteria resulted in a sample of 63,527 ﬁrm-year observations.Appendix B describes how variables used in the analysis are measured. One measurement issue that deserves discussion is the estimation of the borrowing cost for operating liabilities. Asmost operating liabilities are short term, we approximate the borrowing rate by the after-tax risk-free one-year interest rate. This measure may understate the borrowing cost if the risk associated with operating liabilities is not trivial. The effect of such measurement error is to induce a negative correlation between ROOA and OLLEV. As we show below, however, even with this potential negative bias we document a strong positive relation between OLLEV and ROOA.4. ConclusionTo ﬁnance operations, ﬁrms borrow in the ﬁnancial markets, creating ﬁnancin g leverage. In running their operations, ﬁrms also borrow, but from customers, employees and suppliers, creating operating liability leverage. Because they involve trading in different types of markets, the two types of leverage may have different value implications. In particular, operating liabilities may reﬂect contractual terms that add value in different ways than ﬁnancing liabilities, and so they may be priced differently. Operating liabilities also involve accrual accounting estimates that may further affect their pricing. This study has investigated the implications of the two types of leverage for proﬁtability and equity value.The paper has laid out explicit leveraging equations that show how shareholder proﬁtability is related to ﬁnancing leverage and operating liability leverage. For operating liability leverage, the leveraging equation incorporates both real contractual effects and accounting effects. As price-to-book ratios are based on expected proﬁtability, this analysis also explains how price-to-book ratios are affected by the two types of leverage. The empirical analysis in the paper demonstrates that operating and ﬁnancing liabilities imply different proﬁtability and are priced differently in the stock market.Further analysis shows that operating liability leverage not only explains differences in proﬁtability in the cross-section but also informs on changes in future proﬁtability from current proﬁtability. Operating liability leverage and changes in operating liability leverage are indicat ors of the quality of current reported proﬁtability as a predictor of future proﬁtability.Our analysis distinguishes contractual operating liabilities from estimated liabilities, but further research might examine operating liabilities in more detail, focusing on line items such as accrued expenses and deferred revenues. Further research might also investigate the pricing of operating liabilities under differing circumstances; for example, where ﬁrms have ‘‘market power’’ over their suppliers.。

企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献

企业偿债能力分析中英文对照外文文献原稿IntroductionAlthough creditors can develop a variety of protective provisions to protect their own interests, but a number of complementary measures are critical to effectively safeguard their interests have to see the company's solvency. Therefore, to improve a company's solvency Liabilities are on the rise. On the other hand, the stronger a company's solvency the easier cash investments required for the project, whose total assets are often relatively low debt ratio, which is the point of the pecking order theory of phase agreement. Similarly, a company's short-term liquidity, the stronger the short-term debt ratio is also lower, long-term solvency, the stronger the long-term debt ratio is also lower .Harris et al. Well, Eriotis etc. as well as empirical research and Underperformance found that the solvency (in the quick ratio and interest coverage ratio, respectively, short-term solvency and long-term solvency) to total debt ratio has significant negative correlation. Taking into account the data collected convenience, this paper represents short-term solvency ratios and to study the long-term solvency by the quick ratio and cash flow impact on the real estate debt capital structure of listed companies.Listed Companies Solvency AnalysisWhen companies need money, the choice of financing preference order, namely in accordance with retained earnings, issuance of bonds, financing order issued shares. According to this theory, strong corporate profitability, retained earnings more For financing first will consider retained earnings. Therefore, the profitability of the total debt ratio should be negatively correlated debt avoidance theory based natural surface that under otherwise identical conditions, a highly profitable company should borrow more debt, because they use avoidance of the need for greater debt, and therefore higher debt ratio. rapid growth of the company's financial leverage without the support, based on this, to select 378 samples from the 500 largest US companies, the researchers found that regardless of whether there is an optimal capital structure, the company's liabilities are directly correlated with growth.Growth is the fundamental guarantee company solvency, so whether short-term loans or long-term loans and creditors, as the company's growth as a positive signal, so the listed companies in recent years of growth, the higher its rate and short-term assets The higher rate of long-term assets and liabilities, total assets and liabilities naturally higher, but the impact on growth of real estate companies listed on a smaller debt ratio (coefficient is small). The risk of firm size and capital structure affect the growth has a similar conclusion, it appears that creditors, especially banks that the company scale is a measure of credit risk is an important consideration index, the greater the company size, the more stable cash flow, bankruptcy it is smaller, the creditors are more willing to throw an olive branch large-scale enterprises. The actual controller of the listed companies category to total debt ratio of the impact factor of a 0.040017, indicating that non-state-controlled listed company's total assets and liabilities higher than the state-owned holding companies. The reason for this phenomenon may be non-state-controlled listed companies pay more attention to control benefits, do not want to dilute their control over equity financing, and therefore more inclined to debt financing, which may also explain the non-state-controlled listed companies better use of financial leverage enterprises bigger and stronger impulses. In addition, the actual control of listed companies category short-term impact on asset-liability ratio is a 2.3 times its impact on long-term debt ratio, which shows the non-state-controlled listed companies prefer to take advantage of short-term debt to expand its operations.Current research on factors affecting capital structure point of view there are many factors in various industries concerned is not the same, according to industry characteristics and particularity, we mainly focus on the following aspects to analyze the factors industry capital structure. The article explained variable - capital structure for the asset-liability ratio, generally refers to the total debt ratio, but for more in-depth study of capital structure of listed companies, the paper from the total debt ratio, short-term assets and liabilities and long-term debt ratio of three angles of Capital structure explanatory.At present, domestic and foreign scholars analyzed factors on capital structure mostly used multiple linear regression, as usual statistical regression function in the form of their choice is often subjective factors, but ordinary regression methods to make function with average resistance, most such functions excellent and objectivity are often difficult toreflect. base stochastic frontier model (Stochastic Frontier) in data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, estimate the effective production frontier using mathematical programming method, namely the experience of frontier production function, overcome DEA method assumes that there is no random error term, the better to reflect the objectivity and optimality ¨J function, currently in the field of economic management, sociology and medicine, began to get more and more applications. Therefore, in this paper, stochastic frontier model data on the capital structure factors listed real estate companies conducted a comprehensive analysis, in order to provide a better scientific basis for the study of the optimal capital structure of real estate enterprises.Listed company's solvency and overall asset-liability ratio was significantly negatively correlated with short-term liquidity has a decisive influence on the short-term asset-liability ratio. Similarly, long-term solvency also has a decisive influence on long-term assets and liabilities. Industry higher total debt ratio particularly high proportion of short-term debt is one of the main business risks, thus increasing solvency of listed companies, especially short-term liquidity (that is, to obtain a stable short-term cash flow). reduce its asset liability ratio and effective risk management choice ROA of listed companies is much greater influence than ROE of asset-liability ratio, and affect the relationship is inconsistent, ROE is higher, the higher the total debt ratio, while the ROA high, the lower the rate of the total assets and liabilities, and short-term liabilities ROA more obvious, this difference is mainly due to the special structure of listed companies due to the nature of the capital, and therefore need to improve the capital structure of listed companies, namely to reduce the total assets and liabilities rate debt structure and the need to reduce the proportion of short-term debt in particular, in order to enhance the company's profitability ROA. growth and company size has a significant positive impact on the capital structure, which is mainly due to the growth of the company's solvency is fundamental, The size of the company is the main indicator to measure the bankruptcy creditor risk. Therefore, listed companies should be radically to grow through continuous growth and development of enterprises, so that the total debt ratio has a high margin of safety, through growth to continue to resolve the financial risk than non-state-owned holding companies controlling more use of financial leverage motivation and apparently relied on short-term liabilities, which may lead to moreserious financial risk especially short-term business risks, so that the non-state-owned holding listed companies should establish more strict risk prevention system.译文。

