Beyond Good and Evil Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future 尼可_3140300346

课程名称：希腊罗马哲学专业年级：______ _国际经济与贸易 2014年级学号：_ __3140300346______学生姓名：______尼可（留学生）___论文题目：__Beyond good and evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the futureBeyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the FutureFRIENDICH NEITZSCHEThe very title of this work indicates that Nietzsche puts an end to the ethics, rejecting its basic concepts and especially the opposition between good and evil, the consideration of the good as the principle of morality. "We immorality," he says. This "we" is not quite clear, because Nietzsche alone, he has no supporters, it is therefore not the head of a group of like-minded people. And yet this "we" is no accident. Royal decrees began with the words: "We..." do Not imitate Nietzsche's Royal etiquette? Nietzsche, who was proud that he was named after the Prussian king was also aware of himself as a king in the realm of the spirit. And his judgments, like Royal decree, do not require justification. Morality, he explains, becomes a problem because there are many morals. Therefore every morality inevitably narrows the term, i.e. the opportunity to consider the phenomenon from different angles, from different perspectives, since perspective can always be changed. But if you have a morality, it means that there are moral phenomena. However, contrary to this, Nietzsche asserts: "No moral phenomena, only moral interpretation of phenomena" (2, 296). Moral interpretation however it may be understood Nietzsche, there are, of course, a moral phenomenon.And his judgments, like Royal decree, do not require justification. Morality, he explains, becomes a problem because there are many morals. Therefore every morality inevitably narrows the term, i.e. the opportunity to consider the phenomenon from different angles, from different perspectives, since perspective can always be changed. But if you have a morality, it means that there are moral phenomena. However, contrary to this, Nietzsche asserts: "No moral phenomena, only moral interpretation of phenomena" (2, 296). Moral interpretation however it may be understood Nietzsche, there are, of course, a moral phenomenon. This follows in particular from the "ontology" of the philosopher, according to which there are not facts, but interpretations.Hence a moral interpretation of phenomena that are themselves interpretations, there is nothing like morality, although it acts in this case as the interpretation of interpretation. However, in the same work Nietzsche speaks of morality as a fact. It is not surprising, therefore, that the subjectivist understanding of morality, which is a retelling of the teachings of Schopenhauer of the world as representation, does not prevent Nietzsche to describe morality as a spiritual condition, signs of which exist objectively. Communities, peoples, States, churches are, according to him, the species herd status and the corresponding morality: "Morality in Europe today is herd animal morality" (2, 320). But the "herd morality" - the morality of most people is not the only morality. Requirement of one morality for all is ridiculous. "There is a morality of masters and morality of slaves" (2, 381). Thus Nietzsche, who repeatedly argued that morality does not exist, i.e. is only a superstition, and proves in this work, despite its title ("beyond good and evil"), the need for a higher morality, believing that it may be peculiar only to the aristocrats of the spirit. The ambivalence of this, at first glance, the new statement of ethical problems, not in the least understood philosopher not only because of the subjectivity of his philosophizing, but also because he does not believe a logical sequence, free from incompatible proposals, whatever dignity*. What is the subject of this higher morality? Nietzsche is talking here about Superman, but it still goes on the person of the highest kind.In this context, is formulated moral ideal: "to Live, maintaining a monstrous and proud tranquility; always beyond? - Seem to have their affects, their "for" and "against", or not to have them... And to be master of their four virtues: of courage, insight, sympathy, solitude" (2, 398). The moral ambivalence of this credo is evident. How can you be always beyond good and evil, if Nietzsche had already chosen his moral stand, calling the Supreme morality and so refused to actually state in the same work of immoralist? How can we talk about the arbitrariness in relation to its affects, if Nietzsche denies freedom of choice and freedom of will at all? Is it possible, bearing in mind the views of Nietzsche, considered compassion a virtue? After all, can be sympathy and compassion, which is constantly up in arms against Nietzsche, attributing compassion, selfishness, and other vices. It is significant that Nietzsche believes that virtue alone.His aversion to "herd"consciousness is in general a misanthropic, to put it mildly, attitude towards people. This has already been discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. Probably, this hostile attitude towards others is to a certain extent explained by his morbid condition. To this must be added and such an important circumstance: the books of Nietzsche almost throughout his life are not in demand not only among readers, but also among professional philosophers, historians, psychologists. Nietzsche very painfully experiences the indifference of readers and the publishers complaining that his books do not attract buyers. He tries to console himself, arguing that only mediocrities, possessing a certain dexterity, resourcefulness, gain success with the reading public. But in addition to mediocrity, there are also geniuses who enjoy universal recognition. Nietzsche admires the poetry of Goethe, Byron, Heine, and Dostoyevsky's novels. This admiration is inseparable from bitterness: after all, no one recognizes him, also genius. Hence it is clear not only Nietzsche and loneliness as a fact, but also his glorification of