Co-ordination between banks and financial institutions
经济结构决定金融结构外文文献翻译中英文最新
经济结构决定金融结构外文文献翻译中英文最新经济结构决定金融结构外文文献翻译中英文2019-2020英文Does economic structure determine financial structure?Franklin Allen,Laura BartiloroAbstractIn this paper, we examine the relationship between the structure of the real economy and a country's financial system. We consider whether the development of the real economic structure can predict the direction of evolution of a country's financial structure. Using data for 108 countries, we find a significant relationship between real economic structure and financial structure. Next, we exploit shocks to the economies in India, Finland and Sweden, and South Korea and show that changes in the economic structure of a country influence the evolution of its financial system. This suggests that financial institutions and capital markets change in response to the structure of industries.Keywords:Financial system,Economic structureIntroductionThe structures of financial systems vary among industrial and developing countries. In some countries, financial systems are predominantly bank-based, while in others they are dominated by capital markets. Only fragmented theories exist in the literature that explain the prevailing differences in country financial structures, which are definedas the mix of financial markets, institutions, instruments, and contracts that prescribe how financial activities are organized at a particular date.The existing studies explain the prevailing differences in financial structures using legal origin and protection, politics, history, and culture as factors. This paper considers the link between the real economic structure and the financial system of a country. Such a relationship is influenced by the funding sources for corporate investment that differ depending on firm and project characteristics (Allen, 1993; Boot and Thakor, 1997; Allen and Gale, 1999). Consistent with this theory, banks are more appropriate for the financing of traditional asset-intensive industries, whereas capital markets favour innovative and risky projects. One implication of this theory is that the real economic structure of a country, whether it is asset intensive or service oriented, could determine its financial structure. For instance, financial systems in countries such as Germany and Japan would remain bank-based as long as their economies are dominated by manufacturing industries. Contrastingly, the financial system in the United States will continue to be market-oriented as long as service and highly innovative companies constitute a large share of the economy. Consequently, the financial systems of the United States, Germany, or Japan will remain at polar extremes because of their economic structures even though the countries are at a similar stage of development.Robinson (1952) argues that financial intermediaries and markets emerge when required by industries. Consequently, intermediaries and markets appear in response to economic structure. The idea that the form of financing, and thus the country's financial structure, depends on the type of activity that firms engage in has not yet been directly addressed in the literature. To provide evidence of the hypothesis that structure and changes in the real economy determine the direction ofevolution of a country's financial system, we first must distinguish the different financial structures across countries. However, although recent attention has shifted to a more systematic classification of financial systems, the literature provides only very broad measures and definitions for classification. Consistent with the literature this study classifies a country's financial system as either bank-based (the German or Japanese model) or market-based (the Anglo-Saxon model). In the bank-based financial system, financial intermediaries play an important role by mobilising savings, allocating credit, and facilitating the hedging, pooling, and pricing of risks. In the market-based financial system, capital markets are the main channels of finance in the economy (Allen and Gale, 2000).Our theory builds on Rajan and Zingales (2003a) who note that bank-based systems tend to have a comparative advantage in financing fixed-asset-intensive firms rather than high technology research and development-based firms. Rajan and Zingales (2003a) argue thatfixed-asset-intensive firms are typically more traditional and well understood, and the borrower has the collateral to entice fresh lenders if the existing ones prove overly demanding. As per Rajan and Zingales (2003a), loans are well collateralised by physical assets, and therefore are liquid; hence, the concentration of information in the system will not be a barrier to the financing of these assets. Conversely, the authors argue that market-based systems will have a comparative advantage in financing knowledge industries with intangible assets.Consequently, we suggest that countries with a majority of physical-asset-intensive firms, depending on external finance, will be more likely to possess a bank-oriented financial system.However, capital markets should develop more effectively in countries with firms that are based on knowledge and intangible assets. We test this hypothesis by identifying fixed-asset-intensive firms within the economic sector defined as industry by the standard classification system for economic activity. Conversely, in this study the service sector acts as a proxy for knowledge and intangible asset firms. The relative importance of the two types of firms in an economy will be represented by the relative volume of activity of the two different economic sectors. The standard system of classification for economic activity includes a third sector, agriculture. We classify agriculture as a physical-asset-intensive industry because land and agricultural machinery may be used as collateral and, therefore,we assume that firms in the agricultural sector will prefer bank financing over capital markets.We first present some historical evidence showing the nexus between real economic structure and financial system. In order to test our outlined hypothesis, we use a panel data set for 108 countries and employ both the panel OLS and a two-step generalised-method-of-moments (GMM) system. Additionally, we investigate the robustness of the results by introducing different additional control variables and testing the heterogenous effects. The results suggest that there is a negative and significant relationship between a country's economic structure (industry versus service sector) and financial system structure (stock market versus banking sector). In economies where the service sector carries more weight economically than industry and agriculture, the country tends to have a market-based financial system. In contrast, a bank-based financial system is more likely to emerge in economies with many fixed-asset-intensive firms.Next, we conduct event studies using the treatment effect estimation to isolate the endogeneity concerns. We analyse different types of exogenous shock to the structure of the real economy and its impact on financial structure. We employ three events that changed the economic structures of the countries and further investigate their impact on the financial structure using a difference-in-difference strategy. The firstevent is India's structural reforms in 1991 as a positive shock to the country's economy; the second one is the demise of the Soviet Union as a negative shock to the economy of Finland and Sweden; the third one is the economic reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s in South Korea. In India and South Korea we find that after the structural reforms of the economies, the service sector grew in relative terms and the stock markets in both countries experienced significantly faster growth than their banking systems, compared to the control countries. In Finland and Sweden we document that following the negative shock the service sector gained in relative importance, which was followed by the faster growth of the equity market in comparison to the banking system. Overall, the results of the three different event studies confirm our hypothesis that the relative importance of financial intermediaries and markets is determined by the industry needs of a country.The findings of this study are interesting from a regulatory perspective and lend insight into the development of financial structures worldwide. The main policy implications from this study are that financial structures should be evaluated in terms of whether they meet the requirements of the real economy and industries. Furthermore the financial structure cannot bechanged as long as the economic structure does not change. The results provide insight into the reasons for limited capital markets growth in developing countries despite officialstimulation efforts from governments and multilateral organisations (Schmukler et al., 2007). According to our study of many developing countries, as long as economies remain relatively agriculture- and industry-oriented, any government effort to create or further develop a capital market is likely to not to be very successful. Additionally, any regulation that attempts to force a change in the financial system may result in a discrepancy in the economic and financial structure. Therefore, such efforts or regulations may introduce financial constraints that can further stall economic growth because financial structure influences output levels and economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Luintel et al., 2008).The real economy and finance nexusA number of explanations for financial structure exist in the literature; however, none are able to provide a comprehensive account of the observations. The first explanation is based on legal origin and investor protection. Levine (1997) builds on the work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998); henceforth LLSV) stating that legal systems originate from a limited number of legal traditions: English common law or French, German, and Scandinavian civil law. In his study on financial development and economic growth, the author employs measures of creditors' rights and demonstrates that they may explain the emergence of bank-based financial systems. Modigliani and Perotti (2000) argue that legal institutionsdetermine the degree of financial development and the financial structure of a country. They argue that market-based systems flourish in environments with stronginstitutions. Ergungor (2004) also attempts to explain differences in financial structure by examining legal origin across countries. His study presents evidence that countries with civil law financial systems are more likely to be bank-oriented than common law countries. In the author's opinion, this evolution is a result of effective rule of law in common law countries, which improves shareholder and creditor rights protection. A perspective has emerged in the literature that legal origin can be used to explain the structure of a financial system.However, Rajan and Zingales (2003a) argue that countries with a common law system did not rely on markets to a greater extent than civil law systems at the beginning of the last century. They report that in 1913, the ratio of France's stock market capitalisation to GDP was twice as high as that of the United States, which is a country that has an environment that favours capital market development according to the legal origin perspective. It is therefore problematic to argue that legal origin is the main determinant of financial structure. The view presented below is that both the structure of the financial system and the laws will adapt to the needs and demands of the economy. One example of this is branching regulation in the United States banking sector. Rajan and Zingales(2004) note that as technology improved the ability of banks to lend and borrow from customers at a distance, competition increased in the United States even when banks had no in-state branches. Politicians who could not prevent this competition because they lacked jurisdiction, withdrew the regulations that limited branching. Another example is the removal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which had restricted banking activities in the United States since 1933. In this case, the introduction of the FinancialModernisation Act in 1999 followed the creation of the first financial holding company in the United States and removed past restrictions. Therefore, we argue that economic demand may enhance the evolution of the financial structures and of the legal system.The existing empirical results show also that legal investor protection may support financial development. For example, LLSV (1997) show that countries with poorer investor protection have less developed capital markets. Demirgü?-Kunt and Levine (2004) find that countries with stronger protection for shareholder rights tend to have a more market-based financial system. Djankov et al. (2007) investigate cross-country determinants of private credit and find that legal creditor rights are statistically significant and quantitatively important in determining private credit development, while there is no evidence showing that creditor rights are converging among legal origins. Moreover, Djankov et al. (2007) confirm that shareholder protection ispositively related to stock market development.The second explanation for financial structure is based on political factors. Biais and Perotti (2002) provide a theoretical model of government incentives to structure privatisation policy so that financial shareholders are diffused, which may be designed to ensure re-election. Additionally, Perotti and V olpin (2004)argue that established firms have an incentive to limit entry by retarding financial development, which may well impact the financial structure. Perotti and von Thadden (2006) use a theoretical model to demonstrate the effect of the distribution of income and wealth in democratic societies and their influence on the financial structure of an economy.Moreover, according to Rajan and Zingales (2003a, 2004) structures of the financial system are unstable and evolve over time. They argue that a financial system will develop toward the optimal structure but will be hindered by politics, which are often influenced by powerful, incumbent groups. Similarly, Cull and Xu (2013) argue that financial development is driven by political economy. In their opinion financial development may reflect the interests of the elite, rather than providing broad-based access to financial services. Song and Thakor (2012a, b) develop a theory of how a financial system is influenced by political intervention that is designed to expand credit availability. They show that the relationship between political intervention and financial system development isnonmonotonic. In the early stage of financial development, the size of markets is relatively small and politicians intervene by controlling some banks and providing capital subsidies, while in the advanced stage when the financial sector is most developed, political intervention returns in the form of direct-lending regulation.Industrial-level evidenceTo check the robustness of our main results we conduct a wide array of additional analyses; however, for brevity we do not report them in full. First, we check the consistency of the results after removing outliers. These outliers are eliminated after considering the scatter plot of the main financial and economic structure indicators. We eliminate those countries that fall particularly far from the regression line and then repeat the estimation on the new sample. After eliminating the extreme observations, we still find a significant and negative relationship between economic and financial structure. Second, we increasethe set of explanatory variables and add variables for country GDP, inflation, area, latitude, dummies for landlocked economies, transition economies, or developing countries. Including these variables does not affect either the significance level or the sign of the estimated coefficients. Third, we divide the countries in the sample into two groups based on their membership in the OECD. We assume that countries belonging to the OECD are on average more developed than non-OECD member countries. Using the two separatesamples we compute again the baseline regressions. The results indicate that the relationship between financial structure and economic structure is much stronger in industrial countries than in developing countries. One possible explanation for this result is the different development stage of the financial system itself. In developing countries, the financial structure is emerging and adjusting to the needs of the real economy at the same time. Moreover, rapid changes in the financial structure are often caused by additional factors such as liberalization or political transformation. Conversely, in most of the industrial countries, we may assume that the financial system may already have an optimal structure, whereas changes are only caused in case of significant changes in the economic structure, which takes substantial time.Fourth, in the case of the OECD countries the data availability on the composition of value added for most of the industries allows us to calculate an alternative measure of economic structures, where we control for the firm asset characteristics in the given industry. In this analysis, the primary data source is the OECD STAN database for industrial analysis, which enables retrieval of gross value added for 47 industries representing ninemain sectors of the economy in 25 countries. We divide the industries using firm specific characteristics from either an asset-intensive or knowledge sector, where we measured asset intensity as the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total bookassets of the firm in the industry, whereas the company specific data was computed using data from the Bureau van Dijk's ORBIS database.According to our theory, asset-intensive firms with tangible assets may use the assets to collateralise their bank debt. Hence, in countries dominated by asset-intensive industries bank-based financial systems are more likely to emerge. In contrast, knowledge-based companies with a low level of tangible assets are often forced to use either equity or bonds to finance their needs. Therefore, countries dominated by industries with intangible assets are more likely to have a market-based financial system.Classifying industries as either asset or tangible asset intensive, where we distinguish industries using ratios calculated on firm level data, we again construct two alternative measures for economic structure and employ them in the basic regression. The results of those regressions are similar to those we have presented previously and the coefficients of the economic structure were again negative and statistically significant. Overall the robustness tests at the industry-level also confirm our findings on the link between economic structure and financial structure.ConclusionOur results provide new evidence concerning the causes and causality of the direction of evolution of the financial systemstructure. Using both OLS, dynamic panel techniques and event studies wedocument that the economic structure is closely linked to the shape of the financial system. We find that countries with asset-intensive sectors are more likely to have a bank-based system. Conversely, countries with sectors that are based on knowledge and intangible assets are likely to exhibit a market-based financial system. The results suggest that the structure of the real economy may influence the structure of the financial system. Additionally, even during systemic crises, such a relationship still holds. Moreover, we conduct event studies using a difference-in-difference strategy in order to address the problems of potential endogeneity. We use different shocks that alter the economic structures in India, Finland and Sweden, and South Korea. In all the countries the shocks resulted in significant development of the service sector relative to the industry sector. The changes in economic structure were followed by changes in the structure of financial system, where the stock market gained on importance relative to the banking sector. Consequently, the results of the event studies suggest a causal relation between economic structure and financial structure.In our opinion, these results present a missing link in the explanation as to why country financial structures still differ. The results, however, confirm that other factors may influence the structure of the financial system. Consequently, a financial system may not always have an optimal structure, which may be a result of political arrangements or the interestsof incumbent groups (Rajan and Zingales, 2003a,b). Therefore, we assume that financial systems may not always be able to reach their optimal structure. However, as existing barriersare removed the structure of a financial system may develop and gain ground, but it would be independent of further changes in the real economic structure. Finally, when the financial system has reached its optimal structure with respect to the characteristics of the real economy, our theory implies that any increase in the significance of fixed-asset-intensive sectors would lead to an increase in the role of banks with respect to the stock market.The main policy implications of the model are that despite efforts from governments and multilateral organisations, particular those from the emerging economies, country capital markets will not grow in size or activity as long as the economy remains asset-intensive. Therefore, governments should focus on improving the transparency or efficiency of the existing financial structure and less on the development of the stock market because the market will develop as soon as the economic structure changes. These results are consistent with Robinson (1952).Finally, this study contributes to the ongoing debate on the relative merits of bank-based versus market-based financial systems with respect to the promotion of economic growth. Our paper presents plausible explanations to Luintel et al. (2008), that financial structure matters with respect to economic growth.中文经济结构决定金融结构吗?富兰克林·艾伦,劳拉·巴蒂洛罗摘要在本文中,我们研究了实体经济结构与一国金融体系之间的关系。
外文翻译--欧元区跨国公司的现金管理和集团内的折扣
