Listed corporate governance structure defects and false financial reporting
上市公司的治理结构研究经济学本科学士毕业论文
毕业设计(论文)题目:我国上市公司治理结构的研究毕业设计(论文)任务书题目类别:毕业论文题目性质:理论研究毕业设计(论文)题目:我国上市公司治理结构研究学院:人文社会科学学院专业:经济学题目内容:上市公司是指所发行的股票经过国务院或者国务院授权的证券管理部门批准在证券交易所上市交易的股份有限公司。
上市公司是股份有限公司的一种,这种公司到证券交易所上市交易,除了必须经过批准外,还必须符合一定的条件。
公司治理(Corporate Governance, 又译为法人治理结构或公司管治)是现代企业制度中最重要的组织架构。
狭义上说公司治理主要指公司的股东, 董事及经理层之间的关系。
广义上说公司治理还包括与利益者(如员工、客户、供应商、债权人和社会公众等)之间的关系, 及有关法律, 法规和上市规则等。
公司治理结构问题的产生是与股份有限公司的出现联系在一起的,其核心是由于所有权和经营权的分离,所有者与经营者的利益不一致而产生的委托——代理关系。
当前,我国的上市公司的治理结构存在着较多的问题,例如封闭式的股权结构、“内部人控制”严重、职业经理人队伍缺乏等等。
企业管理中,如何针对这些问题,提出优化封闭式股权结构,强化董事会内部的制衡,培育经理人员市场,对经营者鼓励和约束等思想和对策,是我国上市公司治理结构的重要研究课题之一。
任务要求:公司治理的核心是企业的所有者如何保证授权经营这些资产的管理者按照所有者的最佳利益有效地使用企业的资产以及由这些资产所产生的收益。
有效的公司治理,需要一套有效地控制/监督管理者和激励管理者按所有者利益最大限度地创造股东价值的机制。
要求作者借鉴国外上市公司的先进管理经验,结合我国当前上市公司的具体现状,提出对我国上市公司治理结构调整的合理建议。
文章第一部分主要介绍本文的选题背景和研究意义、当前国内外的研究现状以及本文的研究方法和框架。
第二部分概述有关上市公司、治理结构等的相关概念,以保证文章的连贯性和完整性。
CFA考试《CFA一级》历年真题精选04(附详解)
CFA考试《CFA一级》历年真题精选04(附详解)1、Which of the following is most likely a sign of a good corporate governance structure?【单选题】A.Independent board members comprise a minority proportion on the company’s board.B.The separation of the chief executive position from the chair position on the company’s board.C.Independent board members are allowed to meet shareholders only in the presence of the entire board.正确答案:B答案解析:“The Corporate Governance of Listed Companies: A Manual for Investors”The CEO and board chair should be separated to prevent too much executive power.2、Which statement best describes option price sensitivities? The value of a:【单选题】A.call option increases as interest rates rise.B.put option increases as volatility decreases.C.put option decreases as interest rates decline.正确答案:A答案解析:“Derivative Markets and Instruments,” Don M. ChanceA is correct. Call options increase in value as interest rates rise.3、The most likely impact of adding commodities to a portfolio of equities and bonds is to:【单选题】A.increase riskB.enhance return.C.reduce exposure to inflation.正确答案:C答案解析:“Investing in Commodities,” Ronald G. Layard-LieschingC is correct. Over the long term, commodity prices are closely related to inflation and, therefore, including commodities in a portfolio of equities and bonds will reduce its exposure to inflation.4、Amanda Janney, CFA, is employed as a fixed-income portfolio manager for CollinsAsset Management Inc.(CAM) , a large international capital managementfirm.Janney signed a non-compete agreement with CAM when she joined CAM.The agreement strictly restricts Janney from contacting CAM's clients for fiveyears after leaving CAM.Janney leaves CAM and immediately sets up anothercompeting firm herself where Janney uses the knowledge and experience shelearns at CAM.In her first week at her new firm, Janney uses public internetsearching to find some of her former clients and recommends her new firm tothem.Janney has most likely violated the Standards of Professional Conduct by:【单选题】A.violating his non-compete agreement signed with CAM.ing public internet searching to find some of her former clients at her newfirm.ing the knowledge and experience she learns at CAM.正确答案:A答案解析:因为签署过同业竞争协议就应该加以遵守,即在离开原来公司后5年内不联系原有雇主的客户,而Janney离开后的第一个星期就利用公开的互联网搜索寻找以前的客户并拉拢这些客户,显然违反了对于雇主忠诚的原则。
《公司治理结构》word版
公司治理結構什麼是公司治理結構公司治理結構(Corporate Governance Structure),或稱法人治理結構、公司治理系統(Corporate Governance System)、公司治理機制(Corporate Governance Mechanism),是一種對公司進行管理和控制的體系。
是指由所有者、董事會和高級執行人員即高級經理三者組成的一種組織結構。
現代企業製度區別於傳統企業的根本點在於所有權和經營權的分離,或稱所有與控制的分離(separation of ownership and control),從而需要在所有者和經營者之間形成一種相互制衡的機制,用以對企業進行管理和控制。
現代企業中的公司治理結構正是這樣一種協調股東和其他利益相關者關係的一種機制,它涉及到激勵與約束等多方面的內容。
簡單地說,公司治理結構就是處理企業各種契約關係的一種制度。
例如,董事會、經理層、股東和其他利害相關者的責任和權利分佈,而且明確了決策公司事務時所應遵循的規則和程序。
公司治理的核心是在所有權和經營權分離的條件下,由於所有者和經營者的利益不一致而產生的委託—代理關係。
公司治理的目標是降低代理成本,使所有者不干預公司的日常經營,同時又保證經理層能以股東的利益和公司的利潤最大化為目標。
這裡所說的“結構”應該理解為兼有製度(Institutions)、體系(Systems)和控制機制(Controlmechanism)的含義。
現代企業採取了股份制,在股份制企業中所有權與經營權分離,所有者與經營者之間,經營者不同集團之間的利益關係比單人業主制企業或合夥制企業要復雜得多。
如何處理這種利益關係涉及到企業的效率、業績,甚至成敗。
處理這些利益關係需要一套相應的製度,這就形成了公司治理結構理論。
經濟學家談論公司治理結構時,狹義地講是指投資者(股東)和企業之間的利益分配和控制關係,包括公司董事會的職能、結構、股東的權利等方面的製度安排;廣義地講是指關於公司控制權和剩餘索取權,即企業組織方式、控制機制和利益分配的所有法律、機構、制度和文化的安排。
西方公司治理结构
西方公司治理结构西方公司治理结构(Western Corporate Governance Structure)公司治理是指企业内部组织结构、权力分配、决策过程和监督机制等方面的安排与运作。
西方国家的公司治理结构始于工业革命时期,随着企业规模的不断扩大和全球化的加速,西方公司治理结构也日趋完善和复杂。
西方公司治理结构的特点1. 股权结构多样化:西方公司股权分散,一般由大量股东持有股份,股权集中度相对较低。
这种多样化的股权结构确保了企业的决策权不会被个别股东掌握,有效避免了股东利益的过度侵权。
2. 董事会的重要性:西方公司董事会是公司决策的主要机构,由股东选举产生,并由董事长或首席执行官负责领导。
董事会的职责包括制定企业战略、监督企业经营、决策投资和风险管理等重要事项。
董事会成员一般由内部董事和外部董事组成,以确保董事会的独立性和公正性。
3. 董事会委员会的设立:为了提高监督和决策效率,西方公司董事会往往设立多个专门的委员会,如审计委员会、薪酬委员会、风险委员会等。
这些委员会由董事会成员和独立董事组成,对公司的运营和决策进行专门的审议和监督。
4. 外部监管机构的存在:西方国家设立了许多独立的监管机构,如证券监管机构和公司注册机构等,负责监督和管理公司的运营活动,并保护投资者的利益。
这些外部监管机构对公司治理进行监督,确保公司遵守法律法规和道德规范。
西方公司治理结构的优势1. 公司决策灵活:西方公司治理结构注重权力分散和民主决策,保障了各利益相关方的参与权和监督权。
这种灵活的公司治理结构能够更好地适应市场环境和经营需求,提高决策效率和执行力。
2. 投资者保护完备:西方的公司治理结构通过建立独立的监管机构和设立多个专门的委员会,确保公司运营和决策的公正性和透明度。
这种完备的监管机制可以最大程度地保护投资者的利益,减少投资风险。
3. 增强企业竞争力:西方公司治理结构重视公司长期发展和战略规划,坚持以股东长远利益为导向,而不是追求短期经济利益。
公司治理论文:公司治理独立董事独立董事职能定位独立董事职能实现
公司治理论文:公司治理独立董事独立董事职能定位独立董事职能实现【中文摘要】独立董事制度,是英美法系国家为弥补其“一元制”公司治理机制的缺陷而逐渐确立的,主要在于防止“内部人控制”失控及完善公司治理。
随着独立董事在实践中显著作用的发挥,独立董事制度成了全球探讨改革公司治理的焦点。
为完善我国的公司治理结构,解决我国上市公司普遍存在的“一股独大”及由此导致的控股股东掏空公司、侵犯中小股东利益的问题,我国也引入了独立董事制度。
实践证明,独立董事制度在改善现有公司治理结构、控制和制约内部管理人及帮助公司决策等方面确实发挥了积极作用。
然而,独立董事制度在我国的运行中也暴露出许多问题与缺陷,仍无法摆脱“花瓶董事”及“签字董事”的称呼,需要进一步研究解决。
本文联系中国实际情况,就独立董事制度的职能定位及其实现进行了分析,并提出了一些观点、建议。
本文内容分为三部分。
第一部分主要内容为对独立董事职能进行定位。
首先,分析了在英美国家相关立法及规范对独立董事职能的规定,对英美国家独立董事的职能定位进行了分析。
其次,从我国实际国情出发,对我国独立董事的职能定位进行了研究,并从监事会与独立董事两种制度关系出发,对独立董事的职能进行了分析。
第二部分分析了我国独立董事制度的现状,分别从我国独立董事制度的立法、独立董事的独立性保障及行使职权环境三个方面对影响我国独立董事在公司治理中职能实现的制约因素进行了论述。
第三部分探讨了保障我国上市公司独立董事职能实现的有效途径和方法。
针对我国上市公司独立董事在实践中存在的问题,本章从四个方面提出了完善建议:建立完善的独立董事法制体系、完善独立董事制度的立法;完善独立董事任职资格及选任制度;完善独立董事作用机制;健全独立董事的激励约束机制。
独立董事制度的创建过程也是不断摸索、完善的过程。
我们希望看到一个有效率的、完善的独立董事制度在上市公司治理结构的过程中发挥应有的作用。
【英文摘要】The independent director system is first established by Britain and American in order to make up for the defects of the “one system” corporate governance structure, the main purpose is to prevent the “control of internal man”out of control, and improve the effect of corporate governance. Because of its effectiveness in the practice of corporate governance, thereafter the independent director system become the global focus while other countries studying how to reform and improve the corporate governance structure. Then to optimize the corporate governance structure of our country, and to address the prevalent problem (which caused by the phenomenon of the “the only big shareholder” that exist in many listed companies in our county) that the controlling shareholder hollow out the listed companies and infringe the interest of the small shareholders, our country also introducethis system. The practice has proved that the independent director system had indeed made an effective role in improving the existing corporate governance structure, in constraining and supervising internal managers and in making corporate decisions, etc. However, the operation of independent directors in China also has exposed many problems and shortcomings, still can not get rid of the name of “Vase Directors” and “Signature Directors”. So we need to study further in how to establish this system in our country as to address our problems. This paper will link the actual conditions in China to locate the independent director’s functions and to study how to realize the functions, and further put forward some ideas and suggestions on these problems.This paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter is mainly to locate the function of the independent directors. Firstly, it studied the relevant laws and regulations about independent directors’ functions of Britain and American, and then discussed the location of functions of independent in the two countries. Secondly, this paper discussed the location of functions of independent director in China based on its actual national conditions. At the same time, this thesis also analyzed the functions of independent directors from therelationship between the supervising border and independent director system.The second chapter analyze the status of independent director system in China and discuss the conditions which impact the operation and realization of functions of independent directors in China from following three aspects:the legislation of independent directors;the independence of independent directors and the environment of exercising the power of independent directors.The third chapter studied the effective ways and methods in guaranteeing the realization of the functions of independent directors in China’s listed companies. This paper put forward suggestions from four aspects based on the problem that existed in the practice of independent director system. These suggestions were divided into following four aspects:to improve the legislation system and set up a suit sound and perfect laws and regulation for independent director system; to improve the regulation in qualification and selection system of independent director system; optimize the power exercising mechanism of the independent directors and establish a sound incentive and restraint mechanism for independent directors.The course of setting up independent director system in China is also a trial course to improve and optimize theindependent director system. We hope to see an efficient, comprehensive independent director system to play a due role in the process of improving our governance structure in China’s listed companies.