of Crime Act 2001
史泰龙电影
个人作品演员作品第一滴血5Rambo Ⅴ（2013）[5]越狱The Tomb（2012）[6]爆头Bullet to the Head（2012）敢死队2The Expendables2（2012）敢死队The Expendables（2010）兰博4第一滴血4Rambo Ⅳ（2008）洛奇6Rocky Balboa（Rocky Ⅵ）（2007）特工小子3Spy Kids 3-D: Game Over（2003）的士速递3Le premier passager(uncredited)(2003)[7]摊牌Shade（2003）绝地狂龙Avenging Angelo（2002）狙击杀手D-Tox（2002）生死极速Driven（2001）美利坚向英雄致敬America: A Tribute to Heroes（2001）大开杀戒Get Carter（2000）警察帝国Cop Land（1997）龙出生天Daylight（1996）最后刺客Assassins（1995）超时空战警Judge Dredd（1995）炸弹专家The Specialist（1994）绝岭雄风Cliffhanger（1993）史泰龙超级战警Demolition Man（1993）母子威龙Stop! Or My Mom Will Shoot（1992）弹指威龙Oscar（1991）洛奇5Rocky V（1990）破茧威龙Lock Up（1989）探戈与加什Tango & Cash（1989）第一滴血3Rambo Ⅲ（1988）超越颠峰Over the Top（1987）铁胆威龙Cobra（1986）洛奇4Rocky Ⅳ（1985）第一滴血2Ramb First Blood Part Ⅱ（1985）纽约司机Rhinestone（1984）第一滴血First Blood（1982）洛奇3Rocky Ⅲ（1982）胜利大逃亡Victory（1981）洛奇2Rocky Ⅱ（1979）陋巷风云Paradise Alley（1978）洛奇Rocky（1976）夺命狂奔Death Race 2000（1975）狂野少年Lord's of Flatbush,The（1974）叛逆者Rebel（1973）香蕉Bananas（1971）克鲁特Klute（1971）意大利军团Italian Stallion（1970）意大利种马Party at Kitty and Stud's（1970）导演作品第一滴血5Rambo Ⅴ敢死队The Expendables（2010）第一滴血4Rambo Ⅳ（2008）洛奇Ⅵ：勇者无惧Rocky Balboa (Rocky Ⅵ）（2007）洛奇Ⅳ：天下无敌Rocky Ⅳ（1985）空中监狱之塔Staying Alive（1983）洛奇ⅢRocky Ⅲ（1982）洛奇ⅡRocky Ⅱ（1979）陋巷风云Paradise Alley（1978）编剧作品敢死队The Expendables（2010）第一滴血4Rambo Ⅳ（2008）洛奇Ⅵ：勇者无惧Rocky Balboa（Rocky Ⅵ）（2007）二人游戏Two Can Play That Game（2001）生死极速Driven（2001）最后刺客Assassins（1995）绝岭雄风Cliffhanger（1993）洛奇V：龙吟虎啸Rocky V（1990）第一滴血3Rambo Ⅲ（1988）洛奇Ⅳ：天下无敌Rocky Ⅳ（1985）第一滴血2Ramb First Blood Part Ⅱ（1985）龙飞凤舞Staying Alive（1983）洛奇ⅢRocky Ⅲ（1982）第一滴血First Blood（1982）洛奇ⅡRocky Ⅱ（1979）陋巷风云Paradise Alley（1978）洛奇ⅠRocky（1976）狂野少年Lord's of Flatbush,The（1974）编辑本段获奖记录第49届奥斯卡金像奖最佳影片获奖《洛奇》第49届奥斯卡金像奖最佳导演获奖《洛奇》第49届奥斯卡金像奖最佳剪辑获奖《洛奇》第49届奥斯卡金像奖最佳男主角提名《洛奇》第49届奥斯卡金像奖最佳原创剧本提名《洛奇》第34届美国电影金球奖最佳剧情片获奖《洛奇》第34届美国电影金球奖剧情类最佳男主角提名《洛奇》第34届美国电影金球奖最佳编剧提名《洛奇》2009年威尼斯国际电影节向西尔维斯特·史泰龙颁发电影人荣誉最高奖。
NIJ010106防弹服防弹性能标准-英文
ABOUT THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CORRECTIONSSTANDARDS AND TESTING PROGRAMThe Standards and Testing Program is sponsored by the Office of Science and Technology of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The program responds to the mandate of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which directed the Office of Science and Technology to establish and maintain performance standards in accordance with the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Public Law 104–113) to test and evaluate law enforcement technologies that may be used by Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also directed the Office of Science and Technology to establish and maintain a program to certify, validate, and mark or otherwise recognize law enforcement technology products that conform to the standards mentioned above.The Standards and Testing Program is a basic and applied research effort that determines the technological needs of justice system agencies, sets minimum performance standards for specific devices, tests commercially available equipment against those standards, and disseminates the standards and the test results to criminal justice agencies nationally and internationally.The Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology develops voluntary national performance standards for compliance testing to ensure that individual items of equipment are suitable for use by criminal justice agencies. The standards are based upon laboratory testing and evaluation of representative samples of each item of equipment to determine the key attributes, develop test methods, and establish minimum performance requirements for each essential attribute. In addition to the technical standards, OLES also produces technical reports and user guidelines that explain in nontechnical terms the capabilities of available equipment.The National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC), operated by a grantee, coordinates a national compliance testing program conducted by independent laboratories. The standards developed by OLES serve as performance benchmarks against which commercial equipment is measured.Publications are available at no charge through NLECTC. Some documents are also available online at https:///justnet.html. To request a document or additional information, call 800–248–2742 or 301–519–5060, or write:National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center2277 Research Boulevard, Mailstop 8J20850MDRockville,asknlectc@E-mail:World Wide Web address: This page intentionally left blank.U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of Justice ProgramsNational Institute of JusticeBallistic Resistance of Body ArmorNIJ Standard–0101.06Supersedes:NIJ 2005 Interim Requirements, Ballistic Resistance of Body Armor (August 2005) Also supersedes:NIJ Standard–0101.04 Rev. A, Ballistic Resistance of Personal Body Armor (June 2001) Coordination by:Office of Law Enforcement StandardsNational Institute of Standards and TechnologyGaithersburg, MD 20899–8102Prepared for:National Institute of JusticeOffice of Science and TechnologyWashington, DC 20531July 2008NCJ 223054N ATIONAL I NSTITUTE OF J USTICEDavid HagyDirectorJohn MorganDeputy Director for Science and TechnologyMarc CaplanChief, Operational Technologies DivisionDebra StoePhysical Scientist, Operational Technologies DivisionThe technical effort to develop this standard was conducted underInteragency Agreement 2003–IJ–R–029.This standard was formulated by the Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The participants in the research andrevision of this standard were:Kirk Rice, Program Manager, Weapons and Protective SystemsMichael A. Riley, Program Manager, Weapons and Protective Systems, Testing and EvaluationAmanda Forster, Materials Research EngineerThe preparation of this standard was sponsored by the National Institute of Justice.F OREWORDThis document, NIJ Standard–0101.06, “Ballistic Resistance of Body Armor,” is a minimum performance standard developed in collaboration with the Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). It is produced as part of the Standards and Testing Program of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. This standard is a technical document that specifies the minimum performance requirements that equipment must meet to satisfy the requirements of criminal justice agencies and the methods that shall be used to test this performance. This standard is used by the NIJ Voluntary Compliance Testing Program (CTP) to determine which body armor models meet the minimum performance requirements for inclusion on the NIJ Compliant Products List. In addition, manufacturers, criminal justice agencies, and others may use the tests described in this standard to determine whether a particular armor design meets their own requirements. Users are strongly encouraged to have this testing conducted in accordance with the NIJ CTP. Procurement officials may also refer to this standard in their purchasing documents and require that equipment offered for purchase meet or exceed these requirements.This document is a testing and performance standard and provides precise and detailed test methods. Additional requirements, processes, and procedures for CTP participants are detailed in the NIJ Voluntary CTP Administrative Procedures Manual. Those seeking guidance concerning the selection and application of body armor should refer to the most recent revision of the Selection and Application Guide to Personal Body Armor, NIJ Guide 100, which is published as a separate document and explains in nontechnical language how to select equipment that provides the level of performance required by a purchasing agency.Publication of this revision of the standard does not invalidate or renderunsuitable any body armor models previously determined by NIJ to becompliant to either the NIJ 2005 Interim Requirements or the NIJ Standard–0101.04 Rev. A Requirements. While it may not necessary to remove theseexisting armors from service, agencies are advised to always require theirprocurements to meet or exceed the most recent and up-to-date version ofthis standard.Personal body armor that is independently tested to this standard bymanufacturers, purchasers, or other parties will not be considered as NIJ compliant unless the body armor is submitted and tested through the NIJ CTP and found incompliance with this standard.When manufacturers seek NIJ compliance of their armor to this standard and thearmor contains unique materials or forms of construction that may not have beenanticipated when this standard was drafted, NIJ may modify the test methods of the standard to take those features into account. If NIJ determines that the model meets the requirements of the standard, modified test methods, and the NIJ CTP, NIJ will include the armor on the NIJ Compliant Products List.NIJ standards are subjected to continued research, development, testing, review, and revision. This standard and its successors will be re-evaluated and modified as necessary. Because of ongoing advancements in ballistic-resistant materials, changes to armor designs and manufacturing techniques, and improvements in testing methods, NIJ reserves the right to withhold NIJ compliance status for body armor that meets the current requirements but is deemed by NIJ to pose a risk to officer safety. NIJ also reserves the right to alter or modify existing test methods and/or requirements to address perceived weaknesses in varying designs of body armor submitted for inclusion on the NIJ Compliant Products List.Technical comments and recommended revisions are welcome. Please send all written comments and suggestions to the Deputy Director, Office of Science and Technology, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, 810 Seventh Street, NW, Washington, DC 20531. Before citing this or any other NIJ standard in a contract document, users should verify that the most recent edition of the standard is used. The most recent edition will be available on the Justice Technology Information Network (JUSTNET) at , or write to the Director, Office of Law Enforcement Standards, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8102, Gaithersburg, MD 20899.John Morgan, Deputy Director for Science andTechnology, National Institute of JusticeC ONTENTS Foreword (v)Commonly Used Symbols And Abbreviations (xi)1. Purpose And Scope (1)2. NIJ Body Armor Classification (3)2.1 Type IIA (9 mm; .40 S&W) (3)2.2 Type II (9 mm; .357 Magnum) (3)2.3 Type IIIA (.357 SIG; .44 Magnum) (3)2.4 Type III (Rifles) (4)2.5 Type IV (Armor Piercing Rifle) (4)2.6 Special Type (4)3. Definitions (5)4. Sample Requirements and Laboratory Configuration (11)4.1 Test Samples (11)4.1.1 Flexible Vests and Jackets (11)4.1.2 Hard Armors and Plate Inserts (12)4.1.3 Accessory Ballistic Panels (17)4.1.4 Workmanship (17)4.1.5 Labeling (17)4.1.6 Armor Carriers With Removable Ballistic Panels (20)4.1.7 Armors With Built-In Inserts or Trauma Packs (20)4.2 Laboratory Configuration and Test Equipment (20)4.2.1 Range Configuration (20)4.2.2 Test Rounds and Barrels (22)4.2.3 Velocity Measurement Equipment (22)4.2.4 Armor Submersion Equipment (23)4.2.5 Armor Backing Material (23)5. Flexible Armor Conditioning Protocol (27)5.1 Purpose and Scope (27)5.2 Pretest Parameters (27)5.2.1 Storage of Armors (27)5.2.2 Pretest Calibrations (27)5.2.3 Test Conditions (27)5.3 Laboratory Configuration and Test Equipment (28)5.3.1 General Parameters (28)5.3.2 Controls (29)5.3.3 Test Interruption (29)5.3.4 Procedure (30)6. Hard Armor Conditioning Protocol (33)6.1 Purpose and Scope (33)6.2 Pretest Parameters (33)6.2.1 Storage of Armors (33)6.2.2 Pretest Calibrations (33)6.2.3 Test Conditions (33)6.3 Laboratory Configuration and Test Equipment (35)6.3.1 General Parameters (35)6.3.2 Controls (35)6.3.3 Test Interruption (35)6.3.4 Conditioning Procedure (36)7. Ballistic Test Methods (39)7.1 Purpose and Scope (39)7.2 Test Order (39)7.3 Workmanship Examination (39)7.3.1 Armor Carriers and Ballistic Panel Covers (39)7.3.2 Ballistic Panels (39)7.3.3 Label Examination (39)7.4 Sampling (40)7.5 Sample Acclimation (40)7.5.1 Inserts (40)7.6 Fair Hit Requirements for All Ballistic Tests (40)7.6.1 Minimum Shot-to-Edge Distance (40)7.6.2 Minimum Shot-to-Shot Distance (40)7.7 Backing Material Preparation and Sample Mounting for All Ballistic Tests (41)7.7.1 Backing Material Fixture Preparation (41)7.7.2 Mounting Armor for Ballistic Testing (41)7.8 Perforation and Backface Signature Test (P-BFS) (43)7.8.1 Shot Location Marking (43)7.8.2 Armor Submersion (45)7.8.3 Test Threats for P-BFS Tests (45)7.8.4 Test Duration (45)7.8.5 Requirements for Number of Shots and Number of Armor Samples (45)7.8.6 P-BFS Test for Special Type Armor (49)7.8.7 P-BFS Test for Accessory Ballistic Panels (49)7.8.8 P-BFS Performance Requirements (49)7.9 Ballistic Limit (BL) Determination Test (50)7.9.1 Requirements for Number of BL Tests and Test Samples (51)7.9.2 Test Procedure Requirements (51)7.9.3 Backing Material Conditioning (52)7.9.4 Data Set Tabulation (52)7.9.5 Ballistic Limit Performance Requirements (52)8. References (53)APPENDIX A –Acceptable Bullets for Handloading (55)APPENDIX B –Common Special Type Threats (57)APPENDIX C –Armor Sizing Templates (59)APPENDIX D –Analysis of Backface Signature Data (65)APPENDIX E –Analysis of Ballistic Limit Data (69)APPENDIX F –Explanatory Materials (71)T ABLESTable 1. Armor samples required for each test threat (flexible vests and jackets) (11)Table 2. Uniform thermal exposure conditions (33)Table 3. Thermal cycle testing conditions (34)Table 4. P-BFS performance test summary (46)Table 5. Number of shots and fair hits on each size of new condition armor samples (47)Table 6. Number of shots and fair hits on each size of conditioned samples (47)Table 7. Angle of incidence locations (48)Table 8. Baseline ballistic limit determination test summary (50)Table 9. Test parameters and requirements for ballistic limit test (51)Table 10. Acceptable bullets (55)Table 11. Special type threats of particular concern to law enforcement (58)Table 12. Surface areas of armor sizing templates (59)Table 13. Minimum allowable surface areas for production armor (59)Table 14. Maximum allowable surface areas for production armor (59)Table 15. k Factors for 80 % Probability with 95 % Confidence (67)F IGURESFigure 1. Angle of incidence (5)Figure 2. Examples of BFS measurements (6)Figure 3. Sample quantity and utilization for armor Types IIA, II, and IIIA (14)Figure 4. Sample quantity and utilization for flexible armor of Type III, Type IV, and Type Special (15)Figure 5. Sample quantity and utilization for hard armors and plate inserts of Type III (16)Figure 6. Sample quantity and utilization for hard armors and plate inserts of Type IV (16)Figure 7. Example label for test samples (19)Figure 8. Test range configuration (21)Figure 9. General pretest drop locations (25)Figure 10. Flexible armor conditioning test interruption flow chart (31)Figure 11. Test interruption flowchart for hard armor (37)Figure 12. Proposed mechanical durability test apparatus (38)Figure 13. Acceptable strapping methods (42)Figure 14. General armor panel impact locations (front and back) (44)S TANDARD S PECIFIC A BBREVIATIONSACP =Automatic Colt Pistol LR = Long Rifle ANSI =American National Standards Institute LRN = Lead Round Nose AP =Armor Piercing NLECTC = BFS =Backface Signature National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center BL =Ballistic Limit P-BFS = Perforation and Backface Signature CPO =Compliance Program Office RN = Round Nose CTP =Compliance