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纳税筹划文献综述及外文文献资料

纳税筹划文献综述及外文文献资料

纳税筹划文献综述及外文文献资料本文档包括改专题的:外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献信息标题:Effect of Tax Planning on Firms Market Performance: Evidence from Listed Firms in Ghana 作者:Kawor, Seyram; Kportorgbi, Holy Kwabla期刊:International Journal of Economics and Finance第6卷,第3期,页码:162-168,2014年Effect of Tax Planning on Firms Market Performance: Evidence from Listed Firms in GhanaKawor, Seyram; Kportorgbi, Holy KwablaAbstractThe study sought to ascertain the level of tax planning of firms and to explore the relationship between tax planning and firms' market performance. The study used 22 non-financial companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange over a twelve year period from 2000. The longitudinal correlative designed was used. The results indicate that that firms' tendency to engage in intensive tax planning activities reduces when tax authorities maintain low corporate income tax rates. Secondly, tax planning has a neutral influence on firms' performance. This finding challenges the general perception that every cedi of tax savings from tax planning reflect in the pocket of investors. It is concluded that investors must institute systems to ensure tax planning benefits reflect significantly in their pockets.Keywords: Ghana stock exchange, tax planning, market performance, longitudinal correlative design, investors1. IntroductionOver the years and throughout the world, the history of taxation brings out one fact; that taxes are coercive in nature and therefore economic units which are assigned the tax liability never wholly intend to bear the actual tax burden (Commonwealth Association of Tax Administrators (CATA), 2007). Economic units, more specifically, corporate bodies are always adopting ways to minimise, postpone, or avoid entirely, the payment of tax. The attempts by the economic units to reduce, postpone or avoid tax payment can be legal or illegal. The legal means is called tax planning while the illegal means is called tax evasion. The dire consequence of tax evasion makes it an unattractive option for listed companies (Murphy, 2004).The practice of tax planning dates back to 1947 when learned judge Hand, in the case Commissioner v Newman, held that there is nothing sinister in arranging ones affairs so as to keep taxes as low as possible. Hoffman's (1961) tax planning theory supports this argument. According to Hoffman, it is a necessity for firms to understand the prevailing tax laws and apply the laws in a manner that ensures the firms minimise their tax exposure. Hoffman posits that it makes no economic sense to pay more tax than what the law demands. Scholes and Wolfson's (1992) tax planning framework also underscores the need for corporate bodies to engage in tax planning. According to Scholes and Wolfson, a successful company is the one that is properly attuned to its tax environment.International governmental organizations, such as CA TA (2009), suggest that corporate bodies in Ghana, especially the large entities, engage in complex tax planning activities. Research by civil society groups such as Christian Aid (2008), Action Aid (2011), and Dan Watch (2011), confirm this assertions made bythe Domestic Revenue Division. The missing element in the findings is thequantitative expression of the tax planning activities of the firms.The traditional thinking is that firms that derive maximum benefit from tax planning perform better than those that do not plan their taxes (Murphy, 2007). From the empirical perspective, tax planning is positively associated with firms' performance. For instance, Desai and Hines (2002); Chen, Chen, Chen and Shelvin (2010) reported positive association between tax planning savings and firm performance. The argument is that tax represents cost of doing business, and any action that has the potential of minimising tax cost reflects in higher firm performance. This argument presupposes that tax planning cost and risk does not exceed the savings from the planning.Few studies in the UK dispel the traditional relationship between tax planning and firm performance. While admitting that tax planning has a positive association with accounting performance, Desai and Dharmaphala (2007) reported that tax planning has a neutral association with market performance. Indeed Abdul-Wahab (2010) found a negative association between tax planning and firm performance. Kportorgbi (2013) suggested that corporate governance strength plays a mediating factor in the tax planning-firm performance relationship.A study of the effect of tax planning savings on firms' market performance is crucial for all stakeholders in the emerging security markets such as the Ghana stock Exchange. In fact each possible relationship has a unique implication for the players. For instance, a positive association implies that tax planning produces a win-win situation for both management andshareholders (investors). A negative association connotes that tax planning benefits may not eventually trickle to the pocket of the shareholder. Indeed, a negative association may be an indicative of the existence of agency problem, where management is inclined to pursue tax planning to enhance their own lot rather than advancing the interest of the investor. Where a neutral association is established, it will invoke a follow up study on the possible factors that could influence the relationship either positively or negatively. Secondly, the study is necessary to inform tax planning agents and investors on the dynamics of tax planning1.1 Objective of the StudyThe primary objective of this study is to explore the relationship between tax planning savings of firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange and firm market performance. The study also seeks to examine the simultaneous influence of other firm specific variables on the tax planning-market performance relationship.1.2 Tax Planning Intensity of Firms in GhanaCommentators on tax behaviour of firms in Ghana paint a picture that suggests that large firms engage in tax planning activities. For instance CATA (2009) posits that Ghana Revenue Authority lost seventy-four million pounds between 2005 and 2007 to the European Union (EU) in tax revenue as a result of tax avoidance by several multinational companies. Murphy (2004) also reported that firms have complex gamut of arsenals to reduce their tax burden. The reports indicate that the tax avoiding mechanism of firms are largely allowed by the tax laws. There are also indications that the firms take advantage of the loopholes in the tax laws to derive unintended tax benefits. Theavenues for tax planning usually revolve around locational reliefs, industry-specific concessions and capital allowance provitions. Others are time variables and entity variables.Most of the reports are not precise in their estimation of the benefits that firms achieve through tax planning. The lack of precision in measuring tax planning intensity is largely attributed to the insufficient reporting of issues of taxation by firms. Aside the mandatory disclosures to tax authorities, firms are reluctant in disclosing much on tax behaviours. This is due to the perceived thin line that exist between tax planning and tax evasion. Listed companies, however, provide provide adequate information necessary to estimate the tax savings of the firms. This is made possible by virtue of the financial reporting guidelines provided by the security exchange commision.2. Review of Related LiteratureThis section is subdivided into theoretical review and empirical review. The theoritical review encapsultes the Hoffman's (1961) tax planning theory. Three main empirical studies are reviewed. They are Desai and Hines (2002), Desai and Dharmaphala (2009) and Abdul-Wahab (2010).2.1 Hoffman's Tax Planning TheoryAccording to Hoffman (1961) tax planning seeks to divert cash, which would ordinarily flow to tax authorities, to the corporate entities. Tax planning activities are desirable to the extent that they reduce taxable income to the barest minimum, without sacrificing accounting income. The theory is premised on the fact that firms tax liability is based on taxable income rather than accounting income. The idea is thus to intensify activities that reduce taxable income but has no indirect relationship on accounting profit. The theory thus recognised a positiveassociation between firm tax planning activity and firm performance.Hoffman (1961) also recognised the role of tax cost in the tax planning activities. The theory thus provided that the positive association between tax planning and corporate performance is on a basic assumption that tax benefits from the tax planning exceed tax cost. The scope of the Hoffman's tax planning theory does not address the dynamics of tax planning and market performance. As capital markets develop and the separation of ownership and control of corporate bodies become well-spread, the need for a comprehensive tax planning theory is imperative. This need is rather addressed through the empirical perspective than through theoretical perspective (Inger, 2012).2.2 Empirical Review and Development of HypothesisDesai and Hines (2002) provide evidence on firm performance and tax planning behaviour of firms. Again, the study investigates the relationship between tightening of tax systems and market value of firms. The study was based on 850 listed US firms. The study sample was purposively selected to reflect the characteristics desired by the researchers. The study was cross sectional and the data relates to year 2000. Correlative-description design was adopted. Simple regression and t-tests were used to establish the relationships. Desai and Hines established that intensive tax planning is associated with higher firm performance. On the other hand, the study reported that tightening of the tax system is positively associated with higher market performance of firms. The findings of Desai and Hines (2002) are similar to that reported by Chen, Chen and Chen (2010). Desai and Dharmapala (2007) provided a comprehensive study that incorporates tax planning, corporate governance andfirm performance. The study used 4,492 observations on 862 firms over the period 1993 to 2001. This panel data was drawn from the Compustat and Execucomp databases, merged with data on institutional ownership of firms from the CDA/Spectrum database. Firms' performance is measured using Tobin's q and governance quality is proxied by the level of institutional ownership. Tax planning is measured by inferring the difference between the income reported to capital markets and tax authorities (the book-tax-gap). Two analysis models were adopted-the OLS model and the IV estimation model. The OLS results shows that the average effect of tax planning on corporate performance is not significantly different from zero. In other words, there is no relationship between tax planning and firm performance. The study howeverreports a positive association between tax planning savings and performance for well-governed firms. Desai and Dharmapala (2007) thus concluded that corporate governance mediates the tax planning-firm performance relationship. The IV estimate shows a higher effect of corporate governance on firm performance.Abdul-Wahab (2010) provides a result that differs from the findings of Desai and Hines (2002), Desai and Dhamarpala (2009), and Chen, Chen, Chen and Shelvin. Abdul-Wahab's (2010) study sought to establish a relationship between tax planning savings of firms and their value. The study simultaneously investigates the moderating influence of corporate governance. Abdul-Wahab's study employed 240 firms listed on the London stock exchange from 2005 to 2007. Tax planning was proxied by the difference between the effective tax rate of the entities and the applicable statutory tax rates. Self-constructed governance indexwas constructed using corporate governance mechanisms. Firms' value was represented by the Tobin's Q. The data was analysed using panel regression analysis model. As a check, the OLS model was also used.The results indicate a negative relationship between firm value and tax planning activities. Abdul-Wahab (2010) explains the relationship with reference to tax planning cost and risk. The study suggested that tax planning cost and risks associated with tax planning have the potential of derailing the benefits that should have accrued to shareholders. The researcher maintains that as tax planning activities increase, the tax costs and risks outweighs the benefits.Due to the diversity of the relationships found between tax planning and firms' market performance, it is right to develop a null hypothesis as:H1: There is an association between tax planning and firms' market performance.It is unreasonable to suggest that tax planning is the only determinants of firm performance. Baring the existence of multicollinearity between (among) the explanatory variables, sales growth, financial leverage, firm size and age of the firms will be introduced into the regression models. Several studies, including Desai and Hines (2002), Desai and Dharmaphala (2007), Abdul-Wahab (2010) reported positive association between firm performance and sales growth, firm size and financial leverage. It is thus clear to develop the null hypothesis that:H2: Firm performance and sales growth and firm size are positively associated.Firms' age, according to Desai and Dharmapala (2007) and Abdul-Wahab (2010) has a negative association with marketperformance of firms. This gives rise to the third null hypothesis that:H3: Firms age and financial leverage are negatively associated with firms' market performance. 3. Methodology Longitudinal correlative design is adopted for the study. Longitudinal design is essential if the same research entities sampled in a cross section are then re-sampled at different times (Creswell, 2009; De Vaus, 2001). According to the authors, the design helps overcome limitations associated with the "snap shot" approach of cross sectional designs.The study population comprises all non-financial firms listed on the Ghana stock exchange. As of June 2013, twenty-three (23) out of thirty-five (35) firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange were non-financial companies. Financial companies are excluded from the population. Previous researchers posit that the financial sector is a highly regulated sector and as such regulations blur the relationship that exist among the variables to be studied (O'Hamon & Taylor, 2007; Desai & Dharmapala, 2009; Abdul-Wahab, 2010).The study uses a panel data for twelve-year period, from 2000 to 2011. Data for the study is collected from the database of the Ghana Stock Exchange. Panel regression model is adopted fordata analysis and the Ordinary least square (OLS) been the method of regression.The regression model is summarized as:(1)α = (alpha) shows the constant affecting net profit margin on corporate tax.Tobin's q (market performance) = (market capitalization ofentity) ÷ (book va lue of shareholders fund).Tax savings = Statutory tax rate -Effective tax rate.Statutory tax rate = flat rate as mandated by the Ghana Revenue Authority.Effective tax rate = Corporate income tax expense/profit before tax.Sgrowth (sales growth) = (Previous Sales revenue -Current sales revenue) ÷Previous sales revenue.Fsize (firm size) = Natural log of firm's total assets.fLev (Financial leverage ) = Long term debt/shareholders fund.Age (Age of firms) = log(the difference between the year of establishment and years of observation).4. Results and DiscussionFigure 1 and Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for two key variables, namely tax planning of firms and market performance over the twelve year period.Like the statutory rate, tax savings of firms show a decreasing trend. As tax authorities take steps to reduce the tax burden on firms, the leakages in tax revenue due to firms tax planning activities reduce. From figure 1, the statutory tax rate reduced from about 32% to 25%. Tax savings of firms reduced also from 15% to 8% by 2011. That is to say each percentage point decrease in the statutory rate leads to a corresponding decrease in firms' tax planning savings.The policy implication of this finding is two-fold. Firstly, the notion of increasing tax rate in order to rake in more tax revenue may not hold. As tax rates increased, the motivation of firms to deny the state of revenue through intensified tax planning machinery is enhanced. Secondly, as the tax rate is decreased, thenet benefit of planning tax is derailed. The way forward for tax revenue optimisation is to maintain lower tax rates and drag more firms into the tax net.Table 1 provides the market performance of the firms over the twelve year period.The farther the Tobin's Q is from unity, the better the company performance. From Table 1, all the company groups recorded an average score higher than 1.00. The overall average score is 1.78 (the median represents the average as skewness is negative). The high average market performance by the firms is driven by only the mining sector and the manufacturing companies. All the remaining classes of companies recorded lower than the average score.This finding confirms the observation of business persons in Ghana that business climate in Ghana gives unmatched advantage to the mining sector. The service sector records the lowest market performance. This raises a major concern as the sector is the major contributor to gross domestic product (GDP) in Ghana. Another sector to watch out for is the oil and gas. This sector has the most recent history. It was expected that the high hopes of investors in the sector after the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Ghana would have positive influence on the performance. It is expected that the sector will be one of the major drivers of firms' market performance in the future.Table 2 provides correlation results on the variables. This result is essential for at least two reasons. Firstly, it shows basic association between the dependent variable (market performance) and theindependent variable. Secondly, it shows if the "so-called" independent variables are indeed independent. In other words, ittests the multicollinearity status of the independent variables. From Table 2, the correlation co-efficient between tax savings and Tobin's Q is 0.112. This is however significant at 0.097. This significant level is compared with the default alpha of 0.05. As rule of thumb, we reject the null hypothesis if the actual significant level is higher than the expected alpha and do not reject if the actual significant is less than the expected alpha. In this instance p-value of 0.097 is greater than the expected alpha of 0.05. The null hypothesis that:H1: There is an association between tax planning and firms' market performance is rejected.The correlation results do not suggest causation but gives an indication of association between the variables. The "no relationship" finding between tax planning and firms' market performance supports the reports of Desai and Dharmapala (2007) but differ from the findings of Desai and Hines (2002) and Abdul-Wahab (2010). The findings suggest that although savings from tax planning reflect in higher profit after tax, it does not necessarily reflect in the pocket of shareholders. This finding ignites studies aimed at uncovering factors that mediate the tax planning-firm performance relationship. Indeed, it might be the reasons behind the works of Desai and Dharmapala (2007), Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and Abdul Wahab (2010).Another finding in table 3 is the relationship between market performance (proxied by tobin's Q) and the firm specific variables. Sales growth and firm size shows positive and significant association with firms' market performance. On the other hand financial leverage and age of the firms shows a negative association with firm performance. The findingsWe do not reject the null hypotheses (H2 and H3) stated asH2: Firm performance and sales growth and firm size are positively associatedH3: Firms age and financial leverage are negatively associated with firms' market performance. Further Table 3 gives an indication that multicollinearity among the independent variables does not exist. The rule of thumb is that if the correlation coefficients between any two of the variables is above 0.50 (either positive or negative), those two variables are multi-correlated and should not be simultaneously included in the regression model. From Table 3, this condition does not exist. The variables can be regressed against the dependent variables.Table 3 shows the regression of Tobin's Q (proxy of firms' market performance) and all the independent variables.The adjusted R2 connotes that the five independent variables explain 55.3% of the variations in the dependent variable. The model is significant at 0.0001. This is a strong indicator that the variables used in the model have sufficiently explained the firms' market performance.The regression results found a relationship that is largely consistent with the correlation results shown in table 3. The results affirm that tax planning plays an insignificant role in the determination of firms' market performance. Again this supports the agency theory's argument that it not all actions of management that help achieve the wealth maximisation objective of management. From the results sales growth and the financial leverage are the two most influential variables. Firms should maintain low financial leverage ratio and pursue sales growth strategies in order to boost their market performance.5. ConclusionsThe study sought to ascertain the level of tax planning offirms and to explore the relationship between tax planning and firms' market performance. The study used 22 non-financial companies over a twelve year period from 2000. The longitudinal correlative designed was used. Thefollowing conclusions are reached.Firstly firms' tax savings decrease as tax authorities reduce the statutory corporate income tax rates. This indicates that leakages in tax revenue as a result of intensive tax planning of firms reduce when tax authorities maintain low corporate income tax rates.Secondly, tax planning has a neutral influence on firms' performance. This finding challenges the general perception that every cedi of tax savings from tax planning reflect in the pocket of investors. Agency problem is much present in the issue of tax planning. The efforts of management to reduce tax burden of firms benefit other stakeholders rather than shareholders. There may be other factors that could ensure that substantial benefits of tax planning accrue to shareholders. Some researchers arguably, root for good corporate governance. This falls outside the scope of this study.Finally, sales growth, firm size, age of firms, financial leverage and tax planning simultaneously play a major role in determining firms' market performance. These variables explain 55.3% of the variations in firms' market performance. Sales growth and financial leverage are the two most influential variables that determine firm market performance.References二、文献综述企业纳税筹划文献综述摘要:20 世纪以来并购已经成为企业快速扩张和整合的重要手段之一。

个人所得税英文参考文献

个人所得税英文参考文献

个人所得税英文参考文献个人所得税英语参考文献一:[1]José Félix Sanz-Sanz. The Laffer curve in schedular multi-rate income taxes with non-genuine allowances: An application to Spain[J]. Economic Modelling,2019,.[2]Craig Brett,John A. Weymark. Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules[J]. Games and Economic Behavior,2019,.[3]Mónica Unda Gutiérrez. A Tale of Two Taxes: the Diverging Fates of the Federal Property and Income Tax Decrees in post-Revolutionary Mexico[J]. Investigaciones de Historia Económica - Economic History Research,2019,.[4]Sim Choon Ling,Abdullah Osman,Safizal Muhammad,Sin Kit Yeng,Lim Yi Jin. Goods and Services Tax (GST) Compliance among Malaysian Consumers: The Influence of Price, Government Subsidies and Income Inequality[J]. Procedia Economics and Finance,2019,35.[5]Martin Lopez-Daneri. NIT Picking: The Macroeconomic Effects of a Negative Income Tax[J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2019,.[6]Tad Miller,Lindsay Miller,Jeffrey Tolin. Provision for income tax expense ASC 740: A teaching note[J]. Journal of Accounting Education,2019,35.[7]Petr David,Lucie Formanová。