loneliness as virtues. "Do not become attached to the person, even to the most beloved, - every person is a prison, as well as an angle.Attached to the Fatherland, even to the most suffering and in need of assistance... Not to cling to compassion, though it were of the highest people... Not to get attached to science, even though she was attracted to a person dearest, and apparently, we saved finds. Not to get attached to my own liberation... Not to get attached to our own virtues..." (2, 273). Briefly express the meaning of this imperative, he says one thing: to live in society, but be free from it. But society is not only a few directly surrounding the philosopher people. Society is the interaction between a huge numbers of people, is a diverse public relations, both material and spiritual. Society - the Foundation and source of all inherent individual abilities, needs, knowledge and skills. Even all his features including his genius - is also a social product, a cultural phenomenon that does not exclude the initiative of the individual, his perseverance in the realization of your calling and the ensuing objectives. Nietzsche, of course, realized that the loneliness, - as he understood it, is unattainable and, in fact, undesirable. But he sought to be alone, craving public recognition of his genius. Of course, the ambivalence of the above provisions, like other aphorisms of Nietzsche, is not subject to correction by the defect. On the contrary, it largely overcomes the one-sidedness, extravagance, shockingutterances of the philosopher, who corrects himself, not realizing it. Therefore, the negation of "moral phenomena", i.e. immoralist, is compensated by the recognition of higher, authentic morality. However, purely one-sided nits - Rzewski features of everyday morality as herd consciousness does not overcome the opposite proposition about a higher morality, which, according to Nietzsche, inherent only to a few, exceptional people. It just shows that not always Nietzsche makes concessions for himself at least in order to clarify a particular position. Some of his sayings Nietzsche put it beyond any criticism. These are primarily "aristocratic" views of the philosopher, aristocratic in quotes because we are talking about a spiritual aristocracy However, the name is accompanied by the subtitle "Prelude to a philosophy of the future", which indicates that no questions of morality, and the question about the fate of philosophy is Nietzsche. He denies all previous philosophy, reducing all its content to the dogmas and the dogmatic method of philosophizing. Not included in the analyses of dogmatism, its significantly different from each other forms (ancient philosophy, medieval European scholasticism, the philosophy of the New time is quite different in this respect from each other), he strongly opposes systematically, rightly condemning it as "a noble childishness". It is known that any distinguished philosopher, created his system as a system of complete knowledge, not subject to any kind of review, and especially further development. The system, which should be distinguished from the systematic presentation of content, inevitably doomed every philosophical doctrine to be defeated, which remained, at best, only some basic ideas that are independent of the fact that they gave complete. Nietzsche is not limited to criticism of systematically. He sees dogmatism also in the fact that the doctrines proclaimed as self-sufficient truths, despite the fact that they were not previously questioned. Indicative of this, in his opinion, Plato's theory of transcendent ideas and the good as the highest good in the afterlife. "Talk about spirit and the good as Plato says, it means, no doubt, to put the truth upside down and denying the very prospect, i.e. the basic condition of all life..." (2, 240). There is no self-knowledge, under the banner of which are philosophers. There can be a self-pursuit of knowledge. Philosophy is generated, the conviction of Nietzsche, one of the inherent human instincts, which is knowledge as a means to achieve goals unrelated to cognition, independent of him. This rootedness ofphilosophy in non-philosophical, is not a cognitive activity, can't you see don't want to see philosophers. Therefore, they argue that philosophy is generated by a tireless thirst for truth, inherent to the human being curiosity.It is the belief of the philosophers is not just an illusion or delusion. Illusions and delusions necessary, useful, fruitful. Philosophical views are not only theoretically untenable, but also malicious. Equally untenable and detrimental characteristic of philosophy contraindication truth to the illusions and misconceptions. Illusion and delusion that are "revealing" philosophers, in fact, not less valuable than the truth. Perhaps even more valuable. "With all values, what can pertain the true, the truthful, unselfish, it is still possible that illusion, the will to deception, selfishness, and lust must be assigned a higher and more unquestionable value of all life" (2, 242). The belief that truth is more important than illusion, is characterized by Nietzsche as moral prejudice. Illusion, delusion inherent in life, which, in essence, nothing to do with the truth. The lies that philosophers reviled as being unacceptable, malicious, and harmful in all respects, in fact, is the most important prerequisite of life. "To recognize the lie for the condition on which depends the life, is of course risky way to resist the usual sense of the value of things, and philosophy brave enough for it, puts himself has one that is beyond good and evil" (2, 243). Thus, the traditional belief in the truth of its superiority over the misconception is, from the point of view of Nietzsche, pernicious delusion than those misconceptions that need life, a person needs to survive no matter what. However, Nietzsche distinguishes between useful and harmful misconceptions. The truth, in which all previous philosophy had only seen good, often turns out to be harmful, dangerous, real