Testing Program S&W = Smith & Wesson CTR =Compliance Test Report SAAMI = FMJ =Full Metal Jacket Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute ISO =International Standards Organization JHP =Jacketed Hollow Point SJHP = Semi Jacketed Hollow Point JSP =Jacketed Soft Point SJSP = Semi Jacketed Soft PointC OMMONLY U SED S YMBOLS A ND A BBREVIATIONSA ampereH henry nm nanometer ac alternating currenth hour No. number AM amplitude modulationhf high frequency o.d. outside diameter cd candelaHz hertz Ω ohm cm centimeteri.d. inside diameter p. page CP chemically purein inch Pa pascal c/s cycle per secondIR infrared pe probable error d dayJ joule pp. pages dB decibelL lambert ppm parts per million dc direct currentL liter qt quart °C degree CelsiusLb pound rad radian °F degree Fahrenheitlbf pound force rf radio frequency diam diameterlbf ⋅in pound force inch rh relative humidity emf electromotive forcelm lumen s second eq equationln logarithm (base e) SD standard deviation F faradlog logarithm (base 10) sec. section fc footcandleM molar SWR standing wave ratio fig. figurem meter uhf ultrahigh frequency FM frequency modulationmin. minute UV ultraviolet ft footmm millimeter V volt ft/s foot per secondmph miles per hour vhf very high frequency g accelerationm/s meter per second W watt g gramN newton λ wavelength gr grainN ⋅m newton meter wt weightarea = unit 2 (e.g., ft 2, in 2, etc.); volume = unit 3 (e.g., ft 3, m 3, etc.)P REFIXES d deci (10-1) da deka (10) c centi (10-2) h hecto (102) m milli (10-3) k kilo (103) µ micro (10-6) M mega (106) n nano (10-9) G giga (109)p pico (10-12) T tera (1012) C OMMON C ONVERSIONS(See ASTM E380)0.30480 m = 1 ft 4.448222 N = 1 lbf 2.54 cm = 1 in 1.355818 J = 1 ft ⋅lbf 0.4535924 kg = 1 lb 0.1129848 N.m = 1 lbf ⋅in 0.06479891 g = 1 gr 14.59390 N/m = 1 lbf/ft 0.9463529 L = 1 qt 6894.757 Pa = 1 lbf/in 2 3600000 J = 1 kW ⋅h1.609344 km/h = 1 mphTemperature: T °C = (T °F - 32) × 5/9Temperature: T °F = (T °C × 9/5) + 32This page intentionally left blank.NIJ STANDARD–0101.06FORBALLISTIC RESISTANCE OF BODY ARMOR1.P URPOSE A ND S COPEThe purpose of this standard is to establish minimum performance requirements and test methods for the ballistic resistance of personal body armor intended to protect against gunfire.This standard is a revision of NIJ Standard–0101.04, dated September 2000. It supersedes the NIJ 2005 Interim Requirements, dated September 2005, NIJ Standard–0101.04, and all other revisions and addenda to NIJ Standard–0101.04.The scope of the standard is limited to ballistic resistance only; this standard does not address threats from knives and sharply pointed instruments, which are different types of threats and are addressed in the current version of NIJ Standard–0115 Stab Resistance of Personal Body Armor.Body armor manufacturers and purchasers may use this standard to help to determine whether specific armor models meet the minimum performance standards and test methods identified in this document. However, NIJ strongly encourages body armor manufacturers to participate in the NIJ Voluntary Compliance Testing Program (CTP) and encourages purchasers to insist that the armor model(s) they purchase be tested by the NIJ CTP and be listed on the NIJ Compliant Products List. This will help to assure that the armor models will meet the minimum performance standards for use by the criminal justice community.The ballistic tests described in this standard have inherent hazards. Adequate safeguards for personnel and property must be employed when conducting these tests.This page intentionally left blank.2.NIJ B ODY A RMOR C LASSIFICATIONPersonal body armor covered by this standard is classified into five types (IIA, II, IIIA, III, IV) by level of ballistic performance. In addition, a special test class is defined to allow armor to be validated against threats that may not be covered by the five standard classes.The classification of an armor panel that provides two or more levels of NIJ ballistic protection at different locations on the ballistic panel shall be that of the minimum ballistic protection provided at any location on the panel.2.1Type IIA (9 mm; .40 S&W)Type IIA armor that is new and unworn shall be tested with 9 mm Full Metal Jacketed Round Nose (FMJ RN) bullets with a specified mass of 8.0 g (124 gr) and a velocity of 373 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (1225 ft/s ± 30 ft/s) and with .40 S&W Full Metal Jacketed (FMJ) bullets with a specified mass of 11.7 g (180 gr) and a velocity of 352 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (1155 ft/s ± 30 ft/s).Type IIA armor that has been conditioned shall be tested with 9 mm FMJ RN bullets with a specified mass of 8.0 g (124 gr) and a velocity of 355 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (1165 ft/s ± 30 ft/s) and with .40 S&W FMJ bullets with a specified mass of 11.7 g (180 gr) and a velocity of 325 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (1065 ft/s ± 30 ft/s).2.2Type II (9 mm; .357 Magnum)Type II armor that is new and unworn shall be tested with 9 mm FMJ RN bullets with a specified mass of 8.0 g (124 gr) and a velocity of 398 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (1305 ft/s ± 30 ft/s) and with .357 Magnum Jacketed Soft Point (JSP) bullets with a specified mass of 10.2 g (158 gr) and a velocity of 436 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (1430 ft/s ± 30 ft/s).Type II armor that has been conditioned shall be tested with 9 mm FMJ RN bullets with a specified mass of 8.0 g (124 gr) and a velocity of 379 m/s ±9.1 m/s (1245 ft/s ± 30 ft/s) and with .357 Magnum JSP bullets with a specified mass of 10.2 g (158 gr) and a velocity of 408 m/s ±9.1 m/s (1340 ft/s ± 30 ft/s).2.3Type IIIA (.357 SIG; .44 Magnum)Type IIIA armor that is new and unworn shall be tested with .357 SIG FMJ Flat Nose (FN) bullets with a specified mass of 8.1 g (125 gr) and a velocity of 448 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (1470ft/s ± 30 ft/s) and with .44 Magnum Semi Jacketed Hollow Point (SJHP) bullets with a specified mass of 15.6 g (240 gr) and a velocity of 436 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (1430 ft/s ± 30 ft/s).Type IIIA armor that has been conditioned shall be tested with .357 SIG FMJ FN bullets with a specified mass of 8.1 g (125 gr) and a velocity of 430 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (1410 ft/s ± 30 ft/s) and with .44 Magnum SJHP bullets with a specified mass of 15.6 g (240 gr) and a velocity of 408 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (1340 ft/s ± 30 ft/s).2.4Type III (Rifles)Type III hard armor or plate inserts shall be tested in a conditioned state with 7.62 mm FMJ, steel jacketed bullets (U.S. Military designation M80) with a specified mass of 9.6 g (147 gr) and a velocity of 847 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (2780 ft/s ± 30 ft/s).Type III flexible armor shall be tested in both the “as new” state and the conditioned state with 7.62 mm FMJ, steel jacketed bullets (U.S. Military designation M80) with a specified mass of 9.6 g (147 gr) and a velocity of 847 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (2780 ft/s ± 30 ft/s).For a Type III hard armor or plate insert that will be tested as an in conjunction design, the flexible armor shall be tested in accordance with this standard and found compliant as a stand-alone armor at its specified threat level. The combination of the flexible armor and hard armor/plate shall then be tested as a system and found to provide protection at the system’s specified threat level. NIJ-approved hard armors and plate inserts must be clearly labeled as providing ballistic protection only when worn in conjunction with the NIJ-approved flexible armor system with which they were tested.2.5Type IV (Armor Piercing Rifle)Type IV hard armor or plate inserts shall be tested in a conditioned state with .30 caliber armor piercing (AP) bullets (U.S. Military designation M2 AP) with a specified mass of 10.8 g (166 gr) and a velocity of 878 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (2880 ft/s ± 30 ft/s).Type IV flexible armor shall be tested in both the “as new” state and the conditioned state with .30 caliber AP bullets (U.S. Military designation M2 AP) with a specified mass of 10.8 g (166 gr) and a velocity of 878 m/s ± 9.1 m/s (2880 ft/s ± 30 ft/s).For a Type IV hard armor or plate insert that will be tested as an in conjunction design, the flexible armor shall be tested in accordance with this standard and found compliant as a stand-alone armor at its specified threat level. The combination of the flexible armor and hard armor/plate shall then be tested as a system and found to provide protection at the system’s specified threat level. NIJ-approved hard armors and plate inserts must be clearly labeled as providing ballistic protection only when worn in conjunction with the NIJ-approved flexible armor system with which they were tested.2.6Special TypeA purchaser having a special requirement for a level of protection other than one of the above standard types and threat levels should specify the exact test round(s) and reference measurement velocities to be used and indicate that this standard shall govern all other aspects. Guidance on common special type threats and the appropriate threat velocities is provided in appendix B, along with a methodology for determining the correct reference velocity for other threats.3.D EFINITIONS3.1Absolute Humidity: The quantity of water in a given volume of air, often reported ingrams per cubic meter.3.2Accessory Ballistic Panels: Accessory panels are armor components that are detachable orremovable from the primary body armor sample and are intended to provide comparable ballistic protection. Examples of accessory panels include groin, coccyx, and sideprotection panels, which are attached to or inserted into the external armor carrier but are not integral to the armor panels or armor sample.3.3Angle of Incidence: The angle between the bullet’s line of flight and the perpendicular tothe front surface of the backing material fixture as shown in figure 1.Figure 1. Angle of incidence3.4Armor Carrier: A component of the armor sample or armor panel whose primary purposeis to retain the ballistic panel and provide a means of supporting and securing the armor garment to the user. Generally, the carrier is not ballistic resistant.3.5Armor Conditioning: Environmental and mechanical conditioning of armor prior toballistic testing, which consists of exposure to specified conditions of temperature,humidity, and mechanical damage.3.6Armor Panel or Panel: The portion of an armor sample that consists of an externalballistic cover and its internal ballistic panel. The word “panel,” if not preceded by theword “ballistic,” refers to an armor panel in this standard.3.7Armor Sample:One complete armor garment. Typically, a front armor panel, a backarmor panel, and the armor carrier comprise a body armor sample. The armor sample may be a single wraparound style or consist of multiple parts that are worn around the body. 3.8Backface Signature (BFS): The greatest extent of indentation in the backing materialcaused by a nonperforating impact on the armor. The BFS is the perpendicular distance between two planes, both of which are parallel to the front surface of the backing materialfixture. One plane contains the reference point on the original (pretest) backing material surface that is co-linear with the bullet line of flight. (If armor were not present, the bulletFigure 2. Examples of BFS measurementswould strike this point.) The other plane contains the point that represents the deepestindentation in the backing material. Depending on bullet–armor–backing materialinteractions, the two points that define the locations of the measurement planes may not be co-linear with the bullet line of flight. Examples of how BFS is measured are shown infigure 2.3.9Backing Material: A homogenous block of nonhardening, oil-based modeling clay placedin contact with the back of the armor panel during ballistic testing.3.10Backing Material Fixture: A box-like rigid frame, with a removable back, which containsthe backing material. The removable back is used for perforation-backface signature testing but is not used for ballistic limit testing.3.11Ballistic Limit: For a given bullet type, the velocity at which the bullet is expected toperforate the armor 50 % of the time. The ballistic limit is typically denoted as the V50 or V50 value.3.12Ballistic Panel: The protective component of an armor sample or armor panel, consistingprimarily of ballistic resistant materials. The ballistic panel is usually enclosed in a non-removable panel cover, which is considered part of the ballistic panel. The ballistic panel is normally enclosed within an armor carrier.3.13Baseline Ballistic Limit: The experimentally derived ballistic limit of an armor modelwhen new.3.14Body Armor: An item of personal protective equipment that provides protection againstspecific ballistic threats within its coverage area. In this standard, the term body armorrefers to that which provides coverage primarily for the torso.3.15Complete Penetration: This nomenclature is no longer used in this standard. See“perforation.” Perforation replaces complete penetration. Although the terms partialpenetration and complete penetration are no longer used in this standard, they may still be used by test laboratories for compatibility with military standards.3.16Compliance Test Group: A group of armor samples submitted for testing according to thisstandard.3.17Condensation: Precipitation of water vapor on a surface whose temperature is lower thanthe dew point of the ambient air. The dew point depends on the quantity of water vapor in the air. The dew point, the absolute humidity, and the vapor pressure are directlyinterdependent. Condensation occurs on a test item when the temperature at the surface of the item placed in the test chamber is lower than the dew point of the air in the chamber. Asa result, the item may need to be preheated to prevent condensation.3.18Dewpoint (or dew point): The temperature to which a parcel of air must be cooled (atconstant barometric pressure) for water vapor present in the air to condense into water(dew).3.19Fair Hit: The impact of a bullet on an armor panel that meets the shot spacing and velocityrequirements of section 7.6.3.20Flexible Body Armor: Body armor constructed of pliable, textile-based materials such thatthe complete system is capable of being flexed. Such systems are typically in the form of vests or jackets that provide greater coverage area than rigid plate armor. Generally, these armors provide protection against handgun threats.3.21Full Metal Jacketed Bullet (FMJ): A bullet consisting of a lead core completely covered,except for the base, with copper alloy (approximately 90 % copper and 10 % zinc). “Total Metal Jacket (TMJ),” “Totally Enclosed Metal Case (TEMC),” and other commercialterminology for bullets with electro-deposited copper and copper alloy coatings have been tested and are considered comparable to FMJ bullets for this standard.3.22Hard Armor or Rigid Armor: Rigid armor systems, plates, inserts, accessories, or semi-rigid armor systems constructed with rigid plates that are typically designed to provideprotection against rifle threats.。
英国青少年反社会行为控制体系的形成及反思
英国青少年反社会行为控制体系的形成及反思王小光*【内容摘要】英国青少年反社会行为问题在20世纪末呈现出恶化趋势，一度成为社会各界关注的焦点。
英国新工党胜选组阁后，采取强硬措施治理青少年反社会行为问题，先后发布大量反社会行为法令，青少年被贴上反社会标签，警察权力不断渗入校园管理，出现青少年反社会行为控制强化趋势。
