外文翻译--红利和资本收益的税收策略和在双重税收标准下的分红决策
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外文文献翻译译文
一、外文原文
原文:
Tax treatment of dividends and capital gains and the dividend
decision under dual income tax
The paper analyses efficiency aspects of a dual income tax system with a higher tax on capital gains than dividends. It argues that apart from the distortions to investments claimed in earlier literature, the system puts even more emphasis in creating incentives for entrepreneurs to participate in tax planning. The paper suggests that the owner of a closely held company can avoid all personal taxes on entrepreneurial income by two tax-planning strategies. The first is the avoidance of distributions, which would be taxed at the tax rate on labour income. These funds would instead be invested in the financial markets. The second strategy is a distribute and call-back policy, converting retained profits into new equity capital. Interestingly, the outcome is that investment in real capital is not distorted in the long-run equilibrium. Empirical evidence using micro data is also provided.
The taxation of dividends has attracted renewed attention in public economics literature in recent years, partly because of the US 2003 tax reform which introduced considerable cuts to the tax rates on dividend income. Several studies have used the reform as a “natural”experiment to bring new understanding on the effects of dividend taxation on corporate behaviour. One of the issues is how the change in the relative tax burden between dividends and capital gains affected dividend pay-out behaviour (Poterba 2004; Chetty and Saez 2005; Gordon and Dietz 2006).
Another topical theme in public economics is income shifting between different tax bases. While the US literature has mainly focused on shifting between corporate and individual income tax bases (Gordon and Slemrod 2000), the European debate also pays attention to the incentives generated by the tax rate differentials
between individual labour and capital income (Sørensen 2005b). On the background is the recent trend towards low nominal tax rates on capital income.
The Nordic dual income taxation (DIT), which combines progressive taxation of labour income with proportional tax on capital income, has received growing attention in the international debate.1 As the literature explains, there are several theoretical and practical arguments in favour of DIT. However, since there is a large tax-rate gap between the proportional rates on capital income and the top marginal rates levied on labour income, the system is likely to provide incentives for tax-minimising behaviour. Another problem, when implementing DIT, is how to deal with the fact that entrepreneurial income is a result of a combined contribution of capital and labour inputs. To tackle these issues, the Nordic countries have set up tax rules, among them the so-called splitting rules, for the taxation of owners of closely held corporations (CHC) and unincorporated firms. These splitting rules calculate the capital income part as an imputed return on the firm’s assets and treat the residual as labour income.
The question of whether the tax rules of income-splitting have behavioural implications has attracted some attention among Nordic tax economists. Hagen and Sørensen (1998) provide a verbal analysis of the problem and Kari (1999), Lindhe etal. (2002, 2004) and Hietala and Kari (2006) report on the effects on investment decisions using standard corporate tax models. Kanniainen (2007) discusses the effects on entrepreneurship. Some studies have also dealt with the issue of income-shifting. Alstadsæter (2003) examines the effects of the previous Norwegian DIT rules on tax planning, especially the choice of the organizational form. Fjærli and Lund (2001) provide empirical evidence on income-shifting between labour income and capital income bases.
This paper analyses the taxation of closely held companies (CHC) under the variant of DIT applied in Finland since 1993. It centres on tax-planning, especially on how dividends and financial investments should be arranged to maximise after-tax income in the long run. Evidence using a large set of micro data is also provided.
The Finnish DIT combines a broad-based flat tax on capital income with a progressive tax on labour income (Table 1). The tax rate difference between the top
marginal tax rate (MTR) and the proportional capital income tax rate was close to 26% in 2004 and even larger before the gradual MTR cuts implemented in the last decade. There is relief on owner-level taxation of dividends so that in practice owners receive normal dividends tax-free.3 Realised capital gains from the sale of shares are taxed at the normal tax rate on capital income. Dividends received from a CHC are split into capital income and earned income by considering an imputed return on the firm’s net assets as capital income (normal dividend) and categorising the residual as earned income (excess dividend). The presumptive rate used to calculate the capita income portion of dividends was 9.6% and the capital base was defined as the assets in the firm’s tax accounts.
