human capital and macroeconomics growth:austria and german update-koman

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L08-Human-Capital-Model人力资本模型教学提纲

L08-Human-Capital-Model人力资本模型教学提纲

四、Lucas的内生增长模型
1. 文献
• Lucas,R.1988.”On the mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics,22(July).
配规律;③人力资本与职业选择问题。)
一、 序(续)
3.人力资本增长模型的提出
80年代,罗默和卢卡斯将人力资本理论
发展成新经济增长理论(人力资本增长 模型)。
⑴说明时间和空间上增长率的巨大差异。 ⑵方法:引入人力资本,扩大了资本收入的份额。 使得增长模型的说明能力大大提高。
一、 序(续)
4.有关人力资本增长模型的几个问题
L08-Human-Capital-Model人 力资本模型
一、 序
1. 增长理论的两个基本问题
长期中①经济增长率是如何决定的 ②在时间和空间上存在大幅增长率的差异。
Solow模型, R=C=K模型, Diamond模型及R&D模型对第 一个问题作出了较好的回答,但对第二问没有作出令人满 意的回答。
K(t)sKY(t)
用于人力资本积累的产出的比例sH • H(t)sHY(t)
二、人力资本增长模型(续)
2.动态分析

k
(k 0)
k •(t)sK k(t)h (t) (ng)k(t) h •(t)sH k(t)h (t) (ng )h (t)•k0 Nhomakorabeak

h0

(k 0)

(h 0)

