巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(12附录4(英文))

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巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(首封)

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(首封)

概述导言1. 巴塞尔银行监管委员会(以下简称委员会)现公布巴塞尔新资本协议(BaselII,以下简称巴塞尔II)第三次征求意见稿(CP3,以下简称第三稿)。

第三稿的公布是构建新资本充足率框架的一项重大步骤。

委员会的目标仍然是在今年第四季度完成新协议,并于2006年底在成员国开始实施。

2. 委员会认为,完善资本充足率框架有两方面的公共政策利好。

一是建立不仅包括最低资本而且还包括监管当局的监督检查和市场纪律的资本管理规定。

二是大幅度提高最低资本要求的风险敏感度。

3. 完善的资本充足率框架,旨在促进鼓励银行强化风险管理能力,不断提高风险评估水平。

委员会认为,实现这一目标的途径是,将资本规定与当今的现代化风险管理作法紧密地结合起来,在监管实践中并通过有关风险和资本的信息披露,确保对风险的重视。

4. 委员会修改资本协议的一项重要内容,就是加强与业内人士和非成员国监管人员之间的对话。

通过多次征求意见,委员会认为,包括多项选择方案的新框架不仅适用于十国集团国家,而且也适用于世界各国的银行和银行体系。

5. 委员会另一项同等重要的工作,就是研究参加新协议定量测算影响分析各行提出的反馈意见。

这方面研究工作的目的,就是掌握各国银行提供的有关新协议各项建议对各行资产将产生何种影响。

特别要指出,委员会注意到,来自40多个国家规模及复杂程度各异的350多家银行参加了近期开展的定量影响分析(以下称简QIS3)。

正如另一份文件所指出,QIS3的结果表明,调整后新框架规定的资本要求总体上与委员会的既定目标相一致。

6. 本文由两部分内容组成。

第一部分简单介绍新资本充足框架的内容及有关实施方面的问题。

在此主要的考虑是,加深读者对新协议银行各项选择方案的认识。

第二部分技术性较强,大体描述了在2002年10月公布的QIS3技术指导文件之后对新协议有关规定所做的修改。

第一部分新协议的主要内容7. 新协议由三大支柱组成:一是最低资本要求,二是监管当局对资本充足率的监督检查,三是信息披露。

巴塞尔新资本协议第三版(中文版)-232页

巴塞尔新资本协议第三版(中文版)-232页

巴塞尔委员会Basel Committeeon Banking Supervision征求意见稿(第三稿)巴塞尔新资本协议The NewBasel Capital Accord 中国银行业监督管理委员会翻译目录概述 (10)导言 (10)第一部分新协议的主要内容 (11)第一支柱:最低资本要求 (11)信用风险标准法 (11)内部评级法(Internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches) (12)公司、银行和主权的风险暴露 (13)零售风险暴露 (14)专业贷款(Specialised lending) (14)股权风险暴露(Equity exposures) (14)IRB法的实施问题 (15)证券化 (15)操作风险 (16)第二支柱和第三支柱:监管当局的监督检查和市场纪律 (17)监管当局的监督检查 (17)市场纪律 (18)新协议的实施 (18)朝新协议过渡 (18)有关前瞻性问题 (19)跨境实施问题 (20)今后的工作 (20)第二部分: 对QIS3技术指导文件的修改 (21)导言 21允许使用准备 (21)合格的循环零售风险暴露(qualifying revolving retail exposures,QRRE)..22住房抵押贷款 (22)专业贷款(specialised lending, SL) (22)高波动性商业房地产(high volatility commercial real estate ,HVCRE).23信用衍生工具 (23)证券化 (23)操作风险 (24)缩写词 (26)第一部分:适用范围 (28)A.导言 (28)B.银行、证券公司和其他附属金融企业 (28)C.对银行、证券公司和其他金融企业的大额少数股权投资 (29)D.保险公司 (29)E.对商业企业的大额投资 (30)F.根据本部分的规定对投资的扣减 (31)第二部分:第一支柱-最低资本要求 (33)I. 最低资本要求的计算 (33)II.信用风险-标准法(Standardised Approach) (33)A.标准法 — 一般规则 (33)1.单笔债权的处理 (34)(i)对主权国家的债权 (34)(ii)对非中央政府公共部门实体(public sector entities)的债权 (35)(iii)对多边开发银行的债权 (35)(iv) 对银行的债权 (36)(v)对证券公司的债权 (37)(vi)对公司的债权 (37)(vii)包括在监管定义的零售资产中的债权 (37)(viii) 对居民房产抵押的债权 (38)(ix)对商业房地产抵押的债权 (38)(x)逾期贷款 (39)(xi)高风险的债权 (39)(xii)其他资产 (40)(xiii) 资产负债表外项目 (40)2.外部评级 (40)(i)认定程序 (40)(ii)资格标准 (40)3.实施中需考虑的问题 (41)(i)对应程序(mapping process) (41)(ii)多方评级结果的处理 (42)(iii)发行人评级和债项评级(issuer versus issues assessment) (42)(iv)本币和外币的评级 (42)(v)短期和长期评级 (43)(vi)评级的适用范围 (43)(vii)被动评级(unsolicited ratings) (43)B. 标准法—信用风险缓释(Credit risk mitigation) (44)1.主要问题 (44)(i)综述 (44)(ii) 一般性论述 (44)(iii)法律确定性 (45)2.信用风险缓释技术的综述 (45)(i)抵押交易 (45)(ii) 表内净扣(On-balance sheet netting) (47)(iii)担保和信用衍生工具 (47)(iv) 期限错配 (47)(v) 其他问题 (48)3.抵押品 (48)(i)合格的金融抵押品 (48)(ii) 综合方法 (49)(iii)简单方法 (56)(iv) 抵押的场外衍生工具交易 (57)4.表内净扣 (57)5.担保和信用衍生工具 (58)(i)操作要求 (58)(ii)合格的担保人/信用保护提供者的范围 (60)(iii)风险权重 (60)(iv)币种错配 (60)(v)主权担保 (61)6.期限错配 (61)7.与信用风险缓释相关的其他问题的处理 (62)(i)对信用风险缓释技术池(pools of CRM techniques)的处理 (62)(ii) 第一违约的信用衍生工具 (62)(iii)第二违约的信用衍生工具 (62)III. 信用风险——IRB法 (62)A.概述 (62)B.IRB法的具体要求 (63)1.风险暴露类别 (63)(i) 公司暴露的定义 (63)(ii) 主权暴露的定义 (65)(iii) 银行暴露的定义 (65)(iv) 零售暴露的定义 (65)(v)合格的循环零售暴露的定义 (66)(vi) 股权暴露的定义 (67)(vii)合格的购入应收账款的定义 (68)2.初级法和高级法 (69)(i)公司、主权和银行暴露 (69)(ii) 零售暴露 (70)(iii) 股权暴露 (70)(iv) 合格的购入应收账款 (70)3. 在不同资产类别中采用IRB法 (70)4.过渡期安排 (71)(i)采用高级法的银行平行计算资本充足率 (71)(ii) 公司、主权、银行和零售暴露 (72)(iii) 股权暴露 (72)C.公司、主权、及银行暴露的规定 (73)1.公司、主权和银行暴露的风险加权资产 (73)(i)风险加权资产的推导公式 (73)(ii) 中小企业的规模调整 (73)(iii) 专业贷款的风险权重 (74)2.风险要素 (75)(i)违约概率 (75)(iii)违约风险暴露 (79)(iv) 有效期限 (80)D.零售暴露规定 (82)1.零售暴露的风险加权资产 (82)(i) 住房抵押贷款 (82)(ii) 合格的循环零售贷款 (82)(iii) 其他零售暴露 (83)2.风险要素 (83)(i)违约概率和违约损失率 (83)(ii) 担保和信贷衍生产品的认定 (83)(iii) 违约风险暴露 (83)E.股权暴露的规则 (84)1.股权暴露的风险加权资产 (84)(i)市场法 (84)(ii) 违约概率/违约损失率方法 (85)(iii) 不采用市场法和违约概率/违约损失率法的情况 (86)2. 风险要素 (87)F. 购入应收账款的规则 (87)1.违约风险的风险加权资产 (87)(i)购入的零售应收账款 (87)(ii) 购入的公司应收账款 (87)2.稀释风险的风险加权资产 (89)(i)购入折扣的处理 (89)(ii) 担保的认定 (89)G. 准备的认定 (89)H.IRB法的最低要求 (90)1.最低要求的内容 (91)2.遵照最低要求 (91)3.评级体系设计 (91)(i)评级维度 (92)(ii) 评级结构 (93)(iv) 评估的时间 (94)(v)模型的使用 (95)(vi) 评级体系设计的记录 (95)4.风险评级体系运作 (96)(i) 评级的涵盖范围 (96)(ii) 评级过程的完整性 (96)(iii) 推翻评级的情况(Overrides) (97)(iv) 数据维护 (97)(v)评估资本充足率的压力测试 (98)5. 公司治理和监督 (98)(i)公司治理(Corporate governance) (98)(ii) 信用风险控制 (99)(iii) 内审和外审 (99)6. 内部评级的使用 (99)7.风险量化 (100)(i)估值的全面要求 (100)(ii) 违约的定义 (101)(iii) 重新确定帐龄(Re-ageing) (102)(iv) 对透支的处理 (102)(v) 所有资产类别损失的的定义 (102)(vi) 估计违约概率的要求 (102)(vii) 自行估计违约损失率的要求 (104)(viii) 自己估计违约风险暴露的要求 (104)(ix) 评估担保和信贷衍生产品成熟性效应的最低要求 (106)(x)估计合格的购入应收账款违约概率和违约损失率的要求 (107)8. 内部评估的验证 (109)9. 监管当局确定的违约损失率和违约风险暴露 (110)(i)商用房地产和居民住房作为抵押品资格的定义 (110)(ii) 合格的商用房地产/居民住房的操作要求 (110)(iii) 认定金融应收账款的要求 (111)10.认定租赁的要求 (113)11.股权暴露资本要求的计算 (114)(i)内部模型法下的市场法 (114)(ii) 资本要求和风险量化 (114)(iv) 验证和形成文件 (116)12.披露要求 (118)IV.信用风险--- 资产证券化框架 (119)A.资产证券化框架下所涉及交易的范围和定义 (119)B. 定义 (120)1. 银行所承担的不同角色 (120)(i)银行作为投资行 (120)(ii) 银行作为发起行 (120)2. 通用词汇 (120)(i) 清收式赎回(clean-up call) (120)(ii) 信用提升(credit enhancement) (120)(iii) 提前摊还(early amortisation) (120)(iv) 超额利差(excess spread) (121)(v)隐性支持(implicit support) (121)(vi) 特别目的机构(Special purpose entity (SPE)) (121)C. 确认风险转移的操作要求 (121)1.传统型资产证券化的操作要求 (121)2.对合成型资产证券化的操作要求 (122)3.清收式赎回的操作要求和处理 (123)D. 对资产证券化风险暴露的处理 (123)1.最低资本要求 (123)(i)扣减 (123)(ii) 隐性支持 (123)2. 使用外部信用评估的操作要求 (124)3. 资产证券化风险暴露的标准化方法 (124)(i) 范围 (124)(ii) 风险权重 (125)(iii) 对于未评级资产证券化风险暴露一般处理方法的例外情况 (125)(iv) 表外风险资产的信用转换系数 (126)(v)信用风险缓释的确认 (127)(vi) 提前摊还规定的资本要求 (128)(viii)对于非控制型具有提前摊还特征的风险暴露的信用风险转换系数的确定 (130)4.资产证券化的内部评级法 (131)(i)范围 (131)(ii) KIRB定义 (131)(iii) 各种不同的方法 (132)(iv) 所需资本最高限 (133)(v) 以评级为基础的方法 (133)(vi) 监管公式 (135)(vii)流动性便利 (137)(viii) 合格服务人现金透支便利 (138)(ix) 信用风险缓释的确认 (138)(x) 提前摊还的资本要求 (138)V. 操作风险 (139)A. 操作风险的定义 (139)B. 计量方法 (139)1.基本指标法 (139)2.标准法 (140)3.高级计量法(Advanced Measurement Approaches ,AMA) (141)C.资格标准 (142)1.一般标准 (142)2.标准法 (142)3. 高级计量法 (143)D.局部使用 (147)VI.交易账户 (148)A.交易账户的定义 (148)B.审慎评估标准 (149)1.评估系统和控制手段 (149)2.评估方法 (149)3.计值调整(储备) (150)C.交易账户对手信用风险的处理 (151)D.标准法对交易账户特定风险资本要求的处理 (152)1.政府债券的特定风险资本要求 (152)2.对未评级债券特定风险的处理原则 (152)3. 采用信用衍生工具套做保值头寸的专项资本要求 (152)4.信用衍生工具的附加系数 (153)第三部分:监督检查 (155)A.监督检查的重要性 (155)B.监督检查的四项主要原则 (155)C.监督检查的具体问题 (161)D:监管检查的其他问题 (167)第四部分:第三支柱——市场纪律 (169)A.总体考虑 (169)1.披露要求 (169)2.指导原则 (169)3.恰当的披露 (169)4. 与会计披露的相互关系 (169)5.重要性(Materiality) (170)6.频率 (170)B.披露要求 (171)1.总体披露原则 (171)2.适用范围 (171)3.资本 (173)4.风险暴露和评估 (175)(i)定性披露的总体要求 (175)(ii)信用风险 (175)(iii)市场风险 (183)(iv)操作风险 (184)(v)银行账户的利率风险 (184)附录1 创新工具在一级资本中的上线为15% (185)附录2 标准法-实施对应程序 (186)附录3 IRB法风险权重的实例 (190)附录4 监管当局对专业贷款设定的标准 (193)附录5 按照监管公式计算信用风险缓释的影响 (207)附录 6 (211)附录7 损失事件分类详表 (215)附录8 (220)概 述导言1.巴塞尔银行监管委员会(以下简称委员会)现公布巴塞尔新资本协议(Basel II, 以下简称巴塞尔II)第三次征求意见稿(CP3,以下简称第三稿)。

