经济学人读译Who’s afraid of Huawei谁在害怕华为？

【导读】中国的电信跨国公司给海外带来的威胁到底是在信息安全方面，还是在市场竞争方面？应对“华为威胁论”需要进一步加强监管审查；而华为本身也应当做出透明性调整
Chinese multinat ionals
中国的跨国公司
Who’s afraid of Huawei?
谁在害怕华为？
The rise of a Chinese world-beater is stoking fears of cyber-espionage. Techno-nationalism is not the answer
一家举世瞩目的中国公司崛起，加剧了关于网络间谍活动的恐慌。

技术民族主义并非解决方案
Aug 4th 2012 | from the print edition
CHINESE companies have started to win first place in global markets. Huaw ei has just overtaken Sweden’s Ericsson to become the world’s largest telecoms-equipment-maker. Even though many foreigners still cannot pronounce its name (some call it “Hawaii”, and the firm has even produced a video teaching people to say hwah-way), Huawei is becoming an increasingly powerful global player, capable of going head-to-head with the best in intensely competitive markets. It follows Haier, which is already the leading white-goods-maker; now Lenovo is challenging Hewlett-Packard as the world’s biggest
PC-maker. Plenty more will follow (see article).
中国公司已经开始在全球市场上赢得了领先地位。

华为公司日前超过了瑞典的爱立信公司，成了世界上最大的电信设备生产商。

尽管还有很多外国人无法正确读出它的名字（有人把它念成“夏威夷”，而该公司甚至放出了一部视频来教人们读“华为”二字）【注1】，华为正在成为越来越强大的全球竞争者，可以在竞争激烈的市场中和顶尖企业正面交锋。

在华为之前，还有海尔公司——它已经是全球领先的大件家电生产商。

如今，联想正在挑战惠普作为世界上最大PC 制造商的地位。

还有很多的公司将紧随其后朝着业界领军的方向前进（见另文）。

Huawei, a private firm, is a standard-bearer in China’s long march into Western markets. Its founder, Ren Zhengfei, who served as an engineer in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), at first struggled to win customers even in China. But his company followed Mao’s strategy of using the countryside to encircle and capture the cities, and it has moved on to win foreign markets too: in Europe it is involved in over half of the superfast 4G telecoms networks that have been announced, and it has become a strong competitor in mobile phones (see article). The company is now a $32-billion business empire with 140,000 employees, and customers in 140 countries. It commands respect by delivering high-quality telecoms equipment at low prices.
作为一家私营公司，华为在中国进入西方市场的长征中是领军企业。

该公司创始人任正非【注2】曾在中国人民解放军中担任工程师。

最初，华为甚至在中国国内都难以立足，任正非为了吸引客户费尽心力。

但他的公司遵循了毛泽东“农村包围城市”的战略，并已经开始攻占海外市场了。

在欧洲已经宣布的超高速4G电信网络建设中，超过一半的工程有华为参与。

同时该公司还成了手机市场中的强力竞争者（见另文）。

如今，华为已经俨然是一家商业帝国，雇佣14万员工、营业额达320亿美元、在140个国家拥有客户。

它以质优价廉的电信设备赢得了市场赞誉。

They did it Huawei
他们以华为的方式行事
But Huawei inspires fear too—and not just among its competitors. The company is said to be too close for comfort to the PLA. Westerners fret that the networks the firm is building are used by Chinese spooks to eavesdrop during peacetime and could be shut down suddenly during wartime. They see the firm as a potent weapon in China’s burgeoning cyber-arsenal.
但华为也引起了一些恐慌——而且这种恐慌不仅仅局限于它的竞争者之中。

据说该公司和中国人民解放军的关系过于密切，让人不安。

西方人担忧华为正在建设的网络会被中国情报人员所利用——在和平年代用来窃听，并可能在战时突然被封锁关闭。

他们把华为视作中国迅速发展的网络兵工厂的有力武器。

It is a view that some governments are taking seriously. Earlier this year Australia blocked Huawei’s participation in a scheme to build a national broadband network in the country.
The company has also faced opposition to its commercial expansion in India. And in America, where Huawei’s attempts to grow have often been stymied, a congressional committee that focuses on intelligence matters is putting the firm under a microscope; suspicions have been aggravated by a recent spate of cyber-attacks attributed to Chinese hackers.
对于这种观点，有些国家的政府不敢轻忽。

