0 Simon 1955 a behavioral model of rational choice
Behavioral Decision Making andRisk Management
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Otherwise ____________________________________________
Expected Value Model: Maximize Expected Value
EV = pi . vi
i=1 n
where pi is the probability of outcome i, Vi is its objective value, and n is the number of possible outcomes in a prospect.
Skills：
Define Risk with Personal Examples
Risk: Risky Choice: Common factors you consider when making risky choice: Examples:
Human Decision Making
• Risk is the essence of life, which keeps the mind busy perceiving, feeling, thinking and deciding. • Risk demands choice, choice means freedom, and freedom has its cost. • A life story can be viewed as a temporal sequence of risky choices. • Management is decision making. Decisions determine success or failure. • Diligence and hard work cannot warrant correct decisions（e.g., beginner of swimming） • Understand the process and mechanisms of decision making under uncertainty
Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership StructureMichael C. JensenHarvard Business SchoolMJensen@AndWilliam H. MecklingUniversity of RochesterAbstractThis paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the ‘separation and control’ issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new definition of the firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and issuance of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness of markets problem.The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of otherpeople’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it withthe same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch overtheir own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as notfor their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it.Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of theaffairs of such a company.— Adam Smith (1776) Keywords: Agency costs and theory, internal control systems, conflicts of interest, capital structure, internal equity, outside equity, demand for security analysis, completeness of markets, supply of claims, limited liability©1976 Jensen and MecklingJournal of Financial Economics, October, 1976, V. 3, No. 4, pp. 305-360.Reprinted in Michael C. Jensen, A Theory of the Firm: Governance,Residual Claims and Organizational Forms (Harvard University Press, December 2000)available at /catalog/JENTHF.htmlAlso published in Foundations of Organizational Strategy,Michael C. Jensen, Harvard University Press, 1998.You may redistribute this document freely, but please do not post the electronic file on the web. I welcome web links to this document at: /abstract=94043. I revise my papers regularly, and providing a link to the original ensures that readers will receive the most recent version. Thank you,Michael C. JensenTheory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership StructureMichael C. JensenHarvard Business SchoolandWilliam H. Meckling*University of Rochester1. Introduction1.1.Motivation of the PaperIn this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of ownership structure1 for the firm. In addition to tying together elements of the theory of each of these three areas, our analysis casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature including the definition of the firm, the “separation of ownership and control,” the “social responsibility” of business, the definition of a “corporate objective function,” the determination of an optimal capital structure, the specification of the content of credit agreements, the theory of organizations, and the supply side of the completeness of markets problems.1 We do not use the term ‘capital structure’ because that term usually denotes the relative quantities of bonds, equity, warrants, trade credit, etc., which represent the liabilities of a firm. Our theory implies there is another important dimension to this problem—namely the relative amount of ownership claims held by insiders (management) and outsiders (investors with no direct role in the management of the firm).* Associate Professor and Dean, respectively, Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Analysis and Ideology, Interlaken, Switzerland, June 1974, sponsored by the Center for Research in Government Policy and Business at the University of Rochester, Graduate School of Management. We are indebted to F. Black, E. Fama, R. Ibbotson, W. Klein, M. Rozeff, R. Weil, O. Williamson, an anonymous referee, and to our colleagues and members of the Finance Workshop at the University of Rochester for their comments and criticisms, in particular G. Benston, M. Canes, D. Henderson, K. Leffler, J. Long, C. Smith, R. Thompson, R. Watts, and J. Zimmerman.Our theory helps explain:1.why an entrepreneur or manager in a firm which has a mixed financial structure(containing both debt and outside equity claims) will choose a set of activities for the firm such that the total value of the firm is less than it would be if he were the sole owner and why this result is independent of whether the firm operates in monopolistic or competitive product or factor markets;2.why his failure to maximize the value of the firm is perfectly consistent withefficiency;3.why the sale of common stock is a viable source of capital even though managers donot literally maximize the value of the firm;4.why debt was relied upon as a source of capital before debt financing offered any taxadvantage relative to equity;5.why preferred stock would be issued;6.why accounting reports would be provided voluntarily to creditors and stockholders,and why independent auditors would be engaged by management to testify to the accuracy and correctness of such reports;7.why lenders often place restrictions on the activities of firms to whom they lend, andwhy firms would themselves be led to suggest the imposition of such restrictions;8.why some industries are characterized by owner-operated firms whose sole outsidesource of capital is borrowing;9.why highly regulated industries such as public utilities or banks will have higher debtequity ratios for equivalent levels of risk than the average nonregulated firm;10.why security analysis can be socially productive even if it does not increase portfolioreturns to investors.1.2Theory of the Firm: An Empty Box?While the literature of