[经济市场]巴塞尔新资本协议第三版中文版

[经济市场]巴塞尔新资本协议第三版中文版

巴塞尔委员会Basel Committeeon Banking Supervision征求意见稿(第三稿)巴塞尔新资本协议The NewBasel Capital Accord 中国银行业监督管理委员会翻译目录概述 (10)导言 (10)第一部分新协议的主要内容 (11)第一支柱:最低资本要求 (11)信用风险标准法 (11)内部评级法(Internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches) (12)公司、银行和主权的风险暴露 (13)零售风险暴露 (14)专业贷款(Specialised lending) (14)股权风险暴露(Equity exposures) (14)IRB法的实施问题 (15)证券化 (15)操作风险 (16)第二支柱和第三支柱:监管当局的监督检查和市场纪律 (17)监管当局的监督检查 (17)市场纪律 (18)新协议的实施 (18)朝新协议过渡 (18)有关前瞻性问题 (19)跨境实施问题 (20)今后的工作 (20)第二部分: 对QIS3技术指导文件的修改 (21)导言 21允许使用准备 (21)合格的循环零售风险暴露(qualifying revolving retail exposures,QRRE)..22住房抵押贷款 (22)专业贷款(specialised lending, SL) (22)高波动性商业房地产(high volatility commercial real estate ,HVCRE).23信用衍生工具 (23)证券化 (23)操作风险 (24)缩写词 (26)第一部分:适用范围 (28)A.导言 (28)B.银行、证券公司和其他附属金融企业 (28)C.对银行、证券公司和其他金融企业的大额少数股权投资 (29)D.保险公司 (29)E.对商业企业的大额投资 (30)F.根据本部分的规定对投资的扣减 (31)第二部分:第一支柱-最低资本要求 (33)I. 最低资本要求的计算 (33)II.信用风险-标准法(Standardised Approach) (33)A.标准法 — 一般规则 (33)1.单笔债权的处理 (34)(i)对主权国家的债权 (34)(ii)对非中央政府公共部门实体(public sector entities)的债权 (35)(iii)对多边开发银行的债权 (35)(iv) 对银行的债权 (36)(v)对证券公司的债权 (37)(vi)对公司的债权 (37)(vii)包括在监管定义的零售资产中的债权 (37)(viii) 对居民房产抵押的债权 (38)(ix)对商业房地产抵押的债权 (38)(x)逾期贷款 (39)(xi)高风险的债权 (39)(xii)其他资产 (40)(xiii) 资产负债表外项目 (40)2.外部评级 (40)(i)认定程序 (40)(ii)资格标准 (40)3.实施中需考虑的问题 (41)(i)对应程序(mapping process) (41)(ii)多方评级结果的处理 (42)(iii)发行人评级和债项评级(issuer versus issues assessment) (42)(iv)本币和外币的评级 (42)(v)短期和长期评级 (43)(vi)评级的适用范围 (43)(vii)被动评级(unsolicited ratings) (43)B. 标准法—信用风险缓释(Credit risk mitigation) (44)1.主要问题 (44)(i)综述 (44)(ii) 一般性论述 (44)(iii)法律确定性 (45)2.信用风险缓释技术的综述 (45)(i)抵押交易 (45)(ii) 表内净扣(On-balance sheet netting) (47)(iii)担保和信用衍生工具 (47)(iv) 期限错配 (47)(v) 其他问题 (48)3.抵押品 (48)(i)合格的金融抵押品 (48)(ii) 综合方法 (49)(iii)简单方法 (56)(iv) 抵押的场外衍生工具交易 (57)4.表内净扣 (57)5.担保和信用衍生工具 (58)(i)操作要求 (58)(ii)合格的担保人/信用保护提供者的范围 (60)(iii)风险权重 (60)(iv)币种错配 (60)(v)主权担保 (61)6.期限错配 (61)7.与信用风险缓释相关的其他问题的处理 (62)(i)对信用风险缓释技术池(pools of CRM techniques)的处理 (62)(ii) 第一违约的信用衍生工具 (62)(iii)第二违约的信用衍生工具 (62)III. 信用风险——IRB法 (62)A.概述 (62)B.IRB法的具体要求 (63)1.风险暴露类别 (63)(i) 公司暴露的定义 (63)(ii) 主权暴露的定义 (65)(iii) 银行暴露的定义 (65)(iv) 零售暴露的定义 (65)(v)合格的循环零售暴露的定义 (66)(vi) 股权暴露的定义 (67)(vii)合格的购入应收账款的定义 (68)2.初级法和高级法 (69)(i)公司、主权和银行暴露 (69)(ii) 零售暴露 (70)(iii) 股权暴露 (70)(iv) 合格的购入应收账款 (70)3. 在不同资产类别中采用IRB法 (70)4.过渡期安排 (71)(i)采用高级法的银行平行计算资本充足率 (71)(ii) 公司、主权、银行和零售暴露 (72)(iii) 股权暴露 (72)C.公司、主权、及银行暴露的规定 (73)1.公司、主权和银行暴露的风险加权资产 (73)(i)风险加权资产的推导公式 (73)(ii) 中小企业的规模调整 (73)(iii) 专业贷款的风险权重 (74)2.风险要素 (75)(i)违约概率 (75)(iii)违约风险暴露 (79)(iv) 有效期限 (80)D.零售暴露规定 (82)1.零售暴露的风险加权资产 (82)(i) 住房抵押贷款 (82)(ii) 合格的循环零售贷款 (82)(iii) 其他零售暴露 (83)2.风险要素 (83)(i)违约概率和违约损失率 (83)(ii) 担保和信贷衍生产品的认定 (83)(iii) 违约风险暴露 (83)E.股权暴露的规则 (84)1.股权暴露的风险加权资产 (84)(i)市场法 (84)(ii) 违约概率/违约损失率方法 (85)(iii) 不采用市场法和违约概率/违约损失率法的情况 (86)2. 风险要素 (87)F. 购入应收账款的规则 (87)1.违约风险的风险加权资产 (87)(i)购入的零售应收账款 (87)(ii) 购入的公司应收账款 (87)2.稀释风险的风险加权资产 (89)(i)购入折扣的处理 (89)(ii) 担保的认定 (89)G. 准备的认定 (89)H.IRB法的最低要求 (90)1.最低要求的内容 (91)2.遵照最低要求 (91)3.评级体系设计 (91)(i)评级维度 (92)(ii) 评级结构 (93)(iv) 评估的时间 (94)(v)模型的使用 (95)(vi) 评级体系设计的记录 (95)4.风险评级体系运作 (96)(i) 评级的涵盖范围 (96)(ii) 评级过程的完整性 (96)(iii) 推翻评级的情况(Overrides) (97)(iv) 数据维护 (97)(v)评估资本充足率的压力测试 (98)5. 公司治理和监督 (98)(i)公司治理(Corporate governance) (98)(ii) 信用风险控制 (99)(iii) 内审和外审 (99)6. 内部评级的使用 (99)7.风险量化 (100)(i)估值的全面要求 (100)(ii) 违约的定义 (101)(iii) 重新确定帐龄(Re-ageing) (102)(iv) 对透支的处理 (102)(v) 所有资产类别损失的的定义 (102)(vi) 估计违约概率的要求 (102)(vii) 自行估计违约损失率的要求 (104)(viii) 自己估计违约风险暴露的要求 (104)(ix) 评估担保和信贷衍生产品成熟性效应的最低要求 (106)(x)估计合格的购入应收账款违约概率和违约损失率的要求 (107)8. 内部评估的验证 (109)9. 监管当局确定的违约损失率和违约风险暴露 (110)(i)商用房地产和居民住房作为抵押品资格的定义 (110)(ii) 合格的商用房地产/居民住房的操作要求 (110)(iii) 认定金融应收账款的要求 (111)10.认定租赁的要求 (113)11.股权暴露资本要求的计算 (114)(i)内部模型法下的市场法 (114)(ii) 资本要求和风险量化 (114)(iv) 验证和形成文件 (116)12.披露要求 (118)IV.信用风险--- 资产证券化框架 (119)A.资产证券化框架下所涉及交易的范围和定义 (119)B. 定义 (120)1. 银行所承担的不同角色 (120)(i)银行作为投资行 (120)(ii) 银行作为发起行 (120)2. 通用词汇 (120)(i) 清收式赎回(clean-up call) (120)(ii) 信用提升(credit enhancement) (120)(iii) 提前摊还(early amortisation) (120)(iv) 超额利差(excess spread) (121)(v)隐性支持(implicit support) (121)(vi) 特别目的机构(Special purpose entity (SPE)) (121)C. 确认风险转移的操作要求 (121)1.传统型资产证券化的操作要求 (121)2.对合成型资产证券化的操作要求 (122)3.清收式赎回的操作要求和处理 (123)D. 对资产证券化风险暴露的处理 (123)1.最低资本要求 (123)(i)扣减 (123)(ii) 隐性支持 (123)2. 使用外部信用评估的操作要求 (124)3. 资产证券化风险暴露的标准化方法 (124)(i) 范围 (124)(ii) 风险权重 (125)(iii) 对于未评级资产证券化风险暴露一般处理方法的例外情况 (125)(iv) 表外风险资产的信用转换系数 (126)(v)信用风险缓释的确认 (127)(vi) 提前摊还规定的资本要求 (128)(viii)对于非控制型具有提前摊还特征的风险暴露的信用风险转换系数的确定 (130)4.资产证券化的内部评级法 (131)(i)范围 (131)(ii) KIRB定义 (131)(iii) 各种不同的方法 (132)(iv) 所需资本最高限 (133)(v) 以评级为基础的方法 (133)(vi) 监管公式 (135)(vii)流动性便利 (137)(viii) 合格服务人现金透支便利 (138)(ix) 信用风险缓释的确认 (138)(x) 提前摊还的资本要求 (138)V. 操作风险 (139)A. 操作风险的定义 (139)B. 计量方法 (139)1.基本指标法 (139)2.标准法 (140)3.高级计量法(Advanced Measurement Approaches ,AMA) (141)C.资格标准 (142)1.一般标准 (142)2.标准法 (142)3. 高级计量法 (143)D.局部使用 (147)VI.交易账户 (148)A.交易账户的定义 (148)B.审慎评估标准 (149)1.评估系统和控制手段 (149)2.评估方法 (149)3.计值调整(储备) (150)C.交易账户对手信用风险的处理 (151)D.标准法对交易账户特定风险资本要求的处理 (152)1.政府债券的特定风险资本要求 (152)2.对未评级债券特定风险的处理原则 (152)3. 采用信用衍生工具套做保值头寸的专项资本要求 (152)4.信用衍生工具的附加系数 (153)第三部分:监督检查 (155)A.监督检查的重要性 (155)B.监督检查的四项主要原则 (155)C.监督检查的具体问题 (161)D:监管检查的其他问题 (167)第四部分:第三支柱——市场纪律 (169)A.总体考虑 (169)1.披露要求 (169)2.指导原则 (169)3.恰当的披露 (169)4. 与会计披露的相互关系 (169)5.重要性(Materiality) (170)6.频率 (170)B.披露要求 (171)1.总体披露原则 (171)2.适用范围 (171)3.资本 (173)4.风险暴露和评估 (175)(i)定性披露的总体要求 (175)(ii)信用风险 (175)(iii)市场风险 (183)(iv)操作风险 (184)(v)银行账户的利率风险 (184)附录1 创新工具在一级资本中的上线为15% (185)附录2 标准法-实施对应程序 (186)附录3 IRB法风险权重的实例 (190)附录4 监管当局对专业贷款设定的标准 (193)附录5 按照监管公式计算信用风险缓释的影响 (207)附录 6 (211)附录7 损失事件分类详表 (215)附录8 (220)概 述导言1.巴塞尔银行监管委员会(以下简称委员会)现公布巴塞尔新资本协议(Basel II, 以下简称巴塞尔II)第三次征求意见稿(CP3,以下简称第三稿)。