【关键词】公司治理独立董事独立董事职能定位独立董事职能实现【英文关键词】Corporate Governance The Independent Director System Location of Functions of Independent Directors Realization Functions of independent directors【目录】我国独立董事职能实现之探讨内容摘要6-7Abstract7-8引言11-13一、我国独立董事的职能定位13-19(一) 独立董事的含义13(二) 英美国家独立董事职能定位13-15 1. 制约和监督”内部人”14 2. 审查公司财务及监督重大决策14-15 3. 战略与决策咨询功能15(三) 我国独立董事职能的定位15-19 1. 我国独立董事的职能15-17 2. 独立董事与监事会职能界定17-19二、我国独立董事职能发挥的制约因素19-24(一) 缺乏法律制度的保障19(二) 独立董事的”独立性”难以保障19-21 1. 任职资格不合理19-20 2. 独立董事的选拔机制不合理20-21 3. 任期过长难于保证独立性21(三) 独立董事行权环境难以保障21-24 1. 知情权得不到保障21-22 2. 独立董事发挥职能平台不完善22-23 3. 独立董事承担风险较大23-24三、独立董事职能实现的保障24-37(一)完善独立董事职能实现的制度保障24-25 1. 提高独立董事制度的立法效力24 2. 完善相关配套规定24-25 3. 完善自律准则25(二) 完善独立董事的任职资格及选任制度25-29 1. 具备独立性资格25-27 2. 具备良好的执业素质27-28 3. 完善独立董事的选任机制28-29(三) 完善独立董事的作用机制29-32 1.完善董事会会议制度29-31 2. 健全董事会专门委员会制度31-32(四) 完善独立董事的激励约束机制32-37 1. 声誉激励32-33 2. 薪酬激励33-35 3. 消极激励制度35-37结语37-38致谢38-39参考文献39-41【采买全文】1.3.9.9.38.8.4.8 1.3.8.1.13.7.2.1 同时提供论文写作一对一辅导和论文发表服务.保过包发【说明】本文仅为中国学术文献总库合作提供,无涉版权。
上市公司治理准则中英文对照
上市公司治理准则中英文对照一、引言上市公司治理准则是规范上市公司运作、保障投资者权益、促进资本市场健康发展的重要文件。
随着全球经济一体化的加速,越来越多的中国上市公司走向国际市场,同时也有众多国际投资者参与中国资本市场。
因此,提供上市公司治理准则的中英文对照版本具有重要的现实意义。
二、上市公司治理准则的主要内容(一)股东与股东大会Shareholders and Shareholders' General Meeting股东享有平等的权利,能够按照其所持有的股份行使表决权。
Shareholders enjoy equal rights and can exercise their voting rights in accordance with the shares they hold股东大会是公司的最高权力机构,应当依法行使职权。
The shareholders' general meeting is the highest authority of the company and shall exercise its functions and powers in accordance with the law(二)董事与董事会Directors and the Board of Directors董事应当具备履行职责所必需的知识、技能和经验。
Directors should possess the necessary knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties董事会应当对公司的战略规划、重大决策等进行审议和决策。
The board of directors should review and make decisions on the company's strategic planning and major decisions(三)监事与监事会Supervisors and the Board of Supervisors监事应当认真履行监督职责,维护公司及股东的合法权益。
英文版 上市公司治理准则
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in ChinaIssued by:China Securities Regulatory CommissionState Economic and Trade CommissionJanuary 7, 2001(Zhengjianfa No.1 of 2002)Code of Corporate Governance for Listed CompaniesPrefaceIn accordance with the basic principles of the Company Law, the Securities Law and other relevant laws and regulations, as well as the commonly accepted standards in international corporate governance, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") is formulated to promote the establishment and improvement of modern enterprise system by listed companies, to standardize the operation of listed companies and to bring forward the healthy development of the securities market of our country.The Code sets forth, among other things, the basic principles for corporate governance of listed companies in our country, the means for the protection of investors' interests and rights, the basic behavior rules and moral standards for directors, supervisors, managers and other senior management members of listed companies.The Code is applicable to all listed companies within the boundary of the People's Republic of China. Listed companies shall act in the spirit of the Code in their efforts to improve corporate governance. Requirements of the Code shall be embodied when listed companies formulate or amend their articles of association or rules of governance. The Code is the major measuring standard for evaluating whether a listed company has a good corporate governance structure, and if major problems exist with the corporate governance structure of a listed company, the securities supervision and regulation authorities may instruct the company to make corrections in accordance with the Code.Chapter 1. Shareholders and Shareholders' Meetings(1) Rights of Shareholders1. As the owner of a company, the shareholders shall enjoy the legal rights stipulated by laws, administrative regulations and the company's articles of association. A listed company shall establish a corporate governance structure sufficient for ensuring the full exercise of shareholders' rights.2. The corporate governance structure of a company shall ensure fair treatment toward all shareholders, especially minority shareholders. All shareholders are to enjoy equal rights and to bear the corresponding duties based on the shares they hold.3. Shareholders shall have the right to know about and the right to participate in major matters of the company set forth in the laws, administrative regulations and articles of association.A listed company shall establish efficient channels of communication with its shareholders.4. Shareholders shall have the right to protect their interests and rights through civil litigation or other legal means in accordance with laws and administrative regulations. In the event the resolutions of shareholders' meetings or the resolutions of the board of directors are in breach of laws and administrative regulations or infringe on shareholders' legal interests and rights, the shareholders shall have the right to initiate litigation to stop such breach or infringement. The directors, supervisors and managers of the company shall bear the liability of compensation incases where they violate laws, administrative regulations or articles of association and cause damages to the company during the performance of their duties. Shareholders shall have the right to request the company to sue for such compensation in accordance with law.(2) Rules for Shareholders' Meetings5. A listed company shall set out convening and voting procedures for shareholders' meetings in its articles of association, including rules governing such matters as notification, registration, review of proposals, voting, counting of votes, announcement of voting results, formulation of resolutions, recording of minutes and signatories, public announcement, etc.6. The board of directors shall earnestly study and arrange the agenda for a shareholders' meeting. During a shareholders' meeting, each item on the agenda shall be given a reasonable amount of time for discussion.7. A listed company shall state in its articles of association the principles for the shareholders' meeting to grant authorization to the board of directors. The content of such authorization shall be explicit and concrete.8. Besides ensuring that shareholders' meetings proceed legally and effectively, a listed company shall make every effort, including fully utilizing modern information technology means, to increase the number of shareholders attending the shareholders' meetings. The time and location of the shareholders' meetings shall be set so as to allow the maximum number of shareholders to participate.9. The shareholders can either be present at the shareholders' meetings in person or they may appoint a proxy to vote on their behalf, and both means of voting possess the same legal effect.10. The board of directors, independent directors and qualified shareholders of a listed company may solicit for the shareholders' right to vote in a shareholders' meeting. No payments shall be made to the shareholders for such solicitation, and adequate information shall be provided to persons whose voting rights are being solicited.11. Iinstitutional investors shall play a role in the appointment of company directors, the compensation and supervision of management and major decision-making processes.