economics is replete with references to the “theory of the firm,”the material generally subsumed under that heading is not actually a theory of the firm but rather a theory of markets in which firms are important actors. The firm is a “black box” operated so as to meet the relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, thereby maximizing profits, or more accurately, present value. Except for a few recent and tentative steps, however, we have no theory which explains how the conflicting objectives of the individual participants are brought into equilibrium so as to yield this result. The limitations of this black box view of the firm have been cited by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall, among others. More recently, popular and professional debates over the “social responsibility” of corporations, the separation of ownership and control, and the rash of reviews of the literature on the “theory of the firm” have evidenced continuing concern with these issues.2A number of major attempts have been made during recent years to construct a theory of the firm by substituting other models for profit or value maximization, with each attempt motivated by a conviction that the latter is inadequate to explain managerial behavior in large corporations.3 Some of these reformulation attempts have rejected the fundamental principle of maximizing2 Reviews of this literature are given by Peterson (1965), Alchian (1965, 1968), Machlup (1967), Shubik (1970), Cyert and Hedrick (1972), Branch (1973), Preston (1975).3 See Williamson (1964, 1970, 1975), Marris (1964), Baumol (1959), Penrose (1958), and Cyert and March (1963). Thorough reviews of these and other contributions are given by Machlup (1967) and Alchian (1965).Simon (1955) developed a model of human choice incorporating information (search) and computational costs which also has important implications for the behavior of managers. Unfortunately, Simon’s work has often been misinterpreted as a denial of maximizing behavior, and misused, especially in the marketing and behavioral science literature. His later use of the term “satisficing” (Simon, 1959) has undoubtedly contributed to this confusion because it suggests rejection of maximizing behavior rather than maximization subject to costs of information and of decision making.behavior as well as rejecting the more specific profit-maximizing model. We retain the notion of maximizing behavior on the part of all individuals in the analysis that follows.41.3Property RightsAn independent stream of research with important implications for the theory of the firm has been stimulated by the pioneering work of Coase, and extended by Alchian, Demsetz, and others.5 A comprehensive survey of this literature is given by Furubotn and Pejovich (1972). While the focus of this research has been “property rights”,6 the subject matter encompassed is far broader than that term suggests. What is important for the problems addressed here is that specification of individual rights determines how costs and rewards will be allocated among the participants in any organization. Since the specification of rights is generally affected through contracting (implicit as well as explicit), individual behavior in organizations, including the behavior of managers, will depend upon the nature of these contracts. We focus in this paper on the behavioral implications of the property rights specified in the contracts between the owners and managers of the firm.1.4Agency CostsMany problems associated with the inadequacy of the current theory of the firm can also be viewed as special cases of the theory of agency relationships in which there is a growing4 See Meckling (1976) for a discussion of the fundamental importance of the assumption of resourceful, evaluative, maximizing behavior on the part of individuals in the development of theory. Klein (1976) takes an approach similar to the one we embark on in this paper in his review of the theory of the firm and the law.5 See Coase (1937, 1959, 1960), Alchian (1965, 1968), Alchian and Kessel (1962), Demsetz (1967), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Monson and Downs (1965), Silver and Auster (1969), and McManus (1975).6 Property rights are of course human rights, i.e., rights which are possessed by human beings. The introduction of the wholly false distinction between property rights and human rights in many policy discussions is surely one of the all time great semantic flimflams.literature.7 This literature has developed independently of the property rights literature even though the problems with which it is concerned are similar; the approaches are in fact highly complementary to each other.We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions. However, it is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint. In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent’s decisions8 and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal. The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal as a result of this divergence is also a cost of the agency relationship, and we refer to this latter cost as the “residual loss.” We define agency costs as the sum of:7 Cf. Berhold (1971), Ross (1973, 1974a), Wilson (1968, 1969), and Heckerman (1975).8 Given the optimal monitoring and bonding activities by the principal and agent.1.the monitoring expenditures by the principal,92.the bonding expenditures by the agent,3.the residual loss.Note also that agency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative effort (such as the co-authoring of this paper) by two or more people even though there is no clear-cut principal-agent relationship. Viewed in this light it is clear that our definition of agency costs and their importance to the theory of the firm bears a close relationship to the problem of shirking and monitoring of team production which Alchian and Demsetz (1972) raise in their paper on the theory of the firm.Since the relationship between the stockholders and the managers of a corporation fits the definition of a pure agency relationship, it should come as no surprise to discover that the issues associated with the “separation of ownership and control” in the modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of agency. We show below that an explanation of why and how the agency costs