英国青少年反社会行为控制存在应对手段强硬、教育问题被当作刑事问题处置等问题。
治理青少年反社会行为不仅依赖严厉的惩罚措施，还应深入发掘学生个体实施反社会行为的根源，综合运用恢复性措施等措施达到最佳治理效果。
【关键词】青少年反社会行为零容忍控制体系恢复性措施反社会行为这个词汇源于医学领域的专业术语，医学中的反社会行为主要指人格障碍引发个人不当行为，通常表现为行为人侵害他人或者行为不考虑他人感受。
①后来，该词汇超出医学术语范畴，演变成为一个内容驳杂的犯罪学概念。
犯罪学中的反社会行为一词在英国、澳大利亚、新西兰等地的司法实务及学术界使用较广，但在其他地区的使用率相对较低。
英国所关注的反社会行为并非新生现象，大多数类型的反社会行为在英国早期历史中已经存在，只是未贴上反社会行为标签，比如工业革命时期的都市街头酗酒现象。
英国刑事司法系统在维多利亚时代发生转变，《1865年监狱法》等大量法律出台标志着犯罪管控的全面强化，对犯罪风险人群开展重点管理的理念盛行。
②反社会行为在20世纪末正式进入英国与英国特殊的社会环境有关。
当时英国社会出现了较为严重的青少年扰乱社会秩序和违法犯罪问题，青少年实施的聚众闹事、毁坏公物、恶意制造噪音等行为侵蚀社区安宁，法律无法处置那些所谓的“顽劣少年”，引发民意的强烈不满。
新工党上台后开始采取严厉的反社会行为控制措施，在一定程度上遏制了青少年反社会行为问题，但也存在处置手段不当等问题。
近年来，我国青少年违法犯罪形势也趋于恶化，校园内外的暴力事件引起民众强烈不满，英国二十年来处置该类问题的经验教训具有借鉴价值。
英国国家安全局
法定职责
根据安全局法案，MI5负责保卫国家安全，反制国外谍报、恐怖及破坏活动以及意图以政治、经济或暴力方 式颠覆民主体制的不法活动。同时也保障英国经济利益，对抗来自境外的威胁或破坏。另依据1996年修正法案， 将协助执法机关防制及侦查重大犯罪增列为该局另项职责。
工作职权
安全局法案明订MI5并非执法机关，不得进行逮捕、讯问或搜索、扣押等行动。仅依法定程序核可后，必须 依法进行电子人企业。即该局在相关案件侦 查上，如需对嫌犯进行强制性司法侦查程序时，需交由其它执法机关执行侦办。
隶属关系
英国国家安全局依据英国安全局法案，MI5应受内政大臣(Home Secretary )节制，其局长(Director General)为内政大臣经首相同意后任命，除督导日常业务外，还必须确保该局工作应维持行政中立不得介入政党 事务，并有义务向内政大臣随时报告国家在安全及经济利益上所受威胁及重大案件侦查情形，且需向内政部长及 首相提出年度工作报告。
谢谢观看
但是总参谋部为情报部门的归属问题却争论不休，争论的结果导致MI5（军情5处）的成立，它起先归属于陆 军部，后来由外交部接管。军情五处成立以来，在对付颠覆和恐怖活动上立下累累战功,一度拯救英国于危亡之中。
简介
英国“军情五处”（Military Intelligence 5），是世界上最具神秘色彩的谍报机构之一。
历任掌门人
Major-General Sir Vernon Kell (1873-1942)1st Director General, 1909-1940 Brigadier A.er 2nd Director General, 1940-1941 Sir David Petrie (1879-1961) 3rd Director General, 1941-1946 Sir Percy Sillitoe (1888-1962)4th Director General, 1946-1953 Sir Dick White (1906-1993)5th Director General, 1953-1956 Sir Roger Hollis (1905-1973)6th Director General, 1956-1965 Sir Martin Furnival Jones (1912-1997)7th Director General, 1965-1972 Sir Michael Hanley (1918-2001)8th Director General, 1972-1978 Sir Howard Smith (1919-1996)9th Director General, 1978-1981 Sir John Jones (1923-1998)10th Director General, 1981-1985 Sir Antony Duff (1920-2000)11th Director General, 1985-1987
No. 248 Intelligence-led Policing
No. 248Intelligence-led PolicingJerry H. RatcliffeAdam GraycarDirectorThis paper is timely, given that policing is currently going through a period of significant change in both operational tactics and organisational structures. New ideas in crime reduction and changes to short- and long-term policing strategies are underway. Intelligence-led policing represents a recent approach and is one of the more prevalent of the current “shifts in crime control philosophy and policing practice” (Maguire 2000).Surprisingly, given the wide distribution of the term “intelligence-led policing”, considerable confusion remains in regard to its actual meaning to both front-line officers and police management. This paper provides an introduction to intelligence-led policing and discusses some of the related limitations and opportunities.Since the 1990s, “intelligence-led policing” (also known asintelligence-driven policing”) has entered the lexicon of modern policing, especially in the UK and more recently Australia. Yet even with the ability of new ideas and innovation to spread throughout the policing world at the click of a mouse, there is still a lack of clarity among many in law enforcement as to what intelligence-led policing is, what it aims to achieve, and how it is supposed to operate. This can be seen in recent inspectionreports of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) in the UK (HMIC 2001, 2002), and in the lack of clarity regarding intelligence-led policing in the United States. A recent summit in March 2002 of over 120 criminal intelligence experts from across the US, funded by the US government and organised by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, may become a turning point in policing within the US. The participants called for a National Intelligence Plan, with one of the corerecommendations being to “promote intelligence-led policing through a common understanding of criminal intelligence and its usefulness” (IACP 2002, p. v). The aspirations of the summit are considerable, but what is unclear from the summit report is a sound understanding of the aims of intelligence-led policing and its relationship to crime reduction.As intelligence-led policing is now a term in common usage within Australian law enforcement (a search of web pages and media releases found the term “intelligence-led” in allAustralian police sites and the web site of the new Australian Crime Commission), it is timely to consider the origins of intelligence-led policing, the crime reduction levers it aims to pull, and the limitations and possibilities for this type of operational practice.Origins of Intelligence-led PolicingIntelligence-led policing entered the police lexicon at some time around the early 1990s. As Gill (1998) has noted, the origins of intelligence-led policing are a little indistinct, but the earliest references to it originate in the UK where a seemingly inexorablerise in crime during the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with increasing calls for police to be more effective and to be more cost-efficient. The driving forces for this move to a new strategy were both external and internal to policing.External drivers included an inability of the traditional, reactive model of policing to cope with the rapid changes in globalisation which have increased opportunities for transnational organised crime and removed physical and technological barriers across the policing domain. In the new “risk society” (Ericson & Haggerty 1997) the police were seen as the source of risk management data for a range of external institutions. With such an influence beyond the boundaries of law enforcement, it was never going to be long before the “new public management” drive to increase efficiency in public agencies reached the police.At the same time there was an internal recognition that changes were taking place in the dynamic relationship between the private security industry and the public police. The police were losing the battle on the streets, and public confidence with it. The rapid growth of private sector security saw police marginalised in some areas of public safety.The search for a new strategy was helped by the 1993 Audit Commission report into police effectiveness (Audit Commission 1993). This “landmark report” (Heaton 2000, p. 337) was the first foray of the Audit Commission (an independent body with responsibility for the economic and effective use of public money) into the machinations of operational policing. There were three central tenets to “helping with enquiries—tackling crimeeffectively”:•existing roles and the level ofaccountability lackedintegration and efficiency;•the police were failing to makethe best use of resources; and•greater emphasis on tacklingcriminals would be moreeffective than focusing oncrimes.This report was followed upfairly quickly by further officialpublications that provided aroad map to intelligence-ledpolicing, including an HMICpublication Policing WithIntelligence (1997) and a HomeOffice report on the integrationof different intelligence sources,complete with case studies(Maguire & John 1995).Intelligence-led policing wasbeginning to appear in Australiain the late 1990s, driven by anumber of policecommissioners. The localadoption included newaccountability structures at alocal level, a greater integrationof intelligence and investigation,and improved targeting of dailypolice efforts throughintelligence dissemination.Performance outcome reviewsincluding more dynamicfeatures were incorporated in anumber of Australianjurisdictions in various formats,such as the Operations andCrime Reviews (OCRs)conducted in New South Walesand modelled on the successfulCompStat process of the NewYork City Police Department.OCRs were found to beinstrumental as a mechanism indriving police-centred crimereduction (Chilvers &Weatherburn 2001).While there are alwaysproblems implementing changein police services, there isgeneral support for the explicitcrime reduction focus ofintelligence-led policing: crimereduction and especially crimeprevention have been themainstay and core business ofpolicing since the formation ofthe Metropolitan Police in theUK in 1829. So what isintelligence-led policing?Definition of Intelligence-ledPolicingAlthough there is a growingliterature on intelligence-ledpolicing (see the reference list ofthis paper as a starting point) ithas been generally assumed thatthe term speaks for itself, anddefinitions are rare.The aim of intelligence-ledpolicing can be interpreted fromthe tactical tasking priorities ofthe UK National IntelligenceModel, as disseminated by theNational Criminal IntelligenceService (NCIS). The fourelements concentrate on:•targeting offenders (especiallythe targeting of activecriminals through overt andcovert means);•the management of crime anddisorder hotspots;•the investigation of linkedseries of crimes and incidents;and•the application of preventativemeasures, including workingwith local partnerships toreduce crime and disorder(NCIS 2000).This focus within the UKNational Intelligence Modelemphsises that crime is notrandomly distributed, with thecorollary that identification ofhotspots of criminal activity is aworthwhile pursuit. Itrecognises the importance ofworking with partnerships toachieve crime prevention, andfinally that there should be aspotlight on targeting thecriminal and not a focus on thecrime. This latter principle is, toa large extent, based on researchthat shows a small percentage ofactive and repeat offenders(recidivists) commit adisproportionately large amount of crime (Audit Commission 1993).While the National Intelligence Model provides one definition of intelligence-led policing, this paper will explore the process of crime reduction through intelligence-led policing. Good intelligence analysis is vital, but research is also essential to identify crime reduction strategies that actually work and have solid evidential support. For the purposes of this paper, the following definition isemployed:Intelligence-led policing is theapplication of criminalintelligence analysis as anobjective decision-making toolin order to facilitate crimereduction and preventionthrough effective policingstrategies and externalpartnership projects drawnfrom an evidential base.How Should it Work?As Pawson and Tilley (1997) have pointed out, it is important to be clear on the “mechanism”for any crime reduction or prevention initiative, as this helps to understand why it works. Figure 1 shows a model for crime reduction through an intelligence-led process.In this intelligence-led policing model, we shall assume that the criminal environment is a permanent feature of the operating environment for police services. Although it is dynamic and fluid, constantly changing in shape, composition and size, it remains a reality that there will always be a criminal environment that the police will need to understand for subsequent operations to be effective.To be truly intelligence-led, the first stage of the model is to be able to interpret the criminal environment. This is usually performed by an intelligence section or unit, and relies on arange of information sourcesboth within and external to thepolice service. The informationthat this unit obtains should, inan intelligence-led environment,be passed as some form ofintelligence to people who canactually impact in a positivemanner on the criminalenvironment (stage 2 of themodel).This second stage requiresthe intelligence structure to beable to identify and influence thedecision-makers. It should benoted that this requires both anability to identify the decision-makers, as well as to influencetheir thinking regarding thetypes of reduction strategies thatare implemented.Finally, the model requiresthe decision-makers to have theenthusiasm and skills to exploreways to reduce crime and tohave a positive impact on thecriminal environment. Themodel therefore has threestructures, and three processes,each of which are discussed inturn below.The Criminal EnvironmentFor different levels of policing,the criminal environment to bestudied may be different. Forexample, a local rural policestation will have a differentcriminal environment tocompete with compared to anational strategic drugs unit.However the principle remainsthe same: although there aresignificant differences (but alsosome overlaps) in the type ofcriminal environment to beunderstood, each level is facedwith a challenging criminalsituation that is dynamic, hasdifferent memberships andstructures, and it is hoped canbe changed and influenced bypolice strategies.IntelligenceIntelligence can be defined as “avalue-added product, derivedfrom the collection andprocessing of all relevantinformation relating to clientneeds, which is immediately orpotentially significant to clientdecision-making” (ACS 2000).A broader view ofintelligence could incorporatethe view that intelligence is astructure, a process and aproduct. In most police services,the intelligence unit or section isa recognised internalorganisation with people, skills,methods and an organisationalstructure.Intelligence is also a process,incorporating a continuous cycleof tasking, data collection,collation, analysis,dissemination and feedback,prior to the next or a refinedtask. This continuous process isresponsible for the generation of Figure 1: An intelligence-led policing and crime reduction processan intelligence product, which is designed to shape the thinking of decision-makers.Within the model shown at Figure 1, intelligence therefore requires a number of organisational structures to work effectively in both the interpretation of the criminal environment and the dissemination of a product that can shape the thinking of decision-makers.Interpreting the Criminal Environment How capable are the systems, people, analytical tools and collective understanding to be able to interpret the criminal environment? An effective system requires investment in people, tools and systems, but also an understanding of the functions and limitations of an intelligence system.This is especially the case with a policing style that emphasises the criminal and not the crime as the focal point for intelligence. Often unrealistic expectations can dampen enthusiasm for intelligence-led operations when, for example, an intelligence analyst is unable to precisely predict the next date, time and place of a burglary. In a recent review of Northamptonshire Police in the UK, HMIC found that the National Intelligence Model definition of intelligence-led policing was not widely known amongst intelligence staff (HMIC 2001, p. 9). When the people that are tasked with being the hub of intelligence-led policing are not familiar with what intelligence-led policing is, it draws into question the value that they can add to information they receive. Even when clear direction is given, this component of the model requires coordination of sources, data storage and retrieval, analytical tools and training to enable the maximum benefit to be derived.At more strategic levels thisalso requires the ability of staffto have systems in place to shareintelligence within and outsideof the force, a notable problemin the United States (IACP 2002).The Decision-makersAll operational and leadershipranks have the capability toimpact on the criminalenvironment. Commanderscontrol resources, but the newestprobationers often spend themost time on the streets in anoperational capacity. Accuratetargeting of police activities tothe “hot spots” and “hot times”of crime has substantial supportas a crime