(3) Related Party Transactions12. Written agreements shall be entered into for related party transactions among a listed company and its connected parties. Such agreements shall observe principles of equality, voluntarity, and making compensation for equal value. The contents of such agreements shall be specific and concrete. Matters such as the signing, amendment, termination and execution of such agreements shall be disclosed by the listed company in accordance with relevant regulations.13. Efficient measures shall be adopted by a listed company to prevent its connected parties from interfering with the operation of the company and damaging the company's interests by monopolizing purchase or sales channels. Related party transactions shall observe commercial principles. In principle, the prices for related party transactions shall not deviate from an independent third party's market price or charging standard. The company shall fully disclose the basis for pricing for related party transactions.14. The assets of a listed company belong to the company. The company shall adopt efficient measures to prevent its shareholders and their affiliates from misappropriating or transferring the capital, assets or other resources of the company through various means. A listed company shall not provide financial guarantees for its shareholders or their affiliates.Chapter 2. Listed Company and Its Controlling Shareholders(1) Behavior Rules for Controlling Shareholders15. During the restructuring and reorganization of a company that plans to list, the controlling shareholders shall observe the principle of "first restructuring, then listing", and shall emphasize the establishment of a reasonably balanced shareholding structure.16. During the restructuring and reorganization of a company that plans to list, the controlling shareholders shall sever the company's social functions and strip out non-operational assets. Non-operational institutions, welfare institutions and their facilities shall not be included in the listed company.17. Controlling shareholders' remaining enterprises or institutions that provide services for the major business of the listed company may be restructured into specialized companies in accordance with the principles of specialization and market practice, and may enter into relevant agreements with the listed company in accordance with commercial principles. Remaining enterprises engaged in other businesses shall increase their capability of independent development. Remaining enterprises not capable to continue operation shall exit the market, through such channels as bankruptcy, in accordance with relevant laws and regulations. Enterprises meeting certain requirements during restructuring may sever all their social functions and disperse surplus employees at one time and keep no remaining enterprises.18. The controlling shareholders shall support the listed company to further reform labor, personnel and distribution systems, to transform operational and managerial mechanisms, and to establish such systems as: management selection through bidding and competition, with the chance for both promotion and demotion; employment of employees on the basis of competitive selection, with the chance for both employment and termination of employment; income distribution scheme that provides sufficient incentive, with the chance to both increase and decrease the remuneration; etc.19. The controlling shareholders owe a duty of good faith toward the listed company and other shareholders. The controlling shareholders of a listed company shall strictly comply with laws and regulations while exercising their rights as investors, and shall be prevented from damaging the listed company's or other shareholders' legal rights and interests, through means such as assets restructuring, or from taking advantage of their privileged position to gain additional benefit.20. The controlling shareholders shall nominate the candidates for directors and supervisors in strict compliance with the terms and procedures provided for by laws, regulations and the company's articles of association. The nominated candidates shall possess certain relevant professional knowledge and the capability to make decisions or supervise. The resolutions made by the shareholders' meetings electing personnel or the board of directors' resolutions appointing personnel shall not be subjected to approval procedures by the controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders are forbidden to appoint senior management personnel by circumventing the shareholders' meetings or the board of directors.21. The important decisions of a listed company shall be made through a shareholders' meeting or board of directors' meeting in accordance with law. The controlling shareholders shall not directly or indirectly interfere with the company's decisions or business activities conducted in accordance with laws; nor shall they impair the listed company's or other shareholders' rights and interests.(2) Independence of Listed Company22. A listed company shall be separated from its controlling shareholders in such aspects as personnel, assets and financial affairs, shall be independent in institution and business, shall practice independent business accounting, and shall independently bear risks and obligations.23. The personnel of a listed company shall be independent from the controlling shareholders. The management, financial officers, sales officers and secretary of the board of directors of the listed company shall not take posts other than as a director in a controlling shareholder's entities. In the case where a member of a controlling shareholder's senior management concurrently holds the position of director of the listed company, such member shall ensure adequate time and energy to perform the work for the listed company.24. The assets invested by a controlling shareholder in a listed company shall be independent, complete and with clear indication of ownership. Where controlling shareholders invest non-cash assets into a listed company, ownership transfer procedures shall be completed and explicit boundaries for such assets shall be clarified. The listed company shall independently register such assets, independently set up account for such assets, and independently carry out business accounting and management for such assets. The controlling shareholders shall not misappropriate or control such assets or interfere with the listed company's management of such assets.25. A listed company shall establish sound financial and accounting management systems in accordance with laws and regulations and shall conduct independent business accounting. Controlling shareholders shall respect the financial independence of the company and shall not interfere with the financial and accounting activities of the company.26. The board of directors, the supervisory committee and other internal offices of a listed company shall operate in an independent manner. There shall be no subordination relationship between, on the one hand, a listed company or its internal offices and, on the other hand, the company's controlling shareholders or their internal offices, and the latter shall not give plans or instructions concerning the listed company's business operation to the former, nor shall the latter interfere with the independent operation of the former in any other manner.27. A listed company's business shall be completely independent from that of its controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries shall not engage in the same or similar business as that of the listed company. Controlling shareholders shall adopt efficient measures to avoid competition with the listed company.Chapter 3. Directors and Board of Directors(1) Election Procedures for Directors28. A company shall establish a standardized and transparent procedure for director election in its articles of association, so as to ensure the openness, fairness, impartialness and independence of the election.29. Detailed information regarding the candidates for directorship shall be disclosed prior to the convening of the shareholders' meeting to ensure adequate understanding of the candidates by the shareholders at the time of voting.30. Candidates for directorship shall give written undertakings to accept their nomination, to warrant the truthfulness and completeness of the candidate's information that has been publicly disclosed and to promise to earnestly perform their duties once elected.31. The election of directors shall fully reflect the opinions of minority shareholders. A cumulative voting system shall be earnestly advanced in shareholders' meetings for the election of directors. Listed companies that are more than 30% owned by controlling shareholders shall adopta cumulative voting system, and the companies that do adopt such a system shall stipulate the implementing rules for such cumulative voting system in their articles of association.32. Appointment agreements shall be entered into by a listed company and its directors to clarify such matters as the rights and obligations between the company and the director, the term of the directorship, the director's liabilities in case of breach of laws, regulations or articles of association, and the compensation from the company in case of early termination of the appointment agreement for cause by the company.