本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译原文:Multinational Cash Management and Conglomerate Discounts in theEuro ZoneIntroductionWe discuss in this paper the consequences of the changing financial market circumstances for multinational companies. In particular we will concentrate on the consequences for cash management within multinational euro zone firms.Cash management is a topic that is addressed mainly by practitioners and by scholars who study cash management practices or conduct financial modelling, but it can also be approached from a theoretical perspective. In this respect two distinct approaches can be distinguished. Firstly, cash management can be considered as a stand-alone topic within the management of short-term assets and the question is addressed how much cash is needed in comparison to other liquid assets. It is the main approach in textbooks on short-term financial management (e.g. Hill and Sartoris, 1995; Maness and Zietlow, 1998). Secondly, cash management theories can start with the perfect markets assumptions of Modigliani and Miller (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Miller and Modigliani, 1961). The theory then suggests that companies need no cash at all unless market imperfections urge companies to hold it (Van Horne, 2002). Transaction costs involved in frequently attracting additional debt and/or equity -e.g. if cash funds are needed to pay suppliers or employees- are high. Therefore it may be worthwhile to hold cash funds, even if these funds do not generate any return. Also bankruptcy costs come to the fore as a reason for cash holdings. If creditors are not paid in time, they may force the company into bankruptcy and the shareholders and managers try to avoid the concomitant costs.In this paper we follow the latter approach. The developments within the eurozone have reduced market imperfections and we evaluate how these have affected cash management in multinationals. We add the context of a multinational, a firm that has operating subsidiaries in at least four countries, because major developments in the financial markets of the euro zone have their impact across countries and do not only affect local companies. Moreover, multinationals are more complex than single country companies and it is usual to find a corporate headquarter and local subsidiaries. Managers of local subsidiaries can be considered to be the agents of the board members at the multinational headquarter, while the board members in their turn are agents of the shareholders. In particular the agency relationships between local and headquarter managers is important here because the control of cash is a determinant in exercising power. Managers of local subsidiaries might like to keep as much cash as possible within their realm. According to Jensen (1986), free cash (flows) may introduce agency costs. Moreover, the investment in cash, bank accounts and short term paper does not give high returns. For these reasons the value of the multinational may decline if unnecessary amounts of cash are left at the local level. In that case the internal financial market within the multinational is inadequate and the company may show a "conglomerate discount" when compared to a comparable set of stand-alone companies.Centralization and disintermediationTypically, the cash management system of a multinational in the euro zone has traditionally been structured in a simple way. In every country where the company had substantial operating facilities, the treasury of the affiliate often largely did its own cash management (Soenen and Aggarwal, 1989; Tse and Westerman, 1997). This was a rational approach because of the imperfections in the European capital markets. After liberalization, deregulation and the introduction of a single currency, these market imperfections have diminished quite significantly along with the costs of centralizing the finance function.CentralizationCentralization offers various advantages (Kenyon et. al., 1992; Brown, 1997; Miles,1997). Firstly, concentrating financing gives economies of scale and negotiatingpower. Secondly, because cash balances, cash flows and risk exposures are decreased, financing costs are reduced further. Thirdly, leading and lagging of intracompany cash flows can more easily be traced and controlled. Fourthly, an overall reduction of treasury personnel throughout the firm may be possible. Fifthly, the services of banks in transferring cash may be reduced and the concomitant costs can be reduced. Moreover, the benefits of internal financing may be more easily reaped, as the concentration of financial know-how helps to improve investment decision making.There are, however, also various disadvantages. Local managers may lose the motivation to control cash flows adequately. When the cash management and finance functions are in the hands of headquarters, the co-ordination between the financial disciplines and the local knowledge may more easily be frustrated. Moreover, a centralized cash system requires a highly formalized cash balance control system, thus raising regulative, administrative and information costs. Finally, internalizing and reorganizing the cash balances may disturb relationships of subsidiaries with local banks.The disadvantages of centralized European cash management, however, decline (Van Alphen, 1998). Moreover, netting and pooling of cash positions gain attractiveness and a trend towards centralized treasuries is already apparent (Peters, 1999). In fact even non-European multinationals have reorganized their European treasury operations along Pan-European lines. For example, the Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Company formally incorporated a European treasury centre in Luxembourg. That treasury now provides access to capital markets, establishes and maintains bank relationships, manages currency exchange risk, develops intercompany transaction strategies, negotiates credit terms with banks, evaluates cash utilization and establishes guidelines for SBU cash management, among others (Brown, 1997, p.36). We expect that deregulation and liberalization as well as the introduction of the Euro may have helped to tip the balance in favour of centralization and may still be continuing to do so.DisintermediationThe form a cash management system takes is not only determined by internalcharacteristics. It also involves external relationships, in particular with banks and it is not surprising that European firms consider their relationship with a bank almost as important as banks’ prices and service quality (Tse and Westerman, 1997).The external relationships evolve with centralization over time. First the banking system is used to collect receivables and to pay accounts. The relationship with the "house banks" is asymmetrical: the house bank provides a wide array of products that firms can use. Then the tendency may evolve to centralize cash management and the multinational will aim at processing efficiently the various financial transactions of the operational units. This may lead to a substantial decrease in the number of bank accounts, since little used accounts will be closed. The finance department of a multinational will be starting to act as a purchasing unit and the relationships with banks will be loosened as "shopping" with other banks grows and financial knowledge at headquarters is enlarged.Still later, the cash function within the multinational may develop into a corporate finance function that acts in balancing conflicting objectives like minimizing tax and interest payments, reducing interest risks and providing liquidity. Banks with international networks, know-how and information systems skills may then shift to providing services instead of products to such departments. In fact, some large financial institutions have picked up the recent trends, by expanding their services to more countries and by investments in sophisticated information systems to be used in the operation of European cash management systems. Finally, the corporate finance function of a multinational may act as an in house bank (Hagemann, 1991). Such an in-house bank provides intra company products and services by itself, issues short-term financial instruments like commercial paper, competes with other banks for the business of third-party customers and has thus become an equal partner for licensed banks. It will be clear that the aforementioned centralization trend goes to the detriment of the intermediary function of banks.Headquarters' control and conglomerate discountsThe joint trends of centralizing the cash function and of disintermediation will have their impact on the power of the Multinational's headquarter. Centralization will,generally, take place at headquarters, and may positively influence the power of headquarters with respect to cash management. As the headquarters' lack of power in financing and investing was a major reason for corporate discounts, the centralization of cash management may reduce these discounts.Headquarters' power may further increase with disintermediation. Firstly because fewer banks are involved and the bank that remains most relevant for the multinational will have its main ties with headquarters. Secondly, if the cash management function develops into a corporate finance function also external financing will be channelled through headquarters and then -again- the financial power of headquarters will increase. For these reasons, we expect that the liberalization, deregulation and introduction of a single currency will improve the internal financing function and that conglomerate discounts will decrease.However, not all multinationals will be able to centralize the cash function directly (Gruiters and Bergen, 1998) and the centralization of European cash management still differs between companies (Tse and Westerman, 1997). Moreover, not all multinationals will be able or willing to develop the cash management function into a corporate finance function. Finally, even if a corporate finance function is managed centrally at the corporate headquarter, it is not necessarily the case that also decisions on fixed assets will -or should- be centralized. Conglomerate discounts based on a lack of power of headquarters with respect to internal financing and investments will thus not vanish within all multinationals. Nevertheless, it is likely that the developments in the financial markets assist in reducing conglomerate discounts for some multinationals in the euro zone.ConclusionsLiberalization and deregulation of financial markets as well as the introduction of the single currency in Europe will reduce transaction and bankruptcy costs for multinationals. This gives rise to two trends in Europe. Firstly, internal transfers of cash and the management of residual cash positions will become cheaper and easier. Therefore, the centralization of cash management activities gains attractiveness. This may even result into a full-fledged corporate finance function at headquarters.Secondly, the centralization will affect the relationship of multinationals with banks. It is likely that the number of bank relations will be reduced, as more money is managed internally within multinationals and that one major bank will provide most of the cash management services to the treasuries at multinationals' headquarters.These trends will have an impact on the internal financing function of multinationals and if cash management is centralized, conglomerate discounts may diminish. Multinationals in the euro zone may benefit further if they also operate in countries that will join the European Union or the euro zone in the future. Because multinationals have different backgrounds and different reasons for empowering subsidiaries, the corporate discounts will not vanish completely.Until now, academics have largely focused on cash management models and on cash management surveys. Our paper is different as we link the cash management function to mainstream theory of corporate finance. First we suggest that institutional changes within the euro zone have reduced market imperfections. Then we show that the reduction of these imperfections could trigger centralization and disintermediation. Finally, we suggest that centralization followed by disintermediation may improve the internal financing function within multinationals. This may eventually diminish conglomerate discounts and improve the value of the multinational.It is outside of the scope of this paper to answer the empirical question whether the centralization of cash management is beneficial to multinationals. Nevertheless, further empirical research might be interesting. In particular, it would be interesting to learn whether multinationals that centralize their cash management function do indeed outperform in terms of value the comparable multinationals that did not. Our analysis not only suggests that centralization creates value, but that the concomitant disintermediation adds value too. Researchers could therefore, also try to measure the amount of disintermediation and study its impact on conglomerate discounts. Of course, such research may create multicollinearity problems because disintermediation will be related to centralization. Moreover, econometric simultaneity problems may arise: disintermediation is considered to create value, but at the same time higher valued companies may be better able to avoid bankingproducts. Despite of these problems, we hope that our qualitative approach may not only trigger related theoretical but also empirical research.Source: Henk von Eije and Wim Westerman,2002.“Multinational Cash Management and Conglomerate Discounts in the Euro Zone”.International Business Review. August. pp.453-464.译文:欧元区跨国公司的现金管理和集团内的折扣简介本文我们讨论了不断变化的金融市场的情况,给跨国公司现金管理所带来的后果。
毕业论文外文翻译-巴塞尔II和银行家倾向于采取措施避免过多的风险
嘉兴学院本科毕业论文外文翻译论文题目:新巴塞尔协议的实施对商业银行的影响研究---以建设银行为例外文题目:Basel II and Bankers’ Propensity to Take or Avoid Excessive Risk 出处:International Atlantic Economic Society作者:George J. Benston译文:巴塞尔II和银行家倾向于采取措施避免过多的风险乔治J斯顿摘要银行家们都关注巴塞尔协议,尤其是新巴塞尔协议中关于风险的控制,因为风险是银行的重要组成部分。
这最基本问题是“当过多的风险出现时,新巴塞尔协议是否可以有效地限制银行承担过多的风险?“我通过概述过度风险的定义和分析巴塞尔有效处理这种风险的程度来回答这些问题。
我觉得新巴塞尔协议的措施既费钱又有不充分的地方,可能会增加过度冒险。
最后,我做出的一个更好方法——基于资本/资产比率的包括完全必要的资金和及时的纠正措施的次级债券。
关键词巴塞尔协议风险,过度风险,银行破产,次级债务,迅速纠正行动对巴塞尔协议和新巴塞尔协议而言,两者都(切实地,着力地)关注于银行的风险承受能力。
风险是银行的重要组成部分。
银行家作为提供贷款和其它投资的先驱者,因为它们可能蒙受损失既不是自己的群体也是不其股东和员工。
然而,在一个特定的社会中,应该考虑过度风险的存在增加了银行破产的危险。
因此,我将通过讨论着手这个分析,在“过度风险的划定”方面,包括有益的风险、“过度”的风险和3种可能被他们认为是过度的情况下的风险。
根据“新巴塞尔协议-基本协定”,我概述和分析了一些新巴塞尔协议对资本和风险之间关系的基本协定。
新巴塞尔协议的制定是为了弥补巴塞尔协议的缺点,但这些部分显示,一些重要的缺点被忽略,因此,由新巴塞尔协议加以延续。
我在“新巴塞尔协议和风险测量”中概述了新巴塞尔协议在原来的基础之上提供了更复杂的风险措施。
“一个更好的办法”主要描述了这些新巴塞尔协议措施的代价与不足。
MONEY,BANKINGANDFINANCE:货币,银行与金融
MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCECEU, Economics DepartmentLecturer: Prof. Jacek RostowskiCourse: 4 creditsAims of the courseThe aim of the course is to develop the students' understanding of the microeconomics of money and banking, of the role of the monetary and banking systems in a market economy, and of the macroeconomic impact of the behaviour of banking firms. Students should also develop a knowledge of the structure of banking systems, their place in the wider environment of the financial system and of the economy as a whole, as well as the implications both for microeconomic regulatory policy and national and global macroeconomic policy of bank behaviour. Lectures will concentrate on the structure of financial and banking systems and on the microeconomic theory of banking, as well as the impact of the banking sector on macroeconomic fluctuations and policy. A final section will address the issue of banking reform in the transition from Communism. Seminars will address a wide range of historical, empirical and policy topics, and will require broad reading, critical analysis of the recommended material and its succinct presentation in class.***Assessment:The course will consist of lectures and seminars. Students will be required to present a seminar paper on a specific topic relating to the course, to submit this paper after revision, as a term paper and to pass a written 3 hour essay-type exam at the end of the course.The purpose of this form of assessment is to help develop students’ presentational and writing skills, as well as their ability to summarize arguments, cogently and convincingly.GradingTerm paper 45%Term examination 55%Course Outline:PART ONE: INTRODUCTION - THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMSPART TWO: REASONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF BANKS.PART THREE: BANK RUNS AND BANK REGULATION.PART FOUR: OTHER REASONS FOR BANK REGULATION.PART FIVE: THE EVOLUTION OF BANKING REGULATION SINCE THE 1930s.PART SIX: INTEREST RATES, MONEY AND CENTRAL BANKS IN MACROECONOMIC POLICY.PART SEVEN: DEBT DEFLATION, BANKING AND THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM.PART EIGHT: BANKING REFORM IN TRANSITION.ECONOMICS OF MONEY AND BANKINGPART ONE: INTRODUCTION - THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS1. Wealth, real assets, financial assets and capital markets.2. Financial development and growth.3.Macro-financial ratios and the structure of the financial sector.4. Bank based v. Market based financial systems.5. Credit as a short term facilitator of investment.5. The interaction of bank credit and equity finance.PART TWO: REASONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF BANKS.1. Traditional explanations for the existence of banks.2. Adverse selection, the ex-post verification problem and moral hazard.3. The bank - lender relation: why lenders need banks.4. Firm size and the relevance of the Diamond model.5. Firm bankruptcy costs and the existence of banks.PART THREE: BANK RUNS AND BANK REGULATION.1. Unconvincing arguments for bank regulation.2. Causes of bank runs: individual bank runs and runs on the system.3. Information based and irrational runs.4. What the authorities can do about bank runs.5. What banks can do to prevent bank runs.PART FOUR: OTHER REASONS FOR BANK REGULATION.1. Justifications of bank regulation.2. Neo-classical and Neo-Austrian views of banking competition.PART FIVE: THE EVOLUTION OF BANKING REGULATION SINCE THE 1930s.1. Main mechanisms of regulation during the "Keynesian" period.2. The erosion of controls since the 1960s and inflation.3. Changes in supply conditions: telecoms and computers.4. The decline of the banking industry.5. Implications of the decline of the banking industry for regulation.6. The "new regulatory framework".7. International harmonisation in the "New Framework".PART SIX: INTEREST RATES, MONEY AND CENTRAL BANKS IN MACROECONOMIC POLICY.1. Monetarist and Keynesian transmission mechanisms.2. Should central banks control interest rates or the monetary base?3. International capital mobility on the term structure of interest rates.4. Credit rationing and the "credit channel" for monetary policy.5. Other channels for the monetary transmission mechanism.PART SEVEN: DEBT DEFLATION, BANKING AND THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM.1. Net worth, equity rationing and business cycles.2. The Greenwald-Stiglitz model and credit rationing.3. Debt deflation and the Greenwald-Stiglitz model.4. Unemployment in the Greenwald-Stiglitz model.5. Anatomy of a debt deflation.6. Debt deflation via the aggregate demand channel.7. Including asset prices in the price level for monetary policy purposes.8. Asset prices in the inter-war period in the US.PART EIGHT: MONEY AND BANKING IN TRANSITION1. The Monobank system, Active and Passive Money, the MFO.2. The "Main Sequence" of banking reforms in Central Europe and the FSU Model.3. Radical Proposals for banking Sector Reform.4. The Payments System, Settlement Risk and Inter-enterprise Arrears.5. Banking Crises in PCEs and their Remedies.6. Progress with the wrong model?MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCE- SEMINAR TOPICS -[* marks reqired reading for all students, not just presenters]1. Assess the "real bills doctrine"and the "principle of reflux" which figured prominently in the three cornered debates between the currency school, the banking school and the free banking school in mid-nineteenth century England.A.J. Schwartz "Banking School, Currency School, Free Banking School" in TheNew Palgrave Dictionary of Economics: Volume on Money, eds. J. Eatwell, M. Millgate and P. Newman, MacMillan, 1989.*R. Green "The Real Bills doctrine" in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics:Volume on Money, eds. J. Eatwell, M. Millgate and P. Newman, MacMillan, 1989.V.Smith The Rationale for Central Banking and the Free Banking Alternative, Liberty Press, Indianapolis, 1990.2. Discuss the controversy between bullionists and the currency school on the one hand and supporters of the banking school on the other.D. Laidler "The Bullionist Controversy" in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics: Volume on Money, eds. J. Eatwell, M. Millgate and P. Newman, MacMillan, 1989.*A.J. Schwartz "Banking School, Currency School, Free Banking School" in TheNew Palgrave Dictionary of Economics: Volume on Money, eds. J. Eatwell, M. Millgate and P. Newman, MacMillan, 1989.3. Why are middle developed countries particularly subject to banking crises?Kaminsky,G. and C.Reinhart (1996) "The Twin Crises: the Causes of Banking andBalance of Payments Problems" International Finance Discussion Papers, no. 544,Federal Reserve, washington,D.C.*Sundararajan, V. and Balino, J.T., Banking Crises: Cases and Issues, IMF, 1991,Chapter 1.*4. Does a "hard-peg" exchange rate system make a country more susceptible to banking crises?Temzelides, T. (1997) "Are Bank Runs Contagious?" Business Review, Federalreserve Bank of Philadelphia, November, Philadelphia.*Santiprabhob,V. (1997) "Bank Soundness and Currency Board Arrangements",Working Paper PPAA/97/11, International Monetary Fund, Washington,D.C. 5. Discuss the arguments for and against the independence of central banks.A.S. Posen "Why Central bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: Thereis no Institutional Fix for Politics", Finance and the International Economy: 7, TheAMEX BANK Review 1993.*Alesina "Politics and Business Cycles in the Industrial Democracies", EconomicPolicy, April 1989.C.A.E. Goodhart "Central Bank Independence" in The Central Bank and the Financial System, C.A.E. Goodhart, 1995.6. Should central banks supervise the banking system, and if so should they supervise non-bank financial institutions as well?Goodhart, C. (2001)"The Organizational Structure of Banking Supervision”, in Financial Stability and Central Banks, a global perspective, eds. J.Healey and P.Sinclair, Routledge and Bank of England, pp.254.Peek,J., E.Rosengren and G.Tootell (2001) in Prudential Supervision: What Works and What doesn’t ed. F.Mishkin, NBER and Chicago University Press, Chicago, pp.368.7. How do regulation and ownership affect banking sector performance and stability?Barth, J.R., G.Caprio and R.Levine (2001) “Banking Systems around the Globe: Do Regulation and Ownership affect Performance and Stability?” in Prudential Supervision: What Works and What doesn’t ed. F.Mishkin, NBER and Chicago University Press, Chicago, pp.368.Brealey,R. (2001) “Bank capital requirements and the control of bank failure”, in Financial Stability and Central Banks, a global perspective, eds. J.Healey and P.Sinclair, Routledge and Bank of England, pp.254.8. Assess Argentina’s attempt at creating a credible and partly market-based system of bank regulation. Does it hold lessons for other emerging market and transition economies?Calomiris, C. and A.Powell (2001) “Can Emerging Market Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-99” in Prudential Supervision: What Works and What doesn’t ed. F.Mishkin, NBER and Chicago University Press, Chicago, pp.368.De la Torre, A., E.Levy Yeyati,S.Schmukler (2002) “Argentina’s Financial Crisis: Floating Money, Sinking Banking”, mimeo, paper presented at the London School of Economics Conference on Euroization and Dollarisation, March 18-19, available on /~ely/papers.html .9. Does the stringency of bank supervision affect the macroeconomy? Berger,A., M.Kyle and J.Scalise (2001) “Did US Bank Supervisors get tougher during the Credit Crunch? Did they get easier during the Banking Boom? Did it matter to Bank Lending?” in Prudential Supervision: What Works and What doesn’t ed. F.Mishkin, NBER and Chicago University Press, Chicago, pp.368.10. Can the ECB’s monetary policy function properly given the differences in legal and financial structure among the states participating in EMU?Cecchetti, S. (1999) “Legal Structure, Financial Structure and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 7151, available on /papers/w7151 *11. Does a "pensions overhang" threaten the macroeconomic stability of the developed countries?International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, Focus on Fiscal Policy, pp50-60.*E. Phillip Davis "The Development of Pension Funds: an approaching FinancialRevolution for Continental Europe" Finance and the International Economy: 7, TheAMEX BANK Review 1993.The World Bank Averting the Old Age Crisis, Oxford UP, 1994.12. How convincing is the evidence that financial sector development leads to faster economic growth?Levine,R. (1997) "Financial development and economic growth: views and agenda",Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.35 (June), pp.688-726.*King,R.G. and R.Levine (1993) "Finance, Entrepreneurship and Growth: Theory andEvidence", Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol.32, pp.513-542.13. Account for the existence of credit rationing. Is this phenomenon likely to be important in practice?Freixas, X. and Rochet,J-C. (1997) The Microeconomics of Banking, Chapter 5.