今年早些时候，在澳大利亚架设全国宽带网络的方案中，政府不允许华为参与。

华为还想在印度进行商业扩张，但也吃了闭门羹。

而在美国，华为试图进行发展，政府却从中阻挠。

专注于情报事务的国会委员会对华为进行了细致入微的调查。

美国最近遭到了接二连三的网络攻击，有人认为这是中国黑客的杰作。

由此，人们对于华为的猜疑更重了。

Western governments are also suspicious of the subsidies, low-interest loans and generous export credits lavished on favoured champions, including Huawei. The European Commission is considering opening an investigation. Some people suppose that the Chinese government is helping Huawei win overseas contracts so that spies can exploit its networks to snoop on ever more of the world’s electronic traffic.
西方政府还怀疑包括华为在内的顶尖公司享有优惠，中国政府给了它们过多的补贴、低利息贷款和慷慨的出口信贷。

欧盟委员会正在考虑对此展开调查。

有人认为中国政府在帮助华为赢取海外合约，以便让谍报人员利用其网络来进一步窥探全球电子通信网。

Arguments against imports always need to be viewed with caution, since they will be used by protectionists to keep emerging rivals out. Still, it is reasonable to worry about security in telecoms: recent reports have pointed to the efforts of Chinese state-sponsored hackers to vacuum up valuable Western commercial secrets on a massive scale. Western intelligence agencies are also alert to the risks of eavesdropping and cyber-attacks because they themselves are practitioners (a prime example being the Stuxnet virus, aimed at Iran’s nuclear programme). As for Huawei, a firm that controls a network’s creation and management is ideally placed to sneak in malware and sneak out sensitive data. Even though it is a private company with an awful lot to lose if it were caught spying, the power of the state in China’s version of capitalism means the West is right to be vigilant.
反对进口的论调总是需要谨慎看待，因为贸易保护主义者将借此排挤新晋竞争对手。

不过，担忧电信安全情有可原：最近有报告指出，受中国政府资助的黑客正在大规模攫取宝贵的西方商业机密。

西方情报机构也对潜在的窃听和网络攻击保持着警惕，因为它们本身也精于此道（针对伊朗核计划的Stuxnet 病毒就是很好的例子）。

至于华为，该公司控制着网络的架构和管理，让它来植入恶意软件并窃取敏感数据真是再合适不过了。

华为是一家私营公司，如果被发现从事间谍活动，它将面临重大损失。

然而中国式资本主义中的国家力量意味着西方有理由保持警觉。

But banning Huawei from bidding for commercial contracts is wrongheaded, for two reasons. One is that the economic benefit of competition from China in general and Huawei in particular is huge. It boosts growth and thus wellbeing. Huawei’s cheap but
effective equipment helped make Africa’s mobile-telecoms revolution possible.
但禁止华为对商业合同进行投标，却是有失偏颇了。

原因有二。

其一，无论是有中国整体或是华为个体参与竞争，都有着巨大的经济收益。

这样可以推动增长、实现繁荣。

华为质优价廉的设备曾让非洲的移动电信革命成为了可能。

Distrust and verify
不信任？来验证
The other reason for not banning Huawei is the dirty little secret that its foreign rivals strangely neglect to mention: just about everybody makes telecoms equipment in China these days. Chinese manufacturers and designers have become an integral part of the global telecoms supply chain. Blocking Huawei (or its rival Chinese telecoms giant, ZTE) while allowing gear from, say, Alcatel-Lucent or Ericsson on a network may make politicians feel good. But it is no guarantee of security. Huawei’s competitors have a vested interest in hyping concerns about it, while disguising their own reliance on Chinese subcontractors and on subsidies.
不对华为加以阻挠还有另一层原因，就是一种肮脏的小秘密——华为的海外竞争对手对此避而不谈，让人生疑。