(2) The Duties and Responsibilities of Directors33. Directors shall faithfully, honestly and diligently perform their duties for the best interests of the company and all the shareholders.34. Directors shall ensure adequate time and energy for the performance of their duties.35. Directors shall attend the board of directors meetings in a diligent and responsible manner, and shall express their clear opinion on the topics discussed. When unable to attend a board of directors meeting, a director may authorize another director in writing to vote on his behalf and the director who makes such authorization shall be responsible for the vote.36. The board of directors shall abide by relevant laws, regulations, rules and the company's articles of association, and shall strictly fulfill the undertakings they made publicly.37. Directors shall earnestly attend relevant trainings to learn about the rights, obligations and duties of a director, to familiarize themselves with relevant laws and regulations and to master relevant knowledge necessary for acting as directors.38. In cases where the resolutions of board of directors violate laws or regulations or a listed company's articles of association and cause losses to the listed company, directors responsible for making such resolutions shall be liable for compensation, except those proved to have objected and the objections of whom have been recorded in the minutes.39. After approval by the shareholders' meeting, a listed company may purchase liability insurance for directors. Such insurance shall not cover the liabilities arising in connection with directors' violation of laws, regulations or the company's articles of association.(3) Duties and Composition of the Board of Directors40. The number of directors and the structure of the board of directors shall be in compliance with laws and regulations and shall ensure the effective discussion and efficient, timely and prudent decision-making process of the board of directors.41. The board of directors shall possess proper professional background. The directors shall possess adequate knowledge, skill and quality to perform their duties.42. The board of directors shall be made accountable to shareholders. A listed company's corporate governance framework shall ensure that the board of directors can exercise its power in accordance with laws, administrative regulations and the company's articles of association.43. The board of directors shall earnestly perform its duties as stipulated by laws, regulations and the company's articles of association, shall ensure that the company complies with laws, regulations and its articles of association, shall treat all the shareholders equally and shall be concerned with the interests of stakeholders.(4) Rules and Procedure of the Board of Directors44. A listed company shall formulate rules of procedure for its board of directors in its articles of association to ensure the board of directors' efficient function and rational decisions.45. The board of directors shall meet periodically and shall convene interim meetings in atimely manner when necessary. Each board of directors' meeting shall have a pre-decided agenda.46. The meetings of the board of directors of a listed company shall be conducted in strict compliance with prescribed procedures. The board of directors shall send notice to all directors in advance, at the stipulated time, and shall provide sufficient materials, including relevant background materials for the items on the agenda and other information and data that may assist the directors in their understanding of the company's business development. When two or more independent directors deem the materials inadequate or unclear, they may jointly submit a written request to postpone the meeting or to postpone the discussion of the related matter, which shall be granted by the board of directors.47. The minutes of the board of directors' meetings shall be complete and accurate. The secretary of the board of directors shall carefully organize the minutes and the records of discussed matters. Directors that have attended the meetings and the person who drafted the minutes shall sign the minutes. The minutes of the board of directors' meetings shall be properly maintained and stored as important records of the company, and may be used as an important basis for clarifying responsibilities of individual directors in the future.48. In the case of authorization to the chairman of the board of directors to exercise part of the board of directors' power of office when the board of directors is not in session, clear rules and principles for such authorization shall be stated in the articles of association of the listed company. The content of such authorization shall be clear and specific. All matters related to material interests of the company shall be submitted to the board of directors for collective decision.(5) Independent Directors49. A listed company shall introduce independent directors to its board of directors in accordance with relevant regulations. Independent directors shall be independent from the listed company that employs them and the company's major shareholders. An independent director may not hold any other position apart from independent director in the listed company.50. The independent directors shall bear the duties of good faith and due diligence toward the listed company and all the shareholders. They shall earnestly perform their duties in accordance with laws, regulations and the company's articles of association, shall protect the overall interests of the company, and shall be especially concerned with protecting the interests of minority shareholders from being infringed. Independent directors shall carry out their duties independently and shall not subject themselves to the influence of the company's major shareholders, actual controllers, or other entities or persons who are interested parties of the listed company.51. Relevant laws and regulations shall be complied with for matters such as the qualifications, procedure of election and replacement, and duties of independent directors.(6) Specialized Committees of the Board of Directors52. The board of directors of a listed company may establish a corporate strategy committee, an audit committee, a nomination committee, a remuneration and appraisal committee and other special committees in accordance with the resolutions of the shareholders' meetings. All committees shall be composed solely of directors. The audit committee, the nomination committee and the remuneration and appraisal committee shall be chaired by an independent director, and independent directors shall constitute the majority of the committees. At least one independent director from the audit committee shall be an accounting professional.53. The main duties of the corporate strategy committee shall be to conduct research and make recommendations on the long-term strategic development plans and major investmentdecisions of the company.54. The main duties of the audit committee are (1) to recommend the engagement or replacement of the company's external auditing institutions; (2) to review the internal audit system and its execution; (3) to oversee the interaction between the company's internal and external auditing institutions; (4) to inspect the company's financial information and its disclosure; and (5) to monitor the company's internal control system.55. The main duties of the nomination committee are (1) to formulate standards and procedures for the election of directors and make recommendations; (2) to extensively seek qualified candidates for directorship and management; and (3) to review the candidates for directorship and management and make recommendations.56. The main duties of the remuneration and appraisal committee are (1) to study the appraisal standard for directors and management personnel, to conduct appraisal and to make recommendations; and (2) to study and review the remuneration policies and schemes for directors and senior management personnel.57. Each specialized committee may engage intermediary institutions to provide professional opinions, the relevant expenses to be borne by the company.58. Each specialized committee shall be accountable to the board of directors. All proposals by specialized committees shall be submitted to the board of directors for review and approval.Chapter 4. The Supervisors and the Supervisory Board(1) Duties and Responsibilities of the Supervisory Board59. The supervisory board of a listed company shall be accountable to all shareholders. The supervisory board shall supervise the corporate finance, the legitimacy of directors, managers and other senior management personnel's performance of duties, and shall protect the company's and the shareholders' legal rights and interests.60. Supervisors shall have the right to learn about the operating status of the listed company and shall have the corresponding obligation of confidentiality. The supervisory board may independently hire intermediary institutions to provide professional opinions.61. A listed company shall adopt measures to ensure supervisors' right to learn about company's matters and shall provide necessary assistance to supervisors for their normal performance of duties. No one shall interfere with or obstruct supervisors' work. A supervisor's reasonable expenses necessary to perform their duties shall be borne by the listed company.62. The record of the supervisory committee's supervision as well as the results of financial or other specific investigations shall be used as an important basis for performance assessment of directors, managers and other senior management personnel.63. The supervisory board may report directly to securities regulatory authorities and other related authorities as well as reporting to the board of directors and the shareholders' meetings when the supervisory board learns of any violation of laws, regulations or the company's articles of association by directors, managers or other senior management personnel.