(h 0)
同Solow模型。 2.定量分析
在均衡点处储蓄率的弹性系数增大了, 对资本(实物及人力)投入的不同可以 引起人均产出上很大的差距。

4《管理学》阅读材料

4《管理学》阅读材料

阅读材料Reading list第一章[1]Aldrich, H. & Zimmer, C. 1986, Entrepreneurship through social networks. In The art and science of entrepreneurship, eds. D. L. Sexton & R. W. Smilor. Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, pp. 3-23.[2]Amit, R., Glosten, L. & Muller, E. 1993, Challenges to theory development in entrepreneurship research. Journal of Management Studies, 30(5), pp. 815-834.[3]Brazeal, D. V. & Herbert, T. T. 1999, The genesis of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Spring, pp. 29-45.[4]Carsrud, A. L., Olm, K. W. & Eddy, G. G. 1986, Entrepreneurship: Research in quest of a paradigm. In The art and science of entrepreneurship, eds. D. L. Sexton & R. W. Smilor. Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, pp. 367-377.[5]Drucker, P. F. 1985, Innovation and entrepreneurship: Practice and principles. Harper & Row, New Y ork.[6]Gartner, W. B. 1988, Who is an entrepreneur? Is the wrong question. American Journal of Small Business, Spring, pp. 11-32.[7]Herron, L. & Robinson, R. B., Jr. 1993, A structural model of the effects of entrepreneurial characteristics on venture performance. Journal of Business V enturing, 8, pp. 281-294.[8]H. Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work (New Y ork: Harper&Row 1973); and J.T.Straub. Put on Y our Manager’s Hat.USA Today Online (),October 29, 2002.[9]Stevenson, H. H. & Jarillo, J. C. 1990, A paradigm of entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial management. Strategic Management Journal, 11, pp. 17-27.[10]Watson, T. J. 1995, Entrepreneurship and professional management: A fatal distinction. International Small Business Journal, 13(2), pp. 34-46.[11]彼得·德鲁克, 卓有成效的管理者, 北京: 机械工业出版社, 2005.[12]杰克·韦尔奇. 赢. 北京: 中信出版社, 2005.[1]Bird, B. 1988, Implementing entrepreneurial ideas : The case for intention. Academy of Management Review, 13(3), pp. 442-453.[2]Boeker, W. P. 1988, Organizational origins: Entrepreneurial and environmental imprinting at the time of founding. In Ecological models of organizations, ed. G. R. Carroll. Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, pp. 33-51. [3]Brazeal, D. V. & Herbert, T. T. 1999, The genesis of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Spring, pp. 29-45.[4]Claude S. George, The History of Management Thought , Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968.[5]E. Mayo. The Human Problems of an industrial Civilization, New Y ork: Macmillan, 1933.[6]F. W. Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management, New Y ork: Harper,1911.[7]Hebert, R. F. & Link, A. N. 1988, The entrepreneur: Mainstream views and radical critiques. 2nd edn. Praeger, New Y ork.[8]H. Fayol. Industrial and General Administration, Paris: Dunod, 1916.[9]Koontz, H. 1980, Commentary on the management theory jungle: Nearly two decades later. In Management: A book of readings, eds. H. Koontz, C. O'Donnell & H. Weihrich. McGraw-Hill, New Y ork, pp. 18-26.[10]Mintzberg, H. 1973, The nature of managerial work. HarperCollins, New Y ork..[11]M. Weber. The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, ed. T. Parsons. Trans. A. M. Henderson and T Parsons(New Y ork: Free Press, 1947).[12]丹尼尔·A·雷恩, 管理思想的演变, 北京:中国社会科学院出版社, 2000.[13]郭咸纲. 西方管理思想史. 北京: 经济管理出版社, 2004.[14]王德清主编. 中外管理思想史. 重庆: 重庆大学出版社, 2006.[15]钱穆. 中国历代政治得失. 三联书店. 2005.[1]A. M. Pettigrew, On Studying. Organizational Culture, Administrative Science Quarterly, December, 1979,pp. 570-581.[2]Bonoma, T. V. 1985, Case research in marketing: Opportunities, problems and a process. Journal of Marketing Research, 22, pp. 199-208.[3]Gnyawali, D. R. & Fogel, D. S. 1994, Environments for entrepreneurship development: Key dimensions and research implications. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Summer, pp. 43-62.[4]Chander, G.N. & Hanks, S.H. 1994a, Founder competence, the environment and venture performance.Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Spring, pp. 77-89.[5]H. A. Simom, new science of management decision, New Y ork Harper & Row, 1960.[6]Hoy, F., McDougall, P. P. & Dsouza, D. E. 1992, Strategies and environments of high-growth firms. In The state of the art of entrepreneurship, eds. D. L. Sexton & J. D. Kasarda. PWS-Kent, Boston, pp. 341-357. [7]McCall, M. and Kaplan, R. Whatever It Takes: Decision Makers at Work. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985.[8]Porter, M. E, Competitive Strategy, Free Press, New Y ork, 1980.[9]Porter, M. E, Competitive advantage, New Y ork: Free Press, 1985.[10]拉里·博西迪等, 曹建海译. 转型--用对策略, 做对事. 北京: 中信出版社, 2005.[1]Cassar, G. & Mankelow, G. 1997, The effects of planning on perceived venture opportunities. Small Enterprise Research, 5(2), pp. 39-46.[2]Chandler, G. N. & Hanks, S. H. 1994b, Market attractiveness, resource-based capabilities, venture strategies and venture performance. Journal of Business V enturing, 9, pp. 331-349.[3]Gary Hamel, CK Prahalad, Competing For The Future, Harvard Business School Press,1994.[4]H. Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, New Y ork: Free Press,1994.[5]Kolvereid, L. & Bullvag, E. 1996, Growth intentions and actual growth: The impact of entrepreneurial choice. Journal of Enterprising Culture, 4(1), pp. 1-17.[6]Kropp, F. & Lindsay, N. J. 1999, Differences in entrepreneurial business ventures: A new categorization scheme and its implications. Asian Journal of Business and Entrepreneurship, 2(1), pp. 3-21.