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(04缩写词)

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(04缩写词)

缩写词ABCP Asset-backed commercial paper资产支持型商业票据ADC Acquisition, development and construction收购、开发与建设AMA Advanced measurement approaches高级计量法ASA Alternative standardised approach另外一种标准法CCF Credit conversion factor信用转换系数CDR Cumulative default rate积累违约率CF Commodities finance商品融资CRM Credit risk mitigation信用风险缓释技术EAD Exposure at default违约风险暴露ECA Export credit agency出口信贷机构ECAI External credit assessment institution外部信用评估机构EL Expected loss预期损失FMI Future margin income未来利差收入HVCRE High-volatility commercial real estate高波动性商业房地产IPRE Income-producing real estate 创造收入的房地产IRB approach Internal ratings-based approach内部评级法LGD Loss given default违约损失率M Effective maturity有效到期日MDB Multilateral development bank多边发开银行NIF Note issuance facility票据发行工具OF Object finance物品融资PD Probability of default违约率PF Project finance项目融资PSE Public sector entity共公部门企业RBA Ratings-based approach采用评级的方法RUF Revolving underwriting facility 循环认购工具SF Supervisory formula监管工式SL Specialised lending专业贷款SME Small- and medium-sized enterprise中小企业SPE Special purpose entity特别目的机构UCITS Undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities 集体投资可转让证券UL Unexpected loss非预期损失。

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(10附录2(英文))

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(10附录2(英文))

Annex 2Standardised Approach - Implementing the Mapping Process1. Because supervisors will be responsible for assigning eligible ECAI’s credit risk assessments to the risk weights available under the standardised approach, they will need to consider a variety of qualitative and quantitative factors to differentiate between the relative degrees of risk expressed by each assessment. Such qualitative factors could include the pool of issuers that each agency covers, the range of ratings that an agency assigns, each rating’s meaning, and each agency’s definition of default, among others.2. Quantifiable parameters may help to promote a more consistent mapping of credit risk assessments into the available risk weights under the standardised approach. This annex summarises the Committee’s proposals to help supervisors with mapping exercises. The parameters presented below are intended to provide guidance to supervisors and are not intended to establish new or complement existing eligibility requirements for ECAIs. Evaluating CDRs: two proposed measures3. To help ensure that a particular risk weight is appropriate for a particular credit risk assessment, the Committee recommends that supervisors evaluate the cumulative default rate (CDR) associated with all issues assigned the same credit risk rating. Supervisors would evaluate two separate measures of CDRs associated with each risk rating contained in the standardised approach, using in both cases the CDR measured over a three-year period.∙To ensure that supervisors have a sense of the long-run default experience over time, supervisors should evaluate the ten-year average of the three-year CDR when this depth of data is available.150 For new rating agencies or for those that have compiled less than ten years of default data, supervisors may wish to ask rating agencies what they believe the 10-year average of the three-year CDR would be for each risk rating and hold them accountable for such an evaluation thereafter for the purpose of risk weighting the claims they rate.∙The other measure that supervisors should consider is the most recent three-year CDR associated with each credit risk assessment of an ECAI4. Both measurements would be compared to aggregate, historical default rates of credit risk assessments compiled by the Committee that are believed to represent an equivalent level of credit risk.5. As three-year CDR data is expected to be available from ECAIs, supervisors should be able to compare the default experience of a particular ECAI’s assessments with t hose issued by other rating agencies, in particular major agencies rating a similar population.150 In 2002, for example, a supervisor would calculate the average of the three-year CDRs for issuers assigned to each rating grade (the “cohort”) for each of the ten years 1990-1999.170Mapping risk ratings to risk weights using CDRs6. To help supervisors determine the appropriate risk weights to which an ECAI’s risk ratings should be mapped, each of the CDR measures mentioned above could be compared to the following reference and benchmark values of CDRs:∙For each step in an ECAI’s rating scale, a ten-year average of the three-year CDR would be compared to a long run “reference” three-year CDR that would represent a sense of the long-run international default experience of risk assessments.∙Likewise, for each step in the ECAI’s rating scale, the two most recent three-year CDR would be compared to “benchmarks” for CDRs. This comparison would be intended to determine whether the ECAI’s most recent record of assessing credit risk remains within the CDR supervisory benchmarks.7. Table 1 below illustrates the overall framework for such comparisons.Table 1Comparisons of CDR Measures1511. Comparing an ECAI’s long-run average three-year CDR to a long-run“reference” CDR8. For each credit risk category used in the standardised approach of the New Accord, the corresponding long-run reference CDR would provide information to supervisors on what its default experience has been internationally. The ten-year average of an eligible ECAI’s particular assessment would not be expected to match exactly the long-run reference CDR. The long run CDRs are meant as guidance for supervisors, and not as “targets” that ECAIs would have to meet. The recommended long-run “reference” three-year CDRs for each of the Committee’s credit risk categories are presented in Table 2 below, based on the Committee’s observations of the default experience reported by major rating agencies internationally.151 It should be noted that each major rating agency would be subject to these comparisons as well, in which its individual experience would be compared to the aggregate international experience.171Table 2Proposed long run "reference" three-year CDRs2. Comparing an ECAI’s most recent three-year CDR to CDR Benchmarks9. Since an ECAI’s own CDRs are not intended to match the reference CDRs exactly, it is important to provide a better sense of what upper bounds of CDRs are acceptable for each assessment, and hence each risk weight, contained in the standardised approach. 10. It is the Committee’s general sense that the upper bounds for CDRs should serve as guidance for supervisors and not necessarily as mandatory requirements. Exceeding the upper bound for a CDR would therefore not necessarily require the supervisor to increase the risk weight associated with a particular assessment in all cases if the supervisor is convinced that the higher CDR results from some temporary cause other than weaker credit risk assessment standards.11. To assist supervisors in interpreting whether a CDR falls within an acceptable range for a risk rating to qualify for a particular risk weight, two benchmarks would be set for each assessment, namely a “monitoring” level benchmark and a “trigger” level benchmark.(a) “Monitoring” level benchmark12. Exceeding the “monitoring” level CDR benchmark implies that a rating agency’s current default experience for a particular credit risk-assessment grade is markedly higher than international default experience. Although such assessments would generally still be considered eligible for the associated risk weights, supervisors would be expected to consult with the relevant rating agency to understand why the default experience appears to be significantly worse. If supervisors determine that the higher default experience is attributable to weaker standards in assessing credit risk, they would be expected to assign a higher risk category to the agency’s credit risk assessment.(b) “Trigger” level13. Exceeding the “trigger” level benchmark implies that a rating agency’s default experience is considerably above the international historical default experience for a p articular assessment grade. Thus there is a presumption that the ECAI’s standards for assessing credit risk are either too weak or are not applied appropriately. If the observed three-year CDR exceeds the trigger level in two consecutive years, supervisors would be expected to move the risk assessment into a less favourable risk category. However, if supervisors determine that the higher observed CDR is not attributable to weaker 172assessment standards, then they may exercise judgement and retain the original risk weight.15214. In all cases where the supervisor decides to leave the risk category unchanged, it may wish to rely on Pillar 2 of the New Accord and encourage banks to hold more capital temporarily or to establish higher reserves.15. When the supervisor has increased the associated risk category, there would be the opportunity for the assessment to again map to the original risk category if the ECAI is able to demonstrate that its three-year CDR falls and remains below the monitoring level for two consecutive years.(c) Calibrating the benchmark CDRs16. After reviewing a variety of methodologies, the Committee decided to use Monte Carlo simulations to calibrate both the monitoring and trigger levels for each credit risk assessment category. In particular, the proposed monitoring levels were derived from the 99.0th percentile confidence interval and the trigger level benchmark from the 99.9th percentile confidence interval. The simulations relied on publicly available historical default data from major international rating agencies. The levels derived for each risk assessment category are presented in Table 3 below, rounded to the first decimal:Table 3Proposed three-year CDR benchmarks152 For example, if supervisors determine that the higher default experience is a temporary phenomenon, perhaps because it reflects a temporary or exogenous shock such as a natural disaster, then the risk weighting proposed in the standardised approach could still apply. Likewise, a breach of the trigger level by several ECAIs simultaneously may indicate a temporary market change or exogenous shock as opposed to a loosening of credit standards. In either scenario, supervisors would be expected to monitor the ECAI’s assessments to ensure that the higher default experience is not the result of a loosening of credit risk assessment standards.173。