(2) The Composition and Steering of the Supervisory Board64. Supervisors shall have professional knowledge or work experience in such areas as law and accounting. The members and the structure of the supervisory board shall ensure its capability to independently and efficiently conduct its supervision of directors, managers and other senior management personnel and to supervise and examine the company's financial matters.65. A listed company shall formulate in its articles of association standardized rules andprocedures governing the steering of the supervisory board. The supervisory board's meetings shall be convened in strict compliance with the rules and procedures.66. The supervisory board shall meet periodically and shall convene interim meetings in a timely manner when necessary. If for any reason a supervisory board meeting cannot be convened as scheduled, an explanation shall be publicly announced.67. The supervisory board may ask directors, managers and other senior management personnel, internal auditing personnel and external auditing personnel to attend the meetings of supervisory board and to answer the questions that the supervisory board is concerned with.68. Minutes shall be drafted for the meetings of the supervisory board, which shall be signed by the supervisors that attended the meetings and the person who drafted the minutes. The supervisors shall have the right to request to record in the minutes explanatory notes to their statements in the meetings. Minutes of the meetings of the supervisory board shall be properly maintained and stored as important records of the company.Chapter 5. Performance Assessments and Incentive and Disciplinary Systems(1) Performance Assessment for Directors, Supervisors and Management Personnel69. A listed company shall establish fair and transparent standards and procedures for the assessment of the performance of directors, supervisors and management personnel.70. The evaluation of the directors and management personnel shall be conducted by the board of directors or by the remuneration and appraisal committee of the board of directors. The evaluation of the performance of independent directors and supervisors shall be conducted througha combination of self-review and peer review.71. The board of directors shall propose a scheme for the amount and method of compensation for directors to the shareholders' meeting for approval. When the board of directors or the remuneration and appraisal committee reviews the performance of or discusses the compensation for a certain director, such director shall withdraw.72. The board of directors and the supervisory board shall report to the shareholder meetings the performance of the directors and the supervisors, the results of the assessment of their work and their compensation, and shall disclose such information.(2) Selection of Management Personnel73. The recruiting of management personnel of a listed company shall be conducted in strict observation with relevant laws and regulations and the company's articles of association. No institution or individual shall interfere with a listed company's normal recruiting procedure for management personnel.74. The recruiting of management personnel of a listed company shall, to the extent possible, be carried out in a fair and transparent manner, through domestic and international markets for professional management, making full use of intermediary agencies.75. Employment agreements shall be entered into by a listed company and its management personnel to clarify each party's rights and obligations.76. The appointment and removal of managers shall be in compliance with legal procedure and shall be publicly announced.(3) Incentive and Disciplinary Systems for Management77. To attract qualified personnel and to maintain the stability of management, a listed company shall establish rewarding systems that link the compensation for management personnel to the company's performance and to the individual's work performance.。
公司治理的一个逻辑梳理
(一)什么是公司治理? 安然事件、华尔街事件是公司治理结构失败的典型案例 它再次说明良好的的发展,是企业增强竞争力和提高经营绩效的必要条件。
一、公司治理一般内涵
公司治理结构是现代企业制度中最重要的组织架构: 现代企业与传统企业最主要的区别在于所有权和经营权的分离,从而产生了所有者和经营者的委托代理关系 公司组织成员间利益的冲突需要一整套制度性的安排来解决权力的监督与制衡问题。
一、公司治理一般内涵
“老三会”英文翻译: 1、党委会:Party Member Congress 2、工会:Labor Union/Labor Congress 总工会:General Confederation of Labor 3、职代会:Employee Congress
一、公司治理一般内涵
一、公司治理一般内涵
CGO 首席政府官Chief Government Officer CQO 首席质量官Chief Quality Officer CTO 首席技术官Chief Technology Officer
一、公司治理一般内涵
公司其他首席官员: CBO—首席品牌官(Chief Brand Officer) CCO—首席文化官(Chief Cultural Officer) CDO—首席开发官(Chief Development Officer) CHO—首席人事官(Chief Human Resource Officer) CKO—首席知识官(Chief Knowledge Officer)
一、公司治理一般内涵
相关链接二:关于公司的形式: 公司的五大形式: 1、股份有限公司 2、有限责任公司 英美法系 3、无限责任公司 4、两合公司 大陆法系 5、股份两合公司
浅谈公司治理结构对于会计信息质量的影响
成绩学年论文题目:浅谈公司治理结构对于会计信息质量的影响学生__黎汉英学号2013103208指导教师__ 卢春香院系__经济管理学院__专业会计系年级_ 2013级教务处制摘要我国股票市场经过20 多年的发展,管理正逐步迈向规化的轨道,但是在发展的过程中依然不断发生着上市公司财务舞弊案件,这也使得上市公司会计信息质量越来越被市场参与者所关注,信息披露失真、信息质量低下的现象十分严重。
会计信息披露失真,不规现象的发生有多方面原因,其中最重要原因是我国上市公司激励监督机制不完善,缺乏运行良好的公司治理结构。
主要表现在公司治理方面,有质量的会计信息披露只有通过公司董事会、独立董事、监事会、管理层之间的公开诚信的沟通和合作才能获得。
因此,要从本质上提高我国上市公司的会计信息质量,只有对上市公司的部治理进行加强,通过市场的有效监管和惩戒才能实现目标。
本文分别从理论和实证方面进行了公司治理结构对会计信息质量影响的分析。
首先通过阅读期刊杂志,归纳公司治理结构对会计信息质量的影响,进行解释变量的选择。
通过阐述会计信息质量及公司治理结构的基础理论,以此提出实证假设。
在实证研究中,研究对象选取沪市2009 年 A 股上市公司,将一些不完善信息不全的公司排除后,共得到579 家上市公司,通过11 个解释变量与被解释变量建立模型进行相关性分析,研究发现在总样本中,金额最高前三名董事报酬总额、金额最高前三名高管报酬总额、独立董事比例、监事会持股比例均与会计信息披露质量呈正相关关系,而董事会会议与会计信息质量呈负相关关系。
上述研究结论表明:上市公司高层薪酬激励机制对会计信息质量有促进作用,独立董事和监事发挥了其应有的作用。
最后本文在实证研究的基础上进一步提出了完善公司治理结构、提高会计信息质量的政策建议与发展方向。
关键词:公司治理结构会计信息质量回归分析AbstractChinese stock market management is on the way to be standardized after 20 years development. While the financial fraud cases in listed corporations have occurred one after one. More and more attention is paid to the listed corporation information and the low quality problem of the information is serious. There are many reasons contribute to the distortion of information disclosure and lack of standard phenomenon. The most important reason is mainly reflected in the corporation governance that quality accounting information disclosure only could be achieved from the open and honest communication and corporation by the board of directors、independent directors、board of supervisors and managers. The listed corporation accounting information disclosure quality could be fundamentally improved only by strengthening the internal governance together with effective regulation and punishment from the market.This paper analyzed the theoretical and empirical aspects of corporate governance structure and the quality of information disclosure. In the empirical study, taking the listed corporations in Shanghai Stock Market as the objects during which the financial and incomplete data were excluded. The paper analyzes the relationship between corporation governance structure and information disclosure quality through an element and multiple regressions among the 597 corporations. The study shows that in the total samples, the highest amount of compensation of three directors is positively related to the accounting information quality. The board of directors is negatively related with the accounting information quality and same to the relationship between the chairman of the board of supervisor shareholding ratio and the information quality.To conclude, the article put forward some advices and further direction of development on improving corporate governance structure and quality of earnings based on the empirical research.Key Words: The theoretical and empirical aspects of corporate governance structure, The quality of accounting information, Analysis of regression目录1导论 (3)1.1研究背景 (3)1.2研究方法 (3)1.3研究框架 (3)2公司治理结构与会计信息质量理论基础 (3)2.1 会计信息质量及特征 (3)2.1.1 会计信息质量的含义 (3)2.1.2会计信息质量的特征 (3)2.1.3会计信息质量的现状 (3)2.2公司治理结构及特征 (3)2.2.1公司治理结构的概念 (3)2.2.2公司治理结构的基本框架 (3)2.3 公司治理结构对会计信息披露质量的影响 (3)3. 公司治理结构对会计信息质量影响的实证分析 (3)3.1 研究设计 (3)3.1.1 样本选择与数据来源 (3)3.1.2 研究假设与模型 (3)3.2实董事会会议证结果与分析 (3)3.2.1描述性统计 (3)3.2.2 回归分析 (3)4. 研究结论和建议 (3)4.1 研究结论 (3)4.2 研究建议 (3)参考文献 (3)1导论1.1研究背景随着当代中国市场经济的不断发展,会计信息质量正日益成为备受人们关注的焦点问题。