[7]McDougall, P. P., Covin, J. G., Robinson, R. B., Jr. & Herron, L. 1994, The effects of industry growth and strategic breadth on new venture performance and strategy content. Strategic Management Journal, 15, pp. 537-554.[8]R. Molz, How Leaders Use Goals, Long Range Planning October 1987, pp.91.[1]Chandler, G. N. & Jansen, E. 1992, The founder's self-assessed competence and venture performance. Journal of Business V enturing, 7(3), pp. 223-236.[2]Eisenhardt, K. M. & Bird Schoonhoven, C. 1990, Organizational growth: Linking founding team, strategy, environment and growth among U.S. semiconductor ventures, 1978-1988. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(3), pp. 504-529.[3]Gartner, W. B., Bird, B. J. & Starr, J. A. 1992, Acting as if: Differentiating entrepreneurial from organizational behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Spring, pp. 13-31.[4]Hunt, J. & Wallace, J. 1997, Organizational change and the atomization of modern management. Management Development Forum, 1(1), pp. 9-21.[5]Kazanjian, R. K. & Drazin, R. 1990, A stage-contingent model of design and growth for technology based new ventures. Journal of Business V enturing, 5, pp. 137-150.[6]Learned, K. E. 1992, What happened before the organization? A model of organization formation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Fall, pp. 39-48.[7]H. Mintzberg. Structure in fives: designing effective organizations. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1983.[8]V an de V en, A. H., Hudson, R. & Schroeder, D. M. 1984, Designing new business startups: Entrepreneurial, organizational and ecological considerations. Journal of Management, 10(1), pp. 87-107. [9]V an de V en, A. H., V enkataraman, S., Polley, D. & Garud, R. 1989, Processes of new business creation in different organizational settings. In Research on the management of innovation: The Minnesota studies, eds.A. H. V an de V en, H. L. Angle & M. S. Poole. Harper & Row, New Y ork, pp. 221-297.[10]Zhao, L. & Aram, J. D. 1995, Networking and growth of young technology-intensive ventures in China. Journal of Business V enturing, 10, pp. 349-370.[1]Cooper, A. C. & Gimeno Gascon, F. J. 1992, Entrepreneurs, processes of founding and new-firm performance. In The state of the art of entrepreneurship, eds. D. L. Sexton & J. D. Kasarda. PWS-Kent, Boston, MA, pp. 301-327.[2]Cooney, T. M. & O'Driscoll, A. 1999, High growth firms in the software industry: Comparing Ireland with America through structure, strategy and entrepreneurial teams (CDROM). Frontiers of entrepreneurship research: Proceedings of the 19th annual entrepreneurhsip research conference, [pp. 1-15][3]F. Herzberg, One More Time: How Do Y ou Motivate Employees?, Harvard Business Review, January –February 1968, pp. 53-62.[4]Legge, J. & Hindle, K. 1997, Entrepreneurship: How innovators create the future. MacMillan Education Australia, South Melbourne.[5]Miner, J. B. 2000, Testing a psychological typology of entrepreneurship using business founders. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 36(1), pp. 43-69.[6]Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Great Ideas: Revisiting the Life-Cycle Theory of Leadership,” Training & Development, January 1996, pp. 42–47.[7]Reynolds, P. D. & White, S. B. 1997, The entrepreneurial process: Economic growth, men, women and minorities. Quorum Books, Westport, Connecticut; London.[8]Robert R. Blake and Anne Adams McCanse, Leadership Dilemmas—Grid Solutions , Houston: Gulf Publishing, 1991.[9]Shaver, K. G. & Scott, L. R. 1991, Person, process, choice: The psychology of new venture creation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Winter, pp. 23-45.[10]Smith, N. R. 1967, The entrepreneur and his firm: The relationship between type of man and type of company. UMI Out of Print Books on Demand, Ann Arbor, Michigan.[11]Sexton, D. L. & Bowman-Upton, N. B. 1991, Entrepreneurship: Creativity and growth. MacMillan, New Y ork..[12]V room and Arthur G.Jago, The New Leadership: Managing Participation in Organizations , Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1988.[1]Cooper, A. C., Gimeno Gascon, F. J. & Woo, C. Y. 1994, Initial human and financial capital as predictors of new venture performance. Journal of Business V enturing, 9, pp. 371-395.[2]Carroll, S. J. & Gillen, D. J. 1987, Are the classical management functions useful in describing managerial work? Academy of Management Review, 12(1), pp. 38-51.[3]Chrisman, J. J., Bauerschmidt, A. & Hofer, C. W. 1998, The determinants of new venture performance: An extended model. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Fall, pp. 5-29.[4]Goold M, Quinn J J. The paradox of strategic controls. Strategic Management Journal, 1990, 11:43-57.[5]Kaplan,R.S.&Norton,D.P.,The Balanced Scorecard:Translating Strategy into Action Boston:Harvard Business School Press,1996.[6]Mellewigt, T. & Späth, J. F. 2001, Occurrence, size, completeness and performance of entrepreneurial teams: A meta-analysis of German and US empirical studies. Summary in Frontiers of entrepreneurship research, eds W. D. Bygrave, E. Autio, C. G. Brush, P. Davidsson, P. G. Green, P. D. Reynolds & H. J. Sapienza. Babson College, p. 250.[7]R. Simons, Strategic orientation and top management attention to control systems, Strategic Management Journal 1991, pp.49-62.[8]Shrader, R. C. & Simon, M. 1997, Corporate versus independent new ventures: Resource, strategy and performance differences. Journal of Business V enturing, 12, pp. 47-66.。