generated by the corporate form are born leads to a theory of the ownership (or capital) structure of the firm.Before moving on, however, it is worthwhile to point out the generality of the agency problem. The problem of inducing an “agent” to behave as if he were maximizing the “principal’s” welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts—at every level of management in firms,10 in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in9 As it is used in this paper the term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing the behavior of the agent. It includes efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control’ the behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, etc.10 As we show below the existence of positive monitoring and bonding costs will result in the manager of a corporation possessing control over some resources which he can allocate (within certain constraints) to satisfy his own preferences. However, to the extent that he must obtain the cooperation of others in order to carry out his tasks (such as divisional vice presidents) and to the extent that he cannot control their behavior perfectly and costlessly they will be able to appropriate some of these resources for their own ends. In short, there are agency costs generated at every level of the organization. Unfortunately, the analysis of these more general organizational issues is even more difficult than that of the ‘ownership andgovernmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as those common in the performing arts and the market for real estate. The development of theories to explain the form which agency costs take in each of these situations (where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how and why they are born will lead to a rich theory of organizations which is now lacking in economics and the social sciences generally. We confine our attention in this paper to only a small part of this general problem—the analysis of agency costs generated by the contractual arrangements between the owners and top management of the corporation.Our approach to the agency problem here differs fundamentally from most of the existing literature. That literature focuses almost exclusively on the normative aspects of the agency relationship; that is, how to structure the contractual relation (including compensation incentives) between the principal and agent to provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare, given that uncertainty and imperfect monitoring exist. We focus almost entirely on the positive aspects of the theory. That is, we assume individuals solve these normative problems, and given that only stocks and bonds can be issued as claims, we investigate the incentives faced by each of the parties and the elements entering into the determination of the equilibrium contractual form characterizing the relationship between the manager (i.e., agent) of the firm and the outside equity and debt holders (i.e., principals).1.5General Comments on the Definition of the firmRonald Coase in his seminal paper entitled “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) pointed out that economics had no positive theory to determine the bounds of the firm. He characterized thecontrol’ issue because the nature of the contractual obligations and rights of the parties are much more varied and generally not as well specified in explicit contractual arrangements. Nevertheless, they exist and we believe that extensions of our analysis in these directions show promise of producing insights into a viable theory of organization.bounds of the firm as that range of exchanges over which the market system was suppressed and where resource allocation was accomplished instead by authority and direction. He focused on the cost of using markets to effect contracts and exchanges and argued that activities would be included within the firm whenever the costs of using markets were greater than the costs of using direct authority. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) object to the notion that activities within the firm are governed by authority, and correctly emphasize the role of contracts as a vehicle for voluntary exchange. They emphasize the role of monitoring in situations in which there is joint input or team production.11 We are sympathetic to with the importance they attach to monitoring, but we believe the emphasis that Alchian and Demsetz place on joint input production is too narrow and therefore misleading. Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, and so on. The problem of agency costs and monitoring exists for all of these contracts, independent of whether there is joint production in their sense; i.e., joint production can explain only a small fraction of the behavior of individuals associated with a firm.It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal fictions12 which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals. This includes firms, non-profit institutions such as universities, hospitals, and foundations, mutual organizations such as mutual savings banks and insurance companies and co-operatives, some private clubs, and even governmental bodies such as cities, states, and the federal government, government enterprises such as TVA, the Post Office, transit systems, and so forth.11 They define the classical capitalist firm as a contractual organization of inputs in which there is ‘(a) joint input production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party who is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs, (d) who has rights to renegotiate any input’s contract independently of contracts with other input owners, (e) who holds the residual claim, and (f) who has the right to sell his contractual residual status.’12 By legal fiction we mean the artificial construct under the law which allows certain organizations to be treated as individuals.The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals. Although this definition of the firm has little substantive content, emphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations focuses attention on a crucial set of questions—why particular sets of contractual relations arise for various types of organizations, what the consequences of these contractual relations are, and how they are affected by changes exogenous to the organization. Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things that are “inside” the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are “outside” of it. There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.13Viewing the firm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships among individuals also serves to make it clear that the personalization of the firm implied by asking questions such as “what should be the objective function of the firm?” or “does the firm have a social responsibility?” is seriously misleading. The firm is not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may “represent” other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations. In this sense the “behavior” of the firm is like the behavior of a market, that is, the outcome of a complex equilibrium process. We seldom fall into the trap of characterizing13 For example, we ordinarily think of a product as leaving the firm at the time it is sold, but implicitly or explicitly such sales generally carry with them continuing contracts between the firm and the buyer. If the product does not perform as expected the buyer often can and does have a right to satisfaction. Explicit evidence that such implicit contracts do exist is the practice we occasionally observe of specific provision that ‘all sales are final.’the wheat or stock market as an individual, but we often make this error by thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motivations and intentions.141.6 Overview of the PaperWe develop our theory in stages. Sections 2 and 4 provide analyses of the agency costs of equity and debt respectively. These form the major foundation of the theory. In Section 3, we pose some questions regarding the existence of the corporate form of organization and examines the role of limited liability. Section 5 provides a synthesis of the basic concepts derived in sections 2-4 into a theory of the corporate ownership structure which takes account of the trade-offs available to the entrepreneur-manager between inside and outside equity and debt. Some qualifications and extensions of the analysis are discussed in section 6, and section 7 contains a brief summary and conclusions.2. The Agency Costs of Outside Equity2.1OverviewIn this section we analyze the effect of outside equity on agency costs by comparing the behavior of a manager when he owns 100 percent of the residual claims on a firm with his behavior when he sells off a portion of those claims to outsiders. If a wholly-owned firm is managed by the owner, he will make operating decisions that maximize his utility. These decisions14 This view of the firm points up the important role which the legal system and the law play in social organizations, especially, the organization of economic activity. Statutory laws sets bounds on the kinds of contracts into which individuals and organizations may enter without risking criminal prosecution. The police powers of the state are available and used to enforce performance of contracts or to enforce the collection of damages for non-performance. The courts adjudicate conflicts between contracting parties and establish precedents which form the body of common law. All of these government activities affect both the kinds of contracts executed and the extent to which contracting is relied upon. This in turn determines the usefulness, productivity, profitability and viability of various forms of organization. Moreover, new laws as well as court decisions often can and do change the rights of contracting parties ex post, and they can and do serve as a vehicle for redistribution of wealth. An analysis of some of the implications of these facts is contained in Jensen and Meckling (1978) and we shall not pursue them here.will involve not only the benefits he derives from pecuniary returns but also the utility generated by various non-pecuniary aspects of his entrepreneurial activities such as the physical appointments of the office, the attractiveness of the office staff, the level of employee discipline, the kind and amount of charitable contributions, personal relations (“friendship,” “respect,” and so on) with employees, a larger than optimal computer to play with, or purchase of production inputs from friends. The optimum mix (in the absence of taxes) of the various pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits is achieved when the marginal utility derived from an additional dollar of expenditure (measured net of any productive effects) is equal for each non-pecuniary item and equal to the marginal utility derived from an additional dollar of after-tax purchasing power (wealth).If the owner-manager sells equity claims on the corporation which are identical to his own (i.e., which share proportionately in the profits of the firm and have limited liability), agency costs will be generated by the divergence between his interest and those of the outside shareholders, since he will then bear only a fraction of the costs of any non-pecuniary benefits he takes out in maximizing his own utility. If the manager owns only 95 percent of the stock, he will expend resources to the point where the marginal utility derived from a dollar’s expenditure of the firm’s resources on such items equals the marginal utility of an additional 95 cents in general purchasing power (i.e., his share of the wealth reduction) and not one dollar. Such activities, on his part, can be limited (but probably not eliminated) by the expenditure of resources on monitoring activities by the outside stockholders. But as we show below, the owner will bear the entire wealth effects of these expected costs so long as the equity market anticipates these effects. Prospective minority shareholders will realize that the owner-manager’s interests will diverge somewhat from theirs; hence the price which they will pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of the divergence between the manager’s interest and theirs. Nevertheless, ignoring for the moment the possibility of borrowing against his wealth, the owner will find it desirable to bear these costsas long as the welfare increment he experiences from converting his claims on the firm into general purchasing power15 is large enough to offset them.As the owner-manager’s fraction of the equity falls, his fractional claim on the outcomes falls and