纳税筹划文献综述及外文文献资料

纳税筹划文献综述及外文文献资料

本文档包括改专题的:外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献信息标题:Effect of Tax Planning on Firms Market Performance: Evidence from Listed Firms in Ghana 作者:Kawor, Seyram; Kportorgbi, Holy Kwabla期刊:International Journal of Economics and Finance第6卷,第3期,页码:162-168,2014年Effect of Tax Planning on Firms Market Performance: Evidence from Listed Firms in GhanaKawor, Seyram; Kportorgbi, Holy KwablaAbstractThe study sought to ascertain the level of tax planning of firms and to explore the relationship between tax planning and firms' market performance. The study used 22 non-financial companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange over a twelve year period from 2000. The longitudinal correlative designed was used. The results indicate that that firms' tendency to engage in intensive tax planning activities reduces when tax authorities maintain low corporate income tax rates. Secondly, tax planning has a neutral influence on firms' performance. This finding challenges the general perception that every cedi of tax savings from tax planning reflect in the pocket of investors. It is concluded that investors must institute systems to ensure tax planning benefits reflect significantly in their pockets.Keywords: Ghana stock exchange, tax planning, market performance, longitudinal correlative design, investors1. IntroductionOver the years and throughout the world, the history of taxation brings out one fact; that taxes are coercive in nature and therefore economic units which are assigned the tax liability never wholly intend to bear the actual tax burden (Commonwealth Association of Tax Administrators (CATA), 2007). Economic units, more specifically, corporate bodies are always adopting ways to minimise, postpone, or avoid entirely, the payment of tax. The attempts by the economic units to reduce, postpone or avoid tax payment can be legal or illegal. The legal means is called tax planning while the illegal means is called tax evasion. The dire consequence of tax evasion makes it an unattractive option for listed companies (Murphy, 2004).The practice of tax planning dates back to 1947 when learned judge Hand, in the case Commissioner v Newman, held that there is nothing sinister in arranging ones affairs so as to keep taxes as low as possible. Hoffman's (1961) tax planning theory supports this argument. According to Hoffman, it is a necessity for firms to understand the prevailing tax laws and apply the laws in a manner that ensures the firms minimise their tax exposure. Hoffman posits that it makes no economic sense to pay more tax than what the law demands. Scholes and Wolfson's (1992) tax planning framework also underscores the need for corporate bodies to engage in tax planning. According to Scholes and Wolfson, a successful company is the one that is properly attuned to its tax environment.International governmental organizations, such as CA TA (2009), suggest that corporate bodies in Ghana, especially the large entities, engage in complex tax planning activities. Research by civil society groups such as Christian Aid (2008), Action Aid (2011), and Dan Watch (2011), confirm this assertions made by the Domestic Revenue Division. The missing element in the findings is thequantitative expression of the tax planning activities of the firms.The traditional thinking is that firms that derive maximum benefit from tax planning perform better than those that do not plan their taxes (Murphy, 2007). From the empirical perspective, tax planning is positively associated with firms' performance. For instance, Desai and Hines (2002); Chen, Chen, Chen and Shelvin (2010) reported positive association between tax planning savings and firm performance. The argument is that tax represents cost of doing business, and any action that has the potential of minimising tax cost reflects in higher firm performance. This argument presupposes that tax planning cost and risk does not exceed the savings from the planning.Few studies in the UK dispel the traditional relationship between tax planning and firm performance. While admitting that tax planning has a positive association with accounting performance, Desai and Dharmaphala (2007) reported that tax planning has a neutral association with market performance. Indeed Abdul-Wahab (2010) found a negative association between tax planning and firm performance. Kportorgbi (2013) suggested that corporate governance strength plays a mediating factor in the tax planning-firm performance relationship.A study of the effect of tax planning savings on firms' market performance is crucial for all stakeholders in the emerging security markets such as the Ghana stock Exchange. In fact each possible relationship has a unique implication for the players. For instance, a positive association implies that tax planning produces a win-win situation for both management and shareholders (investors). A negative association connotes that tax planning benefits may not eventually trickle to the pocket of the shareholder. Indeed, a negative association may be an indicative of the existence of agency problem, where management is inclined to pursue tax planning to enhance their own lot rather than advancing the interest of the investor. Where a neutral association is established, it will invoke a follow up study on the possible factors that could influence the relationship either positively or negatively. Secondly, the study is necessary to inform tax planning agents and investors on the dynamics of tax planning1.1 Objective of the StudyThe primary objective of this study is to explore the relationship between tax planning savings of firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange and firm market performance. The study also seeks to examine the simultaneous influence of other firm specific variables on the tax planning-market performance relationship.1.2 Tax Planning Intensity of Firms in GhanaCommentators on tax behaviour of firms in Ghana paint a picture that suggests that large firms engage in tax planning activities. For instance CATA (2009) posits that Ghana Revenue Authority lost seventy-four million pounds between 2005 and 2007 to the European Union (EU) in tax revenue as a result of tax avoidance by several multinational companies. Murphy (2004) also reported that firms have complex gamut of arsenals to reduce their tax burden. The reports indicate that the tax avoiding mechanism of firms are largely allowed by the tax laws. There are also indications that the firms take advantage of the loopholes in the tax laws to derive unintended tax benefits. The avenues for tax planning usually revolve around locational reliefs, industry-specific concessions and capital allowance provitions. Others are time variables and entity variables.Most of the reports are not precise in their estimation of the benefits that firms achieve through tax planning. The lack of precision in measuring tax planning intensity is largely attributed to the insufficient reporting of issues of taxation by firms. Aside the mandatory disclosures to tax authorities, firms are reluctant in disclosing much on tax behaviours. This is due to the perceivedthin line that exist between tax planning and tax evasion. Listed companies, however, provide provide adequate information necessary to estimate the tax savings of the firms. This is made possible by virtue of the financial reporting guidelines provided by the security exchange commision.2. Review of Related LiteratureThis section is subdivided into theoretical review and empirical review. The theoritical review encapsultes the Hoffman's (1961) tax planning theory. Three main empirical studies are reviewed. They are Desai and Hines (2002), Desai and Dharmaphala (2009) and Abdul-Wahab (2010).2.1 Hoffman's Tax Planning TheoryAccording to Hoffman (1961) tax planning seeks to divert cash, which would ordinarily flow to tax authorities, to the corporate entities. Tax planning activities are desirable to the extent that they reduce taxable income to the barest minimum, without sacrificing accounting income. The theory is premised on the fact that firms tax liability is based on taxable income rather than accounting income. The idea is thus to intensify activities that reduce taxable income but has no indirect relationship on accounting profit. The theory thus recognised a positive association between firm tax planning activity and firm performance.Hoffman (1961) also recognised the role of tax cost in the tax planning activities. The theory thus provided that the positive association between tax planning and corporate performance is on a basic assumption that tax benefits from the tax planning exceed tax cost. The scope of the Hoffman's tax planning theory does not address the dynamics of tax planning and market performance. As capital markets develop and the separation of ownership and control of corporate bodies become well-spread, the need for a comprehensive tax planning theory is imperative. This need is rather addressed through the empirical perspective than through theoretical perspective (Inger, 2012).2.2 Empirical Review and Development of HypothesisDesai and Hines (2002) provide evidence on firm performance and tax planning behaviour of firms. Again, the study investigates the relationship between tightening of tax systems and market value of firms. The study was based on 850 listed US firms. The study sample was purposively selected to reflect the characteristics desired by the researchers. The study was cross sectional and the data relates to year 2000. Correlative-description design was adopted. Simple regression and t-tests were used to establish the relationships. Desai and Hines established that intensive tax planning is associated with higher firm performance. On the other hand, the study reported that tightening of the tax system is positively associated with higher market performance of firms. The findings of Desai and Hines (2002) are similar to that reported by Chen, Chen and Chen (2010). Desai and Dharmapala (2007) provided a comprehensive study that incorporates tax planning, corporate governance and firm performance. The study used 4,492 observations on 862 firms over the period 1993 to 2001. This panel data was drawn from the Compustat and Execucomp databases, merged with data on institutional ownership of firms from the CDA/Spectrum database. Firms' performance is measured using Tobin's q and governance quality is proxied by the level of institutional ownership. Tax planning is measured by inferring the difference between the income reported to capital markets and tax authorities (the book-tax-gap). Two analysis models were adopted-the OLS model and the IV estimation model. The OLS results shows that the average effect of tax planning on corporate performance is not significantly different from zero. In other words, there is no relationship between tax planning and firm performance. The study howeverreports a positive association between tax planning savings and performance for well-governed firms. Desai and Dharmapala (2007) thus concluded that corporate governance mediates the tax planning-firm performance relationship. The IV estimate shows a higher effect of corporate governance on firm performance.Abdul-Wahab (2010) provides a result that differs from the findings of Desai and Hines (2002), Desai and Dhamarpala (2009), and Chen, Chen, Chen and Shelvin. Abdul-Wahab's (2010) study sought to establish a relationship between tax planning savings of firms and their value. The study simultaneously investigates the moderating influence of corporate governance. Abdul-Wahab's study employed 240 firms listed on the London stock exchange from 2005 to 2007. Tax planning was proxied by the difference between the effective tax rate of the entities and the applicable statutory tax rates. Self-constructed governance index was constructed using corporate governance mechanisms. Firms' value was represented by the Tobin's Q. The data was analysed using panel regression analysis model. As a check, the OLS model was also used.The results indicate a negative relationship between firm value and tax planning activities. Abdul-Wahab (2010) explains the relationship with reference to tax planning cost and risk. The study suggested that tax planning cost and risks associated with tax planning have the potential of derailing the benefits that should have accrued to shareholders. The researcher maintains that as tax planning activities increase, the tax costs and risks outweighs the benefits.Due to the diversity of the relationships found between tax planning and firms' market performance, it is right to develop a null hypothesis as:H1: There is an association between tax planning and firms' market performance.It is unreasonable to suggest that tax planning is the only determinants of firm performance. Baring the existence of multicollinearity between (among) the explanatory variables, sales growth, financial leverage, firm size and age of the firms will be introduced into the regression models. Several studies, including Desai and Hines (2002), Desai and Dharmaphala (2007), Abdul-Wahab (2010) reported positive association between firm performance and sales growth, firm size and financial leverage. It is thus clear to develop the null hypothesis that:H2: Firm performance and sales growth and firm size are positively associated.Firms' age, according to Desai and Dharmapala (2007) and Abdul-Wahab (2010) has a negative association with market performance of firms. This gives rise to the third null hypothesis that:H3: Firms age and financial leverage are negatively associated with firms' market performance. 3. MethodologyLongitudinal correlative design is adopted for the study. Longitudinal design is essential if the same research entities sampled in a cross section are then re-sampled at different times (Creswell, 2009; De Vaus, 2001). According to the authors, the design helps overcome limitations associated with the "snap shot" approach of cross sectional designs.The study population comprises all non-financial firms listed on the Ghana stock exchange. As of June 2013, twenty-three (23) out of thirty-five (35) firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange were non-financial companies. Financial companies are excluded from the population. Previous researchers posit that the financial sector is a highly regulated sector and as such regulations blur the relationship that exist among the variables to be studied (O'Hamon & Taylor, 2007; Desai & Dharmapala, 2009; Abdul-Wahab, 2010).The study uses a panel data for twelve-year period, from 2000 to 2011. Data for the study is collected from the database of the Ghana Stock Exchange. Panel regression model is adopted fordata analysis and the Ordinary least square (OLS) been the method of regression.The regression model is summarized as: (1)α = (alpha) shows the constant affecting net profit margin on corporate tax.Tobin's q (market performance) = (market capitalization of entity) ÷ (book value of shareholders fund).Tax savings = Statutory tax rate -Effective tax rate.Statutory tax rate = flat rate as mandated by the Ghana Revenue Authority.Effective tax rate = Corporate income tax expense/profit before tax.Sgrowth (sales growth) = (Previous Sales revenue -Current sales revenue) ÷Previous sales revenue.Fsize (firm size) = Natural log of firm's total assets.fLev (Financial leverage ) = Long term debt/shareholders fund.Age (Age of firms) = log(the difference between the year of establishment and years of observation).4. Results and DiscussionFigure 1 and Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for two key variables, namely tax planning of firms and market performance over the twelve year period.Like the statutory rate, tax savings of firms show a decreasing trend. As tax authorities take steps to reduce the tax burden on firms, the leakages in tax revenue due to firms tax planning activities reduce. From figure 1, the statutory tax rate reduced from about 32% to 25%. Tax savings of firms reduced also from 15% to 8% by 2011. That is to say each percentage point decrease in the statutory rate leads to a corresponding decrease in firms' tax planning savings.The policy implication of this finding is two-fold. Firstly, the notion of increasing tax rate in order to rake in more tax revenue may not hold. As tax rates increased, the motivation of firms to deny the state of revenue through intensified tax planning machinery is enhanced. Secondly, as the tax rate is decreased, the net benefit of planning tax is derailed. The way forward for tax revenue optimisation is to maintain lower tax rates and drag more firms into the tax net.Table 1 provides the market performance of the firms over the twelve year period.The farther the Tobin's Q is from unity, the better the company performance. From Table 1, all the company groups recorded an average score higher than 1.00. The overall average score is 1.78 (the median represents the average as skewness is negative). The high average market performance by the firms is driven by only the mining sector and the manufacturing companies. All the remaining classes of companies recorded lower than the average score.This finding confirms the observation of business persons in Ghana that business climate in Ghana gives unmatched advantage to the mining sector. The service sector records the lowest market performance. This raises a major concern as the sector is the major contributor to gross domestic product (GDP) in Ghana. Another sector to watch out for is the oil and gas. This sector has the most recent history. It was expected that the high hopes of investors in the sector after the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Ghana would have positive influence on the performance. It is expected that the sector will be one of the major drivers of firms' market performance in the future.Table 2 provides correlation results on the variables. This result is essential for at least two reasons. Firstly, it shows basic association between the dependent variable (market performance) and theindependent variable. Secondly, it shows if the "so-called" independent variables are indeed independent. In other words, it tests the multicollinearity status of the independent variables. From Table 2, the correlation co-efficient between tax savings and Tobin's Q is 0.112. This is however significant at 0.097. This significant level is compared with the default alpha of 0.05. As rule of thumb, we reject the null hypothesis if the actual significant level is higher than the expected alpha and do not reject if the actual significant is less than the expected alpha. In this instance p-value of 0.097 is greater than the expected alpha of 0.05. The null hypothesis that:H1: There is an association between tax planning and firms' market performance is rejected.The correlation results do not suggest causation but gives an indication of association between the variables. The "no relationship" finding between tax planning and firms' market performance supports the reports of Desai and Dharmapala (2007) but differ from the findings of Desai and Hines (2002) and Abdul-Wahab (2010). The findings suggest that although savings from tax planning reflect in higher profit after tax, it does not necessarily reflect in the pocket of shareholders. This finding ignites studies aimed at uncovering factors that mediate the tax planning-firm performance relationship. Indeed, it might be the reasons behind the works of Desai and Dharmapala (2007), Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and Abdul Wahab (2010).Another finding in table 3 is the relationship between market performance (proxied by tobin's Q) and the firm specific variables. Sales growth and firm size shows positive and significant association with firms' market performance. On the other hand financial leverage and age of the firms shows a negative association with firm performance. The findingsWe do not reject the null hypotheses (H2 and H3) stated asH2: Firm performance and sales growth and firm size are positively associatedH3: Firms age and financial leverage are negatively associated with firms' market performance. Further Table 3 gives an indication that multicollinearity among the independent variables does not exist. The rule of thumb is that if the correlation coefficients between any two of the variables is above 0.50 (either positive or negative), those two variables are multi-correlated and should not be simultaneously included in the regression model. From Table 3, this condition does not exist. The variables can be regressed against the dependent variables.Table 3 shows the regression of Tobin's Q (proxy of firms' market performance) and all the independent variables.The adjusted R2 connotes that the five independent variables explain 55.3% of the variations in the dependent variable. The model is significant at 0.0001. This is a strong indicator that the variables used in the model have sufficiently explained the firms' market performance.The regression results found a relationship that is largely consistent with the correlation results shown in table 3. The results affirm that tax planning plays an insignificant role in the determination of firms' market performance. Again this supports the agency theory's argument that it not all actions of management that help achieve the wealth maximisation objective of management. From the results sales growth and the financial leverage are the two most influential variables. Firms should maintain low financial leverage ratio and pursue sales growth strategies in order to boost their market performance.5. ConclusionsThe study sought to ascertain the level of tax planning of firms and to explore the relationship between tax planning and firms' market performance. The study used 22 non-financial companies over a twelve year period from 2000. The longitudinal correlative designed was used. Thefollowing conclusions are reached.Firstly firms' tax savings decrease as tax authorities reduce the statutory corporate income tax rates. This indicates that leakages in tax revenue as a result of intensive tax planning of firms reduce when tax authorities maintain low corporate income tax rates.Secondly, tax planning has a neutral influence on firms' performance. This finding challenges the general perception that every cedi of tax savings from tax planning reflect in the pocket of investors. Agency problem is much present in the issue of tax planning. The efforts of management to reduce tax burden of firms benefit other stakeholders rather than shareholders. There may be other factors that could ensure that substantial benefits of tax planning accrue to shareholders. Some researchers arguably, root for good corporate governance. This falls outside the scope of this study.Finally, sales growth, firm size, age of firms, financial leverage and tax planning simultaneously play a major role in determining firms' market performance. These variables explain 55.3% of the variations in firms' market performance. Sales growth and financial leverage are the two most influential variables that determine firm market performance.References二、文献综述企业纳税筹划文献综述摘要:20 世纪以来并购已经成为企业快速扩张和整合的重要手段之一。