熊彼特竞争、专有资产与人力资本的互补性与创新激励

熊彼特竞争、专有资产与人力资本的互补性与创新激励

业,需要的财务投入越多,也就越可能受到融资约束[25],更高原创性需要更多专有资产,专有资产投入是
创新原创性的一个良好测度①。在专有资产一定的前提下,专有资产独特性 α 越大(例如 ROMER[26]所考
虑的 AK 模型中对专有资产技术含量的识别),创新原创性也就越高。本文定义创新原创性 δ 如下。
性知识在多样性团队中互补的结果,投入与创新能力流无须满足通常假设的边际报酬递减规律,因而认
为 β ∈ (0,1)。定义专有资产指数 α 与人力资本指数 β 的和(α + β)为两类资本间的互补性,与通常的 C-D
生产函数相同,表示投入变化对产出影响的规应对行为,并且企业通过对环境的适应来获取发展机会[24]。企业投入
特竞争对创新原创性、创新复杂性与创新团队剩余索取权分配的影响。研究表明:熊彼特竞争与创新复杂性和
剩余索取权分配比例负相关;熊彼特竞争对创新原创性与创新团队努力程度的影响取决于两类资本的互补性,
其中创新团队能力独特性发挥了调节作用;创新原创性和团队努力程度两者在委托代理关系存在与否时的相
对水平取决于两类资本的互补性,而创新复杂性在委托代理关系存在与否时的相对水平则依赖于熊彼特竞争。
研究结论凸显了熊彼特竞争和两类资本互补性对创新项目选择和创新激励的影响,提高了企业响应外部竞争
和管理创新团队的可操作性。
关键词:原创性;复杂性;互补性;创新激励
中图分类号:F273. 1;G301
文献标识码:A
创新原创性和创新复杂性对创新企业至关重要。理论与实践证实了原创性与创新收益之间的关系, 1985 年 DAVID[1]指出转换成本是高原创性产品赢利能力低于中等原创性产品的关键。随后,KLEIN⁃ SCHMIDT 和 COOPER[2]发现创新原创性与创新收益之间的 U 型关系,而 CALNTONE 等[3]进一步证实他 们的观点,认为创新原创性的提高会降低客户熟悉度,部分抵消对创新收益的正面影响。STOCK 和 TATIKONDA[4]则说明高原创性所具有的不确定性足以抹杀其为客户带来的新价值。近年来,多数学者 坚持原创性与创新收益的正向关系,如:LYNCH 等[5]认为企业可以获得必要的技能、知识和能力,利用市 场机会在竞争中领先,通过高原创性获得更多收益;TEPIC 等[6]证实原创性是产品潜能的决定因素,而产品潜 能又决定了创新收益。与此同时,创新复杂性也会对创新收益产生重大影响,ALMIRALL 和 CASADESUSMASANELL[7]认为复杂性更高的创新会得到更高创新收益,但与之不同,张慧颖和王辉[8]表明创新复杂性 与创新绩效负相关。此外,创新复杂性对技术学习[9]、知识域之间的耦合点[10]等相关因素与创新绩效之 间的关系也会产生影响。因而,创新原创性与创新复杂性面临着高收益与高风险的权衡,是企业创新的 重要挑战。

人力资本与增值 Human Capital and Growth

人力资本与增值 Human Capital and Growth

Convergence club
Convergence: GDP per capita - Western Europe & Western Offshoots30,000
25,000
Hale Waihona Puke Denmark 20,000 France Germany Italy 15,000 Sw itzerand United Kingdom Australia 10,000 Canada United States



Divergence

Modern economic growth:


Divergence in relative productivity levels and living standards. In the last century: income in the “less” developed countries have fallen far behind those in “developed” countries.
East Asian miracle

Features


Large exporters of manufactured goods of increasing sophistication. Highly urbanized and increasingly well-educated. High savings rates. Pro-business governments.

1000-1820


1820 onwards:

No consensus

Economic growth models have attempted to explain the change in growth rates but no consensus has emerged.