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版

概述导言1. 巴塞尔银行羁系委员会(以下简称委员会)现宣布巴塞尔新资本协议(Basel II, 以下简称巴塞尔II)第三次征求意见稿(CP3,以下简称第三稿)。

第三稿的宣布是构建新资本富足率框架的一项重大步调。

委员会的目标仍然是在今年第四季度完成新协议,并于2006年底在成员国开始实施。

2. 委员会认为,完善资本富足率框架有两方面的大众政策利好。

一是创建不但包罗最低资本并且还包罗羁系政府的监视查抄和市场规律的资本治理划定。

二是大幅度提高最低资本要求的风险敏感度。

3. 完善的资本富足率框架,旨在促进勉励银行强化风险治理能力,不停提高风险评估水平。

委员会认为,实现这一目标的途径是,将资本划定与当今的现代化风险治理作法紧密地结合起来,在羁系实践中并通过有关风险和资本的信息披露,确保对风险的重视。

4. 委员会修改资本协议的一项重要内容,就是增强与业内人士和非成员国羁系人员之间的对话。

通过多次征求意见,委员会认为,包罗多项选择方案的新框架不但适用于十国团体国度,并且也适用于世界各国的银行和银行体系。

5. 委员会另一项同等重要的事情,就是研究到场新协议定量测算影响阐发各行提出的反馈意见。

这方面研究事情的目的,就是掌握各国银行提供的有关新协议各项发起对各行资产将产生何种影响。

特别要指出,委员会注意到,来自40多个国度范围及庞大水平各异的350多家银行到场了近期开展的定量影响阐发(以下称简QIS3)。

正如另一份文件所指出,QIS3的结果表明,调解后新框架划定的资本要求总体上与委员会的既定目标相一致。

6. 本文由两部分内容组成。

第一部分简朴介绍新资本富足框架的内容及有关实施方面的问题。

在此主要的考虑是,加深读者对新协议银行各项选择方案的认识。

第二部分技能性较强,大要描述了在2002年10月宣布的QIS3技能指导文件之后对新协议有关划定所做的修改。

第一部分新协议的主要内容7. 新协议由三大支柱组成:一是最低资本要求,二是羁系政府对资本富足率的监视查抄,三是信息披露。

巴塞尔资本协议精品文档88页

巴塞尔资本协议精品文档88页

风险权重体系
资本充足率
委员会根据资产负债表上各类资产以及表外项目按其相对风险程度进 行加权,以计算资本充足率。 此法有如下优点:1.为结构不同的银行体系之间进行国际比较提
供公平基础 2.便于计算资产负债表表外项目的风险 3.不妨碍银行持有风险较低的流动和其他资产
风险分类
把不同资本的风险分为5级,使用0%、10%、20%、50%和100%5 个权数,资产风险越小,使用权数越小。
协议出台之目的
1
将银行的监管 从外围修补转 移到内部调控 。
2
通过制定银行 的资本与其资 产间的比例, 订出计算方法 和标准,加强 国际银行体系 的健全性和稳
定性。
3
逐步消除目前
国际银行业不 公平竞争的基 础,统一各国 银行监管的标 准,建立公正 的国际性银行 管理体制。
(二)巴塞尔协议Ⅰ的内容
1975年和1983年——《对银行国外机构监管的原则》
内容简介
该协定制定于1975年,被成为神圣条约,是第一个巴塞尔协定。这份 协定最终于1983年5月经修改后确定下来,对海外银行监管责任进行 了明确的分工。
任何银行的国外机构都不能逃避监管 东道国与母国监管当局对于银行的外国分支机构、子公司
和合资机构分担监管责任
导火索--三大国际性商业银行的倒闭
德国赫斯德特银行 纽约富兰克林国民银行 英国-以色列银行
它们的倒闭使监管机构在惊愕之余开始全面 审视拥有广泛国际业务的银行监管问题 。
20世纪70年代起,国际商业银行的发展表现 出:
(1)越来越脱离国内的银行管制,同时国际银行监管十分薄弱; (2)金融操作与金融工具的创新,使银行经营的资产超过银行资本几 十倍,使风险增大; (3)国际债务危机影响银行经营的稳定性。 例如:1982年发展中国家 爆发债务危机 (4)国际银行业中的不平等竞争使得对国际银行的监管不能只靠各国 各自为政、孤单作战,必须要在金融监管上进行国际协调。

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版

巴塞尔资本协议 Basel Capital Accord1. 简介 Introduction巴塞尔资本协议(Basel Capital Accord)是由巴塞尔银行监管委员会(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision)制定的一项国际金融监管准则。

该准则旨在确保银行业机构具备足够的资本金来覆盖其潜在风险,并提高全球金融体系的稳定性。

巴塞尔资本协议于1988年首次发布,目前已经更新到第三版(Basel III)。

巴塞尔资本协议主要通过设立风险权重和资本充足率的指标,要求银行业机构根据其业务风险的不同,以一定比例的资本金抵御其风险敞口。

该协议对银行业机构的监管提出了一系列硬性要求,包括最低资本充足率、风险敞口计算方法等,以确保银行业机构在经济不稳定时期依然能够稳健运营。

2. 资本充足率和风险权重 Capital Adequacy Ratio and Risk Weight在巴塞尔资本协议中,资本充足率(Capital Adequacy Ratio)是一个关键指标,用于衡量银行业机构的偿付能力和承担风险的能力。

资本充足率是指银行业机构的核心资本与其风险加权资产之比。

核心资本包括股本和留存收益,风险加权资产则根据其风险程度分配不同的权重。

巴塞尔资本协议中规定了不同资产类别的风险权重,根据这些权重计算得出的风险加权资产总额将作为分母与核心资本相除,从而得出资本充足率。

不同风险权重反映了不同资产类别的风险程度,风险越高的资产需要投入更多的资本金进行覆盖。

3. 最低资本充足率 Minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio巴塞尔资本协议对银行业机构的最低资本充足率设定了硬性要求。

根据协议规定,银行业机构的资本充足率应不低于8%,其中核心资本至少占资本充足率的4.5%,附加资本占至少2.5%。

这意味着银行业机构至少需要将其风险加权资产的8%作为资本金。

此外,巴塞尔资本协议还规定了系统性重要性银行(Systemically Important Banks)的额外资本充足要求。

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(03目录)

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(03目录)

目录第一部分:适用范围 (1)A. 导言 (1)B. 银行、证券公司和其他金融企业 (1)C. 对银行、证券公司和其他金融企业的大额少数股权投资 (2)D. 保险公司 (2)E. 对商业企业的大额投资 (3)F. 根据本部分的规定对投资的扣减 (4)第二部分:第一支柱-最低资本要求 (6)I. 最低资本充足率的计算 (6)II. 信用风险-标准法 (6)A. 标准法-一般规则 (6)1. 单笔债权的的处理 (7)(i) 对主权的债权 (7)(ii) 对非中央政府公共部门实体的债权 (7)(iii) 对多边开发银行的债权 (8)(iv) 对银行的债权 (8)(v) 对证券公司的债权 (9)(vi) 对公司的债权 (9)(vii) 包括在监管定义的零售资产中的债权 (10)(viii) 以居民房产抵押的债权 (10)(ix) 以商业房地产抵押的债权 (11)(x) 逾期贷款 (11)(xi) 高风险的债权 (11)(xii) 其他资产 (12)(xiii) 资产负债表外项目 (12)2. 外部评级 (12)(i) 认定程序 (12)(ii) 资格标准 (12)3. 实施中需考虑的问题 (13)(i) 对应程序 (13)(ii) 多方评级结果的处理 (13)(iii) 发行人评级和债项评级 (14)(iv) 本币和外币评级 (14)(v) 短期/长期评级 (14)(vi) 评级的适用范围 (15)(vii) 被动评级 (15)B. 标准法-信用风险缓释 (15)1. 主要问题 (15)(i) 综述 (15)(ii) 一般性论述 (16)(iii) 法律确定性 (16)2. 信用风险缓释技术的综述 (16)(i) 抵押交易 (16)(ii) 表内净扣 (18)(iii) 担保和衍生工具 (18)(iv) 期限错配 (18)(v) 其他问题 (19)3. 抵押 (19)(i) 合格的金融抵押品 (19)(ii) 综合法 (20)(iii) 简单法 (27)(iv) 抵押的场外衍生工具交易 (27)4. 表内净扣 (28)5. 担保和衍生工具 (28)(i) 操作要求 (28)(ii) 合格的担保人/信用保护提供者的范围 (30)(iii) 风险权重 (30)(iv) 币种错配 (30)(v) 国家担保 (31)6. 期限错配 (31)(i) 期限的定义 (31)(ii) 期限错配的风险权重 (31)7. 与信用风险缓释相关的其他问题的处理 (32)(i) 对信用风险缓释技术库的处理 (32)(ii) 第一违约的信用衍生工具 (32)(iii) 第二违约的信用衍生工具 32 III. 信用风险——IRB法 (32)A. 概述 (32)B. IRB法的具体要求 (32)1. 风险暴露类别 (33)(i) 公司暴露的定义 (33)(ii) 主权暴露的定义 (35)(iii) 银行暴露的定义 (35)(iv) 零售暴露的定义 (35)(v) 合格的循环零售风险暴露的定义 (35)(vi) 股权暴露的定义 (36)(vii) 合格的购入应收帐款的定义 (36)2. 初级法和高级法 (37)(i) 公司、主权和银行暴露 (38)(ii) 零售暴露 (38)(iii) 股权暴露 (39)(iv) 合格的购入应收帐款 (39)3. 在不同资产类别中采用IRB法 (39)4. 过渡期安排 (39)(i) 采用高级法的银行平行计算资本充足率 (40)(ii) 公司、主权、银行和零售暴露 (40)(iii) 股权暴露 (40)C. 公司、主权、及银行暴露的规定 (41)1. 公司、主权和银行暴露的风险加权资产 (41)(i) 风险加权资产的推导公式 (41)(ii) 中小企业的规模调整 (41)(iii) 专业贷款的风险权重 (42)2. 风险要素 (42)(i) 违约概率(PD) (43)(ii) 违约损失率 (LGD) (43)(iii) 违约风险暴露(EAD) (43)(iv) 有效期限(M) (47)D. 零售暴露规定 (48)1. 零售暴露的风险加权资产 (49)(i) 住房抵押贷款 (49)(ii) 合格的循环零售贷款 (49)(iii) 其他零售暴露 (49)2. 风险要素 (50)(i) 违约概率(PD) 和违约损失率 (LGD) (50)(ii) 担保和信贷衍生产品的认定 (50)(iii) 违约风险暴露 (EAD) (50)E. 股权暴露的规则 (50)1. 股权暴露的风险加权资产 (51)(i) 市场法 (51)(ii) 违约概率/违约损失率法 (51)(iii) 不采用市场法和违约概率/违约损失率法的情况 (52)2. 风险要素 (52)F. 购入应收帐款的规则 (53)1. 违约风险的风险加权资产 (53)(i) 购入的零售应收帐款 (53)(ii) 购入的公司应收帐款 (53)2. 稀释风险的风险加权资产 (54)(i) 购入折扣的处理 (54)(ii) 担保的认定 (55)G. 准备的认定 (55)H. IRB法的最低要求 (55)1. 最低要求的内容 (56)2. 遵照最低要求 (56)3. 评级体系设计 (57)(i) 评级维度 (57)(ii) 评级结构 (57)(iii) 评级标准 (58)(iv) 评估的时间 (59)(v) 模型的使用 (60)(vi) 评级体系设计的记录 (60)4. 风险评级体系运作 (60)(i) 评级的涵盖范围 (61)(ii) 评级过程的完整性 (61)(iii) 推翻评级的情况 (61)(iv) 数据维护 (61)(v) 评估资本充足率的压力测试 (62)5. 公司治理和监督 (62)(i) 公司治理 (63)(ii) 信用风险控制 (63)(iii) 内审和外审 (63)6. 内部评级的使用 (64)7. 风险量化 (64)(i) 估值的全面要求 (64)(ii) 违约的定义 (65)(iii) 重新确定帐龄 (66)(iv) 对透支的处理 (66)(v) 所有资产类别损失的的定义 (66)(vi) 估计违约概率的要求 (66)(vii) 自行估计违约损失率的要求 (67)(viii) 自己估计违约风险暴露的要求 (68)(ix) 评估担保和信贷衍生产品效应的最低要求 (69)(x) 估计违约概率、违约损失率(或预期损失)的最低要求......................... . 718. 内部评估的验证 (72)9. 监管当局确定的违约损失率和违约风险暴露 (73)(i) 商用房地产和住宅用房地产作为抵押品资格的定义 (73)(ii) 合格的商用房地产/住宅用房地产的操作要求 (73)(iii) 认定金融应收账款的要求 (74)10. 认定租赁的要求 (76)11. 股权暴露资本要求的计算 (76)(i) 内部模型法下的市场法 (76)(ii) 资本要求和风险量化 (76)(iii) 风险管理过程和控制 (78)(iv) 验证和形成文件 (78)12. 披露要求 (80)IV. 信用风险–资产证券化框架 (80)A. 资产证券化框架下所涉及交易的范围和定义 (80)B. 定义 (80)1. 银行所承担的不同角色 (80)(i) 投资行 (80)(ii) 发起行 (81)2. 通用词汇 (81)(i) 清除式召回 (81)(ii) 信用提高 (81)(iii) 提前摊还 (81)(iv) 超额利差 (81)(v) 隐性支持 (82)(vi) 特别目的机构 (SPE) (82)C. 确认风险转移的操作要求 (82)1. 传统型资产证券化的操作要求 (82)2. 合成型资产证券化的操作要求 (83)3. 清除式召回的操作要求和处理 (83)D. 对资产证券化风险暴露的处理 (84)1. 最低资本要求 (84)(i) 扣减 (84)(ii) 隐性支持 (84)2. 使用外部信用评估的操作要求 (84)3. 资产证券化风险暴露的标准化方法 (85)(i) 范围 (85)(ii) 风险权重 (85)(iii) 未评级资产证券化风险暴露一般处理方法的例外情况 (86)(iv) 表外风险资产的信用转换系数 (86)(v) 信用风险缓释的确认 (87)(vi) 提前摊还规定的资本要求 (88)(vii) 具有控制型提前摊还特征的信用转换系数的确定 (89)(viii) 对于非控制型具有提前摊还特征的风险暴露的信用风险转换系数的确定. 904. 资产证券化的内部评级法 (91)(i) 范围 (91)(ii) K IRB的定义 (92)(iii) 各种不同的方法 (92)(iv) 所需资本最高限 (93)(v) 以评级为基础的方法 (RBA) (93)(vi) 监管公式 (SF) (95)(vii) 流动性便利 (97)(viii) 合格服务人现金透支便利 (98)(ix) 信用风险缓释的确认 (98)(x) 提前摊还的资本要求 (98)V. 操作风险 (98)A. 操作风险定义 (98)B. 计量方法 (98)1. 基本指标法 (99)2. 标准法 (99)3. 高级计量法 (AMA) (100)C. 资格标准 (101)1. 一般标准 (101)2. 标准法 (101)3. 高级计量法 (102)(i) 定性标准 (102)(ii) 定量标准 (102)(iii) 风险缓释 (105)D. 局部使用 (106)VI. 交易账户 (106)A. 交易账户定义 (106)B. 审慎评估标准 (107)1. 评估系统和控制手段 (107)2. 评估方法 (107)(i) 按照市场价格计值 (107)(ii) 按照模型计值 (108)(iii) 价格独立验证 (108)3. 计值调整,又称储备 (108)C. 交易账户对手方信用风险的处理 (109)D. 标准法对交易账户特定风险资本要求的处理 (109)1. 政府债券的特定风险资本要求 (110)2. 对未评级债券特定风险的处理原则 (110)3. 采用信用衍生工具套做保值头寸的专项资本要求 (110)4. 信用衍生工具的附加系数 (111)Part 3: 第二支柱——监督检查 (113)A. 监督检查的重要性 (113)B. 监督检查的四项主要原则 (113)C. 监督检查的具体问题 (119)D. 监督检查的其他问题 (124)Part 4: 第三支柱——市场纪律 (126)A. 总体考虑 (126)1. 披露要求 (126)2. 指导原则 (126)3. 恰当的披露 (126)4. 与会计披露的相互关系 (126)5. 重要性 (127)6. 频率 (127)7. 内部和保密信息 (127)B. 披露要求 (128)1. 总体披露原则 (128)2. 使用范围 (128)3. 资本 (129)4. 风险暴露和评估 (130)(i) 定性披露的总体要求 (130)(ii) 信用风险 (131)(iii) 市场风险 (136)(iv) 操作风险 (137)(v) 银行账户的利率风险 (137)附录 1 创新工具在一级资本中的上线为15% (138)附录2 标准法-实施对应程序 (139)附录 3 IRB 法风险权重的实例 (143)附录4 监管当局对专业贷款设定的标准 (145)附录5 例子:按照监管公式计算信用风险缓释的影响 (159)附录6 产品线对应表 (163)附录7 损失事件分类详表 (165)附录8 按照标准法和内部评级法的规定,计算金融抵押品担保交易的资本要求的方法概述 (168)附录9 简化的标准法 (170)。