reduction technique(Sherman et al. 1998), but itrequires the necessaryintelligence (in this example, thehot places and hot times) to findits way to the decision-makersand for those decision-makers toproperly understand andrespond to the information.Influencing the Decision-makersAs the Australian CustomsService’s definition shows,“intelligence” is a product thatis “immediately or potentiallysignificant to client decision-making” (ACS 2000).Dissemination is the method ofinforming the client, yetconveying the significance ofeven the most stimulatingintelligence is a fine art. It isprobably impossible to count thenumber of intelligence failuresthat have occurred due to aninability of the intelligenceorganisation to “sell” itsproduct, or the failing of thedecision-maker (the intelligenceclient) to recognise the value ofthe product.Intelligence also has tocompete with other pressures onthe decision-maker. Forexample, a police commandermay have an objectiveintelligence product thatrecommends targeting aparticular group of criminals butmay be constrained by thecovert nature of the group or bycompeting demands, such as apossible adverse communityreaction, pressures from themedia, or financial constraints.Even good intelligence has tocompete to influence decision-makers.The model in Figure 1 isdescribed as a policing and crimereduction process, because it isnot necessarily the case that adecision-maker works for thepolice. Increasingly, throughlocal partnerships, it is beingrecognised that decision-makersfor crime reduction also existoutside of the police service. Acomprehensive intelligencesystem can recognise this andinfluence a broad range ofinternal and external decision-makers.Impacting on the Criminal EnvironmentThe whole process has littlevalue if at the last stage thedecision-maker, be theycommissioner or probationer,cannot influence the criminalenvironment and effect crimereduction.There are limitations to theability of police to significantlychange crime rates, but this doesnot mean that the police cannotachieve any reductions, and thatthey cannot achieve maximumefficiency in the process. Anumber of policing-focusedtactics have been positivelyevaluated as having recognisedcrime prevention benefits,including increased directedpatrols in street-corner hot spotsof crime and the proactive arrestof serious repeat offenders(Sherman et al. 1998).There is a tendency,however, for what really worksin policing to be overshadowedby schemes that have significantpublic appeal, but for which thecrime reduction evidence isdisputed. These schemes includeNeighbourhood Watch, DARE(Drug Abuse Resistance Education), and community policing that has no clear crime risk-factor focus—all of which have been evaluated overseas as not appearing to significantly reduce crime (Sherman et al. 1998).Integration of Intelligence-ledPolicing into the PolicingParadigm Intelligence-led policing can be closely associated with problem-oriented policing (Goldstein 1990) in that they are both tactics that can support a broader policing paradigm such as community policing. Some intelligence units use a problem-solving methodology, such as SARA—scan, analyse, respond and assess (Eck & Spelman 1987)—as the framework for prioritisation. An evidential base is therefore significant to both problem-oriented policing in the analysis and response stage, and to intelligence-led policing in the selection of crime reduction plans. Problem-oriented policing and SARA provide a case management orientated focus for intelligence-led targeting, where the “case” may be an individual, organised crime group, or high crime location. This compartmentalisation of problems into manageable “chunks” is more in line with the case orientation of other professions, and potentially provides for greater managerial accountability.The broader policing philosophy, such as community policing, will be important in providing the “context”(Laycock 2001) for the success or failure of the intelligence-led policing mechanism. This is an important point, because while the mechanism for intelligence-led policing may be sound, it can be introduced to situations where the context is notappropriate for that style ofpolicing. For example, acommunity policing objectivemay be to reduce fear of crime.As such, a NeighbourhoodWatch arrangement maysucceed in the chosen objective,but might not be selected froman intelligence-led policingregime that strives for an actualreduction in crime.Threats and OpportunitiesA review of a burglary reductionprogram in the ACT (Ratcliffe2001, 2002a) found strongevidence for an intelligence-driven short-term policy; a morethorough evaluation of the long-term impact is planned.Generally, however, there is apaucity of explicit evaluations ofintelligence-led policing (Heaton2000). As time passes the newstrategy should receive moreattention from evaluators, if theycan avoid the tendency toconcentrate on the policingapproach on the street, ratherthan the managerial systemsthat create, fuel and drive theapproach.Intelligence-led policingstrives for greater efficiency inpolicing, but it has also beenaccompanied by other efficiencymethods, some of which conflictwith intelligence-led policing.There is a performance culturein many police services whichstrives to measure everythingpossible, and it is a concern thatthe benefits of intelligence-ledpolicing will be lost in aquagmire of operationalstatistics and micro-management. As Albert Einsteinsaid, “not everything that can becounted counts, and noteverything that counts can becounted”. A case in point isresponse times. Many policeservices now record theresponse time of officers gettingto priority and routine calls forservice, and they buildimprovements of response timeinto performance agreements formanagement and front-lineofficers. Unfortunately theresearch evidence is fairlyconclusive: improving responsetimes to calls for service doesnot reduce crime (Sherman et al.1998).The expansion of aperformance culture can drivepolice from the hard-to-quantifyareas such as communitypolicing and crime prevention tosimply concentrate on whateverthey are being measuredagainst. Scott (1998) expressedthese concerns when sherecognised the impact of theperformance culture on twopolice divisions in London,finding that the mechanisms ofthe new public managementwere focusing policingobjectives on the measurableand the quantifiable, and as aresult were driving a return toreactive policing.Another potential problem isthe use of a strategy thatemphasises the deployment oftactics once reserved for serious“high impact, low volume”criminals against high volume,more mundane, offenders. This“principle of proportionality” isan area that will have to bemanaged to maintain publicconfidence in police tactics thatare more focused and targeted,but also potentially moreinvasive (Ratcliffe 2002b).Concerns have been raisedregarding both the financialbenefits, and the implicationsfor police legitimacy with astrategy that includes increasingthe use of criminal informants(Dunnighan & Norris 1999;Ratcliffe 2002b). All of this said,there is a real opportunity toengage the public and gathertheir support for a policingpractice that is objective,General Editor, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice series:Dr Adam Graycar, DirectorAustralian Institute of Criminology GPO Box 2944Canberra ACT 2601 AustraliaNote: Trends and Issues in Crime andCriminal Justice are refereed papers.focused and cost-effective. It is difficult to argue againstefficiency and value-for-money,as these factors were the driving forces behind intelligence-led policing in the first place.The drive towardsintelligence-led policing has to be tempered by realisticexpectations. A review of the literature indicates that theability of the police to impact on the level of crime in society is limited, though there areindications that some gains in crime reduction can be made (Heaton 2000, p. 344). This may sound like back-peddling, but an examination of the broad swathe of potential causes of crime (for an excellent review see Weatherburn 2001) would suggest that there are a very restricted number of thesecausal factors that are within the power of the police to influence.However, more of the causal mechanisms for crime in society can be influenced by the police through collaboration with outside agencies. There is a growing recognition within policing that external agencies may hold the key to long-term crime reduction. These agencies,such as local councils, housing authorities, and health and education departments, have a greater potential to impact on a wider range of causal factors,and the police are well placed as the “gatekeepers” to much crime information (Ericson & Haggerty 1997). Increased sharing ofintelligence beyond the limits of law enforcement may see a more substantial reduction in crime. If employed in this more effective manner, intelligence-led policing is really a misnomer: a better term would be “intelligence-led crime reduction”.ReferencesAustralian Customs Service (ACS)2000, Intelligence Doctrine ,Australian Customs Service,Canberra, p. 15.Audit Commission 1993, Helping WithEnquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively , HMSO, London.Chilvers, M. & Weatherburn, D. 2001,“Operation and Crime Review panels: Their impact on break and enter”, Crime and Justice Statistics Bureau Brief , April, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research,Sydney.Dunnighan, C. & Norris, C. 1999, “Thedetective, the snout, and theAudit Commission: The real costs in using informants”, Howard Journal of Criminal Justice , vol. 38,pp. 67–86.Eck, J.E. & Spelman, W. 1987, ProblemSolving: Problem-oriented Policing in Newport News , Police Executive Research Forum, Washington DC.Ericson, R.V . & Haggerty, K.D. 1997,Policing the Risk Society ,Clarendon Press, Oxford.Gill, P. 1998, “Making sense of policeintelligence? The use of acybernetic model in analysing information and power in police intelligence processes”, Policing and Society , vol. 8, pp. 289–314.Goldstein, H. 1990, Problem-orientatedPolicing , McGraw-Hill, New York.Heaton, R. 2000, “The prospects forintelligence-led policing: Some historical and quantitative considerations”, Policing and Society , vol. 9, pp. 337–56.Her Majesty’s Inspectorate ofConstabulary (HMIC) 1997,Policing with Intelligence , Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, London.——— 2001, Northamptonshire Police:Intelligence-led Policing and Proactive Investigation of Crime ,Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, London.——— 2002, Bedfordshire Police: CrimeIntelligence , Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary,London.International Association of Chiefs ofPolice (IACP) 2002, “Criminal intelligence sharing: A national plan for intelligence-led policing at the local, state and federal levels”, IACP Intelligence Summit ,COPS and InternationalAssociation of Chiefs of Police,Alexandria, Virginia, p. 51.Laycock, G. 2001, “Research for police:Who needs it?” Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice ,no. 211, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra.Maguire, M. 2000, “Policing by risksand targets: Some dimensions and implications of intelligence-led crime control”, Policing and Society , vol. 9, pp. 315–36.Maguire, M. & John, T. 1995,“Intelligence, surveillance and informants: Integratedapproaches”, Police Research Group: Crime Detection and Prevention Series , no. 64, p. 58.National Criminal Intelligence Service(NCIS) 2000, The National Intelligence Model , National Criminal Intelligence Service,London.Pawson, R. & Tilley, N. 1997, RealisticEvaluation , Sage, London.Ratcliffe, J.H. 2001, “Policing urbanburglary”, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice , no. 213,Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra.——— 2002a, “Burglary reduction andthe myth of displacement”, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice , no. 232, Australian Institute of Criminology,Canberra.——— 2002b, “Intelligence-led policingand the problems of turning rhetoric into practice”, Policing and Society , vol. 12, pp. 53–66.Scott, J. 1998, “‘Performance culture’:The return of reactive policing”,Policing and Society , vol. 8,pp. 269–88.Sherman, L.W., Gottfredson, D.,MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P .& Bushway, S. 1998, Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t,What’s Promising , National Institute of Justice,Washington DC.Weatherburn, D. 2001, “What causescrime?” Crime and Justice Bulletin ,no. 54, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Sydney.AcknowledgmentThe author is grateful for consent from Glen Fisher (of the Australian Federal Police) to adapt the model shown inFigure 1.。
徇私枉法罪若干问题的分析
第二部分，徇私枉法罪的犯罪主体。认为司法工作人员的认定要坚持职责论，徇私 枉法罪的司法工作人员指从事刑事司法工作的正式职工或被委托、被聘用等临时但任刑 事司法工作的人员，只要是行使侦查权、检察权、审判权的人员均可构成。司法机关内 的鉴定人、检验人等专业技术人员、监管工作人员和侦查、检察、审判工作中的书记员 可以构成本罪。政法委工作人员不是本罪主体，单位不应当成为本罪主体。
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学位论文版权使用授权书
本学位论文作者完全了解 西南政法大学 有关保留、使用学位论文的规定。特授权 西南政法大学 可以将学位论文的全部或部分内容编入有关数据库进行检索，并采用影 印、缩印或扫描等复制手段保存、汇编以供查阅和借阅。同意学校向国家有关部门或机 构送交论文的复印件和磁盘。 （保密的学位论文在解密后适用本授权说明）
2
徇私枉法罪若干问题研究
Abstract
Jurisdiction is an essential part of state power, which protects the interest of people and the legal order of the public. As a typical crime of misconduct in office among judicial personnel, the crime of bending the law not only violates the normal legal activities of state, but also damages the dignity and trust in the fairness of the public, so the crime of bending the law has always been paying attention to. The most serious crime of misconduct cases has been happening frequently and some new problems arise in judicial practice. It attracts both theoretical and practical world, whereas, some theoretical confusions such as the scope of subjects, the forms of intention, the behaviour in objective aspect and the determining the commission of a crime are still existing and need discussing. The paper made a research on the theoretical and practical problems of the crime of bending the law, in order to benefit the theory and practice of this crime, combining the theory on the analysis on the current criminal law and relevant judicial interpretation contents.
bm1
boxyboy 仓库番 豪华版
brain Brain
breakers 爆烈人
breakrev 爆烈人 复仇
brival Burning Rival
bssoccer 街头足球
bstars 棒球之星 专业版
bstars2 棒球之星2
btlkroad Battle K-Road
hiimpact High Impact Football
hippodrm 激斗幻想
hitice Hit the Ice
holo Holosseum
hopmappy Hopping Mappy
horekid Kid no Hore Hore Daisakusen
hotdogst Hotdog Storm
dungeonm 光明力量
dunkshot Dunk Shot
earthjkr 国联防卫军 - 地球王牌
ecofghtr 环保战士
edf E.D.F.- 地球保卫战
eightman 8号超人
elvactr 电梯大战 2
endurob2 Enduro Racer (盗版 2)
endurobl Enduro Racer (盗版 1)
fcombat Field Combat
ffight 快ory
fhawk 战斗猎鹰
fightfev Fight Fever
finalap2 Final Lap 2
finalap3 Final Lap 3
finalb 最终打击
finallap Final Lap
gwarrior 银河战士
美剧真探英文简介
美剧真探英文简介《真探》是由凯瑞·福永执导的悬疑连续剧，由马修·麦康纳与伍迪·哈里森等主演。
这部剧采用多视角叙事，伍迪·哈里森与马修·麦康纳饰演两名侦探搭档，他们一起调查一桩17年前的悬案，寻找涉及该案的路易斯安那州连环杀手。
这桩发生于1995年的案件当年因为伪证而遭误判，致使涉案的两位侦探哈里森与麦康纳多年来内心不安。
直到2012年该案被重新审查才发现当年漏洞。
真探第一季大结局吸引352万人收看，美国权威电影网站IMDB 上网友评分9.5分，豆瓣网友评分9.2分，就连美国总统奥巴马也对它赞不绝口。
被称为“开年第一神剧”的《真探》究竟有何魅力?能够如此这般“高贵冷艳”?导演: 凯瑞·福永编剧: 尼克·皮佐拉托主演: 马修·麦康纳 / 伍迪·哈里森 / 布鲁斯·埃利奥特 / 米歇尔·莫娜汉 / Tory Kittles / 迈克尔·波茨 / 埃里克·普莱斯 / Madison Wolfe / J.D·埃弗摩尔 / Dana Gourrier / Joe Chrest类型: 剧情 / 犯罪真探True DetectiveI’m usually skeptical whenever I read such words from critics as “the best” or “the greatest”. So, I didn’t quite buy it when True Detective, HBO’s crime drama series, was described as “the finest show on television at the moment”.每当看到影视评论中蹦出“最佳”、“最了不起”等字眼时，我总是保留怀疑态度。