this will tend to encourage him to appropriate larger amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites. This also makes it desirable for the minority shareholders to expend more resources in monitoring his behavior. Thus, the wealth costs to the owner of obtaining additional cash in the equity markets rise as his fractional ownership falls.We shall continue to characterize the agency conflict between the owner-manager and outside shareholders as deriving from the manager’s tendency to appropriate perquisites out of the firm’s resources for his own consumption. However, we do not mean to leave the impression that this is the only or even the most important source of conflict. Indeed, it is likely that the most important conflict arises from the fact that as the manager’s ownership claim falls, his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities such as searching out new profitable ventures falls. He may in fact avoid such ventures simply because it requires too much trouble or effort on his part to manage or to learn about new technologies. Avoidance of these personal costs and the anxieties that go with them also represent a source of on-the-job utility to him and it can result in the value of the firm being substantially lower than it otherwise could be.2.2A Simple Formal Analysis of the Sources of Agency Costs of Equity and Who Bears ThemIn order to develop some structure for the analysis to follow we make two sets of assumptions. The first set (permanent assumptions) are those which will carry through almost all of the analysis in sections 2-5. The effects of relaxing some of these are discussed in section 6.15 For use in consumption, for the diversification of his wealth, or more importantly, for the financing of ‘profitable’ projects which he could not otherwise finance out of his personal wealth. We deal with these issues below after having developed some of the elementary analytical tools necessary to their solution.。
从个人理性到集体理性的分析
从个人理性到集体理性的分析引言：在人类的社会生活中，个体和集体之间的关系一直备受关注。
个人理性和集体理性是其中重要的两个概念。
本文将通过分析个人理性和集体理性的概念、特征及其关系，探讨个人理性如何逐渐演变为集体理性的过程。
个人理性的概念与特征：个人理性是指个体根据自身的认知、信念和目标做出决策的能力和倾向。
在个人理性的基础上，个体会基于自身的利益最大化原则来做出选择。
个人理性的特征包括：1.自私性：个人在决策时，通常会以自身的利益为出发点，追求自身的最大利益。
2.有限理性：个人在决策过程中，通常无法获取到完全准确的信息，并且常常受到有限的知识和认知能力的限制。
3.短期目标导向：个人往往更关注眼前的利益而不是长远的影响，因此在决策过程中会偏向于短期利益的追求。
集体理性的概念与特征：集体理性是指整个集体群体在决策中所显示的理性特征与行为方式。
集体理性在个人理性的基础上，通过相互协商和合作来达成集体最优决策。
集体理性的特征包括：1.长远目标导向：集体理性可以通过综合考虑各个个体的意见和利益，追求整体的最大利益，而不仅仅关注个体的短期利益。
2.信息共享：集体理性可以通过集体协商和交流，将各个个体获取到的信息进行整合和分享，减少有限理性对决策的影响。
3.合作协调：集体理性可以通过协商和合作的方式，充分利用每个个体的优势，形成合力，共同解决问题或达到共同的目标。
个人理性向集体理性的演变过程：个人理性是集体理性的前提和基础。
而个人理性如何逐渐演变为集体理性呢？首先，个体在社会交往的过程中会逐渐认识到个人的利益与集体的利益是紧密关联的。
特别是在共同面对一些社会问题时，个体逐渐认识到通过集体协作可以更好地实现个人利益。
因此，个体在一定程度上会放弃自身的个人利益，为了集体的整体利益做出贡献。
其次，社会规范和制度的作用是个人理性向集体理性演变的重要驱动力。
通过社会规范和制度，个体被约束在一定的行为准则中，不仅仅考虑自身利益，还要考虑其他个体和整体的利益。
THEORY OF THE FIRM MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR,
firm. In addition to tying together elements of the theory of each of these three areas, our analysis casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature such as the definition of the firm, the “separation of ownership and control”, the “social responsibility” of business, the definition of a “corporate objective function”, the determination of an optimal capital structure, the specification of the content of credit agreements, the theory of organizations, and the supply side of the completeness of markets problem. Our theory helps explain: (1) why an entrepreneur or manager in a firm which has a mixed financial structure (containing both debt and outside equity claims) will choose a set of activities for the firm such that the total value of the firm is Iess than it would be if he were the sole owner and why this result is independent of whether the firm operates in monopolistic or competitive product or factor markets; (2) why his failure to maximize the value of the firm is perfectly consistent with efficiency; (3) why the sale of common stock is a viable source of capital even though managers do not literally maximize the value of the firm; (4) why debt was relied upon as a source of capital before debt financing offered any tax advantage relative to equity; (5) why preferred stock would be issued; (6) why accounting reports would be provided voluntarily to creditors and stockholders, and why independent auditors would be engaged by management to testify to the accuracy and corrcctncss of such reports; (7) why lenders often place restrictions on the activities of firms to whom they lend, and why firms would themselves be led to suggest the imposition of such restrictions; (8) why some industries are characterized by owner-operated firms whose sole outside source of capital is borrowing; (9) why highly regulated industries such as public utilities or banks will have higher debt equity ratios for equivalent levels of risk than the average non-regulated firm; (10) why security analysis can be socially productive even if it does not increase portfolio returns to investors. Z.2. Tfwory of thefirtn:
马奇和西蒙模型的参考文献
马奇和西蒙模型的参考文献马奇和西蒙模型的参考文献包括以下几篇研究论文：1. March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. John Wiley & Sons.这是马奇和西蒙最早的合著之一，论述了他们对组织行为的研究。
2. Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69(1), 99-118.这篇论文提出了马奇和西蒙的决策理论框架，并介绍了理性选择模型。
3. March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization science, 2(1), 71-87.这篇论文重点讨论了马奇和西蒙模型中的探索与利用的概念，并探讨了组织学习的过程和机制。
4. Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1972). A garbage can model of organizational choice. Administrative science quarterly, 1-25.这篇论文介绍了马奇和西蒙的“垃圾桶”模型，用于解释组织内部的决策过程和选择行为。
5. Cyert, R. M., & March J. G. (1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Prentice-Hall.这本书是马奇和西蒙合写的，详细讨论了组织行为和决策的行为理论，并提出了“增量决策”的概念。
以上是马奇和西蒙模型的一些经典参考文献，供进一步研究和学习使用。
《网购消费水平的影响因素研究国内外文献综述3000字》
网购消费水平的影响因素研究国内外文献综述1 国外研究现状及趋势网购消费水平测度及影响因素方面，Xinyu(Jason) Cao等（2013）[1]通过建立结构方程模型，研究明尼阿波利斯和明尼苏达州圣保罗市区的互联网用户，检验两个相互竞争的假说：技术扩散假说和效率假说，实证研究表明购物可达性对电子购物的影响并不一致，主要取决于大城市的地理位置，生活在城市地区、购物便利性较强的地区或两者都有的网民往往比其他地区的网民更经常地在网上购物。
研究消费者网购行为的影响因素方面，Liao Shu hsien等（2011）[2]通过聚类分析方法分析如何提高网上购物率。
Miguel Jaller and Anmol Pahwa（2020）[3]开发了一个计量经济行为模型，以了解影响购物决策的因素。
Ocampo Lanndon等（2021）[4]运用解释结构模型方法理解网络购物驱动关系。
MelovićBoban等（2021）[5]通过结构方程建模和差异分析千禧一代网上购物行为的态度和主要决定因素。
Siyal Musrat等（2021）[6]通过扩展技术验收模型讨论了导致外国人使用网上购物受阻的因素及其行为。