上市公司独立董事规则理解一本通
上市公司独立董事规则理解一本通1.上市公司独立董事是公司治理结构中的重要组成部分。
The independent director of a listed company is an important part of the corporate governance structure.2.独立董事在公司决策中发挥着监督和建议的作用。
Independent directors play a supervisory and advisoryrole in corporate decision-making.3.他们需要独立行使职责,不受公司或任何利益相关方的影响。
They are required to exercise their duties independently, free from the influence of the company or any stakeholders.4.独立董事需具有丰富的行业经验和专业知识。
Independent directors are required to have extensive industry experience and professional knowledge.5.他们还需要了解公司的业务和治理结构,并积极参与公司事务。
They also need to understand the company's business and governance structure and actively participate in corporate affairs.6.上市公司独立董事的任职资格和条件通常由法律法规和交易所规定。
The qualifications and conditions for serving as an independent director of a listed company are generally prescribed by laws and regulations and the exchange.7.独立董事需要保持高度的独立性和中立性,不受其他董事或管理层的控制。
试论我国上市公司治理结构的完善
试论我国上市公司治理结构的完善毕业论文中文摘要毕业论文外文摘要目次1 引言 (2)2 我国公司治理结构的相关理论 (2)3 国外公司治理典型模式的研究 (3)3.1 英美国家公司治理结构 (3)3.2 日德国家公司治理结构 (4)4 我国上市公司治理结构存在的问题及案例分析 (5)4.1 我国上市公司外部治理结构存在的问题 (5)4.2 我国上市公司内部治理结构存在的问题 (5)4.3 案例分析——科龙事件是我国部分问题类上市公司的缩影 (7)5 完善我国上市公司治理结构的有效途径 (8)5.1 改善上市公司治理外部环境 (8)5.2 改善上市公司治理内部环境 (8)结论 (12)参考文献 (13)致谢................................................ 错误!未定义书签。
1 引言我国当前处在经济改革和转轨的新时期,公司制企业建立时间不长,证券市场从无到有不过二十几年的时间,尽管在《公司法》《证券法》等其他有关公司治理的制度在制定之初便学习了国外的先进经验,但是在上市公司治理结构等诸多方面仍有欠缺之处,近年来,中国许多上市公司接连不断地出现问题,己经严重威胁到我国资本市场和上市公司的健康发展,对我国的经济转型产生了不良影响。
我国加入WTO以后,国际竞争,可以说是各国上市企业之间的竞争,在一定程度上也是公司治理结构水平的竞争。
一个国家的证券市场如果不建立一套行之有效的公司治理系统,将会直接影响到投资者的信念和证券市场的融资功能。
如果没有好的公司治理结构,中国的国有公司无论是采取公司化的办法还是采取所有权结构多元化的方法,都不可能带来真正的实效,我国的家族和私营企业也很难摆脱“长不大”的命途。
中国政府已将建立有效的公司治理结构视为“现代企业制度”建设的核心内容。
所以,在这种背景下,积极的探讨如何建立适合我国公司的公司治理结构,具有非常大的现实和理论意义。
2 我国公司治理结构相关理论国内一些学者、教授强调公司治理结构相互制衡的作用,他们认为所谓公司治理结构,指的是由董事会、所有者和高级执行人员即高级经理三者组成的一种组织结构系统。
公司法人治理结构存在什么问题
公司法人治理结构存在什么问题公司制改革时间很长但是总体效果并不理想,那公司法人治理结构存在什么问题?接下来由的我为大家整理了一些关于这方面的知识,欢迎大家阅读!公司法人治理结构(CorporateGovernanceStructure)一词起源于西方经济学,是指由一套组织结构严密的自然人来治理公司而形成的组织结构体系。
在现代公司中,股东大会、董事会、监事会和执行机构(经理层)四部分各司其职,各负其责,相互制衡,共同组成公司法人治理结构。
我国公司法人治理结构存在的问题(一)所有者缺位状况仍未解决,由此产生“内部人控制”问题从理论上讲,改制后的公司中只要存在国家股,那么国家就是公司的股东。
国家所有,其实质就是全民所有。
但是在实际的经济运行中,全民对公司的产权并没有极强的约束力。
因此,由什么机构或人员来代表国家(全民)来履行作为出资人的股东职责、享有所有者权益、实现权利义务和责任的统一以及这种代表产生的法律依据、授权基础便成为迫切需要解决的问题。
由于国家股的代表人至今仍然不十分明确,因而造成了事实上的所有者缺位。
这就给企业的经营者为牟取个人私利或本企业职工的小集团利益以可乘之机,从而产生了“内部人控制”的问题,严重破坏了公司的法人财产权和已经组建的公司法人治理结构,使得股东和董事之间的信任委托制衡关系形同虚设。
(二)公司股权结构过于单一,政企不分,公司法人的自主经营权并未真正落实虽然我国《公司法》第4条第2款以及第5条确认了公司法人财产权和自主经营权,但由于我国公司化改制是在传统的国有企业基础上进行的,因而不可避免地出现了公司产权过分集中,国家股处于绝对控制地位,股权结构过于单一的现象,难以形成多元化投资主体,使得《公司法》赋予公司法人的自主经营权不能真正落实,公司法人实体地位难以实现。
(三)关于股东大会的问题我国国有企业经过公司化改制后,“由于公司产权过分集中,国家股处于绝对控制地位,加之我国证券市场尚不成熟,产权交易市场也未建立,而社会个人股数量和持股比例有限,个人股(股民)倾向于进行短期的投机操作,所关心的不是公司的长远发展,而是短期的股价涨跌。
corporate governance的定义
corporate governance的定义
公司治理(Corporate Governance)是指一套机制和制度安排,用以确保公司管理层的行为符合股东和其他利益相关者的利益,同时促进公司的长期稳定发展。
这套机制涵盖了公司的内部管理和外部监管,以及公司与各利益相关者之间的关系管理。
首先,公司治理的核心目标是保护股东权益。
股东作为公司的所有者,享有公司的经营成果和承担风险。
因此,公司治理机制应确保管理层以股东利益最大化为目标,避免管理层滥用职权、损害股东利益的行为发生。
其次,公司治理还包括了对公司内部管理层的监督和制衡。
这通常通过设立董事会、监事会等内部机构来实现。
董事会负责制定公司的战略和政策,并对管理层进行监督;监事会则负责监督董事会的决策和管理层的执行情况,确保公司的运营符合法律法规和股东利益。
此外,公司治理还涉及到公司与各利益相关者之间的关系管理。
这些利益相关者包括员工、客户、供应商、债权人等,他们的利益与公司的发展密切相关。
因此,公司治理机制应确保公司在追求自身利益的同时,充分考虑并维护这些利益相关者的权益。
最后,公司治理还强调透明度和信息披露。
公司应及时、准确、全面地披露其财务状况、经营状况和风险信息,以便股东和其他利益相关者做出明智的决策。
总之,公司治理是一套复杂的机制和制度安排,旨在确保公司的管理层以股东和其
他利益相关者的利益为出发点,促进公司的长期稳定发展。
良好的公司治理结构有助于提高公司的竞争力和市场信誉,为公司的长期发展奠定坚实的基础。
中投简介
概述中国投资有限责任公司(以下简称“中投公司”)成立于2007年9月29日,是依照《中华人民共和国公司法》(以下简称《公司法》)设立的从事外汇资金投资管理业务的国有独资公司。
中国财政部通过发行特别国债的方式筹集15500亿元人民币,购买了相当于2000亿美元的外汇储备作为中投公司的注册资本金。
中投公司的经营宗旨是持有、管理和投资其受托资产,在可接受的风险范围内,努力实现股东利益最大化。
中投公司独立经营,自主决策,基于经济和财务目的,在全球范围内对股权、固定收益以及多种形式的另类资产进行投资。
中投公司已建立了完整的治理结构,包括董事会、监事会和执行委员会;依照《公司法》、公司章程和董事会确定的方针政策运作,并对国务院负责。
中央汇金投资有限责任公司(以下简称“中央汇金”)是中投公司的全资子公司,自设董事会和监事会。
中央汇金投资并持有国有重点金融企业的股权,并代表国务院行使股东权利,不开展其它任何商业性经营活动,不干预其控股企业的日常经营活动。
OVERVIEWChina Investment Corporation (CIC) is an investment institution established as a wholly state-owned company under the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China and headquartered in Beijing.The mission of CIC is to make long-term investments that maximize risk adjusted financial returns for the benefit of its shareholder.CIC was established on September 29th 2007 with the issuance of special bonds worth RMB 1.55 trillion by the Ministry of Finance. These were, in turn, used to acquire approximately U SD 200 billion of China’s foreign exchange reserves and formed the foundation of its registered capital. Because its financing is grounded in financial instruments and subject to commercial obligations, CIC maintains a strict commercial orientation and is driven by purely economic and financial interests.CIC is committed to maintaining the high professional and ethical standards in corporate governance, transparency, and accountability.CIC selects investments based on established investment principles and values. under CIC usually does not take a controlling role – or seek to influence operations – in the companies in which it invests.CIC’s fundamental approach is to hold, manage, and invest its mandated assets to maximize shareholder’s value.While every investment is unique, CIC believes in the importance of having a long-term vision and, as a result, it is committed to investing for the long-term. As a commercial investment institution, CIC has full operational independence and makes its investment decisions based on its assessment of economic and financial objectives.CIC’s investments are not limited to any particular sector, geography, or asset class and include equity, fixed income, and alternative assets.CIC is committed to maintaining the highest professional and ethical standards of corporate governance, transparency, and accountability.CIC’s comprehensive three-tiered corporate governance structure includes Board of Directors, Board of Supervisors, and Executive Committee. It is governed b y the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China and the company’s Articles of Association and operating guidelines. While it operates with independence and its investment decisions are based on the pure economics of each deal, CIC remains accountable to the State Council of the People’s Republic of China and, ultimately, to the citizens of the People’s Republic of China.Central Huijin Investment Ltd. (Central Huijin) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CIC with its own Board of Directors and Board of Supervisors. It was established to invest in key state-owned financial institutions in China; it does not conduct any other commercial activities and is not involved in day-to-day issues within the institutions in which it invests.公司章程(摘要)中国投资有限责任公司(以下简称“公司”)是依照《中华人民共和国公司法》(以下简称《公司法》)设立的从事外汇资金投资管理业务的国有独资公司。
有色金属冶炼加工民营企业的法人治理结构
有色金属冶炼加工民营企业的法人治理结构随着国有企业改革的进一步深入,国有企业法人治理结构逐步清晰,国有企业管理者的股权分配在政策上逐步放开。
这无疑是中国企业改革的一大步,将有力地促进中国国有企业的业绩进一步提升。
与此同时,随着民营企业规模的扩大,管理体系的复杂程度增加,民营企业的法人治理结构的矛盾逐步显现:案例A:A集团成立20年,是行业的领头羊之一。
A集团的创始人经过长期艰苦的贸易积累,开始向产业链上游转移,进入制造环节。
由于规模扩大,管理变得复杂,创始人将兄弟姐妹四人引入自己的企业。
创业阶段,兄弟姐妹齐心协力,锐意进取,通过有效的市场策略和生产策略,历经波折,成为行业三甲之一。
随着规模进一步扩大,兄弟姐妹之间的分歧开始变大,主要在战略方向出现分歧。
由于没有清晰的产权界定,也缺乏有效的决策管理机制,兄弟姐妹都试图通过采用说服手段,达成战略一致。
事实是谁也无法说服谁,结果兄弟之间隔阂难消,成为集团进一步发展的障碍。
兄弟姐妹经常开会沟通,但是开会的时候,很难对主题进行限定,经营的方向问题、重要人事的任免激励问题、运营当中出现的细节问题,彼此之间的沟通不当问题……各种各样的问题糅杂在一起,既没有会议纪要,也没有会议决议,往往这次会议的主题又会成为下一次会议的争论。
更糟糕的是,最终谁应该对决策负责、对结果负责,也在兄弟姐妹之间的争吵中成为一份难以定论的帐单。
案例B:B集团创始人打拼10年,成为国内细分市场的老大。
随着规模扩大,集团管理体系跟不上,连续几年销售额徘徊不前,而行业此时的增长速度很快。
敏锐的创始人立刻高薪引进高级职业经理人,重新构建公司的管理体系。
随着空降兵的到任以及随后一系列的管理变革,公司的业绩开始稳步增长。
当创始人正在感慨还是管理体系效果好的时候,这位立下汗马功劳的空降兵似乎没有动力了,每天嘻嘻哈哈,不谈要领。
创始人不禁忧心忡忡。
以上只是区区两例,在现实当中,民营企业的法人治理结构的问题多样,成为发展的障碍。
十四五”时期,国有企业面临的机遇与挑战
十四五”时期,国有企业面临的机遇与挑战During the 14th Five-Year Plan d。
state-owned ___ and training。
___ services include platform company n。
state-owned enterprise reform。
and PPP consulting。
with integrated system consulting capabilities in strategic planning。
corporate governance structure。
group control。
business processes。
and human resources management.The company has an experienced and outstanding nal team。
consisting of backbone experts from nal research ___。
as well as r management experts with more than 10 years of ___ practical experience。
able to provide customized enterprise restructuring。