The Nordic countries have adopted differing definitions of the capital base (Hagen and Sørensen 1998; Lindhe et al. 2002). Under the Norwegian gross method, the base is measured as the firm’s non-financial gross assets.4 Sweden’s approach is to define the base as the acquisition cost of the shares. Finland chose a third alternative and defines the base as the firm’s net business assets. The Finnish base thus includes all types of business assets, including financial assets, and deducts liabilities. As is shown in this paper, this definition has interesting implications for firm behaviour and also for the efficiency of the tax system.
Besides the splitting system, another unconventional feature of the Finnish tax system is that it has combined single taxation of dividends with non-relieved taxation of capital gains, the latter implying double taxation of retained profits. Sweden and Norway took a different approach in their DIT reforms in the early 1990s: both countries aimed at neutrality. While Norway’s strategy was to implement single taxation of both distributed and retained profits, Sweden chose the other extreme: double taxation of both.
Tax literature suggests that the relative tax burden on distributed and retained profits may induce higher dividend distributions (e.g. Poterba 2004; Gordon and Dietz 2006). Furthermore, Sinn (1987) shows it to establish incentives for what he calls a distribute-and-call-back policy, where profits are converted into new equity capital by distributing them and then collecting them back through new share issues. This paper
presents a formal analysis of the financial behaviour of a CHC under the Finnish dual income tax. It argues that the non-neutralities of the tax system encourage entrepreneurs to undertake two specific tax-planning strategies by which these agents may avoid personal taxation entirely. Capital gains taxation is shown to be important in understanding the observed dividend behaviour. In the theoretical part, a standard deterministic corporate tax model is used (Auerbach 1979; Sinn 1987) augmented here by financial capital. The modelling of the Finnish dual income tax closely follows Kari (1999) and Lindhe et al. (2002).
Observe the non-standard features of the entire dynamic solution to the firm’s problem. Dividends are paid during the (second) real investment growth phase, and not only in the steady state. In this respect, the outcome differs from Sinn (1991), who shows that under a linear dividend tax profits are only distributed in the steady state. We also observe an unambiguous incentive to invest excess profits in financial assets. The firm is not indifferent in respect of the use of funds, but strictly prefers investment in financial assets. Furthermore, no personal taxes are paid on distributed profits. This is because the imputation credit eliminates taxes on normal dividends and because excess dividends, subject to a high tax burden, are never paid out.
Our theoretical model adds financial investments to the standard investment model for CHCs. The model predicts that under the Finnish DIT, which splits dividends from a CHC using the firm’s net assets as the capital base, the owner avoids taxes on earned income using firm-level financial investments as the tax-planning vehicle. This is shown to eliminate the tax distortion to real investment decisions reported in earlier literature.
The firm’s growth path contains several non-standard features. Unlike in the standard dividend-tax model by Sinn (1991), here the firm pays out dividends not only in the steady-state but also during its growth path. The CHCs dividend policy is determined by the rule that the maximum amount of normal dividends is distributed. This occurs both in the second real investment regime and the financial investment regime. Moreover, the CHC faces an incentive to collect new equity at the same time as it pays out dividends (distribute-and-call-back policy). This incentive is induced by
the higher tax on retained profits (capital gains) than distributions in the Finnish tax system.
The opposite holds when considering financial holdings; The probability of distributing maximum normal dividends increases when the corporation’s financial holdings increase. This is evident also when we are considering only dividend-paying corporations. This finding gives strong support to our theoretical result of the investment behaviour in CHCs. We argued that firms have an incentive to increase net assets by investing in financial assets and simultaneously pay dividend the maximum amount taxable as capital income. These conclusions provide support for the findings of investment behaviour and dividend policy of the firm presented in the theoretical part of the article.
The owner dummies are contained in the two last estimations. Because of the data restrictions we are now only considering dividend-paying corporations. When the owner of the corporation is another firm or foreign, the probability of dividends being distributed to the maximum amount of normal dividends decreases. This is exactly what can be expected for tax reasons. The results are consistent with the intuitive presentation in Fig.
In the first estimations, the entire data set is considered. As can be expected, profit has a very significant influence on dividend distribution. It can also be seen that the more the firm invests in real assets, the less it pays dividends; real investments and dividends are more or less alternative uses of funds. They also take in all likelihood places in different growth stages. The influence of financial investments on dividends is positive and significant. This is very much in line with expectations.
In the second estimations, we consider corporations that have distributed dividends the maximum amount of normal dividends. In this case we require that dividends correspond 7–12% return on the fir m’s net assets. There are few differences comparing to the results in the previous case; the significance of financial holdings variable increases, whilst the significance of profit and real investments decreases. Compared to the previous case, this reflects that there are also other factors than profitability aspects behind the dividend decision of these corporations.