私募股权投资者:萨姆·泽尔人物简介

私募股权投资者:萨姆·泽尔人物简介

房地产投资
• 投资了大量的房地产资产,如写字楼、购物中心等
• 通过房地产投资实现资产价值的最大化
私募股权投资
• 投资了许多知名企业和初创公司
• 通过私募股权投资实现企业价值的提升和收益最大化
其他投资
• 投资于股票、债券等其他金融产品
• 实现投资组合的多元化和风险分散

⌛️
萨姆·泽尔的经典投资案例
• 捐赠了大量的资金和物资,支持教育、医疗等领域的发

CREATE TOGETHER
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DOCS
• 投资回报高达10倍
萨姆·泽尔的投资组合回报与影响
投资组合回报
• 萨姆·泽尔的投资组合实现了持续的高回报
• 长期投资回报远高于行业平均水平
行业影响
• 萨姆·泽尔的投资策略和方法对私募股权行业产生了深远影响
• 许多投资者效仿萨姆·泽尔的投资策略,取得了成功
04
萨姆·泽尔对私募股权行业的贡献
萨姆·泽尔对行业投资策略的启示
CREATE TOGETHER
DOCS SMART CREATE
私募股权投资者:萨姆·泽尔人物简介
DOCS
01
萨姆·泽尔的职业生涯与成就
萨姆·泽尔的早期经历与教育背景
出生于美国纽约市
• 1944年出生,成长于一个犹太家庭
• 父母都是普通的工薪阶层,家庭环境并不富裕
教育背景
• 1966年毕业于哥伦比亚大学,获得经济学学士学位
• 在行业内享有很高的声誉和尊敬
05
萨姆·泽尔的个人品质与领导力
萨姆·泽尔的职业精神与诚信原则
职业精神
诚信原则

投资于早期儿童发育

投资于早期儿童发育

DECRG - 人力资源开发与公共服务研究生命早期的严重营养不良和认知能力缺陷使发展中国家的许多儿童只能取得较低的教育成果,具有较低的经济生产率。

研究表明,在学龄前阶段(以及越早越好)进行的营养投资可以取得明显的长期人力资本和经济收益。

投资于早期儿童发育2006年8月,Harold Alderman和Elizabeth M. King许多发展中国家的儿童都在生命的早期阶段面临严重的营养不良和认知缺陷。

有关的估计表明,在发展中国家的所有儿童中,有八分之一的儿童在出生时就营养不良(体重不足2.5公斤),有相当大比例的儿童(在低收入国家中占47%)在五岁之前一直营养不良。

这些数字令人非常不安的原因是,在一个儿童两岁之后仍然发生作用的营养不良的影响是很难扭转的。

[1]早期营养不良消弱儿童的身体和认知能力潜力,甚至他们的非认知特性,如能动性和持续性,因此严重影响他们未来的健康、教育成就、以及社会经济成就。

[2]早期儿童发育(ECD)的持久收益从一出生开始就改善营养,可以为一生带来源源不断的收益。

有关的估计表明,预防生育体重为2.5公斤或不足2.5公斤的儿童可以产生510美元的经济收益,其中有40%是因为预防过低的出生体重而提高了儿童的认知能力和生产率产生的结果。

[3]在厄瓜多尔的学龄前儿童中,用提高血色素水平来衡量的营养的改善可以改善用儿童考试成绩来衡量的认知能力发育的改善。

另外,这种相关联系在年龄较大的儿童样本中(四岁半和四岁半以上)比在年龄较小的儿童样本中(三岁至四岁半)更明显。

这表明,营养和认知能力发育之间的联系随着儿童的年龄增长而变得越来越明显。

[4]在菲律宾的学龄前儿童中,一个标准偏差的身高增长提高了他们数年后的考试成绩分数。

这个增长相当于完成了另外八个月的学校教育,并意味着三或更高的效益成本比。

[5]在津巴布韦的学龄前儿童中,如果一个中位学龄前儿童的身高相当于发达国家的中位学龄前儿童的身高的话,这个儿童青春期的身高将提高3.4厘米,并将多完成0.85年级的学校教育。

