The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior

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中级口译教程梅德明第四版句子精炼单元全

句子精炼( Sentences in Focus )Unit 2 接待口译（机场迎宾、宾馆入住、宴会招待、参观访问）1. This is a fantastic airport, absolutely one of the top-notch international airports.（这个机场太美了，绝对是一个顶尖的国际机场。

）2. I’m very bad with a jet-lag. But I will be all right in a couple of days.（我倒时差很慢，但两天后自然就回复了。

）3. I’d like to have a 7 o’clock morning call, breakfast sent up to my room, laundry done, some documents photocopied, an express mail sent out, and something like that.（我要早上7点钟叫醒，早餐送到我房间，衣服要熨，文件要复印，邮件要快递，诸如此类的事情需要服务。

）4. We all maneuvered successfully to get our job done, so to speak.（可以说我们每个人都成功的使我们的使命得以完成。

）5. Let’s delight ourselves completely in the foods that Mother Nature grants us.（让我们尽情享受大自然赋予我们的食物吧。

）6. 我要是没认错的话，您一定是从伦敦来的泰莱科教授吧。

(You must be Prof. Tallack from London, if I’m not mistaken.)7. 我是海通集团人力资源部经理。

(I’m manager of Human Resources, the Haitong Group.)8. 感激您不辞辛劳，从百忙之中抽空来我公司指导。

制度的翻译英语作文

制度的翻译英语作文The Importance of Institutional Reform。

Institutional reform is a crucial aspect of modern society. It refers to the process of changing the rules, regulations, and procedures that govern a particular organization or system. The aim of institutional reform is to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness of the system in question. In this essay, we will explore the importance of institutional reform and its impact on society.Firstly, institutional reform can help to promote economic growth and development. A well-functioning institutional framework is essential for creating an environment that is conducive to investment and economic activity. By reforming institutions that are inefficient, corrupt, or outdated, governments can create a more attractive environment for businesses and investors. This, in turn, can lead to increased economic growth, jobcreation, and improved living standards for citizens.Secondly, institutional reform can help to promote social justice and equality. Many institutions, such as the legal system and government agencies, have a significant impact on the lives of citizens. If these institutions are unfair or discriminatory, they can perpetuate inequality and social injustice. By reforming these institutions, governments can ensure that they are more equitable and just, and that they serve the needs of all citizens, regardless of their background or status.Thirdly, institutional reform can help to promote democracy and good governance. Democratic institutions, such as parliaments, courts, and electoral systems, are essential for ensuring that citizens have a say in howtheir country is governed. By reforming these institutions, governments can strengthen democracy, promote transparency and accountability, and ensure that the voices of all citizens are heard.In conclusion, institutional reform is a crucial aspectof modern society. It can help to promote economic growth and development, social justice and equality, and democracy and good governance. Governments must be committed to reforming institutions that are inefficient, corrupt, or outdated, and to creating a more efficient, effective, and fair system for all citizens. By doing so, they can create a more prosperous, just, and democratic society for all.。

CFA3级背诵内容4-Asset allocation

Asset allocation 一、机构投资者和个人投资者的不同点 1. Liability of institutional investor are legal obligations or debts. There is no legal obligations for individual investor but goals, such as lifestyle object. 2. Institutional liability are uniform in nature but individual’s goals may be many and varied; 3. Institutional liability may be forecast with confidence. But individual goals are not subject to the law of large numbers and averaging;
Asset allocation 一、使用 Asset Class 的缺点 Modeling using asset classes as the unit of analysis tend to obscure the portfolio’s sensitivity to overlapping risk factors.
Asset allocation 一、重调整的几个方法 1. Rebalance back to target weight. 2. Rebalance to range edge. 3. Rebalance halfway between the range-edge trigger point and the target weight.
Asset allocation 一、传统 MVO 方法的缺点