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(04缩写词(英文))

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(04缩写词(英文))

The New Basel Capital AccordLatest news29 April 2003The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has issued a third consultative paper on the New Basel Capital Accord.Comments are due by 31 July 2003, and will be helpful to the Committee as it makes the final modifications to its proposal for a new capital adequacy framework. The goal of the Committee continues to be to complete the New Accord by the fourth quarter of this year, with implementation to take effect in member countries by year-end 2006. To that end, work already has begun in a number of countries on draft rules that would integrate Basel capital standards with national capital regimes.An overview paper accompanies the third consultative document. This paper provides a summary of the new capital adequacy framework. It also outlines changes to the proposal since the release in October 2002 of the QIS 3 Technical Guidance, which banks used to assess the impact of the New Accord on their portfolios. The Committee issued the results of the QIS 3 impact study on 5 May 2003.Read the documents from the Third Consultative Paper, April 2003Read the documents from the Second Consultative Paper, January 2001BackgroundIn January 2001 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a proposal for a New Basel Capital Accord that, once finalised, will replace the current 1988 Capital Accord. The proposal is based on three mutually reinforcing pillars that allow banks and supervisors to evaluate properly the various risks that banks face. The New Basel Capital Accord focuses on:minimum capital requirements, which seek to refine the measurement framework set out in the 1988 Accordsupervisory review of an institution's capital adequacy and internal assessment processmarket discipline through effective disclosure to encourage safe and sound banking practicesThe Basel Committee received more than 250 comments on its January 2001 proposals. In April 2001 the Committee initiated a Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) of banks to gather the data necessary to allow the Committee to gauge the impact of the proposals for capital requirements. A further study, QIS 2.5, was undertaken in November 2001 to gain industry feedback about potential modifications to the Committee's proposals.In December 2001 the Basel Committee announced a revised approach to finalising the New Basel Capital Accord and the establishment of an Accord Implementation Group. Previously, in June2001 the Committee released an update on its progress and highlighted several important ways in which it had agreed to modify some of its earlier proposals based, in part, on industry comments.During its 10 July 2002 meeting, members of the Basel Committee reached agreement on a number of important issues related to the New Basel Capital Accord that the Committee has been exploring since releasing its January 2001 consultative paper.The New Basel Capital AccordPlease note that full translations into French, German, Italian and Spanish will be available soon.Third Consultative Paper29 April 2003The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has issued a third consultative paper on the New Basel Capital Accord.Comments are due by 31 July 2003, and will be helpful to the Committee as it makes the final modifications to its proposal for a new capital adequacy framework. The goal of the Committee continues to be to complete the New Accord by the fourth quarter of this year, with implementation to take effect in member countries by year-end 2006. To that end, work already has begun in a number of countries on draft rules that would integrate Basel capital standards with national capital regimes.An overview paper accompanies the third consultative document. This paper provides a summary of the new capital adequacy framework. It also outlines changes to the proposal since the release in October 2002 of the QIS 3 Technical Guidance, which banks used to assess the impact of the New Accord on their portfolios. The Committee issued the results of the QIS 3 impact study on 5 May 2003.DocumentsOverview of The New Basel Capital Accord (PDF, 18 pages, 103 kb)The New Basel Capital Accord by section:Scope of Application (PDF, 15 pages, 70 kb)Pillar One (PDF, 132 pages, 732 kb)Pillar Two (PDF, 16 pages, 88 kb)Pillar Three (PDF, 15 pages, 82 kb)Annexes (PDF, 48 pages, 220 kb)Press release (April 2003)The 1988 Capital AccordQuantitative Impact Study (QIS)Basel II ChronologyFull document (PDF, 1176 kb)Print-friendly version© Please see disclaimer and copyright informationBIS Home > Basel Committee > The New Basel Capital Accord > Third Consultative Paper。

中级经济师巴塞尔协议内容

中级经济师巴塞尔协议内容

中级经济师巴塞尔协议内容
巴塞尔协议是国际货币基金组织(IMF)和巴塞尔银行监管委员会推出的一系列合规准则,旨在加强全球银行业的风险管理和监管标准。

该协议包含三个主要组成部分:
1. 巴塞尔资本协议(Basel Capital Accord):该协议最早于1988年制定,目的是确保银行拥有足够的资本来承担风险。

根据这一协议,银行必须根据其风险承受能力和风险水平来保持一定的资本储备。

资本要求根据银行的资产类型和风险权重来计算,以确保银行能够应对可能的损失。

2. 巴塞尔监管准则(Basel Supervisory Guidelines):此准则为银行和监管机构提供了指导,以确保其在执行巴塞尔资本协议的过程中遵守统一的规定。

这些准则包括有关监测和评估风险管理和内部控制体系、银行风险报告和披露、资本计量和资本监控的要求。

3. 巴塞尔市场风险协议(Basel Market Risk Accord):此协议于1996年制定,旨在规范银行对市场风险(包括利率风险、股票风险和外汇风险)的管理和监测。

根据该协议,银行必须根据其交易部门的市值风险承受能力,以及所持有的金融工具的市场风险程度来维持一定的资本储备。

巴塞尔协议的中级经济师必须了解和应用这些协议,并确保银行在风险管理和监管方面的合规性。

它对于全球金融稳定至关重要,可以减少银行业的系统性风险,并增强金融体系的可持续性。

巴塞尔资本协议.pptx

巴塞尔资本协议.pptx

导火索--三大国际性商业银行的倒闭
德国赫斯德特银行 纽约富兰克林国民银行 英国-以色列银行
它们的倒闭使监管机构在惊愕之余开始全面 审视拥有广泛国际业务的银行监管问题 。
20世纪70年代起,国际商业银行的发展表现 出:
(1)越来越脱离国内的银行管制,同时国际银行监管十分薄弱; (2)金融操作与金融工具的创新,使银行经营的资产超过银行资本几 十倍,使风险增大; (3)国际债务危机影响银行经营的稳定性。 例如:1982年发展中国家 爆发债务危机 (4)国际银行业中的不平等竞争使得对国际银行的监管不能只靠各国 各自为政、孤单作战,必须要在金融监管上进行国际协调。
巴塞尔协议 Ⅰ
Basel Capital Accord Ⅰ
1. 巴塞尔协议Ⅰ的产生 2. 巴塞尔协议Ⅰ的更新过程及内容介绍 3. 对旧巴塞尔协议的反思 4. 对新巴塞尔协议的启示
巴塞尔协 议Ⅰ的产生
金融业发展 的
必经之路
协议出台 之
目的
金融业发展的必经之路 金融危机演变的逻辑变化特征
传统:经济危机 金融危机 社会危机 现代:金融危机 经济危机 社会危机
巴塞尔协议 Ⅰ,II, III
Basel Capital Accord Ⅰ,II,III
巴塞尔协议就是由巴塞尔委员会成员国(包括
美国、英国、法国、德国、意大利、日本、荷兰、加拿大、比利时、
瑞典等十国 )的中央银行在瑞士巴塞尔达成的若 干重要协议的统称。其实质是为了完善与 补充单个国家对商业银行监管体制的不足 ,减轻银行倒闭的风险与代价,是对国际 商业银行联合监管的最重要形式,并具有 很强的约束力。
决定是否将各种成分都包括在内。
风险权重体系
资本充足率
委员会根据资产负债表上各类资产以及表外项目按其相对风险程度进 行加权,以计算资本充足率。 此法有如下优点:1.为结构不同的银行体系之间进行国际比较提

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(02概述(英文))

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(02概述(英文))