We conclude by noticing that the fixed-effects model seems to fit the data well:the results of the Hausman specification tests reject the null hypothesis of random effects. This is consistent with our expectation of the importance of effects that vary across corporations but are constant over time.
Source: Seppo Kari · Hanna Karikallio,2007.“Tax treatment of dividends and capital gains and the dividend decision under dual income tax” . Int Tax Public Finance. October.pp. 427-1431.
二、翻译文章
译文:
红利和资本收益的税收策略和在双重税收标准下的分红决策
这篇论文有效分析了在高额赋税的情况下,资本收益于红利相比更有效的部分。
这篇文章讨论之前除了提到早期文献中说的投资不合理,还强调了要加强企业参与税收计划的积极性。
这篇文章还建议私营企业的经营者能够通过采取双重税收策略计划来避免个人在企业中全部的所得税。
第一个策略是避免分配,必须按照个人收入的税率来纳税。
这些资金可以投资在金融市场。
第二个策略是分配与召回策略,把现存利益转换成新的股票资金。
有趣的是,在实际投资中的结果在长期的平衡没有歪曲。
最近几年中在公共经济学中红利问题重新引起了人们的关注,部分原因是美国2003年的税收改革在红利收入的基础上实行了大规模的减轻税率的政策。
几个研究把改革作为一次试验。
这个试验会给企业经营活动中的红利税收带来影响。
其中的一个问题是红利和资本收益在相关课税负担中如何变化。
这些都会影响红利的付出款项。
另一个在公共经济学中很热门的话题是收入在不同的课税基础上的转移。
尽管美国经济学主要集中在企业和个人所得税上的转移。
欧洲的竞争也集中在个人的税收负担和资本收益在不同税率下利益驱动。
最近在这样的背景下企业的资本
收入朝向有名无实的税率趋势发展。
北欧的双重收入征税,是把劳动收入的累进税率和在资本收益中的比例税结合在一起。
这个问题也在国际上引起了广泛的关注。
正如字面解释的一样,有一些理论和实际的争论支持双重收入征税。
然而,资本收益中的比例税和劳动收入最高的边际率有很大的税率差别。
当实施双重收入征税时最低税率的动机可以解决税率差别这一问题,企业的收入是企业贡献和劳动收入结合的结果。
为了解决这些问题,北欧国家已经制定了税收规则,对他们而言是所谓的分担原则。
对于私营企业和未成为法人企业的公司。
这些分担规则把资本收入部分不作为公司的固定资产,把剩余的部分看做是劳动者的收入。
在是否收入分配的税收规则行为上吸引了北欧国家经济学家的注意。
哈根和森对于这个问题进行了书面的分析,他们使用标准的税收模式发表了一篇是否收入分配的税收规则对投资决定影响的文章,讨论了对企业的影响。
一些研究也涉及到了收入转移的问题。
检查了以前的挪威原则对于税收策略的影响,特别是组织形式的选择,提供了劳动收入和资本收入基础的经验证据。
这篇文章分析了自从1993年私营企业在不同制度下在荷兰的应用。
它集中研究税收计划,特别是关于红利和金融投资怎么样在长期过程中获得最大的税后利润。
证据使用了大量微型的数据。
芬兰制度结合了资金收入的广泛税收和累进收入的税收。
最大的差额利润税率和资金收入税率之间是不同的。
在2004年比例税收税率接近26%,甚至在过去10年差额利润逐步减少。
在个人税收水平上股利分红被减免,实际上,有者得到正规的红利税收免税。
把股本从股票的销售部分扣出来。
这些税是资本收入的正规税率。
从私营企业得到的红利被分成了资本收入和所得,并且考虑把企业的净收入作为资本收入,把剩余的收入作为所得。
资本收入的9.6%用来去计算分红,分红后的资本被定义为企业税收的净得。