公司多元化经营外文文献及文献综述

本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献标题: The effects of institutional ownership on the value and risk of diversifiedfirms 作者: Mohammad Jafarinejada, Surendranath R. Joryb, Thanh N. Ngoc, 期刊: International Review of Financial Ana lys is (Volume 40 2015): 207-219年份: 2015The effects of institutional ownership on the value and risk of diversified firmsAbstractWe study the link between institutional ownership and firms' diversification strategy, value and risk. Our sample includes US-listed firms with segment data from 1998 to 2012. We find that not a ll kinds of diversification are value-destroying; unlike industria lly-diversified firms, global single-segment firms are trading at a premium relative to their imputed va lue. The presence of institutional investors and the stability of their shareholdings positively influence the likelihood that a firm is diversified. The proportion (volatility) of institutional ownership is higher (lower) among diversified firms compared to domestic s ingle-segment firms. More importantly, the higher the proportions of institutional shareholdings, the higher the excess value of the diversified firm and the lower the firm idiosyncratic risk. Institutional ownership volatility, on the other hand, is inversely related to a firm excess value but positively related to its idiosyncratic risk. Thus, the presence of long-term stable institutional investors enhances the value of diversified firms. Our findings remain robust to various model specifications and estimation techniques. Ke yw or ds: Institutional ownership; Corporate diversification; Diversification discount;1.IntroductionThe effect of diversification on firm value continues to attract considerable research interest. There are two main types of diversification: product- and geographic diversification (Vachani, 1991 and Martin, 2008). Product diversification refers to the degree to which firms are involved in different industries (we refer to them asbusiness segments). Geographic diversification refers to the extent to which firms are involved in different countries (we refer to them as geographic segments). Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1997) find that global diversification is associated with higher firm value. In contrast, Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) find that diversification decreases firm value. Other studies that suggest that diversification adversely affects firm value include Berger and Ofek (1995), Fauver, Houston, and Naranjo (2004); a nd Kim and Mathur (2008).Corporate diversification is appealing to investors. Under the premise that corporations are better at diversification than shareholders, corporate diversification should lower shareholders' investment risk at a fraction of the cost incurred by individual investors (see Agmon and Lessard (1977); Doukas and Travlos (1988); Harris and Ravenscraft (1991);Sanders and Carpenter (1998)). However, the diversity of operations at conglomerate firms makes it harder for ordinary investors to monitor them (Fatemi, 1984), opening the possibility for management to pursue self-interest objectives at the expense of the shareholders (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000). Such agency problems will reduce shareholders' return on investment and/or increase their risk. As a consequence, if there is a group out there who is better at monitoring managers, it is better to follow their lead. Jensen and Meckling (1976),and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that large investors could well be that group. We propose to consider the contribution to firm value and risk brought about by such an important group of investors at diversified firms, i.e., institutional investors.Institutional investors —inc luding mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, banks and insurance companies —are leading players in the financial markets as well as the primary owners of US corporate equity (Gillan & Starks, 2000). Estimates of their shareholdings at US firms range from 35% in the 1980s and 60% in the 2000s to 66% by the end of 2010. Given the size of their equity investments, they tend to exert considerable pressure on management to create wealth for investors (see also, Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). Jarrell and Poulsen (1987), Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988); Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) suggest a direct link between institutional investors and shareholders' wealth. Consequently, managers pay a lot of attention tomeet the financial targets set by these investors (Easley and O'hara, 1987, Kyle, 1985 and Clay, 2002). Actions taken by the investors tend to generate a lot of press and media attention, especially at large and diversified firms. Many institutional investors believe that diversified firms can generate more profit by restructuring their divis ions; examples include campaigns by investors demanding restructuring at big firms like PepsiCo, Sony, Timken, and McGraw-Hill.Do institutional investors —as effective monitors of firm performance —support diversification and add value to diversified firms by virtue of their presence? We attempt to answer the question and analyze the importance of two measures of institutional ownership on diversified firms' value and risk, i.e., the proportion of the shares held by the institutional investors (IOPr) and the institutional ownership volat ility (IOV). The first measure is extensively used in the literature, though mostly focused on domestic firms. An emerging literature on the effects of institutional ownership on firm value suggests that in addition to the proportion of shares held by investors, it is equally important to consider institutional ownership stability. They argue that not all institutional investors stay with a firm for the long-term. Some are short-term and would leave at the first s ign of trouble. E lyasiani and J ia (2010),and Ca lle n and Fa ng (2013)ar gue that ―stable‖institutiona l inves tor s are m ore incentivized to monitor target firms and improve shareholder welfare.To the extent that diversification destroys value while institutional investors add value, we test whether their presence at diversified firms adds value. We hypothesize that diversified firms w ith higher proportions of shares held by institutional investors(IOPr) and lower variability in the proportions (IOV) are associated with higher excess values. Similar ly, we posit that firm risk is inversely related to IOPr and positively related to IOV. Managers would be under scrutiny not to cripple the firm with non-value added diversifications when more shares are held by institutional investors (IOPr). Conversely, if a firm pursues the wrong type of diversification, then there is little reason for the investors to hold onto their shares. Thus, we should observe a higher volatility in institutional shareholdings (IOV) among this subgroup of firms.We examine the universe of firms listed in COMPUSTAT from 1998 to 2012. We break the universe of COMPUSTAT firms into four groups: (i) domestic single-segment firms (DS), (ii) domestic multi-segment firms (DM), (iii) global single-segment firms (GS) and (iv) global mult i-segment firms (GM). We find that unlike domestic firms, the trend is to go global, i.e., we observe a fall in the number of domestic firms and a rise in the number of global firms over time. We find that not all kinds of diversification are associated with negative excess values. As opposed to industrially-diversified firms, global single-segment firms trade at a premium relative to their matched domestic s ingle-segment firms. The idiosyncratic risk levels are l ower for diversif ied firms compared to domestic s ingle-segment firms.The proportion of shares held by institutional investors (IOPr) is higher and the volatility in those proportions (IOV) is lower at diversif ied firms compared to domestic single-segment firms. Using probit regressions, we find that the likelihood to diversify is pos itively associated with the proportion of shares held by institutional investors (IOPr) and inversely related to its volatility (IOV).Univariate analyses suggest the existence of a positive relationship between IOPr and firm's excess value and an inverse relationship between IOPr and firm's idiosyncratic risk. Conversely, IOV is inversely related to excess value and positively related to idiosyncratic risk. The evidence suggests that there exists a significant relationship between the presence of long-term stable institutional investors and the ability of diversified firms to create wealth.Consistent with the univariate findings, the coefficient of IOPr is positive and that of IOV is negative in panel f ixed-effect regressions of firms' excess values. The coefficients of DMand GM, representing domestic multi-segment firms and globally diversified multi-segment firms, respectively, are both negative and highly significant. On the other hand, globa l single segment (GS) firms are associated with higher excess values.In regressions of firms' idiosyncratic risk, the coefficients of IOV and IOPr are positive and negative, respectively, suggesting that firms with lower proportions of equity held by institutional investors and higher volatility in that proportion areperceived as riskier and carrying more idiosyncratic risk. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that diversified firm value is linked to investors with considerable and stable shareholdings. Furthermore, the absence of stable, long-term institutional investors increases the idiosyncratic risk of diversified firms. Our empirical findings are robust to alternative control variables, various model specifications and estimation techniques.Beyond complementing and extending the literature on the diversification discount, this study also contributes to the emerging literature on the role of institutional ownership stability on firm governance and performance. To the bestof our knowledge, our study is the first to assess the impact of institutional ownership stability among diversified firms. We consider the effect of institutional investors in lessening the diversification discount. We also examine the link between institutional investors and firm risk. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and formulates the hypotheses. Section 3presents the data. Section 4 presents the methods used. We present and discuss the findings in Section 5, and conclude the paper in the final section.2.Literature review and hypotheses developmentAt the firm leve l, institutional investors tend to resist counterproductive strategies while supporting beneficial ones, especially shareholder driven ones (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993, Hill and Snell, 1988, Holderness and Sheehan, 1985 and Mikkelson and Ruback, 1991). They tend to lobby senior executives to implement restructuring strategies that are beneficial to all the shareholders (see also Bethel and L iebeskind (1993)). Attig et al. (2012)argue that long-term institutional investors have greater incentives and efficiencies —economies of scale in the collection and processing of corporate information —to engage in effective monitoring, which in turn mitigate the asymmetric information dilemma and a ssociated agency problems.Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993) find that investors va lue the skills and demands of block purchasers and that firm value increases follow ing a block trade.They document a high turnover in management following these trades and a decline in firm va lue when the block holders either fail to achieve control and/or face resistance from management. Navissi and Naiker (2006) find that shareholding by active institutional investors of up to 30% positively influences corporate value. Beyond30%, the ownership tends to reduce firm value, which suggests that there exists a non-linear relationship between the two. When these shareholders become too large, there exists a signif icant risk that they will join forces with management to safeguard their common interests at the expense of the other shareholders, especially minority/individual ones. The authors find that passive investors do not affect firm value. Cornett et a l. (2007) find that the percentages of institutional investor involvement in a firm, as well as their numbers, are associated with better operating cash flow returns. However, the findings only hold when the investors have no business relation w ith the firm; else there is no significant relationship between institutional investors and firm performance.In theory, a conglomerate firm with multiple business segments should trade at the same price as the sum of the individual segments as standalone businesses. Yet, the literature finds that this is rarely the case. This inequality is due to asymmetric information and agency conflicts along the lines explained by M yers (1984); Myers and Majluf (1984). However, recent studies on institutional ownership and stability suggest that institutional investors can help solve such problems. We study whether the involvement of institutional investors can turn the fortunes of diversified firms given the evidence of a diversification discount (Fauver et al., 2004, Jory & Ngo,2012).H1.There exists a positive relationship between diversified firms' value and the proportion of the shares held by institutional investors.Nonetheless, not all institutional investors are equally motivated to ensure the long-term well-being of a firm. There exist some investors with an interest in short-term trading, quick profits and turnaround. They are not w illing to incur long-term monitoring costs and are not interested in monitoring firm'smanagement. Callen and Fang (2013) review some scenarios suggestive of a short-term bias. In the first case, the cost of monitoring far exceeds the combined costs of selling the shares and investing in another company. Second, many institutional investors hold well-diversif ied portfolios that do not require them to monitor actively every company in their portfolio. Third, the benefits of short-term gains far exceed those of long-term investing. With their constant buying and selling, these investors cause a lot of variability/volatility in the proportion of shares held by them in the company. Thus, we hypothesize that for value creation, stable institutional investors are more desirable than transient ones.H2.There exists an inverse relationship between firm value and institutional ownership volatility.Institutional investors tend to be large ones buying signif icant stakes in the companies they invest. Given the size of their investments, they pay particular attention to the risk-taking activity at target firms, and they have sufficient influence to lobby senior executives to sway risk-taking decisions in their favor. We hypothesize that the presence of these investors would dissuade managers from taking excessive idiosyncratic risks —for instance, engaging in unrelated diversification abroad where the managers have little know ledge of, thus increasing the risks the firm faces.Institutional investors have their own stakeholders to satisfy —for instance, pension funds and insurance companies have to make regular payments to their subscribers — and they would resist changes that would disrupt those relationships. To the extent that their required return on investment is linked to changes in the value of the firm, they would withstand actions that would increase the variance of the firm returns and adversely affect its ability to pay dividend. This would also be true for institutional investors who have selected targets based on their current business strategies and are satisfied with the status quo; those who lack the expertise and/or incentives to monitor new ventures and risky undertakings; and, investors whose wealth is concentrated in the target company.There are two types of risks faced by a firm, i.e., market and idiosyncraticrisks.Management can more directly affect the latter. Thus, for the purpose of our study, we consider a firm's idiosyncratic risk. To minimize its impact on the value of their equity investment, we test the hypothesis that the presence of institutional investors helps to m inimize idiosyncratic risk.H3.There exists an inverse relationship between firm idiosyncratic risk and the proportion of shares held by institutional investors.Financial markets comprise investors and traders of different time horizons (Malagon, Moreno, & Rodriguez, 2015). Investors engaging in frequent trading are more interested in short- rather than long-term gains. They could lobby for makeshift corporate changes at the expense of changes that would have benefited all the shareholders in the long run. Their presence will a lso do little in alleviat ing the risks associated with misalignment of objectives, opportunistic behavior and earnings management at the investee firm and, consequently, accentuate the firm's idiosyncratic risk. Frequent trading in the shares of a firm — caused by short-term traders — will lead to an increase in the volatility of the proportions of shares held by its investors. Conversely, long-term investors — those who are more like ly to buy and hold and cause less volatility in the proportions of shares held by investors —are more incentivized to monitor firm activities and improve shareholder value. Thus, we test the hypothesis that there exists a positive association between the volatility in the p roportions of shares held by investors and a firm's idiosyncratic risk.H4.There exists a positive association between firm idiosyncratic risk and institutional ownership volatility.3.DataOur sample of firms is from the COMPUSTAT database and our sample period starts in 1998 and ends in 2012. We define a diversified firm as one that reports data on the industry and/or geographic segments in the COMPUSTAT segment data tapes. Similar to He (2009), we start the sample period in 1998 because the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued SFAS 131 in 1997, which significantlyaffects the way businesses report segment data.Following, we exclude the follow ing firms from our sample: (i) firms with SIC codes 4900–4999 (i.e., utility firms) and 6000–6999 (i.e., financial firms) since they are heavily regulated; (ii) firm-year observations with segment sales less than $20 million; and (iii) firm-year observations where the difference between the total sales of all its segments and the reported total sales for the entire firm i s greater than 1%. We further obtain accounting and financial data from COMPUSTAT, ownership data from Thomson Financial and stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases. The Thomson Financial database reports institutional 13F common stock holdings and transactions. It includes common stock holdings and transactions of institutional money managers where holdings of the managing company /filer's level are as per the 13F filing itself. It covers all NYSE,AMEX, NASDAQ common stocks and includes all managers filing 13F reports w ith the SEC.We present the sample descriptives in Table 1. We break the sample into four groups as follows: domestic single-segment (DS, i.e., not diversified), domestic multi-segment (DM, i.e., industrially diversified only), global single-segment (GS, i.e., geographically diversified only) and global mult i-segment (GM, i.e., both industrially and geographically diversified). The trend is toward more globally diversif ied firms; from 18% in 1998, their proportion as a percentage of the entire sample increases to 33% by 2012. We have 53,481 firm-year observations obtained from 11,882 firmsdistributed as follows, 63% DS, 12% DM, 15% GSand 10% GM firms.4.Methodology4.1.Measuring excess valueTo explore the valuation consequences of diversification, we use the same measure of excess value as in Berger and Ofek (1995); and Bodnar et al. (1997). The excess value of firm i is calculated as the natural log of the ratio of the firm's market v alue to its imputed value.4.2.Measuring idiosyncratic riskTo compute a fir m's idios yncra tic risk we use the Fama and French,1992 and Fama and French, 1993 model and add the excess return on a world portfolio to the equation as follows (see also Stulz (1999)):5.Results5.1.Probit regressionsWe model a firm's propensity to diversify as a function of the characteristics of the firm, its industry, its macroeconomic environment and, more importantly, the institutional ownership variables of IOPr and IOV. Table 2 reports the probit estimates from two different models. Model (1) contains the IOPr variable while Model (2) c ontains both the IOPr and the IOVvariables.value of the coefficient representing the variable IOPr is positive and statistically significant. Conversely, the value of the coefficient IOV is negative and statistically signif icant. The margina l effects of IOPr and IOV are positive and negative,respectively. Thus, diversified firms are associated with higher proportions of institutional ownership and lower volatility in that ratio over time.We also find that the odds that a firm is diversified are positively associated to: firm size (ln(AT)), profitability (EBITS), being listed on a major US stock exchange (MAJOR), the number of diversified firms in the industry (NUMDIVF), the proportion of sales generated by diversified firms (PrINDS), and the number of M&As occurring in the industry (NUMA). Conversely, capital-intensive firms (CAPX), growth firms as measured by the Q ratio, as well as growth industries (INDUSTRYQ), growth in GDP (GDPGr) and the industry's dollar amount of deals (VOLMA) are inversely related to a firm's propensity to diversify.5.2.Excess value and idiosyncratic risk of diversified firmsWe present the mean and median excess values of industrially- (i.e., DM, GM) and geographically diversified (i.e., GS, GM) firms in Table 3. We compare the excess values to that of the sample of DS (i.e., domestic single-segment) firms and various portfolios comprising DS firms. More precisely and following Villalonga (2004), we calculate each firm's predicted probability to diversify using the probit model of Eq. For each diversified firm, we form a portfolio comprising domestic single-segment firms w ith probability values from the same quartile. Since we run two versions of theprobit model, we present our findings based on two portfolios of matched domestic single-segment firms (i.e., portfolios 1 and 2, respectively) for every diversified firm.The excess values of DM (mean of − 8.20% in Panel A) and GM (mean of 16.20% in Panel C) firms are significantly lower than the corresponding values of both portfolios of matched domestic single-segment firms. Thus, industrial diversification is associated with lower excess values. Conversely, the excess values of global single segment firms (GS firms in Panel B) are positive and significantly higher than those of domestic single-segment firms. Our findings are consistent with Denis et a l. (2002), Kim and Mathur (2008); and Jory and Ngo (2012).We also compare the idiosyncratic risks of the four groups of firms. The idiosyncratic risk measures of the diversified firms (i.e, DM, GS and GM firms) are all significantly lower compared to either the sample of domestic single-segment firms or matching portfolios of domestic s ingle-segment firms. The combination of different business and/or geographic units leads to a portfolio effect that dampens the individual risk of each unit causing a diversified firm to report lower risk measures.5.3.The percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders (IOPr) and the volatility of institutional ownership (IOV)We present the values of IOPr and IOV by diversification type in Table 4. We compare the figures with various subsamples of DM firms. The mean and median IOPr figures are 21% and 7%, respectively for domestic single-segment firms, i.e., non-diversified firms. In contrast, the proportion of company shares held by institutional investors is higher among diversified firms (both industria lly- and geographically-diversified firms). For instance, the mean values of IOPr at DM, GS and GM firms are 39%, 52% and 56%, respectively. The corresponding median figures are 38%, 57% and 64%, respectively. Thus, institutional investors hold a higher proportion of the shares at diversified firms when compared to non-diversified ones.6 ConclusionWhile single-segment domestic firms still dominate the corporate landscape, we observe a gradual decline in their numbers and an increase in the frequency ofglobally-diversified firms. We find that not all kinds of diversification are value-destroying and that global single-segment firms trade at a premium compared to matched domestic single-segment firms. Industrially-diversified firms though (either domestic or global) are associated with lower excess values. Nonetheless, the combination of the different business and/or geographic units exerts a portfolio effect that causes the overall enterprise risk to decline causing diversified firms to report lower risk measures compared to domestic single-segment firms.We provide empirical evidence that institutional ownership is a core value driver of diversified firms. They are associated with higher levels of institutional shareholdings and more stable shareholdings over time. The proportion and stability of institutional ownership are positively related to firm value and inversely related to its idiosyncratic risk. Our results indicate that the presence of long-term stable institutional investors is a source of value for diversified corporations.二、文献综述公司多元化经营文献综述摘要公司多元化经营的相关问题是近年来公司战略管理、产业经济学和公司金融领域的一个研究热点，也是一个在理论界颇具争议的话题。