税务英语文章阅读

税务英语文章阅读

税务英语文章阅读——Laffer curveIn economics, the Laffer curve(also Khaldun–Laffer curve) is a representation of the relationship between possible rates of taxation and the resulting levels of government revenue. It illustrates the concept of taxable income elasticity—i.e., taxable income will change in response to changes in the rate of taxation. It postulates that no tax revenue will be raised at the extreme tax rates of 0% and 100% and that there must be at least one rate where tax revenue would be a non-zero maximum.The Laffer curve is typically represented as a graph which starts at 0% tax with zero revenue, rises to a maximum rate of revenue at an intermediate rate of taxation, and then falls again to zero revenue at a 100% tax rate. The actual existence and shape of the curve is uncertain and disputed. One potential result of the Laffer curve is that increasing tax rates beyond a certain point will be counter-productive for raising further tax revenue.A hypothetical Laffer curve for any given economy can only be estimated and such estimates are controversial. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics reports that estimates of revenue-maximizing tax rates have varied widely, with a mid-range of around70%.Although economist Arthur Laffer does not claim to have invented the Laffer curve concept, it was popularized with policymakers following an afternoon meeting with Ford Administration officials Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld in 1974 in which he reportedly sketched the curve on anapkin to illustrate his argument. The term "Laffer curve" was coined by Jude Wanniski, who was also present at the meeting. The basic concept was not new; Laffer himself notes antecedents in the writings of Ibn Khaldun and John Maynard Keynes.Laffer curve: t* represents the rate of taxation at which maximal revenue is generated. This is the curve as drawn by Arthur Laffer, however, the curve need not be single peaked nor symmetrical at 50%.Laffer explains the model in terms of two interacting effects of taxation: an "arithmetic effect" and an "economic effect". The "arithmetic effect" assumes that tax revenue raised is the tax rate multiplied by ther evenue available for taxation (or tax base). At a 0% tax rate, the model assumes that no tax revenue is raised. The "economic effect" assumes that the tax rate will have an impact on the tax base itself. At the extreme of a 100% tax rate, the government theoretically collects zero revenue becausetaxpayers change their behavior in response to the tax rate: either they have no incentive to work or they find a way to avoid paying taxes. Thus, the "economic effect" of a 100% tax rate is to decrease the tax base to zero. If this is the case, then somewhere between 0% and 100% lies a tax rate that will maximize revenue. Graphical representations of the curve sometimes appear to put the rate at around 50%, but the optimal rate could theoretically be any percentage greater than 0% and less than 100%. Similarly, the curve is often presented as a parabolic shape, but there is no reason that this is necessarily the case.Jude Wanniski noted that all economic activity would be unlikely to cease at 100% taxation, but would switch from the exchange of money to barter. He also noted that there can be special circumstances where economic activity can continue for a period at a near 100%taxation rate (for example, in war time).Various efforts have been made to quantify the relationship between tax revenue and tax rates (for example, in the United States by the Congressional Budget Office). While the interaction between tax rates and tax revenue is generally accepted, the precise nature of this interaction is debated. In practice, the shape of a hypothetical Laffer curve for a given economy can only be estimated. The relationship between tax rate and tax revenue is likely to vary from one economy to another and depends on the elasticity of supply for labor and variousother factors. Even in the same economy, the characteristics of the curve could vary over time. Complexities such as progressive taxation and possible differences in the incentive to work for different income groups complicate the task of estimation. The structure of the curve may also be changed by policy decisions. For example, if tax loopholes and off-shore tax shelters are made more readily available by legislation, the point at which revenue begins to decrease with increased taxation is likely to become lower.Laffer presented the curve as a pedagogical device to show that, in some circumstances, a reduction in tax rates will actually increase government revenue and not need to be offset by decreased government spending or increased borrowing. For a reduction in tax rates to increase revenue, the current tax rate would need to be higher than the revenue maximizing rate. In 2007, Laffer said that the curve should not be the sole basis for raising or lowering taxes.ProblemsLaffer assumes that the government would collect no income tax at a 100% tax rate because there would be no incentive to earn income. Research has developed theoretical mathematical models in which a Laffer curve can slope continuously upwards all the way to100%, though it is not clear whether or when the assumptions on which such mathematical models are based hold in real economies. Additionally, theLaffer curve depends on the assumption that tax revenue is used to provide a public good that is separable in utility and separate from labor supply, which may not be true in practice. The Laffer curve as presented is also simplistic in that it assumes a single tax rate and a single labor supply. Actual systems of public finance are more complex. There is serious doubt about the relevance of considering a single marginal tax rate. In addition, revenue may well be a multi valued function of tax rate - for instance, an increase in tax rate to a certain percentage may not result in the same revenue as a decrease in tax rate to the same percentage (a kind of hysteresis).Empirical dataTax rate at which revenue is maximizedA possible non-symmetric Laffer Curve with a maximum revenue point at around a 70% tax rate, based on "How Far Are We From The Slippery Slope? The Laffer Curve Revisited" by Mathias Trabandt and Harald Uhlig.The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics reports that a comparison of academic studies yields a range of revenue maximizing rates that centers around 70%.Economist Paul Pecorino presented a model in 1995 that predicted the peak of the Laffer curve occurred at tax rates around 65%.A 1996 study by Y. Hsing of the United States economy between 1959 and 1991placed the revenue-maximizing average federal tax rate between 32.67% and35.21%.A 1981 paper published in the Journal of Political Economy presented a model integrating empirical data that indicated that the point of maximum tax revenue in Sweden in the 1970s would have been 70%. A paper by Trabandt and Uhlig of the NBER from 2009presented a model that predicted that the US and most European economies were on the left of the Laffer curve (in other words, that raising taxes would raise further revenue). Congressional Budget Office analysisIn 2005, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a papercalled "Analyzing the Economic and Budgetary Effects of a10 Percent Cutin Income Tax Rates". This paper considered the impact of a stylizedreduction of 10% in the then existing marginal rate of federal income tax in the US (for example, ifthose facing a 25% marginal federal income tax rate had it lowered to 22.5%).Unlike earlier research, the CBO paper estimates the budgetary impact of possible macroeconomic effects of tax policies, that is, it attempts to account for how reductions in individual income tax rates might affect the overall future growth of the economy, and therefore influence future government tax revenues; and ultimately, impact deficits or surpluses. In the paper's most generous estimated growth scenario, only 28% of the projected lost revenue from the lower tax rate would be recouped over a 10-year period after a 10%across-the-board reduction in all individual income tax rates. In other words, deficits would increase by nearly the same amount as the tax cut in the first five years, with limited feedback revenue thereafter. Through increased budget deficits, the tax cuts primarily benefiting the wealthy will be paid for — plus interest —by taxes borne relatively evenly by all taxpayers. The paper points out that these projected shortfalls in revenue would have to be made up by federal borrowing: the paper estimates that the federal government would pay an extra $200 billion in interest over the decade covered by the paper's analysis.OtherLaffer has presented the examples of Russia and the Baltic states, which instituted a flat tax with rates lower than 35% and whose economies started growing soon after implementation. He has similarly referred to the economic outcome of the Kemp-Roth tax act, the Kennedy tax cuts, the 1920s tax cuts, and the changes in US capital gains tax structure in 1997.Some have also cited Hauser's Law, which postulates that US federal revenues, as a percentage of GDP, have remained stable at approximately 19.5% over the period 1950 to 2007despite changes in marginal tax rates over the same period. Others however, have called Hauser's Law "misleading" and contend that tax changes have had large effects on tax revenues.Optimal taxationOne of the uses of the Laffer curve is in determining the rate of taxation which will raise the maximum revenue (in other words, "optimizing" revenue collection). However, the revenue maximizing rate should not be confused with the optimal tax rate, which economists use to describe a tax which raises a given amount of revenue with the least distortions to the economy.Relationship with supply-side economicsSupply-side economics is a school of macroeconomic thought that argues that overall economic well-being is maximized by lowering the barriers to producing goods and services (the "Supply Side" of the economy). By lowering such barriers, consumers are thought to benefit from a greater supply of goods and services at lower prices. Typical supply-side policy would advocate generally lower income tax and capital gains tax rates (to increase the supply of labor and capital),smaller government and a lower regulatory burden on enterprises (to lower costs). Although tax policy is often mentioned in relation to supply-side economics, supply-side economists are concerned with all impediments to the supply of goods and services and not just taxation.HistoryOriginThe term "Laffer curve" was reportedly coined by Jude Wanniski (a writer for The Wall Street Journal) after a 1974 dinner meeting at the Two Continents Restaurant in the Washington Hotel with Arthur Laffer, Wanniski, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and his deputy press secretary Grace-Marie Arnett. In this meeting, Laffer, arguing against President Gerald Ford's tax increase, reportedly sketched the curve on a napkin to illustrate the concept. Cheney did not accept the idea immediately, but it caught the imaginations of thosepresent. Laffer professes no recollection of this napkin, but writes:"I used the so-called Laffer Curve all the time in my classes and with anyone else who would listen to me."Laffer himself does not claim to have invented the concept, attributing it to 14th-century Muslim scholar Ibn Khaldunand, more recently, to John Maynard Keynes.PrecedentsThere are historical precedents other than those cited directly by Laffer. For example, in 1924,Secretary of Treasury Andrew Mellon wrote: "It seems difficult for some to understand that high rates of taxation do not necessarily mean large revenue to the Government, and that more revenue may often be obtained by lower rates." Exercising his understanding that "73% of nothing is nothing", he pushed for the reduction of the top income tax bracket from 73% to an eventual 24% (as well as tax breaks for lower brackets). Personal income-tax receipts rose from US$719million in 1921 to over $1 billion in 1929, an average increase of 4.2% per year over an 8-year period, which supporters attribute to the rate cut. Amongst others, David Hume expressed similar arguments in his essay Of Taxes in 1756, as did fellow Scottish economist Adam Smith, twenty years later.The Democratic party made a similar argument in the 1880s when high revenue from import tariffs raised during the Civil War (1861–1865) led to federal budget surpluses. The Republican party, which was then based in the protectionist industrial Northeast, argued that cutting rates would lower revenues. But the Democratic party, then rooted in the agricultural South, argued tariff reductions would increase revenues by increasing the number of taxable imports. A 1997 analysis concluded that the tariff rate used was lower than the revenue maximizing rate.An argument along similar lines has also been advocated by Aliibn Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam and fourth Caliph of the Islamic empire; in his letter to the Governor of Egypt, Malik al-Ashtar. A careful reading of the quote below shows that he only argues for a decrease in taxes' reducing revenues, not for an optimal point where most revenues would be raised, thus missing the prototypical point of the Laffer curve. It does however imply that revenues might rise in time because of this reduction of taxes. He writes:If the tax-payers complain to you of the heavy incidence to taxation, of any accidental calamity, of the vagaries of the monsoons, of the recession of the means of irrigation, off loads, or destruction of their crops on account of excessive rainfall and if their complaints aretrue, then reduce their taxes. This reduction should be such that it provides them opportunities to improve their conditions and eases them of their troubles. Decrease in state income due to such reasons should not depress you because the best investment for a ruler is to help his subjects at the time of their difficulties. They are the real wealth of a country and any investment on them even in the form of reduction of taxes, will be returned to the State in the shape of the prosperity of its cities and improvement of the country at large. At the same time you will be in a position to command and secure their love, respect and praises along with the revenues.—Ali ibn Abi Talib, Nahj al-Balagha,Letter 53In political discourseReaganomicsAverage taxrate percentages for the highest-income U.S. taxpayers, 1945-2009The Laffer curve and supply-side economics inspired Reaganomics and the Kemp-Roth Tax Cut of 1981. Supply-side advocates of tax cuts claimed that lower tax rates would generate more tax revenue because the United States government's marginal income tax rates prior to the legislation were on the right-hand side of the curve. As a successful actor, Reagan himself had been subject to marginal tax rates as high as 90% during World War II. During the Reagan presidency, the top marginal rate of tax in the United States fell from 70% to 31%. According to OMB historical data, federal government revenue fell from 19.0% of GDP in 1980 to 18.4% by 1989, resulting in a significant increase in federal debt-to-outlays percentages compared with both preceding and succeeding decades.David Stockman, Ronald Reagan's budget director during his first administration and one of the early proponents of supply-side economics, was concerned that the administration did not pay enough attention to cutting government spending. He maintained that the Laffer curve was not to be taken literally — at least not in the economic environment of the 1980s United States. In TheTriumph of Politics, he writes:"[T]he whole California gang had taken [the Laffer curve] literally (and primitively). The way they talked, they seemed to expect that once the supply-side tax cut was in effect, additional revenue would start to fall, manna-like, from the heavens. Since January, I had been explaining that there is no literal Laffer curve." Stockman also said that "Laffer wasn't wrong, he just didn't go far enough" (in paying attention to government spending).Some have criticized elements of Reaganomics on the basis of equity. For example, economist John Kenneth Galbraith believed that the Reagan administration actively used the Laffer curve "to lower taxes on the affluent". Some critics point out that tax revenues almost always rise every year, and during Reagan's two terms increases in tax revenue were more shallow than increases during presidencies where top marginal tax rates were higher. Critics also point out that since the Reagan tax cuts, income has not significantly increased for the rest of the population. This assertion is supported by studies that show the income of the top 1% nearly doubling during the Reagan years, while income for other income levels increased only marginally; income actually decreased for the bottom quintile.Bush tax cutsChange in real GDP per capita annual growth rate from 1975-9 to 2004-8 against the change in top marginal tax rate for 18 OECD countries. The lack of significant correlation contradicts supply-side theories and suggests that cuts in top tax rates might not lead to higher economic growth.The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that extending the Bush tax cuts of 2001-2003 beyond their 2010 expiration would increase deficits by $1.8 trillion over the following decade. Economist Paul Krugman contended that supply-side adherents did not fully believe that the United States income tax rate was on the "backwards-sloping" side of the curve and yet they still advocated lowering taxes to encourage investment of personalsavings.Outside the United StatesBetween1979 and 2002, more than 40 other countries, including the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, and Sweden cut their top rates of personal income tax. In an article about this, Alan Reynolds, a senior fellow with the libertarian think tank CatoInstitute, wrote, "Why did so many other countries so dramatically reduce marginal tax rates? Perhaps they were influenced by new economic analysis and evidence from... supply-side economics. But the sheer force of example may well have been more persuasive. Political authorities saw that other national governments fared better by having tax collectors claim a medium share of a rapidly growing economy (a low marginal tax) rather than trying to extract a large share of a stagnant economy (a high average tax)."。

企业税收筹划外文翻译文献

企业税收筹划外文翻译文献

企业税收筹划外文翻译文献企业税收筹划外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)Corporate Tax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-BasedIncentives (Ⅰ)John D. Phillips University of ConnecticutABSTRACTThis study investigates whether compensating chief executive officers andbusiness-unit managers using after-tax accounting-based performance measures leads to lower effective tax rates, the empirical surrogate used for tax-planning effectiveness. Utilizing proprietary compensation data obtained in a survey of corporate executives, the relation between effective tax rates and after-tax performance measures is modeled and estimated using a two-step approach that corrects for the endogeneity bias associated with firms' decisions to compensate managers on a pre- versus after-tax basis. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that compensating business-unit managers, but not chief executive officers, on an after-tax basis leads to lower effective tax rates.KEYWORDS tax planning; performance measures; endogenous treatment effects.I. INTRODUCTIONEffective tax planning, defined by Scholes et al. (2002) as tax planning that maximizes the firm's expected discounted after-tax cash flows, requires managers to consider their decisions' after-tax consequences. In this paper, I investigate whether after-tax accounting-based performance measures lead to lower effective tax rates (ETR), my empirical surrogate for tax planning effectiveness.1 The ETR, an income-statement-based outcome measure calculated as the ratio of total income tax expense to pre-tax income, generally measures the effectiveness of tax reduction strategies that lead to higher after-tax income. A lower ETR, however, can only proxy for tax savings and does not always imply that after-tax income and/or cash flows have been maximized.2 Despite this limitation, the ETR has been used to measure the effectiveness of spending on the tax function (Mills et al. 1998) and corporate tax department performance (Douglas et al. 1996). Also, lowering the ETR is frequently cited as a way to increase earnings (e.g., Ziegler 1997) and increase share price (e.g., Mintz 1999; Swenson 1999).Accounting research has addressed the relation between accounting-based compensation and managers' actions (e.g., Larcker 1983; Healy 1985; Wallace 1997). This paper is the first to address whether after-tax accounting-based performance measures motivate managers to take actions that help lower their firms' ETR and does so at both the chief executive officer (CEO) and business-unit (SBU) manager levels.Prior after-tax performance measure research has focused only on the determinants of compensation CEOs using pre- versus after-tax earnings (e.g., Newman 1989; Carnes and Guffey 2000; Atwood et al. 1998; Dhaliwal et al. 2000) and provides no evidence concerning after-tax compensation's effectiveness in lowering a firm's tax liability. Extending this investigation to the SBU level is motivated out of the apparent conflict between arguments that taxes should be allocated to SBU for incentive compensation purposes (e.g., McLemore 1997) with empirical observations that a majority of firms do not do so (e.g., Douglas et al. 1996).4 The current investigation provides evidence concerning the incremental effectiveness of explicitly motivating CEOs and SBU managers to incorporate tax consequences into their operating and investment decisions.A common issue in cross-sectional studies that attempt to link a particular management accounting choice to an outcome measure is that all sample firms may be optimizing with respect to the choice being investigated (Ittner and Larcker 2001). Without addressing the endogeneity of a firm's choice, it is difficult to provide evidence consistent with this choice leading to an improved outcome. To address this issue, the relation between ETR and CEO and SBU-manager after-tax performance measures is estimated using a two-step approach that helps correct for the potential endogeneity bias associated with these two choice variables. As a first step in implementing this approach, the Antle and Demski (1988) controllability principle is used to model a firm's decisions to adopt after-tax CEO and SBU-manager performance measures. To include a particular measure in a manager's compensation contract, this principle requires that the expected benefits from holding a manager responsible for a measure must be greater than the additional wage that must be paid to compensate the manager for the resulting additional risk and effort. Accordingly, an after- tax performance measure should be used as a contracting variable in a manager's incentive compensation contract only if the manager's involvement in tax-planning efforts leads to a difference between pre-tax and after-tax accounting results, which is generally reflected in the ETR. Consistent with prior research, the pre- versus after-tax CEO and SBU-manager selection models include variables that control for a firm's tax-planning opportunities because the presence of such opportunities reflect the extent to which a manager's actions can be expected to lower the ETR.Even if a manager's efforts are expected to lead to a lower ETR, a firm will use an after-tax performance measure only if the expected benefits exceed the expectedcosts of doing so. An after-tax performance measure is expected to lead to a lower ETR because it motivates the manager's increased cooperation with tax professionals to help identify, develop, and execute tax-planning strategies. McLemore (1997, 1) cites Hewlett Packard's tax director to support the need for SBU-manager involvement in tax-planning efforts:Tax planning is only as good as being involved in the early stages of such things as business planning, strategic planning, and merger and acquisition work....Your tax department has to be represented at the table when those decisions are made. The evolving model for the future is the tight integration of tax people with business unit planning.Costs associated with using after-tax performance measures include the additional wage that must be paid to compensate the manager for the increased risk due to potential tax law changes and the increased effort that results from including income tax expense in the compensation contract. Other potential costs associated with after-tax compensation include the administrative cost of allocating tax expense to a firm's SBU, increased tax examination costs, and increased tax authority scrutiny. Contrary to measuring after-tax compensation's benefits via observed ETR, there are no clear empirical surrogates for after-tax performance measures' costs. This study thus focuses on the realized benefits of compensating managers on an after-tax basis but does not provide evidence of the associated costs' magnitude.Proprietary data obtained in a survey of corporate executives are used to construct certain test variables, including those indicating whether CEOs and SBU managers are compensated using after-tax accounting-based performance measures. Publicly available data are used to construct ETR and other test variables. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that compensating SBU managers, but not CEOs, on an after-tax basis leads to lower ETR, resulting in an estimated median tax savings of $13.3 million annually. Sensitivity tests performed on a subsample of firms with high simulated MTR (Graham 1996) provide further evidence that low-MTR firms' potential ETR-lowering actions that could have ambiguous effects on cash flows and after-tax profits are not driving this result. Further sensitivity tests help rule out the proportion of tax function outsourcing as an alternative explanation for the statistically and economically significant negative relation between after- tax SBU-manager compensation and ETR.The results contribute to the accounting-based compensation literature by linking after- tax accounting-based performance measures to SBU-manager involvement that is incrementally effective in lowering firms' ETR. Consistent with Guidry et al. (1999) who document bonus-induced earnings management at the SBU level, this finding provides additional insight into the effect that SBU-manager accounting-based incentives have on managers' actions. Also, the estimated explicit tax savings resulting from after-tax performance measures provide corporate decision makers with information relevant to the design of SBU-manager incentive compensation plans.The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets forth the hypotheses tested in this study. Section III outlines the empirical models and estimation procedures used in testing these hypotheses. Section IV provides a discussion of the data and sample, including a brief overview of the survey used to obtain proprietary compensation data. Results are presented in Section V. The final section provides the conclusion and a discussion of the study's limitations.II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENTNewman (1989), Cares and Guffey (2000), and Atwood et al. (1998) investigate firms' choices of after-tax earnings as the contracting variable in CEO bonus plans. These studies hypothesize that firms with greater tax-planning opportunities, consistent with the Antle and Demski (1988) controllability principle, are more likely to use after-tax performance measures. Using proxies for tax-planning opportunities, these studies collectively find that multinational status, number of operating segments, firm size, and capital intensity are positively associated with after-tax CEO compensation. Atwood et al. (1998) also presents evidence that leverage is negatively associated with this choice.企业税收筹划的有效性:基于对报酬的激励作用(上)约翰D·菲利普斯康涅狄格大学摘要本研究探讨首席执行官是否修正主管和业务部门经理利用税后会计为基础的绩效措施,导致较低的实际税率,以报酬激励用于税收筹划的有效性。