Basel Committeeon Banking SupervisionConsultative Document Overview ofThe NewBasel Capital Accord Issued for comment by 31 July 2003 April 2003Introduction1. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) is releasing this overview paper as an accompaniment to its third consultative paper (CP3) on the New Basel Capital Accord (also known as Basel II). The issuance of CP3 represents an important step in putting the new capital adequacy framework in place. The Committee‟s goal continues to be to finalise the New Accord by the fourth quarter of this year with implementation to take effect in member countries by year-end 2006.2. The Committee believes that important public policy benefits can be obtained by improving the capital adequacy framework along two important dimensions. First, by developing capital regulation that encompasses not only minimum capital requirements, but also supervisory review and market discipline. Second, by increasing substantially the risk sensitivity of the minimum capital requirements.3. An improved capital adequacy framework is intended to foster a strong emphasis on risk management and to encourage ongoing improvements in banks‟ risk assessment capabilities. The Committee believes this can be accomplished by closely aligning banks‟ capital requirements with prevailing modern risk management practices, and by ensuring that this emphasis on risk makes its way into supervisory practices and into market discipline through enhanced risk- and capital-related disclosures.4. A critical component of the Committee‟s efforts to revise the Basel Accord has been its extensive dialogue with industry participants and with supervisors from outside member countries. As a result of these consultations, the Committee believes the new framework with its various options will be suitable not only within the G10 but also for banks and for countries around the world to apply to their banking systems.5. An equally important aspect to the Committee‟s work has been the feedback received from banks participating in its impact studies. The aim of these studies has been to gather information from banks worldwide on the impact of the capital proposals on their existing portfolios. In particular, the Committee recognises the tremendous effort of the more than 350 banks of varying size and levels of complexity from more than 40 countries that participated in the most recent quantitative exercise known as QIS 3. As discussed in a separate paper, the QIS 3 results confirmed that the framework as currently calibrated produces capital requirements broadly consistent with the Committee‟s objectives.6. This overview paper is structured in two parts. The first part provides a summary of the new capital adequacy framework and also touches upon implementation considerations. It is targeted to readers that would like to increase their familiarity with the options available to banks in Basel II. The second part is more technical in nature. It outlines the specific modifications to the New Accord relative to the proposals embodied in the QIS 3 Technical Guidance released in October 2002.Part I: Key Elements of the New Accord7. The New Accord consists of three pillars: (1) minimum capital requirements, (2) supervisory review of capital adequacy, and (3) public disclosure. The proposals comprising each of the three pillars are summarised below.Pillar 1: Minimum capital requirements8. While the proposed New Accord differs from the current Accord along a number of dimensions, it is important to begin with a description of elements that have not changed. The current Accord is based on the concept of a capital ratio where the numerator represents the amount of capital a bank has available and the denominator is a measure of the risks faced by the bank and is referred to as risk-weighted assets. The resulting capital ratio may be no less than 8%.9. Under the proposed New Accord, the regulations that define the numerator of the capital ratio (i.e. the definition of regulatory capital) remain unchanged. Similarly, the minimum required ratio of 8% is not changing. The modifications, therefore, are occurring in the definition of risk-weighted assets, that is in the methods used to measure the risks faced by banks. The new approaches for calculating risk-weighted assets are intended to provide improved bank assessments of risk and thus to make the resulting capital ratios more meaningful.10. The current Accord explicitly covers only two types of risks in the definition of risk-weighted assets: (1) credit risk and (2) market risk. Other risks are presumed to be covered implicitly through the treatments of these two major risks. The treatment of market risk arising from trading activities was the subject of the Basel Committee‟s 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord. The proposed New Accord envisions this treatment remaining unchanged. 11. The pillar one proposals to modify the definition of risk-weighted assets in the New Accord have two primary elements: (1) substantive changes to the treatment of credit risk relative to the current Accord; and (2) the introduction of an explicit treatment of operational risk that will result in a measure of operational risk being included in the denominator of a bank‟s capital ratio. The discussions below will fo cus on these two elements in turn.12. In both cases, a major innovation of the proposed New Accord is the introduction of three distinct options for the calculation of credit risk and three others for operational risk. The Committee believes that it is not feasible or desirable to insist upon a one-size-fits-all approach to the measurement of either risk. Instead, for both credit and operational risk, there are three approaches of increasing risk sensitivity to allow banks and supervisors to select the approach or approaches that they believe are most appropriate to the stage of development of banks‟ operations and of the financial market infrastructure. The following table identifies the three primary approaches available by risk type.Standardised approach to credit risk13. The standardised approach is similar to the current Accord in that banks are required to slot their credit exposures into supervisory categories based on observable characteristics of the exposures (e.g. whether the exposure is a corporate loan or a residential mortgage loan). The standardised approach establishes fixed risk weights corresponding to each supervisory category and makes use of external credit assessments to enhance risk sensitivity compared to the current Accord. The risk weights for sovereign, interbank, and corporate exposures are differentiated based on external credit assessments. For sovereign exposures, these credit assessments may include those developed by OECD export credit agencies, as well as those published by private rating agencies.14. The standardised approach contains guidance for use by national supervisors in determining whether a particular source of external ratings should be eligible for banks to use.The use of external ratings for the evaluation of corporate exposures, however, is consideredto be an optional element of the framework. Where no external rating is applied to anexposure, the standardised approach mandates that in most cases a risk weighting of 100%be used, implying a capital requirement of 8% as in the current Accord. In such instances,supervisors are to ensure that the capital requirement is adequate given the defaultexperience of the exposure type in question. An important innovation of the standardised approach is the requirement that loans considered past-due be risk weighted at 150%,unless a threshold amount of specific provisions has already been set aside by the bankagainst that loan.15. Another important development is the expanded range of collateral, guarantees, andcredit derivatives that banks using the standardised approach may recognise. Collectively,Basel II refers to these instruments as credit risk mitigants. The standardised approachexpands the range of eligible collateral beyond OECD sovereign issues to include most typesof financial instruments, while setting out several approaches for assessing the degree of capital reduction based on the market risk of the collateral instrument. Similarly, thestandardised approach expands the range of recognised guarantors to include all firms thatmeet a threshold external credit rating.16. The standardised approach also includes a specific treatment for retail exposures.The risk weights for residential mortgage exposures are being reduced relative to the currentAccord, as are those for other retail exposures, which will now receive a lower risk weightthan that for unrated corporate exposures. In addition, some loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may be included within the retail treatment, subject to meetingvarious criteria.17. By design the standardised approach draws a number of distinctions betweenexposures and transactions in an effort to improve the risk sensitivity of the resulting capitalratios. The same can also be said of the IRB approaches to credit risk and those forassessing the capital requirement for operational risk where capital requirements are moreclosely linked to risk. In order to assist banks and national supervisors where circumstancesmay not warrant a broad range of options, the Committee has developed the …simplified st andardised approach‟ outlined in Annex 9 of CP3. The annex collects in one place thesimplest options for calculating risk weighted assets. Banks intending to adopt the simplifiedstandardised methods are also expected to comply with the corresponding supervisoryreview and market discipline requirements of the New Accord.Internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches18. One of the most innovative aspects of the New Accord is the IRB approach to creditrisk, which includes two variants: a foundation version and an advanced version. The IRB approach differs substantially from the standardised approach in that banks‟ internal assessments of key risk drivers serve as primary inputs to the capital calculation. Because the approach is based on banks‟ internal assess ments, the potential for more risk sensitive capital requirements is substantial. However, the IRB approach does not allow banks themselves to determine all of the elements needed to calculate their own capital requirements. Instead, the risk weights and thus capital charges are determined through the combination of quantitative inputs provided by banks and formulas specified by the Committee.19. The formulas, or risk weight functions, translate a bank‟s inputs into a specificcapital requirement. They are based on modern risk management techniques that involve astatistical and thus quantitative assessment of risk. Ongoing dialogue with industryparticipants has confirmed that use of such methods represents an important step forward for developing a meaningful assessment of risk at the largest most complex banking organisations in today‟s market.20. The IRB approaches cover a wide range of portfolios with the mechanics of the capital calculation varying somewhat across exposure types. The remainder of this section highlights the differences between the foundation and advanced IRB approaches by portfolio, where applicable.Corporate, bank and sovereign exposures21. The IRB calculation of risk-weighted assets for exposures to sovereigns, banks, or corporate entities uses the same basic approach. It relies on four quantitative inputs: (1) Probability of default (PD), which measures the likelihood that the borrower will default over a given time horizon; (2) Loss given default (LGD), which measures the proportion of the exposure that will be lost if a default occurs; (3) Exposure at default (EAD), which for loan commitments measures the amount of the facility that is likely to be drawn if a default occurs; and (4) Maturity (M), which measures the remaining economic maturity of the exposure. 22. Given a value for each of these four inputs, the corporate IRB risk-weight function described in CP3 produces a specific capital requirement for each exposure. In addition, for exposures to SME borrowers defined as those with annual sales of less than 50 million of Euros, banks will be permitted to make use of a firm size adjustment to the corporate IRB risk weight formula.23. The foundation and advanced IRB approaches differ primarily in terms of the inputs that are provided by the bank based on its own estimates and those that have been specified by the supervisor. The following table summarises these differences.24. The table makes clear that for corporate, sovereign, and interbank exposures, all IRB banks must provide internal estimates of PD. In addition, advanced IRB banks must provide internal estimates of LGD and EAD, while foundation IRB banks will make use of supervisory values contained in CP3 that depend on the nature of the exposure. Advanced IRB banks will generally provide their own estimates of remaining maturity for theseexposures, although there are some exceptions where supervisors can allow fixed maturity assumptions to be used instead. For foundation IRB banks, supervisors can choose on a national basis whether all such banks are to apply fixed maturity assumptions described in CP3 or to provide their own estimates of remaining maturity.25. Another major element of the IRB framework pertains to the treatment of credit risk mitigants, namely, collateral, guarantees and credit derivatives. The IRB framework itself, particularly the LGD parameter, provides a great deal of flexibility to assess the potential value of credit risk mitigation techniques. For foundation IRB banks, therefore, the different supervisory LGD values provided in CP3 reflect the presence of different types of collateral. Advanced IRB banks have even greater flexibility to assess the value of different types of collateral. With respect to transactions involving financial collateral, the IRB approach seeks to ensure that banks are using a recognised approach to assessing the risk that such collateral could change in value, and thus a specific set of methods is provided, as in the standardised approach.Retail exposures26. For retail exposures, there is only a single, advanced IRB approach and no foundation IRB alternative. The key inputs to the IRB retail formulas are PD, LGD and EAD, all of which are to be provided by the bank based on its internal estimates. In contrast to the IRB approach for corporate exposures, these values would not be estimated for individual exposures, but instead for pools of similar exposures.27. In light of the fact that retail exposures address a broad range of products with each exhibiting different historical loss experiences, the framework divides retail exposures into three primary categories: (1) exposures secured by residential mortgages, (2) qualifying revolving retail exposures (QRRE), and (3) other non-mortgage exposures also known as …other retail.‟ Generally speaking, the QRRE category captures unsecured revolving credits that exhibit appropriate loss characteristics, which would include many credit card relationships. All other non-mortgage consumer lending including exposures to small businesses falls into the …other retail‟ category. A separate risk-weight formula for each of the three categories is provided in CP3.Specialised lending28. Basel II distinguishes several sub-categories of wholesale lending from other forms of corporate lending and refers to them as specialised lending. The term specialised lending is associated with the financing of individual projects where the repayment is highly dependent on the performance of the underlying pool or collateral. For all but one of the specialised lending sub-categories, if banks can meet the minimum criteria for the estimation of the relevant data inputs, they can simply use the corporate IRB framework to calculate the risk weights for these exposures. However, in recognition that the hurdles for meeting these criteria for this set of exposures may be more difficult in practice, CP3 also includes an additional option that only requires that a bank be able to classify such exposures into five distinct quality grades. CP3 provides a specific risk weight for each of these grades.29. For one sub-category of specialised lending, …high volatility commercial real estate‟ (HVCRE), IRB banks that can estimate the required data inputs will use a separate risk-weight formula that is more conservative than the general corporate risk-weight formula in light of the risk characteristics of this type of lending. Banks that cannot estimate the required inputs will classify their HVCRE exposures into five grades, for which CP3 also provides specific risk weights.Equity exposures30. IRB banks will be required to separately treat their equity exposures. Two distinctapproaches are described in CP3. One approach builds on the PD/LGD approach forcorporate exposures and requires banks to provide own PD estimates for the associatedequity exposures. This approach, however, mandates the use of a 90% LGD value and alsoimposes various other limitations, including a minimum risk weight of 100% in manycircumstances. The other approach is intended to provide banks with the opportunity tomodel the potential decrease in the market value of their equity holdings over a quarterly holding period. A simplified version of this approach with fixed risk weights for public andprivate equities is also included.Implementation of IRB31. By relying on internally generated inputs to the Basel II risk weight functions, there isbound to be some variation in the way in which the IRB approach is carried out. To ensuresignificant comparability across banks, the Committee has established minimum qualifyingcriteria for use of the IRB approaches that cover the comprehensiveness and integrity ofbanks‟ internal credit risk assessment c apabilities. While banks using the advanced IRB approach will have greater flexibility relative to those relying on the foundation IRB approach,at the same time they must also satisfy a more stringent set of minimum standards.32. The Committee believes that banks‟ internal rating systems should accurately andconsistently differentiate between different degrees of risk. The challenge is for banks todefine clearly and objectively the criteria for their rating categories in order to providemeaningful assessments of both individual credit exposures and ultimately an overall riskprofile. A strong control environment is another important factor for ensuring that banks‟ rating systems perform as intended and the resulting ratings are accurate. An independent ratings process, internal review and transparency are control concepts addressed in the minimum IRB standards.33. Clearly, an internal rating system is only as good as its inputs. Accordingly, banksusing the IRB approach will need to be able to measure the key statistical drivers of creditrisk. The minimum Basel II standards provide banks with the flexibility to rely on data derivedfrom their own experience, or from external sources as long as the bank can demonstrate therelevance of such data to its own exposures. In practical terms, banks will be expected to have in place a process that enables them to collect, to store and to utilise loss statistics over time in a reliable manner.Securitisation34. Basel II provides a specific treatment for securitisation, a risk management technique that the current Accord does not fully contemplate. The Committee recognises that securitisation by its very nature relates to the transfer of ownership and/or risks associated with the credit exposures of a bank to other parties. In this respect, securitisation is important in helping to provide better risk diversification and to enhance financial stability.35. The Committee believes that it is essential for the New Accord to include a robust treatment of securitisation. Otherwise the new framework would remain vulnerable to capital arbitrage, as some securitisations have enabled banks under the current Accord to avoid maintaining capital commensurate with the risks to which they are exposed. To address this concern, Basel II requires banks to look to the economic substance of a securitisation transaction when determining the appropriate capital requirement in both the standardised and IRB treatments.36. As elsewhere in the standardised approach to credit risk, banks must assign supervisory risk weights to securitisation exposures based on various criteria. Onenoteworthy point is the difference in treatment of lower quality and unrated securitisationsvis-à-vis comparable corporate exposures. In a securitisation, such positions are generallydesigned to absorb all losses on the underlying pool of exposures up to a certain level.Accordingly, the Committee believes this concentration of risk warrants higher capitalrequirements. In particular, for banks using the standardised approach, unrated securitisationpositions must be deducted from capital.37. For IRB banks that originate securitisations, a key element of the framework is thecalculation of the amount of capital that the bank would have been required to hold on theunderlying pool had it not securitised the exposures. This amount of capital is referred to asK IRB. If an IRB bank retains a position in a securitisation that obligates it to absorb losses upto or less than K IRB before any other holders bear losses (i.e. a first loss position), then thebank must deduct this position from capital. The Committee believes that this requirement iswarranted in order to provide strong incentives for originating banks to shed the riskassociated with highly subordinated securitisation positions that inherently contain the greatest risks. For IRB banks that invest in highly rated securitisation exposures, a treatmentbased on the presence of an external rating, the granularity of the underlying pool, and thethickness of an exposure has been developed.38. Because of their importance in ensuring the smooth functioning of commercial papermarkets and their importance to corporate banking generally, the Basel II securitisationframework includes an explicit treatment of liquidity facilities provided by banks. In the IRBframework, the capital requirement for a liquidity facility is dependent upon a number of factors including the asset quality of the underlying pool and the degree to which creditenhancements are available to absorb losses prior to use of the facility. Each is a criticalinput to the supervisory formula designed for use by originating banks to calculate capitalrequirements for unrated positions, such as liquidity facilities. A treatment of liquidity facilitiesin the standardised approach is also provided which sets out various criteria for ensuring thatmore preferential treatment is only provided to those liquidity facilities where the risks arelower.39. Many securitisations of revolving retail exposures contain provisions that call for the securitisation to be wound down if the quality of securitised assets begins to deteriorate. TheBasel II proposals include a specific treatment of securitisations with these …earlyamortisation‟ features, given that suc h mechanisms can in effect partly shield investors fromfully sharing in the losses of the underlying accounts. The Committee‟s approach is based ona measure of the quality of the underlying assets in the pool. When this is high, the approachimplies a zero capital requirement associated with the securitised exposures. As the qualitydeteriorates, however, the bank must increasingly hold capital as if future draws on existing credit card lines would remain on its balance sheet.Operational risk40. The Committee believes that operational risk is an important risk facing banks andthat banks need to hold capital to protect against losses from it. Within the Basel IIframework, operational risk is defined as the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failedinternal processes, people and systems, or external events. This is another area where theCommittee has developed a new regulatory capital approach. As with credit risk, theCommittee builds on banks‟ rapidly developing internal assessment techniques and seeks to provide incentives for banks to improve upon those techniques, and more broadly, theirmanagement of operational risk over time. This is particularly true of the AdvancedMeasurement Approaches (AMA) to operational risk described below.41. Approaches to operational risk are continuing to evolve rapidly, but are not likely in the near term to attain the precision with which market and credit risk can be quantified. This situation has posed obvious challenges to the incorporation of a measure of operational risk within pillar one of the New Accord. Nevertheless, the Committee believes that such inclusion is essential to ensure that there are strong incentives for banks to continue to develop approaches to operational risk measurement and to ensure that banks are holding sufficient capital buffers for this risk. It is clear that a failure to establish a minimum capital requirement for operational risk within the New Accord would reduce these incentives and result in a reduction of industry resources devoted to operational risk.42. The Committee is prepared to provide banks with an unprecedented amount of flexibility to develop an approach to calculate operational risk capital that they believe is consistent with their mix of activities and underlying risks. In the AMA, banks may use their own method for assessing their exposure to operational risk, so long as it is sufficiently comprehensive and systematic. The extent of detailed standards and criteria for use of the AMA are limited in order to accommodate the rapid evolution in operational risk management practices that the Committee expects to see over the coming years.43. The Committee intends to review progress in regard to operational risk approaches on an ongoing basis. It has been strongly encouraged by the advances made at those banks that have been developing operational risk frameworks consistent with the spirit of the AMA. Management at these banking organisations has concluded that it is possible to develop a flexible and comprehensive approach to operational risk measurement within their firms. 44. Internationally active banks and banks with significant operational risk exposure (for example, specialised processing banks) are expected to adopt over time the more risk sensitive AMA. Basel II contains two simpler approaches to operational risk: the basic indicator and the standardised approach, which are targeted to banks with less significant operational risk exposures. In general terms, the basic indicator and standardised approaches require banks to hold capital for operational risk equal to a fixed percentage of a specified risk measure.45. In the basic indicator approach, the measure is a bank‟s average annual gross income over the previous three years. This average, multiplied by a factor of 0.15 set by the Committee, produces the capital requirement. As a point of entry for the capital calculation, there are no specific criteria for use of the basic indicator approach. Nevertheless banks using this approach are encouraged to comp ly with the Committee‟s guidance on sound practices for the management and supervision of operational risk, which was released in February 2003.46. In the standardised approach, gross income again serves as a proxy for the scale ofa bank‟s business oper ations and thus the likely scale of the related operational risk exposure for a given business line. However, rather than calculate capital at the firm level as under the basic indicator approach, banks must calculate a capital requirement for each business line. This is determined by multiplying gross income by specific supervisory factors determined by the Committee. The total operational risk capital requirement for a banking organisation is the summation of the regulatory capital requirements across all of its business lines. As a condition for use of the standardised approach, it is important for banks to have adequate operational risk systems that comply with the minimum criteria outlined in CP3. 47. Banks using the basic indicator or standardised approaches to operational risk are not permitted to recognise the risk mitigating impact of insurance. As discussed in Part II of this overview paper, banks using the AMA are permitted to do so subject to certain conditions.。