Kim Woojung等（2021）[7]使用多个同时方程模型，研究送货与网上购物之间的关系。
Khathutshelo M. Makhitha等（2021）[8]研究确定人口因素是否影响南非消费者对网上购物态度的风险因素。
Grudiček Ines等（2021）[9]使用SPSSAMOS26建模结构方程对影响克罗地亚消费者网上购物行为的因素进行分析。
Bhattacharyya Sekhar Som等（2021）[10]研究在线评论对千禧一代购买行为的影响，并研究其特点。
Dominici Andrea等（2021）[11]发现远离实体店和拥有汽车并不是网上购物的影响因素。
Deepa S等（2021）[12]发现手机和笔记本电脑方便人们从世界各地购买产品，从而导致人们喜欢网上购物。
satisficing behavior theory
satisficing behavior theoryxSatisficing Behaviour TheoryIntroductionSatisficing behaviour theory is a concept developed by Herbert Simon in 1955 and states that people often take a “good-enough” approach when making decisions, rather than striving to achieve the best possible outcome. This theory suggests that people are often satisfied with a “good enough”solution instead of looking for the optimal answer. This approach to decision making is based on the idea that the effort needed to find the optimal solution is too time consuming and costly, and therefore it is more efficient to simply accept a satisfactory solution.The development of the satisficing behaviour theory was a response to the rational choice theory, which suggests that individuals make decisions based on their subjective preferences. This idea of subjective preferences is based on the assumption that all individuals have different preferences and therefore make decisions that are best suited to their needs. However, the satisficing behaviour theory suggests that individuals tend to pick solutions that are satisfactory, evenif they are not necessarily the optimal solution.ApplicationSatisficing behaviour theory has a wide range of applications, from finance to marketing and sociology. For example, in the financial sector, investors may use this theory when deciding which stocks to purchase. Instead of spending hours researching every stock available, the investor may simply select a portfolio of stocks that are good enough and likely to yield a satisfactory return. Similarly, in marketing, companies may use this theory to find a satisfactory target market instead of trying to find the optimal target market. The theory is also applied to decision making in the social sciences. For example, when deciding which job to apply for, an individual may use this theory to narrow down their options. Rather than spending months researching every job they could potentially apply for, they might simply select the job that is good enough for them.ConclusionSatisficing behaviour theory suggests that people take a “good enough” approach when making decisions rather than striving for the optimal solution. This theory has a wide range of applications, from finance to marketing and sociology. Itis an important concept to consider when making decisions, as it suggests that it is more efficient to select satisfactory solutions rather than trying to find the perfect solution.。
Mahoney-Ch01--Behavioral-Theory-of-the-Firm
勞資簽訂僱傭契約，讓資方有彈性可令員工在接受領域之內，從事不同的工作
– Sales contract versus employment contract – An incomplete contracting approach – A real options perspective
Simon (1947) Administrative Behavce:
– Attention is the chief bottleneck in organizational activity, and the bottleneck becomes narrower and narrower as we move to the tops of the organizations.
– Transmits decisions by authority;
– Provides formal and informal channels of communication; and
– Trains and inculcates its members.
Simon (1947) Administrative Behavior
Barnard (1938) The Functions of the Executive
Barnard argues that there exists a “zone of indifference” in each individual within which orders are acceptable without conscious questioning of their authority.
Economic Foundations of Strategy
大学生完美主义_自尊与学业拖延的关系_陈陈
Johnson ，＆ McCown，1995 ； Lay，1986 ） 。 学业拖延 是拖延在学校情境中的表现， 与学习任务的完成有 关。有学者认为， 学业拖延是对要在预期时间内完 成的学习任务的一种自愿延迟， 即使知道这种延迟 会带来 不 良 后 果 （ Senécal，Koestner，＆ Vallerand， 1995 ； Solomon ＆ Ｒothblum， 1984 ； Steel， 2007 ） 。也 有学者将学业拖延理解为因个体迟迟不着手一项最 终必须 完 成 的 任 务 而 经 历 到 的 情 绪 不 适 （ Lay ＆ Schouwenburg ， 1993 ） 。 学业拖延在大学生中普遍存在。国外有学者指 出， 大约 30% 至 60% 的本科生报告了有规律的对学 习任务， 如准备考试、 写学期论文或完成每周阅读任 Upham，2011 ） 。 务的拖延 （ Ｒabin，Fogel，＆ Nutter国内也有学者指出， 我国不同区域、 类别高校中的大 学生 普 遍 存 在 学 业 拖 延 现 象 （ 庞 维 国， 韩 贵 宁， 2009 ） 。鉴于学业拖延会影响大学生的学习表现 ， 阻碍其学习进步， 增加其压力并降低生活质量， 国内 外学者做了大量工作来研究是什么因素导致大学生 学业拖延产生并使之维持 （ Ｒabin et al． ，2011 ； 田 2011 ） 。 芊， 邓士昌， 自上 世 纪 80 年 代 起 ， 国外学者们陆续从人 格、 认知 、 情 绪、 成就动机和执行功能等角度来概
* 基金项目： 教育部人文社科研究项目（ 10YJCXLX002 ） ； 江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究项目（ 211060A5103 ） ． Email： chenchen@ njnu． edu． cn 通讯作者： 陈陈，
西蒙和卡尼曼有限理性研究的意义和不足
西蒙和卡尼曼有限理性研究的意义和不足摘要：西蒙作为有限理性说的领袖，其学说无论在那个完全理性理性独占经济学中心的年代还是在今天无疑都具有开创性意义。
虽然西蒙提出了有限理性说，但他的许多理论观点是松散的，没有形成一套完整的体系。
另外他对传统经济学的批判也是零散的，没有进行全面系统的证伪。
卡尼曼和特维斯基不仅解释了决策者对理性经济人行为的系统性偏离，对不确定性下决策者的决策模型做了详细阐述，从新古典经济学的最根本假设到最核心的分析工具否定了传统经济学的有效性。
尽管如此，他们的理论还是存在许多缺陷和不足，行为经济学并没有提出确定的价值函数及参照点，理论的严密性不够，逻辑的不充分造成理论体系的不完美。
关键词：有限理性；系统性偏差；行为经济学一、西蒙有限理性的意义和不足西蒙作为有限理性说的领袖，其学说无论在那个完全理性理性独占经济学中心的年代还是在今天无疑都具有开创性意义，卡尼曼曾在诺贝尔经济学奖演讲辞中说，西蒙“在20多年前把心理学研究的第一轮成果整合到经济学特别显得令人畏缩不前”。
可见，当时西蒙需要具有多大的勇气与智慧来提出“有限理性说”。
西蒙的学说不仅第一个系统论证提出了有限理性，他更是勇敢突破了学派和社会的束缚对经济学基本假设前提进行了修正。
他的学说的理论意义还在于为心理学进入经济学打下了夯实的基础，为行为经济学的产生铺垫了道路，后来的行为经济学已经深深影响现代经济学的发展方向。
由于西蒙对经济学的描述性、实用性和实证性十分重视，强调经济学要具备“现有目的”，为实证经济学和规范经济学夯实了决策理论基础，他在方法论上影响巨大，由于他的决策理论服务于政治经济学，他十分强调理论需具备现实性，他的研究和结论都基于大量观察和实例。
西蒙在把心理学应用到经济学研究当中时，也把实验引入经济的研究当中，可谓是现在实验经济学的先驱。
西蒙有限理性的论证并非从心理学开始，他是先在商业案例中发现了决策者并非按完全理性行事，对于这些案例的研究西蒙发现了有限理性，于是他又救助于心理学寻求证据支持，后来发现了满意原则，创立了“有限理性说”。
预期理论的发展及应用
《预期理论的发展及应用》摘要：着重介绍了预期理论发展到积累预期理论的过程，经过比较分析得出二者的差异和预期理论的应用办法，并对预期理论以后的发展方向，表达了自己的看法，应用，= π（pi） v （xi），E值最大的方案为最优方案摘要：本文对预期理论的现状进行研究，了解其发展程度。
着重介绍了预期理论发展到积累预期理论的过程，经过比较分析得出二者的差异和预期理论的应用办法，并对预期理论以后的发展方向，表达了自己的看法。
关键词：预期理论积累预期理决策应用随着社会的发展，人们知识水平的提高，对于决策的认知到了更深的层次。
决策不仅是指理性的逻辑推理，即单纯的经济数学模型。
它也受到决策者个体因素的影响，其中偏好、思想、观念、学历、情感等因素是最主要的方面。
由此得出，决策是理性和非理性、逻辑和非逻辑相结合的认知过程。
预期理论在二十世纪七十年代末被卡尼曼和特维斯基提出的；他们运用心理学和行为科学的理论对决策机制进行研究，得出了决策机制受不确定因素影响较大。
在进行决策的时候，理性因素并不是一直占据主导地位，非理性因素的作用也不容小觑。
所谓预期，指被认定的当事人对未来变动方向的一种事前估计，它可以被应用在很多方面。
如，经济、金融等等，它作为人们活动的主要表现形式、前提、特征，支配着当事人的某些行为。
融合了心理学、行为学及经济学相融合的分析方法的预期理论，大大促进了不确定性条件下的个人决策行为研究的发展。
一、预期理论的发展（一）预期理论的出现Neuman和Morgenstern于1944 年提出的期望效用理论（ expected utility theory， EU）是风险与不确定性决策领域长期居于权威地位的理论。
随着理论的日渐成熟和研究的深入，人们对人类理性有限性和判断决策的主观偏差有了更加清晰的认识。
相关学者在一系列理论的基础上提出了新的决策理论——预期理论。
由于预期理论涉及心理学、经济学、等多个学科，因此它的完善无疑对这些学科产生了广泛深刻且持久的影响。
经济学研究的必看网站重点
经济学资源概览(转载经济学资源概览这里所说的综合类经济学资源,是指不局限于某一特定的研究领域的经济学资源。
按此界定,一般经济学资源理所当然属于综合类经济学资源的范畴,它提供了许多当今世界上最优秀的经济学网站链接地址。
1、/socialsci/ecores.html 美国西康狄涅格州立大学社会科学系提供的网上经济学资源链接站点。