金融学外文文献英文文献外文翻译担保的作用和个人担保贷款的关系

外文文献原文Material Source: Hitotsubashi University Author: lichiro uesugi Role of collateral and personal guarantees in relationship lending: evidencefrom Japan's SME loan market1 IntroductionA key issue of interest in the recent literature on financial intermediation has been the role of relationship lending. Relationship lending is particularly common in the case of small business lending, because small businesses typically rely on bank loans for a substantial part of their financing needs but also tend to be informationally opaque. An important issue in this context is the use of collateral, which is a common feature of loan contracts between small firms and banks around the world, and a number of theoretical and empirical studies have examined why it is so widespread and how it relates to the incentives for borrowers and lenders and the borrower-lender relationship. For instance, it has been argued that in the presence of information asymmetries between creditors and borrowers, collateral may mitigate the problem of adverse selection (Bester, 1985; 1987) and/or the problem of moral hazard (Bester, 1994; Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991). Collateral also affects the incentives of creditors, who will use it either as a substitute for (Manove, Padilla, and Pagano, 2001) or complement to (Rajan and Winton, 1995; Boot 2000; Longhofer and Santos, 2000) screening and monitoring efforts. Another aspect of collateral that studies have concentrated on is that its presence may depend on the length and intimacy of the relationship between creditors and borrowers (Boot, 2000; Boot and Thakor, 1994; Sharpe, 1990). Existing empirical research has yet to reach decisive conclusions about the nature of these relationships.This paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature on collateral using a unique firm-level data set of the small and medium sized enterprise (SME) loan market in Japan. Explicitly differentiating physical collateral (such as real estate) and personal guarantees by business representatives, we investigate how the use of collateral and personal guarantees affects the incentives of borrowers, lenders, and the relationship between them. More specifically, we examine the following three issues. First, we examine whether riskier borrowers are more likely to be required to provide collateral or personal guarantees. Second, we investigate how collateral and personal guarantees affect banks’ monitoring of borrowers. Third, we examine thecorrelation between the use of collateral and personal guarantees on the one hand and the closeness of borrower-lender relationships on the other.The data set we employ is based mainly on the “Survey of the Financial Environment” (SFE) conducted by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency of Japan in October 2002. In order to focus on firms that mostly depend on bank loans for their financing, we limit the sample to firms satisfying the legal definition of an SME in Japan. We then combine the SFE data for each SME with information on their main bank obt ained from the bank’s financial statements in order to control for lender characteristics as well. Furthermore, to control for the effect of government credit guarantees on collateral and personal guarantees, in the main analysis of this paper we exclude from the sample all firms that enjoyed any form of government credit guarantee.As a result of this screening process, we end up with a sample of 1,702 firms. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We find that firms’ riskiness does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that collateral is used. Thus, we cannot find firm evidence that the use of collateral mitigates moral hazard. We find, however, that banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively, and that borrowers who have a long-term relationship with their main bank are more likely to pledge collateral. These findings suggest that collateral is complementary to relationship lending. In contrast, the complementarity between relationship lending and personal guarantees is weaker.As far as we know, this is the first empirical study that systematically examines the role of collateral and personal guarantees in Japan’s SME loan market. The two main contributions of the paper are as follows. First, given that Japan is generally considered to have a relationship-based financial system in which the relationship-lender, the main bank, plays a central role in corporate financing (Rajan and Zingales, 2003), the study helps to improve our understanding of the role of collateral in relationship lending and complements existing studies that focus on the United States and Europe. Second, and more importantly, by distinguishing collateral and personal guarantees, the study detects an important role of collateral in relationship lending that has not been remarked on much before. As we argue below, although a typical SME in Japan has a long-term relationship with its main bank, it actually engages in transactions with several banks, which is not common in other countries. A possible corollary of this is that because of the informationalfree-rider problem it creates, this practice may reduce the main bank’s incentive to screen and monitor borrowers. Since collateral defines the order of seniority among creditors, using collateral may mitigate the free-rider problem and enhance the main bank’s screening and monitoring. This incentive effect for the main bank becomes tenuous for personal guarantees, because personal guarantees do not define the seniority among creditors. Thus, our work provides empirical evidence on how collateral affects relationship lenders’ incentives, and complements previous studies that focus on the problem of borrower incentives (moral hazard and adverse selection).The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our empirical hypotheses which are based on previous theoretical models and empirical research. Section 3 describes the data and variables that are used in the paper, and explains our empirical model.Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis, and Section 5 concludes.2 Empirical hypotheses2.1 Borrower riskinessMuch of the empirical literature in this field examines theoretical predictions of asymmetric information models on the relationship between risk and collateral. If the bank cannot discern borrowers’ riskiness (hidden information), then collateral may serve as a screening device to distinguish between borrowers and to mitigate the adverse selection problem (Bester, 1985). This follows from the observation that a lower-risk borrower has a greater incentive to pledge collateral than a risky borrower, because of his lower probability of failure and loss of collateral. Hence, the lower-risk borrower will choose the contract with collateral.On the other hand, if the lender can observe the ex-ante risk, but there are information asymmetries with regard to actions taken by the borrower after the loan is extended, collateral potentially provides an incentive to mitigate moral hazard. Thus, opposite to models focusing on hidden information, those concentrating on hidden action suggest that it is observably riskier borrowers that will pledge collateral, because collateral induces more effort by the borrower (Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991), or reduces the incentives of strategic default (Bester, 1994).Because our data base only contains measures of firms’ observed riskiness(namely, credit scores), we couch our first empirical hypothesis as follows: Hypothesis 1 (H1): The use of collateral is higher among observably higher-risk (low credit score) borrowers if the lender requires collateral in order to mitigate the extent of moral hazard.Alternatively, if borrowers pledge collateral as a signal of their unobserved high credit quality, then there is negative or no relationship between the use of collateral and the credit score.Consistent with the theory of moral hazard, most existing empirical studies, including Berger and Udell (1990; 1995), have found a positive relationship between collateral and borrowers’ ex-ante risk. Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006) directly test the adverse selection and moral hazard hypotheses by separating ex-ante and ex-post measures of borrower riskiness, namely defaults prior to and after the loan origination. Their results suggest that although observed riskiness increases the likelihood that collateral is used, there is also a negative association between collateral and default after the loan has been granted, which is consistent with the adverse selection argument.It should be noted that theories of collateral as a solution to moral hazard and/or adverse selection problems assume collateral is external to the firm.Unfortunately, our measure of the incidence of collateral does not distinguish between firm (inside) collateral and personal (outside) collateral. Hence, throughout our analysis, we will assume that collateral is mostly inside, but allow for the fact that there may also be some outside collateral. As for personal guarantees, they clearly represent outside collateral.2.2 Screening and monitoring by the lenderRecent research on collateral also discusses how collateral affects lenders’ incentives with regard to information production, that is, the screening of borr owers’ quality and the monitoring of their performance. These theories of the effect of collateral on lenders’ incentives apply to both inside and outside collateral. Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001), for instance, argue that, from banks’ point of view, collateral can be considered as a substitute for the evaluation of the actual risk of a borrower. Thus, banks that are highly protected by collateral may perform less screening of the projects they finance than is socially optimal.However, several theoretical studies argue that collateral may complement lenders’ screening and monitoring activities. In the presence of other claimants,lenders’ incentive to monitor borrowers is reduced due to the informational free-rider problem. In order to enhance le nders’ incentive to monitor, loan contracts must be structured in a way that makes lenders’ payoff sensitive to borrowers’ financial health. Rajan and Winton (1995) argue that collateral may serve as a contractual device to increase lenders’ monitoring incentive, because collateral is likely to be effective only if its value can be monitored. Moreover, the use of collateral as an incentive will be more extensive when the value of such collateral (as in the case of accounts receivable and inventories, for example) depreciates rapidly if business conditions deteriorate, than when the value of collateral is relatively stable (as in the case of, e.g., real estate). Longhofer and Santos (2000) argue that collateral serves as an incentive for information production by the principal lender in the presence of several creditors, because taking collateral is effective in making its loan senior to other creditors’ claims. Thus, the bank that provides collateralized loan is able to reap the benefits of screening and monitoring activities. Note that this argument does not straightforwardly apply to personal guarantees, because, in general, personal guarantees do not define seniority among several creditors.As we have a proxy variable for the intensity of monitoring by the principal lender, our second hypothesis for the empirical analysis is as follows: Hypothesis 2 (H2): The use of collateral decreases with the intensity of monitoring by the principal lender if collateral reduces lenders’ incentive to exert effort in loan management. Alternatively, if collateral serves as an incentive device to induce monitoring efforts by the principal lender in the presence of other claimants, then we expect a positive relationship between the use of collateral and monitoring intensity.To our knowledge, there are only two existing studies that empirically assess whether the use of collateral and personal guarantees substitute for or complement screening and monitoring by the lender. Examining Spanish loan data, Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006) found that banks with a lower level of expertise (smaller banks and savings banks) in small business lending use collateral more intensively. This is consistent with the theory that collateral is used as a substitute for the evaluation of credit risk. The present study complements these works investigating the relationship between collateral and screening by focusing on the relationship between collateral and monitoring using Japanese firm data. Our proxy variable for monitoring intensity is the frequency of document submissions tothe main bank.2.3 Relationship between the borrower and the lenderThe existing literature on relationship lending provides conflicting predictions on how the strength of the relationship between borrower and lender affects the likelihood of collateral being pledged. By establishing a solid relationship with the borrower, the lender learns about the hidden attributes and actions of the borrower, thus reducing information asymmetries. Hence, the terms of loan contracts may become more favorable to the borrower if the firm has transactions with a specific relationship lender over a long period of time and thus establishes trust, resulting in a lower likelihood of collateral being pledged (Boot and Thakor, 1994). However, a solid relationship may become detrimental to the borrower if the bank exerts its information monopoly by charging higher interest rates or requiring more collateral (Sharpe, 1990). If such a hold-up problem is indeed common, then there is likely to be a positive correlation between the strength of a relationship and the use of collateral. It should be noted that these theories assume that the collateral is outside collateral. In addition, collateral can also be used as an incentive device in mitigating the soft-budget constraint problem in relationship lending (Boot, 2000). For example, consider the case where a borrower in difficulty asks the bank for more credit and reduced interest obligations in order to avoid default. Although a transaction-based lender would not lend to such a borrower, a relationship lender that has already made loans might accept the borrower’s request in the hope of recovering a previous loan. However, once the borrower realizes he can renegotiate the loan contract relatively easily, he has an incentive to misbehave ex ante (the soft budget problem). In such cases, collateral will increase the ex-post bargaining power of the lender and hence reduce the extent of the soft-budget constraint problem, because collateral makes the value of the lender’s claim less sensitive to the borrower’s total net worth. These theoretical considerations apply to inside collateral as well as outside collateral and lead to the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 3 (H3): Borrowers that establish a solid relationship with their principal lender are less likely to use collateral if the relationship reduces information asymmetries and enhances mutual trust between the borrower and the lender. Alternatively, borrowers with a strong relationship with their principal lender are more likely to use collateral if the effects of the hold-up problem or the mitigation of the soft-budget constraint problem dominate.外文文献译文资料来源: 日本一桥大学作者：lichiro uesugi担保的作用和个人担保贷款的关系：来自日本的中小企业贷款市场的证据在中小企业的贷款中关系贷款非常的普遍，小企业的贷款主要是依靠银行融资，但是小企业却存在财务不透明的问题。

企业负债外文文献翻译

The effects of debt structure on firm strategy and performance
There are many aspects of a firms' strategic behaviour. We examinetwo important dimensions: whether it chooses to diversify or not and how much it spends on advertising expenditures. Similarly, there are various ways that firm performance can be measured-in this paper, we look only at profitability. We begin by discussing our findings with respect to firm diversification strategies.
The Debt Market
In this section, we describe the nature of debt markets in India. We also provide a snapshot of debt structure of Indian firms, using the data-set that we have specially compiled to analyse the determinants and effects of debt structure.
Diversification
Several arguments exist on why managers derive private benefits from diversification. First, managers derive a certain degree of power and prestige in managing a larger firm (Jensen,1986;Stultz1990).Second, managerial compensation increases with firm size. Third, diversification may reduce the risk of managers' undiversified personal portfolios (Amihud &Lev,1981).Finally, diversification may make managers indispensable to the firm (Shleifer &Vishny,1989).