巴塞尔协议书资本规定

巴塞尔协议书资本规定

巴塞尔协议书资本规定甲方(全称):___________________________法定代表人:_____________________________地址:___________________________________联系电话:_____________________________乙方(全称):___________________________法定代表人:_____________________________地址:___________________________________联系电话:_____________________________鉴于甲方和乙方(以下简称“各方”)就资本规定事项达成以下协议:第一条资本定义及分类1.1 资本是指各方用于承担风险的财务资源,包括但不限于核心一级资本、其他一级资本和二级资本。

1.2 核心一级资本包括普通股、留存收益和其他符合条件的权益工具。

1.3 其他一级资本包括优先股和其他符合条件的永久性工具。

1.4 二级资本包括长期次级债务和其他符合条件的债务工具。

第二条资本充足率要求2.1 各方应遵守国家或地区金融监管机构规定的最低资本充足率标准。

2.2 各方应根据自身风险状况,合理确定并维持资本充足率,确保持续满足监管要求。

第三条资本充足率计算3.1 资本充足率的计算应根据监管机构发布的具体规则和方法进行。

3.2 各方应定期对资本充足率进行自我评估,并在必要时进行调整。

第四条资本补充机制4.1 各方应建立资本补充机制,确保在资本充足率低于监管要求时,能够及时补充资本。

4.2 资本补充方式包括但不限于发行新股、优先股、次级债务等。

第五条风险管理5.1 各方应建立和完善风险管理体系,对各类风险进行有效识别、评估、监控和控制。

5.2 风险管理应涵盖信用风险、市场风险、操作风险等,并与资本充足率管理相结合。

第六条信息披露6.1 各方应按照监管要求,定期向监管机构和公众披露资本充足率、资本结构等相关信息。

巴塞尔资金协议书

巴塞尔资金协议书

巴塞尔资金协议书甲方(资金提供方):_____________________乙方(资金使用方):_____________________鉴于甲方愿意提供资金支持乙方的商业活动,乙方需要资金以实现其商业目标,双方本着平等自愿、诚实信用的原则,经友好协商,达成如下协议:第一条资金提供1.1 甲方同意向乙方提供总额为人民币____万元的资金支持。

1.2 资金提供的具体方式为:甲方在本协议生效之日起____个工作日内,将资金一次性汇入乙方指定的银行账户。

第二条资金用途2.1 乙方承诺将甲方提供的资金专项用于以下用途:____________________。

2.2 乙方不得将资金用于非法活动或与本协议约定用途不符的其他活动。

第三条资金使用期限3.1 本协议项下资金的使用期限为自资金到达乙方账户之日起至____年____月____日止。

3.2 乙方应在资金使用期限届满前,将资金使用情况报告甲方,并按约定归还资金。

第四条资金归还4.1 乙方应于资金使用期限届满之日起____个工作日内,将全部资金归还甲方。

4.2 资金归还方式为:乙方将资金汇入甲方指定的银行账户。

第五条利息与费用5.1 乙方应按照年利率____%的标准,向甲方支付资金使用期间的利息。

5.2 利息支付方式为:乙方每季度末支付一次,直至资金归还完毕。

第六条违约责任6.1 如乙方未按期归还资金或支付利息,应按照未归还金额的____%向甲方支付违约金。

6.2 如甲方未按约定提供资金,应按照未提供资金金额的____%向乙方支付违约金。

第七条争议解决7.1 本协议项下发生的任何争议,双方应首先通过友好协商解决。

7.2 如果协商不成,任何一方均可向甲方所在地的人民法院提起诉讼。

第八条协议的变更与解除8.1 本协议的任何变更或解除,必须经双方协商一致,并以书面形式确认。

8.2 如遇不可抗力因素,导致本协议无法继续履行,双方均可解除本协议。

第九条其他9.1 本协议未尽事宜,双方可另行协商解决。

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(12附录4)