个人所得税改革外文文献翻译2018-2019

个人所得税改革外文文献翻译2018-2019

个人所得税改革外文文献翻译2018-2019个人所得税改革外文翻译2018-2019英文Personal income tax reforms: A genetic algorithm approach Matteo Morini, Simone PellegrinoAbstractGiven a settled reduction in the present level of tax revenue, and by exploring a very large combinatorial space of tax structures, in this paper we employ a genetic algorithm in order to determine the ‘best’ structure of a real world personal income tax that allows for the maximisation of the redistributive effect of the tax, while preventing all taxpayers being worse off than with the present tax structure. We take Italy as a case study.Keywords:Genetic algorithms,Personal income taxation,Micro-simulation models,Reynolds–Smolensky index,Tax reforms Personal income tax (hereafter, PIT) is characterised around the world by several parameters that define its structure: marginal tax rates, upper limits of thresholds, allowances and deductions, as well as tax credits. Applied to the distribution of income observed in a specific country, the PIT structure of that country determines a given tax revenue and a given redistributive effect, as well as influences economic efficiency, first of all work incentives and tax compliance.The existing economic literature represents a fundamental tool forthe PIT design and for the need of balancing equity and efficiency, as well as social preferences for redistribution. This literature first focused on axioms that are required in order to equally apportion the burden of taxation among citizens (Mill,1848, Samuelson, 1947). However, starting with the seminal paper by Mirrlees (1971), the theoretical literature has mainly focused on the equity-efficiency trade-off in optimum taxation. This is a difficult task, since many empirical simulation studies have, in fact, shown that in the short-run it is almost impossible to find a tax reform, which does not decrease efficiency or equity and, at the same time, is still financially and politically feasible. Moreover, if applied to a real-world tax system, most of the results of the economic literature would imply considerable modifications of the present tax structure and would certainly affect the tax revenue, which is one of the most important concerns that policymakers have to face. In other words, governments are certainly interested in setting up a tax system by implementing the literature's results, at least in the long-run. In the short-run, they are undoubtedly subject to budget constraints and to the political feasibility of a reform.Despite these arguments, the PIT structure is subject to continuous evolution around the world. Peter, Buttrick and Duncan (2010) study and categorize the trends in the PIT structure over the period of 1981 to 2005 in 189 countries. They show that many governments substantially and/orfrequently change the PIT structure; according to their analysis, about 45 per cent of governments changed at least one parameter of the PIT every year. They also emphasize that ‘The high frequency of changes may also be due to the gradual enactment of tax reforms that get implemented over several years, fiscal policy responses to the business cycle, or continuous experimentation and search for the best tax structure.’This paper focus on these key issues by considering a recently proposed real-world tax cut; it evaluates a feasible taxreform by optimizing the government's target and, in the meantime, by exactly complying with the government's budget constraint. The solution for this problem can be obtained by employing a genetic algorithm (hereafter, GA): a search heuristic inspired by natural selection, well-suited to the identification of the most promising solution to the problem under consideration. To our knowledge, no previous attempts at employing GAs for PIT structure optimisation exist. The unique applications to tax systems deal with other and simpler aspects (Brooks, 2000, Chen and Lee, 1997).The tax cut, which we study, has recently been implemented by the Italian government. In order to increase the purchasing power of ‘poor’ PIT taxpayers, as well as taxpayers belonging to the ‘middle class’ (a proxy of the redistributive effect maximisation), the Italian government recently reduced the PIT revenue by 9.324 billion euros (about 6 per centof the PIT tax revenue) by introducing a cash transfer of 80 euros per month only for employees with a PIT gross income in the range of 8–26 thousand euros (about 10.9 million taxpayers).Considering this reform, two questions arise: is this tax cut allocation the best one the government could have considered? Or, given this settled amount of the tax cut, which is the best way to reform the whole PIT structure in order to achieve the highest redistributive effect, whilst leaving no taxpayers worse-off with respect to the present tax structure? The GA is an appropriate tool, and Italy is a perfect case study, since the Italian PIT is very complicated and its structure incorporates more than thirty parameters. Our results show that a more general, better, and more equity-oriented reform is possible; moreover, this methodology can be applied to any other specific target.The solution of the problem discussed here faces an equity-efficiency trade-off: in order for the redistributive effect to be its highest, the efficiency of the tax (i.e. the level of the effective marginal tax rates) can worsen. In this first paper we just focus on the equity side of the problem. This does not imply that we forget about efficiency; we suggest a few constraints to the allowable parameters of tax structure in order to not arrive at both trivial and inefficient solutions.Even if by employing the ‘best’ tax structure (almost) no taxpayer is worse-off, its actual applicability could face political resistance since allparameters of the tax change and, consequently, taxpayers could hardly believe that no one is worse-off. We do not discuss these political economy inconveniences. Finally, it has to be noted that we also do not consider taxpayers’ responses to the new parameters of the tax structure; it is a ‘short run’ solution that can help policy makers when they think of PIT reform. In order to consider taxpayers’ responses further research can be done regarding a long-run perspective: for example by modelling the equity-efficiency trade-off in a genetic algorithm framework or by employing agent-based models. This is the baseline of our further research.Given its progressive nature, the PIT is a globally fundamental tool through which the redistributive effect of the whole tax system of a country is achieved, even if a large variability, in terms of both tax revenue and redistributive effect, is observed around the world (Verbist and Figari, 2014, Wagstaff et al., 1999). The two key reasons for this variability deal with the role played by social preferences for redistribution (Lefranc, Pistolesi, & Trannoy, 2008) and the equity-efficiency trade-off oftaxation (Feldstein, 1976, Saez, 2001, Sandmo, 1981, Stern, 1976, Toumala, 2016).Starting from Mill's (1848) approach, economic theory has first elaborated precise axioms to equally apportion the burden of taxation among citizens. The principle of equal sacrifice can thus give normativeand positive contents to the ability-to-pay principle and justify the tax progressivity. The resulting degree of progressivity depends on the amount of tax revenue to be raised, as well as the social welfare function characterizing preferences of the society. Within this framework, Young (1990) proposed a theoretical strategy in order to test the possibility of stating that a country's lawmaker adopts a precise criterion of distributive justice and a particular social welfare function when he determines vertical equity and modifications in the PIT structure (e.g., Pellegrino, 2008 for an application to the Italian case). Young's (1990) framework does not consider efficiency and incentive effects, so his methodology favours high marginal tax rates on higher incomes. Berliant and Gouveia (1993) introduce incentive effects within Young's (1990) methodology, finding conditions for progressive taxation similar to the standard ones elaborated by Samuelson (1947).On the other hand, Mirrlees (1971) introduces the theory of optimal direct taxation, which also deals with the equity-efficiency trade-off. As the real-world PIT systems are very complex, empirical applications of the optimal income tax theory are based on stylised tax, which involve only a few tax parameters. Within this framework, the most effective estimation difficulties deal with the economic behaviour modelling since the labour supply responses (Aaberge and Colombino, 2013, Bargain et al.,2014, Blundell and Shephard, 2012) and the tax base responses to taxchanges have to be introduced and parameterised (Saez, 2001, Saez et al., 2012).On the contrary, governments have to face PIT structures composed by several parameters and, most importantly, the PIT structure observed in a country (in a given year) is indeed the result of several and partial adjustments that have occurred over the previous years. Focusing on those aspects, this paper differs from the existing literature for several reasons. First of all, it has a different the point of view from which the PIT reform is evaluated. Usually, the existing empirical literature evaluates the effects of a tax reform after the government introduces it. On the contrary, in this paper, we consider the government's point of view before such a reform is introduced.Let us consider a generic government. Every year, this government plans finance law, which sets the annual adjustments on the level of the overall value of public spending and tax revenue to be obtained by the current legislation, in order to achieve some specific goals (such as the level of the government deficit) set in the long-term budget. One possible adjustment is the level of the PIT revenue. Starting from the actual PIT structure, the government may then want to cut PIT revenue in order to increase the purchasing power of taxpayers; conversely, it may want to increase the redistributive effect of the tax leaving the tax revenue unchanged; or, it may want to increase tax revenue by letting the richesttaxpayers face the whole tax increase, or it may want to modify the PIT structure in order to reduce the inefficiencies of the tax. These are, of course, only some explanatory perspectives.Whatever the target, which parameters of the tax should be changed in order to optimize it? How much should they change? Or, more generally, how should the whole PIT structure change? Given this target, it is not the case that policy-makers consider these questions when thinking of such a PIT reform. In order to implement a reform, the government usually changes some parameters of the tax compatible with its revenue constraint. Whether such a tax structure change is aimed at achieving the best way to obtain the specific target is debatable. The perspective discussed here can therefore be useful in setting a short-run tax reform. Apart from exceptional cases, the tax cuts represent a small percentage of the overall revenue of the tax; on one hand, results of the economic literature can be only guidelines for the implementation of such a reduction; on the other hand, the government is primarily interested in correctly forecasting the tax reduction, given its balanced budget constraint.In this paper, we propose a new methodology to implement a personal income tax reform. In particular, given a settled tax cut decided upon by the government, (a similar strategy can be applied if the tax revenue increases), we show how a genetic algorithm can be employed, in order to find out the values of all parameters defining the structure of thepersonal income tax able to satisfy a specific target. Our methodology can be applied to any other specific target; as an example, in this work our target is the maximisation of the redistributive effect of the tax, while preventing all taxpayers being worse off with respect to the present tax structure. We apply this methodology to the Italian personal income taxation system for two reasons: the tax structure is quite complicated,and recently the government decided to reduce tax revenue by about 9.324 billion euro starting from 2015. The aim of this tax cut is to increase the purchasing power of ‘poor’ taxpayers and taxpayers belonging to the ‘middle class’, and the instrument is the introduction of a cash transfer (not related to the structure of the personal income tax) only for employees with gross incomes in the range 8–26 thousand euros (in order for the yearly gain to be about one thousand euros), whilst all other kinds of taxpayer are not affected by this money transfer. Here we show that a better and more equity-oriented reform is possible. This methodology allows a short run reform, and can help policy makers when they think of a tax reform.中文个人所得税改革:一种遗传算法摘要考虑到目前税收收入的逐渐减少,并且通过探索发现当前的税收结构有很大的改革空间,在本文中,我们采用遗传算法来确定现实世界个人所得税的“最佳”结构,该结构允许为了最大程度地提高税收的再分配效果,同时防止所有纳税人的状况比目前的税收结构更糟。

会计 外文翻译 外文文献 英文文献 税务会计

会计 外文翻译 外文文献 英文文献 税务会计

Tax Accounting(From: Sun Kun. English Langusge in Accounting. Dongbei University of Finance & Economics Press, 2006.)Tax accounting is a branch of accounting that involves determining the correct liability-that is, the amount owed-for taxes, and preparing the necessary tax-return forms.Income taxes are a major concern to businesses as well as to individuals. Unfortunately, businessmen themselves often do not understand the tax laws, and they must therefore depend on the advice of tax accountants and lawyers. A tax accountant must have a thorough knowledge of the tax code of his or her country and of any divisions within it that have the power to levy, or impose, taxes.It is easy to appreciate the impact of income taxes on business. Careful planning designed to decrease the tax liability to the lowest level is thus a major concern of business. This planning is made possible by various provisions in the tax laws that offer alternative methods for handling particular transactions or accounting procedures. One alternative may thus have a significant tax advantage over another, resulting in either a tax saving, or postponement of the tax liability. A business can pay substantially more taxes than necessary if the wrong financial decision is made. Among these potentially significant decisions might be included the form of business under which to organize, whether or not to set up multiple corporations, and which accounting methods should be used to deal with inventory and depreciation.CHOOSING THE RIGHT FORM OF ORGANIZATION . There are three major forms of business ownership: the single proprietorship, the partnership, and the corporation. Tax laws vary considerably for each of these. In the case of both the individual proprietorship and partnership forms of business, income is taxed to the individual proprietor or partners. The owners of these businesses therefore pay the progressive income tax rate for individuals on their business income. A progressive income tax is one that charges a higher rate for higher earnings.Corporations, on the other hand, are subject to a tax on their profits, while the stockholders of a corporation are also taxed at the individual rates on the dividends they receive from these profits. Dividends are paid out of the corporation's earnings. The corporation is not allowed a deduction for the dividends it pays out when its taxable income is computed. This results in double taxation of the corporation'sincome.In certain eases, the double tax is eliminated or reduced under special provisions of the tax laws. Under one provision, the taxpayer receives a dividend exemption (income not subject to taxation) up to $ 100 for dividends received during the tax year. Another provision allows a corporation to be taxed as partnership if it meets the following requirements for a small business:(a)It is a domestic, rather than a foreign corporation.(b)It has no more than fifteen stockholders.(c)All the stockholders are didferent people.(d)No stockholder is a nonresident alien.(e)There is only one class of stock.While the small-business corporation can save a great deal in taxes by being taxed as partnership, it keeps the other nontax advantages, such as limited liability.Other income tax advantages often encourage the corporate form of organization. One of these is the possibility of selling the business or liquidating it; that is, of going out of business and disposing of the assets. When this occurs, it is possible to obtain long-term capital-gains treatment. A long-term capital gain is a profit on the sale of a capital asset that has been owned for a specified period. Long-term capital gains get preferential tax treatment-that is, half the rate applied to other kinds of income. A second possible tax advantage of the corporate structure is the deferral or postponement of double taxation by simply not paying dividends. A third is the flexibility that comes from being able to time the distribution of earnings so that they occur during the years in which the owners have the lowest tax liability. A fourth advantage is income splitting. This is a provision of the tax laws that allows the owner of a corporation to divide dividend payments from the corporation among members of his family by having each one own some of the stock. A fifth possible advantage is related to fringe benefits, such as group life insurance, medical payment plans, and wage continuation plans, that provide for full or partial payment of wages and salary to the employees during sickness. Many of these fringe benefits are encouraged in the tax laws by allowing deferred tax payments.CHOOSING THE RIGHT ACCOUNTING METHODS. The choice of one method or procedure over the possible alternatives can lead to a tax advantage.Some methods of accounting for depreciation offer a tax advantage. For example, in the declining-balance method, a greater percentage of the cost of a fixed asset isfigured for the earlier years of the life of the asset. The result is that part of the tax liability is deferred until later years.There is also a special tax credit for investment in most kinds of depreciable assets, with the exception of buildings that are acquired and placed in service. This credit was instituted as means of stimulating new investment in productive facilities.There are also different accounting methods for the inventory, commonly known as Fifo and Lifo. The Lifo method may be better from a tax standpoint since this method results in a lower tax liability in a period of rising prices. Under Lifo, the higher-priced goods are depreciated in the accounting period.A tax advantage also exists for businesses-that sell merchandise for personal use. These sales are often made on the installment basis, with payments spread over a period of weeks, months, or perhaps even years. For tax purposes, it is permissible to report the profit from sales during the years in which the actual payments are made rather than during the year of the original sale.A tax advantage is also available to the holders of most depletive assets-those which are used up, or depleted, over a period of time-like oil, natural gas, uranium, or coal. The taxpayer who owns assets of this kind is allowed a deduction on the gross income derived from the asset. The deduction is known as a depletion allowance; because of the economic importance of many of the depletive assets, the percentages allowed to the taxpayer are of great political concern.ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME TAXES. The basic accounting procedure for computing income taxes is relatively simple. The final or estimated tax liability is charged to the Income Tax Expense account and is deducted on the income statement. The liability is credited to the Estimated Income Taxes Payable account and is then classified as a current liability on the statement of financial position. There are, however, accounting problems that arise in regard to income taxes. These problems result from differences in the amount of taxable income and the amount of income reported on the income statement. This may result from the use of different accounting methods for tax purposes.CHINA'S TAX SYSTEM. The well-to-do in China have snubbed their government. In 2007 for the first time, anyone earning more than 120,000 yuan ($15,000) annually is supposed to file a personal income-tax return. Yet by the deadline of April 2nd(extended by a couple of days because of low compliance), only a small minority had done so. Threats of massive fines have gone unheeded.The government’s embarrassment was evident when it missed its own deadline of April 10th for announcing the total tally of tax returns completed. But officials have estimated the number is around 1.6m. The number of those required to file is widely reported to be 6m-7m and could well be much higher. Those who have done so already are mostly wage earners who have tax deducted from their salaries and feel they have no option but to report their incomes because they are already in the tax authorities’ records.A big difficulty for tax officials is that even some of the government’s own media have broken ranks and sugges ted that the middle classes’ obvious disdain for the new requirement may not be unreasonable. Confusingly, the annual tax return does not supersede an existing monthly requirement to report and pay tax on non-tax income if total earnings exceed a certain threshold. A newspaper run by the state prosecutor’s office argue that the tax administration had no legal authority to fine people for failing to fill out returns relating to income on which they had already paid tax.But very few bother to pay personal income tax unless it is deducted automatically. As some Chinese newspapers have pointed out, this is partly because many Chinese believed they get little in return for their taxes. They have to pay through the nose for health care and for decent education for their children. They are also resentful that few officials pay tax, even though many have big incomes from shady dealings.Even the words “no taxation without representation” have found their way into print, in an article in the “information times”, a go vernment owned newspaper in the southern city of Guangzhou. Noting that half of the delegates to China’s legislature were officials, the newspaper reported that commentators had pointed out that the parliament should have “fewer officials and more taxpayers”: an interesting distinction suggesting the taxman has struck a raw nerve.税务会计税务会计是会计的一个分支,其主要内容是如何确定正确的税务负债数额,编制纳税申报单。