因此，当HBO电视网推出的犯罪题材剧集《真探》被评为“时下最好看剧集”时，我并不买账。
欧洲议会和欧盟理事会《关于修订理事会关于防止利用金融系统洗钱的指令的指令》
欧洲议会和欧盟理事会《关于修订理事会<关于防止利用金融系统洗钱的指令>的指令》背景：1991年6月10日，欧洲共同体理事会在卢森堡通过了欧盟的第一个反洗钱指令，即《关于防止利用金融系统洗钱的指令》（91/308/EEC）。
该指令的颁布考虑到建立欧洲经济共同体的条约，以及反洗钱行动与金融系统的密切相关性和其国际协作的本质。
2001年12月，欧洲议会和欧盟理事会在布鲁塞尔通过了欧盟的第二个反洗钱指令，即《关于修订理事会<关于防止利用金融系统洗钱的指令>的指令》（2001/97/EC）。
2001/97/EC号指令考虑到建立欧盟的条约、服务贸易总协议（General Agreement on Trade in Service）的原则以及国际洗钱的新趋势，通过修订“信用机构”和“金融机构”的界定等来最大范围地覆盖金融业，对上游犯罪做出了进一步的核定，将履行必要义务的对象进行了扩展，对公证人等专业人员的相关行为和成员国应负义务做出了一定规定。
其中91/308/EEC号指令的第1、3、6、7、9、11条由2001/97/EC中的新条款代替，第2、8、10条分别添加了新内容，而第4、5、8、10、12条中的部分术语做了替代。
本文以修订后的指令为准。
Article 1For the purpose of this Directive:(A) Credit institution means a credit institution, as defined in Article 1(1) first subparagraph of Directive 2000/12/EC(9) and includes branches within the meaning of Article 1(3) of that Directive[1] and located in the Community[2], of credit institutions having their head offices inside or outside the Community;(B) 'Financial institution' means:1. an undertaking[3] other than a credit institution whose principal activity is to carry out one or more of the operations included in numbers 2 to 12 and number 14 of the list set out in Annex I to Directive 2000/12/EC; these include the activities of currency exchange offices (bureaux de change)[4] and of money transmission/remittance offices[5];2. an insurance company duly authorised in accordance with Directive 79/267/EEC(10), insofar[6] as it carries out activities covered by that Directive;3. an investment firm as defined in Article 1(2) of Directive 93/22/EEC(11);4. a collective investment undertaking[7] marketing its units[8] or shares.This definition of financial institution includes branches located in the Community of financial institutions, whose head offices are inside or outside the Community,(C) 'Money laundering' means the following conduct when committed intentionally:- the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity to evade the legal consequences of his action;- the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity;- the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity;- participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions mentioned in the foregoing indents.Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of the abovementioned activities may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.Money laundering shall be regarded as such even where the activities which generated the property to be laundered were carried out in the territory of another Member State or in that of a third country.(D) 'Property' means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interests in such assets.(E) 'Criminal activity' means any kind of criminal involvement in the commission of a serious crime.Serious crimes are, at least:- any of the offences defined in Article 3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention[9];- the activities of criminal organisations as defined in Article 1 of Joint Action 98/733/JHA(12);- fraud, at least serious, as defined in Article 1(1) and Article 2 of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests(13);- corruption;- an offence which may generate substantial proceeds and which is punishable by a severe sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the penal law[10] of the Member State.Member States shall before 15 December 2004 amend the definition provided for in this indent in order to bring this definition into line with the definition of serious crime of Joint Action 98/699/JHA. The Council invites the Commission to present before 15 December 2004 a proposal for a Directive amending in that respect this Directive.Member States may designate[11] any other offence as a criminal activity for the purposes of this Directive.(F) 'Competent authorities' means the national authorities empowered by law or regulation to supervise the activity of any of the institutions or persons subject to this Directive.Article 2(A) Member States shall ensure that the obligations laid down in this Directive are imposed on the following institutions:1. credit institutions as defined in point A of Article 1;2. financial institutions as defined in point B of Article 1;and on the following legal or natural persons acting in the exercise of their professional activities:3. auditors, external accountants and tax advisors;4. real estate agents;5. notaries[12] and other independent legal professionals, when they participate, whether:(a) by assisting in the planning or execution of transactions for their client concerning the(i) buying and selling of real property or business entities;(ii) managing of client money, securities or other assets;(iii) opening or management of bank, savings or securities accounts;(iv) organisation of contributions necessary for the creation, operation or management of companies;(v) creation, operation or management of trusts, companies or similar structures; (b) or by acting on behalf of and for their client in any financial or real estate transaction;6. dealers in high-value goods, such as precious stones or metals, or works of art, auctioneers, whenever payment is made in cash, and in an amount of EUR 15000 or more;7. casinos.(B) Member States shall ensure that money laundering as defined in this Directive is prohibited.Article 31. Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive require identification of their customers by means of supporting evidence when entering into business relations, particularly, in the case of the institutions, when opening an account or savings accounts, or when offering safe custody facilities.2. The identification requirement shall also apply for any transaction with customers other than those referred to in paragraph 1, involving a sum amounting to EUR 15000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which seem to be linked. Where the sum is not known at the time when the transaction is undertaken, the institution or person concerned shall proceed with identification as soon as it or he is apprised[13] of the sum and establishes that thethreshold has been reached.3. By way of derogation[14] from the preceding paragraphs, the identification requirements with regard to insurance policies written by insurance undertakings within the meaning of Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance (third life assurance Directive)(14), where they perform activities which fall within the scope of that Directive shall not be required where the periodic premium[15] amount or amounts to be paid in any given year does or do not exceed EUR 1000 or where a single premium is paid amounting to EUR 2500 or less. [16]If the periodic premium amount or amounts to be paid in any given year is or are increased so as to exceed the EUR 1000 threshold, identification shall be required.4. Member States may provide that the identification requirement is not compulsory for insurance policies in respect of pension schemes taken out[17] by virtue of[18] a contract of employment or the insured's occupation[19], provided that such policies contain no surrender clause and may not be used as collateral for a loan.5. By way of derogation from the preceding paragraphs, all casino customers shall be identified if they purchase or sell gambling chips with a value of EUR 1000 or more.6. Casinos subject to State supervision shall be deemed[20] in any event to have complied with the identification requirement laid down in this Directive if they register and identify their customers immediately on entry, regardless of the number of gambling chips purchased.7. In the event of doubt as to whether the customers referred to in the above paragraphs are acting on their own behalf, or where it is certain that they are not acting on their own behalf, the institutions and persons subject to this Directive shall take reasonable measures to obtain information as to the real identity of the persons on whose behalf those customers are acting.8. The institutions and persons subject to this Directive shall carry out such identification, even where the amount of the transaction is lower than the threshold laid down, wherever there is suspicion of money laundering.9. The institutions and persons subject to this Directive shall not be subject to the identification requirements provided for in this Article where the customer is a credit or financial institution covered by this Directive or a credit or financial institution situated in a third country which imposes, in the opinion of the relevant Member States, equivalent requirements to those laid down by this Directive.10. Member States may provide that the identification requirements regarding transactions referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 are fulfilled when it is established thatthe payment for the transaction is to be debited[21] from an account opened in the customer's name with a credit institution subject to this Directive according to the requirements of paragraph 1.[22]11. Member States shall, in any case, ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive take specific and adequate measures necessary to compensate for the greater risk of money laundering which arises when establishing business relations or entering into a transaction with a customer who has not been physically present for identification purposes ('non-face to face' operations). Such measures shall ensure that the customer's identity is established, for example, by requiring additional documentary evidence, or supplementary measures to verify or certify the documents supplied, or confirmatory certification by an institution subject to this Directive, or by requiring that the first payment of the operations is carried out through an account opened in the customer's name with a credit institution subject to this Directive. The internal control procedures laid down in Article 11(1) shall take specific account of these measures.Article 4Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive keep the following for use as evidence in any investigation into money laundering:- in the case of identification, a copy or the references[23] of the evidence required, for a period of at least five years after the relationship with their customer has ended,- in the case of transactions, the supporting evidence and records, consisting of the original documents or copies admissible[24] in court proceedings under the applicable national legislation for a period of at least five years following execution of the transactions.Article 5Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive examine with special attention any transaction which they regard as particularly likely, by its nature, to be related to money laundering.Article 61. Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive and their directors and employees cooperate fully with the authorities responsible for combating money laundering:(a) by informing those authorities, on their own initiative[25], of any fact which might be an indication of money laundering;(a) by furnishing those authorities, at their request, with all necessary information, in accordance with the procedures established by the applicable legislation.2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be forwarded to the authorities responsible for combating money laundering of the Member State in whose territory the institution or person forwarding the information is situated. The person or persons designated by the institutions and persons in accordance with the procedures provided for in Article 11(1)(a) shall normally forward the information.3. In the case of the notaries and independent legal professionals referred to in Article 2a(5), Member States may designate an appropriate self-regulatory body of the profession concerned as the authority to be informed of the facts referred to in paragraph 1(a) and in such case shall lay down the appropriate forms of cooperation between that body and the authorities responsible for combating money laundering.Member States shall not be obliged to apply the obligations laid down in paragraph 1 to notaries, independent legal professionals, auditors, external accountants and tax advisors with regard to information they receive from or obtain on one of their clients, in the course of ascertaining[26] the legal position for their client or performing their task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning judicial proceedings, including advice on instituting or avoiding proceedings, whether such information is received or obtained before, during or after such proceedings. Article 7Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive refrain[27] from carrying out transactions which they know or suspect to be related to money laundering until they have apprised the authorities referred to in Article 6. Those authorities may, under conditions determined by their national legislation, give instructions not to execute the operation. Where such a transaction is suspectedof giving rise to money laundering and where to refrain in such manner is impossible or is likely to frustrate efforts to pursue the beneficiaries of a suspected money-laundering operation, the institutions and persons concerned shall apprise the authorities immediately afterwards.Article 81.The institutions and persons subject to this Directive and their directors and employees shall not disclose to the customer concerned nor to other third persons that information has been transmitted to the authorities in accordance with Articles 6 and 7 or that a money laundering investigation is being carried out.2. Member States shall not be obliged under this Directive to apply the obligation laid down in paragraph 1 to the professions mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 6(3).Article 9The disclosure in good faith to the authorities responsible for combating money laundering by an institution or person subject to this Directive or by an employee or director of such an institution or person of the information referred to in Articles 6 and 7 shall not constitute a breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative provision, and shall not involve the institution or person or its directors or employees in liability of any kind.Article 10Member States shall ensure that if, in the course of inspections carried out in the institutions or persons subject to this Directive by the competent authorities, or in any other way, those authorities discover facts that could constitute evidence of money laundering, they inform the authorities responsible for combating money laundering.Member States shall ensure that supervisory bodies empowered by law or regulation to oversee the stock, foreign exchange and financial derivatives markets[28] inform the authorities responsible for combating money laundering if they discover facts that could constitute evidence of money laundering.Article 111. Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive:(a) establish adequate procedures of internal control and communication in order to forestall and prevent operations related to money laundering;(b) take appropriate measures so that their employees are aware of the provisions contained in this Directive. These measures shall include participation of their relevant employees in special training programmes to help them recognise operations which may be related to money laundering as well as to instruct them as to how to proceed in such cases.Where a natural person falling within any of Article 2a(3) to (7) undertakes his professional activities as an employee of a legal person, the obligations in this Article shall apply to that legal person rather than to the natural person.2. Member States shall ensure that the institutions and persons subject to this Directive have access to up-to-date information on the practices of money launderers and on indications leading to the recognition of suspicious transactions.Article 12Member States shall ensure that the provisions of this Directive are extended in whole or in part to professions and to categories of undertakings, other than the institutions and persons referred to in Article 2a, which engage in activities which are particularly likely to be used for money-laundering purposes.[1] directive[di5rektiv, dai5rektiv] 指示[2] European Community: 欧洲经济共同体[3] undertaking[7QndE5teikiN] 事业,企业[4] currency exchange offices (bureaux de change):外币兑换所[5] money transmission/remittance offices:可以从事汇款业务的单位[6] insofar[7insEu5fB:] 在…范围内[7] collective investment undertaking:集体投资企业，如基金公司[8] unit[5ju:nIt] 单位，如契约型基金的基金单位; share:股份，如公司型基金的基金股份[9] Vienna Convention: 维也纳公约。