中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Financing of SMEsJan Bartholdy, Cesario MateusOriginally Published in“Financing of SMEs”.London business review.AbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking OrderTheory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financialintermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers.Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view offinancial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier maybe able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangibleassets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the e xpected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, thatproposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。

融资问题外文翻译文献

融资问题外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstract ：This article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are someconcise suggestions be given to rectify the companies’ prefer ence to equity fund. Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Ma ny researchers usually analyze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed companies’ financial activities betray to western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference to equity fund According to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is theturn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-free rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and using fund, we can call it fund cost. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculat ion, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listedcompanies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then the ir position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies and preference to equity fund Static Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies’ value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower convertibility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincidewith the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small change in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which have excellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM,Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financia l distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equity fundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstanding shares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally higher than t he average level of all thelisted companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevanc e to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes of financing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.译文：中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要：本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。

中小企业融资外文文献翻译

外文文献：Financing of SMEsAbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ managementand shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for pricediscrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discussesseveral ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to theissuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the ind ustry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delive ry value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.2.3. Expensive trade credit and other loansAfter other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade credits. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can havereputational costs and it may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the same goods and services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again, the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.中文译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。

融资租赁中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献中英文资料外文翻译附录1：（原文）The Determinants of the Leasing of Small Companies1, international for small and medium-sized companies were discussedAt the beginning of the 20th century, appear with ford motor as a representative of the mass production methods, people believed in the enterprise of large-scale business is the trend of The Times. But last of the twentieth century ago in economics leading view also think big enterprise is efficient, the scale become the pronoun of efficiency, enterprise's economic development of large-scale become direction. Yet the century in the 1970s, a kind of traditional ideas beganchallenged. In 1973, the British scholar schumacher (E.F.S chumacher) published a small is a good book. Quickly and has caused a great echo. The author thinks that the western countries specialization, large-scale production pattern looks is solved "production problem", but actually is an illusion. This mode of production caused economic inefficiency, environmental pollution, resource exhaustion, and fostered many social problems. Therefore, must choose again a development pattern or way. Schumacher pointed out the development of large-scale and automation error, advocated the development of small and medium-sized intermediate technology. He thinks. To make the society "enduring" development, must go miniaturization, among the development of roads, especially to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and "intermediate technology". British prime minister Tony Blair also put forward by 2005 to the development of small businesses of British construction become heaven ".2, small and medium-sized enterprises in China's economy contributionSmall and medium-sized enterprises is an important means of technical innovation. Before world war ii, the century with different since the 1960s and 1970s gradually arisen on information technology and biotechnology as the core of the new technology revolution is mainly in small and medium-sized enterprises, and at least in lots of small and medium-sized enterprises tody develops. In the middle of the century ago, rich economies in the proportion ofsmall and medium-sized enterprises has been declining trend; In the middle of the century especially after the 1960s and 1970s, and small and medium-sized enterprises and started mass development (see Storey, D.J., 1994). This suggests that small and medium-sized enterprise is to adapt to this new trend of technological progress. According to statistics, so far, small and medium-sized enterprises in China has more than 800 thousand, accounts for the enterprise 99% of all. In since 1960s of rapid economic growth, industrial output value of new 76% above is created by small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprise output and realize profits tax have accounted for 60% of the national respectively and 407., in recent years in the total export, small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for about 60 percent. "no doubt, small and medium-sized enterprises has become the new growth point of boosting the national economy, promoting China's economic boom is the main driving force of uplink. About smes in the country's economy, the importance of roughly boils down to:First, provide employment opportunity, absorbing surplus labor force. Compared with large enterprises and small and medium sized enterprises are using more labor-intensive technology, so the development of small and medium-sized enterprises can help alleviate current employment pressure. In fact, although small and medium-sized enterprise role far more than that, but it is small and medium-sized enterprises of this feature, to medium and small-sized enterprisesfor people increasingly attention. Our country the industry and commerce registration of small and medium-sized enterprises, more than 1,500 million, accounts for the total enterprises ninety-nine percent, to be town provides seventy-five percent of the jobs.Second, create the mainstay of GDP. According to the above information: small and medium-sized enterprises in the national industrial output account for about 60, realize profits tax of up to 40%. Table 3-1 for our independent accounting industrial enterprises in 1995-2000 some data, including various types of enterprise of gross industrial output and the proportion of total assets, value added of industry and the proportion of total assets and profit tax amount to total assets ratio (namely fund LiShuiLv). We can find that, regardless of in the output value on the proportions still in proportion of small and medium-sized enterprises are superior to large enterprises. This shows that every unit fund of small and medium-sized enterprises than large enterprise creates more social wealth. But, in addition to 2000, small and medium-sized enterprises outside the capital LiShuiLv below large enterprises. So, in proportion with capital value LiShuiLv appears between some contradictions. Because the latter reflects the former distribution relationship, this is because of hard to get the bank low-interest loans to small and medium-sized enterprises to use capital interest of proportion of those enterprises.Lease financing background is socialized production developed market economydevelopment to a higher level, industrial products, developed countries and its relative surplus of industrial capital seek and develop new market, therefore in the investigation of its function and advantages, cannot be separated from the historical background. Only understand this historical background, can answer financing lease why produced in the 1950s and to worldwide development, rather than creating and developing in other time periods. Financing lease improved social reproduction pace, acceleration of capital goods circulation and consumption, drive investment demand and the fellowship demand expanded. Eventually have a promotion aggregate demand growth, and thus to promote full employment and economic development.3. Move investment demandBritish lease experts, the bott who specially in the world on the lease yearbook of literary theory and the effect. He said: "in fact, some governments are shifting in full-scale lease to stimulate domestic investment. They moved to increase employment desire from an" '. He in investigating the German and British examples. Conclusion: lease industry in ensuring the role of main domestic investment was profound. Governments also encourage leasing company for capital equipment finance to expand exports, in order to improve their producers in the international market competition in position. Lease financing are able to expand domestic demand, increase employment in plays a unique role, reason mainly has two sides, the first, the financing lease of the equipment suppliedwhatever is located where requires some personnel, this undoubtedly will increase employment; Second, governments for lease provides preferential tax reduced leasing companies and enterprise's financing cost, thus make many enterprises want to use lease form to carry on an investment, investment increase is apparent.4 our experienceOur country economy in the 1990s, has maintained a strong growth momentum. During this decade, there are eight years is the Clinton administration office. China's President economic commission chairman is 2001 Nobel Prize winner Joseph. SiDiGeLiCi as he died, but also by the Nobel Prize winner, lemon, the author of the article George gram rove lady janet "Aaron, which are both as a new Keynesian representative figures, they advocate information asymmetry theory that completely on market economic regulation is not solve all problems. As a free economy does not guarantee during the trade information symmetry, causing some areas of adverse selection (vicious circle) and moral hazard (credit crisis), this shows that our country was inclined to conditionally government intervention and control the market. Our country government to use tax and interest rate leverage to regulate the market, with investment policy caused investment direction. These again and lease have internal relations. Our so-called tuyuhun equipment leasing the financing lease of by the financing involving rates, strong city in the policy has led to $rising interest rates to leasebring the opportunity of the development. Our tax on rental industry has certain preferential, while rental industry is more relying on talent advantage and control the ownership of the lease objects legal status, make full use of our country to encourage investment preferential policies, and designed the system "lease", such as: "leveraged lease", "tax leasing", etc in accord with the government encourages investment direction lease modes, enlarged policy efforts, promote the economic development of our country. From our lease data can be found in a decade ago our lease permeability (leasing forehead occupies equipment investment proportion) is 32%, lease the forehead is $120 billion, after 10 years (1999), the leasing of statistical data, the lease 34.4% permeability is the forehead is 2260 billion dollars. Lease lease frontal doubled. Its economic permeability (rental amount of GDP) 30% of the proportion of GDP of China accounts for almost a third. Lease with the China economic double forehead, but no major permeability changes show that lease is not omnipotent, just a economic levers, from our own experience, lease for economic development in the ability to move around." Lease has so magical function, it mainly in the operation of the real rights and use "separation" concept in action, property and rights separation gave lease activities to enlarge government control of the will, become market between government and market between effective macro-control measures. From since 9/11, our country and take several rate cuts and tax adjustment policy, as well as expand access to war, lay particular stresson government input control economy components.Lease financing background is socialized production developed market economy development to a higher level, industrial products, developed countries and its relative surplus of industrial capital seek and develop new market, therefore in the investigation of its function and advantages, cannot be separated from the historical background. Only understand this historical background, can answer financing lease why produced in the 1950s and to worldwide development, rather than creating and developing in other time periods. Financing lease improved social reproduction pace, acceleration of capital goods circulation and consumption, drive investment demand and the fellowship demand expanded. Eventually have a promotion aggregate demand growth, and thus to promote full employment and economic development.附录2：（译文）小型公司融资租赁的决定因素l、国际对中小型公司的探讨20世纪初，出现以福特汽车为代表的大规模生产方式，人们相信企业的大规模经营是大势所趋。