mixed ownership reform。
group control。
nal change。
human resources。
equity incentives。
state-owned capital investment and n companies。
debt-to-equity swaps。
financial and fund services for clients.The 14th Five-Year Plan d is a ___ China's "Two Centenary Goals" and an ___ d for the new journey of building a socialist modern strong country。
董事会在公司治理中的地位及作用 (2)
董事会在公司治理中的地位及作用 (2)董事会在公司治理中的地位及作用The board of directors’ status and role at thecompany’s governance【摘要】公司治理是现代企业制度的核心,董事会是公司治理的关键。
上市公司的董事会存在着董事会成员来源单一、结构不合理、缺乏独立性;董事会的许多职权受到限制,董事会职能虚化的问题。
这样直接地影响到董事会在公司治理中的权利以及其发挥的作用。
尽管如此,董事会在公司治理中展现的决定能力仍可体现董事会是公司治理的核心。
董事会作为公司治理的重要组成部分,其治理机制的正常发挥是公司制度得以较好发挥作用韵中心课题和重要保障。
董事会是公司治理结构的核心,是关系到公司长远发展与广大股东利益的关键所在。
因此应加强董事会的治理。
【Abstract】Corporate governance is the core of modern enterprise system, the board of directors is the key to corporate governance. The board of directors of the listed company exist board members single source, the structure unreasonable and the lack of independence.Many of the restrictions on board, the board of directors function powers derived problems. So directly affect the board in the company governance in the rights and its functions. Nonetheless, the board in corporate governance in the ability to display can still be embodied the board decision is the core of company governance. The board of directors as the important component of corporate governance, the governance mechanism of normal play is the company system to better role central subject and important guarantee for the musical. The board of directors is the core of corporate governance structure, is related to the company with the long-term development is the key to the interests of the shareholders. So it should strengthen the management board.【关键词】董事会公司治理核心地位【Key word】Board of directors Corporate governanceCore position目录:引言 (2)一、董事会在公司治理地位和作用的概述 (3)(一)董事会在公司治理中的地位 (3)(二)董事会在公司治理中的作用 (4)二、我国上市公司董事长在公司治理中的地位及作用 (6)(一)现状 (6)(二)我国上市公司董事会在公司治理中存在的问题 (7)三、如何确立地位和发挥作用 (7)四、董事会的自我评价 (8)引言在现代企业制度的框架下,董事会在我们现在大多数人熟悉的法人治理结构中,居于一种承上启下的委托代理者的角色。
2020年京东集团内部审计分析研究
摘要随着现代企业制度的建立,公司作为社会经济活动的主体,在面对时时变化的经济环境以及复杂多样的市场时,不断增加的竞争压力使其逐渐暴露出一些公司治理的问题,而拥有较为完善的公司治理结构的上市公司作为当中最具活力的部分,在面对这一处境时更是积极地寻求解决问题的途径。
于二十世纪四十年代产生的现代内部审计,在这样的大环境下得以迅速发展。
但是,在对内部审计的研究上本就滞后于西方发达国家的我国,内部审计的重要性至今仍没有受到社会的普遍接受和认可,而和内部审计相关的制度法规也处在不够完善的状态,我国的内部审计状况不容乐观。
这篇论文试图从内部审计的基本概念及相关理论出发,分析内部审计的重要性,再通过以京东为例,对京东的现今的内审制度现状进行进一步的考察,并进行原因分析,最后对比我国上市公司普遍面临的内部审计问题,探究京东的内部审计制度能给我国上市公司内部审计的发展带来的启示。
关键词内部审计;上市公司;内部审计职能;京东集团;反腐败ABSTRACTWith the establishment of the modern enterprise system, the company as the main body of social and economic activities, in the face of ever-changing economic environment and complex and diverse markets, the increasing competitive pressure has gradually exposed some corporate governance issues, and has more As the most dynamic part of a well-established corporate governance structure, listed companies are actively seeking ways to solve problems in the face of this situation. The modern internal audits produced in the 194s have developed rapidly in such a large environment.However, in the study of internal audit, it lags behind the developed countries in the West. The importance of internal audit has not been generally accepted and recognized by the society, and the internal and external auditing related regulations are also in an inadequate state. The internal audit situation in China is not optimistic. This paper attempts to analyze the importance of internal audit from the basic concepts of internal audit and related theories. Then, take JD Group as an example to further investigate the current status of JD's current internal audit system, and analyze the causes. The internal audit problems commonly faced by listed companies in China explore the implications of JD's internal audit system for the development of internal audit of listed companies in China.KeywordsInternal Audit; Listed Companies; Internal Audit Function; JD Group; Anti-corruption目录TOC \o "1-3" \h \z 绪论 11 研究背景及意义 11 研究背景 12 研究意义 22 文献综述 31 国外文献综述 32 国内文献综述 33 研究内容 44 研究方法 42 内部审计相关理论及概念 51 内部审计的涵义 52 内部审计产生的理论依据 51 受托责任理论 52 委托代理理论 63 契约理论 73 内部审计的组织模式 74 内部审计的职能 83 京东集团的内部审计现状 81 设立“内控合规部” 92 出台相关条例和制度 93 建立反腐网站及公众号 14 对内审人员开展腐败治理专项训练 14 京东集团内部审计现状原因分析 11 国家机关和相关机构的支持和鼓励 112 内部审计在公司治理中有明确定位 113 京东为内审设置了严格的制度规定 114 重视对内部审计人员的专业水平培养 125 由京东内部审计得到的行业启示 121 上市公司需要建立完整的内部审计体系 122 内部审计机构的设置要符合上市公司具体情况 133 上市公司应充分发挥内部审计的职能 134 上市公司应注重提高内部审计人员的专业素质 146 结束语 14参考文献 16致谢 17武汉纺织大学219届毕业论文191 绪论纵观国际社会,从金融证券市场较为成熟的资本主义国家,再到资本市场多元化成长的发展中国家,企业因为财务信息失真等问题而传出重大财务丑闻的情况不在少数,而由其引发的一系列社会矛盾和问题受到越来越多人的关注,企业开始关注自身的公司治理问题,内部审计作为公司治理中非常重要的一环更是被重视了起来。
治理结构与治理机制
治理结构与治理机制公司治理与企业管理(corporate management)是不同的。
通俗地讲,如果说企业管理主要是指经营班⼦对⼀般员⼯的管理,那么公司治理则指股东、出资⼈、所有者(委托⼈)对董事会、监事会、经营班⼦(代理⼈)的管理,按照代理理论,就是委托⼈对代理⼈的管理。
在这个意义上,公司治理更接近于我国国企领导班⼦建设的概念,只不过公司治理强调的是经济逻辑、法律逻辑,⽽领导班⼦建设强调的是政治逻辑。
可以讲,公司治理是企业管理的基础。
没有好的公司治理,很难有好的企业管理。
⼀般地讲,公司治理可以分为两个部分:⼀个是治理结构(governance structure),另⼀个是治理机制(governance mechanism)。
治理结构包括股权结构、董事会、监事会、经营班⼦等。
治理机制包括⽤⼈机制、监督机制和激励机制,⽐如⽤⼈机制⼜可细分为董事长⼈选、独⽴董事⼈选、CEO⼈选等。
这两者共同决定了治理效率的⾼低。
图1:公司治理⽰意图治理结构,包括股权结构、资本结构以及治理机构设置等。
解决⼀股独⼤、建⽴独⽴董事制度等,属于治理结构的问题。
我国在国企中建⽴的党组织、职代会等,也属于治理结构问题。
治理机制,有企业外部的,最典型的是资本市场的监管,也有企业内部的,最重要的是⽤⼈机制、监督机制和激励机制等。
⼗六届三中全会提出,要探索党管⼲部原则与市场化配置企业经营管理者相结合的⽅式和途径。
2003年,国资委已在6家中央企业公开招聘经营管理者,并推动中央企业实⾏经营者年薪制改⾰试点。
这些要解决的都属于治理机制问题。
从这种概念来看,仅仅建⽴董事会、监事会,或在解决⼀股独⼤上下功夫,很难达到提⾼治理效率的⽬标。
学者们对公司治理概念的理解⾄少包含以下两层含义:1.公司治理是⼀种合同关系。
公司被看作是⼀组合同的联合体,这些合同治理着公司发⽣的交易,使得交易成本低于由市场组织这些交易时发⽣的交易成本。
由于经济⾏为⼈的⾏为具有有限理性和机会主义的特征,所以这些合同不可能是完全合同,即能够事前预期各种可能发⽣的情况,并对各种情况下缔约⽅的利益、损失都作出明确规定的合同。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性,平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益,请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间:9:00-18:30)。
Listed corporate governance structure defects and falsefinancial reportingJohn Davis1.A structural deficienciesCorporate governance structure defects are false financial reports of listed companies have the root causes in recent years, with Enron, WorldCom and other blue-chip companies the shattered myths, false financial reports of listed companies issue has become the focus of attention of the public. As for listed companies preparing fraudulent financial reporting reasons, it was felt that the interests of managers chase is the fundamental and this view is unrealistic. It can be said that the emergence of false financial reports from the false self-motivation, but the fundamental reason is the system. As the accounting fraud managers often shows that the people of the economy, the economy of the mainly from the self-motivation and self-economic motives were also primarily due to the unreasonable structure of the system, because certain economic always act in a certain framework of a system of rational behavior. The reason why people in the framework of the different systems will produce different acts, not because people changed, but because they have a system in which the environment has changed, a different system structure, have a different incentive mechanism. Therefore, a different system will be different arrangements for the conduct of accounting fraud in the criticism, behind these acts should analyze the deep-seated causes. Of course, this should be a cause of the system level. Listed companies of the most important internal arrangement is the corporate governance structure, corporate governance structure is the cornerstone of the modern enterprise system and the core. The so-called corporate governance structure, this means the establishment of the system based on the theory of a group of association and the corresponding standard corporate owner, unencumbered, manager of mutual rights, obligations, interestsAn institutional arrangement. It is all of the property rights of the empowerment formed on the basis of reasonable property rights system arrangement is effective corporate governance structure necessary precondition andfoundation. The corporate governance structure is the essence of resolving ownership and control arising from the agency problem, the structure of corporate governance is the core of handling between shareholders, as well as representatives of the shareholders and clients as an agent of the relationship between the manager . Sound corporate governance structure has two major functions of incentive and restraint, the so-called stimulants, and is based on the principal-agent relationship based on the owners and operators of such rights and responsibilities in the General Assembly designed to ensure that the company's shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors and the manager of Oxfam their level, the operator can be given full operational autonomy, but also protect the rights of owners and make full use of the overall function and the function is bound instructed all right assets in