threat of life itself, he says. That is why the knowledge of a life fraught with mortal danger, and sometimes even just death. Human intelligence ought to measure that portion of the truth which it can stand. The proportion of this, typically small. Nietzsche, exposing a witty criticism of the juxtaposition of truth and error, however, cannot actually abandon this opposition the only difference is that he takes under the protection of the fallacy, claiming that it is more necessary to life than truth. But he, in spite of this opposition, abolishes the contrast between truth and error. In place of opposites is the distinction, but this distinction between truth and error there is a differenceonly in the degree of illusion. Imaginary — this is what characterizes not only the life but knowledge. Should not, therefore, to attribute to science the pursuit of knowledge of the truth. A scientist, of course, as a rule, I am convinced that this is the task of science and of his own task. This self-deception that fuels and supports science, should not take philosophy seriously. Philosophy seeks always and everywhere to reveal the imaginary as the primary definition of reality. "Whichever philosophical point of view were we now, from all sides is the kind of world in which we think we live is the most loyal of just what else might catch our eyes..." (2, 268). All of this relates to the external world, which, from this point of view, there are already external. Subjectivist considerations of Nietzsche is obvious not only to the reader but to the philosopher who is not inclined, of course, to solipsism. Therefore, he insists that it is not only imaginary. Authentic and what is imaginary. It is reliable is rooted in our senses. Sensitive data is irrefutable. He even argues that sense data comes from the "any evidence of the truth." Sensationalism, in his opinion, should be adopted as a "guiding hypothesis." Of course, the sensationalism can also be made subjectivist insights bordering on solipsism. Nietzsche is well aware of this danger. So he writes: "with a clear conscience to do physiology, you need to assume that the sense organs are not phenomena in the sense of idealistic philosophy... some say even that the external world is like the creation of our bodies.But then our body, as part of this external world, would be the creation of our bodies... Therefore, the outside world is not a creation of our bodies" (2, 251-252). This provision may not agree 235 is only an objective idealist, but a materialist, of course, if not to bring the outside world to the imaginary. Nietzsche is not a supporter of either materialism or idealism that allows him to make the situation as acceptable and unacceptable these philosophical directions, and thus, to rise (apparently) on these contrasts and on all sorts of "isms" in General. This philosophical position could be called eclectic, but eclecticism is not inherent in the philosophy of Nietzsche, as it is a collection of fragments, aphorisms, which are logically connected to each other, can swap places and can be removed from the text without any change of the meaning of its content. In this kind of dignityof Nietzsche's philosophy, which declares the various, often incompatible views,each of which becomes more meaningful when it is supplemented by an opposing philosopher? However, despite the diversity expressed by Nietzsche provisions can be concluded that in the end he inclined to skepticism. "Let not mistaken the great minds - skeptics. Zarathustra is a skeptic. The fortress of freedom resulting from spiritual power and its excess, proved to skepticism" (2, 680). A radical negation of previous philosophy (with the exception of... philosophy of Schopenhauer and skepticism) is the basis of the conclusion about the necessity of a new type of philosophy, philosophy of the future, according to Nietzsche. About the content of this philosophy is stated very sparingly and definitely not enough. The philosophers of the future will be the masters and creators, the creators of new values. They become the "evil conscience of his time" (2, 336). This thesis should, apparently, be understood in the sense that the new philosophers will act as the ruthless criticism of all that exists, denying all temporary, transient, every "now". The philosophy of the future will be independent of her time, she would confront him. The philosopher as "a man bearing great responsibility with conscience, which fits the overall development of man - this philosopher will make use of religions for the purposes of disciplining and upbringing the same way as other political and economic conditions" (2, 287). This position of Nietzsche shows that the new approach to religion.Not in the sense that he refuses to atheism. No, he remains an atheist, but now it is politically suitable to religion and begins to see in it the means of spiritual subjugation of masses of people.The philosopher of the future, from his point of view, cannot be a politician. Needless to say, I do not mean just the current policy with its limited private purposes. The philosopher of the future with contempt for the political routine, small things. "Time for small politics is gone: already the coming century carries with him the struggle for supremacy over the entire globe - the compulsion to great politics" (2, 332). Nietzsche, therefore, fully aware that the ruling powers of his time striving to dominate the world. His attitude to this desire is rather positive than negative. In any case, it is the great policy, the goals of which, however, as yet nothing more is said. The work "beyond good and evil" is characterized by some researchers of the teachings of Nietzsche as a radicalturning point in terms of transition to a new circle of ideas. In my opinion, for this assessment there was insufficient evidence. With the exception of the thesis of the great policy, all other provisions, in some formulation or other, had already met in the previous works of Nietzsche, part of even the earliest.。