聪明的投资者——本杰明.格雷厄姆

聪明的投资者——本杰明.格雷厄姆
聪明的投资者
——本杰明.格雷厄姆(1894~1976)
1
目录
背景 论投资与投机 防御型投资者的证券组合策略 积极型投资者的证券组合策略 投资者与市场波动 防御型投资者的股票选择 积极型投资者的股票选择 对每股利润的思考 作为投资中心思想的“安全边际”
背景之一——本杰明.格雷厄姆生平简介
1894年,格雷厄姆生于伦敦,1-8岁期间,家境殷实。 1903年,格雷厄 1907年,格雷厄姆13岁,在股灾中,其母亲把借钱进行股票保证金交易的本金全额赔光。 1914年,格雷厄姆20岁,以全班第二名的成绩从哥伦比亚大学毕业(通过赢得奖学金入得此学校),并且被邀请担任教职。他未接 受,而是选择了到华尔街闯荡一番。 1920年,格雷厄姆26岁,成为纽伯格.亨德森.劳伯公司的合伙人。 1923年,格雷厄姆29岁,离开了纽伯格.亨德森.劳伯公司,成立了格兰赫私人基金,资金规模50万美元。 1923-1924年间,格兰赫基金运作一年半,其投资回报率高达100%以上,远高于同期平均股价79%的上涨幅度,但由于股东与格雷厄 姆在分红方案上的意见分歧,格兰赫基金最终不得不以解散而告终。 1926年,本杰明·格雷厄姆(Benjamin Graham)和杰罗姆·纽曼(Newman) 合伙投资组建格雷厄姆-纽曼公司。 1929-1932年大萧条期间,格雷厄姆亏损近70%,其后的岁月卷土重来,在市场的废墟上收获了大量有利的交易。 1936-1956期间(其后退休),格雷厄姆.纽曼公司的年收益率不低于14.7%,高于同期股票市场12.2%的整体收益率,跻身华尔街有 史以来最佳的长期收益率之列。 1934年年底出版《有价证券分析》(Security Analysis)。 1936年出版《财务报表解读》。 1949年出版《聪明的投资者》(The Intelligent Investor)。