北欧国家已经对资本进行不同定义。
在挪威的通常计算方法中,企业国内非金融总资产做为计算的基础。
芬兰选择1/3并且定义了企业的净商业资本作为计算基础。
因此芬兰基础包括了各种类型的商业资本,包括扣除债务的金融资本。
正向这篇论文所提到的一样。
这个定义对于企业行为和税收的有效性都有很有趣的暗示。
除了分担体系,另一个不是传统的芬兰税收系统的特点是它把单独的红利税率和非相关的资金所得联系在一起,后者指的是既定利率的双重税率。
瑞典和挪威在19世纪90年代对于这个制度采取了不同的方法,两国都保持中立状态。
但是挪威的策略是实施分配和保留利润的单独税率。
瑞典采取了另一种极端的方法,即采取双重税率。
在这个方面芬兰采取非中立的方法,表明了税收对于分红和金融决定来说十分重要。
分红少而税收压力大也许会刺激高的红利分配。
例外,斯恩表示这个税收体系为他建立所谓的分配策略带来了动力,在这个策略中利润被转换为新的股本。
股本是把利润分配并且通过新的股份回收得到的。
观察整个动态解答企业的非标准特点。
股息在产权投资成长阶段是有偿而且是相对稳定的。
但此结论与斯姆(1991)不同,在一种线性纯收益的税收下赢利。
我们从财政收入也观察到一个刺激投资获得超额利润的现象,企业关于资金使用不是冷漠的,而是更喜欢对金融性资产的投资。
此外,没有哪个人的个人所得税是在分配后的利润中支付的。
信用抵消了正常股息的税收,依据高税金负担的剩余股息,从不用交税,这是因为正常的税信用扣除了多余的股息。
我们金融投资的理论模型增加了CHCs标准投资模型。
该模型预测芬兰在DIT下,CHC的股息用企业净资产作为计算基础,所有者可以在金融投资时对劳动收入进行税收筹划。
这在更早的报告文学中证明,企业应该在降低税负时做出投资决策。
中小企业成长道路中包含几个非标准特点。
不同于森姆的标准股息税模型(1991),此模型下企业在它的成长道路期间稳定付出股息。
裁决取决于CHCs 股息政策分布最大金额正常股息。
这种情况发生时,利用金融外商的政权直接投资。
此外,需积极去收集新股在同一时间内支付股息的信息,这个比芬兰的税收制度,更激励企业获得更高利润。
非线性模型与典型的数据相结合,在这些情况下,高斯混合模型(GMM)的方法是一种很好的选择。
所有相关性的假设都没有忽视误差大的问题。
这些假设和初始条件所提及的问题可以轻松通过估计固定线性概率效应模型解决。
我们估计时也可以使用高斯混合(GMM)的线性概率模型,其结果比较吻合随机效应模型。
他们未提示这些研究结果似乎是相当强劲的不同模型的规格说明细看一遍。
这些研究似乎对不同模型详细解释了一遍。
相反,在考虑金融控股时,企业正常分红派息的概率增加,这是明显的只考虑分红企业。
这一发现能够提供很强的理论来支持我们CHCs投资行为。
我们认为,企业在一个诱因的情况下,提高投资金融资产的净资产同时支付股利的最高金额应税作为资本收入。
这些结论支持了投资行为以及股利政策。
有些数据吸引我们现在只考虑分红企业,即企业的主人是另一家母公司或外国人。
红利被分发后,股息的数量大大下降了,这一结果也比较吻合直观的表现图。
因变量滞后是极显著的因素,表明了应该控制财务与不可观察性等因素, 我在一定的程度上坚持芬兰公司的红利政策。
我们在第一次估算中对整个数据集中考虑。
可以预料,利润对股利分配有非常显著的影响,可以也看到更多的企业投资固定资产, 这样可以少支付股息。
真正的投资和股息或多或少都在多种不同的用途,它们有可能用在企业不同的生长阶段。
金融投资对股利的影响积极而又重大。
这些都非常符合期望。
我们最后关注了固定模型合适的数据,这些都符合我们的期望,但对企业的影响不尽相同。
在第二次估算下,我们认为企业分配的股利金额高于正常的股息。
在这个例子中,我们要求股息对应的回报率是企业净资产额的33%。
在以前的案例中有一些差别对比的结果,金融控股以及增加变量使得实际投资利润下降。
从以前的情况中反映,是其他因素而不是股息盈利能力决定企业的发展。
我们最后关注了固定模型合适的数据,这些都符合我们的期望,但对企业的影响不尽相同。
出处:[美]玛丽亚.沃达森,《红利和资本收益的税收策略和在双重税收标准下的分红决策》,小型商业经济学,第41卷(4),2007(8):101-105.。