企业税收筹划中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业税收筹划中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业税收筹划中英文对照外文翻译文献中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)1、Enterprises of the major means of tax planningTax planning is the premise of strict enforcement of tax laws to minimize tax, customs tax called. Enterprises to carry out the correct tax, the need for the adoption of the following major route of transmission.First, reasonable means of financing options. In accordance with the provisions of China's current tax law, corporate interest payments on the loan within a certain range can be pre-tax expenses, and dividends can only be spending the after-tax profits of enterprise expenses. From a tax point of view, appropriate to the bank business loans and financing between enterprises, rather than directly to thefund-raising benefits.Second, a reasonable choice of trading partners. China's existing value-added tax system has a general taxpayers and small-scale taxpayers on the points, choose a different supplier object, the tax burden on enterprises is not the same. For example, when the Department of suppliers of value-added tax general taxpayer, the businessafter the purchase of goods, according to the amount of tax deduction of input tax amount of the corresponding balance after payment of value-added tax; if the purchase of goods for small-scale taxpayers, VAT can not be achieved Its not contain the amount of input tax deduction, the tax burden more than the former. Such as open invoices can also be part of deduction.Third, "the easy way out" tax conversion. Enterprises will beconverted tohigh-tax low-tax, refers to economic activities in the same, there are a variety of revenue options to choose from, the taxpayers to avoid "high-tax point", choose the "low tax" and reduce the tax liability . The most typical example of this is to run non-taxable to the tax planning services. From the tax point of view, run mainly two: First, the same taxes, different tax rates. Systems such as supply and marketing enterprises, the general operating tax rate is 17% of the means of subsistence, but also the operating value-added tax rate of 13% of the agricultural means of production and so on. Second, different taxes, different tax rates. This usually refers to types of enterprises in their business activities, both value-added business project, the project also involves the business tax.Fourth, the cost of reasonable expenses. Enterprises does not violate tax laws and financial system under the premise of the full cost of the reasonable expenses, that may occur on the full estimated losses and narrow the tax base and reduce the amount of taxable income. Countries allow for costs incurred in the projects, such as wages, respectively, the total amount of tax by 2%, 14%, 1.5% extracts of trade union funds, staff welfare, staff education funding should be sufficient to mention as much as possible to the whole. For some of the losses that may occur, such as bad debt losses, businesses should be fully expected in the tax law as far as possible the extent permitted by the cap enough to reserve. This is in line with the national tax law and financial system, can receive the tax effect.Fifth, to reduce tax liability. Factors that affect the tax liability there are two, namely, tax base and tax rates, the smaller the tax base, lower tax rates, tax liability is also smaller. Tax planning canstart from these two factors to find legitimate ways to reduce tax liability. For example, an enterprise December 30, 2005 estimated taxableincome amounted to 100,200 yuan, the enterprise income tax liability 25050 yuan (100200 ×25%). If the corporate tax planning, tax consulting fees to pay 200 yuan, the corporate taxable income 100,000 (100200-200), income tax liability 27,000 yuan (100000 × 27%), can be found by comparing, for tax planning to pay only 200 yuan, 6066 yuan tax is (33066-27000).Sixth, to weigh the severity of the overall tax burden. For example, manyvalue-added tax planning programs have the general taxpayer and the taxpayer to choose small-scale planning. If an enterprise is a non-tax-year sales of about 900,000 yuan of production enterprises and enterprises to buy the materials each year the price of non-value-added tax of 70 million or less. The company's accounting system, the conditions identified as the general taxpayers. If that is the general taxpayer, the company's products are value-added tax rate applies to 17% capital gains tax liability 34,000 yuan (90 × 17% -70 × 17%); If it is small-scale taxpayers, the rate is 6%, 5.4 VAT liability million (90 × 6%)> 3.4 million. Therefore, from the perspective of value-added tax general taxpayer should be selected. But, in fact, although small-scale VAT taxpayers pay 20,000 yuan, but the input tax amount of 119,000 yuan (70 × 17%), although it can not offset the costs, thereby increasing the cost of 119,000 yuan, the income tax reduction of 2.975 million (11.9 × 25%), than pay a 20,000 yuan of value-added tax. Therefore, the business tax planning in the selection of programs, not only to look in a certain period of time watching the program on tax less, and toconsider business development goals, to choose to increase their overall revenue program.Seventh, take full advantage of preferential taxation policies. For taxpayers, the use of tax incentives for tax planning focuses on how the rational use of tax policies and regulations shall apply to the lower or more favorable tax rates, a well-planned production and operation activities, the actual tax burden to a minimum in order to achieve Festival tax effect. For example, according to China's Law of the State Council for approval of high-tech industrial development zone of the high-tech enterprises, since the production from the fiscal year income tax exemption for 2 years. To-business use of wastewater, waste gas, waste residue and other waste as themain raw materials for production, 5 years in the income tax reduction or exemption. In addition, to support agriculture and the development of UNESCO Wei investment, countries have different tax incentives. Business operators should refer to policy, comparing the investment environment, investment income, investment risks and other factors, decided to invest in the region, investment direction, as well as investment projects, a reasonable tax planning, in order to reduce the corporate tax burden.企业税收筹划的主要途径纳税筹划是在严格执行税法前提下,尽量减少缴税,习惯称其为节税。

经济学类税收收入外文翻译文献编辑

经济学类税收收入外文翻译文献编辑

文献信息:文献标题:Tax Revenues in the Context of Economic Determinants(经济决定因素背景下的税收收入)文献作者:A Andrejovska,V Pulikova文献出处:《Montenegrin Journal of Economics》, 2018,14(1):133-141 字数统计:英文3564单词,18987字符;中文5726汉字外文文献:Tax Revenues in the Context of Economic Determinants Abstract Despite the general recognition that taxes are generally a strong policy tool for assessing the macroeconomic impact of the country's alternative tax policies, taxes are often weakened by restrictions on tax revenue measurement. The aim of the contribution is to quantify the impact of selected macroeconomic indicators (gross domestic product, level of employment, public debt, foreign direct investments, effective tax rate, statutory tax rate) on the total amount of tax revenues, taking into account the tax competitiveness of the 28 EU member states. There was used methods of three models of regression analysis: the pooling model, the fixed effects model and the random effects model. The hypothesis that the gross domestic product has the greatest impact on tax revenue has been tested. In conclusion, the analysis confirmed that the strongest correlation is between tax revenues and employment rate. Followed by foreign direct investment and gross domestic product. Increasing these determinants by 1 mil. € (increase in employment by 1%) would increase tax revenues by 10 072 mil. € at the employment rate, by 383.1 thousand € for gross domestic product and by 434.2 thousand € for foreign direct investment.Keywords: tax competition, corporate taxation, tax revenue, capital mobilityINTRODUCTIONCorporate taxes represent the driving force of the economy which makesindividual countries more attractive for investment. It helps creating new jobs and ultimately increase welfare in the country and brings sufficient tax revenues to national budgets. However, it is not easy to determine its optimal level. Lower taxes attract investors, but higher taxes bring higher revenues to national budgets. Even when high taxes are linked to tax avoidance. When assessing corporate taxes at European Union level, it has to be said that despite the existence of free trade and the common currency, there are 28 different tax systems with different levels of corporate taxation. Governments have to seriously address the issue of tax harmonization and coordination of EU tax policies to maintain economic progress and stability. There is a contradiction. On the one hand, it is the duty of the Member States to comply with the legal norms and acts in force in the EU. On the other hand, countries are trying to maintain their current position in the field of tax policy with respect to other countries. It is important that all harmonization measures lead to sufficient tax revenues in each country.Taxes are in general considered as a relevant policy tool, which significantly influences macroeconomic outcomes of tax policies braked by some limits and those are tax rates. Statutary tax rates of corporate taxation are key element within a pack of stimulus and restrictions, which influence and direct economic decisions of investors. Besides that, they are indispensable for development of quantitative applications in theory and help transform theory as a tool for policy making. In theoretical diameter there are vivid discussions about profit of companies, good conditions and optimal taxation (Lucasa, 1991, Cooley and Hansen, 1992, Mendoza and Tesar, 1994), which are depending on characteristics of taxation policies in particular countries. Measurement of tax revenues from the point of macroeconomic models proved to be very difficult because statutory rates of corporate tax, which are by taxation one of the deciding tools, come from big amount of information about given country, its taxation system, taxation policy, taxation stimulus, as well as its investment projects in certain fields (Frenkel et al., 1991, Bulter, 1981, Aschauer and Greenwood, 1985, Pissarides, 1985, Frenkel and Razin, 1986, Greenwood and Huffman, 1991, Rebel, 1991, Baxter et al., 1993).Kawano and Slemrod (2016) dealt with a correlation that expresses the relationship between corporate tax rates and tax revenues for OECD countries between 1980 and 2004. They found that raising implicit tax rates maximizes corporate profits. Claude (2007), Devereux et al (2002) and Devereux and Griffith (1998) also discussed this dependence. The authors have presented the result of their research is the fact that higher tax rates increase tax revenue. We can observe a negative two-way relationship between the tax rate and tax revenue. The tax rate has a negative dependence on investment. The higher the corporate tax rate is, the more negative the impact on the investment has further increasing. The statutory rate is the easiest and most accessible way to gather information about the country, but certainly not the only criterion.As reported by Bayer (2012), Gupta (2007) Bird et al. (2008), it is important to monitor the total tax burden that represents the level of corporate taxation or in the other words, the share of tax on the total income or profits of the company in that country. Even though the legislation sets the basic (in some countries a reduced tax rate too), which is the same for all companies, it is necessary to monitor the tax burden in a wider perspective. It is precisely the inappropriateness of using statutory rates as an objective indicator in tracking and then comparing the corporate tax rate to deriving an effective tax rate that has a significantly better disclosure ability, McKenzie et al. (1997) Barrios et al. (2014). The effective tax rate is expressed by the actual tax rate of the income and an increase of this tax rate predicts higher tax revenue.Lucas (1990, 1991) and Razin et al. (1993) suggested alternative method of taxation, which creates effective tax rates based on data about real tax payments and national accounts. This method takes into consideration effective system of taxation, gross tax charging resulting from primary taxes, and produces measures of tax rates, which are in line with conception of gross tax rates on national level. Consequential tax rates are capable to get close to happenings, which do not disrupt economic decision making in dynamic macroeconomic conditions.Tax rates are an important segmentation criterion that indirectly affects taxrevenues and the economic performance of countries. We express it as a gross domestic product or GDP per capita. Foreign direct investment, inflation rate, unemployment, and public debt are the other criteria. Besides tax rates, the crucial segmental criteria is economic forwardness of the country, in terms of gross domestic product or HDP per capita (Castro and Camarillo 2014, Gupta, 2007, Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010 and Livermore 2004). Stated authors, within the scope of economic analysis, dedicated to examination of dependence between GDP and tax revenues. In their thesis they showed, that increase of profit positively influences the growth of GDP. Within analysis they were counting on model, which assumes unitary elasticity between tax basis (profit of firms) and explaining variable and so nominal GDP. The result of the analysis is the fact that growth of profit in monitored time was direct proportionally equal with tempo of GDP growth.They conclude that tempo of increase of tax revenue shouldn´t significantly overstep the tempo of GDP growth. The influence of GDP on revenue of corporate tax by the means of different analysis examined more authors: Kubátová and Říhová (2009), Bayer (2011), Bánociová and Pavlíková (2013), Simionescu et al. (2016), Karnitis and Karnitis (2017). Through panel regression analysis, the positive bilateral relationship between GDP and tax revenues was claimed.The research results suggest that demographic change in the EU countries is affecting tax revenues (Goudswaard and van de Kar (1994), Al-Mamun, Entebang, Mansor and Yasser (2014), Hasseldine (1999), Devos (2008), Felix and Watkins (2013). Total tax revenue will increase with the overall population growth in most countries. According to Goudswaard and van de Kar (1994), tax revenues will increase with population growth and an increase of the relatively older workforce. His forecasts indicate that after 2030 revenues will decline as a result of the declining population and the rapidly aging population.Kennedy, McMillen and Simmons (2015) point to the positive relationship between employment growth and revenues from corporate tax. At the same time, they point out that the high level of unemployment is in a negative correlation with the tax rate, so governments have to stimulate the economy at a time of economic downturnwith lower tax rates. Schwellnuss and Arnold (2008) assess the impact of the negative dependence between domestic and foreign investment and the corporate tax rate. This negative dependence was also confirmed at the industrial level. An important role was played by the specific tax rate for corporations.The higher the corporate tax rate is, the more negative is its impact on the future growth of the investment. A similar view is expressed by Abbabs and Klemm (2012), who note that excessive tax increases, which are linked to the increase in tax revenues, reduce the inflow of foreign investment and vice versa. The lower rates mean the increase the inflow of foreign investment. The state budget and the public debt balance are other macroeconomic indicators that monitor the government's ability to effectively manage state budget resources and have a direct impact on the state's fiscal policy (Dráb and Mihóková, 2013).Impact on debt, tax systems, primary expenditures and tax competition was given by Krogstrup (2002) as part of the European Central Bank study. He focused on the causality between tax burden and fiscal imbalance. Osterloh and Heinemann (2013) concluded that other socio-economic and geographic factors form the support of the minimum corporate tax at member state level are also important. These factors included political affiliation, individual characteristics and educational level as well as national interests.RESEARCH METHODOLOGYRegression AnalysisThe aim of the submission is to monitor the influence of macroeconomic determinants on the amount of tax revenues. Conducted analysis quantified the influence of chosen indicators on gross amount of tax revenues for 28 member states of European Union. Data was structured as panel data from Eurostat data base (2015) and analysis was conducted in statistical program SAS Enterprise Guide 7.1.Considering the significant differences in macroeconomic markers between the countries, the analysis was conducted specifically for 5 economically most advanced countries (Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain) and specially for 23countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Austria and Sweden. 13 new member states were: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). Selection of markers was influenced by theoretical scopes of authors Karagöz, (2013), Hansson, Porter and Williams, (2012), Stratil, (2009), Gupta, (2007) and Kubátová and Říhová, (2009), which followed big amount of determinants influencing the volume of tax revenues lapsing to budget.Degree of impact of these factors differed depending on intensity of relationship between respective variables. In the submission, the analysis was examined by panel regression, which in their thesis were used by Hsiao et al. (2006) and Boubtane et al. (2013), while:•dependent variable:-TR total tax revenues from direct and indirect taxes at current prices in mil. €,•independent variables:-STR nominal (statutory) corporation tax rate in %,-ETR effective corporation tax rate in%,-GDP gross domestic product at current prices in mil. €,-LoE employment rate as a share of employees aged 15-64,-IN the rate of inflation, measured on the basis of the harmonized index of consumer prices,-PD public debt as debt-to-GDP ratio in %,-DI direct foreign investments as the ratio of FDI inflows and outflows at current prices in mil. €.The general panel model was defined as:where y it is a dependent variable (total tax revenue), x it is a vector of explanatory variables (HDP, employment rate, inflation rate, public debt, direct foreign investments, a statutory and effective tax rate), I = 1,… n is the index of country in question, t = 1, … T is time index a u it is a model error with a mean value equal to 0.Three models were used in the analysis: pooling model (PM), fixed effects model (FEM) and random effects model (REM). Pooling model provided an undistorted and effective estimate in the case of statistically insignificant individual errors. If individual errors were correlated with one of the explanatory variables estimates of pooling patterns and random effects were distorted, and it was required to use fixed effects model. The statistical significance of the individual components was tested using the poolability of the F test. For testing of the statistical significance of individual effects and time effects was used Lagrange multiplier test and F test based on comparison of pooling and fixed effects models. To compare the suitability of using two different model specifications and two different estimators during the analysis we have used the Universal Hausman test.Finding Dependencies Between VariablesIn the first step of analysis, the basic numerous characteristics of variables were found, 60 values were analyzed for every variable (5 countries in 12 years). In this group of countries were average values effective (30,64%) and statutory (31,49%) rate above European average (23%), also above the average of euro area (25,7%). Inflation rate was within the rage of -0,60% (deflation) up to 4,5%. The amount of tax revenues (on average 724 243 m €), and also foreign direct investments (497 457 m €) were above European average since these are economically the most advanced member states of EU.While observance the correlation of entry variables was found, that strong relationship towards tax revenues was accounted by gross domestic products (r = 0,93). Statistically significant correlations were show by foreign direct investments (r = 0,72) and level of employment (r = 0,55). Positive dependence was shown in all mentioned cases, meaning that with growth of entry variables, also the output variables value was growing. Very strong indirect dependence was accounted by public debt (r = -0,74), inflation rate (r = 0,23) and effective tax rate (r = -0, 12). With the growth of initial variables tax revenues were decreasing. Statutory rate didn’t have any influence on tax revenue. Its correlated coefficient was 0,06 (table 1).Table 1. Correlated coefficient of variables of 5 countriesLegend: TR: tax revenues, GDP: gross domestic product, LoE: level of employment, PD: public debt, FDI: foreign direct investments, ETR: effective tax rate, STR: statutory tax rate.The second group was formed as a mix of 10 old (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Austria and Sweden) and 13 new (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) member states. By every variable, 276 observations were analyzed (23 states and 12 years).The average level of effective (19,70 %) and statutory (21,82 %) tax rate was significantly below European average (23 %), but also below euro area average (25,7 %), since tax rate of these countries was between 10 % (Bulgaria) up to 35 % (Malta). Burden on public finances was 99 557 m €, which is markedly above the limit of Maastricht criteria (60 %).Tax revenues as well as the amount of foreign direct investments were more than 60 000 m €. Positive in this, and in previous group of countries seems to be the level of employment, which was on average 64,11 %. Opposite negative impact was noticed by inflation rate with 2,5 %.While analyzing, a strong direct dependency between gross domestic product (r = 0,98) and foreign direct investment (r = 0,85) was found. Statistically significant was also the level of employment (r = 0,49), effective tax rate (r = 0,38) and statutory tax rate (r = 0,41).Indirect strong dependency was shown by public debt (r = -0,85) and inflation (r = -0,24).The analysis clearly showed, that the higher statutory rate, the lower dependency and weaker influence on total tax revenue (Laffer curve pattern).Legend: TR: tax revenues, GDP: gross domestic product, LoE: level ofemployment, IR: inflation rate, PD: public debt, FDI: foreign direct investments, ETR: effective tax rate, STR: statutory tax rate.Table 2. Correlated coefficients of 23 countriesLegend: TR: tax revenues, GDP: gross domestic product, LoE: level of employment, PD: public debt, FDI: foreign direct investments, ETR: effective tax rate, STR: statutory tax rate.Regression Analysis of Panel DataIn all observations, based on the p-value of Hausman test, the model of random effects was favored. The biggest influence on tax revenues were shown by level of employment, gross domestic product and foreign direct investment. If these determinants would be 1 m € higher (by increase in employment by 1%) it would come to growth of tax revenue by 10 072 m €, in employment by 383,1 thousand € by gross domestic product and 432,2 thousand € by foreign direct investment.Gupta (2007), Tanzi, (1992), Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2003) point out that there is positive correlation between tax revenue and gross domestic product and negative correlation between tax revenue and state budget balance. Swiston et al. (2007) was observing the influence of factors on tax revenue in American states between 2004 and 2006 and demonstrated, that growth of tax revenue from the percentage of taxes on GDP is only temporary phenomenon. While the growth of company profit and capital profit contribute to 40% increase in percentage of taxes on GDP perpetually.By monitoring 23 countries, it was found that not all macroeconomic determinants have a positive impact on tax revenues. Government debt, inflation rates and the statutory tax rate were negative. Public debt growth of 1 mil. € would reduce tax revenues by € 23 million. €. The opposite result in its research was achieved by Krogstrup (2002) who found that the results of its regression analysis showed that 1% growth of the debt service variable in relation to GDP provides an increase in taxrevenue in the country by an average of 0.2%.Table 3. Evaluation of modeling of input variablesLegend: TR: tax revenues, GDP: gross domestic product, LoE: level of employment, IR: inflation rate, PD: public debt, FDI: foreign direct investments, ETR: effective tax rate, STR: statutory tax rate.This relationship of the direct dependence between government's fiscal discipline and corporate tax is also dependent on the level of capital mobility. Based on empirical research, high mobility of capital increases the tax asymmetries. A statutory rate is critical for tax but it has negligible impact on our analysis. Increase of statutory rate by 1% would decrease total tax revenue by 231 million. This finding is true for 23 countries, 5 countries were discarded from monitoring. As a result, the higher the statutory rate is, dependence and the impact on the total tax revenue are lower (the lawfulness of the Laffer curve).Similar findings were made by Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), who monitored 16 countries in a panel regression for the period 1979-1997, and found that a 1% increase in tax rates would reduce tax revenues by 1.5 pp. Regression analysis in their research was used by Garrett (1995), Quinn (1997), Garrett Mitchell (2001), Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Swank and Steinmo (2002), Slemrod (2004) and Winner (2005) trying to explain the impact of tax rates and other countryspecific factors, including capital mobility.They dealt with an estimate of the reduced form of equations, without any significant theoretical specification. They were distinguished by various methods, including the variables used and the econometric specifications. These documents include, for example, a survey presenting a mixed picture of the impact of capital mobility, all of whom consistently claim that the most commonly used tax rate is the rate of statutory tax, although effective tax rates and tax revenue levels are alsoimportant.Levišauskaitė and Rūškys (2003) point out that, in addition to monitoring the dependence of macroeconomic variables, many other quantitative indicators that affect the development of corporate tax and the total amount of tax revenue must not be forgotten. Such factors, according to the authors, include the geographic location of a state that affects a number of tax-law elements of corporate tax construction, as there is a continental and Anglo-American legal system coexisting within the EU, with several significant differences.CONCLUSIONIn general, it is stated that with the increase in the nominal tax rate we achieve higher tax revenues. However, this is a macroeconomic view that does not apply from a microeconomic point of view. In this view, it is necessary to take into the consideration fact that the higher the nominal tax rate is, the more companies try to reduce the value of the tax paid by adjusting the tax bases. Companies have the ability to reduce the total tax paid through tax optimization systems. Tax management also enables companies to achieve the beneficial difference between effective rates and nominal tax rates. Research shows that the effective rate is rising below the nominal rate. The regression analysis, which was more closely focused on its models of fixed effects, random effects and pooling models on the impact of macroeconomic determinants on the total amount of tax revenues, found that the positive aspect of growth was shown in all the determinants. But the decisive factor was employment rate, gross domestic product and foreign direct investment. What's interesting, the nominal and effective tax rates did not have a relevant impact. In the first group (5 countries), was the nominal tax rate for high correlation dependence eliminated and in the second group (23 countries) it had a negative impact. Although the effective tax rate had a positive impact in both cases, its increase did not generate sufficient tax revenue. In conclusion we can say that, macroeconomic as well as microeconomic factors are important in the foreign investor's decision about location and extent of his investment.中文译文:经济决定因素背景下的税收收入摘要尽管人们普遍认为,税收通常是评估该国替代税收政策的宏观经济影响的有力政策工具,但税收往往因税收计量受到限制而削弱。