Growth_Theory_through_the_Lens_of___Development_Economics

Growth_Theory_through_the_Lens_of___Development_Economics

Growth Theory through the Lens of Development EconomicsAbhijit Banerjee and Esther DufloMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyAbstractGrowth theory traditionally assumed the existence of an aggregate production function, whose existence and properties are closely tied to the assumption of optimal resource allocation within each economy. We show extensive evidence, culled from the micro-development literature, demonstrating that the assumption of optimal resource allocation fails radically. The key fact is the enormous heterogeneity of rates of return to the same factor within a single economy, a heterogeneity that dwarfs the cross-country heterogeneity in the economy-wide average return. Prima facie, we argue, this evidence poses problems for old and new growth theories alike. We then review the literature on various causes of this misallocation. We go on to calibrate a simple model which explicitly introduces the possibility of misallocation into an otherwise standard growth model . We show that, in order to match the data, it is not enough to have misallocated factors: there also needs to be important fixed costs in production. We conclude by outlining the contour of a possible non-aggregate growth theory, and review the existing attempts to take such a model to the data.JEL numbers O0, O10, O11, O12, O14, O15, O16, O40Keywords: Non-aggregative growth theory; aggregate production function; factor allocation; non-convexities.Growth Theory through the Lens of Development EconomicsAbhijit V.Banerjee and Esther Duflo∗December20041Introduction:Neo-classical Growth TheoryThe premise of neo-classical growth theory is that it is possible to do a reasonable job of explaining the broad patterns of economic change across countries,by looking at it through the lens of an aggregate production function.The aggregate production function relates the total output of an economy(a country, for example)to the aggregate amounts of labor,human capital and physical capital in the economy,and some simple measure of the level of technology in the economy as a whole.It is formally represented as F(A,K P K H,L)where K P and K H are the total amounts of physical and human capital invested,L is the total labor endowment of the economy and A is a technology parameter.The aggregate production function is not meant to be something that physically exists.Rather,it is a convenient construct.Growth theorists,like everyone else,have in mind a world where production functions are associated with people.To see how they proceed,let us start with a model where everyone has the option of starting afirm,and when they do,they have access to an individual production functionY=F(K P,K H,L,θ),(1)where K P and K H are the amounts of physical and human capital invested in thefirm and L is the amount of labor.θis a productivity parameter which may vary over time,but at any point of time is a characteristic of thefirm’s owner.Assume that F is increasing in all its inputs.To make life simpler, assume that there is only onefinal good in this economy and physical capital is made from it.Also assume ∗MIT,Department of Economics,50Memorial Drive,Cambridge,MA02142.banerjee@,eduflo@.For financial support,the authors are grateful to the National Science Foundation under the grant SES-0137015(Banerjee),the Alfred P.Sloan Foundation(Duflo)and the John D.and Catherine MacArthur Foundation.We are also grateful to Pranab Bardhan,Michael Kremer,Rohini Pande,Chris Udry and Ivan Werning for helpful conversations,to Philippe Aghion and Seema Jayachandran for detailed comments,and to Charles Cohen and Thomas Wang for excellent research assistance.A part of this material was presented as the Kuznets Memorial Lecture,2004,at Yale University.We are grateful for the many comments that we received from the audience.that the population of the economy is described by a distribution function G t(W,θ),the joint distribution of W andθ,where W is the wealth of a particular individual andθis his productivity parameter.Let G(θ)be the corresponding partial distribution onθ.The lives of people,as often is the case in economic models,is rather dreary:In each period,each person,given his wealth,hisθand the prices of the inputs,decides whether to set up afirm,and if so how to invest in physical and human capital.At the end of the period,once he gets returns from the investment and possibly other incomes,he consumes and the period ends.The consumption decision is based on maximizing the following utility function:∞t=0δt U(C t,θ),0<δ<1.(2) 1.1The Aggregate Production FunctionThe key assumption behind the construction of the aggregate production function is that all factor markets are perfect,in the sense that individuals can buy or sell as much as they want at a given price. With perfect factor markets(and no risk)the market must allocate the available supply of inputs to maximize total output.Assuming that the distribution of productivities does not vary across countries, we can therefore define F(K P,K H,L)to be:max{K P(θ),K H(θ),L(θ)}{θF(K P(θ),K H(θ),L(θ),θ)d G(θ)}subject toθK P(θ)dθ=K P,θK H(θ)dθ=K H,andθL(θ)dθ=L.This is the aggregate production function.It is notable that the distribution of wealth does not enter anywhere in this calculation.This reflects the fact that with perfect factor markets,there is no necessary link between what someone owns and what gets used in thefirm that he owns.The fact that G(θ)does not enter as an argument of F(K P,K H,L)reflects our assumption that the distribution of productivities does not vary across countries.It should be clear from the construction that there is no reason to expect a close relation between the “shape”of the individual production function and the shape of the aggregate function.Indeed it is well known that aggregation tends to convexify the production set:In other words,the aggregate production function may be concave even if the individual production functions are not.In this environment where there are a continuum offirms,the(weak)concavity of the aggregate production function is guaranteed as long as the average product of the inputs in the individual production functions is bounded in the sense that there is aλsuch that F(λK P,λK H,λL,θ)≤λ (K P,K H,L,θ) for all K P,K H,L andθ.It follows that the concavity of the individual functions is sufficient for the concavity of the aggregate but by nomeans necessary:The aggregate production would also be concave if the individual production functions were S-shaped(convex to start out and then becoming concave).Alternately,the individual production function being bounded is enough to guarantee concavity of the aggregate production function.Moreover, the aggregate production function will typically be differentiable almost everywhere.It is a corollary of this result that the easiest way to generate an aggregate production function with increasing returns is to base the increasing returns not on the shape of the individual production function,but rather on the possibility of externalities acrossfirms.If there are sufficiently strong positive externalities between investment in onefirm and investment in another,increasing the total capital stock in all of them together will increase aggregate output by more(in proportional terms)than the same increase in a singlefirm would raise thefirm’s output,which could easily make the aggregate production function convex.This is the reason why externalities have been intimately connected,in the growth