美国爱国者法案USAPA
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE CERTIFICATIONAppendix A – Certification Regarding Correspondent Accounts For Foreign Banks–Must be completed if the original Certification provided was a different version of the Certification enclosed in this packet。
If you have a global certification （one certification for all accounts your institution maintains at any U。
S. covered financial institution) and maintain this certification on your website or have posted your Certification with Bankers Almanac, you need only provide us with the link.1.Section Ba.The first box allows you to fill out one certification for all accountsyour institution maintains at any U.S。
covered financial institution。
ORb.The second box requires that you identify a specific U。
S. coveredfinancial institution and only that institution can rely on the certification.2.Section C– Physical Presence – you must include the full physical address（no P。
英国反贿赂法人责任及对中国启示
英国反贿赂法人责任及对中国启示作者：刘宇中来源：《华侨大学学报·哲学社会科学版》2023年第06期摘要：英国《反贿赂法》创制了“商业组织防止行贿失职罪”，明确了法人的严格责任，并扩大了管辖权。
该法还规定了“适当的程序”的无罪抗辩事由。
但由于《反贿赂法》的条文对“适当的程序”的定义不够明确，使企业在合规实践中仍面临困难和不确定性。
中国可以借鉴英国的做法，通过扩大法人责任以激励企业采取积极措施防止贿赂行为的发生。
中国也可以引入类似的合规奖励机制，激励企业积极建立合规机制，作为中国当前涉案企业合规从宽处理司法改革中减轻企业处罚的法律依据。
关键词：英国《反贿赂法》；商业组织防止行贿失职罪；企业责任；法人责任；企业合规作者简介：刘宇中，南安普顿大学商学院博士研究生，主要研究方向：英国商业法学、组织心理学（E-mail：********************.uk；英国南安普顿SO171BF）。
中图分类号：D997.9 文献标识码：A文章编号：1006-1398（2023）06-0132-11随着经济全球化和中国企业国际化的进程，中国企业在他国从事业务、与他国实体合作等海外业务活动成为常态。
中国企业可能受到他国反贿赂法的管辖，承担相应的企业责任并面临合规风险。
外国反贿赂法的研究对中国企业的国际化发展具有重要意义。
以英国2010年《反贿赂法》为切入点，分析英国治理商业贿赂的法律体系的特点和问题，探讨涉英企业的合规对策及可能为中国的立法和司法改革提供的启示和借鉴。
英国是第一个制定反贿赂法律的国家。
自1889年《公共机构腐败行为法》（Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act）将公有领域的贿赂行为入罪以来，英国相继将私有领域的贿赂行为、法人的贿赂行为、本国自然人和法人的海外贿赂行为纳入了立法。
然而至1997年，英国作为缔约国签署经济合作与发展组织（OECD）《关于打击国际商业交易中行贿外国公职人员行为的公约》时，其贿赂立法已经落后于各项国际公约的要求，其中之一是对贿赂的法人责任的立法。
反洗钱考试辅助资料——反洗钱专业术语中英文对照表
relationships
34 transation records
to suspect or have reasonable ground to 35
suspect 36 disclosure obligation 37 trade-based money laundering (TBML)
79
公认反洗钱协会
Specialists (ACAMS)
全称“当代 ACAMS 反洗钱合规教育中 心”专业反洗钱教 育网站
全球最大的反洗钱 协会
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 80
(BCBS)
巴塞尔银行监管委员会
中级：国际反洗钱、 西方十国央行的俱乐 反恐融资主要组织 部
善意第三人的权利 客户尽职调查 高风险客户 身份识别 核查
1/4
to identify and verify the identity of their 29
customers 30 customer identification and verification 31 to establish business relations 32 the beneficial owener
洗钱高频业务
2/4
58 reputaion risk 59 retail banking business 60 risk-based approach
61 shell company
62 SWIFT system 63 weapon of mass destruction (WMD) 64 wire transfer 65 wold bank 66 Vienna Convention
2001年北美电影票房排行榜
2001-1121 2001-1-2 6
暂无
39
缘分没法挡 The Wedding Planner
暂无
40
深入敌后 Behind
福 克
$58,856,79 0
$18,736,1 33
2001-1130
2002-4-2 3
Enemy Lines 41 拳王阿里 Ali
斯 哥 伦 比 亚 $58,203,10 5 $14,710,8 92 2001-1225 2004-6-1
the哥spiritswithin伦比亚75来自地狱fromhell福克3160256611014818200110192002514斯76high到哈佛howhigh77与男孩同车ridingincarswithboys78杰与鲍伯的回击jayandsilentbobstrikeback环球哥伦比亚米拉麦克斯帝门79死囚舞会monstersball80双重身份doubletake82戏迷情人themajestic84另类情人someonelikeyou博伟华纳福克斯298315832780726627343067100098284904339100106002001112200112212001330暂无暂无暂无狮门30079249110552200112262002611300851471101854320018242002226311787403016553671022601040465220011221200110192002319暂无85乔蒂特历险记joedirt哥伦比亚2708769580160082001411暂无86剑侠雄心themusketeer环球2707364010312740200197200222687鳄鱼邓迪3crocodiledundeeinlosangeles派拉蒙2563568277143622001420暂无88纪念品memento新市场255448672354882001330200252189柯莱利上尉的曼陀林captaincorellismandolin环球米拉麦克斯255438957209345200181720022590甜蜜十一月sweetnovember华纳2528810397339542001216暂无9115分钟新244035510523120013920018115minutes92亚特兰蒂斯之心heartsinatlantis93天使眼angeleyes94考基罗曼诺corkyromano98二人游戏线华纳224185781549021494200192842002212华纳试金石索241742182398030492255759023173200151820011012暂无暂无222359017720942200197暂无twocanplay尼thatgame99惊心之旅joyride福克斯100玩尽杀绝情人节valentine101夏日激情summer
英国会计师反洗钱暂行指引对我国的启示
英国会计师反洗钱暂行指引对我国的启示作者：刘国文骆月敏王涛来源：《财会通讯》2009年第10期英国在反洗钱行动中有较为成熟的经验，于2002年制定了《2002年犯罪收益法》(Proceeds of Crime Act 2002，下称“PCA2002”)，在修订完善的基础上颁布了《2003年洗钱防范规则》(Money Laundering Regulations2003，下称“MLR2003”)，英国会计咨询委员会(Consultative Committee ofAccountancy Bodies，下称“CCAB”)于2004年3月制定发布了《英国会计师反洗钱暂行指引》(第二版，下称“指引”)。
在“指引”的执行摘要中，明确了在英国执业的所有会计师都受到“PCA2002”、“MLR2003”及《2000反恐行动法》(2001年修订为反恐怖犯罪与安全法，Anti-terrorism Crimeand Security Act 2001)的规定，并要求从2004年3月1日起，执业会计师以及提供相关业务的其他会计师应关注相关规范中对反洗钱责任和义务的规定。
一、英国会计师反洗钱指引的基本内容(一)指引部分内容提要“指引”的第二部分明确了该“指引”适用于英国执业的英格兰与威尔士会计师公会、爱尔兰会计师公会、苏格兰会计师公会、认证会计师协会、管理会计师公会、公共财务与会计公会)等“CCAB”会员及从事类似会计师业务的任何人。
虽然“指引”大部分与执行相关业务的企业与个人应遵循的程序相关，但建议所有会计师了解主要的洗钱犯罪行为、可能违法行为，以及向国家犯罪情报中心(National Criminal Intelligence Service,下称“NCIS”)的申报程序。
“指引”的第三部分“法令”中说明了“MLR2003”适用的相关业务，并扩及先前相关金融业务的定义范围，并指出特别包括：经由企业提供会计服务；经核准执行1986年破产法(Insolveney Act 1986)第388条或1989年北爱尔兰破产命令第3条中的破产执行人的行为；经由企业提供税务咨询；经由企业提供由有资格任命为1989年公司法第25条或1990年公司(北爱尔兰)命令第28条的公司审计人员的审计服务；经由企业提供成立、经营或管理公司或信托基金相关服务；涉及收受15000欧元以上之现金交易(高价值交易者)。
史蒂芬西格作品
被迫杀人Driven.to.Kill-------（2009）Guitar Man ------- (2008)Prince of Pistols ------- (2008)杀戮时刻Kill Switch------- (2008)重振威严Pistol Whipped------- (2008)Sasha - Die Show ------- (2007)A Tribute to Les Paul ------- (2007)Once Upon a Time in the Hood ------- (2007)The Untitled Onion Movie -------(2007)都市正义Urban Justice------- (2007)怒火飞行Flight of Fury ------- (2007)司法雇佣兵/正义佣兵Mercenary for Justice ------- (2006)特攻无间Attack Force ------- (2006)Making 'Mercenary for Justice' ------- (2006)Shadow Man ------- (2006)在劫难逃Today You Die ------- (2005)"Biography" Steven Seagal ------- (2005)深海潜龙Submerged ------- (2005)黑暗坠落Black Dawn ------- (2005)烈日血战/向望太阳/日本攻略Into the Sun ------- (2005)Out of Reach ------- (2004)克莱蒙泰Clementine ------- (2004)Words of My Perfect Teacher ------- (2003)狙击速递The Foreigner ------- (2003)潜龙轰天3之野兽之腹Belly of the Beast ------- (2003)破茧杀机Out for a Kill ------- (2003)Who Is Alan Smithee? ------- (2002)"E! True Hollywood Story" Steven Seagal ------- (2002)功夫片岁月The Art of Action: Martial Arts in Motion Picture ------- (2002)不死潜龙Half Past Dead ------- (2002)绝命出路Exit Wounds ------- (2001)即时引爆Ticker ------- (2001)The Path Beyond Thought ------- (2001)美国影史百部佳片AFI's 100 Years, 100 Thrills: America's Most Heart-Pounding Movies ------- (2001)The Unbeatable Bruce Lee ------- (2001)2000年MTV电影颁奖典礼2000 MTV Movie Awards ------- (2000)Get Bruce ------- (1999)VH1/Vogue Fashion Awards ------- (1999)火线战将The Patriot ------- (1998)Femmes Fatales: Sharon Stone ------- (1998)我的巨人My Giant ------- (1998)枪口朝下Fire Down Below ------- (1997)飞虎狂龙The Glimmer Man ------- (1996)最高危机Executive Decision ------- (1996)暴走潜龙Under Siege 2: Dark Territory ------- (1995)第67届奥斯卡金像奖颁奖典礼The 67th Annual Academy Awards ------- (1995)非常地带/极地雄风On Deadly Ground ------- (1994)The Celebrity Guide to Entertaining ------- (1993)Universal Cops ------- (1992)潜龙轰天/魔鬼战将Under Siege ------- (1992)为了正义Out for Justice ------- (1991)Celebrity Guide to Wine ------- (1990)死亡标记Marked for Death ------- (1990)七年风暴Hard to Kill ------- (1990)法律之上Above the Law ------- (1988)作为编剧史蒂文·西格尔Steven Seagal的电影作品(数量：7) Prince of Pistols ------- (2008)怒火飞行Flight of Fury ------- (2007)特攻无间Attack Force ------- (2006)Shadow Man ------- (2006)烈日血战/向望太阳/日本攻略Into the Sun ------- (2005)潜龙轰天3之野兽之腹Belly of the Beast ------- (2003)法律之上Above the Law ------- (1988)2。
反洗钱考试辅助资料——反洗钱专业术语中英文对照表
Laundering (FATF)
《爱国者法案》 海外账户纳税法案
长臂管辖权内容及重 中级：国际反洗钱、
点条款 反恐融资主要法规
中级：国际反洗钱、 反洗钱金融行动特别工作组
反恐融资主要组织
74 Egmont Grou
罪公约》（巴勒莫公约）
反恐融资主要法规 在三个国际公约上
69 UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)
《联合国反腐败公约》
70 FATF 40 Recommendations
《四十条建议》
通行的国际标准
演变史
71 Patriot Act (2001) 72 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)
合规
合规反洗钱
恐怖融资 反洗钱战略 反洗钱义务 掩饰 隐瞒 犯罪所得 毒品犯罪 金融诈骗 反洗钱培训 金融机构
16 suspicious transaction reporting requirements 可疑交易报告要求
17 know your customer (KYC)
18 record keeping 19 designated non-financial businesses 20 illegal proceeds 21 prdicate offences 22 transnational organized crime
四大反洗钱措施乊一 熟悉内容 四大反洗钱措施乊一 熟悉内容
7 种上游犯罪
23 to confiscate proceeds from money laundering 没收洗钱所得
萨班斯法案-介绍
萨班斯法案2001年12月,美国最大的能源公司——安然公司,突然申请破产保护,此后,公司丑闻不断,规模也"屡创新高",特别是2002年6月的世界通信会计丑闻事件,"彻底打击了(美国)投资者对(美国)资本市场的信心"(Congress repor t, 2002).为了改变这一局面,美国国会和政府加速通过了《萨班斯法案》(以下简称SOX法案),该法案的另一个名称是"公众公司会计改革与投资者保护法案".法案的第一句话就是"遵守证券法律以提高公司披露的准确性和可靠性,从而保护投资者及其他目的."美国总统布什在签署"SOX法案"的新闻发布会上称"这是自罗斯福总统以来美国商业界影响最为深远的改革法案".但由于该法案刚刚通过不久,其执行也不到两年,现在就来评价该法案的成败得失,为时尚早.但是,了解该法案的通过背景以及该法案制订过程中的一些问题,对我们正确认识,把握该法案,从而理性地看待我国资本市场的相关事件以及相应的对策问题,不无裨益.一,法案的形成过程按照美国国会网站对SOX法案的介绍,该法案最初于2002年2月14日提交给国会众议院金融服务委员会(Committee on Financial Services),到7月25日国会参众两院最终通过,先后有6个版本,它们分别是:2月14日, 4月22日,4月24日,7月15日,7月24日,7月25日,我们现在看到的是7月25日的最后版本.2002年2月14日提交到众议院金融服务委员会的版本,包括13章,主要内容集中在对注册会计师行业的监管,如:成立一个管制机构,监督注册会计师的运行;对该管制机构的运行给出一些原则性的规定;禁止公司官员,董事等相关人员对审计实务施加不当影响;加快财务披露的速度,包括对内幕交易和关联交易的电子披露;禁止在退休和养老金冻结期间(blackout periods)内部人的交易;责成SEC修改公司信息披露的相关规定,设定最低检查期,并在指定的日期内提交对分析师的利益冲突,公司治理实务,执行(enforcement actions),信贷评级机构等的专项研究报告.与最终通过的版本相比,第一稿较温和,不仅没有最终定稿所包括的各项严厉的刑事责任要求,而且,对会计职业监管相对较宽松.当然,这与该法案起草时间短有一定的关系,因为,2001年12月2日安然申请破产保护,第一稿正式提交的日期为2002年2月14日,这中间还包括一个月的国会休会期(2001年12月21日至2002年1月2 2日).此外,当时世界通信等事件尚未爆发,社会舆论对企业管理层的态度还没有根本转变.从对美国国会网站的检索情况看,安然公司2001年12月2日申请破产保护,美国国会众议院"金融服务委员会"2001年12月12日就安然事件举行第一次听证会,讨论安然倒闭对投资者及资本市场的影响,作为专家证人出席听证会的有SEC首席会计师,安达信的首席执行官等4人.国会于2002年1月下旬复会后,2月4日,5日又召集两次听证会,2月14日正式提交第一稿,自2月14日起,众议院金融服务委员会就该法案先后进行了多次听证会,到4月22日列入Union Calendar, Calendar No. 247,并根据听证情况进行了第一次较系统地修订.4月22日的第二稿与第一稿相比,篇幅增加了将近一倍,主要变化是对公众监督组织(Public Regulatory Organization, PRO)的人员组成,经费来源与独立性,具体运行等的规定更加细致,增加了要求SEC对公司高管在重新编制财务报表之前六个月销售公司证券所得部分进行审定并强迫其交出相应利得;具体讨论了对安然和安达信主要责任人的可能法律行为及其所得的处理;要求美国总审计署(GAO)对投资银行和财务顾问在安然,环球通讯(Global Crossing)失败事件中的作用,特别是投资银行从事的纯粹帮助企业操纵现金流以掩盖其真实财务状况的行为;要求美国律师协会(A merican Bar Association)对其职业行为示范规则(Model Rule of Professi onal Conduct)以及SEC的规则展开研究,讨论相应职业道德指南是否有效地指导律师行为并保护公司股东利益.第二稿提交后,众议院的讨论非常激烈,4月24日当天共提交了5份正式的修改意见,涉及:部分术语(A001),要求PRO成员中至少有一人从来没有获取过会计资格(A002),责成SEC对审计公开上市公司的事务所要求其不低于一半的收入来自审计(A003),成立一个联邦审计局以从事证券法所要求的财务报表审计(A004),对PRO的具体运行进行讨论与限定(A005).上述修正案只有前两个获得通过,后三个都未能通过.在经过正式讨论后,国会责成工作人员进行修订,从而完成了第三稿.第三稿与第二稿相比,变化不大,主要调整就是PRO成员的组成上,从原来的两个非会计人士,三个会计人士,改为一个从未接触过会计,两个最近两年未执业,其他就是一些遣词用句上的调整.美国国会关于该法案的记录表明,从4月25日提交给参议院"银行,住房与城市事务委员会"讨论,之后直到7月15日,这之间没有关于该法案讨论,修订的记录.但实际上,参议院同期也在进行相应的立法行动.比如,参议院"银行,住房与城市事务委员会"自2月12日至3月20日,共举行了十次听证会,讨论安然,安达信事件的原因,影响与对策.其中,2月14日的听证会邀请了国际会计准则委员会的秘书长,主席等就会计准则的表现形式以及美国"公认会计原则"等问题作证.3月8日,参议员Dodd提交了有关重建投资者对会计行业信任的法案,该法案基本思路与众议院所提交的H3673相似,但增加了有关会计与审计准则,会计师事务所轮换等提议.6月25日,参议院"银行,住房和城市事务委员会"主席Sarbanes报告有关"公众公司会计改革与投资者保护2002法案",该法案的书面文本于7月3日正式提交给参议院,7月8至15日的讨论中,共收到122份补充或修正提案,最终于7月15日在参议院以97对0票高票通过,最终通过的提案名称为"公司与犯罪舞弊责任2002法案"或"强化白领犯罪惩罚2002法案",但参议院同时将该法案与众议院提交的HR 3673进行合并,成为7月15日的修改稿(第五稿).按照相关资料的介绍,当民主党参议员Sarbanes早在6月18日宣布将提交一份关于"公众公司会计改革与投资者保护法案"时,参议院内部的意见并不统一,共和党资深议员Gramm不支持该提案.有评论认为,如果不能取得Gramm的支持,估计该提案2002年内都无法获得通过.但6月下旬至7月上旬的一些事件,对该提案产生重大影响.其中,影响最大的是2002年6月25日公布的世界通信(WorldCom)38亿美元假账事件.如果说,安然,环球电讯等公司丑闻令美国社会震惊,那么,世界通信赤裸裸的假账令美国社会愤怒.6月26日,布什总统承诺要推进对世界通信事件的调查,并将相关人员"绳之以法", 7月9日,布什总统专程到华尔街发表演讲,宣布成立由司法部副总检察长(Deputy Attorney General)为主席的"公司舞弊惩治工作组",加大对公司高管人员涉及舞弊问题的刑事责任.同时,布什也要求国会在7月底休会前能够提交让其签字生效的法案.这一切,都促成了参议院最后快速通过对S2673的审议,并将其并入HR 3673.这样,修正后的草案篇幅又增加了一倍多,内容也发生了较大变化,从原来的18章压缩为10章,删除了对有关投资银行,律师等的讨论,将S2673的内容与第四稿的内容进行合并,如第8章"公司及舞弊罪的责任"(Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability),第9章"严惩白领犯罪" (White-collar crime penalty enhancements)都是直接来自S2673;将原先数章讨论的内容如对审计行为的不当影响,非法证券收入的测定与没收,内部人交易等并入"公司责任"(corporate responsibility)一章;正式确定监管会计职业的权威机构名称为"公众公司会计监督委员会"(Public Company Acco unting Oversight Board),并对该机构的具体运作加以限定.本次修订稿基本确立了SOX法案最终版本的基调.7月17日,参议院任命了由Sarbanes等9名参议员作为该项法案的主要评议人(conferee),负责与众议院进行沟通,进行后续的修订.众议院同时也在采取相应的行动.7月15日,众议员Sensenbrenner提交了一份关于强化公司高管层舞弊责任的议案,16日获得众议院高票通过,通过的名称为"公司舞弊责任2002法案"(Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002),并同时提交参议院司法委员会(the Committee on the Judici ary)进行讨论.该法案最终也并入HR 3673,成为最终法案的第11章.7月17日,由参议院修改的法案被返回给众议院.不知是出于对众议院荣誉的维持,还是出于对自身荣誉的维护,Oxley要求全体众议员一致否决参议院的修改,并专门举行一个会议(a conference).当天的辩论结果是:将法案提交会议讨论,同时,任命了以Oxley为召集人的10位评议人.此外,众议院还就该法案的一些具体章节(如306,904,108,109等)任命了专门的成员作为评议人,要求对这些部分给出具体的修改意见.由于美国总统布什多次要求国会加快立法进程,并要求国会在8月份休会前能够提交一份最终法案让总统签署,因此,国会参众两院都在尽快协调双方之间的差距.自19日起,众议院的相关成员与参议院的会议成员举行会议,对相互分歧进行辩论,并于24日完成了对法案的修改.7月25日,该修正稿以高票分别在参众两院通过,7月30日,美国总统布什签字,SOX Act正式成为美国的一项法律.二,SOX法案的主要内容最后修订完稿的SOX法案共分11章,第1至第6章主要涉及对会计职业及公司行为的监管,包括:建立一个独立的"公众公司会计监管委员会"(Publ ic Company Accounting Oversight Board, PCAOB),对上市公司审计进行监管;通过负责合伙人轮换制度以及咨询与审计服务不兼容等提高审计的独立性;对公司高管人员的行为进行限定以及改善公司治理结构等,以增进公司的报告责任;加强财务报告的披露;通过增加拨款和雇员等来提高SEC的执法能力.第8至第11章主要是提高对公司高管及白领犯罪的刑事责任,比如,针对安达信销毁安然审计档案事件,专门制订相关法律,规定了销毁审计档案最高可判10年监禁,在联邦调查及破产事件中销毁档案最高可判20年监禁;为强化公司高管层对财务报告的责任,要求公司高管对财务报告的真实性宣誓,并就提供不实财务报告分别设定了10年或20年的刑事责任.除上述两个部分外,法案第七章要求相关部门在SOX法案正式生效后的指定日期内(一般都在6个月至9个月)提交若干份研究报告,包括:会计师事务所合并,信贷评级机构,市场违规者,(法律的)执行,投资银行等研究报告,以供相关执行机构参考,并作为未来立法的参照.按照法案的要求,这些报告都已经完成.美国2001年至2002年度所爆发的各项公司丑闻事件中,企业管理层无疑应当负有最主要的责任,因而,SOX法案的主要内容之一就是明确公司管理层责任(如对公司内部控制进行评估等),尤其是对股东所承担的受托责任,同时,加大对公司管理层及白领犯罪的刑事责任.企业会计人员以及外部审计人员在这些事件中的负面作用,不容否定,比如,安然通过复杂的"特殊目的主体"安排,虚构利润,隐瞒债务,而世界通讯则是赤裸裸的假账,提高财务报告的可靠性,成为SOX法案的另一个主要内容,法案的要求包括:建立一个独立机构来监管上市公司审计,审计师定期轮换,全面修订会计准则,制订关于审计委员会成员构成的标准,要求管理层及时评估内部控制,更及时的财务报告,对审计时提供咨询服务进行限制等.并且,从全部法案的次序安排来看,这些内容排在前三章,而篇幅也超过2/3.因而,SOX法案更像一个会计改革法案.该法案前后被用过多个名称,其中之一就是"公众公司会计改革和投资者保护法案".三,SOX法案:中期评估由于SOX法案的正式生效是2002年7月30日,到2004年初也不足两年.应当说,该法案的影响尚未充分发挥,因此,现在就评价该法案及其对资本市场的影响,为时尚早.下面的讨论主要集中在法案制订本身以及该法案的短期影响.(一)法案的制订过程:匆忙诚如上述,2001年12月2日安然公司申请破产保护;2002年1月10日,安达信公开承认销毁了与安然审计有关的档案.很快,安然公司丑闻转化为会计丑闻.安达信成为人们谈论的焦点.由于2002年事关中期选举,有效利用公司丑闻事件所产生的"机会",是政治家的必然选择.因此,从国会众议院,参议院,到美国总统,都尽力显示他们对公司丑闻事件的重视程度,并力图向公众表明他们在努力工作,以求解决相关问题.比如,在SOX法案最后提交投票表决的讨论会上,参议员Gramm(该项法案的主要反对者)认为,美国奇特的政治制度决定了:一旦社会上发生重大事件,尽管议员们并不一定知道答案,也不一定了解很多情况,但选民们都期望议员要有所行动.在SOX法案最终通过之前,参众两院两个委员会先后提交的相关法案就有十多起.特别是由于世界通讯巨额假账丑闻爆出,"(美国)政治风暴急剧上升,道·琼斯指数跳水,大家都普遍认为国会应当有所行动,并且越快越好.正是在这种背景下,几个原来已经提交讨论的议案被拼接起来,成为SOX法案"(Perino, 2002).在法案制订过程介绍部分也提及,美国总统布什对该法案也非常关注,他本人为了改变外交和战争总统形象,塑造一个重视并擅长国内事务和经济问题的新形象,以利其未来竞选连任,还专门推出一个关于美国公司责任的专题"运动",从2002年1月10发表讲话要求改革养老金的规定以及公司披露的准则起,不断推出有关公司责任的讲话与呼吁,包括世界通讯丑闻后立即表示要彻底调查.在SO X法案制订过程中,布什总统还多次催促,要求国会尽快提交草案让其签字,并明确表示要求国会在7月底休会前,一定要送交草案.美国国会参众两院在最后就该法案准备投票前的辩论中,很多人都反复提到这一点.最终通过的SO X法案,也被媒体批评为一种"本能的"反应(knee-jerk reaction).换言之,它很难说是一种深思熟虑的产物.(二)法案本身:重点突出,逻辑混乱中国有句古话:慢工出细活.与之相对应,赶工只能是粗糙.将之用于SOX 法案,虽然有点夸张,但总体应是恰当的.如上所述,SOX法案是一种情绪下的产物:美国社会普遍对公司高管的腐败行为感到愤怒.比如,2002年7月25日,Adelphia公司的前首席执行官J ohn Rigas被公开逮捕.按照媒体的报道,J. Rigas的律师曾经与司法部协商,要求让J. Rigas去司法部指定的地点"报到",但司法部拒绝了这一要求,J. Ri gas也以78岁高龄成为美国近20年来第一起"戴手铐游街"的公司高管.美国司法部的副总检察长,布什总统任命的"公司舞弊惩治工作组"负责人在随后的新闻发布会上说,公司高管(非法占有公司财产)与普通的市井小偷并无两样,(公开逮捕他们)是惩治公司犯罪行为的一种恰当方式.