最新个人所得税英文参考文献精选

最新个人所得税英文参考文献精选

最新个人所得税英文参考文献精选概要个人所得税英文个人所得税参考文献精选本文关键词:英文,个人所得税,参考文献,精选,最新最新脚注个人所得税全名参考文献精选本文简介:个人所得税(personalincometax)是以个人(自然人)取得的各项应税所得为征税对象所征收的一种税。

它可以调节收入下放,增强纳税意识,增加财政输入。

下面我们为大家引文准备了个人所得税英语参考文献,所有人鼓励大家撰写此方向的论文。

个人所得税英语参考文献一:[1]JoséF最新个人所得税英文参考文献精选本文内容:个人所得税英语参考文献二:[41]Alastair Thomas. The elasticity of taxable income in New Zealand: Evidence from the 1986 tax reform[J]. New Zealand Eic Papers,2021,462:.[42]Mitja ?ok,Jo?e Sambt,Marko Ko?ak,MiroslavVerbi?,Boris Majcen. Distribution of personal income tax changes in Slovenia[J]. Post-ist Eies,2021,244:.[43]Casey Dawkins. The Spatial Pattern of Low Income Housing Tax Credit Properties: Implications for Fair Housing and Poverty Deconcentration Policies[J]. Journal of the American Planning Association,2021,793:.[44]Jaan Masso,Jaanika Meriküll. Macroeic effects of zero corporate income tax on retained earnings[J]. Baltic Journal of Eics,2021,112:.[45]Nadeem Ahmed Sheikh,Muhammad Azeem Qureshi. Crowding-out or shying-away: impact of corporate income taxon capital structure choice of firms in Pakistan[J]. Applied Financial Eics,2021,2419:.[46]José Félix Sanz-Sanz,María Arrazola-Vacas,Nuria Rueda-López,Desiderio Romero-Jordán. Reported gros s incomeand marginal tax rates: estimation of the behaviouralreactions of Spanish taxpayers[J]. Applied Eics,2021,475:.[47]Shigeki Kunieda. New Optimal Income Tax Theoryand Japan's Income Tax System[J]. Japanese Ey,2021,394:.[48]Jessica Wiederspan,Elizabeth Rhodes,H. Luke Shaefer. Expanding the Discourse on Antipoverty Policy: Reconsidering a Negative Income Tax[J]. Journal ofPoverty,2021,192:.[49]John Creedy,Norman Gemmell. Revenue-maximisingtax rates and elasticities of taxable income inNew Zealand[J]. New Zealand Eic Papers,2021,492:.[50]Hrvoje ?imovi?. Development of Personal IncomeTax in Croatia: Reforms and Failures[J]. Croatian Journal of Social Policy,2021,191:.[51]Vjekoslav Brati?. (In)efficiency of corporate income tax expenditures on underdeveloped areas of specialtax treatment in Croatia[J]. Financial Theory andPractice,2021,364:.[52]Helena Bla?i?,Sa?a Drezgi?. Personal income tax non-standard reliefs in European Union member states, Croatia and countries of the region[J]. Financial Theory andPractice,2021,371:.[53]Maja Klun. Slovenian income taxes and analysis of their tax expenditure in 2021-2021[J]. Financial Theory and Practice,2021,363:.[54]Alka Obadi?,Nika ?imurina,Robert Sonora. The effects of tax policy and labour market institutions onincome inequality[J]. Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of Eics: Journal of Eics and Business,2021,321:.[55]Averett Susan,Wang Yang. THE EFFECTS OF EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PAYMENT EXPANSION ON MATERNAL SMOKING.[J]. Health Eics,2021,:.[56]Anonymous. Research and Markets: J.K. Lasser's Your Income Tax Professional Edition 2021[J]. M2Presswire,2021,:.[57]Anonymous. Russian Energy Ministry suggests mulling switch to supplementary income tax for gasindustry[J]. Interfax : Russia & CIS Energy Newswire,2021,:.[58]Anonymous. Energy Ministry suggests supplementary income tax for gas industry (Part 2)[J]. Interfax : Russia & CIS Energy Newswire,2021,:.[59]Anonymous. US Department of Justice: Nantucket Man Arrested and Charged with Operating International Online 'Phishing' Scheme to Steal Income Tax Refunds[J]. M2 Presswire,2021,:.附件下载:。

纳税筹划外文文献原文和翻译

纳税筹划外文文献原文和翻译

Tax PlanningTax planning involves conceiving of and implementing various strategies in order to minimize the amount of taxes paid for given period. For a small business, minimizing the tax liability can provide money for expenses, investment, or growth. In this way, tax planning can be a source of working capital. According to The Entrepreneur Magazine Small Business Advisor, two basic rules apply to tax planning. First, a small business should never incur additional expense only to gain a tax deduction. While purchasing necessary equipment prior to the end of tax year can be a valuable tax planning strategy, marking unnecessary purchases is not recommended. Second a small business should always attempt to defer taxes when possible. Deferring taxes enables the business to use that money interest-free, and sometimes even earn interest on it, until the next time taxes are due.Experts recommend that entrepreneurs and small business owners conduct formal tax planning sessions in the middle of each tax year. This approach will give them time to apply their strategies to the current year as well as allow them to get a jump on the following year. It is important for small business owners to maintain a personal awareness of tax planning issues in order to save money. Even if employ a professional bookkeeper or accountant, small business owners should keep careful tabs on theirs own tax preparation in order to take advantage of all possible opportunities for deduction and tax savings."Whether or not you enlist the aid of an outsider, you should understand the basic provisions of the tax code." Just as you would not turn over the management of your money to another person, you should not blindly allow someone else to take complete charge of your tax paying responsibilities." In addition, as Frederick W. Dailey wrote in his book Tax Savvy for Small Business, "Tax knowledge has powerful profit potential. Knowing what the tax law has to offer can give you a far better bottom line than your competitors who don't bother to learn.General Areas of Tax PlanningThere are several general areas of tax planning that apply to all sorts of small businesses. These areas include the choice of accounting andinventory-valuation methods, the timing of equipment purchases, the spreading of business income among family members, and the selection of tax-favored benefit plans and investments. There are also some areas of tax planning that are specific to certain business forms—i.e., sole proprietorships, partnerships, C corporations, and S corporations. Some of the general tax planning strategies are described below:ACCOUNTING METHODS. Accounting methods refer to the basic rules and guidelines under which businesses keep their financial records and prepare their financial reports. There are two main accounting methods used for record-keeping: the cash basis and the accrual basis. Small business owners must decide which method to use depending on the legal form of the business, its sales volume, whether it extends credit to customers, and the tax requirements set forth by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The choice of accounting method is an issue in tax planning, as it can affect the amount of taxes owed by a small business in a given year.Accounting records prepared using the cash basis recognize income and expenses according to real-time cash flow. Income is recorded upon receipt of funds, rather than based upon when it is actually earned, and expenses are recorded as they are paid, rather than as they are actually incurred. Under this accounting method, therefore, it is possible to defer taxable income by delaying billing so that payment is not received in the current year. Likewise, it is possible to accelerate expenses by paying them as soon as the bills are received, in advance of the due date. The cash method is simpler than the accrual method, it provides a more accurate picture of cash flow, and income is not subject to taxation until the money is actually received.In contrast, the accrual basis makes a greater effort to recognize income and expenses in the period to which they apply, regardless of whether or not money has changed hands. Under this system, revenue is recorded when it is earned, rather than when payment is received, and expenses recorded when they are incurred, rather than when payment is made. The main advantage of the accrual method is that it provides a more accurate pictureof how a business is performing over the long-term than the cash method. The main disadvantages are that it is more complex than the cash basis, and that income taxes may be owed on revenue before payment is actually received. However, the accrual basis may yield favorable tax results for companies that have few receivables and large current liabilities.Under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), the accrual basis of accounting is required for all businesses that handle inventory, from small retailers to large manufacturers. It is also required for corporations and partnerships that have gross sales over $5 million per year, though there are exceptions for farming businesses and qualified personal service corporations—such as doctors, lawyers, accountants, and consultants. Other businesses generally can decide which accounting method to use based on the relative tax savings it provides.INVENTORY VALUATION METHODS. The method a small business chooses for inventory valuation can also lead to substantial tax savings. Inventory valuation is important because businesses are required to reduce the amount they deduct for inventory purchases over the course of a year by the amount remaining in inventory at the end of the year. For example, a business that purchased $10,000 in inventory during the year but had $6,000 remaining in inventory at the end of the year could only count $4,000 as an expense for inventory purchases, even though the actual cash outlay was much larger. Valuing the remaining inventory differently could increase the amount deducted from income and thus reduce the amount of tax owed by the business.The tax law provides two possible methods for inventory valuation: the first-in, first-out method (FIFO); and the last-in, first-out method (LIFO). As the names suggest, these inventory methods differ in the assumption they make about the way items are sold from inventory. FIFO assumes that the items purchased the earliest are the first to be removed from inventory, while LIFO assumes that the items purchased most recently are the first to be removed from inventory. In this way, FIFO values the remaining inventory at the most current cost, while LIFO values the remaining inventory at the earliest cost paid that year.LIFO is generally the preferred inventory valuation method during times of rising costs. It places a lower value on the remaining inventory and a higher value on the cost of goods sold, thus reducing income and taxes. On the other hand, FIFO is generally preferred during periods of deflation or in industries where inventory can tend to lose its value rapidly, such as high technology. Companies are allowed to file Form 970 and switch from FIFO to LIFO at any time to take advantage of tax savings. However, they must then either wait ten years or get permission from the IRS to switch back to FIFO.EQUIPMENT PURCHASES. Under Section 179 of the Internal Revenue Code, businesses are allowed to deduct a total of $18,000 in equipment purchases during the year in which the purchases are made. Any purchases above this amount must be depreciated over several future tax periods. It is often advantageous for small businesses to use this tax incentive to increase their deductions for business expenses, thus reducing their taxable income and their tax liability. Necessary equipment purchases up to the limit can be timed at year end and still be fully deductible for the year. This tax incentive also applies to personal property put into service for business use, with the exception of automobiles and real estate.WAGES PAID TO FAMILY MEMBERS. Self-employed persons can also reduce their tax burden by paying wages to a spouse or to dependent children. Wages paid to children under the age of 18 are not subject to FICA (Social Security and Medicare) taxes. Under normal circumstances, employers are required to withhold 7.65 percent of the first $62,700 of an employee's income for FICA taxes. Employers are also required to match the 7.65 percent contributed by every employee, so that the total FICA contribution is 15.3 percent. Self-employed persons are required to pay both the employer and employee portions of the FICA tax.But the FICA taxes are waived when the employee is a dependent child of the small business owner, saving the child and the parent 7.65 percent each. In addition, the child's wages are still considered a tax deductible business expense for the parent—thus reducing the parent's taxable income. Although the child must pay normal income taxes on the wages heor she receives, it is likely to be at a lower tax rate than the parent pays. Some business owners are able to further reduce their tax burden by paying wages to their spouse. If these wages bring the business owner's net income below $62,700—the threshold for FICA taxes—then they may reduce the self-employment tax owed by business owner. It is important to note, however, that the child or spouse must actually work for the business and that the wages must be reasonable for the work performed.BENEFITS PLANS AND INVESTMENTS. Tax planning also applies to various types of employee benefits that can provide a business with tax deductions, such as contributions to life insurance, health insurance, or retirement plans. As an added bonus, many such benefit programs are not considered taxable income for employees. Finally, tax planning applies to various types of investments that can shift tax liability to future periods, such as treasury bills, bank certificates, savings bonds, and deferred annuities. Companies can avoid paying taxes during the current period for income that is reinvested in such tax-deferred instruments.Tax Planning for Different Business Forms"The first step in tax planning—for small business owners and professionals, at least—is to select the right form of organization for your enterprise," according to Albert B. Ellentuck in the Laventhol and Horwath Small Business TaxPlanning Guide. "You'll end up paying radically different amounts of income tax depending on the form you select. And your odds of being audited by the IRS will change, too." Many aspects of tax planning are specific to certain business forms; some of these are discussed below:SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS AND PARTNERSHIPS. Tax planning for sole proprietorships and partnerships is in many ways similar to tax planning for individuals. This is because the owners of businesses organized as sole proprietors and partnerships pay personal income tax rather than business income tax. These small business owners file an informational return for their business with the IRS, and then report any income taken from the business for personal use on their own personal tax return. No special taxes are imposed except for the self-employment tax (SECA), whichrequires all self-employed persons to pay both the employer and employee portions of the FICA tax, for a total of 15.3 percent.Since they do not receive an ordinary salary, the owners of sole proprietorships and partnerships are not required to withhold income taxes for themselves. Instead, they are required to estimate their total tax liability and remit it to the IRS in quarterly installments, using Form 1040 ES. It is important that the amount of tax paid in quarterly installments equal either the total amount owed during the previous year or 90 percent of their total current tax liability. Otherwise, the IRS may charge interest and impose a stiff penalty for underpayment of estimated taxes.Since the IRS calculates the amount owed quarterly, a large lump-sum payment in the fourth quarter will not enable a taxpayer to escape penalties. On the other hand, a significant increase in withholding in the fourth quarter may help, because tax that is withheld by an employer is considered to be paid evenly throughout the year no matter when it was withheld. This leads to a possible tax planning strategy for a self-employed person who falls behind in his or her estimated tax payments. By having an employed spouse increase his or her withholding, the self-employed person can make up for the deficiency and avoid a penalty. The IRS has also been known to waive underpayment penalties for people in special circumstances. For example, they might waive the penalty for newly self-employed taxpayers who underpay their income taxes because they are making estimated tax payments for the first time.Another possible tax planning strategy applies to partnerships that anticipate a loss. At the end of each tax year, partnerships file the informational Form 1065 (Partnership Statement of Income) with the IRS, and then report the amount of income that accrued to each partner on Schedule K1. This income can be divided in any number of ways, depending on the nature of the partnership agreement. In this way, it is possible to pass all of a partnership's early losses to one partner in order to maximize his or her tax advantages.What’s more, enterprises to carry out the correct tax, the need for the adoption of the following major route of transmission.First, reasonable means of financing options. In accordance with the provisions of China's current tax law, corporate interest payments on the loan within a certain range can be pre-tax expenses, and dividends can only be spending the after-tax profits of enterprise expenses. From a tax point of view, appropriate to the bank business loans and financing between enterprises, rather than directly to the fund-raising benefits.Second, a reasonable choice of trading partners. China's existing value-added tax system has a general taxpayers and small-scale taxpayers on the points, choose a different supplier object, the tax burden on enterprises is not the same. For example, when the Department of suppliers of value-added tax general taxpayer, the business after the purchase of goods, according to the amount of tax deduction of input tax amount of the corresponding balance after payment of value-added tax; if the purchase of goods for small-scale taxpayers, VAT can not be achieved Its not contain the amount of input tax deduction, the tax burden more than the former. Such as open invoices can also be part of deduction.Third, "the easy way out" tax conversion. Enterprises will be converted to high-tax low-tax, refers to economic activities in the same, there are a variety of revenue options to choose from, the taxpayers to avoid "high-tax point", choose the "low tax" and reduce the tax liability . The most typical example of this is to run non-taxable to the tax planning services. From the tax point of view, run mainly two: First, the same taxes, different tax rates. Systems such as supply and marketing enterprises, the general operating tax rate is 17% of the means of subsistence, but also the operating value-added tax rate of 13% of the agricultural means of production and so on. Second, different taxes, different tax rates. This usually refers to types of enterprises in their business activities, both value-added business project, the project also involves the business tax.Fourth, the cost of reasonable expenses. Enterprises does not violate tax laws and financial system under the premise of the full cost of thereasonable expenses, that may occur on the full estimated losses and narrow the tax base and reduce the amount of taxable income. Countries allow for costs incurred in the projects, such as wages, respectively, the total amount of tax by 2%, 14%, 1.5% extracts of trade union funds, staff welfare, staff education funding should be sufficient to mention as much as possible to the whole. For some of the losses that may occur, such as bad debt losses, businesses should be fully expected in the tax law as far as possible the extent permitted by the cap enough to reserve. This is in line with the national tax law and financial system, can receive the tax effect.Fifth, to reduce tax liability. Factors that affect the tax liability there are two, namely, tax base and tax rates, the smaller the tax base, lower tax rates, tax liability is also smaller. Tax planning can start from these two factors to find legitimate ways to reduce tax liability. For example, an enterprise December 30, 2005 estimated taxable income amounted to 100,200 yuan, the enterprise income tax liability 25050 yuan (100200 ×25%). If the corporate tax planning, tax consulting fe es to pay 200 yuan, the corporate taxable income 100,000 (100200-200), income tax liability 27,000 yuan (100000 × 27%), can be found by comparing, for tax planning to pay only 200 yuan, 6066 yuan tax is (33066-27000).Sixth, to weigh the severity of the overall tax burden. For example, many value-added tax planning programs have the general taxpayer and the taxpayer to choose small-scale planning. If an enterprise is a non-tax-year sales of about 900,000 yuan of production enterprises and enterprises to buy the materials each year the price of non-value-added tax of 70 million or less. The company's accounting system, the conditions identified as the general taxpayers. If that is the general taxpayer, the company's products are value-added tax rate applies to 17% capital gains tax liability 34,000 yuan (90 × 17% -70 × 17%); If it is small-scale taxpayers, the rate is 6%, 5.4 VAT liability million (90 × 6%)> 3.4 million. Therefore, from the perspective of value-added tax general taxpayer should be selected. But, in fact, although small-scale VAT taxpayers pay 20,000 yuan, but the input tax amount of 119,000 yuan (70 × 17%), although it can not offset the costs, thereby increasing the costof 119,000 yuan, the income tax reduction of 2.975 million (11.9 × 25%), than pay a 20,000 yuan of value-added tax. Therefore, the business tax planning in the selection of programs, not only to look in a certain period of time watching the program on tax less, and to consider business development goals, to choose to increase their overall revenue program.Seventh, take full advantage of preferential taxation policies. For taxpayers, the use of tax incentives for tax planning focuses on how the rational use of tax policies and regulations shall apply to the lower or more favorable tax rates, a well-planned production and operation activities, the actual tax burden to a minimum in order to achieve Festival tax effect. For example, according to China's Law of the State Council for approval of high-tech industrial development zone of the high-tech enterprises, since the production from the fiscal year income tax exemption for 2 years. To-business use of wastewater, waste gas, waste residue and other waste as the main raw materials for production, 5 years in the income tax reduction or exemption. In addition, to support agriculture and the development of UNESCO Wei investment, countries have different tax incentives. Business operators should refer to policy, comparing the investment environment, investment income, investment risks and other factors, decided to invest in the region, investment direction, as well as investment projects, a reasonable tax planning, in order to reduce the corporate tax burden.It should be noted that the above-mentioned methods taxpayers use tax, on the one hand, it is necessary to comply with the characteristics of enterprise production and management, overall planning, comprehensive consideration and can not cater for all kinds; On the other hand, to keep learning and understanding of national trends and policies on tax reform measures amendments and adjustments, accurately grasp the limits of tax regulations and policies, in-depth study of the relevant provisions of tax laws to prevent tax and give rise to other problems.税收筹划税收筹划涉及的设想和实施各种策略的目的是尽量减少对一定时期内支付的税款。