关于绿色壁垒的外文原文

Barriers and Trade Research Green Trade Barriers on International Trade and OrientationLauren GreeneThe University of SalfordPurpose of the implementation of the Green trade barriers and the resulting objective results, the green trade barriers on international trade can be divided into positive and negative aspects.1 through the establishment of green trade barriers promote domestic enterprises to improve their technological standards and environmental standards, thereby reducing emissions, and ultimately enhance the. International competitiveness of export products; the same time to meet environmental protection requirements of the new product development to create the conditions of international trade, developing new international markets, such as environmental certification products (15,014,000), Ozone Layer Protection Products (no Freon new refrigerator) and organic food (the use of organic pesticides), etc. Green trade barriers can contribute to the development of export trade and increase the international competitiveness of export products.2 green trade barriers against international trade in itself is a non-tariff barriers set up, it has covered a wide range of measures under various names, the impact spread effects of large, neutral and easily with the use of trade protectionism and a controversial exception and so, therefore, a State may regulate the import of rational use of green trade barriers.Undeniably, the green trade barriers on international trade also have negative effects: (1) production costs and competitiveness effects. Green trade barriers require environmental science and ecological science principles to the production, processing storage and consumption of transportation sales process, to form a complete clean pollution-free environment management system. In this process, the manufacturer in order to achieve the importing country's environmental standards, have to increase theBarriers and Trade Researchenvironmental inspection, testing, certification and other procedures to be some additional expenses, so that production costs increase, the increase in environmental costs that undermine the competitiveness of products reduce the export of economic efficiency. (2) The impact of market access. Commodity markets to meet the importing country's environmental regulations and standards, exporters need to invest additional capital, technology, human resources. However, this is often not immediate short-term investment, so that green trade barriers will create market access barriers. (3) The impact of international trade relations. Since the mid-1990s, developed countries based on their own interests, often under the banner name of environmental protection, to take unilateral trade measures to restrict foreign imports of products from developing countries in particular, frequently lead to bilateral and multilateral trade frictions and disputes.For developing countries, green trade barriers on the export-oriented trade effects mainly include four aspects:1 co-ordinate the development of environmental protection and trade-oriented effectsThe relationship between environment and trade one of the concerns of many scholars are Due to the inherent growth mechanisms of trade with the demand for natural resources unlimited, with the inherent stability of the mechanism of natural resources, ecological environment has a limited supply, so the infinite demand and limited supply is a contradiction, the need for an integrated environment protection and the relationship between trade development. But the fact is that the developing countries to continue to expand exports, increase foreign exchange reserves, promotion of employment, the environment in economic development, causing serious damage. Green trade barriers can be an objective requires the development of China must gradually and eventually completely abandon the traditional model of development, efforts to embark on a path of sustainable development.Barriers and Trade Research(2) Integration of orientation effects of technical standardsGreen trade barriers are one who has mastered basic technical standards right, grasps the initiative on the international market. International technical standards development process is actually divided between the developed international markets, distribution of benefits and control the world's most advanced technology in the process. Technical standards in developing countries lagged behind, the old paradigm of export product design, international standards for the use of low, can not meet international market demand, changes in the development of export products of developing countries often run into a wall of the important reasons. The emergence of green trade barriers that developing countries must be based on the importing country promulgation of the new technical standards, the use of technical standards for the international market, and through a bit with the side effects of technology diffusion, promote industrial upgrading, thereby enhancing their competitiveness in international markets.3 Effect of institutional innovation-orientedSome countries, the importing country finds some export products will cause pollution of the environment or their deliberate attempts to block specific countries or regions of imports, trade barriers can often be used to achieve the above purpose the green, green trade barriers will lead to products with the advantage of low cost transfer between the importing country, resulting in trade diversion effect. But the trade diversion effect brought about by the growth and green trade barriers formed by the trade ban, limitation effect than a small space and may pay a higher resource and environmental costs. Enhance the status of the green trade barriers in export industries in developing countries for technical innovation, but also an objective to promote export trade of developing countries the system of innovation.4 green production and consumption-oriented effectsAs the level of economic development and technological differences, theBarriers and Trade Researchconcept of developing and developed countries in the green has a considerable understanding of the differences cause differences in understanding consumer attitudes in developing countries and developed countries in the huge contrast. The rise of the green consumer demand, making the green trade becomes the mainstream of international trade patterns. The rise of the green trade barriers in developing countries transform the objective requirements of economic benefits in the past simply the development of ideas, efforts to increase the level of green production and consumption.。