那就是当今中国的电信设备生产商实在是太多了。

中国的制造商和设计者已经成了全球电信供应链中不可或缺的一环。

对华为（或是它在中国的竞争对手——电信巨头中兴）关上大门，而在网络中采用阿尔卡特或是爱立信生产的设备，这可能会博得政界的好感，但绝非什么安全保障。

华为的竞争对手大肆鼓吹“华为威胁论”并掩饰自身对于中国分包商和政府补贴的依赖，这其中确实存在既得利益。

The answer is to insist on greater scrutiny all round, not just of Chinese firms. Governments should be crystal-clear about what conditions telecoms firms need to meet to win business—something America’s secretive security-review process does not do today. They should also do more to ensure that equipment is secure, no matter who makes it. That means demanding to know where hardware components and software come from, and requiring intrusive random inspections of code and equipment. America has no effective system of supply-chain checks. In Britain, by contrast, where BT is a big customer, Huawei has established a unit (run in close co-operation with GCHQ, Britain’s signals-intelligence agency) with security-cleared personnel, including former employees of GCHQ, who vet gear from China before it is installed. Such scrutiny will drive up costs, but these pale in comparison with those imposed by bans on Chinese firms, which diminish competition and push up prices.
解决方案在于对整个业界进行更深入的全面审查，而非仅仅针对中国公司。

各国政府应当阐明电信公司要拿到生意所必须符合的先决条件——而现今的美国机密安全审查程序还没有做到这一点。

各国政府还应当做更多工作来确保设备的安全性，无论它是由谁所生产的。

这意味着：需要知道硬件部件和软件产自哪里，并需要对设备和代码进行硬性随机抽查。

美国没有行之有效的供应链检查系统。

相比之下，由于在英国有英国电信（British Telecom, BT）这样的大客户，华为成立了一个人员经过安全审查的部门（和英国的信号情报机构GCHQ
密切合作运营）【注3】，其中包括了GCHQ 前员工，他们负责在安装中国生产的设备前对其进行检查。

这样的彻底审查将抬高成本；但相比禁止中国公司从而使竞争减少、价格上升的行为，这种检查所带来的成本不过是小巫见大巫罢了。

Huawei can also help allay foreigners’ fears. The company’s opaque ownership structure and secretive culture have damaged its reputation. It needs to be far more open. One way to achieve this would be for the closely held firm to seek a listing on a global stockmarket—if not in America, then at least in Hong Kong. Greater openness would also help clarify the real threat that Chinese firms such as Huawei pose to America and other countries: that they are starting to out-innovate the home-grown competition.
华为也能帮助外国人减轻恐慌之情。

该公司不透明的所有制结构和讳莫如深的文化损害了它的声誉。

它需要进行大幅度的开放。

一种方法就是让这家封闭型控股公司在某个全球股市寻求上市——如果无法在美国上市，至少也要在香港。

更大的透明度将有助于外界了解一点：如果说华为等中国公司对西方国家有什么威胁的话，那真正的威胁不是别的，正是华为在同西方本土企业竞争时已经开始在创新方面领先了。

from the print edition | Leaders
译者注：
1. 外国人之所以会读错是因为华为的字母拼写“Huawei”和Hawaii 形似。

而文中的“hwah-way”是外国人按照英文规则来读“华为”的汉语拼音所产生的读音。

2. 任正非（1944年——），是中国大陆的民营电信设备企业——华为公司的创始人兼总裁。

任正非是中共党员，中共第十二次全国代表大会代表。

任正非曾参军，退役前是某军队研究所领导。

1980年前后，由于中国大规模裁减军队，任正非携带创业资金退役来到深圳；1988年创办华为。

华为最初代理香港产小型交换机，后自主研发万门交换机成功，逐渐发展为中国大陆研发能力最强的电信设备制造商。

任正非深居简出，神秘莫测，是中国现代突出的企业家，分析来看，其性格鲜明，思想极具战略性和开放性，睿智、务实、坚韧，在公司内部具有极高威望，在国内外多次被评为最具影响力商业领袖。

3. GCHQ 是政府通信总部（Government Communications Headquarters）的简称。

它是英国从事通讯、电子侦察、邮件检查的情报机构。

与军情五处、军情六处并列为英国三大情报机构。

4. the closely held firm 指股份握于少数人手中的公司。

文中译为“封闭型控股公司”。