*Stiglitz,J. and Weiss,A. (1981) "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information", American Economic Review, 71(3):393-410.Bester,H. (1985) "Screening v. rationing in credit markets with imperfect information", American Economic Review, 75(4):850-55.14. How important is the lending channel for macroeconomic policy? Kashyap, A. and Stein, J. "Monetary Policy and Bank Lending" in G, Mankiw ed.Monetary Policy, Chicago UP, 1994.*Miron, J., Romer, C. and Weil, D. "Historical Perspecties on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism", in G. Mankiw ed. Monetary Policy, Chicago UP, 1994.15. Assess the empirical evidence on the imperfection of capital markets.Fazzari, S., Hubbard, R. and Petersen, B. (1988) "Financing Constrains and Corporate Investment", Brookings Papers in Economic Activity, I, 141-206.*Kashyap,A., Lamont, O. and Stein, J. (1994) "Credit Conditions and the CyclicalBehavoiour of Inventories", Quarterly Journal of Economics.Deveroux, M. and Schiantarelli, F. (1990) "Investment, Financial Factors and CashFlow: Evidence from UK Panel Data", in Assymetric Information, Capital Marketsand Investment, ed. R. Hubard, Chicago UP.16. Is "relationship banking" superior to other kinds of banking? Ongena,S. and D.Smith (2000) "Bank Relationships: a Review" in Performance ofFinancial Institutions: efficiency, innovation, regulation, eds. P.Harker andS.Zenios,Cambridge UP.*Dewenter,K. and A.Hess (2000) "Risks and Returns in Relationship and Transactional Banks: evidence from returns in Germany, Japan, the UK and theUS." in Performance of Financial Institutions: efficiency, innovation, regulation, eds.P.Harker and S.Zenios, Cambridge UP.17. Should financial institutions specialise or diversify so as to maximise their efficiency and profits?Meador, J., H.Ryan and C,Schellhorn (2000) "Product focus vs. Diversification: estimates of X-efficiency for the US life insurance industry" in Performance of Financial Institutions: efficiency, innovation, regulation, eds. P.Harker andS.Zenios,Cambridge UP.*Eicholtz, P., H. Op t’Veld and M.Schweitzer (2000) "REIT Performance: does managerial specialization pay?" in Performance of Financial Institutions: efficiency,innovation, regulation, eds. P.Harker and S.Zenios, Cambridge UP.18. Discuss the effectiveness of the following financial institutions in Transition Economies:All presenters and students:Buiter,W., go and H.Rey (1999) "Financing Transition: Investing in Enterprises during Macroeconomic Transition" in Financial sectorTransformation: Lessons from Economies in Transition, eds. M.Blejer and M.Skreb, Cambridge UP, 401pp.*a) Universal Banks.Rostowski,J., 1998, "Universal Banking and Economic Growth in Post-Communist Economies" in Macroeconomic Instability in Post-Communist Countries, Chap. 13,Oxford UP.*Perotti,E. and Gelfer,S., (1998), "Investment Financing in RussianFinancial-Industrial Groups" CASE-CEU Working Papers Series, no10.*Fan, Q., Lee,U. and M.Schaffer, (1996), "Firms, Banks and Credit in Russia" in Enterprise Restructuring and Economic Policy in Russia, eds.mander,Fan,Q. and M.Schaffer, The World Bank.b) Commercial Banks.Pinto,B. and van Wijnbergen,S. 1994, "Ownership and Corporate Control in Poland:why State Enterprises Defied the Odds", Policy Research Working Paper No.1308, World Bank, Washington, D.C.*Baer,H. and Gray,C., (1996), "Debt as a Control Device in Transitional Economies:the experiences of Hungary and Poland" in Corporate governance in Central Europe and Russia, Vol.1, eds. R.Frydman, C.Gray and A.Rapaczynski, CEU Press.*Bratkowski,A., Grosfeld,I. And Rostowski,J., 1999, "Investment and Finance in de novo Private Firms: Empirical Results from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland", CASE_CEU Working Papers Series No.21, Budapest-Warsaw.Carare,O. and Perotti,E., (1997), "The Evolution of Bank Credit Quality in Romania since 1991" in Lessons from the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, ed. S.Zecchini, Kluwer.c) Privatization Funds:Coffee,J., (1996), "Institutional Investors in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the Czech Experience", pp.111-8 and pp.145-85 in Corporate governance in Central Europe and Russia, Vol.1, eds. R.Frydman, C.Gray and A.Rapaczynski,CEU Press.*Frydman,R., Pistor,K. and rapaczynski,A., (1996) "Investing in Insider Dominated Firms: a Study of Russian Voucher Privatization Funds" in Corporate governance in Central Europe and Russia, Vol.1, eds. R.Frydman,C.Gray and A.Rapaczynski,CEU Press.19. To what extent are the problems of the financial sector in China special?Mundell,R. "Monetary and Financial Market Reform in Transition Economies: the special case of China" in Financial sector Transformation: Lessons from Economies in Transition, eds. M.Blejer and M.Skreb, Cambridge UP, 401pp.* Li, David. , Qian,Yingyi , Wang, Yijiang and Bai, Chong-en. " Anonymus Banking and Financial Repression: How Does China's Reform Limit Government Predation without Reducing its Revenue?" CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 2221.。
此次金融危机归咎于公允价值是否公平?【外文翻译】
原文:Is It Fair to Blame Fair Value Accounting for the Financial Crisis?Robert C. PozenWhat was the primary cause of the current financial crisis? Subprime mortgages, credit default swaps, or excessive debt? None of those, says Steve Forbes, chairman of Forbes Media and sometime political candidate. In his view, mark-to-market accounting was “the principal reason” that the U.S. financial system melted down in 2008.Do accounting rules actually pack such a wallop? For readers not schooled in financial jargon, marking to market is the practice of revaluing an asset quarterly according to the price it would fetch if sold on the open market, regardless of what was actually paid for it. Because the practice allows for no outdated or wishful-thinking valuations, it is a key component of what is known as fair value accounting. And it is at the center of the hottest accounting debate in decades.Many bankers pilloried fair value accounting when the sudden seize-up of credit markets in the fall of 2008 drove the clearing prices for key assets held by their institutions to unprecedented lows. Economist Brian Wesbury represented the views of that group when he declared, “Mark-to-market accounting rules have turned a large problem into a humongous one. A vast majority of mortgages, corporate bonds, and structured debts are still performing. But because the market is frozen, the prices of these assets have fallen below their true value.” Wesbury and Forbes argue that marking to market pushed many banks toward insolvency and forced them to unload assets at fire-sale prices, which then caused values to fall even further. Persuaded by such arguments, some politicians in the United States and Europe have called for the suspension of fair value accounting in favor of historical cost accounting, in which assets are generally valued at original cost or purchase price.Yet mark-to-market accounting continues to have its proponents, who are equally adamant. Lisa Koonce, an accounting professor at the University of Texas, wrote in Texas magazine: “This is simply a case of blaming the messenger. Fair valueaccounting is not the cause of the current crisis. Rather, it communicated the effects of such bad decisions as granting subprime loans and writing credit defaul t swaps.… The alternative, keeping those loans on the books at their original amounts, is akin to ignoring reality.” Shareholder groups have gone even further, asserting that marking to market is all the more necessary in today’s environment. The investment advisory group of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) stressed that “it is especially critical that fair value information be available to capital providers and other users of financial statements in periods of market turmoil accompanied by l iquidity crunches.” In this view, if banks did not mark their bonds to market, investors would be very uncertain about asset values and therefore reluctant to help recapitalize troubled institutions.Which camp has the right answer? Perhaps neither. We do not want banks to become insolvent because of short-term declines in the prices of mortgage-related securities. Nor do we want to hide bank losses from investors and delay the cleanup of toxic assets—as happened in Japan in the decade after 1990. To meet the legitimate needs of both bankers and investors, regulatory officials should adopt new multidimensional approaches to financial reporting.Before we can begin to implement sensible reforms, though, we must first clear up some misperceptions about accounting methods. Critics have often lambasted the requirement to write down impaired assets to their fair value, but in reality impairment is a more important concept for historical cost accounting than for fair value accounting. Many journalists have incorrectly assumed that most assets of banks are reported at fair market value, rather than at historical cost. Similarly, many politicians have assumed that most illiquid assets must be valued at market prices, despite several FASB rulings to the contrary. Each of these myths bears close examination.Myth 1: Historical Cost Accounting Has No Connection to Current Market ValueFair value proponents argue that historical costs of assets on a company’s balance sheet often bear little relation to their current value. Under historical cost accountingrules, most assets are carried at their purchase price or original value, with minor adjustments for depreciation over their life (as in the case of buildings) or for appreciation until maturity (as in the case of a bond bought at a discount to par). A building owned by a company for decades, therefore, is likely to appear on the books at a much lower value than it would actually command in today’s market.However, even under historical accounting, current market values are factored into financial statements. U.S. regulators require all publicly traded companies to scrutinize their assets carefully each quarter and ascertain whether they have been permanently impaired—that is, whether their market value is likely to remain materially below their historical cost for an extended period. If the impairment is not just temporary, the company must write the asset down to its current market value on its balance sheet— and record the resulting loss on its income statement.Permanent impairments of assets happen frequently under historical cost accounting. In 2008 alone, Sandler O’Neill & Partners reports, U.S. banks wrote down more than $25 billion in goodwill from acquisitions that were no longer worth their purchase price. In an example outside the banking field, Cimarex Energy declared a loss for the first quarter of 2009, despite an operating profit, owing to a noncash impairment charge of more than $500 million (net of taxes) against its oil and gas properties.The point is that, even under historical cost accounting, financial institutions are ultimately forced to report any permanent decrease in the market value of their loans and securities, albeit more slowly and in larger lumps than under fair value accounting. Most bank executives resist such write-downs, arguing that the impairment of a given loan or mortgage-backed bond is only temporary. However, as the financial crisis drags on and mortgage default rates continue to rise, bankers will face increasing pressure from their external auditors to recognize losses on financial assets as permanent.Myth 2: Most Assets of Financial Institutions Are Marked to MarketThose who heap blame on the head of fair value accounting like to imply that financial institutions saw a majority of their assets marked to the deteriorating market.In fact, according to an SEC study in late 2008, only 31% of bank assets were treated in this fashion, and the rest were accounted for at historical cost.Why? Under fair value accounting, management must divide all loans and securities into a maximum of three asset categories: those that are held, those that are traded, and those that are available for sale. If management has the intent and ability to hold loans or securities to maturity, they are carried on the books at historical cost. Most loans and many bonds are held to maturity; they will be written down only if permanently impaired.By contrast, all traded assets are marked to market each quarter. Any decrease in the fair market v alue of a bank’s traded assets reduces the equity on its balance sheet and flows through its income statement as a loss. As a simple illustration, suppose a bank buys a bond for $1 million, and the bond’s market price declines to $900,000 at the end of the next quarter. Although the bank does not sell the bond, the left side of its balance sheet will show a $100,000 decrease in assets, and the right side will show a corresponding $100,000 decrease in equity (before any tax effects). This decrease will also flow through the bank’s income statement and be reported as a $100,000 pretax quarterly loss.The accounting treatment of the third asset category—assets available for sale—is more complex. Although debt securities in this category are marked to market each quarter, any unrealized gains or losses on them are reflected in a special account on a bank’s income statement (where it is called other comprehensive income, or OCI) and aggregated over time on its balance sheet (where it is called accumulated OCI). Because of this special treatment, unrealized losses on them do not r educe the bank’s net income or its regulatory capital. (Held-for-sale loans, meanwhile, must be booked at the lower of cost or market value, with any decline reported as a loss on the income statement. But they make up a very small percentage of this category.) The SEC found in its study that nearly a third of those 31% of bank assets marked to market were available-for-sale debt securities. Accordingly, the percentage of assets for which marking to market affected the bank’s regulatory capital or income was just 22% in 2008—far from a majority.Myth 3: Assets Must Be Valued at Current Market Prices Even If the Market for Them Is IlliquidFair value accounting would be straightforward if all financial assets were what FASB deems Level 1—highly liquid and easy to value at direct market prices. Since they do not always have these characteristics, however, FASB created a standard, FAS 157, which allows for two other levels.Whenever possible, the standard states, assets should be valued according to the Level 1 method: on the basis of observable market prices. But the standard recognizes that market prices are not always available, in which case it allows financial executives to value assets by using observable market inputs, the Level 2 method. These inputs could include, for instance, trading prices and discounts for securities similar or related to the ones being valued. When not even such inputs are available, as with, say, an investment in a private equity fund, the asset should be valued under Level 3.When trading assets are classified as Level 3, because of illiquid markets or for other reasons, financial executives are allowed to value them by “marking to model” instead of marking to market. In marking assets to model, executives may use their own reasonable assumptions to estimate fair market value.When the debt markets froze during the fall of 2008, FASB released a staff paper clarifying the application of fair value accounting to illiquid markets. That paper emphasized the flexibility of standard 157 and made companies aware that they could reclassify trading assets from Level 2 to Level 3 as markets became more illiquid. FASB also stressed that companies did not have to use prices from forced or distressed sales to value illiquid assets.However, these rulings did not provide enough comfort for bankers watching the market value of their toxic assets plummet; they complained loudly to their elected representatives, who threatened to legislate accounting standards unless FASB provided more relief. As a result, in April 2009 FASB quickly proposed and adopted a new rule, which detailed criteria for determining when a market is illiquid enough to qualify for mark-to-model valuation. The rule was designed to allow more securitiesto be valued by bank models instead of by market indicators. On the same day, FASB issued yet another rule on how to account for securities when they were permanently impaired. The rule said that only the credit-loss portion of such impairments would af fect a bank’s income and regulatory capital, with the rest going into the special account for other comprehensive income.Those two retroactive rulings made it possible for large U.S. banks to significantly reduce the size of write-downs they took on assets in the first quarter of 2009. The rulings improved the short-term financial picture of these banks, although they also led bank executives to resist sales of toxic assets at what investors believed to be reasonable prices.Three Recommendations for Realistic ReportingOnce we get beyond the mythmaking and arm waving, it becomes clear that historical cost and fair value accounting are much closer to each other than people think. Nevertheless, the differences between the two forms of accounting may be significant for a particular bank on a specific reporting date. In these situations, the bank executives’ understandable desire to present assets in the best light is likely to conflict with investors’ legitimate interest in understanding the bank’s potential exposures. So let us consider how banks might issue financial reports that would capture the complex realities of their financial situations.1.Enhance the credibility of marking to model.As Warren Buffett has pointed out, mark to model can degenerate into “mark to myth.” This is sure to give rise to real investor skepticism about the accuracy of bank valuations of troubled assets.How can we counter that skepticism and keep valuations defensible? To help investors understand how it arrived at values for assets marked to model, a bank should disclose a supplemental schedule listing Level 3 assets and summarizing their key characteristics. Most important, a bank should disclose enough detail about the assumptions underlying its models to allow investors to trace how it reached valuations.2.Unlink accounting and capital requirements.The most fundamental criticism of fair value accounting is that it drives banks to the brink of insolency by eroding their capital base. In the view of many bankers, fair value accounting has forced an “artificial” reduction in asset values that are likely to rebound after the financial crisis subsides. To inestors, on the other hand, nothing is more artificial than proclaiming that an asset is worth a price no one is actually willing to pay. The typical investor, moreover, is less confident that decreases in the market value of many bank assets are the temporary result of trading illiquidity, not the lasting result of rising defaults.3. Calculate earnings per share both ways.Even if regulators were to further unlink bank capital calculations from financial results under fair value accounting, bankers would still be concerned about the volatility of quarterly earnings. A bank whose total net revenue—from fees and net interest income—was quite stable might see its overall earnings fluctuate significantly from quarter to quarter, thanks to changes in the current market values of its actively traded bonds and other assets. And that volatility might depress the bank’s stock price if not fully understood by investors looking for stable earnings.Source: Harvard Business Review,2009(V ol. 87 Issue 11):84-92译文:此次金融危机归咎于公允价值是否公平?波森,罗伯特C什么是当前金融危机的主要原因?次级抵押贷款、信贷违约掉期、或者过度的债务?主席福布斯与某个政治候选人认为这些都不是。
新世纪商务英语本科生 第二版 商务英语阅读教程2 Unit11答案及注解
Unit ElevenPart I Pre-reading Questions1.What is logistics according to your own knowledge?答案范例:Logistics is used more broadly to refer to the process of coordinating and moving resources – people, materials, inventory, and equipment – from one location to storage at the desired destination. It may involve the integration of information flow, materials handling, production, packaging, inventory, transportation, warehousing, and often security.2.What is the goal of logistics?答案范例:The goal of logistics is to ensure that resources are moved to the destination more efficiently and timely.3.Are supply chains important in the global economy? Why?答案范例:Yes, they are. Supply chains encompass the planning and management of all activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all logistics management activities. They also include coordination and collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service providers, and customers. In essence, supply chains integrate supply and demand management within and across companies.Part II Extensive Reading段落大意难句解析词汇Text A1. 主旨归纳文章通过对沃尔玛总部配销中心的流水线工作场景介绍,引出供应链管理概念,并指出其在当今世界商业活动中扮演着重要角色。
哥伦比亚大学佩里梅林货币银行学中英翻译4-微观和宏观的货币观
The Money View, Micro and Macro微观和宏观的货币观(see full matrix at beginning) Notable features—household deleveraging, switching from credit to money, instrument discrepancy is repo, sectoral discrepancies(⻅开始的完整矩阵)显着特征——家庭去杠杆化,信贷向货币的转变,回购⼯具分化,部⻔分化Last time we saw how the US banking system was born from the strains of war finance andfinancial crisis, and we also saw how understanding balance sheet relationships can help us to understand the underlying processes. Today we focus more specifically on the balance sheet approach that will be used throughout the course, and to aid that focus we confine our discussion to the most placid of events, namely the use of the banking system to facilitate ordinary daily exchange.上⼀次,我们看到了美国银⾏体系是如何在战争⾦融和⾦融危机的压⼒下诞⽣的,我们还看到了理解资产负债表的关系如何帮助我们理解基本流程。
今天,我们将更具体地关注在整个课程中使⽤的资产负债表⽅法,为了有助于集中精⼒,我们将讨论限制在最普遍的事件上,即使⽤银⾏系统促进⽇常交易。
欧元危机英语简介