Large shareholders and accounting research

Large shareholders and accounting research qOle-Kristian HopeUniversity of Toronto,Rotman School of Management,CanadaA R T I C L E I N F O Article history:Received 5April 2012Accepted 11July 2012Available online 29January 2013JEL classiﬁcation:G30G32G38M20M41Keywords:Large shareholdersAgency costsControlling ownersMinority ownersPrivate ﬁrmsInternational A B S T R A C TLarge shareholders are a potentially very important element of ﬁrms’corpo-rate governance system.Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are,in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners (and the diﬀerent types of large owners could play very diﬀerent governance roles).After brieﬂy reviewing the standard agency cost arguments,in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families,institutions,govern-ments,and employee ownership.I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private (i.e.,unlisted)ﬁrms,where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded ﬁrms.Finally,I brieﬂy discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.Ó2013China Journal of Accounting Research.Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.1.IntroductionThis article is based on my keynote address at the 2012CJAR Special Issue Symposium at CEIBS in Shang-hai.The topic of the conference was “large shareholders ”and I was honored to be given the opportunity to1755-3091/$-see front matter Ó2013China Journal of Accounting Research.Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved./10.1016/j.cjar.2012.12.002qThis article has been prepared for the China Journal of Accounting Research and forms the basis for my CJAR Special Issue Symposium presentation (March 30,2012).I appreciate useful comments from Heather Li and acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of the Deloitte Professorship.4O.-K.Hope/China Journal of Accounting Research6(2013)3–20make some comments on how large shareholders are important for(accounting)research.I should hasten to say that there are several well-cited survey studies on corporate governance in accounting,economics,ﬁnance, and management.Thus,in this paper I will not attempt a complete survey on the literature on large sharehold-ers.Instead,I have decided to focus on one particular aspect–the heterogeneity of large shareholders.We tell our PhD students that they should base their research on theory to the extent possible.At least in ﬁnancial accounting the“theory”that is referred to is often analytical economics-based research.At the Rot-man School we have the same emphasis on theory and I am personally a strong believer in anchoring your work in theory.However,most analytical models are vague(to put it mildly)when describing exactly who the large shareholders are and how they act.As this article will highlight,there is in fact rather considerable diversity in the types of large shareholders we observe,and it is very likely that these may have diﬀerent eﬀects on outcomes of interest to accounting researchers.Hence the reader can consider this article also as a call for “attention to the context”in which the study is conducted.For example,I would encourage“case-based”type studies that delve deeper into one particular form of large shareholder,such as state-owned enterprises in China.I would like to oﬀer three brief caveats.First,as already mentioned there are other,more comprehensive surveys on corporate governance issues and I would recommend that readers consult these if relevant.Second, although I consider several diﬀerent types of large shareholders I could clearly have included additional types (e.g.,the eﬀect of foreign shareholders).Finally,there are important measurement issues in deﬁning large shareholders(using cut-oﬀs;multiple large owners;concentration ratios;ownership percentage versus voting rights;considering potential nonlinearities;organizational form;etc.).Section2provides a brief review of the classic Jensen and Meckling(1976)arguments and discusses both vertical and horizontal agency costs.It also discusses the role of the second-largest shareholders and examines how large shareholders exercise their monitoring in practice.Section3focuses on who the large shareholders are.The chapter considers the roles of families,institutions,governments,and employee rge shareholders are particularly prominent in private(i.e.,unlisted)ﬁrms,and Section4summarizes relevant research on these economically very importantﬁrms.Section5contains a discussion of variations across selected countries in the types of dominating ownership,and Section6concludes.2.Overview of large shareholders and agency costs2.1.Brief review of Jensen and Meckling(1976)As this conference is motivated to a large extent by Jensen and Meckling(1976),it is worthwhile toﬁrst brieﬂy revisit and review their seminal study.1Jensen and Meckling deﬁne an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons(the principal(s))engage another person(the agent)to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.If both parties are util-ity maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the value-reducing activities of the agent.2 If a wholly ownedﬁrm is managed by the owner,he will make decisions which maximize his utility.This situation is of course unusual other than for the smallest privateﬁrms and by deﬁnition not observed in pub-licly traded companies.In such cases,Jensen and Meckling argue that agency costs will be generated by the divergence between his interest and those of the outside shareholders,as he will then bear only a fraction of the costs of any non-pecuniary beneﬁts he takes out in maximizing his own utility.Put diﬀerently,as the owner–manager’s fraction of the equity falls,his fractional claim on the outcomes falls and this will tend to encourage him to appropriate larger amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites.This also makes it 1Jensen and Meckling’s article was in part motivated by the observation by Adam Smith(1776)that“The directors of such[joint-stock] companies,however,being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own,it cannot be well expected,that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own... Negligence and profusion,therefore,must always prevail,more or less,in the management of the aﬀairs of such a company.”2In some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions(referred to as“bonding”).O.-K.Hope/China Journal of Accounting Research6(2013)3–205desirable for the minority shareholders to expend more resources in monitoring his behavior.3Important for us in accounting,this is clearly one of the reasons for the demand for accounting-related information.In fact, the genesis of accounting was in the“stewardship role”it can play in monitoring agents(see,e.g.,Gjesdal, 1981for a nice discussion).It is only more recently that the“valuation role”of accounting information has gained in prominence(and may well be the dominating role today).Related to the stewardship role(or governance)role of accounting,Jensen and Meckling argue that their theory can explain“why accounting reports would be provided voluntarily to creditors and stockholders,and why independent auditors would be engaged by management to testify to the accuracy and correctness of such reports.”2.2.More on the role of ownership concentration(or importance of large shareholders)There are two common approaches to corporate governance throughout most of the world(e.g.,Shleifer and Vishny,1997).First,investors’rights are protected to varying degrees across the world through the legal process and legal environment.The second major approach,and the focus of this article,is ownership by large investors.Research provides evidence that managers,when left unmonitored,are more likely to manage earnings, commit fraud,or make suboptimal investment decisions(e.g.,Biddle and Hilary,2006;Hope and Thomas, 2008).Thus,shareholder monitoring is an important mechanism by which agency costs can be reduced.How-ever,while all shareholders have the responsibility to monitor managerial activities,the beneﬁts of doing so by any individual shareholder are proportional to the percentage of shares owned(Jensen and Meckling,1976; Shleifer and Vishny,1997).Put another way,when ownership is widely dispersed,it is economically less fea-sible for any individual shareholder to incur signiﬁcant monitoring costs,because she will receive only a small portion of beneﬁts.Similarly,when ownership is dispersed,it is harder for shareholders to monitor managerial actions.Thus,as the percentage of ownership by individual shareholders increases(i.e.,concentration increases), the more willing individual shareholders are to incur necessary monitoring costs.That is,when ownership is limited to one or a few individuals,it is easier and more eﬃcient for those individuals to directly monitor managerial actions.This is the typical“vertical agency cost”argument(i.e.,conﬂicts between managers and owners)and leads to the general prediction that agency costs are expected to be lower as ownership concen-tration increases.4Potential manager–owner conﬂicts are not the only relevant issues.Horizontal agency costs relate to how large shareholders can decrease aﬁrm’s value through extracting private beneﬁt from the minority sharehold-ers(e.g.,La Porta et al.,1999).Morck et al.(1988)argue that increased ownership concentration may entrench managers,as they are increasingly less subject to governance by boards of directors and to discipline by the market for corporate control.Controlling shareholders may either engage in outright expropriation from self-dealing transactions or exercise de facto expropriation through the pursuit of objectives that are not proﬁt-maximizing in return for personal utilities.These controlling shareholders may attempt to hide these activities from other stakeholders(e.g.,minority shareholders and creditors)by manipulating reported perfor-mance(an issue of obvious interest to accountants).In other words,a controlling owner can increase agency costs via the positive association with private beneﬁts of control(e.g.,Hope et al.,2012a).To summarize the discussion,the presence of a controlling owner represents forces that work in opposite directions.For a researcher,this is both a challenge and an opportunity.It is an opportunity if the researcher is able to specify ex ante which set of agency costs is likely to be most signiﬁcant.For example,in countries with less legal protection of the minority shareholders the main agency problem often exists between control-ling shareholders and minority shareholders.3Jensen and Meckling consider the term monitoring to include more than just measuring or observing the behavior of the agent.It includes eﬀorts on the part of the principal to“control”the behavior of the agent through budget restrictions,compensation policies, operating rules,etc.4Furthermore,controlling shareholders could enable a long investment horizon which allows the building of strong relationships between theﬁrms and outside providers of capital(Ellul et al.,2009).In fact,a controlling shareholder could increase business focus and make contracting negotiations easier.6O.-K.Hope/China Journal of Accounting Research6(2013)3–202.3.The role of the second-largest shareholderWhile the previous discussion explains the need for shareholders to monitor managers,the literature also establishes the need for shareholders to monitor one another.For example,controlling shareholders have the ability to exploit minority shareholders in closely-held corporations(e.g.,Nagar et al.,2011).Such exploita-tion can include higher compensation to controlling shareholders,misappropriation of assets,and dilution of minority shareholders’interests through the issuance of stock or dividends(Gogineni et al.,2010).As the own-ership stake of a second shareholder increases,so does her ability and willingness to eﬀectively monitor the largest shareholder.The monitoring activities by the second largest shareholder would be similar to those used by the largest shareholder to monitor managers(Hope et al.,2012a).Pagano and Roell(1998)specify conditions under which large shareholders monitor each other,reducing expropriation and improvingﬁrm performance.They predict that expropriation of minority shareholders is likely to be less severe when the ownership stake of non-controlling shareholders is more concentrated,as such concentration makes it easier and more eﬀective to monitor the controlling shareholder.This is the typical “horizontal agency cost”argument(i.e.,conﬂicts between majority and minority shareholders)and leads to the prediction that as ownership by the second largest shareholder increases,agency costs decrease.2.4.How do large shareholders exercise their monitoring?Oftenﬁnance and accounting research is vague on the mechanisms through which monitoring happens.In practice monitoring by a large shareholder could take many forms.Perhaps the most commonly discussed means of monitoring discussed in the literature involves a large shareholder having a seat on the board.Sev-eral studies show in a variety of contexts the board’s role in monitoring managers(e.g.,Fama,1980;Fama and Jensen,1983;Adams et al.,2010).Other forms of direct monitoring would be a large shareholder actively par-ticipating in theﬁrm’s operations or having routine meetings with managers.As the proportion of ownership increases,the more beneﬁcial it is for large shareholders to engage in these types of costly direct monitoring rge shareholders can also serve to block business decisions that may be considered suboptimal (e.g.,aggressive expansion through negative net present value projects).Doing so involves an investment in time and expertise by the shareholder to understand the consequences of major business rge shareholders are also likely to have more control over theﬁrm’s dividend(or capital distribution)policy, as a way to further discipline managers’actions.3.Who are the large shareholders?Does it matter?Analytical research on large shareholders tends to be rather generic and often does not consider that there may be very diﬀerent types of large shareholders.There is surprisingly limited extant research on how diﬀerent groups of large shareholders can aﬀect corporate outcomes(e.g.,ﬁnancial reporting quality).5Here I brieﬂy consider research on the following owner types:families(including the CEO as owner),institutional investors, governments,and employees.3.1.Family ownershipA large fraction of businesses throughout the world are organized around families and there is a relatively large literature on family ownership(Bertrand and Schoar,2006).Most of this research in on publicly listed companies.For example,family-controlledﬁrms dominate in East Asia and Latin America.As an indication of the importance of familyﬁrms,La Porta et al.(1999)report that65%of the20largestﬁrms in Argentina have at least a20%family stake;in Hong Kong this fraction is70%.In contrast,in Japan the corresponding number is5%.5An exception is Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach(2009).They examine eﬀects of diﬀerent types of institutional investors in the US andﬁnd that investor type has signiﬁcant eﬀects on several corporate policies.The only study I’m aware of in accounting is Dou et al.