企业财务控制机制与企业绩效：基于价值的管理系统案例【外文翻译】

本科毕业论文（设计）

外文翻译

原文：

Corporate Financial Control Mechanisms and Firm Performance: The Case of Value-Based Management Systems Effective corporate governance and financial control includes the use of monitoring and incentive mechanisms to align divergent interests between shareholders and managers and encourage the creation of shareholder value. Value-based management systems (VBM) provide an integrated management strategy and financial control system intended to increase shareholder value by mitigating agency conflicts. In concept, VBM reduces agency conflicts and helps create shareholder value since it reveals value-increasing decisions to employees, allows for easier monitoring of managers’ decisions, and provides a method to tie compensation to that create shareholder value. However, the degree to which VBM systems actually improve the economic performance of publicly held firms is an open question. To gain insight into this issue, we examine the use and economic efficacy of value-based management systems by 84 firms that adopt VBM systems from 1984 to 1997.

Our primary goal is to examine whether the adoption of a VBM system improves economic performance. We recognize that firm performance and the decision to tie compensation to a VBM metric can be endogenous, which creates a potential sample selection bias. For instance, firms that are performing poorly face tougher challenges to creating economic value and could be more likely to tie compensation to VBM to provide managers the incentives to overcome these challenges. Alternatively, managers who expect to achieve a certain level of performance can negotiate a compensation contract based on the VBM metric that essentially assures a bonus payout. Our sample includes firms that base compensation on VBM metrics, but also firms that use VBM for analysis and evaluation only. Thus, we can examine why

firms choose to tie compensation to VBM, which allows us to control for potential sample selection bias that results from endogenous relations between compensation plans and firm performance.

The literature on property rights and agency theory maintains that different incentives lead to conflicts between shareholders and managers of the public firm that result in a loss in firm value. Ultimately, the shareholders bear this loss. Value-based management provides an integrated management strategy and financial control system designed to mitigate these agency conflicts and increase shareholder value.VBM systems attempt to accomplish this goal by providing managers with a set of decision-making tools (metrics) that, at least in theory, identify which alternatives create or destroy value, and often by linking compensation and promotions to shareholder value. Firms can use these metrics to monitor and reward management performance. They provide a mechanism for linking managers’ decisions to firm performance outcomes that create shareholder value and provide a means to further align shareholder and managerial interests.

We identify four variations of VBM metrics from these articles in the popular press. All of the metrics are similar in that they are single-period measures of performance that take into account return on invested capital and the relevant cost of capital. They are all consistent with discounted cash flow valuation. Although consulting firms have popularized these metrics, many companies apply their own versions of the metrics. We do not take any given metric to represent the work of a consulting firm that may have popularized the method.

Despite the attention afforded value-based management techniques and their widespread application, we have scant evidence on their ability to improve firm performance. Much of the existing empirical research, often conducted by the consulting firms who market value-based management systems, focuses on the relations between the metrics (or value-drivers) and shareholder value. These studies by consultants document positive relations between performance metrics and historical stock-price performances. In contrast, an academic study by Biddle, et al., (1997) concludes that EVA explains shareholder returns no better than earnings.