税务英语文章

税务英语文章

税务英语文章以下是一篇关于税务英语的文章,供参考:Taxation is a critical component of any country's financial system. It provides the government with the funds necessary to operate and provide essential services to its citizens. Tax laws and regulations are complex and can be difficult to understand, particularly for non-native speakers of English. For this reason, it is important for tax professionals to have a strong understanding of English tax terminology and concepts.One of the key concepts in taxation is the tax base. This refers to the value or amount of income, property, goods, or services that are subject to taxation. The tax base is used to calculate the amount of tax owed by an individual or organization. Different types of taxes may have different tax bases. For example, income tax is typically based on a person's taxable income, while sales tax is based on the price of goods or services sold.Another important concept is tax credits. These are deductions from the amount of tax owed, and they can be applied for a variety of reasons. For example, a tax credit may be available for education expenses, charitable donations, or energy-efficient home improvements. Tax credits can help reduce the amount of tax owed and can be particularly valuable for low-income taxpayers.Tax evasion is a serious crime in many countries, and tax authorities use a variety of methods to detect potential tax fraud. One of the mostcommon methods is through audits, which involve a review of an individual or organization's financial records to ensure that all income and deductions have been reported accurately. Tax authorities may also use computer algorithms to detect potential fraud.Taxation is a complex and ever-changing field, and it is important for tax professionals to stay up-to-date with the latest laws and regulations. English-language tax resources, such as tax journals and online databases, can be valuable tools for keeping informed about changes in the tax landscape.In conclusion, a strong understanding of tax terminology and concepts is essential for tax professionals working in an English-speaking context. With the right training and resources, tax professionals can navigate the complex world of taxation and ensure that their clients are in compliance with tax laws and regulations.以下是另一篇关于税务英语的文章,供参考:As businesses expand globally, tax professionals must navigate the complexities of international tax laws and regulations. English plays a critical role in this field, as it is the primary language used in many international tax agreements and treaties.One of the key concepts in international taxation is transfer pricing. This refers to the practice of pricing goods and services between affiliated companies in different countries. Transfer pricing can be used to shiftprofits to countries with lower tax rates, and as a result, it has become a major area of concern for tax authorities around the world. Transfer pricing rules are complex and can vary by country, so it is important for tax professionals to have a strong understanding of the relevant terminology and concepts in English.Another important concept in international taxation is the permanent establishment. This refers to a fixed place of business in a foreign country, such as a branch office or factory. When a business has a permanent establishment in a foreign country, it may be subject to taxes in that country. The rules for determining whether a permanent establishment exists can be complicated, so tax professionals must be familiar with the relevant English-language tax treaties and laws.Tax treaties are a critical component of international taxation, as they provide a framework for avoiding double taxation and resolving disputes between countries. Many tax treaties are written in English, so it is important for tax professionals to have a strong understanding of the relevant terminology and concepts. Some common terms that appear in tax treaties include "taxable presence," "dividends," and "withholding tax."In addition to tax treaties, there are also international tax organizations that play a key role in shaping tax policy around the world. These organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD), publish guidelines and recommendations for countries to follow in order to ensure consistency and fairness in international taxation.In conclusion, international taxation is a complex and rapidly-changing field. Tax professionals must have a strong understanding of English tax terminology and concepts in order to navigate the complex web of tax laws and regulations. With the right training and resources, tax professionals can stay up-to-date with the latest developments in international taxation and provide valuable advice to their clients.。

税收筹划的外文文献及翻译

税收筹划的外文文献及翻译

Planning forever tax savings●Learn how to keep your tax bill at the legal minimum…and keep it there!By Mark E.BattersbyNow is the best time to think about reducing the ornamental and miscellaneous metal operation's tax bill even lower than the point the economy may have driven it to.And,of course,aim to keep that tax bill at its legal minimum for many year to come。

While many of us rely on the advice and help provided by tax professionals or utilize software programs to ensure a low tax bill,the real goal should be a low tax bill for not just this tax year but year—after—year。

The best guarantee of consistently low tax bill,this year,next year,and so—on down the road is,of course,tax planning。

Tax planning is easy:the more tax deductions taken,the lower the fabricating operations taxable income will be—-—-at least for this tax year。