mutual separation of state , to maintain effective restraint and supervision so that the rights of all assets mastered and used strictly as possible by appropriate asset liability constraints, defeated Germany acts to prevent the widespread occurrence. Of course, these two functions are inseparable.The false financial reports should be generated by the two indispensable part of First speculation books, the United States fraudulent financial reporting committee. Be called "fraudulent financial reporting '; Second, buying registered accountants or accounting firms to change purchasing accounting principles Typically, speculation books listed company, registered accountants to follow minimum standards and professional practice caution can check out, the listed companies in order to make false financial reports Notice must buy registered accountants to make it an unqualified opinion issued by the audit reports. Clearly, these two subjects are not with the corporate governance structure is directly related to standardize because under the new "Accounting Law," provides that the people responsible for the unit's accounting practices and accounting information responsible for the authenticity and integrity, while head of listed companies is the chairman of the board and chairman of the board of directors responsible for the turn to the shareholder meeting, the general manager responsible to the Board of Directors, subject to the direct supervision of the chairman, if the corporate management structure norms, "two ofthe three-tier" system of sound financial management effective in the country's major shareholders and managers are considered to be internal. investor-friendly acts will be inspired, and undercut, to the detriment of investors behavior will be an effective restraint and supervision, the interests of medium and small investors good protection will be subject to the above two areas, all avoidable, no false financial report on the survival of space. problem lies in the shareholder structure of listed companies in China unreasonable and seriously affect the management structure of China's listed companies with the management efficiency, resulting in corporate governance structural defects, incentive and restraint function weakening, it is false to the inherent false needs and opportunities, forgery behaviors will not promptly, effectively contained and cooking the books wantonly.2.Perfect Board systemClear stake in the Board of the transfer of responsibilities through the introduction of outside directors, controlling shareholders to change the board complete control of the situation and avoid the appointment of directors own their own manager and general manager in particular the chairman of the integration of the two occurred, and give full play to various special committees in particular the role of the Board, the Board should, based on the general meeting of shareholders and all shareholders and responsible attitude, earnestly implement the "Company Law" provisions of the terms of reference, to properly perform the duties of the owner of financial management, the strengthening of internal restraint and supervision to prevent managers set decision-making power, the Executive, and supervise, thus curbing the emergence of false financial reports.Establish and improve the system of independent directors set up an independent directors, the board can change the one hand, the internal structure, improving the overall quality of the board, increasing the openness and democratic decision-making, controlling shareholder constraints, on the other hand can supervise managers, to reduce internal control of independent directors to take a truly objective and fair stance on the protection of the company to protect shareholders, especially the interests of small and medium shareholders, regulateindependent director system, "step up training so that the independent directors of both possess a certain amount of accounting knowledge, and have stronger Comprehensive judgment, ability to innovate and macro-management strategy analysis. independent directors to work actively and property concern, it should allow access to its obligations and responsibilities under the corresponding reasonable remuneration, but the decision to prevent the return of shareholders fell control or managers.3. Strengthen manager incentiveMajor reflected in revenue system and organizational system. On the revenue system, the annual salary system does not exist the manager's effective incentive and restraint, on the contrary-induced performance fictional manager to obtain improper compensation. For company managers are the efforts made their due reward, inevitably restricted the company through stock options, and other ways to allow managers to participate in the remaining allocation to play manager's enthusiasm and ability to innovate, but also to prevent the manager "internal transactions act! "that is, when the company's long-term development problems, those who know the inside story of a manager in the near future through the company cooking the books to create the illusion of prosperity, the company announced in early operating losses before selling their stock out." the manager of the re-organization system for the improvement of corporate governance is very important, the following areas should strengthen the organization system manager rescheduling:! general manager will be bound directly into the board of directors, supervision; "break with traditional administrative path , the market standard choice manager, it is necessary to pay more attention to personal management can speed up the development manager market, creating a large enough group of managers, increased competitive pressures, forcing managers to work hard, thereby external forces to restrain manager deviated from the company to maximize value, it is especially important to prevent them through the preparation of false financial reports to deceive investors, strengthen the manager's legally binding.4.Perfect system of the board of supervisorsIf the board of supervisors to faithfully perform their duties, can be effectively bound by the directors and managers; false financial reports on a "firewall" role, according to the "Company Law" provides that the board of supervisors is the main duty of the company's financial inspection of directorsManagers exercise their functions and powers and violated the laws, regulations or corporate conduct supervision of the Constitution, when the directors and managers of damage to the interests of the company, require directors and managers to be rectified. The Board of Supervisors should set reasonable and clear to members of duties, powers and responsibilities of Prevent an internal control of the board of supervisors through training and study to continuously upgrade the quality of the business, thereby improving the monitoring capacity of the board of supervisors. Of course, the work of the board of supervisors should be a regular, the general meeting of shareholders on the board of supervisors should also strengthen inspection and supervision.5.Full play to the supervisory role of finance directorThe two separated in the right conditions, because owners and operators are not entirely in the interests of consistency, we need to set up representative of the interests of the owner of the Financial Controller manager for financial supervision. Finance Director through participation in the company's financial planning, regulation and controlThe implementation of the financial plan, and significant funds for the use of the regulation signed, the veracity of the financial report, a review of reliability, such as the exercise of their powers, to constrain the manager's behavior, an internal control system exhibition, which regulate the company's financial activities addressing operational decision-making errors, and financial balance of chaos and false financial reporting issues.6.Strengthen external oversightThe securities regulatory departments, registered accountants dealing with the governance structure of listed companies Reconstruction situation better guidance and supervision, increase the intensity of punishment prompted companyshareholders meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors and senior managers of internal controls and checks and balances between the function of filling The play, to prevent false and arbitrary change of firms to purchase accounting principles. At the same time, improve the relevant laws, regulations, laws, laws must be strictly enforced, and that increase the intensity of punishment are false, so as to enhance the fabrication costs and make false to lose more than they gain, a false financial report can be effective containment.。