Emergency repairsA promised huge rescue fund and central-bank help for indebted governments have eased the euro area’s crisis. The respite must be used wiselyMay 13th 2010 | From The Economist print editionFOR weeks, Europe’s policymakers have stood accused of doing too little, too late as the sovereign-debt crisis that engulfed Greece threatened to spread to Portugal, Spain, Ireland and perhaps elsewhere. By May 7th, as yields on vulnerable euro-area countries’government bonds rose sharply, there seemed to be a real threat that foreign financing for these countries would stop. That in turn raised fears about the exposure of banks to European governments and private borrowers. Europe’s Lehman moment, it seemed, might be at hand.The European Union’s policymakers were forced to act with unaccustomed speed and unprecedented force. In the early hours of May 10th finance ministers, meeting in Brussels, agreed on an extensive scheme of repairs for the euro zone. The biggest stack of financial scaffolding is a “stabilisation fund”, worth up to €500 billion ($635 billion). This includes €60 billion to be financed by EU bonds that can be sold fairly quickly—as much as can be raised over three years without breaching the union’s budget ceiling. This elementhad to be approved by EU members, such as Britain, which do not use the euro, because their taxpayers would also be on the hook were the money not repaid in full. (It is an extension of a similar €50 billion fund for non-euro countries with balance-of-payments problems.) The stabilisation fund would be supplemented by up to €250 billion more from the IMF.In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) said it would purchase government bonds to restore calm to “dysfunctional” markets. It will offer banks unlimited cash at a fixed interest rate at its next two scheduled three-month financing operations on May 26th and June 30th. The ECB also reopened credit lines that had been put in place in the autumn of 2008, in post-Lehman days, with the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada and the Swiss National Bank, so that it will be able to lend European banks dollars and other currencies.Financial markets’ initial response was euphoric. Germany’s stockmarket closed more than 5% higher on May 10th. France’s main index went up by almost 10%: big French banks are heavily exposed to Greece, so they stand to benefit from a guarantee of rescue. The yield on ten-year Greek government bonds plunged from more than 12% to less than 8%. Yields on comparable Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish bonds also fell sharply—mostly, it seems, because of purchases by the ECB (see chart 1).However, this giddy joy soon gave way to a more sober view, for three main reasons. First, the rescue plan has a patched-together feel. Many of the details are still missing. Second, the fact that the ECB is buying the debt of euro-area governments raises questions about the central bank’s much-trumpeted independence of politicians—and hence about its credibility as an inflation-fighter. And third, the package, impressive though its scale and speed may be, only buys time for troubled governments to cut their budget deficits and putin place structural reforms needed to improve their lost export competitiveness. If that time is wasted, even worse trouble may lie ahead for the euro zone’s policymakers and their fellow citizens.International rescueStart with the rescue plan. Its mainstay is the promise of up to €440 billion over three years from a “special-purpose vehicle” to be set up by the 16 euro-zone countries, which will control the disbursement of money and guarantee the vehicle’s financing. The scheme is open to EU countries that do not use the euro: Poland and Sweden say they will sign up to it; Britain says it will not. At Germany’s insistence the money will be raised and overseen by governments. The Germans do not want Eurocrats raising and handing out too much money without close monitoring from national capitals.That much is plain. Further details of the scheme’s workings, however, remain sketchy. It is not clear, for instance, whether the pool will raise money in anticipation of a funding emergency or only when it is needed, which is how the balance-of-payments fund operates. The interest rate to be charged for access to funds has not been decided—a detail that delayed the Greek rescue package for weeks.The IMF has not yet spelled out the precise size and nature of its promised contribution (see article), although it seems that some finance ministers were in contact with fund officials during the late-night talks. The ministers expect the IMF to chip in “at least half as much” as European countries, just as it did for the rescue of Greece and, before that, for Latvia.These elements of the rescue plan would take a while to become fully operational—too long, perhaps, for jittery financial markets to wait. That is what made the ECB’s participation necessary: it is the only institution that could react rapidly enough. However, the role of the central bank raises a second set of concerns.Some of these are easier to assuage than others. By buying government bonds, the ECB is pumping money into the economy. This is potentially inflationary. However, the central bank says it will soak up the cash, for instance by selling instruments of its own, so that monetary policy will not in fact be loosened.More niggling is the suspicion that the ECB has caved in to political pressure to help out spendthrift governments. As recently as May 6th, Jean-Claude Trichet, the central bank’s president, said that the ECB’s 22-strong governing council had not even discussed buying bonds at its regular monetary-policy meeting. Four days later the bank was doing just that. Not every member of the council was happy with the change of heart, even though Mr Trichet insisted it was backed by an “overwhelming majority”. Axel Weber, thehead of the Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, and a leading candidate to succeed Mr Trichet when he steps down next year, voiced his criticism to Börsen-Zeitung, a German financial newspaper.Mr Trichet has denied that the ECB was pressured into buying bonds, saying that the central bank was “fiercely and totally independent”. Yet the ECB looks a different animal from what it was when the fiscal crisis began. Last year it balked at buying government bonds when other central banks were doing so as an emergency extension of monetary policy—ie, to hold down the interest rates at which firms and households could borrow and to get money flowing through the banking system. Now it finds itself providing explicit support for European governments’fiscal policies, which is a far bigger threat to its reputation for independence. It is influencing the borrowing costs of euro-zone governments directly, without much of a guide to what the rates on their bonds should be.This is not the only sharp U-turn Mr Trichet has had to perform recently. He opposed the IMF’s involvement in the Greek rescue, then welcomed it. And he said the central bank’s rules on what constituted acceptable collateral should not be altered to suit one country, only to change them to ensure that Greek bonds could be exchanged by banks for ECB cash. The central bank’s credibility relies in part on a reputation for living up to its pledges and partly on its disdain for political expediency. On both counts, it has lost something.The loss need not be fatal. As one senior policymaker puts it, it is one thing to be independent of politicians but quite another to have discussions with them in a crisis. It was the flaws in the construction of the euro that forced Mr Trichet’s hand, not a lack of fortitude under political pressure. The ECB had to step in to head off the threat of a run on Irish, Portuguese and Spanish bonds (and maybe some banks) because no other euro-zone institution could do so. Equally, the ECB could scarcely refuse Greek government bonds as collateral for central-bank money even if they were junk. To do so would be to deny Greece one of the privileges of membership. It might even have been illegal.Gouvernement économiqueThe third cause for concern is what the euro area’s governments will do with the time the rescue package buys them. Already, countries that have been dilatory in cutting their deficits have pledged to be more resolute. Portugal’s government, which clocked up a deficit of 9.4% of GDP last year, has said it will delay plans to build a new airport, to follow a recent promise of cuts in unemployment insurance. On May 12th the Spanish prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, announced that civil servants’ pay would be cut by 5% from June and frozen next year. Ministers’ pay will be slashed by 15%. It is hoped thatthis and other measures, including a €6 billion reduction in public investment, will cut Spain’s budget deficit from 11.2% of GDP last year to just over 6% in 2011. “The situation is difficult and it would be nonsense to hide it,” said Mr Zapatero.However, keeping up the pressure on countries with big deficits may prove difficult with a safety net in place. After all, the rescue package is, in effect, an attempt by policymakers to convince investors that euro-zone sovereign debts are collectively insured: the debts of one are guaranteed by all. The idea that the €440 billion scheme will be retired after three years is hard to believe: it is difficult to withdraw a guarantee once it has been given. All governments, even that of reluctant Germany, understand that they have taken a step towards a kind of fiscal federalism. Indeed euro-zone policymakers are now scrambling to claim the plan as their own so that they can set the terms for the economic co-ordination and surveillance that it entails.For many, the fallout from the Greek crisis has proved what they had suspected all along: that the euro zone needs more fiscal co-ordination in order to work. If its members are to underwrite each other’s debts, they will demand more say in each other’s budget plans. The stability and growth pact, the scheme that was meant to limit euro-area countries’ budget deficits to 3% of GDP and public debt to 60% of GDP, has clearly failed.That still leaves Europe’s policymakers grappling with the problem of how to impose fiscal discipline. On May 12th the European Commission set out proposals for strengthening the EU’s “economic governance”. The commission said budget plans and economic reforms should be subject to peer review before they reach national parliaments. Breaches of budgetary rules should be punished faster—by withholding funds from the EU budget or by fines, placed in an interest-bearing account pending remedial action. It is easy to think of other possible sanctions but harder to work out how they could be imposed.Lax countries could be threatened with harsher terms on borrowing from pooled funds. Sinners could lose access to ECB support. The trouble is, these sorts of threats are empty as long as they impose costs on those who would dole out punishment. Fiscal surveillance in the euro area has failed because the punishers fret that one day they might be the punished, or because the strong financial links between euro-area countries mean that any punishment would undermine the currency zone’s stability.Budgetary discipline will be only one part of euro-zone surveillance—and perhaps not the most important part. The commission also wants to monitor trade imbalances and the build-up of foreign debts. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have become heavily reliant on foreign capital, racking up big current-account deficits year after year (see chart 2) and hence accumulating ever larger foreign debts. Portugal is deepest in hock: its net international debt (what it owes, less its foreign assets) rose to 112% of GDP last year.Roughly half of that total was public debt. Spain, Greece and Ireland are also heavily in debt.What makes this problem so acute is that very little of the foreign capital in these countries is greenfield direct investments, like new factories, or purchases of shares in big firms listed on stockmarkets—the kind of money that tends to stick around and can bear losses. The bulk of it is either government bonds or short-term money that has been funnelled through the banking system to fund mortgages and loans to small firms, and is more likely to disappear in a crisis. Portuguese banks’ net foreign debts were around 46% of GDP last year. These credit lines need to be rolled over regularly and their price and availability depend on the creditworthiness of the government. In the fallout from the Greek crisis, the market’s confidence about Ireland, Portugal and Spain was draining away. As the yields on their government bonds rose at the end of last week, there seemed to be a real threat that foreign financing would come to a sudden halt.Dependence on foreign capital in these countries is both symptom and cause of a deeper problem: a lack of export competitiveness. Cheap foreign credit fuelled the booms in domestic demand in Greece, Spain and Ireland in the years after the euro’s launch in 1999. That pushed up unit-wage costs relative to those in the rest of the euro area (notably super-competitive Germany) and cost competitiveness declined steadily (see chart 3). Consumer booms also skewed industrial structures away from firms that export to those that serve the domestic market and are more sheltered from foreign competition.Reversing those trends will be hard, but essential if countries are to service their foreign debts from export earnings. Devaluation, the usual route to rebalancing, is not open to countries in the euro area. They must find ways of cutting labour costs and boosting productivity. Ireland has already reduced wages; Spain made a start this week. Granted, lower wages will make mortgage debts harder to service. But the choice is between lower wages and higher unemployment, which is already in double digits in Portugal and Ireland and close to 20% in Spain. It will not be easy to dismantle Portugal’s and Spain’s complex wage-setting agreements, which set a floor to industry pay. But firms, especially small ones, should be allowed to opt out of such arrangements so that they can better match labour costs to productivity.Export or diePolicy should also be directed at shifting resources to exporters. One complaint in Portugal is that the monopolistic state of some service industries serves only to reinforce existing imbalances. The best graduates want to work for telephone and energy companies because they pay well, thanks to the profitability that comes from market power. The lack of competition imposes costs on firms, including exporters, which are forced to use their services; and weak competition reduces productivity more generally. That makes measures to boost competition in services all the more vital. A report on strengthening the single market by Mario Monti, a former EU commissioner, was issued on May 10th.Tax policy can also help, where fiscal consolidation allows it. Increasing levies on spending, such as value-added taxes, while reducing taxes on jobs would shift economies away from domestic demand, mimicking a devaluation. Countries that habitually run a trade surplus (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland) need to mirror the reformsin deficit changes with policies to promote stronger domestic demand and a shift away from an emphasis on exporting industries.The transition to a more competitive economy will be painful. Politicians have not prepared electorates for difficult times. Running up debts is fun; paying them off is not. In an ideal world, the pain of a structural-reform programme would be cushioned by an expansionary fiscal policy. That is a luxury that Spain, Portugal and the rest can no longer afford.The fall in the euro will help. It cannot help high-wage countries compete with Germany, but it gives their firms a chance against imports from outside the euro zone. Economic logic as well as market sentiment points to further euro weakness. Business cycles favour it: America’s recovery is more advanced than Europe’s. Figures released on May 12th showed that the euro-area economy grew by 0.2% in the first quarter: America’s economy expanded four times as quickly.Monetary conditions should also hold the euro down. The pressure to tighten fiscal policy in some parts of the euro area will make it hard for the ECB even to consider raising interest rates. That will weigh on the euro and will also help indebted households in Spain, Portugal and Ireland, where mortgage rates tend to track the ECB’s benchmark interest rate. The euro is still dear against the dollar on gauges such as purchasing-power parity, notwithstanding its recent slide.The measures announced this week offer countries a chance, perhaps their last one, to put things right. There are some hopeful signs. Portugal started to introduce some modest reforms to jobs and product markets after 2005. Its economy grew by an impressive 1.7% in the year to the first quarter—about as fast as Germany’s—which suggests that its efforts to reorient itself may be paying off.It would be wrong to conclude that, in trying to get ahead of the crisis, the euro zone’s policymakers have already gone too far. The threat that Portugal and Spain might be cut off from credit markets, triggering a meltdown in Europe’s financial system, was all too real. The rescue effort will dent the ECB’s reputation as a single-minded inflation-slayer. There is still a risk that the insurance provided by the rescue scheme may leave countries that benefit from it a bit less minded to cut deficits and reform their economies. But those faults, real as they are, must be set against the potential costs of doing nothing.。
银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献
银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献1银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Banks analysis of financial dataAbstractA stochastic analysis of financial data is presented. In particular we investigate how the statistics of log returns change with different time delays t. The scale-dependent behaviour of financial data can be divided into two regions. The first time range, the small-timescale region (in the range of seconds) seems to be characterised by universal features. The second time range, the medium-timescale range from several minutes upwards can be characterised by a cascade process, which is given by a stochastic Markov process in the scale ττ. A corresponding Fokker–Planck equation can be process in the scaleextracted from given data and provides a non-equilibrium thermodynamical description of the complexity of financial data.Keywords: Banks; Financial markets; Stochastic processes;Fokker––Planck equationFokker1.IntroductionFinancial statements for banks present a different analytical problem than manufacturing and service companies. As a result, analysis of a bank’s financial statements requires a distinct approach that recognizes a bank’’s financial statements requires a distinct approach that recognizes a bank somewhat unique risks.Banks take deposits from savers, paying interest on some of these accounts. They pass these funds on to borrowers, receiving interest on the loans. Their profits are derived from the spread between the rate they pay forfunds and the rate they receive from borrowers. This ability to pool deposits from many sources that can be lent to many different borrowers creates the flow of funds inherent in the banking system. By managing this flow of funds,banks generate profits, acting as the intermediary of interest paid and interest received and taking on the risks of offering credit.2. Small-scale analysisBanking is a highly leveraged business requiring regulators to dictate minimal capital levels to help ensure the solvency of each bank and the banking system. In the US, a bank’’s primary regulator could be the Federal banking system. In the US, a bankReserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision or any one of 50 state regulatory bodies, depending on the charter of the bank. Within the Federal Reserve Board, there are 12 districts with 12 different regulatory staffing groups. These regulators focus on compliance with certain requirements, restrictions and guidelines, aiming to uphold the soundness and integrity of the banking system.As one of the most highly regulated banking industries in the world, investors have some level of assurance in the soundness of the banking system. As a result, investors can focus most of their efforts on how a bank will perform in different economic environments.Below is a sample income statement and balance sheet for a large bank. The first thing to notice is that the line items in the statements are not the same as your typical manufacturing or service firm. Instead, there are entries that represent interest earned or expensed as well as deposits and loans.As financial intermediaries, banks assume two primary types of risk asthey manage the flow of money through their business. Interest rate risk is the management of the spread between interest paid on deposits and received on loans over time. Credit risk is the likelihood that a borrower will default onits loan or lease, causing the bank to lose any potential interest earned as wellas the principal that was loaned to the borrower. As investors, these are theprimary elements that need to be understood when analyzing a bank’’s primary elements that need to be understood when analyzing a bankfinancial statement.3. Medium scale analysisThe primary business of a bank is managing the spread between deposits. Basically when the interest that a bank earns from loans is greater than the interest it must pay on deposits, it generates a positive interest spread or net interest income. The size of this spread is a major determinant of the profit generated by a bank. This interest rate risk is primarily determined by the shape of the yield curve.As a result, net interest income will vary, due to differences in the timing of accrual changes and changing rate and yield curve relationships. Changes in the general level of market interest rates also may cause changes in the volume and mix of a bank’’s balance sheet products. For example, when volume and mix of a bankeconomic activity continues to expand while interest rates are rising,commercial loan demand may increase while residential mortgage loangrowth and prepayments slow.Banks, in the normal course of business, assume financial risk by making loans at interest rates that differ from rates paid on deposits. Deposits often have shorter maturities than loans. The result is a balance sheet mismatch between assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits). An upward sloping yield curve is favorable to a bank as the bulk of its deposits are short term and their loans are longer term. This mismatch of maturities generates the net interest revenue banks enjoy. When the yield curve flattens, this mismatch causes net interest revenue to diminish.4.Even in a business using Six Sigma® methodology. an “optimal” level of working capital management needs to beidentified.The table below ties together the bank’s balance sheet with the income statement and displays the yield generated from earning assets and interestbearing deposits. Most banks provide this type of table in their annual reports. The following table represents the same bank as in the previous examples: First of all, the balance sheet is an average balance for the line item, rather than the balance at the end of the period. Average balances provide a better analytical frame analytical framework to help understand the bank’s financial performance. work to help understand the bank’s financial performance. Notice that for each average balance item there is a correspondinginterest-related income, or expense item, and the average yield for the time period. It also demonstrates the impact a flattening yield curve can have on a bank’s net interest income.The best place to start is with the net interest income line item. The bank experienced lower net interest income even though it had grown averagebalances. To help understand how this occurred, look at the yield achieved on total earning assets. For the current period ,it is actually higher than the prior period. Then examine the yield on the interest-bearing assets. It issubstantially higher in the current period, causing higher interest-generating expenses. This discrepancy in the performance of the bank is due to the flattening of the yield curve.As the yield curve flattens, the interest rate the bank pays on shorter term deposits tends to increase faster than the rates it can earn from its loans. This causes the net interest income line to narrow, as shown above. One way banks try o overcome the impact of the flattening of the yield curve is to increase the fees they charge for services. As these fees become a larger portion of the bank’s inco portion of the bank’s income, it becomes less dependent on net interest me, it becomes less dependent on net interest income to drive earnings.Changes in the general level of interest rates may affect the volume ofcertain types of banking activities that generate fee-related income. For example, the volume of residential mortgage loan originations typically declines as interest rates rise, resulting in lower originating fees. In contrast,mortgage servicing pools often face slower prepayments when rates are rising, since borrowers are less likely to refinance. Ad a result, fee income and associated economic value arising from mortgage servicing-related businesses may increase or remain stable in periods of moderately rising interest rates.When analyzing a bank you should also consider how interest rate risk may act jointly with other risks facing the bank. For example, in a rising rate environment, loan customers may not be able to meet interest payments because of the increase in the size of the payment or reduction in earnings. The result will be a higher level of problem loans. An increase in interest rate is exposes a bank with a significant concentration in adjustable rate loans to credit risk. For a bank that is predominately funded with short-term liabilities, a rise in rates may decrease net interest income at the same time credit quality problems are on the increase.5.Related LiteratureThe importance of working capital management is not new to the finance literature. Over twenty years ago. Largay and Stickney (1980) reported that the then-recent bankruptcy of W.T. Grant. a nationwide chain of department stores. should have been anticipated because the corporation had been running a deficit cash flow from operations for eight of the last ten years of its corporate life. As part of a study of the Fortune 500’s financ ial management practices. Gilbert and Reichert (1995) find that accounts receivable management models are used in 59 percent of these firms to improve working capital projects. while inventory management models were used in 60 percent of the companies. More recently. Farragher. Kleiman andSahu (1999) find that 55 percent of firms in the S&P Industrial indexcomplete some form of a cash flow assessment. but did not present insights regarding accounts receivable and inventory management. or the variations of any current asset accounts or liability accounts across industries. Thus. mixed evidence exists concerning the use of working capital managementtechniques.Theoretical determination of optimal trade credit limits are the subject of many articles over the years (e.g.. Schwartz 1974; Scherr 1996). with scant attention paid to actual accounts receivable management. Across a limited sample. Weinraub and Visscher (1998) observe a tendency of firms with low levels of current ratios to also have low levels of current liabilities.Simultaneously investigating accounts receivable and payable issues. Hill. Sartoris. and Ferguson (1984) find differences in the way payment dates are defined. Payees define the date of payment as the date payment is received. while payors view payment as the postmark date. Additional WCM insight across firms. industries. and time can add to this body of research.Maness and Zietlow (2002. 