包括一般经济学资源、经济问题、国际经济资源、金融经济学资源、经济数据资源、美国人口普查及杂项资源等。
2、/cgi/econdir 网上经济学资源索引,这是一个经济学站点大全,内容极其丰富,涉及经济学的每一领域,值得仔细挖掘。
3、/~dtsang/econ.htm 经济学资源站点链接。
包括一般经济学资源、经济学期刊和工作论文、经济数据资源、智库、经济发展、劳动研究、运输研究等。
4、/het/alphabet.htm 极好的经济学家个人主页链接站点。
一些著名经济学家的部分经典文献可在其个人主页上免费下载。
如阿罗(Kenneth J. Arrow与人合写的《Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy》、《On the Stability of Competitive Equilibrium I》、《On the Stability of Competitive Equilibrium II》;米尔格罗姆(Paul R. Milgrom与人合写的《The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction》、《Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information》;西蒙(Herbert A. Simon写的《A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship》、《A Comparison of Organisation Theories》、《A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice》;斯蒂格利兹(Joseph E. Stiglitz与人合写的《Increasing Risk I: A definition》、《Increasing Risk II: Its economic consequences》;Jacob Marschak写的《Remarks on the Economics of Information》以及Martin Shubik、James Tobin等人的大量经典文献都可以在他们各自的个人主页上找到。
99个心理学模型
99个心理学模型1. 杜林四象限模型（DURIN）2. 荣格个体心理模型3. 波特五力模型（Porter's Five Forces Model）4. 斯旺克心态模型（Swank's mindset model）5. 佛洛依德的个人心理模型6. 巴纳姆效应（Barnum effect）7. 斯坦福监狱实验模型（Stanford Prison Experiment）8. 墨菲定律（Murphy's Law）9. 六度分离（Six Degrees of Separation）10. 赫兹伯格两因素理论（Herzberg's Two-Factor Theory）11. 马斯洛需求层次理论（Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs）12. 调节优化模型（Regulatory-Optimal Model）13. 金矿定位理论（Opportunity Identification Theory）14. 赛伯格系统理论（Cybernetic Systems Theory）15. 皮格马利翁效应（Pigmalion Effect）16. 斯塔赫-卡拉曼三元模型（Stajkovi? & Luthans' Three-Component Model）17. 学习曲线模型（Learning Curve Model）18. 康威法则（Conway's Law）19. 维式心理状态模型（Veishea's Psychological States Model）20. 伯尼斯三因素理论（Bernese Three-Factor Model）21. 动机能力需求理论（Motivational Capability Needs Theory）22. 霍斯福德马特图模型（Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions Model）23. 高尔达齐意志阻碍派遣模型（Goldratt's Theory ofConstraint Model）24. 网络效应模型（Network Effect Model）25. 像本模型（Pareto Principle）26. 动机导向教育模型（Motivational Education Model）27. 都柏林巴斯克模型（Dublin and Basque Model）28. 奥尼尔部队模型（O'Neil's Army Model）29. 行为改变模型（Behaviour Change Model）30. 雅克翁-伯恩斯迈斯特模型（Jacobson-Burns-Meister Model）31. 系统操作舒适模型（System Operator Comfort Model）32. 学习结构模型（Learning Frame Model）33. 赛琳杰希德五阶模型（Sleigner's Five-Stage Model）34. 拉斯韦尔模型（Laswell Model）35. 不同模型（Different Model）36. 值量模型（Value/Quantity Model）37. 亥姆霍茨双流模型（Helmholtz's Double Currents Model）38. 皮亚杰认知发展模型（Piaget's Cognitive Development Model）39. 外显指数模型（Exo-Index Model）40. 克鲁格曼模型（Krugman Model）41. 弗洛伊德结构模型（Freud Structural Model）42. 案例模型（Case Model）43. SAMR模型（SAMR Model）44. 雷韦林八个智能模型（Levine's Eight Intelligences Model）45. 奥斯比学习模型（Ausubel Learning Model）46. FRAM模型（FRAM Model）47. 博尔特维尼克五思维风格模型（Boltenhagen's FiveThinking Styles Model）48. 统一问题解决模型（Unified Problem Solving Model）49. 莫斯科儿童性冷淡鉴定模型（Moscow Child Sexual Disinterest Identification Model）50. 加拉赫假想模型（Gallagher's Imaginary Model）51. 协同过滤模型（Collaborative Filtering Model）52. 高绩效团队模型（High-Performing Team Model）53. 客户关系管理模型（Customer Relationship Management Model）54. TTM模型（TTM Model）55. 福柯的权力结构模型（Foucault's Power Structure Model）56. 交互视角模型（Interpretive Perspective Model）57. 玛雅人民志愿兵模型（Maya People's Militia Model）58. 理论模型（Theoretical Model）59. OIE三因子模型（OIE Three-Factor Model）60. 心理动力模型（Psycho-Dynamic Model）61. 流程准确模型（Process Accurate Model）62. 决策树模型（Decision Tree Model）63. 幻想发展模型（Fantasy Development Model）64. 人类寿命模型（Human Lifespan Model）65. 阿伦巴奇模型（Albemarle Model）66. 动力系统模型（Dynamical System Model）67. 奥斯汀社会模型（Austin's Social Model）68. 司机的心理模型（Driver's Mental Model）69. E-爱立信模型（E-Ericsson Model）70. 钢铁模型（Steel Model）71. 荣格集体心理模型（Jung Collective Psychological Model）72. DEC模型（DEC Model）73. 高斯活动模型（Gauss Activity Model）74. 阿三模型（A People's Three-Model Model）75. 马克思资本积累模型（Marx's Capital Accumulation Model）76. 肯特和里诺德感受模型（Kent and Rinord Sensation Model）77. 生理心理模型（Physiological Psychological Model）78. 金斯伯格五基模型（Kingsberg Five Basis Model）79. 系统性干预模型（Systemic Intervention Model）80. EDE-OAB模型（EDE-OAB Model）81. 过程控制模型（Process Control Model）82. 原因-效果模型（Cause-Effect Model）83. 标量模型（Scalar Model）84. 安斯帕赫九因子模型（Anspach Nine-Factor Model）85. 改变模型（Change Model）86. 潜意识无意识模型（Subconscious Unconscious Model）87. 共生模型（Coevolutionary Model）88. 诉求满足模型（Appeal Satisfaction Model）89. 威利斯绩效模型（Willis Performance Model）90. 自然选择模型（Natural Selection Model）91. 心理训练模型（Psychological Training Model）92. 特立尔生态系统模型（Tertial Ecosystem Model）93. 决策支持系统模型（Decision Support System Model）94. 范畴判断模型（Categorical Judgment Model）95. 地区间模型（Interregional Model）96. 企业社会责任模型（Corporate Social Responsibility Model）97. 意味生成模型（Meaning Generation Model）98. 发展模型（Development Model）99. 生活质量模型（Quality of Life Model）。
行为经济学
行为经济学行为经济学：解构人类行为的经济学视角引言行为经济学是一门研究人类行为的学科，它旨在理解个体在经济决策中的行为模式和决策方式。
相较于传统的经济学模型，行为经济学更加注重人类的心理和认知过程，试图解释个体为什么会做出特定的决策，以及在某些情况下为什么会偏离理性决策。
一、行为经济学的发展历程行为经济学的前身可以追溯到20世纪初期的行为主义心理学和认知心理学。
然而，直到二战结束后，行为经济学才真正开始成为独立的学科。
1950年代初，赫伯特·西蒙和詹姆斯·马奎尔等学者开始关注个体在决策中的有限理性行为，并提出了“满足”理论，即人们在决策中追求较短期的满足感而忽视长期利益。
随着信息经济学的出现，行为经济学受到了更多的重视。
尤其是丹尼尔·卡尼曼和阿莫斯·特沃斯基的心理学研究对行为经济学产生了深远影响。
卡尼曼和特沃斯基在20世纪70年代提出了“前景理论”，该理论指出人们在决策过程中会考虑到潜在的收益和损失，而非实际的最终结果。
他们的研究奠定了行为经济学的基础，并为后来的实证研究提供了方向。
二、行为经济学的核心概念1. 有限理性：行为经济学认为人类在决策过程中并非常常遵循理性选择。
相反，个体受限于信息有限、时间限制和认知能力，以及情感和社会因素等，导致偏离理性决策。
2. 心理账户：个体在决策中会将资产和负债进行分离，将不同类型的经济利益视为属于不同的心理账户，这就是心理账户理论。
相较于整体财务状况的综合考虑，个体更容易受到各个心理账户之间的影响。
3. 群体行为：行为经济学研究发现，个体的行为受到社会和群体行为的影响。
个体在面临相似情境时，往往会对他人的行为进行参照，以便作出决策。
这种心理现象被称为从众行为。
4. 相对效用：行为经济学指出，个体的决策更多地受到相对效用的影响，而非绝对效用。
相对效用是指某一选择相对于其他选择的优势程度。
例如，个体更容易接受某种利益的损失，只要其他选择相对更糟糕。
] a behavioral model of rational choice
![] a behavioral model of rational choice](https://img.taocdn.com/s3/m/ade61039773231126edb6f1aff00bed5b9f37308.png)
] a behavioral model of rational choice 《理性选择的行为模型》是指人们在做出选择时所采用的一种模型，该模型的基础是理性。
人们在做出选择时，会考虑到各种因素，如收益、成本、风险、时间等。
基于这些因素，人们会对不同的选择做出权衡，最终选择对自己最有利的一种。
理性选择的行为模型认为，人们在做出选择时会遵循一定的规律，即在不同的选择之间进行比较，并选择最优的那一种。
这种行为模式可以被用于解释人们在各种不同情境下做出的选择，包括经济决策、社会行为、政治选择等等。
在经济学领域，理性选择的行为模型被广泛应用。
基于这个模型，经济学家可以预测人们在做出经济决策时的行为，进而制定相应的政策。
例如，当政府希望促进某一种商品的销售时，可以通过调整价格、增加宣传等方式，使得这种商品的收益高于其成本，从而吸引更多的人选择购买。
除了经济学之外，理性选择的行为模型在心理学、社会学、政治学等领域也有着广泛的应用。
这种模型的基础是认为人们在做出选择时会遵循一定的规律，并不会完全被情感、偏见等因素所左右。
总之，理性选择的行为模型是一个非常有用的模型，可以用来解释人们在各种不同情境下做出的选择。
通过了解这种模型，我们可以更好地理解人类的行为，从而制定出更加精准的政策和策略。
- 1 -。
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Phlegmatic (SI)
Choleric (NE)
Sanguine (SE)
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•Keep in the background.