(2012)who follow an approach similar to Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach(2009)and examine the eﬀects of large shareholders on accounting practices for a large sample of USﬁrms over the2001–2009period.O.-K.Hope/China Journal of Accounting Research6(2013)3–207 If a researcher is really interested in examining the eﬀects of family ownership,it would seem that private (i.e.,unlisted)ﬁrms oﬀer even more fertile ground for research.Section4discusses privateﬁrms in more detail.A stream of research has examined“familyﬁrms”included in the S&P500.This line of research is primarily motivated by the fact that,notwithstanding the oft-cited idea that US publiclyﬁrms have widely dispersed ownership,Shleifer and Vishny(1986)(and others)document that large shareholders are common and,in par-ticular,note that founding families continue to hold equity stakes and board seats in nearly33%of the For-tune500ﬁrms.In other words,USﬁrms may not be as diﬀerent from those observed elsewhere in the world as thought by many.These founding families represent a unique class of long-term shareholders that hold poorly diversiﬁed portfolios and often control senior management positions.Family owners can thus exert inﬂuence and control over theﬁrm,potentially leading to performance diﬀerences with nonfamilyﬁrms.In a widely cited study,Anderson and Reeb(2003)investigate the relation between founding-family own-ership andﬁrm performance.Theyﬁnd that,contrary to their conjecture,familyﬁrms perform better than nonfamilyﬁrms.Additional analyses reveal that the relation between family holdings andﬁrm performance is nonlinear and that when family members serve as CEO,performance is better than with outside CEOs. Overall,their results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that minority shareholders are adversely aﬀected by family ownership,suggesting that family ownership may be an eﬀective organizational structure.Ali et al.(2007)recognize that,compared with nonfamilyﬁrms,familyﬁrms face less severe agency prob-lems due to the separation of ownership and management.However,they face more severe agency problems that arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders.These conﬂicting eﬀects are often referred to as“entrenchment versus alignment.”Thus it is not clear what to predict regarding familyﬁrms’disclosure practices relative to otherﬁing a sample of only S&P500ﬁrms,Ali et al.(2007)conclude that family ﬁrms report better quality earnings,are more likely to warn for a given magnitude of bad news,but make fewer disclosures about their corporate governance practices.Consistent with familyﬁrms making better ﬁnancial disclosures,the authorsﬁnd that familyﬁrms have larger analyst following,more informative ana-lysts’forecasts,and smaller bid–ask spreads.6It is far from clear that the aboveﬁndings should be generalized to other settings,even in the United States. First,although theﬁrms classiﬁed as“familyﬁrms”by deﬁnition meet the deﬁnition of a familyﬁrm for these studies,others may employ a higher threshold for family ownership.Given the nonlinearities documented in the US setting,it is thus highly unclear what to expect in very diﬀerent environments and with much higher family ownership(e.g.,in privateﬁrms).Even more importantly,conﬂicting evidence exists on whether having family ownership increases or decreases aﬁrm’s value,and it seems to be country dependent.Bertrand and Schoar(2006)conclude that there is no strong empirical evidence for the economic superiority of family-con-trolled businesses.According to Bertrand and Schoar(2006),familyﬁrms appear to underperform relative to nonfamilyﬁrms in most countries:for example,Claessens et al.(2002)for several Southeast Asian countries; Morck et al.(2000)for Canada;and Cronqvist and Nilsson(2003)for Sweden.Also,Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)ﬁnd that familyﬁrms in France,Germany,the United Kingdom and the United States are systemat-ically associated with worse managerial practices.Bertrand and Schoar(2006)note two important exceptions. Khanna and Palepu(2000)ﬁnd that business groups in India,which are for the most part family-controlled, perform better than stand-aloneﬁrms in matched industries(see more on this below);and Sraer and Thesmar (2007)whoﬁnd a premium for familyﬁrms in France.3.1.1.The role of the CEO in familyﬁrmsThere is comparatively limited research on the role of the CEO as part of the dominant family.A dominant belief in the literature is that as CEO ownership increases,her incentives align more with those of other share-holders,reducing the agency problem that arises from separation of ownership and control(e.g.,Jensen and Meckling,1976).This is known as the alignment eﬀect which suggests reduced agency costs.6In a closely related study,Chen et al.(2008)ﬁnd that,compared with nonfamilyﬁrms,familyﬁrms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls,but more earnings warnings.The authors interpret the former to be consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon,better monitoring of management,and lower information asymmetry between owners and managers,they interpret the higher likelihood of earnings warnings to be consistent with family owners having greater litigation and reputation cost concerns.In another related paper,Wang(2006)ﬁnds that founding family ownership is associated with higher earnings quality in S&P500ﬁrms(but also shows that the relation is non-linear).8O.-K.Hope/China Journal of Accounting Research6(2013)3–20Major shareholders are often family members of the CEO for privateﬁrms(Hope et al.,2012a).There are interesting competing hypotheses when the CEO is related to the major shareholder.Because of the family relationship,these shareholders no longer act as independent monitors in disciplining CEOs’decisions.In addition,family-controlledﬁrms are likely to suﬀer from greater horizontal agency costs.It may be easier for major shareholders,who are family members of the CEO,to extract private beneﬁts from minority share-holders or other stakeholders.The reason it may be easier to extract these beneﬁts is that major family owners typically have strong inﬂuence over choosing members of the board.Consequently,the monitoring eﬀective-ness of the board may be impaired when its composition is determined primarily by the CEO’s family.These arguments would support the idea that agency costs will increase when there is a family relation between the CEO and major shareholder(Hope et al.,2012a).An alternative view is that family member CEOs are less likely to act in ways that opportunistically harm other family members.That is,installing a family member as the CEO could be a mechanism through which family-owned companies can increase their monitoring of management and reduce the need for external mon-itoring.If this eﬀect dominates,the agency costs are smaller when the CEO is a family member because famil-ial ties are likely to create closer alignment of the CEO’s preferences with those of family owners.In conclusion,vertical and horizontal agency costs supply opposite predictions for eﬀects of familyﬁrms.In addition,there are strong diﬀerences in the degree to which families control business,to what extent the CEO comes from the dominant family,and in other institutional arrangements.In short,there is ample“tension”in terms of predictions and plenty of room for future research!3.1.2.Hope et al.(2012a)on agency conﬂicts in(private)familyﬁrmsHope et al.(2012a)are interested in understanding how agency conﬂicts in privateﬁrms arise through own-ership structures and family relationships.They analyze auditors’increase of eﬀort andﬁrms’choice of audi-tors in situations with higher level of agency conﬂicts.For a large sample of private Norwegianﬁrms,they use data obtained through special permission by the government to measure direct and ultimate ownership for each shareholder as well as extended family relationships.Family relationships are measured based on mar-riage and blood lines,going back four generations and extending out to fourth cousin,and cover all share-holders,board members,and CEOs.The authorsﬁnd that(excess)audit fees,their proxy for audit eﬀort in the face of agency conﬂicts,vary as hypothesized withﬁrm-level characteristics related to ownership structures and family relationships.Speciﬁ-cally,they show that fees relate negatively to ownership concentration and to the extent of ownership by the second-largest shareholder.Audit fees also relate negatively to the portion of shares held by the CEO,consis-tent with ownership aligning the incentives of the CEO and other stakeholders.Audit fees are further posi-tively associated with family relationships between the CEO and the major shareholder(a signal of reduced monitoring and a situation in which expropriation by the family/major shareholder is easier).With respect to board independence,theyﬁnd that audit fees decline as the number of board members related to the largest shareholder increases,consistent with fewer agency conﬂicts between owners and the board.In contrast,as the number of board members related to the CEO increases,fees increase,suggesting less board independence and greater agency conﬂicts.Hope et al.(2012a)report two interesting sets of results for the demand for Big4auditor.First,for agency settings that are not CEO family-related,they observe results consistent with those obtained for the auditor eﬀort tests.Speciﬁcally,the propensity to hire a Big4auditor increases as ownership concentration decreases, ownership of the second largest owner decreases,and the major shareholder’s family inﬂuence on the board decreases.These results are consistent with the demand for a Big4auditor being greater in higher agency cost settings.They do notﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of a relation between hiring a Big4auditor and the fraction of shares owned by the CEO for the main tests but they do in sensitivity tests.The authorsﬁnd no association between the choice to hire a Big4auditor and CEO family-related agency variables.Speciﬁcally,there is no signiﬁcant evidence that the demand for a Big4auditor is aﬀected when a family relationship exists between the CEO and the major shareholder or as the number of board members related to the CEO increases.While some CEOs in family-related agency settings may wish to signal more credible reporting by hiring a Big4auditor,other CEOs in these settings may feel a Big4auditor is eitherO.-K.Hope/China Journal of Accounting Research6(2013)3–209 unnecessary given close family ties or unwanted because of the gains from extracting private beneﬁts which could be reduced by a Big4audit.3.2.Institutional ownershipInstitutional investors such as pension funds and mutual funds are often“large”shareholders.In addition, they are typically viewed as“sophisticated investors”in the literature.The extant theoretical literature gener-ally predicts large institutional investors as an eﬃcient form of corporate governance.However,large institu-tional holders are not using their own money to make investments.Thus,with regulatory constraints or lack of incentives,Coﬀee(1991)argues that institutional shareholders tend to be passive.Prior research has documented that sophisticated investors behave diﬀerently from other,less informed investors(e.g.,Callen et al.,2005).Sophisticated investors have superior abilities and consequently can learn better from experience(Bonner and Walker,1994).Economic incentives are potentially important as well. Institutional investors have large investment portfolios and,therefore,have much more to gain or lose in absolute dollar terms from their investment decisions.Furthermore,the costs of engaging in in-depth ﬁrm analysis are lower for institutions,in part because of their superior access to databases and analytical tools.Research documents the existence of distinct groups among institutions that diﬀer in their objectives and information needs.Bushee(1998)classiﬁes institutions into three groups–transient,dedicated,and quasi-indexers.“Transient”institutions have high portfolio turnover and highly diversiﬁed portfolio holdings.They focus on the short term and make investments based on the likelihood of short-term trading proﬁts.According to Bushee(2001),the short investment horizons of transient investors create little incentive for them to gather information relevant to long-run value.In contrast,“dedicated”investors and“quasi-indexers”focus on the long term and provide stable owner-ship toﬁrms.Dedicated investors hold large stakes in a limited number ofﬁrms.Such ownership creates greater incentives to invest in monitoring management and to rely on information beyond current earnings to assess managers’performance.Quasi-indexers generally follow indexing and buy-and-hold strategies, and are characterized by high diversiﬁcation.Although quasi-indexers follow a passive investment strategy, these investors may also have strong incentives to monitor management to ensure that it is acting in the best interest of theﬁrm.Many studies report results that are consistent with a superior ability of sophisticated investors to gather, analyze,and price information.Price(1998)ﬁnds that informed investors appear to make greater use of accounting disclosures and non-earnings information to form more precise earnings expectations.Bonner et al.(2003)document that sophisticated investors incorporate the information inherent in the relative accu-racy of analyst forecasts to a greater extent than less informed investors.In addition,Bhattacharya et al. (2007)provide evidence that sophisticated investors demonstrate less behavioral bias in the way they process pro forma earnings information relative to more sophisticated investors.Finally,the eﬃciency of aﬁrm’s stock price is associated with the degree of sophistication of theﬁrm’s marginal investor(e.g.,Bartov et al.,2000).As an example of my own work that includes institutional investors,Chen et al.(2012)shows that the dif-ference between closed-end country funds’net asset values and their trading prices(i.e.,the fund discount)is positively associated with the earnings opacity of the underlying companies.In conditional analyses they fur-therﬁnd that the positive relation between earnings opacity and fund discounts is weaker for those funds with a higher level of institutional ownership.In other words,investors who are better equipped at information acquisition than other investors are able to overcome some of the information disadvantage of being“non-local.”In an earlier study,Callen et al.(2005)ﬁnd that the variance contribution of foreign earnings increases with the level of investment by long-term(but not short-term)institutional investors.To sum,there is strong evidence that institutional investors are an important class of large shareholders,in part because of their greater expertise in analyzing accounting information.There is also extensive evidence that there is important variation among the diﬀerent classes of institutional investors.Thus,yet again we con-clude that there is signiﬁcant diversity among even subgroups of large shareholders.。