51. 496) presents two models of valuecreation that incorporate effective short-term financial management activities. However. these models are generic models and do not consider unique firm or industry influences. Maness and Zietlow discuss industry influences in a short paragraph that includes the observation that. “An industry a company is located i located in may have more influence on that company’s fortunes than overall n may have more influence on that company’s fortunes than overall GNP” (2002. 507). In fact. a careful review of this 627GNP” (2002. 507). In fact. a careful review of this 627-page textbook finds -page textbook finds only sporadic information on actual firm levels of WCM dimensions.virtually nothing on industry factors except for some boxed items with titles such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In--House Credit Card” (128) andnothing on WCM stability over time. This research will attempt to fill thisvoid by investigating patterns related to working capital measures within industries and illustrate differences between industries across time.An extensive survey of library and Internet resources provided very few recent reports about working capital management. The most relevant set of articles was Weisel and Bradley’s (2003) arti cle on cash flow management and one of inventory control as a result of effective supply chain management by Hadley (2004).6.Research MethodThe CFO RankingsThe first annual CFO Working Capital Survey. a joint project with REL Consultancy Group. was published in the June 1997 issue of CFO (Mintz and Lezere 1997). REL is a London. England-based management consulting firm specializing in working capital issues for its global list of clients. The original survey reports several working capital benchmarks for public companies using data for 1996. Each company is ranked against its peers and also against the entire field of 1.000 companies. REL continues to update the original information on an annual basis.REL uses the “cash flow from operations” value loc ated on firm cash flow statements to estimate cash conversion efficiency (CCE). This value indicates how well a company transforms revenues into cash flow. A “daysof working capital” (DWC) value is based on the dollar amount in each of the aggregate. equally-weighted receivables. inventory. and payables accounts. The “days of working capital” (DNC) represents the time period between purchase of inventory on acccount from vendor until the sale to the customer. the collection of the receivables. and payment receipt. Thus. it reflects the company’s ability to finance its core operations with vendor credit. A detailed investigation of WCM is possible because CFO also provides firmand industry values for days sales outstanding (A/R). inventory turnover. and days payables outstanding (A/P).7.Research FindingsAverage and Annual Working Capital Management Performance Working capital management component definitions and average values for the entire 1996 –– 2000 period . Across the nearly 1.000 firms in thefor the entire 1996survey. cash flow from operations. defined as cash flow from operations divided by sales and referred to as “cash conversion efficiency” (CCE). averages 9.0 percent. Incorporating a 95 percent confidence interval. CCE ranges from 5.6 percent to 12.4 percent. The days working capital (DWC). defined as the sum of receivables and inventories less payables divided by daily sales. averages 51.8 days and is very similar to the days that sales are outstanding (50.6). because the inventory turnover rate (once every 32.0 days) is similar to the number of days that payables are outstanding (32.4 days). In all instances. the standard deviation is relatively small. suggesting that these working capital management variables are consistent across CFO reports.8.Industry Rankings on Overall Working Capital Management PerformanceCFO magazine provides an overall working capital ranking for firms in its survey. using the following equation:Industry-based differences in overall working capital management are presented for the twenty-six industries that had at least eight companies included in the rankings each year. In the typical year. CFO magazine ranks 970 companies during this period. Industries are listed in order of the mean overall CFO ranking of working capital performance. Since the best average ranking possible for an eight-company industry is 4.5 (this assumes that the eight companies are ranked one through eight for the entire survey). it is quite obvious that all firms in the petroleumindustry must have been receiving very high overall working capital management rankings. In fact. the petroleum industry is ranked first in CCE and third in DWC (as illustrated in Table 5 and discussed later in this paper).Furthermore. the petroleum industry had the lowest standard deviation of working capital rankings and range of working capital rankings. The only other industry with a mean overall ranking less than 100 was the Electric & Gas Utility industry. which ranked second in CCE and fourth in DWC. The two industries with the worst working capital rankings were Textiles and Apparel. Textiles rank twenty-second in CCE and twenty-sixth in DWC. The apparel industry ranks twenty-third and twenty-fourth in the two working capital measures9. Results for Bayer dataThe Kramers––Moyal coefficients were calculated according to Eqs. (5) and The Kramers(6). The timescale was divided into half-open intervalsassuming that the Kramers––Moyal coefficients are constant with respect to assuming that the Kramersthe timescaleττin each of these subintervals of the timescale. The smallestthe timescaletimescale considered was 240 s and all larger scales were chosen such that ττi timescale considered was 240 s and all larger scales were chosen such that . The Kramers––Moyal coefficients themselves were parameterised =0.9*τi+1. The Kramersin the following form:This result shows that the rich and complex structure of financial data, expressed by multi-scale statistics, can be pinned down to coefficients with a relatively simple functional form.10. DiscussionCredit risk is most simply defined as the potential that a bank borrower or counter-party will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. When this happens, the bank will experience a loss of some or all of the credit it provide to its customer. To absorb these losses, banks maintain anallowance for loan and lease losses. In essence, this allowance can be viewed as a pool of capital specifically set aside to absorb estimated loan losses. This allowance should be maintained at a level that is adequate to absorb theestimated amount of probable losses in the institution’’s loan portfolio. estimated amount of probable losses in the institutionA careful review of a bank’’s financial statements can highlight the keyA careful review of a bankfactors that should be considered becomes before making a trading or investing decision. Investors need to have a good understanding of the business cycle and the yield curve-both have a major impact on the economic performance of banks. Interest rate risk and credit risk are the primary factors to consider as a bank’’s financial performance follows the yield curve. When to consider as a bankit flattens or becomes inverted a bank’’s net interest revenue is put underit flattens or becomes inverted a bankgreater pressure. When the yield curve returns to a more traditional shape, a bank’’s net interest revenue usually improves. Credit risk can be the largest bankcontributor to the negative performance of a bank, even causing it to lose money. In addition, management of credit risk is a subjective process that can be manipulated in the short term. Investors in banks need to be aware of these factors before they commit their capital.银行的金融数据分析摘要 财务数据随机分析已经被提出,特别是我们探讨如何统计在不同时间τ记录返回的变化。
The theory and practice of corporate finance全文翻译
公司金融的理论与实践:来自实地的证据关于资本成本、资本预算和资本结构问题,我们调查了392位首席财务官。
大的公司主要依靠现值技术和资本资产定价模型,而小公司相对地比较喜欢使用回收期标准。
当发行债务时,公司比较注重维护财务弹性和比较好的信用等级;当发行股票时,比较注重每股收益稀释和近期股票价格升值情况。
我们发现了对于支持优序融资假说和交易资本结构假说的支持,但是却很少找到经理关心资产替换、不对称信息、交易成本、自由现金流或者个人税务方面的证据。
关键词:资本结构资本成本股权成本资本预算折现率项目估值调查1. 简介在这篇文章中,我们对一项描述公司金融的现行实践的综合调查作了一个分析。
在这个领域中,最著名的实地研究也许就是约翰.林特纳的开创新的股利分配策略分析理论。
那个研究的结论至今仍被引用,并深刻地影响着股利分配策略的研究方式。
在很多方面,我们的目标和林特纳的有点相似。
我们的调查描述了公司金融的现行实践。
我们希望研究者们能利用我们的结果来发展新的理论—并且潜在地修改或者放弃已经存在的观点。
我们也希望从业者们能够从我们的结果中得到启发,通过观察其他的公司是怎样运行的以及确认其他学术文献没有完成的地方。
我们的调查跟以前的一些调查在很多方面都有不同。
首先,我们的调查的范围很广。
我们检测了资本配置,资本成本和资本结构。
这让我们可以把跨领域的结果联系在一起。
例如,有些公司在考虑资本结构问题时会优先考虑财务弹性,我们就调查了这些公司在考虑资本预算决定时是否也会注重实物期权。
我们在每个领域都进行了深入的探索,总共询问了100多个问题。
其次,我们抽样调查了接近4440个公司的大范围截面数据。
总计有392为首席财务官回应了我们的调查,回复率为9%。
我们所知道的第二大范围的调查是摩尔和理查特做的,调查了298个大公司。
我们研究了可能的未回复偏差,得出结论是我们的样本可以作为全部人口的代表。
第三,我们依据公司特征对回复结果进行了分析。
Copeland金融理论与公司政策习题答案03
Chapter 3The Theory of Choice: UtilityTheory Given Uncertainty1. The minimum set of conditions includes(a) The five axioms of cardinal utility• complete ordering and comparability • transitivity • strong independence • measurability • ranking(b) Individuals have positive marginal utility of wealth (greed).(c) The total utility of wealth increases at a decreasing rate (risk aversion); i.e., E[U(W)] < U[E(W)]. (d) The probability density function must be a normal (or two parameter) distribution.2. As shown in Figure3.6, a risk lover has positive marginal utility of wealth, MU(W) > 0, whichincreases with increasing wealth, dMU(W)/dW > 0. In order to know the shape of a risk-lover’s indifference curve, we need to know the marginal rate of substitution between return and risk. To do so, look at equation 3.19: U (E Z)Zf(Z)dZ dE d U (E Z)f(Z)dZ ′−+σ=σ′+σ∫∫(3.19) The denominator must be positive because marginal utility, U’ (E + σZ), is positive and because the frequency, f(Z), of any level of wealth is positive. In order to see that the integral in the numerator is positive, look at Figure S3.1 on the following page.The marginal utility of positive returns, +Z, is always higher than the marginal utility of equally likely (i.e., the same f(Z)) negative returns, −Z. Therefore, when all equally likely returns are multiplied by their marginal utilities, matched, and summed, the result must be positive. Since the integral in the numerator is preceded by a minus sign, the entire numerator is negative and the marginal rate of substitution between risk and return for a risk lover is negative. This leads to indifference curves like those shown in Figure S3.2.14 Copeland/Shastri/Weston • Financial Theory and Corporate Policy,Fourth EditionFigure S3.1Total utility of normally distributed returns for a risk loverFigure S3.2 Indifference curves of a risk lover3. (a)ln W 8.4967825E[U(W)].5ln(4,000).5ln(6,000).5(8.29405).5(8.699515)8.4967825e We $4,898.98W=+=+====Therefore, the individual would be indifferent between the gamble and $4,898.98 for sure. Thisamounts to a risk premium of $101.02. Therefore, he would not buy insurance for $125.(b) The second gamble, given his first loss, is $4,000 plus or minus $1,000. Its expected utility is=+=+====ln W 8.26178E[U(W)].5ln(3,000).5ln(5,000).5(8.006368).5(8.517193)8.26178e e $3,872.98WNow the individual would be willing to pay up to $127.02 for insurance. Since insurance costsonly $125, he will buy it.Chapter 3 The Theory of Choice: Utility Theory Given Uncertainty 154. Because $1,000 is a large change in wealth relative to $10,000, we can use the concept of risk aversionin the large (Markowitz). The expected utility of the gamble isE(U(9,000,11,000; .5)).5U(9,000).5U(11,000).5ln9,000.5ln11,000.5(9.10498).5(9.30565)4.55249 4.6528259.205315=+=+=+=+=The level of wealth which has the same utility isln W =9.205315W =e 9.205315=$9,949.87Therefore, the individual would be willing to pay up to$10,000 − 9,949.87 = $50.13 in order to avoid the risk involved in a fifty-fifty chance of winning or losing $1,000.If current wealth is $1,000,000, the expected utility of the gamble isE(U(999,000, 1,001,000; .5)).5ln 999,000.5ln1,001,000.5(13.81451).5(13.81651)13.81551=+=+=The level of wealth with the same utility is ln W =13.81551W =e 13.81551=$999,999.47Therefore, the individual would be willing to pay $1,000,000.00 − 999,999.47 = $0.53 to avoid the gamble.5. (a) The utility function is graphed in Figure S3.3.U(W)=−e −aW16 Copeland/Shastri/Weston • Financial Theory and Corporate Policy,Fourth EditionFigure S3.3 Negative exponential utility functionThe graph above assumes a = 1. For any other value of a > 0, the utility function will be amonotonic transformation of the above curve.(b) Marginal utility is the first derivative with respect to W.aW dU(W)U (W)(a)e 0dW−′==−−> Therefore, marginal utility is positive. This can also be seen in Figure S3.3 because the slope of a line tangent to the utility function is always positive, regardless of the level of wealth. Risk aversion is the rate of change in marginal utility.aW 2aW dMU(W)U (W)a(a)e a e 0dW−−′′==−=−< Therefore, the utility function is concave and it exhibits risk aversion.(c) Absolute risk aversion, as defined by Pratt-Arrow, is2aWaW U (W)ARA U (W)a e ARA a ae −−′′=−′−=−=Therefore, the function does not exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion. Instead it has constant absolute risk aversion.(d) Relative risk aversion is equal toU (W)RRA W(ARA)WU (W)Wa′′==−′=Therefore, in this case relative risk aversion is not constant. It increases with wealth.Chapter 3 The Theory of Choice: Utility Theory Given Uncertainty 176. Friedman and Savage [1948] show that it is possible to explain both gambling and insurance if anindividual has a utility function such as that shown in Figure S3.4. The individual is risk averse todecreases in wealth because his utility function is concave below his current wealth. Therefore, he will be willing to buy insurance against losses. At the same time he will be willing to buy a lottery ticket which offers him a (small) probability of enormous gains in wealth because his utility function isconvex above his current wealth.Figure S3.4 Gambling and insurance7. We are given thatA >B >C >D Also, we know thatU(A) + U(D) = U(B) + U(C) Transposing, we have U(A) − U(B) = U(C) − U(D) (3.1) Assuming the individual is risk-averse, then 22U U 0 and 0W W∂∂><∂∂ (3.2) Therefore, from (1) and (2) we know that −−<−−U(A)U(B)U(C)U(D)A B C D(3.3) Using equation (3.1), equation (3.3) becomes11A B C DA B C DA D C B1111A D C B 22221111U (A)(D)U (C)(B)2222<−−−>−+>++>+ +>+In general, risk averse individuals will experience decreasing utility as the variance of outcomes increases, but the utility of (1/2)B + (1/2)C is the utility of an expected outcome, an average.18 Copeland/Shastri/Weston • Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, Fourth Edition8. First, we have to compute the expected utility of the individual’s risk.i i E(U(W))p U(W ).1U(1).1U(50,000).8U(100,000).1(0).1(10.81978).8(11.51293)10.292322==++=++=∑ Next, what level of wealth would make him indifferent to the risk?10.292322ln W 10.292322W e W 29,505=== The maximum insurance premium isRisk premium = E (W) – certainty equivalent$85,000.1$29,505$55,495.1=−= 9. The utility function is U(W)=−W −1Therefore, the level of wealth corresponding to any utility isW = –(U(W))–1Therefore, the certainty equivalent wealth for a gamble of ±1,000 is W.−−−=−−++−−111W [.5((W 1,000)).5((W 1,000))]The point of indifference will occur where your current level of wealth, W, minus the certainty equivalent level of wealth for the gamble is just equal to the cost of the insurance, $500. Thus, we have the condition−= −−= −− + +−−−= − =−−+= −−+==2222W W 5001W 50011.5.5W 1,000W 1,0001W 500W W 1,000,000W 1,000,000W 500W W W 1,000,000500WW 2,000Chapter 3 The Theory of Choice: Utility Theory Given Uncertainty 19Therefore, if your current level of wealth is $2,000, you will be indifferent. Below that level of wealth you will pay for the insurance while for higher levels of wealth you will not.10. Table S3.1 shows the payoffs, expected payoffs, and utility of payoffs for n consecutive heads.Table S3.1Number of Consecutive Heads = N Probability = (1/2)n +1 Payoff = 2NE(Payoff) U(Payoff)E U(Payoff) 0 1/2 1 $.50 ln 1 = .000 .0001 1/42 .50 ln 2 = .693 .1732 1/8 4 .50 ln 4 = 1.386 .1733 1/16 8 .50 ln 8 = 2.079 .130N (1/2)N +1 2N .50 ln 2N = N ln 2 N ln 22+=0 The gamble has a .5 probability of ending after the first coin flip (i.e., no heads), a (.5)2probability of ending after the second flip (one head and one tail), and so on. The expected payoff of the gamble is the sum of the expected payoffs (column four), which is infinite. However, no one has ever paid an infinite amount to accept the gamble. The reason is that people are usually risk averse. Consequently, they would be willing to pay an amount whose utility is equal to the expected utility of the gamble. The expected utility of the gamble isN i 1i12i 0Ni 1122i 0N 12ii 0E(U)()ln 2E(U)()i ln 2i E(U) ln 22+======∑∑∑ Proof that i i 0i 22∞==∑follows: First, note that the infinite series can be partitioned as follows: ∞∞∞∞====+−−==+∑∑∑∑i i i i i 0i 0i 0i 0i 1i 11i 12222 Evaluating the first of the two terms in the above expression, we have∞==++++⋅⋅⋅∑1124i i 011182 =+=−1/21211/220 Copeland/Shastri/Weston • Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, Fourth Edition Evaluating the second term, we havei i 0i 11234104816322∞=−=−++++++⋅⋅⋅∑ The above series can be expanded as−=−++++⋅⋅⋅=+++⋅⋅⋅=++⋅⋅⋅=+⋅⋅⋅=1 111111 48163221111 816324111 1632811 3216Therefore, we havei i 0i i 0i 111111248162i 11102∞=∞=−=−+++++⋅⋅⋅−=−+=∑∑ Adding the two terms, we have the desired proof thati i i i 0i 0i 0i 1i 1202222∞∞∞===−=+=+=∑∑∑ Consequently, we have=====∑∑NN i i i 0i 0i i E(U) 1/2ln2 ln2, since 222 If the expected utility of wealth is ln2, the corresponding level of wealth isln2U(W)ln2e W $2===Therefore, an individual with a logarithmic utility function will pay $2 for the gamble.11. (a) First calculate AVL from the insurer’s viewpoint, since the insurer sets the premiums.AVL 1 ($30,000 insurance)=0(.98)+5,000(.01)+10,000(.005)+30,000(.005)=$250AVL 2 ($40,000 insurance)=0(.98)+5,000(.01)+10,000(.005)+40,000(.005)=$300AVL 3 ($50,000 insurance)=0(.98)+5,000(.01)+10,000(.005)+50,000(.005)=$350Chapter 3 The Theory of Choice: Utility Theory Given Uncertainty 21We can now calculate the premium for each amount of coverage:Amount of Insurance Premium$30,000 30 + 250 = $280$40,000 27 + 300 = $327$50,000 24 + 350 = $374Next, calculate the insuree’s ending wealth and utility of wealth in all contingencies (states). Assume he earns 7 percent on savings and that premiums are paid at the beginning of the year. The utility of each ending wealth can be found from the utility function U(W) = ln W. (See Table S3.2a.)Finally, find the expected utility of wealth for each amount of insurance,i i i E(U(W))P U(W )=∑and choose the amount of insurance which yields the highest expected utility.Table S3.2a Contingency Values Of Wealth And Utility of Wealth (Savings = $20,000) End-of-Period Wealth (in $10,000’s) Utility ofWealthU(W) = ln WWith no insuranceNo loss (P = .98) 5 + 2(1.07) = 7.141.9657 $5,000 loss (P = .01) 5 +2.14 − .5 = 6.641.8931 $10,000 loss (P = .005) 5 +2.14 − 1.0 = 6.141.8148 $50,000 loss (P = .005) 5 +2.14 − 5.0 = 2.140.7608 With $30,000 insuranceNo loss (P = .995) 5 + 2.14 − .0280(1.07) ≅ 7.111.9615 $20,000 loss (P = .005) 5 +2.14 − .03 − 2 ≅ 5.111.6312 With $40,000 insuranceNo loss (P = .995) 5 + 2.14 − .0327(1.07) ≅ 7.1051.9608 $10,000 loss (P = .005) 5 +2.14 − .035 − 1.0 ≅ 6.1051.8091 With $50,000 insuranceNo loss (P = 1.0) 5 + 2.14 − .0374(1.07) ≅ 7.10 1.9601 With no Insurance: E(U(W)) = 1.9657(.98) + 1.8931(.01) + 1.8148(.005)+ 0.7608(.005)= 1.9582With $30,000 insurance: E(U(W)) = 1.9615(.995) + 1.6312(.005)= 1.9598With $40,000 insurance: E(U(W)) = 1.9608(.995) + 1.8091(.005)= 1.9600With $50,000 insurance: E(U(W)) = 1.9601Therefore, the optimal insurance for Mr. Casadesus is $50,000, given his utility function.22 Copeland/Shastri/Weston • Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, Fourth EditionTable S3.2b Contingency Values of Wealth and Utility of Wealth(Savings = $320,000)End-of-Period Wealth (in $10,000’s)Utility ofWealthU(W) = ln W (Wealth in $100,000’s)With no insuranceNo loss (P = .98) 5 + 32.00(1.07) = 39.24 1.3671$5,000 loss (P = .01) 5 + 34.24 − .5 = 38.74 1.3543$10,000 loss (P = .005) 5 + 34.24 − 1.0 = 38.24 1.3413$50,000 loss (P = .005) 5 + 34.24 − 5.0 = 34.24 1.2308 With $30,000 insuranceNo loss (P = .995) 5 + 34.24 − .028(1.07) ≅ 39.21 1.3663$20,000 loss (P = .005) 5 + 34.24 − .03 − 2 ≅ 37.21 1.3140 With $40,000 insuranceNo loss (P = .995) 5 + 34.24 − .0327(1.07) ≅ 39.205 1.3662$10,000 loss (P = .005) 5 + 34.24 − .035 − 1.0 ≅ 38.205 1.3404 With $50,000 insuranceNo loss (P = 1.0) 5 + 34.24 − .0374(1.07) ≅ 39.20 1.3661(b) Follow the same procedure as in part a), only with $320,000 in savings instead of $20,000. (SeeTable S3.2b above for these calculations.)With no Insurance: E(U(W)) = .98(1.3671) + .01(1.3543)+ .005(1.3413) + .005(1.2308)= 1.366162With $30,000 insurance: E(U(W)) = .995(1.3663) + .005 (1.3140)= 1.366038With $40,000 insurance: E(U(W)) = .995(1.3662) + .005(1.3404)= 1.366071With $50,000 insurance: E(U(W)) = (1)1.366092 = 1.366092The optimal amount of insurance in this case is no insurance at all. Although the numbers are close with logarithmic utility, the analysis illustrates that a relatively wealthy individual may choose no insurance, while a less wealthy individual may choose maximum coverage.(c) The end-of-period wealth for all contingencies has been calculated in part a), so we can calculatethe expected utilities for each amount of insurance directly.With no insurance:E (U(W)) = .98(U(71.4)) + .01(U(66.4)) + .005(U(61.4)) + .005U(21.4)= –.98(200/71.4) – .01(200/66.4) – .005(200/61.4) – .005(200/21.4)= –2.745 – .030 – .016 – .047= –2.838With $30,000 insurance:E(U(W)) = .995(U(71.1)) + .005(U(51.1))= – .995 (200/71.1) – .005(200/51.1)= –2.799 – .020= –2.819With $40,000 insurance:E(U(W)) = .995(U(71.05) + .005(U(61.05))= – .995(200/71.05) – .005(200/61.05)= –2.8008 – .0164= –2.8172With $50,000 insurance:E(U(W)) = (1)( −200/71) = −2.8169Hence, with this utility function, Mr. Casadesus would renew his policy for $50,000.Properties of this utility function, U(W) = −200,000W −1:=>′=−<′−==>∂=−<∂==>∂=∂-2W -3W -1W W -2MU 200,000W 0 nonsatiationMU 400,000W 0 risk aversionMU ARA 2W 0MU ARA 2W 0 decreasing absolute risk aversion WRRA W(ARA)20RRA 0 Wconstant relative risk aversion Since the individual has decreasing absolute risk aversion, as his savings account is increased he prefers to bear greater and greater amounts of risk. Eventually, once his wealth is large enough, he would prefer not to take out any insurance. To see this, make his savings account = $400,000.12. Because returns are normally distributed, the mean and variance are the only relevant parameters.Case 1(a) Second order dominance—B dominates A because it has lower variance and the same mean. (b) First order dominance—There is no dominance because the cumulative probability functionscross.Case 2(a) Second order dominance—A dominates B because it has a higher mean while they both have thesame variance.