国外负债经营的分析【外文翻译】

外文翻译Foreign debt management analysisMaterial Source: Women’s Consultation Briefing PaperAuthor: Gail Lerner, Rebecca Desiree Lozada and Viola TorresThere is a strong consensus in the international community that the debt burden is a serious barrier to the creation of any meaningful development strategy. The Secretary General’s report of earlier this year rightly identifies debt as a significant obstacle to development in low-income, middle-income and transition economy countries. It recognizes that debt financing ought to be an integral part of a country's development effort and not a hindrance.The foreign debt is growing exponentially. Debt relief continues to be an exercise of power and control through the conditionalities imposed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) impose unacceptable conditions on debtor nations and drain them of precious resources. Present debt-management proposals such as those devised by creditors—the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, to include the Enhanced HIPC—offer too little, too late, to too few countries. Because these are designed by creditors, their purpose is debt collection, not debt relief. Both lenders and borrowers must take responsibility for the debt crisis. It is unjust that creditors dominate the debt relief process. Unless present debt-management plans are transformed into effective, equitable, development-oriented and durable debt release opportunities, the devastating cycle of debt accumulation will repeat itself, condemning millions more people to suffering.Debtor governments are obliged to prioritize debt repayments over spending on health, education, sanitation, clean water and other social needs. This undermines accountability by debtor governments to the people, which in turn erodes local democratic institutions. Debt and loan negotiations are always conducted in secret between elites in the North and elites in the South, fostering corruption.Finally, if the debt problem is to be resolved in a way that contributes in an integral way to sustainable community, attention must be paid to how concurrent channels of development financing contribute towards the creation and expansion of external debt. For example, attention needs to be given to how existing trade andinvestment agreements might inhibit rather than enhance revenue-generating opportunities for developing countries. Vigilance needs to be maintained so that development efforts are not financed through modalities, instruments or mechanisms that create additional burdensome debt.International fora of civil society convened by the international Jubilee campaigns call for the cancellation of all illegitimate debts of all Southern countries. The prevailing opinion is that there are several categories of illegitimate debt, which can be identified as follows:1. Debts that are illegitimate to repay, that is, they cannot be serviced without causing harm to people and communities.2. Debts incurred by illegitimate debtors and creditors acting illegitimately which includes both “odious debt” (that is any debt incurred not for the needs or interests of the state but to strengthen a despotic regime that represses its own population).3. Debts incurred for illegitimate uses, such as debts for projects which were never built or did not befit the people as they were intended; debts contracted for fraudulent purposes;4. Debts incurred with illegitimate terms, included debts incurred at usurious interest rates; debts that became unpayable as a result of external factors (unilateral increase in interest rates) over which debtors have no control.Caught as they are at the divide between the productive and reproductive spheres of life, women have borne the full impact of debt dependence, adherence to SAPs and underdevelopment. In their multitude roles of worker, caregiver, home manager, wife and mother, women’s time and energies are stretched to breaking point as they strive to enable the family to survive economic crises.Instead of perpetuating this set-up, the Financing for Development process must work for systemic, structural and policy changes and programmes that will free countries from the debt trap, prevent the repetition of these problems and promote political and economic democracy and equity, gender equality, popular empowerment and sustainable communities.From this framework and towards this end, we recommend that the international community ensure the:* Immediate cancellation of 100% of the debts of low-income countries, immediate debt relief for severely indebted middle income countries, and cancellation of the illegitimate debts of all Southern countries.* Active participation of civil society in decision-making processes that determine the allocation of funds from new loans and debt relief.* Elimination of any conditionalities attached to new loans and debt relief that perpetuate indebtedness, as articulated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the enhanced HIPC initiatives, starting with heavily indebted poor countries in Africa.* Introduction of a new, independent and transparent arbitration process for negotiating and agreeing upon international debt cancellation which ensures that losses and gains are equally shared along with the introduction of ethical lending and borrowing policies to prevent future recurrence of the debt crisis.Debt financing involves any money that a business borrows in order to run operations. Also referred to as loans, it can be a long-term or short-term solution to needed cash flow. There are various options for obtaining the money a business may need to operate effectively.For any viable business, loans are available. Terms may vary, but every loan is set to be repaid with interest at a future date. This cash flow option can be attractive to business owners because they do not have to sacrifice any ownership interests in their business. Furthermore, the interest on borrowed money may be tax-deductible. Finally, the costs are relatively fixed, and therefore predictable in planning for future business expenses.When looking for a short- or long-term cash flow solution, a business may find that a loan is the most viable option. By definition, short-term debt financing provides money needed for day-to-day business operations with plans for repayment in less than one year. Day-to-day business operation needs may include purchasing inventory or supplies or paying employee wages. Short-term financing is also referred to as operating loans, and can include lines of credit or credit cards.On the other hand, long-term loans provide greater amounts of money that are paid back over a longer period of time. A business may use long-term debt financing to purchase equipment, land, buildings or machinery. This money then is used to purchase business assets in which the scheduled loan repayment and the usefulness of the asset extends longer than one year.A business can obtain money from different sources depending on its needs and financial situation. Banks and credit unions are traditional sources for borrowing money and offer a variety of options especially for businesses. If a business does not yet have established credit, or its credit is poor, it still may be able to get the moneyneeded through a commercial finance company, which offers loans with higher interest rates to high-risk borrowers. Also, commercial financial institutions are available for loaning money, as well as for providing funds for inventory or equipment purchases.Debt financing can be a useful tool for a business in need of additional cash flow. However, it is meant to be a means to an end, namely of generating more money for a business in order to grow it. Business owners should try to avoid falling into the revolving trap of getting their business into an unmanageable state of debt. Remember that "he that loveth silver shall not be satisfied with silver; nor he that loveth abundance with increase" .译文国外负债经营的分析资料来源：联合国妇女咨询简报作者：Gail Lerner, Rebecca Desiree Lozada and Viola Torres在当今国际社会有一个强烈的共识：债务负担对制定有意义的发展战略是一个严重的障碍。