后天环境比先天遗传更重要英语作文

全文分为作者个人简介和正文两个部分：作者个人简介：Hello everyone, I am an author dedicated to creating and sharing high-quality document templates. In this era of information overload, accurate and efficient communication has become especially important. I firmly believe that good communication can build bridges between people, playing an indispensable role in academia, career, and daily life. Therefore, I decided to invest my knowledge and skills into creating valuable documents to help people find inspiration and direction when needed.正文：后天环境比先天遗传更重要英语作文全文共3篇示例，供读者参考篇1Environmental Factors are More Important than Genetic InheritanceNature vs. nurture – it's an age-old debate that has raged on for centuries. Which plays a bigger role in shaping who webecome – our genes or our environment? As a student, I have spent a considerable amount of time pondering this question, and after careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that environmental factors are more important than genetic inheritance.Now, before you accuse me of being biased or ignorant, let me clarify that I am not dismissing the role of genetics altogether. Our DNA undoubtedly plays a crucial part in determining our physical traits, predispositions, and even some aspects of our personalities. However, I firmly believe that the environment we are exposed to has a far more significant impact on our development, behavior, and eventual outcomes in life.One of the most compelling arguments in favor of environmental factors is the sheer diversity of human experience. Identical twins, who share the same genetic makeup, can often end up leading vastly different lives due to the varying environments they are raised in. This phenomenon highlights the profound influence that our surroundings, upbringing, and life experiences have on shaping who we become.Take, for instance, the case of identical twins separated at birth and raised in different socioeconomic and cultural environments. Despite their identical genetic makeup, theirpersonalities, interests, and life trajectories can diverge dramatically. One twin may grow up in a nurturing, intellectually stimulating environment and become a successful academic, while the other, raised in a less favorable setting, may struggle with social or behavioral challenges. This stark contrast underscores the power of environmental factors in shaping our lives.Moreover, the impact of environmental factors is not limited to our formative years; it continues to shape us throughout our lives. Our experiences, relationships, education, and exposure to different cultures and ideas all contribute to our personal growth and development. Even as adults, we are constantly adapting and evolving in response to our ever-changing environments.Consider the remarkable transformations that can occur when individuals are exposed to new environments orlife-altering experiences. A person who grew up in a small, insular community may undergo a profound change in perspective and worldview upon attending university or traveling to different parts of the world. Their exposure to diverse cultures, ideas, and ways of life can challenge their preconceived notions and expand their horizons in ways that their genetic makeup alone could never have predicted.Additionally, the role of environmental factors in shaping our behavior and health cannot be overlooked. Numerous studies have shown that factors such as diet, exercise, stress levels, and exposure to toxins can have a profound impact on our physical and mental well-being, sometimes even overriding genetic predispositions. A person with a genetic predisposition for a certain condition may never develop it if they maintain a healthy lifestyle and avoid environmental triggers. Conversely, someone without such a genetic risk may develop the condition due to poor lifestyle choices or exposure to harmful environmental factors.Furthermore, the impact of environmental factors extends beyond the individual level and can shape entire societies and cultures. The opportunities, resources, and challenges present in a particular environment can influence the collective values, beliefs, and behaviors of a community. This, in turn, can shape the experiences and developmental trajectories of individuals within that community, perpetuating a cycle of environmental influence.It is also important to recognize that environmental factors are not limited to physical surroundings or external stimuli. Our social and emotional environments, including our relationships,support systems, and exposure to trauma or adversity, can have a profound impact on our mental health, resilience, and overall well-being. A supportive and nurturing environment can foster resilience and personal growth, while a toxic or traumatic environment can have lasting negative effects on an individual's development and behavior.Of course, it would be naive to suggest that environmental factors are the sole determinants of our lives. Genetics undoubtedly play a role, and the interplay between nature and nurture is complex and multifaceted. However, what I am arguing is that the environmental factors we are exposed to throughout our lives have a more profound and far-reaching impact on shaping who we become.In conclusion, while genetic inheritance lays the foundation for our physical and mental traits, it is the environmental factors that truly sculpt our personalities, behavior, and life trajectories. Our experiences, relationships, education, exposure to diverse cultures, and overall surroundings shape us in profound ways that our genetic makeup alone cannot account for. By recognizing the immense power of environmental factors, we can strive to create nurturing and enriching environments that foster personal growth, promote diversity, and unlock the fullpotential of every individual, regardless of their genetic inheritance.篇2Environment is More Important than HeredityWe've all heard the age-old debate - which plays a bigger role in shaping who we are, our genes or our environment? As a student, I've spent countless hours poring over nature vs nurture theories in psychology and genetics classes. And I have to say, after weighing the evidence, I firmly believe that environment trumps heredity when it comes to truly defining a person.Now, I'm not denying that we inherit certain traits and predispositions from our parents. Our genes undoubtedly influence factors like our appearance, base personality tendencies, and risk for certain diseases. But genes are not destiny. The genetic code may lay the foundation, but it's the environment that constructs the whole building.Think aboutit - we all know people who were raised in similar environments yet turned out drastically different. And conversely, those raised in entirely separate circumstances who share uncanny similarities. How can this be explained by heredity alone? The answer is environmental influence.The most powerful environmental factor is arguably the one we encounter from the moment we're born - our family life and upbringing. The values, habits, and mindsets instilled in us during our formative years leave an indelible mark. A child raised with love, encouragement and positive role models is far more likely to develop confidence, determination and emotional intelligence than one subjected to neglect or abuse, regardless of their genetic inheritance.Then there are our earliest experiences that quite literally shape our brain architecture. Research shows that elementos like nutrition, emotional stimulation, stress levels and even exposures to toxins can fundamentally rewire neural pathways and circuitry while the brain is in its peak years of developmental plasticity. Poor environmental inputs can stuntor compromise cognitive abilities and emotional regulation. Enriching environments have the opposite effect, optimizing brain function.As we grow, our social environments continue to profoundly impact our psychology and behavior through constant interaction and observational learning. The attitudes, customs and behavioral norms absorbed in our communities, schools, friend groups and other contexts of daily life get internalized asour own. That's how racial biases, gender stereotypes, cultural traditions and even polarizing political mindsets get perpetuated across generations, irrespective of genetic predilections.Our physical environments are equally formative, shaping our lifestyle habits, available opportunities and overall quality of life. For example, children raised in high-crime neighborhoods flooded with liquor stores but lacking parks and quality education are automatically exposed to more adverse environmental risk factors for poor health and academic outcomes compared to those from affluent communities. Environmental determinants play a major role in rates of obesity, addiction, chronic stress and literally hundreds of other conditions.Then we have to consider macro-level environmental impacts like institutional systems and historical events that create disparities in privilege, rights and living conditions based on characteristics like race, gender or socioeconomic status. The compounding effects of environmental disadvantages and lack of equal access to opportunities create systemic barriers that people from entire demographic groups must persistently overcome simply due to the circumstances they were born into.And let's not forget the escalating environmental crisis of climate change and ecological destruction, which regardless of heritage, threatens the safety and sustainability of environments on a global scale for all future generations.So while genes may predispose us to certain potentials and risks, it's ultimately the total lived experience that dictates how those genetic factors get expressed or suppressed. Identical twins raised in separate households share the same DNA but often develop distinct personalities, abilities and health profiles corresponding to the diverging environments they grew up in. Meanwhile, many skills, behaviors and even conditions believed heritable are consistently modified or acquired outright through targeted environmental conditioning and interventions.Of course, genes and environment are inextricably intertwined in complex ways, with environmental factors often triggering genetic propensities and vice versa. But the resounding conclusion from decades of research across numerous scientific disciplines is that environmental influences hold greater sway over the thoughts, feelings, actions, life outcomes and overall human experience of individuals. After all, even traits we assume as hard-wired biologically can be altered through factors like education, nutrition, relationships, careeropportunities, freedom and mobility, and many other external forces.At the end of the day, we all want to take responsibility and do what we can to create the most enriching, nurturing environments possible. Because while we may not be able to control the genes we inherit, we can shape the experiences and circumstances that turn genetic predispositions into realities. Creating positive environments is how we, as individuals and societies, can sculpt the highest version of our hereditary potential. No matter the environmental challenges or personal circumstances we're born into, it's the choices, opportunities, support systems and mindsets we create within those environments that ultimately map the trajectory of our lives and define who we become.篇3Environment is More Important than HeredityNature versus nurture is one of the oldest and most controversial debates in psychology and other related fields. This perennial debate revolves around the relative contributions of genetic inheritance and environmental factors to human development, behavior, and individual differences. While bothplay a crucial role in shaping who we are, I firmly believe that environment outweighs heredity in its profound impact on our lives.Firstly, our environment shapes our personalities, values, and beliefs from a very early age. From the moment we are born, we are exposed to a myriad of environmental influences, ranging from our family's socioeconomic status, cultural background, parenting styles, and educational opportunities, to the media we consume and the peers we associate with. These environmental factors act as a powerful force in molding our worldviews, shaping our perceptions, and influencing our decision-making processes.For instance, consider two individuals born with identical genetic makeup but raised in vastly different environments. One is raised in a nurturing, supportive family that values education and encourages intellectual curiosity, while the other is raised in an environment marred by poverty, neglect, and lack of educational resources. It is highly likely that the individual from the former environment would develop a stronger academic inclination, better social skills, and a more positive outlook on life, whereas the latter individual might struggle with variouschallenges and face greater obstacles in achieving their full potential.Moreover, our environment plays a crucial role in providing us with opportunities for growth, learning, and self-actualization.A stimulating and enriching environment can unlock hidden talents, foster creativity, and encourage personal development in ways that might not have been possible in a less conducive setting. For example, a child exposed to diverse cultural experiences, given access to quality education, and encouraged to explore their interests is more likely to develop a well-rounded personality and acquire valuable skills than a child deprived of such opportunities.Furthermore, environmental factors can significantly influence our physical and mental health. Exposure to pollutants, toxins, and unhealthy living conditions can contribute to various health issues, while access to nutritious food, clean water, and adequate healthcare can promote overall well-being. Similarly, growing up in an environment rife with stress, trauma, or abuse can have long-lasting psychological consequences, whereas a supportive and nurturing environment can foster resilience, emotional intelligence, and positive mental health outcomes.It is important to acknowledge that heredity does play a role in shaping certain aspects of our lives, such as our physical traits, predispositions to certain health conditions, and potentially some innate personality tendencies. However, even in these cases, environmental factors can either mitigate or exacerbate the effects of genetic inheritance. For example, while an individual may have a genetic predisposition to a particular disease, adopting a healthy lifestyle and receiving appropriate medical care can significantly reduce the risk of developing that condition.Furthermore, advances in fields like epigenetics have shed light on the complex interplay between genes and the environment. Epigenetics studies how environmental factors can influence gene expression and potentially alter phenotypic traits without modifying the underlying DNA sequence. This emerging field highlights the dynamic nature of gene-environment interactions and further reinforces the profound impact of environmental influences on human development and behavior.Critics of the environmental perspective often argue that genetic determinism is a more scientifically grounded approach, as it relies on objective biological data. However, this view fails to acknowledge the intricate complexities of human experience andthe multitude of environmental factors that shape our lives. While genetics may set certain parameters, it is the environment that ultimately determines how we navigate those parameters and the choices we make within those boundaries.In conclusion, while both heredity and environment play a role in shaping our lives, I firmly believe that the environment holds a greater sway in determining who we become. Our experiences, opportunities, and surroundings profoundly influence our personalities, values, beliefs, and life trajectories. By recognizing the power of environmental factors, we can strive to create nurturing, supportive, and enriching environments that foster personal growth, promote well-being, and unlock the full potential of every individual, regardless of their genetic inheritance.。