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•Would describe my experiences as somewhat dull.
4
•Keep others at a distance.
Obvious behavioral correlates
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I-E and conditioning
• Newman’s work on psychopaths and conditioning – ability to stop
• Gray’s model of anxiety, impulsivity and conditioning (reinforcement sensitivity)
《社会知觉偏差》课件
六、参考文献
1. Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69(1), 99-118.
2. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124-1131.
自我中心偏差的例子
当某人成功时，往往将功劳 归因于自己的才能；当遭遇 失败时，往往将责任归咎于 外界因素。
印象形成偏差的例子
一个面试者第一印象好，面 试官往往会对其后续表现持 正向态度，忽视后续的负面 信息。
归因偏差的例子
当一个员工做出出色的工作 时，经理认为是他个人能力 的结果，而忽视了他所拥有 的资源和团队支持。
《社会知觉偏差》PPT课 件
社会知觉偏差是人们在社会互动中常常出现的认知倾向。通过本课件，我们 将深入探讨不同种类的认知偏差以及解决方案。
一、社会知觉是什么
社会知觉是指个体在社会互动中感知和理解他人行为、态度和动机的能力。
二、认知偏差的种类
自我中心偏差
个体容易把自己作为认知 过程的中心，倾向于高
个体往往根据第一印象评 估他人，忽视后续信息造 成的干扰。
归因偏差
个体倾向于过度归因他人 行为的内在特质，低估外 部因素的影响。
经验代表性偏差
个体倾向于根据先验经验或代表性事例做出 评价，忽视样本量和统计规律。
可得性偏差
个体偏向于根据信息的易得性和可记忆性来 评估其真实性和重要性。
行为经济学的基本模型
行为经济学的基本模型发表时间：2020-12-28T03:17:47.792Z 来源：《教育考试与评价》2020年第8期作者：刘红军[导读] 赫伯特?西蒙被公认为二战前后对行为经济学研究起到承前启后作用的经济学家，他最早提出有限理性假设，并坚持这一理论最久，他的模型也构成了行为经济学逻辑的开端和基础。
滇西科技师范学院云南临沧 677000摘要：作为有限理性假设最早提出者和坚持者，1955年西蒙提出了寻优算法，在此基础上得到了满意原则和过程理性。
1983年海纳提出了海纳模型，分析了不确定性的外部环境下，人们有限理性行为的行为决策规则。
寻优算法和海纳模型作为行为经济学的基本模型，为行为经济学的发展奠定了基础，并启发了行为经济学们提出其他新的分析模型，对经济学发展具有重要意义。
关键词：有限理性；寻优算法；海纳模型一、西蒙的寻优算法赫伯特?西蒙被公认为二战前后对行为经济学研究起到承前启后作用的经济学家，他最早提出有限理性假设，并坚持这一理论最久，他的模型也构成了行为经济学逻辑的开端和基础。
1955年，西蒙在《理性选择的行为模型》一文中提出了一种寻优算法。
为了讨论有限理性假设，我们可以设想一个程序，如何由计算机在一个预定的实数区间（通常为[0,1]）上寻找某一函数F（X）的最大值。
如果计算机不能事先预知最优结果，那么它只能从某一特定的初始点开始，并逐渐寻找局部最优结果。
当然，计算机管理员也可以根据“淬火算法”迫使计算机离开某一局部最优，然后试着去寻找更好的局部最优，一直到它能在预定的实数区间寻找到全局最优解为止。
问题是由于函数F（X）非常复杂，一般来说即使最聪明的计算机管理员也不未必知道全局最优解的准确位置。
所以，西蒙假设只需一台计算机用于寻找最优解，而排除计算机管理员的人为干涉，他提出基于行为心理学的“令人满意”来取代基于新古典经济学的“全局最优”的寻优过程。
西蒙将这一寻优过程称为“过程理性”，他把新古典经济学的理性称为“实质理性”。
典型有限理性模型的评述
G(X,Y,Z)=a(Xg-X)+b(Yg-Y)+c(Zg-Z)+ε
（5）
模 型(4)表 示 行 为 人 完 成 抉 择 时 超 过 理 性 程 度 下 限 而 达
到 的 理 性 程 度 的 高 度 ， 模 型 (5) 表 示 较 之 理 性 程 度 上 限 尚 有 待
提升的高度。
可见，何大安的研究不仅考虑了时间因素对有限理性程
Zd)、F (X，Y，Z) 和 F (Xg，Yg，Zg)， 其 中 Xd ≤X ≤Xg，Yd ≤Y ≤Yg，
Zd≤Z≤Zg。 从而有：
F(Xd，Yd，Zd)≤F(X，Y，Z)≤F(Xg，Yg，Zg)
（2）
即行为人理性抉择所能达到的实际理性程度介于即时
有限理性和潜在有限理性之间，但无法作出具体的度量。
在信息处理和计算能力方面的局限，从而决策者追求的只是
能力范围内的有限理性，遵循的是“满意”标准，而非最优标准。
Simon 模型通过引进简单的报酬函数简化了达到理性决
策的计算过程，但简化可能影响结果的准确性。 因此 Simon 建
议在决策制定过程中引进一些信息收集步骤，将不完全信息、
信息处理费用等引入经济分析。 而这样做是否合理？ 不完全
下”达到了自己的满意水平，并据此作出取舍，而不会考虑各
种可能出现的结果对自己效用的影响。 因此，对于取值范围
不限于两个不同值的一般报酬函数 W(s)而言，可通过引进基
数效用函数 U(s) 得到一个 W(s)的近似函数①：
V(s)=V{W(s)}
对 于 决 策 结 果 集 （S）中 的 所 有 结 果 （s）来 说 ，V （s） 只 需 取
摘 要：有限理性建模是经济理论面对的重要问题之一，也是有限理性研究的核心问题。文章主