外文文献(了解债务管理)

Understanding Debt ManagementEddie BelcherPreparation Date: 2 November 2009This document provides some additional information to help you understand the financial planning concepts discussed in the SOA in relation to debt management.Important informationThis document has been published by GWM Adviser Services Limited AFSL 230692 , registered address 105-153 Miller St North Sydney NSW 2060, ABN 96 002 071 749 for use in conjunction with Statements of Advice prepared by its authorized representatives and the representatives or author representatives of National Australia Bank Limited, Godfrey Pembroke Limited, Apogee Financial Planning Limited and Australian Financial Services Licensees with whom it has a commercial services agreement.This document contains general information about the benefits, costs and risks associated with certain product classes and strategies. It is designed for use in conjunction with a Statement of Advice that takes into account the circumstances and objectives of an individual. Before making a commitment to purchase or sell a financial product, you should ensure that you have obtained an individual Statement of Advice .As legislation may change you should ensure you have the most recent version of this document.How to read this documentManaging your finances to meet your day to day requirements as well as your long-term goals can be a complex task.There are all sorts of issues you need to consider such as taxation, legislation, protecting your wealth and assets, associated costs and the inherent risks of investment. When undertaking a financial plan it is important that you understand how these issues will impact on you and what you should expect over time.Your financial adviser will provide you with a Statement of Advice (SOA) which sets out the details of the advice and how it will meet your goals and objectives. This document provides some additional information to help you understand the financial planning concepts discussed in the SOA in relation to debt management. It is very important that you read this document to help you understand the benefits of the strategies recommended to you, and the associated costs and risks.Please contact your Adviser if you do not understand anything, or needfurther information or clarification.Debt ManagementBelow is a brief description of the main types of loan facilities, features and risks. Fixed Rate LoanFixed rate loans protect you against the risk of an interest rate rise by fixing the interest rate applicable to all, or a portion of, your loan for a set period of time.If interest rates rise you will have the security of knowing that the interest rate on the fixed portion of your loan and your regular repayments will not change until the end of the fixed period.Factors to be aware of:• Fixed interest rate• loans are generally higher than variable rate loans.• Variable interest rates may fall during the term of your fixed interest rate term.• Fixed rate loans generally have limited features, and restrictions are applied on additional repayments, which may prevent you from accelerating the repayment of your loan.• Early payout fees usually apply to fixed rate loans.Variable LoanVariable rate loans have an interest rate that may change. Therefore, minimum repayments may vary with changing interest rates. Generally, variable rate loans have a lower interest rate than fixed rate loans. Variable loans also have greater features than fixed loans, such as the ability to make additional repayments, vary payment frequency, redraw facility, offset facility and portability.Factors to be aware of:• If interest rates rise, your variable rate loan and repayments are also likely to rise.• You may be paying a higher interest rate than needed, if you are not using all the features of your variable rate loan.Using a Redraw FacilityA redraw facility allows extra funds paid into the loan (above the minimum requirement) to remain available to you upon application to your lender. Additional repayments made directly into the loan result in less interest being charged and a reduction in the term of your loan.Factors to be aware of:• Depending on your loan contract, there may be fees payable and some restrictions on minimum amounts that can be redrawn.• If you make additional repayments dire ctly into an investment loan and then redraw these funds for a non-income producing purpose, the interest expenses will not be fully deductible.Using a 100% Offset AccountA 100% offset account can be operated as your normal transaction account , ensuring that you retain complete flexibility and access to your funds. It is a separate account to your loan, however, when your interest is calculated, the funds held in this account are ’offset’ against your loan, effectively reducing your interest liability.Using an offset account to its optimum involves keeping all of your income and any savings in this account for as long as possible. This effectively minimises the daily balance owing used to calculate your loan interest and as a result can also reduce the term of your loan.If you have an investment loan, there is an advantage in making additional repayments into an offset account rather than making the repayments directly into the investment loan. While in both cases you will reduce the effective loan balance and save interest, you are able to withdraw funds from the offset account whilst maintaining full deductibility of interest on your loan.Factors to be aware of:You may have to pay a fee or higher interest rates for this facility.Debt management strategiesDebt, or borrowed money, can play an important role in helping you to achieve your lifestyle goals and objectives. However, it is important that it be managed and structured effectively to minimise borrowing costs.The way debt is managed may depend on whether it is considere d “efficient” or “inefficient”.Efficient Debt (Tax Deductible)In most cases, debt used to purchase assets that produce income (forexample, a portfolio of shares or an investment property) qualify for a tax deduction in relation to interest costs. This form of debt is considered to be “efficient”.Inefficient Debt(Non Tax Deductible)Loans taken out to purchase services or assets which do not generate income (for example, to purchase a principal residence, a car or fund a holiday) do not qualify for a tax deduction in relation to the interest costs. In these cases the debt is considered to be inefficient from a wealth creation perspective and is often draining on your long-term wealth accumulation capacity when not managed properly.Wherever possible you should try to accelerate the repayment of yourinefficient debt. Outlined below are common debt reduction strategies. Reducing Inefficient DebtBy accelerating the reduction of your inefficient debt, you can:• Reduce your total in terest payments and reduce the duration of yourinefficient debts.• Increase the equity you have in your home, which can be potentially used as security to borro w for investment purposes later on.