(b) First order dominance—A dominates B because its cumulative probability is less than that of B. Itlies to the right of B.Case 3(a) Second order dominance—There is no dominance because although A has a lower variance it alsohas a lower mean.(b) First order dominance—Given normal distributions, it is not possible for B to dominate Aaccording to the first order criterion. Figure S3.5 shows an example.Figure S3.5 First order dominance not possible13. (a)Prob X X pi XiXi− E(X) pi(Xi− E(X))2.1 −10 −1.0 −16.4 .1(268.96)= 26.896 .4 5 2.0 −1.4 .4(1.96) = .784 .3 10 3.0 3.6 .3(12.96) = 3.888 .2 12 2.4 5.6 .2(31.36) = 6.272 E(X)= 6.4 var (X) = 37.840Prob Y Y pi YiYi− E(Y) pi(Yi− E(Y))2.2 2 .4 −3.7 .2(13.69) = 2.738.531.5 −2.7 .5(7.29) =3.645.2 4 .8 −1.7 .2(2.89) = .578.1 303.0 24.3 .1(590.49) = 59.049E(Y) = 5.7 var(Y) = 66.010 X is clearly preferred by any risk averse individual whose utility function is based on mean and variance, because X has a higher mean and a lower variance than Y, as shown in Figure S3.6. (b) Second order stochastic dominance may be tested as shown in Table S3.3 on the following page.Because Σ(F − G) is not less than (or greater than) zero for all outcomes, there is no second order dominance.Table S3.3Outcome Prob(X) Prob(Y) Σ Px = F Σ Py= G F − G Σ (F − G)−10 .1 0 .1 0 .1 .1−9 0 0 .1 0 .1 .2−8 0 0 .1 0 .1 .3−7 0 0 .1 0 .1 .4−6 0 0 .1 0 .1 .5−5 0 0 .1 0 .1 .6−4 0 0 .1 0 .1 .7−3 0 0 .1 0 .1 .8−2 0 0 .1 0 .1 .9−1 0 0 .1 0 .1 1.00 0 0 .1 0 .1 1.11 0 0 .1 0 .1 1.22 0 .2 .1 .2 −.1 1.13 0 .5 .1 .7 −.6 .54 0 .2 .1 .9 −.8 −.35 .4 0 .5 .9 −.4 −.76 0 0 .5 .9 −.4 –1.17 0 0 .5 .9 −.4 −1.58 0 0 .5 .9 −.4 –1.99 0 0 .5 .9 −.4 –2.310 .3 0 .8 .9 −.1 –2.411 0 0 .8 .9 −.1 –2.512 .2 0 1.0 .9 .1 –2.413 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –2.314 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –2.215 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 −2.116 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –1.917 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –1.818 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –1.719 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –1.620 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –1.521 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –1.422 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –1.323 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –1.224 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –1.125 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –1.026 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –.927 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –.828 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –.729 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 –.630 0 .1 1.0 1.0 0 –.61.0 1.0Because Σ (F − G) is not less than (or greater than) zero for all outcomes, there is no second order dominance.Figure S3.6 Asset X is preferred by mean-variance risk averters14. (a) Table S3.4 shows the calculations.Table S3.4p i Co. A Co. B p i A i p i [A − E(A)]2 p i B i p i [B − E(B)]2.1 0 −.50 0 .144 −.05 .4000 .2 .50 −.25 .10 .098 −.05 .6125 .4 1.00 1.50 .40 .016 .60 0.2 2.00 3.00 .40 .128 .60 .4500.1 3.00 4.00 .30 .324 .40 .62501.20 .710 1.502.0875=σ==σ=A B E(A) 1.20, .84E(B) 1.50, 1.44(b) Figure S3.7 shows that a risk averse investor with indifference curves like #1 will prefer A, whilea less risk averse investor (#2) will prefer B, which has higher return and higher variance.Figure S3.7 Risk-return tradeoffs (c) The second order dominance criterion is calculated in Table S3.5 on the following page.15. (a) False. Compare the normally distributed variables in Figure S3.8 below. Using second orderstochastic dominance, A dominates B because they have the same mean, but A has lower variance. But there is no first order stochastic dominance because they have the same mean and hence thecumulative probability distributions cross.Figure S3.8 First order stochastic dominance does not obtain (b) False. Consider the following counterexample.Table S3.5 (Problem 3.14) Second Order Stochastic DominanceReturn Prob(A) Prob(B) F(A) G(B) F − G Σ (F − G) −.50 0 .1 0 .1−.1 −.1−.25 0 .2 0 .3−.3 −.40 .1 0 .1 .3−.2 −.6.25 0 0 .1 .3−.2 −.8.50 .2 0 .3 .3 0 −.8.75 0 0 .3 .3 0 −.81.00 .4 0 .7 .3 .4 −.41.25 0 0 .7 .3 .4 01.50 0 .4 .7 .7 0 01.75 0 0 .7 .7 0 02.00 .2 0 .9 .7 .2 .22.25 0 0 .9 .7 .2 .42.50 0 0 .9 .7 .2 .62.75 0 0 .9 .7 .2 .83.00 .1 .2 1.0 .9 .1 .9 3.25 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 1.0 3.50 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 1.13.75 0 0 1.0 .9 .1 1.24.00 0 .1 1.0 1.0 0 1.21.0 1.0Because Σ (F − G) is not always the same sign for every return, there is no second order stochastic dominance in this case.Payoff Prob (A) Prob (B) F (A) G (B) G (B) − F(A)$1 0 .3 0 .3 .3$2 .5 .1 .5 .4 −.1$3 .5 .31.0 .7 −.3$4 0 .31.0 1.0 01.0 1.0E(A) = $2.50, var(A) = $.25 squaredE(B) = $2.60, var(B) = $1.44 squaredThe cumulative probability distributions cross, and there is no first order dominance.(c) False. A risk neutral investor has a linear utility function; hence he will always choose the set ofreturns which has the highest mean.(d) True. Utility functions which have positive marginal utility and risk aversion are concave. Secondorder stochastic dominance is equivalent to maximizing expected utility for risk averse investors.16. From the point of view of shareholders, their payoffs areProject 1 Project 2Probability Payoff Probability Payoff.2 0 .4 0.6 0 .2 0.2 0 .4 2,000Using either first order or second order stochastic dominance, Project 2 clearly dominatesProject 1.If there were not limited liability, shareholder payoffs would be the following:Project 1 Project 2Probability Payoff Probability Payoff.2 −4000 .4 −8000.6 −3000 .2 −3000.2 −2000 .4 2,000In this case shareholders would be obligated to make debt payments from their personal wealthwhen corporate funds are inadequate, and project 2 is no longer stochastically dominant.17. (a) The first widow is assumed to maximize expected utility, but her tastes for risk are not clear.Hence, first order stochastic dominance is the appropriate selection criterion.E(A) = 6.2 E(D) = 6.2E(B) = 6.0 E(E) = 6.2E(C) = 6.0 E(F) = 6.1One property of FSD is that E(X) > E(Y) if X is to dominate Y. Therefore, the only trusts which might be inferior by FSD are B, C, and F. The second property of FSD is a cumulative probability F(X) that never crosses but is at least sometimes to the right of G(Y). As Figure S3.9 shows, A >C andD > F, so the feasible set of trusts for investment is A, B, D, E.Figure S3.9 First order stochastic dominance(b) The second widow is clearly risk averse, so second order stochastic dominance is the appropriateselection criterion. Since C and F are eliminated by FSD, they are also inferior by SSD. The pairwise comparisons of the remaining four funds, Σ(F(X) − G(Y)) are presented in Table S3.6 on the following page and graphed in Figure S3.10. If the sum of cumulative differences crosses the horizontal axis, as in the comparison of B and D, there is no second order stochastic dominance. By SSD, E > A, E > B, and E > D, so the optimal investment is E.Table S3.6 Second Order Stochastic DominanceRet. P(A)* P(B) P(D) P(E) SSD**(BA)SSD(DA)SSD(EA)SSD(DB)SSD(EB)SSD(ED)−2 −.1 −.1−1 0 .1 .2 0 .2 .2 0 0 −.2 −.20 0 .2 .2 0 .4 .4 0 0 −.4 −.41 0 .3 .2 0 .7 .6 0 −.1 −.7 −.62 0 .3 .4 0 1.0 1.0 0 0 −1.0 −1.03 0 .4 .4 0 1.4 1.4 0 0 −1.4 −1.44 0 .5 .4 0 1.9 1.8 0 −.1 −1.9 −1.85 .4 .5 .4 .4 2.0 1.8 0 −.2 −2.0 −1.86 .6 .5 .5 .4 1.9 1.7 −.2 −.2 −2.1 −1.97 .8 .5 .6 1.0 1.6 1.5 0 −.1 −1.6 −1.58 1.0 .6 .6 1.0 1.2 1.1 0 −.1 −1.2 −1.19 1.0 .6 .7 1.0 .8 .8 0 0 −.8 −.810 1.0 .7 .8 1.0 .5 .6 0 .1 −.5 −.611 1.0 .8 .8 1.0 .3 .4 0 .1 −.3 −.412 1.0 .9 .8 1.0 .2 .2 0 0 −.2 −.213 1.0 1.0 .8 1.0 .2 0 0 −.2 −.2 014 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 .2 0 0 −.2 −.2 0A >B A > D A < E no2ndorderdominance B < ED< E** SSD calculated according to Σ (F(X) − G(Y)) where F(X) = cumulative probability of X and G(Y) = cumulative probability of Y.18. (a) Mean-variance ranking may not be appropriate because we do not know that the trust returns havea two-parameter distribution (e.g., normal).To dominate Y, X must have higher or equal mean and lower variance than Y, or higher mean and lower or equal variance. Means and variances of the six portfolios are shown in Table S3.7. Bymean-variance criteria, E > A, B, C, D, F and A > B, C, D, F. The next in rank cannot bedetermined. D has the highest mean of the four remaining trusts, but also the highest variance. The only other unambiguous dominance is C > B.Figure S3.10 Second order stochastic dominanceTable S3.7E(X) var(X)B 6.0 26.80C 6.0 2.00D 6.2 28.36E 6.2 0.96F 6.1 26.89(b) Mean-variance ranking and SSD both select trust E as optimal. However, the rankings ofsuboptimal portfolios are not consistent across the two selection procedures.Optimal Dominance R elationshipsFSD A, B, D, E A > C, D > FSSD E A > B, A > DM-V E A > B, C, D, F; C > B。
Finance and Non-Banking Finance
Finance and non-banking finance are two critical components of the global financial system. Both play a vital role in supportingeconomic growth and development, but they operate in different ways and serve different purposes.Finance, in general, refers to the management of money and other assets. It encompasses a wide range of activities, including banking, investing, lending, and managing financial risk. The financeindustry is comprised of various institutions such as banks,investment firms, insurance companies, and asset management companies. These institutions provide a wide range of financial services to individuals, businesses, and governments, including lending, credit, investment, and risk management.Non-banking finance, on the other hand, refers to financialactivities that are conducted outside the traditional banking system. This includes a diverse array of financial services and productssuch as microfinance, leasing, factoring, venture capital, andprivate equity. Non-banking finance institutions (NBFIs) areentities that provide these services, and they play a crucial rolein extending financial services to underserved segments of the population and in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).Both finance and non-banking finance are essential for thefunctioning of the economy. Traditional banking institutions provide a wide range of services such as deposit-taking, lending, andpayment processing, which are essential for the smooth functioningof the economy. Non-banking finance institutions, on the other hand, play a critical role in providing alternative sources of funding and financial services to individuals and businesses that may not have access to traditional banking services.The relationship between finance and non-banking finance is complementary, as both sectors work together to meet the diverse financial needs of individuals and businesses. For example, while banks may provide traditional loans to large corporations, non-banking finance institutions may offer alternative financing options such as venture capital or leasing to support the growth of smalland medium-sized enterprises.In conclusion, finance and non-banking finance are two essentialpillars of the global financial system. While traditional banking institutions play a crucial role in providing essential financial services, non-banking finance institutions complement their services by offering alternative sources of funding and financial products to underserved segments of the population and to support the growth of SMEs. Together, these two sectors work in tandem to support economic growth and development.。
Finance and Central Banking
Finance and central banking play a crucial role in the stability and functioning of a country's economy. Central banks are responsiblefor managing a nation's monetary policy, regulating the banking system, and controlling the supply of money and credit in the economy. They also act as the lender of last resort, providing liquidity to financial institutions in times of crisis.One of the primary objectives of central banking is to maintainprice stability, which means keeping inflation in check. Byadjusting interest rates and implementing other monetary tools, central banks aim to keep inflation at a target level to ensure the purchasing power of the currency remains stable.In addition to managing inflation, central banks also focus on promoting economic growth and employment. They do so by influencing interest rates to stimulate or cool down economic activity, and by providing a stable financial environment for businesses and consumers to make investment and spending decisions.Central banks also play a critical role in regulating the banking system. They set reserve requirements, conduct bank examinations, and supervise financial institutions to ensure they operate in asafe and sound manner. This oversight helps to maintain stability in the financial system and protect against systemic risks.Furthermore, central banks are responsible for maintaining the stability of the financial markets. They provide liquidity to the banking system, act as a lender of last resort, and conduct open market operations to manage the supply of money and credit in the economy. These actions help to prevent financial crises and maintain the smooth functioning of the financial system.Overall, finance and central banking are integral to the overall health and stability of an economy. Through their monetary policy decisions, regulatory oversight, and crisis management functions, central banks have a significant impact on the financial well-being of a nation. As such, understanding the role of central banking and its interactions with the broader financial system is crucial for policymakers, economists, and the public alike.。
国际金融(双语)复习大纲
国际金融(双语)复习大纲(一)论述、简答、计算题:1、What is the current account balance ofFrance when the French budget surplus is 348million Euros, private saving is 256 million Euros, domestic capital formation is 134 millionEuros?解答:National saving = private saving + government saving = 256+348=604 millionCurrent account balance = national saving –domestic real investment = 604-134=470 million附:Current account balance(CA)=net foreign investment(If)National saving(S)=domestic real investment(Id)+net foreign investment(If)If=CA=S-Id , CA=Y(domestic production of goods and services)-E(total expenditures on goods and services)2、Which of the following transactions couldcontribute to a British current account surplus?Explain whya French firm sells defense equipment to the British government for 250 million pounds in bank depositsb Great Britain makes a gift of $500 million to the Iraqi government to aid in reconstruction.c The United States borrows 200 million pounds on a short-term basis from the British government to buy 200 million pounds in textiles from Great Britain.C:merchandise exports——current account surplusA:merchandise imports——current account deficitB:unilateral transfer——current account deficit3、You are provided with the following information about a country’s international transactionsduring a given year:Service exports $346 Service imports $354Merchandise exports $480Merchandise imports $348Income flows, net $153Unilateral transfers, net $142Increase in the country’s holding of foreign assets, net(excluding official reserves assets)$352Increase in forei gn holdings of the country’s assets, net(excluding official reserve assets)$252Statistical discrepancy, net $154a.Calculate the official settlements balanceand the current account balance.b.Is the country increasing or decreasing itsnet holdings of official reserve assets?Why?A: Current account balance=net credits –net debits on(the flow of goods ,services ,income and unilateral transfer)=(346—354)+(480—348)+153—142 = 135Financial account balance= foreign holdings of the country’s assets –the country’s holding of foreign assets =—352 + 252 = —100So, official settlement balance(B)=CA balance + financial account balance= 135 —100=35B: Current account balance = 132—8+153—142=135B = CA + FA = 135 + (—100)= 35B + OR + Statistical discrepancy = 0OR = —189Increase in net holdings of official reserve assetDebit (-) Credit(+)BalanceGoods 348 480 132 Services 354 346 -8 Income 153 Unilateral 142 -142transfer352 252 -100 PrivatecapitalflowsOR 189 -189 Statistical154 discrepancy4、For each case below, state whether the eurohas appreciated or depreciated and give an example of an event that could cause the change in the exchange rate.a.The spot rate goes from 450euros/Mexican peso to 440 euros/Mexicanpeso.b.The spot rate goes from 0.011 Mexicanpesos/euro to 0.006 Mexican pesos/euro.c.The spot rate goes from 1.48 euros/Britishpound to 1.51 euros/British pound.d.The spot rate goes from 0.73 Britishpounds/euro to 0.75 British pounds/euro.A: indirect quotation, euro appreciatedB: direct quotation, euro depreciatedC: indirect quotation, euro depreciatedD: direct quotation, euro appreciated5、What are the two forms of interbank foreignexchange trading? Compare and contrast he similarities and differences of the two forms. Form 1 Interbank trading is conducted directly between the traders at different banks Form 2 Interbank trading are conducted through foreign exchange brokerSimilarities: Both are making the foreign exchange trades.Differences:①Form1,the traders know to whom they are quoting exchange rates for possible。
financialratios(accounting)
IntroductionFinancial statements obviously play an important role in a fundamental approach to security analysis. Among the items of potential interest to analysts are financial ratios relating key parts of the financial statement. Financial Ratio is a measure of the relationship which exists between two figures shown in a set of financial statements, which indicates performance and financial situation of a company. Financial ratios could assess the profit of investments during the different years, and it can be also used to analyze trends and to compare the firm’s financials to those of other firms. Thus, financial ratios could compare the benefits and risks of different companies, which help investors and creditors to make rational decision. Moreover, this can evaluate the finance condition, operating results and cash flows for a business as well. Financial ratios can be classified according to the information they provide. There are some types of ratios: Liquidity ratios, Profitability rations, Efficiency ratios and Gearing ratios. However, financial ratios relate to both benefits and limitations in evaluating the performance and management of firms. This assignment is going to analyzing the EasyJet plc annual report and accounts in 2003 to discuss the usefulness and limitations of financial ratios.The ratios analysis is one of the most powerful tools of financial management. It can be computed from any pair of numbers. Given the large quantity of variables included in financial statements, a very long list of meaningful ratios can be derived. A standard list of ratios or standard computation of them does not exist. Financial ratios are used by bankers, investors, and business analysts to assess a company’s financial status. Financial ratio analysis can be used in two different but equally useful ways. Business can use them to examine the current performance of your company in comparison to past periods of time, from the prior quarter two years ago. Frequently, this can help you identify problems that need fixing. Even better, it can direct company attention to potential problems that can be avoided.Financial ratio plays an important role in financial statements, so there are some benefits of financial ratios. First of all, most of the rations become much more meaningful when used as a basis for comparison, which make a company very easy to compare firms against each other. Besides, it also makes possible comparison of the performance of different divisions of the business. Secondly, financial ratio provides information for inter-firm comparison. It highlights the factors associated with successful and unsuccessful firm, and it also reveal strong firms and weak firms, overvalued and undervalued firms. There are no firm has all the strength points, but ratio analysis can create co-ordination between strength points and weak points. Thirdly, it simplifies the comprehension of financial statements, which is able to illustrate the financial condition of a company by the number. For example, a company’s gross profit in 2011 is 25.3% and in 2012, it is 27.5%. According to this ratio, people can understand whether their company is growing or falling. In addition, financial ratio helps in planning and forecasting as well. This means it could be used to assess the risk factor involved for an investor and predict the bankruptcy of acompany. Thus, financial ratio is an early warning system for businesses that are heading into financial distress.Although ratio analysis is an extremely useful and powerful tool for the analysis and interpretation of financial statements, but it still has some limitations. Firstly, there are no two companies are exactly the same. This means many large firms operate different divisions in different industries, so it is difficult to find a meaningful set of industry –average ratios. Additionally, inflation might be damage of balance sheets of a company, which will be affected profits of a company as well. After that, small companies tend to pay more debt than large companies, and this will affect the interest coverage ratio formula as a way needs to be explained. Moreover, ratio analysis explains relationships between past information while users are more concerned about current and future information. Therefore, it is only the reference value for the future decision making. What is more, some accounting ratios might be defined in more than one way. This means, different companies may choose different accounting procedure, and each operators have different calculation methods that lead to different interpretations of data. It is very important that users should be aware of this problem when basing important economic decisions on information provided in the form of ratio analysis. Furthermore, a statement of financial position shows only a snapshot of a company’s financial position on a single date, whilst a statement of comprehensive income covers an entire accounting period. Therefore, if the company’s assets and liabilities end of the period are not typical of the period as a whole, any ratio which combines a figure drawn from the statement of financial position with a figure drawn from the statement of comprehensive income might produce a misleading result. Last but not least, financial ratio just able to show the data of company to the analysts or managers, but it cannot explain the problems and deal with them.EasyJet is a British airline carrier based at London Luton Airport. This is helpful to take a look at what information is obvious from the financial statement. There is some information to interpretation of the ratios, which from the EasyJet plc annual report and accounts in 2013. On the one hand, the non-current assets increased by about 26% (from 2191 pounds to 2964 pounds) between 2009 and 2013. This may be due to the fact that the company invested in some property, such as plane, airline, staffs and so on. Moreover, the number of revenue keep grew up between the 2009 and 2013. Companies use selling products or providing services to achieve the revenue, so the high revenue means the increase of assts or decrease of liabilities in a company. At the same time,there was a significantly increased in the number of profit during the 5 years, which were from 71million pounds in 2009 to 398 million pounds in 2013. Obviously, this means EasyJet Company getting better continually during the year. Return on capital employed is an important ratio expresses a company’s profit as a percentage of the amount of capital invested in the company. This version of ROCE interprets “capital employed”as the total amount of money in the long-term, regardless of whether that money has been supplied by shareholders or lenders. This amount is then compared with the return achieved on that capital. According to theinformation from the EasyJet report, there was a remarkable jumped in the number of the return on capital employed from 3.6% to 17.4% during the five years. Generally, the higher the rate of return on capital employed of the company has more growth in the future.Financial information can be “massaged” in several ways to the figures used for ratios more attractive. For example, many businesses delay payments to trade creditors at the end of the financial year to make the cash balance higher than normal and the creditor days figure higher too.these ratios to compare the performance of the company against that of competitors or other members of same industry Performing a ratio analysis on a single set of financial statements is usually a fairly pointless exercise. For example, if the company's inventory turnover ratio of 1 to 4 this year when it was 1 to 3 last year, this means that inventory levels are building in the current year. The increase in the ratio is an indication that sales are slowing or that inventory levels (which are expensive to maintain) are growing. The ratio change alerts the business manager to a pending cash crunch in time to avert it.If you are evaluating two businesses to hire as subcontractors, their respective debt-to-asset ratios will give you an idea about which of these two companies is the more stable choice. The company with a higher debt-to-asset ratio could be more likely to go out of business as a result of defaulting on interest and principal repayments. However, if your primary objective is investing in a business, and you are seeking high returns, the company with the higher ratio may be a better bet. Firms that borrow heavily are high-risk, high-return investments and tend to do either very well or fail spectacularlyA company can burn through its cash reserves quickly during tough economic times or industry contraction. Financial ratios can operate as an early warning system for businesses that are heading into financial distress. Ratios such as the quick ratio (how much money will there be to pay current debts?), gross margin (how much is the company making on every widget it sells?), and accounts receivable ratio (how quickly are sales being paid for?) tell the company's owners if the money is going to run out and how quickly. The sooner the cash flow problem is identified, the sooner it can be corrected.. The liquidity and non-bank credit ratio are used for assessing the companies going through a hard time. The non-bank ratio is used by a firm where the firm cannot afford to get more credit from banks. This ratio means the greater risk as if the company cannot repay the loan to the bank, it may be charge a higher interest. Therefore, good financial ratio analysing can help business to avoid unnecessary risks.The positive use of financial ratios has been of two types: by accountants and analysts to forecast future financial variables.。