正因为如此,SOX法案的一个重点就是强化公司高管及白领犯罪的刑事责任,比如,SOX法案第9 06节"财务报告的责任"规定,公司高管明知财务报告存在虚假内容而宣誓,可判罚款500万美元或/和最高20年监禁.SOX法案的另一个重点就是加强对会计职业的监管,这一背景在前面已经提及,这里不再重复.SOX法案本身的内在逻辑混乱,体现在多个方面.首先,该法案是若干个法案拼接的产物,比如,第8,9章来自原S2673,第11章来自原HR5118,同时,还吸收了S2004的部分内容.由于最终的SOX法案是若干个法案的拼接与综合,其内容与表述上存在重复,是一种必然现象.特别是有关公司高管和白领犯罪的刑事责任部分,分别散见于第8,9和11章.也就是说,同一份文告先后有三个部分讨论内容相同或相近的话题,重复不可避免,个别地方出现自我不一致,也有规定与现行法律不一致.此外,关于公司高管对财务报告真实性的责任,第302节的表述与第906节的表述也不完全一致.(三)法案的实施效果:初步检验由于SOX法案实施时间很短,对其进行检验,缺少必要的观察值和观察区间,任何检验只能是初步的.诚如上述,SOX法案的目的是加强公司责任,以保护公众公司投资者的利益免受公司高管及相关机构的侵害,其内在逻辑思路是:提高公众公司财务报告及信息披露的及时性与准确性,可以有效地保护公众公司投资者的利益;而强化公司高管的财务报告责任,提供外部审计的独立性等,将有助于提高公司财务报告及信息披露的质量.SOX法案给出的很多内容与规定都是与此相关的.究竟SOX法案是否提高了上市公司信息披露的质量,更好地保护投资者的利益,将有待未来的市场来检验.在相关的文献中,没有找到太多的检验文献.Cohen et al (2003)针对SOX法案颁布前后上市公司盈余管理程度进行检验.他们首先收集美国公司1987年至2001年第二季度之前(安然事件于当年10月份开始引爆)公司盈余管理的数据,数据表明:公司盈余管理不断上升.然后,他们又收集了SOX法案通过之后的相关数据(2002年第三季度至2 003年第二季度),发现盈余管理出现明显下降,会计信息质量明显上升.SOX法案第2章专门讨论审计独立性,并提出若干措施,其中之一是禁止会计师事务所向同一个客户既提供审计服务,又提供咨询服务.Lai (2003)的研究发现,SOX法案实施之后,审计师更愿意提供非标准无保留意见的审计报告,而且,公司报告利润中盈余管理的程度降低.他的发现支持SOX法案提高审计独立性的推断.Li et al (2003)的检验采取不同的视角.他们对SOX法案及其相关事件进行分析,选择了20个相关的事件日.他们认为,由于SOX法案的中心内容之一就是强化审计委员会,限制盈余管理(提高信息质量).如果市场能够充分预期SOX法案的影响,那么,那些盈余管理较高,审计委员会独立性较差的上市公司,其市场反应应当与盈余管理较少,审计委员会独立性较强的上市公司之间存在显著的差异.他们的经验结果不能显著地支持其推论.作者最后认为,S OX法案的通过,只不过是对市场上数量不断增多,规模不断加大的会计舞弊事件的本能反应,它所包含的内容更多地是政治家的口号与煽动,而不是一种真正意义上的改革(more rhetoric than reform).四,有关争论有关SOX法案的争论,主要有两个方面:第一,对会计职业所存在的问题,究竟应当由政府监管还是由市场自身来解决;第二,加大公司高管与会计职业的法律责任,无疑是应当的,但是,法律责任究竟应当有多大过高的法律责任是否会对公司经营,管理以及会计职业产生负面影响市场竞争抑或政府监管,是经济学所关注的一个核心话题.赞成市场竞争的经济学家包括科斯(R. Coase),斯蒂格勒(G. Stigler),弗里德曼(M. Freed man)等.尽管各自的理论并不完全一致,但他们都普遍认为充分竞争的市场本身能够自动达到均衡,比如科斯有关交易成本与企业规模的理论,就隐含了市场能够自动达到最佳企业规模的思想;斯蒂格勒有关政府管制的研究表明,政府管制并没有提高效率,却增大了社会运行的成本.他还专门研究了美国证券交易委员会的作用;弗里德曼同样也是自由市场理论的忠实支持者,他认为,私有企业经营失败的结局是破产和倒闭,而政府经营企业的失败,不是破产和倒闭,而是扩张(Sullum, 2002).他的这一思想被用来反对"9·11"之后美国政府准备资助航空业的提案,认为这种救助不能解决问题.美国现任总统布什在2004年1月的国情咨文中在宣传其减税政策时也认为:美国人民比政府能够更有效地使用资源.在企业经济学领域,阿尔钦(A·Alchian)所提出的经济学达尔文主义, 简森(M·Jensen)等所提出的代理理论,都包含了市场有效且市场机制能够自动实现最佳均衡安排或结果.但是,周期性的市场危机事件表明,市场会失效.而资本市场,现代社会的新闻机制等,在相当程度上放大了市场失效的社会影响,从而加深了人们对市场失效的"记忆".因此,市场危机事件成为政府介入的最好"借口".1929-1933年经济危机产生了"证券交易委员会"(SEC),本次安然等系列公司危机事件以及安达信审计失败,催生了一个独立机构"公众公司会计监管委员会".这些机构运行都需要相应的费用,无论这种费用的来源如何,最终都成为社会成本,加大了经济运行的费用.SOX法案第109节就规定:那些使用到会计准则及被PCAOB监管的公司,都应当要交纳相应的费用.政府管制是否能够纠正市场失效,仍然是一个存有争议的话题,但是,政府管制的一些负面效应却是人所共知的.比如,在SOX法案讨论过程中,参议员Gramm就认为,政府或许干预过度了.他认为,成立PCAOB或许是必要的,但政府具体限定PCAOB的职责与工作,可能存在问题,因为,PCAOB是由相关专家组成,他们比国会议员对该问题有更大的发言权.另外,他对SOX法案本身也不无担心,他认为,一旦由国会通过一项法律,如果应用中发现不当,再来修改将费时费力,其经济后果难以估量.他以金融领域的一个法规(Glass-St eagall)为例,认为该项法规早在20世纪50年代就应当修改,但直到1999年才被修订.最后,他还担心:由于该法案将适用16 254家公众公司,并不是每个公司都象通用汽车那样的规模,采取"一刀切"的方式禁止审计师向其客户提供咨询服务,会加大中小企业的成本.他举例说:一家在NASDAQ上市的规模不大的公司,其CEO是工程技术背景,对会计一无所知;现在公司需要招聘会计负责人,他本来可以让其审计师帮助面试并判断某人是否合格.按照新的法案,他只能重新找另外一个机构帮助完成这项工作,企业的成本必然会上升.G ramm担心的另外一个问题是:PCAOB掌握了一部分人——会计从业人员的谋生权利,他们可以吊销会计从业人员的谋生权利,这种权利一旦被滥用,其后果不堪设想,因此,应当设定一些措施,防止这种权利被滥用.SOX法案的另外一个特色就是加大公司高管及会计从业人员的法律责任,尤其是刑事责任.在美国这样一个以判例法为主体的法律框架内,1933年的《证券法》,1934年的《证券交易法》就已经开始用成文法的体例对资本市场进行约束.但SOX法案前所未有地将公司高管和会计从业人员的法律责任用成文法的方式明确加以限定,比如,给公司高管人员处以最高20年监禁,最高500万美元的罚款等(第906节).以往的经验证明,法律责任在一定程度上能够帮助提高会计职业质量(K othari, Lys and Watts, 1988).但是,过高的法律风险,也会造成一种特殊现。
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Version: 17.7.2008South AustraliaVictims of Crime Act 2001An Act to lay down principles to govern the treatment of victims of crime in the criminal justice system; to provide limited rights to statutory compensation for injury suffered as a result of the commission of criminal offences; to repeal the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1978; and for other purposes.ContentsPart 1—Preliminary1 Short title3 Objects4 InterpretationPart 2—Treatment of victims of crimeDivision 1—Explanatory provisions5 Reasons for declaration and its effectDivision 2—Declaration of principles governing treatment of victims6 Fair and dignified treatment7 Right to have perceived need for protection taken into account in bail proceedings8 Right to information9 Victim to be advised on role as witness9A Victim of serious offence entitled to be consulted in relation to certain decisions9B Victim's entitlement to be present in court10 Victim entitled to have impact of offence considered by sentencing court and to makesubmissions on parole10A Victim may request consideration of appeal11 Victim to be informed about access to health and welfare services12 Rights in relation to compensation and restitution13 Return of property14 Protection of privacyPart 3—Victims of Crime Advisory Committee and Commissioner for Victims' RightsDivision 1—Victims of Crime Advisory Committee15 Power to establish advisory committeeDivision 2—Commissioner for Victims' Rights16 Commissioner for Victims' RightsVictims of Crime Act 2001—17.7.2008Contents16A Powers of the Commissioner16B Appointment of acting Commissioner16C Staff16D Delegation16E Independence of Commissioner16F Annual reportPart 4—Compensation17 Eligibility to make claim18 Application for compensation19 Joinder of offender as party to court proceedings20 Orders for compensation21 Medical examination of claimant22 Evidence and proof23 Joint offences24 Appeals25 Legal costs26 Representation of Crown in proceedingsPart 5—Payment of compensation27 Payment of compensation etc by Attorney-General28 Right of Attorney-General to recover money paid out from offender etc29 Recovery from claimantPart 6—Victims of Crime Fund30 Victims of Crime Fund31 Payments from Fund32 Imposition of levyPart 7—Miscellaneous33 Interaction between this Act and other laws34 Date as at which compensation is to be assessed35 Delegation36 Annual report37 RegulationsSchedule 1—Repeal and transitional provisions1 Repeal of Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 19782 Transitional provision3 Operation of certain amendmentsLegislative historyThe Parliament of South Australia enacts as follows:Part 1—Preliminary1—Short titleThis Act may be cited as the Victims of Crime Act 2001.17.7.2008—Victims of Crime Act 2001Preliminary—Part 13—ObjectsThe objects of this Act are—(a) to give statutory recognition to victims of crime and the harm that they sufferfrom criminal offending; and(b) to establish principles governing how victims of crime are to be treated bypublic agencies and officials; and(c) to help victims of crime recover from the effects of criminal offending and toadvance their welfare in other ways; and(d) to provide from public funds limited monetary compensation to victims mostdirectly affected by criminal offending.4—InterpretationIn this Act, unless the contrary intention appears—child—a reference to a child is not limited to biological and adopted children—itextends to a person in relation to whom another (who is not a biological parent) stands in the position, and undertakes the responsibilities, of a parent; but a reference to achild does not, in the absence of an indication to the contrary, extend to an adult child;claimant means a person by whom, or on whose behalf, an application for statutorycompensation is made;Commissioner means the Commissioner for Victims' Rights appointed under Part 3Division 2;conviction includes a formal finding of guilt and to convict has a correspondingmeaning;court means the District Court;custody includes—(a) home detention; and(b) detention in a training centre within the meaning of the Young OffendersAct 1993; and(c) detention as a result of being declared liable to supervision under Part 8A ofthe Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935;dependants, in relation to a victim, means any spouse, domestic partner, parents orchildren (including adult children) of the victim who are financially dependent on thevictim;domestic partner means a person who is a domestic partner within the meaning of the Family Relationships Act 1975, whether declared as such under that Act or not;harm means injury, damage or loss;homicide means murder or manslaughter;immediate family of a person means any one or more of the following:(a) a spouse or domestic partner;(b) a parent;Victims of Crime Act 2001—17.7.2008Part 1—Preliminary(c) a grandparent;(d) a child (including an adult child);(e) a grandchild (including an adult grandchild);(f) a brother or sister;immediate victim, in relation to an offence, means a victim of any of the followingclasses:(a) a person who suffers physical injury as a result of the commission of theoffence;(b) a person who suffers psychological injury as a result of being directlyinvolved in the circumstances of the offence or in operations in the immediateaftermath of the offence to deal with its consequences;(c) if the offence was committed against a child—a parent or guardian of thechild;(d) if the offence was committed against a person who dies as a result of theoffence—a member of the immediate family of the deceased;injury means physical or mental injury, and includes pregnancy, mental shock andnervous shock;non-financial loss means—(a) pain and suffering;(b) loss of amenities of life;(c) loss of expectation of life;(d) disfigurement;offence includes conduct on the part of a person that would constitute an offence if itwere not for that person's age or mental impairment;offender, in relation to an offence, means—(a) the person who committed the offence; or(b) in the case of conduct that would constitute an offence if it were not for theperson's age or mental impairment—the person who engaged in that conduct;parent includes a person who stands in the position, and undertakes theresponsibilities, of a parent;serious offence means an indictable offence—(a) that resulted in the death of, or physical harm to, a victim; or(b) that is a sexual offence within the meaning of the Evidence Act 1929,and includes an offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commissionof such an offence, conspiring to commit such an offence or being an accessory afterthe fact to such an offence;spouse—a person is the spouse of another if they are legally married;statutory compensation means compensation under this Act;17.7.2008—Victims of Crime Act 2001Preliminary—Part 1 victim, in relation to an offence, means a person who suffers harm as a result of thecommission of the offence (but does not include a person who was a party to thecommission of the offence).Part 2—Treatment of victims of crimeDivision 1—Explanatory provisions5—Reasons for declaration and its effect(1) In this Part, Parliament seeks to declare the principles that should govern the wayvictims are dealt with by public agencies and officials.(2) The need for the declaration arises out of national and international concern about theposition of victims of crime.(3) The principles—(a) are not enforceable in criminal or civil proceedings; and(b) do not give rise to any right to damages for breach; and(c) do not affect the conduct of criminal proceedings.(4) However, public agencies and officials are authorised and required to have regard, andto give effect, to the principles so far as it is practicable to do so having regard to theother obligations binding on them.Division 2—Declaration of principles governing treatment of victims 6—Fair and dignified treatmentA victim should be treated—(a) with courtesy, respect and sympathy; and(b) with due regard to any special need that arises—(i) because of the victim's—•age; or•sex; or•race or ethnicity; or•cultural or linguistic background; or(ii) for any other reason.7—Right to have perceived need for protection taken into account in bail proceedingsIf a police officer or a person representing the Crown in bail proceedings is madeaware that the victim feels a need for protection from the alleged offender—(a) the police officer or other person must ensure that the perceived need forprotection is brought to the attention of the bail authority1; andVictims of Crime Act 2001—17.7.2008Part 2—Treatment of victims of crimeDivision 2—Declaration of principles governing treatment of victims(b) reasonable efforts must be made to notify the victim of the outcome of thebail proceedings and, in particular, any condition imposed to protect thevictim from the alleged offender (unless the victim indicates that he or shedoes not wish to be so informed).Note—1 See also section 10(4) of the Bail Act 1985 which requires that where there is avictim of an offence, the bail authority must, in determining whether anapplicant for bail should be released on bail, give primary consideration to theneed that the victim may have, or perceive, for physical protection from theapplicant.8—Right to information(1) A victim should be informed, on request, about the following:(a) the progress of investigations into the offence;(b) the charge laid and details of the place and date of proceedings on the charge;(c) if a person has been charged with the offence—the name of the allegedoffender1;(d) if an application for bail is made by the alleged offender—the outcome of theapplication;(e) if the prosecutor decides not to proceed with the charge, to amend the charge,or to accept a plea to a lesser charge or agrees with the defendant to make orsupport a recommendation for leniency—the reasons for the prosecutor'sdecision;(f) the outcome of the proceedings based on the charge and of any appeal fromthose proceedings;(g) details of any sentence imposed on the offender for the offence;(ga) details of any order made by a court on declaring the offender to be liable to supervision under Part 8A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935;(h) if the offender is sentenced to imprisonment and later makes an applicationfor release on parole—the outcome of the proceedings and, in particular, anycondition imposed to protect the victim from the offender;(i) if the offender is subject to a supervision order under Part 8A of the CriminalLaw Consolidation Act 1935 and the offender, or any other person, latermakes an application for variation or revocation of the order or an applicationfor review of the supervision order is made—the outcome of the proceedingsand, in particular, if the offender is released on licence, any conditionsimposed on the licence.(2) A victim should be informed, on request, about the following:(a) if the alleged offender absconds before trial—the fact that he or she hasabsconded;(b) if the offender escapes from custody—the fact that he or she has escaped;(c) if the offender, having escaped from custody, is returned to custody—the factthat he or she has been returned to custody;17.7.2008—Victims of Crime Act 2001Treatment of victims of crime—Part 2Declaration of principles governing treatment of victims—Division 2(d) if the release of the offender into the community is imminent—details ofwhen the offender is to be released;(e) if the offender was ordered to undertake community service—whether theoffender completed the community service;(f) if the offender was subject to a bond—whether the conditions of the bondwere complied with.(3) However, a victim is not entitled to information that might jeopardise the investigationof an offence.(4) A victim should be informed, on request, about procedures that may be available todeal with a grievance the victim may have for non-recognition or inadequaterecognition of the victim's rights under this Part.Note—1 Section 64 of the Young Offenders Act 1993 provides a mechanism for exercising thisright in relation to a young offender.9—Victim to be advised on role as witness(1) A victim who is to be a witness for the prosecution at the trial of the offence should beinformed by the prosecution about the trial process and the victim's rights andresponsibilities as a witness for the prosecution.