• Potentially provide you with more cash flow at the end of the loan term that can either be used to repay other debt or to make additional investments.There are various debt management strategies that can be used to reduce inefficient debt. We have listed some common strategies below.Increasing Your Regular RepaymentsIncreasing the size of regular loan repayments involves transferring surplus cash into your loan on a regular basis. This will result in a reduction in the interest charged and principal owing on the loan.Factors to be aware of:• Loss of access to • your funds, unless the payments are made into an offset account or redraw facility.• Many fixed interest rate loans limit additional repayments and may also charge a fee.• By reducing the term of a fixed interest loan, you may incur early payout fees. Increasing Payment Frequency on Your LoanAs interest on your loan is calculated daily on your outstanding loan balance, the longer the period between your payments, the higher the average daily loan balance, and the greater the interest charged. More frequent loan repayments will result in less interest being charged and may result in a reduced loan term. Making Additional Lump Sum PaymentsMaking an additional lump sum repayment involves a one-off cashpayment into your loan.The benefit of this strategy is that you will effectively be earning an after-tax return equivalent to your loan interest rate. It is unlikely that you could obtain an after-tax return as high as this from other investments with the same level of risk. Factors to be aware of:• Loss of access to your funds, unless the payment is made into an offsetaccount or redraw facility.Utilising a Credit Card Effectively in Conjunction with Your LoanYou can retain access to additional loan repayments through the use of an offset account. Therefore, an effective debt management strategy is to take advantage of your mortgage offset account and the interest free period on your credit card. Instead of using your cash to pay your everyday expenses (and as a result taking those funds away from your offset account), using your credit card leaves your cash in your offset account longer, reducing the effective balance of your loan and the daily interest that accumulates.It is important to note that this strategy will only be effective if you pay your credit card debt within the interest free period each and every month. This can be paid via a transfer from your offset account or from other cash flow.Factors to be aware of:• It is important that you pay the entire amount owing on your creditcard each month within the interest free period.Consolidating Your DebtA simple strategy to lower your overall interest rate and more easily manage yourdebt is to consolidate all debts into one loan that provides a lower interest rate and features to help you repay your inefficient debt faster.Loan consolidation will save you interest where your new repayment and loan term are at least equal to your total current loan repayments and loan terms. Otherwise, you could be converting your short-term debts into longer-term debt and be paying more interest in the long run.Factors to be aware of:• Early termination fees may apply to your existing loan(s).• The interest rate on your new loan may be higher than rate than yourexisting loan(s).• Loan consolidation can significantly increase your total interest costs, if you make smaller repayments over a longer time.• Application fees and stamp duty may be applied to your new loan.Debt RecyclingIn some cases, it may be appropriate to consider replacing inefficient debt with more efficient debt that can be used to create wealth tax effectively. This strategy is known as Debt Recycling but should only be undertaken after a thorough analysis of your financial situation.Debt recycling can be an effective strategy to accumulate wealth over thelong-term. It is a process of using surplus capital or cash flow to reduce inefficient debt and then replacing it with efficient debt in the form of an investment loan. The investment loan proceeds are then invested to form part of your investment portfolio.The inefficient debt is eventually extinguished and an investment loan with fully tax deductible interest remains.There is no tax benefit available on debt used for personal purposes, but a tax deduction is available on the interest expense on investment loans, where the loan is used to purchase income producing assets. Debt recycling therefore results in a more tax efficient outcome and wealth accumulation benefits through the accumulation of an investment portfolio. You should note that the investment loan would need to repaid at some point in time. To implement this strategy, your tolerance for risk should allow you to feel comfortable with borrowing to invest. There are two ways debt recycling can be undertaken:Lump Sum Debt RecyclingIf you have available capital such as bank account savings, this can be used to repay any inefficient debt, such as a home mortgage or personal loan. An investment loan can then be taken for the same amount and be used to invest in an investment portfolio.Regular Debt RecyclingIf you have regular surplus income, this can be used to increase the regular repayments on your inefficient debt, such as your home mortgage or personal loan. An investment loan can then be increased by a corresponding amount and the proceeds used to invest in an investment portfolio.了解债务管理埃迪贝尔彻发表日期：2009年11月2日这份文件提供了一些额外的信息，讨论了有关债务管理的SOA，以帮助您了解金融规划概念。

关于融资的外文文献一篇

Consistent with the growing use of CVC by established companies, recent empirical research in Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) provides evidence that CVC creates ﬁrm value, especially when ﬁrms undertake CVC to exploit new technologies. In addition, Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a), (2005b) ﬁnd that CVC investment increases the innovation rates of established ﬁrms signiﬁcantly. Similarly, Chemmanur and Loutskina (2008) document that CVC represents an important source of ﬁnancing for the development of innovative technologies by young and risky entrepreneurial ﬁrms that would not have received ﬁnancing from other sources, such as independent venture capital (IVC).
1291
1292 Journal of Financial and QuantitБайду номын сангаасtive Analysis
projects, outsourced to independent ﬁrms specializing in R&D.1 Moreover, some ﬁrms prefer to undertake their R&D investment outside of ﬁrm boundaries in collaboration with specialized ﬁrms yet still provide ﬁnancing for the project from their own internal funds in the form of corporate venture capital (CVC). Over the last decade, companies such as Microsoft, Intel, and Merck have undertaken substantial amounts of CVC investment in collaboration with external start-ups where they reduced the start-ups’ need to raise ﬁnancing from external capital markets and independent venture capitalists (Chesbrough (2002)). In 2001, more than 400 established ﬁrms participated in 2,123 CVC deals worth of $16.5 billion, representing 15% of all venture capital investment. In the ﬁrst 6 months of 2007, CVC investments reached near-record levels, with ﬁrms investing $1.3bn in 390 deals—the highest level since 2001 (National Venture Capital Association).