在欧洲银行业的国际财务报告准则的价值相关性【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文The value relevance of IFRS in the European banking industry Material Source: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Online Firs t™, 20 June 2010Author: Mariarosaria Agostino·Danilo Drago·Damiano B. SilipoAbstractThe main purpose of the paper is to investigate the market valuation of accounting information in the European banking industry before and after the adoption of IFRS, the latest version of International Accounting Standards. In a value relevance framework, we apply panel methods to a multiplicative interaction model, in which the partial effects of earnings and book value on share prices are conditional on the adoption of IFRS. According to our evidence, the IFRS introduction enhanced the information content of both earnings and book value for more transparent banks. By contrast, less transparent entities did not experience significant increase in the value relevance of book value.1 IntroductionWe investigate whether the value relevance increased after the adoption of IAS/IFRS by listed banks in Europe. Using a standard value-relevance model, we examine the value relevance of earnings and book value for 221 listed banks from 2000 to 2006.A number of papers have studied the value relevance of IAS/IFRS, sampling companies that complied with international standards voluntarily. The literature shows that voluntary movement towards international accounting harmonization has varied with developments in local and international accounting regulations, indicating a certain degree of opportunism on the part of management (e.g., Stolowy and Ding 2003; Kao 2007), so these findings may be affected by selection bias. Our analysis, by contrast, considers the impact of mandatory introduction of IAS/IFRS.We use panel rather than cross-section data, the latter used in most of the value-relevance literature. Indeed, notwithstanding harmonization, most of the political and economic factors influencing financial reporting practices remain localand differentiated(Ball 2006). With panel data, combined to country-level clusterization, we can control for individual and country characteristics that may be unobservable or hard to measure, such as legal systems, financial systems, or alignment between tax and financial reporting, and that differ across our sample.On the whole, our empirical results provide clear evidence that the impact of accounting earnings on the price of bank stocks increased following the compulsory introduction of IFRS. On the other hand, in most estimations, no significant influence of book value on the stock price was found.2 Related literatureA number of studies compare the value relevance of IAS, US-GAAP and local GAAP in other countries.Most are based on the model of Ohlson (1995) and subsequent refinements,which represents the value of the firm as a linear function of the book value of equity and the current value of any expected abnormal earnings (extra profit).3 Value relevance is estimated by the degree of explanatory power of the model. Barth et al. (2006), on a sample of 428 firms applying IAS from 1990 to 2004, found that the accounting quality of IAS is lower than US GAAP but higher than other domestic GAAP. Finally, introducing IAS reduces the difference in accounting quality between the IAS and US firms. By contrast,Harris and Muller (1999), based on a sample of 31 IAS firms cross-listed on US markets over the period 1992–1996, found limited evidence that reconciliation with US-GAAP,even in respect of IAS, provides relevant information to the market.Another way of appraising the relative performance of IAS and US GAAP is suggested by Leuz (2003) and Bartov et al. (2005). These authors compare the value relevance for German companies traded on German stock exchanges before and after their switch from German accounting rules to either US GAAP or IAS. Leuz measures information asymmetry for firms on Germany’s New Market, finding little evidence in bid/ask spreads or trading volume of differing value relevance of the switch to US GAAPS compared with a switch to IAS. Bartov et al. (2005) gets similar results by comparing value relevance measured as the slope coefficient of the returns/earnings regression. Ashbaugh and Olsson (2002) examine non-US firms listed on London’s SEAQ and find that IAS and US GAAP earnings and book values of equity are equally value-relevant, but that the degree of value relevance depends on the valuation model used.The qualitative results for the banking sector are similar. Barth et al. (1996) offer evidence that fair value estimates of loans, securities and long-term debt in theUnited States under SFAS 107 have significant explanatory power with respect to the prices of bank stocks, greater than that of book values. But Nissim (2003) raises doubts about the reliability of banks fair value disclosures for loans and Eccher et al. (1996) and Nelson (1996) found that the value relevance of SFAS 107 disclosures for bank shares have no incremental explanatory power, except in respect of investment securities. Park et al. (1999) also found evidence of value relevance for fair value accounting of investment securities.Barth et al. (2008) consider three indicators of accounting quality: earnings management, prompt loss recognition and value relevance; they posit that accounting quality is higher when earnings management is less, loss recognition prompter and the value relevance of the amounts entered greater. And in fact according to their estimations following the adoption of IAS firms display less earnings management, more timely loss recognition,and greater value relevance of the accounting amounts. That is, their results sustain the thesis that international standards produce better accounting quality than local GAAP outside the US.To date, however, there has very few papers on the value relevance of IFRS as endorsed by the European Union. Among them, Morais and Curto (2007), which lends support to the thesis that the value relevance of European list ed firms’ accounting amounts increased with adoption of IFRS. They also found that the impact of the adoption of the international standards is greater in civil code than in common law countries. However, their data include the period 2000–2005 and do not distinguish between voluntary and compulsory adoption. By contrast, Daske et al. (2008) in a very recent paper deal with voluntary and compulsory adoption of IFRS. They provide an extensive analysis of the early effects of mandatory adoption of IAS around the world. Among other things, they proved that there are modest but economically significant capital-market benefits around the introduction of mandatory IAS reporting. But these benefits are more pronounced for firms that voluntarily switched to IFRS before the mandatory adoption. However, capital-market benefits occur only in countries with relatively strict enforcement regimes and in countries where the institutional environment provides strong incentives to firms to be transparent. In the other adopting countries market liquidity and the cost of capital remain largely unchanged around the mandate. With respect to the previous work our paper focuses on a different issue (the value-relevance of the compulsory adoption of IFRS), and considers a more homogeneous context with respect to the institutional, environmental and firms’ characteristics.3 Empirical questions and methodologyThe conventional wisdom, corroborated by some empirical studies (see, for instance Barth,et al. 2006, 2008), has it that replacing local GAAP with IAS/IFRS should improve the quality of accounting amounts. Here we test this prediction on European listed banks, for which IFRS became mandatory in 2005. Using data from 2000 to 2006, we investigate whether the new standards are in fact more value-relevant by estimating a panel valuation model to see whether the value-relevance of accounting information changed.Formally, building on the well-known Ohlson (1995) framework, we estimate the following model:t it t it it it postIAS BVPS postIAS EPS BVPS P ⨯++++=43210αααααit t it dT postIAS EPS εα++⨯+5where it P is the stock price 6 months after the end of the fiscal year, it BVPS is per-share book value, it EPS is earnings per share, and postIAS is a dummy coded 1 when IFRS become mandatory, namely for the years 2005 and 2006, and 0 otherwise. Previous studies using the same dependent variable are Barth et al. (2008, 2006). As a robustness check,however, we also employ the price of the stock 3 months after the end of the year (see Sect. 5). Finally, the T variable is a trend, and it i it μνε+= is a composite error, in which the individual effect (i ν) summarizes unobserved time-invariant bank characteristics and the second term (it μ) captures idiosyncratic shocks to market value. The reason for disaggregating this error term is that this enables us to control properly for unobserved heterogeneity of banks, factoring out a different fixed effect for each one.4 DataOur sample includes banks whose shares are traded on a stock exchange in one of the EU-15 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom). Information on share prices, book value and earnings are drawn from Bankscope –Bureau van Djik. In our sample, earnings are never negative.After adjusting for data availability for different variables, we have a final sample of 1,201 annual observations for 221 European listed banks. The panel is unbalanced and spans the years 2000–2006. Table 2 arranges the banks by nationality. Denmark, Italy,France, Germany and Britain have the most banks in the sample, Luxembourg the fewest.5 Results5.1 Unbalanced panel estimates5.2 Balanced panel estimates5.3 Segmentations by capitalization, legal form, and rating5.4 Further robustness checks6 Concluding remarksOur intention was to determine whether the mandatory application of IFRS increased the value relevance of accounting information to the prices of bank shares in the European Union. As we expected, the marginal effect (value relevance) of earnings increased for the entire sample. This result is robust to different specifications of the model and to different samples. The largest incremental effect was in Germany and Italy, the smallest in the United Kingdom. This is consistent with the accepted view that IAS/IFRS requires more disclosure than local regulations in the Continental European countries.For equity book value, our results are less clear-cut. The results for the unbalanced panel indicate that the marginal effect of this variable is negative in the years following the introduction of the new standards. However, they are not robust to different specifications.For the balanced panel (banks reporting data in all the sample years) the marginal effect of book value is never significant in the post-adoption period.Generally speaking, it may be not surprising that book value is less value-relevant. Empirical work (Collins et al. 1999) suggests that this variable is more important when current earnings do not provide a good proxy for future earnings or when there is a heightened increased danger of bankruptcy or abandonment. However, these conditions do not apply to our sample banks, which realized positive and relatively stable profits over the survey period.In fact, the pattern differs considerably between small and large banks, and between rated and non-rated banks. For the smaller (and the non-rated) institutions, the impact of earnings increases while that of book value tends to decrease and become statistically insignificant. For the larger (and the rated) banks, the coefficients of both earnings and book value increase after 2005, and both variables exert a positive and significant marginal effect on share prices. These results suggest that the overall result on book value may reflect the weight of less transparent banks, which do not appear to have overcome their problems of opaqueness, even after the introduction of the new international accounting standards.It is also possible that small and non-rated banks are more opaque because theyare owned by shareholders operating in local markets. To inquire into this question, we split the sample according to legal form, i.e. into cooperative banks and public limited companies. Cooperative banks have closer and longer-term relationships with their member-customers (owners). Therefore, they do not need great transparency. The results for the cooperative banks confirm those for the entire sample. By contrast, for the banks organized as public limited companies, the book value continues to have a positive, though decreasing, impact on the share price even after the adoption of IFRS.Summing up according to our evidence, the introduction of the new accounting standards seems to have enhanced the information content of both earnings and book value for more transparent intermediaries. Less transparent entities, by contrast, seem not to have experienced significant increase in the value relevance of book value. Possible explanations for this phenomenon may provide interesting avenues for future research.译文在欧洲银行业的国际财务报告准则的价值相关性资料来源: 审查财务和会计计量,在线第一™,2010年6月20日作者:Mariarosaria Agostino·Danilo Drago·Damiano B. Silipo摘要本文的主要目的是探讨欧洲银行业之前和之后的国际财务报告准则,国际会计标准的最新版本采用了会计信息的市场价值。
金融借贷杠杆中英文对照外文翻译文献
金融借贷杠杆中英文对照外文翻译文献金融借贷杠杆中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)翻译:财务报表分析的杠杆左右以及如何体现盈利性和值比率摘要:本文提供了区分金融活动和业务运营中杠杆作用的财务报表分析。
这些分析得出了两个杠杆作用等式。
一个用于金融业务中的借贷,一个用于运营过程的借贷。
这些等式描述了两种杠杆效应如何影响股本收益率。
实证分析表明,财务报表分析解释了当前和未来的回报率以及股价与账面价值比率具有代表性的差异。
因此文章得出如下结论,资产负债表项目的运营负债定价不同于融资负债。
因此,财务报表的分析能够区分两种类型的负债对未来盈利能力和提升适当地股价与账面价值比率的影响。
关键词:财政杠杆;运营债务杠杆;股本回报率;值比率。
传统观点认为,杠杆效应是从金融活动中产生的:公司通过借贷来增加运营的资金。
本文表明,在分析企业盈利和价值中,有两种相关杠杆起作用,一个的确是从金融活动产生的,另一种是是从运营过程中产生的。
本文提供了两种类型杠杆的财务分析报表来解释股东盈利能力和价格与账面比率的差异。
杠杆作用的衡量标准是负债总额与股东权益。
然而,一些负债——如银行贷款和发行的债券,是由于资金筹措,其他一些负债——如贸易应付账款,预收收入和退休金负债,是由于在运营过程中与供应商的贸易,与顾客和雇佣者在结算过程中产生的负债。
融资负债通常交易运作良好的资本市场其中的发行者是随行就市的商人。
与此相反,在运营中公司能够实现高增值。
因为业务涉及的是与资本市场相比,不太完善的贸易的输入和输出的市场。
因此,考虑到股票估值,运营负债和融资负债的区别的产生有一些先验的原因。
我们研究在资产负债表上,运营负债中的一美元是否与融资中的一美元等值这个问题。
因为运营负债和融资负债是股票价值的组成部分,这个问题就相当于问是否股价与账面价值比率是否取决于账面净值的组成。
价格与账面比率是由预期回报率的账面价值决定的。
所以,如果部分的账面价值要求不同的溢价,他们必须显示出不同的账面价值的预期回报率。
Finance and Central Bank Digital Currencies
Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are becoming an increasingly hot topic in the world of finance. As technology continues to advance, many central banks are exploring the possibility ofcreating their own digital currencies as a way to modernize the financial system and provide a more efficient means of transacting.CBDCs are digital forms of a country's fiat currency that are issued and regulated by the central bank. Unlike cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, CBDCs are not decentralized and are fully backed by the central bank, making them a more stable and reliable form of digital currency.One of the key reasons why central banks are considering theissuance of CBDCs is to adapt to the changing landscape of payments and finance. As digital payments and online transactions become more prevalent, central banks are recognizing the need to provide asecure and efficient digital alternative to cash. CBDCs could potentially streamline payment processes, reduce transaction costs, and provide greater financial inclusion for those who may not have access to traditional banking services.From a regulatory perspective, CBDCs could also provide centralbanks with greater control over the money supply and enable more effective implementation of monetary policy. By having a digitalform of currency, central banks could have more transparency and oversight of financial transactions, which could help combat illicit activities such as money laundering and tax evasion.However, the introduction of CBDCs also raises several important questions and challenges. Privacy and data security are significant concerns, as the widespread use of digital currencies couldpotentially expose individuals to privacy breaches and cyber threats. Additionally, the impact of CBDCs on the existing financial systemand commercial banks needs to be carefully considered, as the widespread adoption of CBDCs could potentially disrupt thetraditional banking sector.Overall, the introduction of central bank digital currencies has the potential to significantly impact the future of finance. As central banks continue to evaluate the feasibility and implications of CBDCs, it's crucial to carefully assess the benefits and risks associated with these digital currencies to ensure a smooth and successful transition to the digital era of finance.。
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Co-ordination between banks and financial institutionsBP. BC. 82 /21.04.048/00-01February 26, 2001All Commercial Banks(excluding RRBs and LABs)Dear SirsCo-ordination between banks and financial institutionsIn the context of transition of the banks and the all-India financial institutions (FIs) from a regulated to a deregulated regime, the issue of more effective co-ordination among the banks and the FIs has been engaging the attention of the financial institutions, banks and Reserve Bank for sometime past, particularly in respect of large value projects jointly financed by the banks and the FIs, with a view to avoiding delays and facilitate better solutions to the common problems. In this regard, informal meetings of the Heads of select banks and the FIs, including the Chairman, IBA, were convened by the Governor to identify and deliberate upon the issues of common interest to the banks and the FIs. The following seven issues emerged at the meetings:a.Timeframe for sanction of facilities;b.Asset classification across consortium members;c.Disciplining borrowers – change in management;d.Levy of charges in the problem accounts;e.Group approach for borrowers;f.Sharing of securities and cash flows; andg.Treatment of restructured accounts for the asset classificationpurposes.An Informal Note indicating the consensus arrived at the aforesaid meetings on the first six issues was forwarded to the CMD, IDBI, for circulation/discussion among the participants of the meeting, with a view to evolving a consensus which should serve as the Ground Rules on the said six issues. We forward herewith a copy of the minutes of the meeting of the select banks and financial institutions convened by IDBI on 24 January 2001, indicating the Ground Rules agreed to by the participants on the aforesaid six issues. A copy of the Informal Note forwarded by us to IDBI in the matter is also enclosed for yourinformation.2. We shall, therefore, be glad if you will please place the minutes indicating the agreed Ground Rules before the Board of Directors of your bank for adoption and ensure implementation thereof thereafter except item at (b) viz. "asset classification across consortium members" (para 2 of the minutes of the meeting held on January 24, 2001) in respect of which banks will continue to follow the current instructions. As these Ground Rules have been arrived at after intensive consultation and discussions among banks/FIs and represent a consensus which is in the interest of all thebanks/institutions and the economy, it will be appreciated if the Rules are implemented in letter and spirit at different levels of management.3. As regards the issue relating to the ‘regulatory treatment of restructured accounts for the purpose of asset classification’, the matter is under our examination and the instructions would be conveyed shortly.4. Please acknowledge receipt.Yours faithfully(M. R. Srinivasan)Chief General Manager-in-ChargeEncls: As aboveInformal note for discussion on "Co-ordination issues betweenbanks and FIs"1. IntroductionThe level of NPAs in the Indian Financial System which has recorded an up-ward trend in the recent past has been an area of concern among the lenders as well as for the supervisors and the Government. As on 31st March 2000 the NPAs for the Indian Banking System aggregated Rs.60,841 crore # # and those for the select all-India FIs it stood at Rs. 18,146.00 crore # #. In this context, a view has been expressed that at least a part of the reason for phenomenal rise in NPAs has been a lack of the requisite co-ordination between the banks and FIs particularly where they are joint financiers of large value projects. (It is recognised in this regard that pursuant to therecommendations of the Working Group on Harmonizing the role and operations of DFIs and Banks [Chairman Shri S.H. Khan], a Standing Co-ordination Committee has become operational since October 1999 under the aegis of IDBI and select FIs and banks are represented on the Committee ). Such jointly financed projects also give rise to certain operational issues which, it is felt, can be better addressed through a more effective and closer co-ordination between the two sets of lenders viz., the banks and the FIs.In this background, the Governor, Reserve Bank of India, had taken two meetings of select FIs and banks, the latter one on 7 November 2000; the minutes of the meeting were sent to the participants on 24 November 2000. It was decided at the meeting that while the matter of treatment of restructured accounts for asset classification purposes would be examined by RBI as a regulator, on certain other issues of mutual interest to the FIs and banks, a draft "non paper" would be prepared to facilitate further discussion in the matter among the banks and the FIs. Accordingly, this paper seeks to raise the following issues for comments from the select banks and the FIs: ∙Delay in sanction of various credit facilities∙Asset classification across consortium members∙Disciplining borrowers - change in management∙Levy of charges in problem / restructured accounts∙Implementation of Group Approach for borrowers∙Sharing of securities and cash flows - Trust & Retention Account (TRA) mechanism2. Various aspects of each of the foregoing issues are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs in order to facilitate the formulation of "ground rules" or a code of conduct by banks / institutions.