巴塞尔资本协议中英文完整版(12附录4)

项目完成担保
约定的损害赔偿金充足 且由金融实物资产支持 以及/或财务实力雄厚的 项目发起人提供项目完 成担保
约定的损害赔偿金较多 且由金融实物资产支持 以及/或财务实力较强的 项目发起人提供项目完 成担保
约定的损害赔偿金适当且 由金融实物资产支持以及/ 或财务实力较强的项目发 起人提供项目完成担保
约定的损害赔偿金不足 或缺乏金融实物资产的 支持或项目完成担保较 弱
房地产在面临连续的财务压 力(如利率、经济增长)情 形下能履行偿债义务。该房 地产仅在面临严峻经济问题 时才可能违约
在经济下滑时,房地产收入 将减少,降低其资本开支能 力并增加了违约风险
市场需求弱,何时改善达到 均衡并不确定。项目租期届 满后不易找不到承租人。新 的租赁条件不如现在的优越
房地产的 DSCR 恶化严 峻,其 LTV 大大高于新贷 款的认购标准。
建设开支超出预算或项目 技术风险过高而不切实 际。承包商文和账户 拥有手续完备的优先担 保权益
贷款人对现金流的操纵(例如现金转 好 账(cash sweep) 和独立第三方账户托 管)
较好
对起动项目的全部资产、 对贷款人几乎未提供担
合同、批文和账户拥有一 保;抵押条款对银行不
样性的担保权益

一样





合同条款的约束力(关于强制提早付 款、递延付款、分期付款和红利限制 等方面的强制规定)(mandatory prepayments, payment deferrals, payment cascade, dividend restrictions…)
涉及项目风险的财务比 率专门健康,经济前景 专门看好。
竞争对手专门少或者在 地域、成本或技术方面 好于平均水平但不一定 连续。需求旺盛且稳 固。

最新巴塞尔协议三中英对照

最新巴塞尔协议三中英对照

Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higherglobal minimum capital standards12 September 2010At its 12 September 2010 meeting, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, announced a substantial strengthening of existing capital requirements and fully endorsed the agreements it reached on 26 July 2010. These capital reforms, together with the introduction of a global liquidity standard, deliver on the core of the global financial reform agenda and will be presented to the G20 Leaders summit in November.Increased capital requirementsThese capital requirements are supplemented by a non-risk-based leverage ratio that will serve as a backstop to the risk-based measures described above. In July, Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed to test a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period. Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments would be carried out in the first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 based on appropriate review and calibration.Transition arrangementsThe Governors and Heads of Supervision also agreed on transitional arrangements for implementing the new standards. These will help ensure that the banking sector can meet the higher capital standards through reasonable earnings retention and capital raising, while still supporting lending to the economy. The transitional arrangements, which are summarised in Annex 2, include:National implementation by member countries will begin on 1 January 2013. Member countries must translate the rules into national laws and regulations before this date. As of 1 January 2013, banks will be required to meet the following new minimum requirements in relation to risk-weighted assets (RWAs):4.5% Tier 1 capital/RWAs, and8.0% total capital/RWAs.Only those instruments issued before the date of this press release should qualify for the above transition arrangements.After an observation period beginning in 2011, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) will be introduced on 1 January 2015. The revised net stable funding ratio (NSFR) will move to a minimum standard by 1 January 2018. The Committee will put in place rigorous reporting processes to monitor the ratios during the transition period and will continue to review the implications of these standards for financial markets, credit extension and economic growth, addressing unintended consequences as necessary.Annex 1: Calibration of the Capital Framework (PDF 1 page, 19 kb)Annex 2: Phase-in arrangements (PDF 1 page, 27 kb)Full press release (PDF 7 pages, 56 kb)--------------------------------------------------------------------------------最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。

巴塞尔新资本协议_中文版

巴塞尔新资本协议_中文版

内部程序
系统
外部事件
操作风险的度量方法
基本指标法、标准法、高级计量法
操作风险的度量方法:基本指标法 基本指标法
银行持有的操作风险资本应等于前三年总收入的平均值 乘上一个固定比例(用α表示)。资本计算公式如下:
KBIA = GI * α
其中,KBIA = 基本指标法需要的资本, GI = 前三年总收入的平均值, α = 15%,由巴塞尔委员会设定。 总收入定义为:净利息收入加上非利息收入。这种 计算方法旨在(1)反映所有准备(例如,未付利息的准备)的 总额;(2)不包括银行账户上出售证券实现的利润(或损失) ; (3)不包括特殊项目以及保险收入。
资本充足率 = 信用风险, ƒ (信用风险, 市场风 操作风险) 险, 操作风险)
市场风险的衡量方法
标准法
对市场风险的最低资本要求=利率风险+股权投 资风险+外汇风险+大宗商品风险+期权风险
内部模型法
对市场风险的最低资本要求=前一个交易日的 VAR 或 3*前六十个交易日的平均VAR
(以高者为准)
操作风险
操作风险的定义 操作风险的度量方法
操作风险的定义
由于内部操作流程不完善、人为过失、系统故 障或外部突发事件造成的损失。 操作风险事件分类
内部欺诈 外界欺诈 雇佣事项及工作场所安全性 客户、产品及业务方式 有形资产的损坏 业务中断及系统故障 操作流程管理
BBA关于操作风险的界定
第一级: 第一级:因素 人 第二级: 第二级:定义 (1)雇员欺诈、犯罪;(2)越权行为、欺诈交 易、操作失误 (3)违反用工法;(4)劳动力中断; (5)关键人员流失或缺乏 (1)支付清算、传输风险;(2)文件、合同风 险;(3)估价、定价风险;(4)内部、外部报 告风险;(5)执行风险;(6)策略风险、管理 变动;(6)出售风险;(7)科技投资风险 (1)系统开发和执行;(2)系统功能; (3)系统失败;(4)系统安全 (1)法律、公共责任;(2)犯罪;(3)外部 采购、供应商风险;(4)外部开发风险;(5) 灾难、基础设施;(6)政策调整(7)政治、政 府风险

巴塞尔协议书资本

巴塞尔协议书资本

巴塞尔协议书资本甲方(以下简称“甲方”):[甲方全称]法定代表人:[甲方法定代表人姓名]地址:[甲方地址]乙方(以下简称“乙方”):[乙方全称]法定代表人:[乙方法定代表人姓名]地址:[乙方地址]鉴于甲方与乙方就资本合作事宜达成一致,为明确双方权利义务关系,特订立本协议。

第一条资本合作目的甲方与乙方基于共同发展和互利共赢的原则,通过资本合作,增强双方在各自领域的竞争力,实现资源优化配置。

第二条资本合作方式1. 甲方同意以现金方式向乙方投资[具体金额]元,作为乙方的资本金。

2. 乙方同意接受甲方的投资,并按照本协议约定的条件使用该资金。

第三条投资用途乙方应将甲方投资的资金主要用于[具体用途],未经甲方书面同意,乙方不得将资金挪作他用。

第四条投资回报1. 乙方应保证甲方的投资回报率不低于[具体回报率]%。

2. 投资回报的具体计算方式为[具体计算方式]。

第五条投资期限甲方的投资期限为[具体期限],自本协议生效之日起计算。

第六条投资退出1. 在投资期限届满时,甲方有权选择继续持有或退出投资。

2. 若甲方选择退出投资,乙方应按照甲方退出时的股权比例回购甲方的股份。

第七条管理与决策1. 甲方有权参与乙方的重大经营决策,但不得干预乙方的日常经营管理。

2. 乙方应定期向甲方报告经营状况,并接受甲方的监督。

第八条保密条款双方应对本协议内容及因履行本协议而知悉的对方商业秘密予以保密,未经对方书面同意,不得向第三方披露。

第九条违约责任任何一方违反本协议约定,应向守约方支付违约金[具体金额]元,并赔偿守约方因此遭受的一切损失。

第十条争议解决因本协议引起的或与本协议有关的任何争议,双方应首先通过友好协商解决;协商不成时,任何一方均可向[约定的仲裁机构或法院]提起仲裁或诉讼。

第十一条协议的变更和解除1. 本协议的任何变更或补充,必须经双方协商一致,并以书面形式确认。

2. 双方可协商一致解除本协议。

第十二条其他1. 本协议未尽事宜,双方可另行协商解决。

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Useful life of the project may not exceed tenor of the loan. Bullet repayment or amortising debt repayments with high bullet repayment.
Political and legal environment Political risk, including transfer risk, considering project type and mitigants Force majeure risk (war, civil unrest, etc), Government support and project's importance for the country over the long term Very low exposure; strong mitigation instruments, if needed. Low exposure. Project of strategic importance for the country (preferably export-oriented). Strong support from Government Favourable and stable regulatory environment over the long term Low exposure; satisfactory mitigation instruments, if needed. Acceptable exposure Project considered important for the country. Good level of support from Government Favourable and stable regulatory environment over the medium term Satisfactory Moderate exposure; fair mitigation instruments. Standard protection Project may not be strategic but brings unquestionable benefits for the country. Support from Government may not be explicit. Regulatory changes can be predicted with a fair level of certainty Fair High exposure; no or weak mitigation instruments Significant risks, not fully mitigated Project not key to the country. No or weak support from Government
Strong Financial structure Duration of the credit compared to the duration of the project Amortisation schedule Useful life of the project significantly exceeds tenor of the loan Amortising debt
The project is vulnerable to stresses that are not uncommon through an economic cycle, and may default in a normal downturn.
The project is likely to default unless conditions improve soon.
Construction risk Permitting and siting All permits have been obtained. Some permits are still outstanding but their receipt is considered very likely. Fixed-price date-certain turnkey construction EPC Significant liquidated damages supported by financial substance AND/OR completion guarantee from sponsors with good financial standing Some permits are still outstanding but the permitting process is well defined and they are considered routine. Fixed-price date-certain turnkey construction contract with one or several contractors Adequate liquidated damages supported by financial substance AND/OR completion guarantee from sponsors with good financial standing Key permits still need to be obtained and are not considered routine. Significant conditions may be attached. No or partial fixed-price turnkey contract and/or interfacing issues with multiple contractors Inadequate liquidated damages or not supported by financial substance or weak completion guarantees.
Good
Satisfactory
Weak
Useful life of the project exceeds tenor of the loan Amortising debt
Useful life of the project exceeds tenor of the loan Amortising debt repayments with limited bullet payment.
Stability of legal and regulatory environment (risk of change in law)
Current or future regulatory issues may affect the project Weak
Acquisition of all necessary supports Strong and approvals for such relief from local conEnforceability of contracts, collateral and security
Good
Satisfactory
Weak There are unresolved key issues in respect if actual enforcement of contracts, collateral and security.
176
Annex 4
Supervisory Slotting Criteria for Specialised Lending
Table 1 - Supervisory Rating Grades for Project Finance Exposures Strong Financial strength Market conditions Few competing suppliers OR substantial and durable advantage in location, cost, or technology. Demand is strong and growing. Strong financial ratios considering the level of project risk; very robust economic assumptions. Few competing suppliers OR better than average location, cost, or technology but this situation may not last. Demand is strong and stable. Strong to acceptable financial ratios considering the level of project risk; robust project economic assumptions. The project can meet its financial obligations under normal stressed economic or sectoral conditions. The project is only likely to default under severe economic conditions. Project has no advantage in location, cost, or technology. Demand is adequate and stable. Project has worse than average location, cost, or technology. Demand is weak and declining. Good Satisfactory Weak
Transaction characteristics Design and technology risk Fully proven technology and design Fully proven technology and design Proven technology and design – start-up issues are mitigated by a strong completion package Unproven technology and design / Technology issues exist and/or complex design
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