企业偿债能力分析外文文献

外文文献原稿和译文原稿IntroductionAlthough creditors can develop a variety of protective provisions to protect their own interests, but a number of complementary measures are critical to effectively safeguard their interests have to see the company's solvency. Therefore, to improve a company's solvency Liabilities are on the rise. On the other hand, the stronger a company's solvency the easier cash investments required for the project, whose total assets are often relatively low debt ratio, which is the point of the pecking order theory of phase agreement. Similarly, a company's short-term liquidity, the stronger the short-term debt ratio is also lower, long-term solvency, the stronger the long-term debt ratio is also lower .Harris et al. Well, Eriotis etc. as well as empirical research and Underperformance found that the solvency (in the quick ratio and interest coverage ratio, respectively, short-term solvency and long-term solvency) to total debt ratio has significant negative correlation. Taking into account the data collected convenience, this paper represents short-term solvency ratios and to study the long-term solvency by the quick ratio and cash flow impact on the real estate debt capital structure of listed companies.Listed Companies Solvency AnalysisWhen companies need money, the choice of financing preference order, namely in accordance with retained earnings, issuance of bonds, financing order issued shares. According to this theory, strong corporate profitability, retained earnings more For financing first will consider retained earnings. Therefore, the profitability of the total debt ratio should be negatively correlated debt avoidance theory based natural surface that under otherwise identical conditions, a highly profitable company should borrow more debt, because they use avoidance of the need for greater debt, and therefore higher debt ratio. rapid growth of the company's financial leverage without the support, based on this, toselect 378 samples from the 500 largest US companies, the researchers found that regardless of whether there is an optimal capital structure, the company's liabilities are directly correlated with growth.Growth is the fundamental guarantee company solvency, so whether short-term loans or long-term loans and creditors, as the company's growth as a positive signal, so the listed companies in recent years of growth, the higher its rate and short-term assets The higher rate of long-term assets and liabilities, total assets and liabilities naturally higher, but the impact on growth of real estate companies listed on a smaller debt ratio (coefficient is small). The risk of firm size and capital structure affect the growth has a similar conclusion, it appears that creditors, especially banks that the company scale is a measure of credit risk is an important consideration index, the greater the company size, the more stable cash flow, bankruptcy it is smaller, the creditors are more willing to throw an olive branch large-scale enterprises. The actual controller of the listed companies category to total debt ratio of the impact factor of a 0.040017, indicating that non-state-controlled listed company's total assets and liabilities higher than the state-owned holding companies. The reason for this phenomenon may be non-state-controlled listed companies pay more attention to control benefits, do not want to dilute their control over equity financing, and therefore more inclined to debt financing, which may also explain the non-state-controlled listed companies better use of financial leverage enterprises bigger and stronger impulses. In addition, the actual control of listed companies category short-term impact on asset-liability ratio is a 2.3 times its impact on long-term debt ratio, which shows the non-state-controlled listed companies prefer to take advantage of short-term debt to expand its operations.Current research on factors affecting capital structure point of view there are many factors in various industries concerned is not the same, according to industry characteristics and particularity, we mainly focus on the following aspects to analyze the factors industry capital structure. The article explained variable - capital structure for the asset-liability ratio, generally refers to the total debt ratio, but for more in-depth study of capital structure of listed companies, the paper from the total debt ratio, short-term assets and liabilities and long-term debt ratio of three angles of Capital structure explanatory.At present, domestic and foreign scholars analyzed factors on capital structure mostlyused multiple linear regression, as usual statistical regression function in the form of their choice is often subjective factors, but ordinary regression methods to make function with average resistance, most such functions excellent and objectivity are often difficult to reflect. base stochastic frontier model (Stochastic Frontier) in data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, estimate the effective production frontier using mathematical programming method, namely the experience of frontier production function, overcome DEA method assumes that there is no random error term, the better to reflect the objectivity and optimality ¨J function, currently in the field of economic management, sociology and medicine, began to get more and more applications. Therefore, in this paper, stochastic frontier model data on the capital structure factors listed real estate companies conducted a comprehensive analysis, in order to provide a better scientific basis for the study of the optimal capital structure of real estate enterprises.Listed company's solvency and overall asset-liability ratio was significantly negatively correlated with short-term liquidity has a decisive influence on the short-term asset-liability ratio. Similarly, long-term solvency also has a decisive influence on long-term assets and liabilities. Industry higher total debt ratio particularly high proportion of short-term debt is one of the main business risks, thus increasing solvency of listed companies, especially short-term liquidity (that is, to obtain a stable short-term cash flow). reduce its asset liability ratio and effective risk management choice ROA of listed companies is much greater influence than ROE of asset-liability ratio, and affect the relationship is inconsistent, ROE is higher, the higher the total debt ratio, while the ROA high, the lower the rate of the total assets and liabilities, and short-term liabilities ROA more obvious, this difference is mainly due to the special structure of listed companies due to the nature of the capital, and therefore need to improve the capital structure of listed companies, namely to reduce the total assets and liabilities rate debt structure and the need to reduce the proportion of short-term debt in particular, in order to enhance the company's profitability ROA. growth and company size has a significant positive impact on the capital structure, which is mainly due to the growth of the company's solvency is fundamental, The size of the company is the main indicator to measure the bankruptcy creditor risk. Therefore, listed companies should be radically to grow through continuous growth and development of enterprises, so that thetotal debt ratio has a high margin of safety, through growth to continue to resolve the financial risk than non-state-owned holding companies controlling more use of financial leverage motivation and apparently relied on short-term liabilities, which may lead to more serious financial risk especially short-term business risks, so that the non-state-owned holding listed companies should establish more strict risk prevention system.译文介绍虽然债权人可以通过制定各种保护性条款来保障自己的利益，但都是一些辅助性的措施，能够有效保障他们利益的关键还得看公司的偿债能力。

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