(a) Delay in sanction of various credit facilitiesOne of the reasons for the mounting NPAs in the Indian financial sector is stated to be the inordinate delays in sanctioning credit facilities, particularly, under project financing,where substantial quantum of cost overrun needs to be financed by the members of the consortium in respect of "last mile" projects or in other cases involving restructuring or rehabilitation of accounts. The delay arises generally on account of lack of co-ordination and consensus among lenders on financing the amount of cost overrun or restructuring or rehabilitation. At times the delays also arise for wantof commitment for working capital facilities from the bankers though the term lending for the project might have been fully tied up. This in turn delays the operationalisation of the project.The issues raised in this regard are : (a) the introduction of the concept of super majority whose decision should be binding on all the members of the consortium, and (b) the time frame within which the entire credit processing for new as well as the existing projects including overrun financing should be completed. The various ramifications of these issues are discussed below.A view has been expressed that to obviate delay in financing, the decision should be taken as per the "super majority" of lenders that should be binding on all the members of the consortium. Super majority in such cases is suggested to be the secured creditors with more than 70 per cent share in total lending. It is also suggested that inter creditor agreement might also be necessary in such cases to make the super majority decision legally binding on all the members.A contrary view has also been expressed that the concept of "super-majority" should not be imposed on the dissenting minority in the consortium since in project financing the banks, as working capital providers, would always be in minority and, therefore, would not be able to safeguard their interests. Further, it was suggested that in case of overrun financing, the share of the dissenting minority should be frozen at the existing levels and any further contribution required from the minority in the overrun financing, should be contributed by the majority itself. As a variation to this view, it was suggested that in consortia where a single lender holds more than 30 per cent share of the total lending, the decision by a simple majority comprising 51% share in total lending, should suffice and should be treated as binding on all the members of the consortium.On examining the above views, the following approach may be appropriate:a.As regards the time-frame for sanction of facilities, it is felt thatin the case of accounts where only two lenders are involved, any issues relating to sanction of facilities should be expeditiouslyresolved by mutual discussions between them.b.In case where more than two lenders were involved, theiragreement or disagreement for sanction of facilities must beconveyed within a maximum period of 90 days from the date of receiving loan applications, complete in all respects.c.In case of fresh loan proposals involving more than two lenders,the sanction or rejection should be conveyed within a period of two months from the date of the appraisal note by the lenders which had initially agreed in-principle to participate in thefinancing.d.In case of accounts involving restructuring, the lead institutionsshould complete the restructuring process within three months while the other participating lenders should convey theirdecision within two months from the date of receipt of appraisal note(b) Asset classification across consortium membersIn the days prior to the deregulation of the Indian financial system, the Reserve Bank had prescribed detailed guidelines for financing of borrowers under consortium arrangement. One of the prescriptions of those guidelines was that all the members should follow the asset classification of the leader of the consortium regardless of the performance of the account in their own respective books. However, with progressive deregulation and liberalisation of the banking sector and realising certain anomalies in the aforesaid dispensation, Reserve Bank stipulated that in consortium financing each lender could classify the asset according to the record of recovery in its own books regardless of asset classification in the books of the leader of the consortium. It is now contended that such liberalisation has given rise to certain unhealthy and unethical practices on the part of the borrowers.There were broadly two streams of thought regarding asset classification of consortium accounts. While one view is that uniform asset classification across all the members of the consortium should be reintroduced by Reserve Bank to pre-empt the possibility of the borrower playing one lender against the other, a counter-view is that the asset classification should continue to be lender- specific as at present and should not be guided by the classification of the lead lender. It is argued in this regard that such a system is necessarily to create the right incentives for the lenders for effective follow up and recovery and for rewarding the recovery efforts of the lenders by way of better asset classification. It is further averred that lender-specific classification is all the more necessary for reflecting true and fair picture of the asset quality in accordance with the performance of the account in the books of each of the lender rather than being distorted by imposition lead classification across all the lenders. Prima facie, there appears to be some merit in this line of argument.A practical difficulty in following the classification of the lead institution / super majority of lenders / lead and second lead institution is the likelihood of change in the asset classification by the auditors of the lead, etc., institution subsequent to such classification having been adopted by other members of the consortium. A suggestion, therefore, made in this context is to put in place a mechanism to ensure that where the lead classification is already adopted by the members of the consortium, the auditors of the lead institution do not subsequently effect a change in the asset classification since it creates a system-wide repurcussion for all the lenders. While this practical constraint is understood and recognised, it may not be feasible in practice to place an embargo on the auditors of the lead institution from changing the asset classification in the books of a lender as per their own best judgement.Majority view would seem to be in favour of continuing the existing dispensation of lender-specific asset classification of a consortium account.(c) Disciplining borrowers - change in managementA view has been expressed that the recalcitrant attitude of certain defaulting borrowers and their deliberate non-cooperation with the lenders for turning around the unit, have also significantly contributed to the burgeoning levels of NPAs in the system. In such circumstances, lenders are at times constrained to adopt the extreme measure of effecting a change in the management of borrowing unit with a view to inducing an element of credit discipline and improving the health and viability of the borrowing unit. Since changing the management of the borrowing unit is an extreme measure, to be adopted only exceptionally, a question arises as to what should be the specific criteria for resorting to the extreme remedy of changing the management of the defaulting borrowing unit.There is divergence in the views held in this regard. While some of the criteria suggested for the purpose are listed in the Annexure I, it has also been indicated that continuance of an account in the NPA category for a period of 18 months should be ground enough for effecting a change in the management of the unit. The modality suggested in this case is the invocation of the "convertibility clause" in the loan agreements and creation of a pool of professional managers for running the unit on behalf of the lenders after the change in the management is effected. Certain other criteria suggested for the purpose are diversion of funds, unapproved investments in theassociate firms, more than 50 per cent erosion in the networth and inability of the promoters to infuse fresh funds equal to losses of the unit. It has also suggested in the same breath that BIFR has outlived its utility and needs to be wound up since it has in effect become a shelter and resort for the sick units and wilful defaulters.As a variant of the aforesaid approach it has also been suggested that once an account becomes NPA, the promoters should be asked to pledge their entire stake (shareholding) in favour of the lender. The lenders thereafter should prescribe specific milestones to be achieved by the borrowers within the specified time frame. The progress in achieving the milestones should be closely monitored and if the promoters / borrowers are unable to comply with the prescribed benchmarks and time schedule, the lending institution should effect a change in the management of the borrowing unit on the strength of its majority shareholding in the borrowing company.Yet another view expressed in this regard is that the case-specific decision for change in management of a particular borrowing unit should be left to the discretion of the members of the consortium on a case to case basis and no uniform approach should be mandated for the purpose.As regards the concept of change in the management for disciplining the borrowers, it is pointed out that the success rate for banks in cases of change in management of the borrowing unit, has been very low and this approach, therefore, does not inspire much confidence as a solution to turning around sick / defaulting unit.Besides, it is also mentioned that the extant provisions of Banking Regulation Act do not permit the banks to have a majority stake in a company unlike the FIs, which are not subject to any such restriction. It is, therefore, indicated that if a change in management by the banks is to be a practicable option for turning around the sick units, necessary amendments to provisions of B. R. Act would be apre-requisite for the purpose.A reference is also made in this regard to the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act which do not provide any legal protection to the nominee directors nominated by the banks on the Boards of the borrowing companies whereas the nominee directors of FIs on the Board of borrowing companies do enjoy certain legal protection. This anomally too needs to be resolved before change in management ofunits could emerge as viable option.A related issue raised in this regard is whether while effecting any change in management of a company within a group, the change in the management of even the healthy units of the group should also be considered, especially if several units within the group are in the non-performing category.Furthermore, it is pointed out that mere change of management of the defaulting unit is not the solution to the underlying fundamental problems and hence, there is a need to provide for deterrent punishment to the wilful defaulters through appropriate statutory enactments.Reckoning the divergence of views in respect of uniform criteria for effecting change in management of defaulting unit, the practicable solution appears to be to follow the views of the majority of lenders in a consortium (say 70 per cent of total funded exposure), on a consortium-specific basis. It may also be worthwhile to effect the change in management in a few extreme cases expeditiously, which could create deterrent example for the borrowing community.(d) Levy of charges in problem accountsA view has been expressed that one of the reasons for high level of NPAs in the Indian financial system is the application of not only high rate of interest applicable at the time of sanction of loan but also levy of various other charges, such as, penal interest, overdue interest, liquidated damages, etc., at very high rates by the lenders. Such levies have resulted in inflating the amount of NPAs especially when viewed in the current low interest rate regime. A question, therefore, arises whether it would prudentially be desirable to evolve a ceiling on levy of such penal, etc., charges from the defaulters in respect of problem accounts so that the level of NPAs is not unduly distorted. Divergent views have been expressed in this regard. On the one hand it has been suggested that the concept of penal interest, liquidated damages, etc., should be dispensed with altogether as it has failed to serve the purpose of disciplining the borrowers. On the other hand a suggestion has also emanated from certain quarters for placing a ceiling of 18 per cent on all levies taken together as it is expected to adequately cover the cost of funds even in the erstwhile high interest rate regime.In another variant of the proposed ceiling it has been suggested thatinstead of prescribing an absolute ceiling on total charges, the ceiling on penal charges should be fixed at 2 to 3 per cent above the contracted rate of interest regardless of what the contracted rate was. It is also contended that reckoning very high rates at which various levies and charges have been debited to the borrowers in the past, if any concession is considered desirable for recovery of dues, it should be extended only as a part of overall restructuring / rehabilitation package and not otherwise. However, such concession should be extended subject to the right of recompense being reserved by the lenders. This suggestion is, however, countered by stating that the right to recompense clause has proved to be ineffective since BIFR and the borrowers have not agreed to such a clause and even though such a clause was included in the rehabilitation package, recoveries have not been possible.Reckoning divergent views and suggestions made in the matter, majority felt that while the consortium members should decide the rate of interest to be charged on such accounts, penal interest or other charges, if any, should not exceed two percentage points above the contracted rate.(e) Group approach for borrowersIt has been a common experience that within a borrower group, while some of the units might be facing difficulties and may be defaulters to the lenders, certain other units of the same Group might be quite healthy and prosperous. The issues have been raised whether in such a situation it would be feasible or desirable to grant additional credit facilities to the healthy units of the group with a condition that such facilities be used only for repaying the dues of the defaulting unit. It is contended in this context that even in cases where such possibilities might exist, there is a lack of requisite cooperation between the banks and FIs. Certain basic issues have also been raised in this regard regarding the definition of Group. It is contended before adopting a "group approach", a clarity in definition of "Group" was a pre-requisite which needed to be studied in depth by an expert group.The adoption of the group approach on the foregoing lines with a view to recovering the dues of the non-performing units by granting fresh facilities to the healthy units of the group has generally not been well received. It has been pointed out that such an approach would be neither legally tenable nor workable in practice besides amounting to a tacit approval for diversion of funds. Such an approach is alsocontended to be contrary to the principles of good corporate governance since it would not be in the interest of the minority shareholders of the healthy companies of the group and could also undermine the financials of such healthy units in the long run. Moreover, every company in a group being a separate legal entity, such a linkage in lending to the healthy units of a group, might not stand the legal scrutiny. As a counter argument, however, it has been mentioned that such an approach could possibly be considered in cases where non-performing unit had diverted the funds to the healthy units of the group and the non-performing unit was considered to be financially viable.On the other hand, a view has been expressed that, regardless of the legal tenability of the aforesaid approach, there should not be a blanket prohibition on adopting such a practice and the decision to adopt this approach, if found feasible in certain cases, should be left to the discretion and commercial judgement of the lenders concerned. This was particularly necessary since there could be circumstances where such an approach was considered appropriate on account of genuine difficulties of the non-performing unit or where the owners / shareholders of the healthy units were willing to borrow for meeting the dues of the non-performing units. It was also pointed out that the aforesaid group approach could possibly be considered as a part of overall restructuring package in respect of a defaulting unit. Hence, no uniform approach or rules should be laid down in this regard. Reckoning the various practical difficulties in operationalising the group approach, a pragmatic solution which emerges is to exercise due circumspection in extending fresh credit facilities to the units of a group where certain other units have been in default with the lenders. However, it would also need to be ensured that the normal funding requirements of the healthy performing units do not get hampered in the process. It was, however, felt that if 70 % majority of lenders (in terms of their funded exposures) agree to effect a change in the management of the defaulting borrowal unit, or to convert the loans to equity for subsequent off-loading of the same to the highest bidder through auction, they should take such decisions on aconsortium-specific basis. Such action should be taken in certain specific circumstances (e.g., where sickness was induced by the same promoters in several units) in at least a few cases expeditiously in order to set a deterrent example in this regard.(f) Sharing of securities and cash flows - Trust & RetentionAccount (TRA) mechanismIn the joint financing of large value projects by banks and FIs, the sharing of securities as also of the cash flows of the borrowers has been a contentious issue. A general view is expressed that while the banks are reluctant to create pari passu or second charge over the current assets in favour of the FIs, the FIs try to delay the creation of pari passu or second charge on the fixed assets of the borrowers in favour of the banks. Likewise, in the problem accounts when the cash flows of the borrowers are not sufficient to service the dues of the banks as well as of the FIs, well defined mechanism does not exist for equitable sharing of cash flows between the two sets of lenders. Hence, it is felt that there is a need to evolve an effective and smooth mechanism for safeguarding the interests of both classes of lenders in jointly financed large projects.A view has emerged in this regard that all the assets of the borrowers available as security (current or fixed) should be pooled together and shared by term lenders (FIs ) as also the working capital providers (banks) as per their weighted average share in the total exposure to the borrower. It is, however, stated in this regard that such an approach of pooling and sharing of securities while perhaps feasible in respect of fresh loans, would not be workable in respect of old / existing stock of NPAs since the charges of the lenders would have already been registered and would, therefore, have chronological priority. As regards creation of a second charge over the assets of the borrowers, while a view is expressed that it should not be a problem at all since creation of second charge does not dilute the security available to the first charge holder, apprehensions are also expressed that creation of second charge might result in withholding of consent by the second charge holders for creation of pari passu charge for additional facilities subsequently granted by the first charge holders. As regards pro rata sharing of securities among the lenders in consortium, a view has also been expressed that at times the FIs hold certain securities by way of pledge of promoters' shares or the real estate, etc., in the project company but such a security is not shared by them with the other lenders in the consortium. Such FIs subsequently enter into undisclosed arrangements with the borrowers / promoters for disposal of such securities at attractive prices but do not involve the banks in the exercise and also do not share the proceeds with the other members of the consortium. There was, therefore, a need to curb such practices in the system.As regards the system of Trust and Retention Account (TRA - a brief write up furnished at Annexure II), it has been opined that TRA mechanism would be possible to adopt only if the banks and FIs share the charge over the entire assets of the borrower and only if such sharing is made a part of the terms and conditions of sanction of limits. On the other hand, adoption of TRA mechanism is strongly advocated since it is stated to be a healthy practice, is expected to bring about greater discipline among the borrowers and would be fair and transparent to all the members of the consortium. It has also been argued in this regard that since the TRA concept has been successful in case of infrastructure financing, it could be suitably adapted for project financing as well. However, a technical point has been raised in operationalising the TRA mechanism that all the cash flows of borrower (such as proceeds of the bill discounted for a manufacturing project) cannot be shared with the FIs since the bill financing by definition is meant to be self liquidating in nature and proceeds must be fully appropriated by the discounting bank only. Certain apprehensions have also been expressed that the TRA mechanism is biased in favour of the FIs and is not fair to the banks, the procedure is quite cumbersome and is not practicable in all the cases.There is, therefore, a need to take a view that where TRA mechanism is not feasible, what should the alternative mechanism be to safeguard the interest of all the lenders.# # : Source : Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 1999-2000ANNEXURE I Suggested criteria for effecting change in management of defaulting units1.Chronic wilful default of the borrower;2.Loss of confidence in the management of the borrowing unit bythe lenders - to be decided by the majority of lenders;3.Non-compliance with the time frame and quantum of committedcontribution from the promoters;4.Non-commencement of commercial production within one yearfrom the date originally planned without assigning anyunavoidable reasons.。