申论大作文：深度解析机构压力与挑战,把握审题要点,提升写作水平

申论大作文：深度解析机构压力与挑战，把握审题要点，提升写作水平英文回答：Title: The Importance of Institutions in Argumentative EssaysIn argumentative essays, institutions play a crucial role in supporting and strengthening the overall argument. Institutions refer to established organizations, systems, or structures that regulate and govern various aspects of society. Whether it is a political institution, educational institution, or social institution, they provide a framework for analysis and discussion in the context of argumentative essays.Firstly, institutions provide a solid foundation for the arguments presented in the essay. They offer a reference point for evaluating the effectiveness, fairness, and impact of certain policies or practices. For example, when discussing the issue of healthcare reform, it is necessary to consider the existing healthcare institutions and their strengths and weaknesses. By examining the current system, the essay can propose potential improvements or alternatives, backed by evidence and logicalreasoning.Secondly, institutions serve as a source of evidence and data. They collect and analyze information, conduct research, and publish reports that can be used to support the arguments made in the essay. These resources lend credibility and authority to the writer's claims. For instance, when writing about climate change, referring to scientific institutions and their findings can strengthen the argument for the urgent need for environmental action.Furthermore, institutions provide a broader perspective on the topic being discussed. They represent the collective wisdom and experience of experts in the field. By incorporating their perspectives and insights, the essay can present a more comprehensive and balanced argument. This demonstrates the writer's ability to consider multiple viewpoints and engage in critical thinking.In conclusion, institutions are essential in argumentative essays as they provide a solid foundation, evidence, and a broader perspective. They contribute to the credibility and effectiveness of the arguments presented. Therefore, it is crucial for writersto thoroughly research and incorporate the role of institutions in their essays to enhance the overall quality and impact of their work.中文回答：标题：机构在申论大作文中的重要性在申论大作文中，机构在支持和加强整体论点方面起着至关重要的作用。

中英经济财金对话

• 双方将继续按照各自国情，通过G20加强宏观经济政策协调，促进两国经济强劲、可持续和平衡增长。中国人民银行将继续实施稳健的货币政策，保持政策的稳定性和连续性，增强宏观调控的针对性和预见性，为经济平稳发展和经济结构调整与转型升级创造稳定的货币条件。英格兰银行将在短期采取措施推动经济复苏时，制定并沟通相关货币政策措施，实现中长期的经济可持续增长和物价稳定。（中国新闻网）
• Both sides will continue to strengthen coordination of macroeconomic policies through the G20 and, in line with country-specific circumstances, promote strong, balanced and sustainable growth in the two countries. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) will continue to adopt a prudent monetary policy and maintain policy stability and continuity while making macro-control more targeted and preemptive so as to create stable monetary conditions for steady growth, structural reform and economic transformation and upgrading. The Bank of England will set and communicate monetary policy in order to achieve sustainable growth and price stability over the medium and long term while taking measures to boost economic recovery in the short term.

制度研究英语

制度研究英语Institutional researchInstitutional research refers to the study and analysis of various systems, policies, and procedures within an organization or institution. It involves examining the effectiveness and efficiency of these systems and making recommendations for improvement.The purpose of institutional research is to provide evidence-based information and data to support decision-making, planning, and policy development within an organization. It helps leaders and administrators be informed about the current state of affairs and guides them in making informed decisions to enhance the overall effectiveness and performance of the institution.The scope of institutional research can vary depending on the organization or institution being studied. It can include analyzing enrollment and retention rates, student success and satisfaction, financial management and budgeting, faculty and staff performance, curriculum and program evaluation, and other aspects of institutional operations.Institutional research often involves both qualitative and quantitative research methods. Qualitative methods may include interviews, focus groups, and observations, while quantitative methods involve the collection and analysis of numerical data. The findings of institutional research are typically presented in reports and presentations to stakeholders within the organization, such as administrators, faculty, staff, and governing boards. Thesereports provide insights and recommendations for addressing challenges, improving processes, and achieving institutional goals. Overall, institutional research plays a crucial role in ensuring that organizations and institutions operate in an efficient and effective manner. It helps to identify areas for improvement, assess the impact of policies and initiatives, and make data-driven decisions to enhance the overall performance and success of the institution.。

制度经济学经典文献英文文章

制度经济学经典文献英文文章制度经济学是一个广泛的领域，有许多经典文献和英文文章可供参考。

以下是一些制度经济学的经典英文文献：1. The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith: This book, published in 1776, is the foundational text of economics and a starting point for the study of institutional economics. Smith’s work considers the nature and causes of wealth accumulation and how institutions shape economic behavior.2. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization by Max Weber: This book, published in 1922, is a foundational text in sociology and economics that explores the role of institutions in organizing economic life. Weber’s work considers the nature and causes of formal organization and the relationship between economic and political power.3. The Constitution of Liberty by Friedrich Hayek: This book, published in 1960, is a foundational text in the field of Austrian economics that explores the role of institutions in supporting individual freedom and the operation of markets. Hayek’s workconsiders the nature and causes of knowledge and spontaneous order and their relationship to the rule of law.4. The New Institutional Economics by Oliver E. Williamson: This book, published in 1981, is a foundational text in the field of new institutional economics that explores the role of institutions in shaping economic rela tionships and performance. Williamson’s work considers the nature and causes of transaction costs and their relationship to organizational form and governance.5. Invisible Hands: Self-Organization and the Political Economy of Markets by Donald MacKenzie: This book, published in 2008, is a foundational text in the field of economic sociology that explores the role of institutions in shaping market outcomes. MacKenzie’s work considers the nature and causes of self-organization and the relationship between micro-level behavior and macro-level outcomes.这些文献只是制度经济学领域的一小部分，但它们都是经典之作，对于理解制度经济学的基本概念和理论有着重要的贡献。

制度对英国的影响英语作文

制度对英国的影响英语作文Title: The Impact of Institutions on Britain: An Analysis。

Institutions play a crucial role in shaping thetrajectory of nations, and the United Kingdom stands as a prime example of this phenomenon. From its historical foundations to contemporary governance structures, institutions have left an indelible mark on British society, politics, and culture. This essay delves into the multifaceted impact of institutions on Britain, exploring their influence on various aspects of English life.First and foremost, the British monarchy stands as a quintessential institution that has profoundly influencedthe nation's identity and governance. Despite themonarchy's ceremonial role in modern Britain, it serves asa symbol of continuity and tradition, anchoring thecountry's sense of heritage. The institution of the monarchy not only preserves historical ties but alsocontributes to the tourism industry and fosters national unity during times of celebration or crisis.In addition to the monarchy, the British parliamentary system represents a cornerstone of the nation's political landscape. The Westminster system, characterized by parliamentary sovereignty and a two-house structure, has shaped the principles of representative democracy in Britain. Institutions such as the House of Commons and the House of Lords provide platforms for legislative debate, scrutiny, and decision-making, thereby ensuring accountability and the rule of law. Furthermore, the tradition of parliamentary democracy has influenced governance models worldwide, underscoring the global significance of British institutions.Moreover, the legal system in Britain, rooted in common law traditions, embodies another vital institutional framework. The judiciary, independent of political influence, interprets and upholds the law, safeguarding individual rights and liberties. Institutions like the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom serve as guardians ofthe constitution, adjudicating disputes and ensuring the balance of powers within the government. The legal framework not only fosters stability and predictability but also facilitates economic growth and social cohesion by providing a fair and accessible system of justice.Beyond politics and law, educational institutions play a pivotal role in shaping the intellectual landscape of Britain. The esteemed universities of Oxford and Cambridge, along with other higher education establishments, have a long-standing reputation for academic excellence and innovation. These institutions serve as hubs of knowledge creation and dissemination, nurturing future leaders and contributing to scientific, cultural, and technological advancements. The educational system not only cultivates human capital but also promotes social mobility and economic competitiveness, thus underpinning the nation's prosperity and global standing.Furthermore, cultural institutions such as museums, galleries, and theaters enrich the fabric of British society, fostering creativity, heritage preservation, andcommunity engagement. From the British Museum to the National Gallery, these institutions showcase the nation's rich cultural heritage and provide avenues for artistic expression and cultural exchange. By promoting cultural diversity and inclusivity, these institutions contribute to social cohesion and national identity, bridging divides and fostering mutual understanding among diverse communities.In conclusion, institutions exert a profound and far-reaching influence on the United Kingdom, shaping its governance, legal system, education, and culture. From the monarchy and parliamentary democracy to the legal framework and educational institutions, these foundational pillars define the essence of British society and contribute to its resilience and prosperity. As Britain continues to evolvein the 21st century, the enduring legacy of itsinstitutions remains central to its national character and global stature.。