(2) The information should be given (if practicable) so as to allow the victim sufficienttime to obtain independent advice, and arrange independent support, in relation to theexercise of those rights or the discharge of those responsibilities.9A—Victim of serious offence entitled to be consulted in relation to certain decisionsA victim of a serious offence should be consulted before any decision is made—(a) to charge the alleged offender with a particular offence; or(b) to amend a charge; or(c) to not proceed with a charge; or(d) to apply under Part 8A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 for aninvestigation into the alleged offender's mental competence to commit anoffence or mental fitness to stand trial.9B—Victim's entitlement to be present in courtA victim of an offence is entitled to be present in the courtroom during proceedingsfor the offence unless the court, in accordance with some other Act or law, ordersotherwise1.Note—1 See also section 29A of the Evidence Act 1929 (which requires that, where avictim of an offence is a witness in the proceedings, the court can only orderthe victim to leave the courtroom until required to give evidence if the courtconsiders it appropriate to do so) and section 24 of the Youth Court Act 1993(which allows a victim and a person chosen by the victim to provide support forthe victim to be present during Youth Court proceedings for the relevantoffence).Victims of Crime Act 2001—17.7.2008Part 2—Treatment of victims of crimeDivision 2—Declaration of principles governing treatment of victims10—Victim entitled to have impact of offence considered by sentencing court and to make submissions on parole(1) A victim is entitled to have any injury, loss or damage suffered as a result of theoffence considered by the sentencing court before it passes sentence1.(2) A victim of an offence is entitled to make written submissions to the Parole Board onquestions affecting the parole of a person imprisoned for the offence.2 Notes—1 Section 7A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 provides a mechanism forexercising this right. See also section 7 of that Act under which the prosecutor is obligedto place before the sentencing court details of injury, loss or damage resulting from theoffence.2 See section 77(2)(ba) of the Correctional Services Act 1982.10A—Victim may request consideration of appeal(1) A victim who is dissatisfied with a determination made in relation to the relevantcriminal proceedings (being a determination against which the prosecution is entitledto appeal) may request the prosecution to consider an appeal against thedetermination.(2) A request under this section must be made within 10 days after the making of thedetermination.(3) The prosecution must give due consideration to a request made under this section. 11—Victim to be informed about access to health and welfare servicesA victim should be informed about health and welfare services that may be availableto alleviate the consequences of injury suffered as a result of the offence. 12—Rights in relation to compensation and restitution(1) A victim should have access to information about how to obtain compensation orrestitution for harm suffered as a result of the offence.(2) If the prosecutor is empowered to make an application for restitution or compensationon behalf of a victim in criminal proceedings—(a) the prosecutor should bring that fact to the attention of the victim; and(b) should, if asked to do so by the victim—(i) make the application on the victim's behalf; and(ii) bring to the attention of the court any relevant information providedby the victim in connection with the application.13—Return of propertyIf a victim's property is taken for investigation or for use as evidence, the propertyshould, if practicable, be returned to the victim as soon as it appears that it is no longer required for the purposes for which it was taken.14—Protection of privacy(1) There should be no unnecessary intrusion on a victim's privacy.17.7.2008—Victims of Crime Act 2001Treatment of victims of crime—Part 2Declaration of principles governing treatment of victims—Division 2(2) In particular, a victim's residential address should not be disclosed unless it is materialto the prosecution or defence.(3) A victim should be protected as far as practicable from unnecessary contact with thealleged offender and defence witnesses during the course of the trial and inproceedings under this Act1.(4) A victim should only be asked to attend proceedings related to the offence if thevictim's attendance is genuinely necessary.Note—1 See also section 13 of the Evidence Act 1929 which contains special provisions for theprotection of a person who is a vulnerable witness within the meaning of that section. Part 3—Victims of Crime Advisory Committee andCommissioner for Victims' RightsDivision 1—Victims of Crime Advisory Committee15—Power to establish advisory committee(1) The Attorney-General may establish an advisory committee to advise on—(a) practical initiatives that the Government might take—(i) to ensure that victims of crime are treated with proper considerationand respect in the criminal justice system; and(ii) to help victims of crime to recover from harm suffered by them; and(iii) to advance the interests of victims of crime in other ways; and(b) any other matter referred to the advisory committee by the Attorney-Generalfor advice.(2) A member of the advisory committee will be appointed and hold office for a term andon conditions determined by the Attorney-General.Division 2—Commissioner for Victims' Rights16—Commissioner for Victims' Rights(1) The Governor may appoint a suitable person to be the Commissioner for Victims'Rights.(2) The person appointed as the Commissioner must not be a member of the PublicService.(3) The Commissioner has the following functions:(a) to marshal available government resources so they can be applied for thebenefit of victims in the most efficient and effective way;(b) to assist victims in their dealings with prosecution authorities and othergovernment agencies;(c) to monitor and review the effect of the law and of court practices andprocedures on victims;Victims of Crime Act 2001—17.7.2008Part 3—Victims of Crime Advisory Committee and Commissioner for Victims' RightsDivision 2—Commissioner for Victims' Rights(d) to carry out other functions related to the objects of this Act assigned by theAttorney-General;(e) if another Act authorises or requires the Commissioner to make submissionsin any proceedings—to make such submissions (either personally or throughcounsel);(f) to carry out any other functions assigned under other Acts.(4) The Commissioner is a member ex officio of the advisory committee.(5) The Commissioner is to be appointed on conditions determined by the Governor andfor a term, not exceeding 5 years, specified in the instrument of appointment.(6) At the expiration of a term of office, the Commissioner will be eligible forre-appointment.(7) The Governor may terminate the Commissioner's appointment if the Commissioner—(a) is guilty of misbehaviour; or(b) becomes physically or mentally incapable of carrying out official dutiessatisfactorily; or(c) becomes bankrupt or applies to take the benefit of a law for the relief ofbankrupt or insolvent debtors; or(d) is absent, without leave of the Attorney-General, for 14 consecutive days, orfor 28 days in any period of 12 months.(8) Except as provided in subsection (7), the Commissioner's appointment cannot beterminated.16A—Powers of the Commissioner(1) A public agency or official must, if requested to do so by the Commissioner, consultwith the Commissioner regarding steps that may be taken by the agency or official tofurther the interests of—(a) victims in general; or(b) a particular victim or class of victim.(2) If, after consultation with a public agency or official, the Commissioner is satisfiedthat the public agency or official—(a) has failed to comply with the requirements of Part 2 in circumstances wheresuch compliance would have been practicable; and(b) has not apologised or otherwise dealt with the victim in relation to the failurein a satisfactory way,the Commissioner may, by notice in writing to the public agency or official,recommend that the agency or official issue a written apology to the relevant victim.(3) The Commissioner must provide the relevant victim with a copy of the notice givenunder subsection (2).(4) The Commissioner must, in his or her report under section 16F, specify the number ofnotices given by the Commissioner under subsection (2), and the public agencies orofficials to whom the notices were given, during the year to which the report relates.Victims of Crime Advisory Committee and Commissioner for Victims' Rights—Part 3Commissioner for Victims' Rights—Division 2(5) The Commissioner must, in exercising his or her powers in relation to a particularvictim, have regard to the wishes of that victim.16B—Appointment of acting Commissioner(1) If the Commissioner is temporarily absent, or the Commissioner's position istemporarily vacant, the Attorney-General may assign a suitable person to act in theCommissioner's position during the temporary absence or vacancy.(2) A person who is a member of the Public Service is eligible to act in theCommissioner's position.(3) The terms on which a person is assigned to act in the Commissioner's position will beas determined by the Attorney-General.(4) A person appointed to act in the Commissioner's position has, while so acting, all thefunctions and powers of the Commissioner.16C—Staff(1) The Commissioner will have such staff as is necessary for the effective performanceof his or her functions.(2) The Commissioner's staff will consist of Public Service employees.16D—Delegation(1) The Commissioner may delegate to a body or person (including a person for the timebeing holding or acting in a specified office or position) a function or power of theCommissioner under this or any other Act.(2) A delegation under this section—(a) must be by instrument in writing; and(b) may be absolute or conditional; and(c) does not derogate from the power of the Commissioner to act in any matter;and(d) is revocable at will.(3) A function or power delegated under this section may, if the instrument of delegationso provides, be further delegated.16E—Independence of Commissioner(1) Subject to this section, the Commissioner is entirely independent of direction orcontrol by the Crown or any Minister or officer of the Crown.(2) The Attorney-General may, after consultation with the Commissioner, give directionsand furnish guidelines to the Commissioner in relation to the carrying out of his or her functions.(3) Directions or guidelines under this section—(a) must, as soon as practicable after they have been given, be published in theGazette; and(b) must, within 6 sitting days after they have been given, be laid before eachHouse of Parliament.Part 3—Victims of Crime Advisory Committee and Commissioner for Victims' RightsDivision 2—Commissioner for Victims' Rights16F—Annual report(1) The Commissioner must, on or before 30 September in each year, present a report tothe Attorney-General on the operations of the Commissioner during the previousfinancial year.(2) The Attorney-General must, within 12 sitting days after receipt of a report under thissection, cause copies of the report to be laid before each House of Parliament. Part 4—Compensation17—Eligibility to make claim(1) A person is eligible to claim statutory compensation for injury caused by an offenceif—(a) the person is an immediate victim of the offence; and(b) at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:(i) the offence involved the use of violence or a threat of violenceagainst the person or a member of the person's immediate family;(ii) the offence created a reasonable apprehension of imminent harm tothe person or a member of the person's immediate family;(iii) the offence is a sexual offence;(iv) the offence caused death or physical injury.(2) A person is eligible to claim statutory compensation for grief suffered in consequenceof the commission of a homicide if the person is—(a) a spouse or domestic partner of the deceased victim; or(b) where the deceased victim was a child—a parent of the deceased victim.(3) A person is eligible to claim statutory compensation for financial loss suffered by thedependants of a deceased victim if—(a) the victim died as a result of the injury caused by the offence; and(b) no previous order for statutory compensation has been made in respect of theinjury; and(c) the person is, in the opinion of the court, a suitable person to represent theinterests of the dependants.(4) A person is eligible to claim statutory compensation for funeral expenses if—(a) a victim dies in consequence of the offence; and(b) the person has paid, or is responsible for payment of, the victim's funeralexpenses.(5) However—(a) a person is not entitled to statutory compensation if the injury arises from abreach of statutory duty by the person's employer that occurs in the course ofthe person's employment; andCompensation—Part 4(b) a person is not entitled to statutory compensation if the person has received,or is entitled to receive, workers compensation for the same harm underDivision 5 or 6 of Part 4 of the Workers Rehabilitation and CompensationAct 1986; and(c) a person is not entitled to statutory compensation if the injury is caused by, orarises out of the use of, a motor vehicle in circumstances in which the injuryfalls within the ambit of a compulsory third-party insurance scheme coveringthe motor vehicle (whether the vehicle is in fact insured under the scheme oran action for damages lies against a nominal defendant); and(d) a person is not entitled to statutory compensation for hospital or medicalexpenses that would, if no award for compensation were made, berecoverable from a health fund or scheme; and(e) a prisoner is not entitled to statutory compensation for psychological injuryresulting from an offence committed in the prison unless the prisoner wasassaulted or suffered physical injury.(6) If workers compensation and statutory compensation are paid for the same harm1, thepayment of statutory compensation does not give rise to a right to recovery under alaw relating to workers compensation.Note—1 Note that this provision will only apply in the comparatively rare cases where thepayment of, or right to, workers compensation does not operate to the exclusion of a rightto statutory compensation under subsection (5)(b) above.18—Application for compensation(1) A person who is eligible to claim statutory compensation may, within the initialapplication period, apply for statutory compensation.(2) The initial application period is—(a) for an application by a victim—3 years after the commission of the offence;(b) for an application arising from the death of a victim—12 months after thedate of death.(3) An application is to be made in the first instance to the Crown Solicitor.(4) The following requirements apply to and in relation to the application:(a) the application must—(i) contain the information required by the regulations; and(ii) be accompanied by any medical reports relevant to the injury in thepossession of, or accessible to, the claimant; and(iii) be accompanied by any further documents required under theregulations; and(b) the information contained in an application must be verified by statutorydeclaration; and(c) a copy of the application must be served on the offender unless—(i) the identity of the offender is unknown; or。