【精品】纳税筹划外文文献原文及翻译

【精品】纳税筹划外文文献原文及翻译

TaxPlanning Taxplanninginvolvesconceivingofandimplementingvariousstrategiesinord ertominimizetheamountoftaxespaidforgivenperiod.Forasmallbusiness,min imizingthetaxliabilitycanprovidemoneyforexpenses,investment,orgrowth .Inthisway,taxplanningcanbeasourceofworkingcapital.Accordingto TheEnt repreneurMagazineSmallBusinessAdvisor,twobasicrulesapplytotaxplannin g.First,asmallbusinessshouldneverincuradditionalexpenseonlytogainata xdeduction.Whilepurchasingnecessaryequipmentpriortotheendoftaxyearca nbeavaluabletaxplanningstrategy,markingunnecessarypurchasesisnotreco mmended.Secondasmallbusinessshouldalwaysattempttodefertaxeswhenpossi ble.Deferringtaxesenablesthebusinesstousethatmoneyinterest-free,ands ometimesevenearninterestonit,untilthenexttimetaxesaredue. Expertsrecommendthatentrepreneursandsmallbusinessownersconductformal taxplanningsessionsinthemiddleofeachtaxyear.Thisapproachwillgivethem timetoapplytheirstrategiestothecurrentyearaswellasallowthemtogetajum ponthefollowingyear.Itisimportantforsmallbusinessownerstomaintainape rsonalawarenessoftaxplanningissuesinordertosavemoney.Evenifemployapr ofessionalbookkeeperoraccountant,smallbusinessownersshouldkeepcarefu ltabsontheirsowntaxpreparationinordertotakeadvantageofallpossibleopp ortunitiesfordeductionandtaxsavings."Whetherornotyouenlisttheaidofanoutsider,youshouldunderstandthebasicp rovisionsofthetaxcode."Justasyouwouldnotturnoverthemanagementofyourmoneytoanotherperson,you shouldnotblindlyallowsomeoneelsetotakecompletechargeofyourtaxpayingr esponsibilities."Inaddition,asFrederickW.Daileywroteinhisbook TaxSavv yforSmallBusiness,"Taxknowledgehaspowerfulprofitpotential.Knowingwha tthetaxlawhastooffercangiveyouafarbetterbottomlinethanyourcompetitor swhodon'tbothertolearn.GeneralAreasofTaxPlanning Thereareseveralgeneralareasoftaxplanningthatapplytoallsortsofsmallbu sinesses.Theseareasincludethechoiceofaccountingandinventory-valuatio nmethods,thetimingofequipmentpurchases,thespreadingofbusinessincomea mongfamilymembers,andtheselectionoftax-favoredbenefitplansandinvestm ents.Therearealsosomeareasoftaxplanningthatarespecifictocertainbusin essforms—i.e.,soleproprietorships,partnerships,Ccorporations,andScorpo rations.Someofthegeneraltaxplanningstrategiesaredescribedbelow: ACCOUNTINGMETHODS.Accountingmethodsrefertothebasicrulesandguidelines underwhichbusinesseskeeptheirfinancialrecordsandpreparetheirfinancia lreports.Therearetwomainaccountingmethodsusedforrecord-keeping:theca shbasisandtheaccrualbasis.Smallbusinessownersmustdecidewhichmethodto usedependingonthelegalformofthebusiness,itssalesvolume,whetheritexte ndscredittocustomers,andthetaxrequirementssetforthbytheInternalReven ueService(IRS).Thechoiceofaccountingmethodisanissueintaxplanning,asi tcanaffecttheamountoftaxesowedbyasmallbusinessinagivenyear. Accountingrecordspreparedusingthecashbasisrecognizeincomeandexpenses accordingtoreal-timecashflow.Incomeisrecordeduponreceiptoffunds,rath erthanbaseduponwhenitisactuallyearned,andexpensesarerecordedastheyar epaid,ratherthanastheyareactuallyincurred.Underthisaccountingmethod, therefore,itispossibletodefertaxableincomebydelayingbillingsothatpay mentisnotreceivedinthecurrentyear.Likewise,itispossibletoacceleratee xpensesbypayingthemassoonasthebillsarereceived,inadvanceoftheduedate .Thecashmethodissimplerthantheaccrualmethod,itprovidesamoreaccuratep ictureofcashflow,andincomeisnotsubjecttotaxationuntilthemoneyisactua llyreceived.Incontrast,theaccrualbasismakesagreaterefforttorecognizeincomeandexp ensesintheperiodtowhichtheyapply,regardlessofwhetherornotmoneyhascha ngedhands.Underthissystem,revenueisrecordedwhenitisearned,ratherthan whenpaymentisreceived,andexpensesrecordedwhentheyareincurred,rathert hanwhenpaymentismade.Themainadvantageoftheaccrualmethodisthatitprovi desamoreaccuratepictureofhowabusinessisperformingoverthelong-termtha nthecashmethod.Themaindisadvantagesarethatitismorecomplexthanthecash basis,andthatincometaxesmaybeowedonrevenuebeforepaymentisactuallyrec eived.However,theaccrualbasismayyieldfavorabletaxresultsforcompanies thathavefewreceivablesandlargecurrentliabilities. Undergenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciples(GAAP),theaccrualbasisofac countingisrequiredforallbusinessesthathandleinventory,fromsmallretai lerstolargemanufacturers.Itisalsorequiredforcorporationsandpartnersh ipsthathavegrosssalesover$5millionperyear,thoughthereareexceptionsfo rfarmingbusinessesandqualifiedpersonalservicecorporations—suchasdoctors,law yers,accountants,andconsultants.Otherbusinessesgenerallycandecidewhi chaccountingmethodtousebasedontherelativetaxsavingsitprovides. INVENTORYVALUATIONMETHODS.Themethodasmallbusinesschoosesforinventory valuationcanalsoleadtosubstantialtaxsavings.Inventoryvaluationisimpo rtantbecausebusinessesarerequiredtoreducetheamounttheydeductforinven torypurchasesoverthecourseofayearbytheamountremainingininventoryatth eendoftheyear.Forexample,abusinessthatpurchased$10,000ininventorydur ingtheyearbuthad$6,000remainingininventoryattheendoftheyearcouldonly count$4,000asanexpenseforinventorypurchases,eventhoughtheactualcasho utlaywasmuchlarger.Valuingtheremaininginventorydifferentlycouldincre asetheamountdeductedfromincomeandthusreducetheamountoftaxowedbythebu siness.Thetaxlawprovidestwopossiblemethodsforinventoryvaluation:thefirst-in ,first-outmethod(FIFO);andthelast-in,first-outmethod(LIFO).Asthename ssuggest,theseinventorymethodsdifferintheassumptiontheymakeaboutthew ayitemsaresoldfrominventory.FIFOassumesthattheitemspurchasedtheearli estarethefirsttoberemovedfrominventory,whileLIFOassumesthattheitemsp urchasedmostrecentlyarethefirsttoberemovedfrominventory.Inthisway,FI FOvaluestheremaininginventoryatthemostcurrentcost,whileLIFOvaluesthe remaininginventoryattheearliestcostpaidthatyear.LIFOisgenerallythepreferredinventoryvaluationmethodduringtimesofrisi ngcosts.Itplacesalowervalueontheremaininginventoryandahighervalueont hecostofgoodssold,thusreducingincomeandtaxes.Ontheotherhand,FIFOisge nerallypreferredduringperiodsofdeflationorinindustrieswhereinventory cantendtoloseitsvaluerapidly,paniesareallowe dtofileForm970andswitchfromFIFOtoLIFOatanytimetotakeadvantageoftaxsa vings.However,theymusttheneitherwaittenyearsorgetpermissionfromtheIR StoswitchbacktoFIFO.EQUIPMENTPURCHASES.UnderSection179oftheInternalRevenueCode,businesse sareallowedtodeductatotalof$18,000inequipmentpurchasesduringtheyeari nwhichthepurchasesaremade.Anypurchasesabovethisamountmustbedepreciat edoverseveralfuturetaxperiods.Itisoftenadvantageousforsmallbusinessestousethistaxincentivetoincreasetheirdeductionsforbusinesse xpenses,thusreducingtheirtaxableincomeandtheirtaxliability.Necessary equipmentpurchasesuptothelimitcanbetimedatyearendandstillbefullydedu ctiblefortheyear.Thistaxincentivealsoappliestopersonalpropertyputint oserviceforbusinessuse,withtheexceptionofautomobilesandrealestate. WAGESPAIDTOFAMILYMEMBERS.Self-employedpersonscanalsoreducetheirtaxbu rdenbypayingwagestoaspouseortodependentchildren.Wagespaidtochildrenu ndertheageof18arenotsubjecttoFICA(SocialSecurityandMedicare)taxes.Un dernormalcircumstances,employersarerequiredtowithhold7.65percentofth efirst$62,700ofanemployee'sincomeforFICAtaxes.Employersarealsorequir edtomatchthe7.65percentcontributedbyeveryemployee,sothatthetotalFICA contributionis15.3percent.Self-employedpersonsarerequiredtopaybothth eemployerandemployeeportionsoftheFICAtax. ButtheFICAtaxesarewaivedwhentheemployeeisadependentchildofthesmallbu sinessowner,savingthechildandtheparent7.65percenteach.Inaddition,the child'swagesarestillconsideredataxdeductiblebusinessexpenseforthepar ent—thusreducingtheparent'staxableincome.Althoughthechildmustpaynor malincometaxesonthewagesheorshereceives,itislikelytobeatalowertaxrat ethantheparentpays.Somebusinessownersareabletofurtherreducetheirtaxb urdenbypayingwagestotheirspouse.Ifthesewagesbringthebusinessowner'sn etincomebelow$62,700—thethresholdforFICAtaxes—thentheymayreducetheself-employmenttaxowedbybusinessowner.Itisimportanttonote,however,th atthechildorspousemustactuallyworkforthebusinessandthatthewagesmustb ereasonablefortheworkperformed. BENEFITSPLANSANDINVESTMENTS.Taxplanningalsoappliestovarioustypesofem ployeebenefitsthatcanprovideabusinesswithtaxdeductions,suchascontrib utionstolifeinsurance,healthinsurance,orretirementplans.Asanaddedbon us,manysuchbenefitprogramsarenotconsideredtaxableincomeforemployees. Finally,taxplanningappliestovarioustypesofinvestmentsthatcanshifttax liabilitytofutureperiods,suchastreasurybills,bankcertificates,saving sbonds,paniescanavoidpayingtaxesduringthecur rentperiodforincomethatisreinvestedinsuchtax-deferredinstruments. TaxPlanningforDifferentBusinessForms"Thefirststepintaxplanning—forsmallbusinessownersandprofessionals,a tleast—istoselecttherightformoforganizationforyourenterprise,"accor dingtoAlbertB.EllentuckintheLaventholandHorwathSmallBusinessTaxPlann ingGuide."You'llenduppayingradicallydifferentamountsofincometaxdepen dingontheformyouselect.AndyouroddsofbeingauditedbytheIRSwillchange,t oo."Manyaspectsoftaxplanningarespecifictocertainbusinessforms;someof thesearediscussedbelow: SOLEPROPRIETORSHIPSANDPARTNERSHIPS.Taxplanningforsoleproprietorships andpartnershipsisinmanywayssimilartotaxplanningforindividuals.Thisis becausetheownersofbusinessesorganizedassoleproprietorsandpartnership spaypersonalincometaxratherthanbusinessincometax.Thesesmallbusinesso wnersfileaninformationalreturnfortheirbusinesswiththeIRS,andthenrepo rtanyincometakenfromthebusinessforpersonaluseontheirownpersonaltaxre turn.Nospecialtaxesareimposedexceptfortheself-employmenttax(SECA),wh ichrequiresallself-employedpersonstopayboththeemployerandemployeepor tionsoftheFICAtax,foratotalof15.3percent. Sincetheydonotreceiveanordinarysalary,theownersofsoleproprietorships andpartnershipsarenotrequiredtowithholdincometaxesforthemselves.Inst ead,theyarerequiredtoestimatetheirtotaltaxliabilityandremitittotheIR Sinquarterlyinstallments,usingForm1040ES.Itisimportantthattheamounto ftaxpaidinquarterlyinstallmentsequaleitherthetotalamountowedduringthepreviousyearor90percentoftheirtotalcurrenttaxliability.Otherwise,th eIRSmaychargeinterestandimposeastiffpenaltyforunderpaymentofestimate dtaxes.SincetheIRScalculatestheamountowedquarterly,alargelump-sumpaymentint hefourthquarterwillnotenableataxpayertoescapepenalties.Ontheotherhan d,asignificantincreaseinwithholdinginthefourthquartermayhelp,because taxthatiswithheldbyanemployerisconsideredtobepaidevenlythroughoutthe yearnomatterwhenitwaswithheld.Thisleadstoapossibletaxplanningstrateg yforaself-employedpersonwhofallsbehindinhisorherestimatedtaxpayments .Byhavinganemployedspouseincreasehisorherwithholding,theself-employe dpersoncanmakeupforthedeficiencyandavoidapenalty.TheIRShasalsobeenkn owntowaiveunderpaymentpenaltiesforpeopleinspecialcircumstances.Forex ample,theymightwaivethepenaltyfornewlyself-employedtaxpayerswhounderpaytheirin cometaxesbecausetheyaremakingestimatedtaxpaymentsforthefirsttime. Anotherpossibletaxplanningstrategyappliestopartnershipsthatanticipat ealoss.Attheendofeachtaxyear,partnershipsfiletheinformationalForm106 5(PartnershipStatementofIncome)withtheIRS,andthenreporttheamountofin comethataccruedtoeachpartneronScheduleK1.Thisincomecanbedividedinany numberofways,dependingonthenatureofthepartnershipagreement.Inthisway ,itispossibletopassallofapartnership'searlylossestoonepartnerinorder tomaximizehisorhertaxadvantages.What’smore,enterprisestocarryoutthecorrecttax,theneedfortheadoption ofthefollowingmajorrouteoftransmission.First,reasonablemeansoffinancingoptions.Inaccordancewiththeprovision sofChina'scurrenttaxlaw,corporateinterestpaymentsontheloanwithinacer tainrangecanbepre-taxexpenses,anddividendscanonlybespendingtheafter-taxprofitsofenterpriseexpenses.Fromataxpointofview,appropriatetotheb ankbusinessloansandfinancingbetweenenterprises,ratherthandirectlytot hefund-raisingbenefits.Second,areasonablechoiceoftradingpartners.China'sexistingvalue-add edtaxsystemhasageneraltaxpayersandsmall-scaletaxpayersonthepoints,ch ooseadifferentsupplierobject,thetaxburdenonenterprisesisnotthesame.Forexample,whentheDepartmentofsuppliersofvalue-addedtaxgeneraltaxpaye r,thebusinessafterthepurchaseofgoods,accordingtotheamountoftaxdeduct ionofinputtaxamountofthecorrespondingbalanceafterpaymentofvalue-adde dtax;ifthepurchaseofgoodsforsmall-scaletaxpayers,VATcannotbeachieved Itsnotcontaintheamountofinputtaxdeduction,thetaxburdenmorethanthefor mer.Suchasopeninvoicescanalsobepartofdeduction. Third,"theeasywayout"taxconversion.Enterpriseswillbeconvertedtohigh-taxlow-tax,referstoeconomicactivitiesinthesame,thereareavarietyofrev enueoptionstochoosefrom,thetaxpayerstoavoid"high-taxpoint",choosethe "lowtax"andreducethetaxliability.Themosttypicalexampleofthisistorunn on-taxabletothetaxplanningservices.Fromthetaxpointofview,runmainlytw o:First,thesametaxes,differenttaxrates.Systemssuchassupplyandmarketi ngenterprises,thegeneraloperatingtaxrateis17%ofthemeansofsubsistence ,butalsotheoperatingvalue-addedtaxrateof13%oftheagriculturalmeansofproductionandsoon.Sec ond,differenttaxes,differenttaxrates.Thisusuallyreferstotypesofenter prisesintheirbusinessactivities,bothvalue-addedbusinessproject,thepr ojectalsoinvolvesthebusinesstax.Fourth,thecostofreasonableexpenses.Enterprisesdoesnotviolatetaxlawsa ndfinancialsystemunderthepremiseofthefullcostofthereasonableexpenses ,thatmayoccuronthefullestimatedlossesandnarrowthetaxbaseandreducethe amountoftaxableincome.Countriesallowforcostsincurredintheprojects,su chaswages,respectively,thetotalamountoftaxby2%,14%,1.5%extractsoftra deunionfunds,staffwelfare,staffeducationfundingshouldbesufficienttom entionasmuchaspossibletothewhole.Forsomeofthelossesthatmayoccur,such asbaddebtlosses,businessesshouldbefullyexpectedinthetaxlawasfaraspos sibletheextentpermittedbythecapenoughtoreserve.Thisisinlinewiththena tionaltaxlawandfinancialsystem,canreceivethetaxeffect.Fifth,toreducetaxliability.Factorsthataffectthetaxliabilitytherearet wo,namely,taxbaseandtaxrates,thesmallerthetaxbase,lowertaxrates,taxl iabilityisalsosmaller.Taxplanningcanstartfromthesetwofactorstofindle gitimatewaystoreducetaxliability.Forexample,anenterpriseDecember30,2 005estimatedtaxableincomeamountedto100,200yuan,theenterpriseincometa xliability25050yuan(100200×25%).Ifthecorporatetaxplanning,taxconsul tingfeestopay200yuan,thecorporatetaxableincome100,000(100200-200),incometaxliability27,000yuan(100000×27%),canbefoundbycomparing,fortax planningtopayonly200yuan,6066yuantaxis(33066-27000).Sixth,toweightheseverityoftheoveralltaxburden.Forexample,manyvalue-a ddedtaxplanningprogramshavethegeneraltaxpayerandthetaxpayertochooses mall-scaleplanning.Ifanenterpriseisanon-tax-yearsalesofabout900,000y uanofproductionenterprisesandenterprisestobuythematerialseachyearthe priceofnon-value-addedtaxof70millionorless.Thecompany'saccountingsys tem,theconditionsidentifiedasthegeneraltaxpayers.Ifthatisthegeneralt axpayer,thecompany'sproductsarevalue-addedtaxrateappliesto17%capital gainstaxliability34,000yuan(90×17%-70×17%);I fitissmall-scaletaxpay ers,therateis6%,5.4VATliabilitymillion(90×6%)>3.4million.Therefore, fromtheperspectiveofvalue-addedtaxgeneraltaxpayershouldbeselected.Bu t,infact,althoughsmall-scaleVATtaxpayerspay20,000yuan,buttheinputtaxamountof119,000yuan(70×17%) ,althoughitcannotoffsetthecosts,therebyincreasingthecostof119,000yua n,theincometaxreductionof2.975million(11.9×25%),thanpaya20,000yuano fvalue-addedtax.Therefore,thebusinesstaxplanningintheselectionofprog rams,notonlytolookinacertainperiodoftimewatchingtheprogramontaxless, andtoconsiderbusinessdevelopmentgoals,tochoosetoincreasetheiroverall revenueprogram.Seventh,takefulladvantageofpreferentialtaxationpolicies.Fortaxpayers ,theuseoftaxincentivesfortaxplanningfocusesonhowtherationaluseoftaxp oliciesandregulationsshallapplytothelowerormorefavorabletaxrates,awe ll-plannedproductionandoperationactivities,theactualtaxburdentoamini muminordertoachieveFestivaltaxeffect.Forexample,accordingtoChina'sLa woftheStateCouncilforapprovalofhigh-techindustrialdevelopmentzoneoft hehigh-techenterprises,sincetheproductionfromthefiscalyearincometaxe xemptionfor2years.To-businessuseofwastewater,wastegas,wasteresiduean dotherwasteasthemainrawmaterialsforproduction,5yearsintheincometaxre ductionorexemption.Inaddition,tosupportagricultureandthedevelopmento fUNESCOWeiinvestment,countrieshavedifferenttaxincentives.Businessope ratorsshouldrefertopolicy,comparingtheinvestmentenvironment,investme ntincome,investmentrisksandotherfactors,decidedtoinvestintheregion,i nvestmentdirection,aswellasinvestmentprojects,areasonabletaxplanning ,inordertoreducethecorporatetaxburden.Itshouldbenotedthattheabove-mentionedmethodstaxpayersusetax,ontheone hand,itisnecessarytocomplywiththecharacteristicsofenterpriseproducti onandmanagement,overallplanning,comprehensiveconsiderationandcannotc aterforallkinds;Ontheotherhand,tokeeplearningandunderstandingofnatio naltrendsandpoliciesontaxreformmeasuresamendmentsandadjustments,accu ratelygraspthelimitsoftaxregulationsandpolicies,in-depthstudyofthere levantprovisionsoftaxlawstopreventtaxandgiverisetootherproblems.税收筹划税收筹划涉及的设想和实施各种策略的目的是尽量减少对一定时期内支付的税款。

西方税收制度参考文献汇编

西方税收制度参考文献汇编

《西方税收制度》参考文献汇编英文文献:1.Judith A. Sage, Federal Tax Course 1998, University of Illinois at Chicago, Prentice Hall, 19982.Kevin E. Murphy Mark Higgins, Concepts in Federal Taxation, South—Western College Publishing, an ITP Company, 1998 3.John Mikesell, Fiscal Administration, Indiana University, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 19994.J. A. Kay and M. A. King ,The British Tax System, 1988 5.Principles of Business Taxation, London, 19886.Simon James and Christopher Nobes, The Economics of Taxation, 1997—19987.Sandford C. T, Successful Tax Reform, Fiscal Publication, 1993 8.Sandford C. T, Why Tax Systems Differ: A Comparative Study of the Political Economy of Taxation, Fiscal Publication, 2000 9.Survey of Global Taxation, 1997—199810.Ministry of Finance, Taxation in the Netherlands, 1999 11.Research and Information Department of the Ministry of Finance of Belgium, Tax Survey, 199912.Coopers &Lybrand, A Guide to V A T in the EU, 199613.Roger Gordon and Wei Li, Puzzling Tax Structures in Developing Countries: A Comparison of Two Alternative Explanations, NBER Working Paper No. 11661, Issued in October 200514.David Joulfaian, The Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Description, Profile of Taxpayers, and Economic Consequences, OTA Paper 80 December 1998.15.Allan C.M. The Theory of Taxation. Penguin Books Ltd, 1971 16.Atkinson A. B. and J. E. Stiglitz. Lectures on Public Economics.McGraw- Hill, 198017.H.J.Arrow, The Economics of Taxation, The Brookings Institution, 198018.Michael J.Boskin and Charles E.Mclure, Jr, World Tax Reform: Case Studies of Developed and Developing Countries, International Center for Economic Growth, 199019.Reuven S. Avi-Y onah , Why tax the rich? Efficiency, equity and progressive taxation, The Y ale Law Journal, V ol.111, No.6 20.Ramsey F. P., A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation [J].Economic Journal, 37, 192721.Baumol W.J. and D.F. Bradford. Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing [J].American Economic Review, 60, 1970 22.Diamond P. A. and J. A. Mirrlees. Optimal Taxation and Public Production [J].American Economic Review, 61, 197123.Atkinson A. B. and J. E. Stiglitz. The Design of Tax Structure: Direct V ersus Indirect Taxation [J].Journal of Public Economics, 6, 1976.24.Barro R. J. Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? Journal of Political Economy 81, 197425.James S. and Christopher Nobes. The Economics of Taxation.Prentice Hall Europe, 199826.OECD, Taxation and Environment: Four Case Studies, OECD, 199327.Martinez-V azquez J. and R. M. McNab, The Tax Reform Experiment in Transitional Countries, National Tax Journal LIII, 2000 28.Do Y ou Need to File a Federal Income Tax Return?/individuals/article/0,,id=96623,00.html 29.Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, How Progressive is the U.S.Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective, NBER Working Paper No. 12404, Issued in August 2006专业网站:1.美国国内收入署(Internal revenue service): 2.税收知识综合网站:3.英国国家税务局(HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) ):/4. /5. /6. /wiki/Tax_reform7. /wiki/Sales_tax中文文献:1、王国华:《外国税收制度》,中国人民大学出版社,2008年。

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1944]
BOOK REVlEW^S
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The author has made no attempt to treat this most recent program for taxing the excess profits of business in an extended manner, nor has he undertaken a detailed analysis of the shifting and incidence of the tax. He is, however, well justified in delimiting his treatment of the subject^ for it will be some little time before the history of this latest American venture into the field of excess profits taxation can be properly appraised, and it will most certainly be necessary for someone to undertake extensive research of an inductive character before many of the uncertainties which obscure the economic effects of this tax are clarified. Measured by the criterion of yield, the excess profits tax of World War I was highly successful, and there is no substantial evidence that it inflicted serious economic injury upon any group of taxpayers, in spite of^ the many annoyances which resulted from the defective character of the legislation and from poorly coordinated attempts at enforcement. No doubt the evolution of other taxes, some of them now major components of the federal revenue system, will reveal difficulties in definition and practice quite as perplexing as many of those which limited the effectiveness of the first excess profits tax laws. The whole situation has been complicated by the fact that there has been little inclination on the part of business men to accept the excess profits tax on any other basis than as a purely emergency levy to be discarded as soon as the pressing need for additional public revenues has passed. Furthermore, as the author makes clear, there has been no substantial agreement among legislators and taxpayers as to what constitutes an appropriate measure of excess profits. It may well be said that if this levy becomes a fixture in the national tax system, excess profits will be variously measured according to whether the government has under consideration peacetime or wartime revenue needs, for there is abundant evidence that profits of a so-called nonnal period cannot be taxed fairly by the same standards as those which apply to periods of war. If these distinctions w^ere given legal sanction it would contribute substantially to sound administration and economic justice, both of which were sadly lacking during the early history of the excess profits tax, but it would also introduce an element of long-range fiscal planning which has not been a conspicuous feature of federal finances up to this time.
178
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Í MARCH
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Professor von Mering, as his title may seem to imply, succeeded in offering the long waited for general and systematic view? Has he developed an original conception or, at least, blended the opinions of various schools of thought into a timely compromise? If we judge only from the pattem of presentation, a full synthesis may seem to have been achieved. It is fitting for a systematic treatment to start with methodological considerations. The first part promises nothing le?s than "the general theory of tax shifting." The author proceeds step by step, beginning with such an oversimplification as Boehm-Bawerk's exchange between one seller and one buyer haggling about one indivisible good. In the following sections, other market conditions are introduced, with emphasis on pure monopoly and pure competition. In contrast to most recent writers in the field, the author shrinks from the application of the monopolistic conu petition approach. As he frankly admits, "the theory of monopolistic competition, as expounded by Mr. Chamberlin, is not a very fruitful basis of investigation concerning tax shifting" (p. 76, note 1). Perhaps lie Vvould have revised his skeptical attitude if, before the completion of his work, he could have consulted John F. Due's valuable monograph. The Theory oj Incidence of Sales Taxation^ reviewed in this joumal in September 1942 (pp. 604-606). A large number of cases are carefully examined by Professor von Mering with the help of numerous charts. At least occasionally, marginal analysis is quailfied by taking account of less abstract conditions. The numerous delicate economic miniatures, used for illustrative purposes, seem to me the greatest achievement of the author. They may be useful in training university students in the marginal approach. WTiile the first part is the core of the study, the second part is designed ÎQ supplement and verify the "general theory." It deals with less "typical'' cases by examining the s^hifting of various kinds of taxes: on agriculture^ real estate, trade, industry, labor, wealth, income and transactions. Generalization and systematization, however, are more apparent than real. It seems surprising that such a broad study has been completed without any attempt to define the concept of tax shifting. The author simply contends that no "unequivocal definition" can be offered and then finds consolation in the thought that a search for a definition "constitutes but a waste of time and energy" (p. 2). Consequently, the analysis is hampered at the outset in determining its field of examination, in classifying the various processes and in segregating incidence and economic effects of taxation. With regard to the first problem, however, the author submits a superficial suggestion: "The economic effects which follow from the moment of the impact of a tax until the ultimate incidence of that tax constitute the subject matter of the theory of tax shifting. The further effects, that is, those which may follow the placing of the ultimate burden of a tax on certain persons or groups are no part of the theory of tax shifting" (p. 3). Apparently, the author believes that the difference between the two groups of processes can be simply stated in terms of time. By following him, however, we are led to strange conclusions. A new protective import duty may immediately curtail the
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