什么是人力资本说英语作文

什么是人力资本说英语作文Title: Understanding Human Capital Theory。

Human capital theory is a fundamental concept in economics and sociology that emphasizes the importance of investing in human resources, such as education, training, and healthcare, to enhance productivity and economic growth. This theory suggests that individuals can increase their economic value and contribute more effectively to society through acquiring and developing skills, knowledge, and abilities.At its core, human capital theory posits that peopleare not just passive inputs to production processes but are valuable assets themselves. Just as physical capital, such as machinery and infrastructure, can be invested in to increase productivity, so too can human capital becultivated to achieve similar outcomes. This perspective shifts the focus from viewing labor solely as a cost to be minimized to recognizing it as an essential driver ofeconomic development.One of the key implications of human capital theory is the importance of education. Investments in education, both formal and informal, are seen as crucial for enhancing individuals' human capital. By acquiring knowledge and skills through education, individuals can improve their productivity, adaptability, and innovation capabilities, thereby contributing more effectively to economic activities. Moreover, education tends to have spillover effects, benefiting not only the individual but also the wider society by fostering innovation, promoting social cohesion, and reducing inequality.Another aspect highlighted by human capital theory is the significance of training and lifelong learning. In today's rapidly evolving economy, technological advancements and changing skill requirements necessitate continuous learning and skill upgrading. By investing in training programs and promoting lifelong learning opportunities, individuals can stay competitive in the labor market and adapt to new challenges and opportunities.Employers also play a crucial role in fostering human capital development by providing training and skill enhancement programs for their employees.Healthcare is another critical component of human capital theory. Healthy individuals are more productive, have higher earning potentials, and are better able to contribute to economic growth. Access to healthcare services, preventive care, and health education not only improves individuals' well-being but also enhances their human capital by reducing absenteeism, improving cognitive abilities, and increasing labor force participation.Human capital theory also underscores the importance of social and institutional factors in shaping human capital formation. Factors such as access to quality education, healthcare, infrastructure, and a supportive regulatory environment can significantly influence individuals'ability to invest in their human capital. Addressing disparities in access to education and healthcare, promoting gender equality, and reducing barriers tomobility and entrepreneurship are essential for maximizingthe potential of human capital across societies.In conclusion, human capital theory provides a valuable framework for understanding the role of human resources in economic development and prosperity. By recognizing individuals as valuable assets and investing in their education, training, and healthcare, societies can enhance productivity, foster innovation, and promote inclusive growth. Embracing human capital development as a priority can lead to more resilient, equitable, and prosperous societies in the long run.。

关于裁员的英语作文

关于裁员的英语作文Layoffs: The Impact on Individuals, Organizations, and the Economy.The term "layoff" evokes a sense of unease and uncertainty, conjuring images of individuals losing their jobs, organizations undergoing restructuring, and economic downturns. Layoffs, also known as downsizing or workforce reduction, have become an increasingly common occurrence in today's dynamic business landscape. While necessary at times to ensure organizational sustainability, layoffs can have profound implications for those affected and broader societal ramifications. Understanding the multifaceted nature of layoffs is crucial for mitigating their negative consequences and harnessing their potential for positive change.The Human Toll of Layoffs.Layoffs have a deeply personal impact on individuals,affecting not only their financial well-being but alsotheir sense of identity, self-worth, and psychological health. The sudden loss of employment can lead to feelings of anxiety, depression, and loss of control. Job displacement can disrupt personal and family routines, creating financial strain and relationship stress. Individuals may face challenges in securing new employment, especially if they lack up-to-date skills or have been out of the workforce for an extended period. The long-term effects of layoffs can include reduced lifetime earnings, lower job satisfaction, and increased risk of chronic health conditions.Organizational Implications of Layoffs.Layoffs can also have significant consequences for organizations. While they may lead to short-term cost savings, they can also create a ripple effect of negative outcomes. Layoffs can damage employee morale, reduce organizational commitment, and hinder innovation. The loss of experienced employees may lead to a loss ofinstitutional knowledge and expertise. Furthermore, layoffscan create a negative reputation for the organization, making it difficult to attract and retain top talent in the future.The Economic Impacts of Layoffs.Layoffs have both direct and indirect impacts on the economy. In the short term, they can reduce consumer spending and business investment, exacerbating economic downturns. Job losses can lead to an increase in unemployment rates, reducing overall economic output and tax revenue. However, in some cases, layoffs can also lead to increased productivity and efficiency, as organizations streamline their operations and focus on core competencies. The long-term economic effects of layoffs depend on a variety of factors, including the overall economic climate, the industry in which layoffs occur, and the availability of alternative employment opportunities.Mitigating the Negative Impacts of Layoffs.Recognizing the far-reaching consequences of layoffs,it is essential to implement measures to mitigate their negative effects. Organizations should consider the following strategies:Provide advance notice and support: Giving employees sufficient notice and providing support services, such as career counseling and outplacement assistance, can help them transition smoothly to new employment.Offer severance packages and benefits: Financial assistance and health insurance coverage can provide a safety net for displaced workers while they search for new jobs.Explore alternative options: Organizations should consider alternatives to layoffs, such as reduced work hours, furloughs, or job rotation, to minimize the impact on employees.Communicate clearly and transparently: Clear and honest communication throughout the layoff process can help reduce anxiety and foster understanding among employees.Harnessing the Potential of Layoffs for Positive Change.While layoffs can be challenging, they can also create opportunities for positive change. Organizations that embrace this perspective can leverage layoffs to:Realign with strategic goals: Layoffs can provide an opportunity to reevaluate organizational structure andalign it with changing market demands.Foster innovation: The disruption caused by layoffscan stimulate creativity and encourage employees to develop new ideas and processes.Improve efficiency: Streamlining operations and eliminating redundant roles can lead to increased productivity and cost savings.Upskill and reskill employees: Layoffs can be an impetus for organizations to invest in training and development programs, equipping employees with skills forfuture roles.Conclusion.Layoffs are a complex issue with far-reaching implications for individuals, organizations, and the economy. While they can be necessary to ensure organizational sustainability, it is crucial to mitigate their negative effects and harness their potential for positive change. By implementing responsible layoff practices, organizations can minimize the human toll, preserve organizational health, and create opportunities for future growth and innovation.。

债券市场(英文)

ContentsPart 1。

Research purpose and meaning of bond market………….。

2 Part 2. The definition of the bond market and bond………………。

.3一、Bond market (3)二、Bond (3)Part 3。

Running of the bonds in the market……………………………。

.3一、The classification of the bond market………………………………。

.3二、The classification of the bond (4)（一)、Government bonds (4)（二）、Financial bonds (8)（三）、Corporate bonds (10)Part 4。

The function of the bond market....................................。

12 Part 5。

How the develop our bond market. (12)Part6.Workingprocessrecords……………………………………………。

.13 Part7。

Summary……………………………………………………………。

15 Reference…………………………………………………。

……………。

16Part 1. Research purpose and meaning of bond marketPurpose：As we know，bond market is very important for our society. So we want to research the bond market and know about how to invest in the bond market。

机构的英语作文带翻译

机构的英语作文带翻译I have always been fascinated by the role and functions of institutions in society. Institutions play a crucialrole in shaping our lives and the way we interact with the world around us. They can be formal, such as government agencies, schools, and hospitals, or informal, such as family, community groups, and social clubs. No matter their form, institutions provide structure, organization, and support for our daily lives.Institutions serve a variety of purposes, from providing education and healthcare to maintaining social order and promoting cultural values. For example, schools are institutions that not only educate students but also socialize them by teaching them the norms and values of society. Similarly, religious institutions providespiritual guidance and a sense of community for their members.In addition to their functional roles, institutionsalso have a significant impact on individuals' identities and behaviors. For instance, growing up in a family with strong cultural traditions can shape a person's values and beliefs. Similarly, being part of a sports team or a social club can influence one's social interactions and sense of belonging.In my own life, I have experienced the influence of institutions in various ways. For example, my experience of attending a public school shaped my understanding of diversity and inclusion. The school's emphasis on multicultural education and acceptance of different perspectives has had a lasting impact on my worldview.Furthermore, my involvement in a community organization has provided me with a sense of belonging and purpose. Being part of a group that shares common goals and values has given me a support network and a platform for personal growth.Overall, institutions play a crucial role in shaping our lives and the way we engage with the world around us.They provide structure, support, and a sense of belonging, and their influence can be seen in our identities, behaviors, and beliefs.英文：我一直对社会中机构的角色和功能深感着迷。

坚定制度自信英语作文

坚定制度自信英语作文Title: Embracing Institutional ConfidenceIn today's rapidly evolving global landscape, the importance of institutional confidence cannot be overstated. Institutional confidence refers to the belief and trust in the systems, policies, and regulations that govern a country or society. It is a cornerstone of stability, progress, and prosperity.Firstly, institutional confidence is essential for maintaining social harmony. A society with strong institutional confidence is one where people believe that the rules and regulations are fair, transparent, and effective. This fosters a sense of equality and justice, reducing social tensions and conflicts. Conversely, a lack of institutional confidence can lead to disillusionment, distrust, and even social unrest.Secondly, institutional confidence is crucial for economic growth. A robust institutional framework provides the necessary stability and predictability for businesses to invest, innovate, and expand. It ensures that contracts are honored, property rights are protected, and competition is fair. Thiscreates an environment conducive to economic growth and prosperity.Moreover, institutional confidence plays a vital role in international relations. A country with strong institutional confidence is more likely to be respected and trusted by other nations. It can negotiate and cooperate more effectively on issues of global concern, such as climate change, trade, and security. This helps to advance shared interests and promote peace and stability in the international community.However, building and maintaining institutional confidence is not an easy task. It requires constant effort, commitment, and reform. Governments must ensure that their institutions are responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. They must uphold the principles of fairness, transparency, and accountability in their policies and decisions. Additionally, education and awareness campaigns can help to foster a culture of institutional confidence, encouraging people to understand, appreciate, and participate in the systems that govern their lives.In conclusion, institutional confidence is a vital asset for any country or society. It is essential for maintaining socialharmony, promoting economic growth, and advancing international relations. By building and maintaining strong institutions, we can create a more stable, prosperous, and just world for all.。

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The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior
Author(s): Brian J. Bushee
Source: The Accounting Review, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Jul., 1998), pp. 305-333
Published by: American Accounting Association
Stable URL: /stable/248542
Accessed: 07/12/2009 09:44
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