literature,with the possibility of increasing returns.The assumption of perfect factor markets is therefore at the heart of neo-classical growth theory.It buys us two key properties:The fact that the ownership of factors does not matter,i.e.,that an aggregate production function exists;and that it is concave.The next sub-section shows how powerful these two assumptions can be.1.2The Logic of ConvergenceAssume for simplicity that production only requires physical capital and labor and that the aggregate production function,F(K p,L)defined as above,exhibits constant returns and is concave,increasing, almost everywhere differentiable and eventually strictly concave,in the sense that F <ε<0,for any K p.As noted above,this does not require the individual production functions to have this shape, K p>though it does impose some constraints on what the individual functions can be like.It does however require that the distribution offirm-level productivities is the same everywhere.Under our assumption that capital markets are perfect,in the sense that people can borrow and lend as much as they want at the common going rate,r t,the marginal returns to capital must be the same for everybody in the economy.This,combined with the preferences as represented by(2),has the immediate consequence that for everybody in the economy:U (C t,θ)=δr t U (C t+1,θ).It follows that everybody’s consumption in the economy must grow as long asδr t>1and shrink ifδr t<1.And since consumption must increase with wealth,it follows that everyone must be getting richer if and only ifδr t>1,and consequently the aggregate wealth of the economy must be growing as long asδr t>1.In a closed economy,the total wealth must be equal to the total capital stock,andtherefore the capital stock must also be increasing under the same conditions.Credit market equilibrium,under perfect capital markets,implies that F (K P t,L)=r t.The fact that F is eventually strictly concave implies that as the aggregate capital stock grows,its marginal product must eventually start falling,at a rate bounded away from0.This process can only stop when δF (K P t,L)=1.As long as the production function is the same everywhere,all countries must end up equally wealthyThe logic of convergence starts with the fact that in poor countries,capital is scarce,which combined with the concavity of the aggregate production function implies that the return on the capital stock should be high.Even with the same fraction of these higher returns being reinvested,the growth rate in the poorer countries would be higher.Moreover,the high returns should encourage a higher reinvestment rate,unless the income effect on consumption is strong enough to dominate.Together,they should make the poorer countries grow faster and catch up with the rich ones.Yet poorer countries do not grow faster.According to Mankiw,Romer and Weil(1992),the correlation between the growth rate and the initial level of Gross Domestic Product is small,and if anything,positive (the coefficient of the log of the GDP in1960on growth rate between1960and1992is0.0943).Somewhere along the way,the logic seems to have broken down.Understanding the failure of convergence has been one of the key endeavors of the economics of growth. What we try to do in this chapter is to argue that the failure of this approach is intimately tied to the failure of the assumptions that underlie the construction of the aggregate production function and to suggest an alternative approach to growth theory that abandons the aggregate production.We start by discussing,in section2,the two implications of the neo-classical model that are at the root of the convergence result:Both rates of returns and investment rates should be higher in poor countries.We show that,in fact,neither rates of returns nor investment are,on average,much higher in poor countries.Moreover,contrary to what the aggregate production approach implies,there are large variations in rate of returns within countries,and large variation in the extent to which profitable investment opportunities are taken advantage of.In section3,we ask whether the puzzle(of no convergence)can be solved,while maintaining the aggregate production function,by theories that focus on reasons for technological backwardness in poor countries.We argue that this class of explanations is not consistent with the empirical evidence which suggests that manyfirms in poor countries do use the latest technologies,while others in the same country use obsolete modes of production.In other words,what we need to explain is less the overall technological backwardness and more why somefirms do not adopt profitable technologies that are available to them (though perhaps not affordable).In section4,we attempt to suggest some answers to the question of whyfirms and people in devel-oping countries do not always avail themselves of the best opportunities afforded to them.We review various possible sources of the inefficient use of resources:government failures,credit constraints,insur-ance failure,externalities,family dynamics,and behavioral issues.We argue that each of these market imperfections can explain why investment may not always take place where the rates of returns are the highest,and therefore why resources may be misallocated within countries.This misallocation,in turn, drives down returns and this may lower the overall investment rate.In section5,we calibrate plausible magnitudes for the aggregate static impact of misallocation of capital within countries We show that, combined with individual production functions characterized byfixed costs,the misallocation of capital implied by the variation of the returns to capital observed within countries can explain the main aggregate puzzles:the low aggregate productivity of capital,and the low Total Factor Productivity in developing countries,relative to rich countries.Non-aggregative growth models thus seem to have the potential to explain why poor countries remain poor.The last section provides an introduction to an alternative growth theory that does not require the existence of an aggregate production function,and therefore can accommodate the misallocation of resources.We then review the attempts to empirically test these models.We argue that the failure to take seriously the implications of non-aggregative models have led to results that are very hard to interpret.To end,we discuss an alternative empirical approach illustrated by some recent calibration exercises based on growth models that take the misallocation of resources seriously.2Rates of Return and Investment Rates in Poor CountriesIn this section,we examine whether the two main implications of the neo-classical model are verified in the data:Are returns and investment rates higher in poor countries?2.1Are returns higher in poor countries?2.1.1Physical Capital•Indirect EstimatesOne way to look at this question is to look at the interest rates people are willing to pay.Unless people have absolutely no assets that they can currently sell,the marginal product of whatever they are doing with the marginal unit of capital should be no less than the interest rate:If this were not true, they could simply divert the last unit of capital toward whatever they are borrowing the money for and be better off.There is a long line of papers that describe the workings of credit markets in poor countries(Banerjee(2003)summarizes this evidence).The evidence suggests that a substantial fraction of borrowing takes place at very high interest rates.Afirst source of evidence is the“Summary Report on Informal Credit Markets in India”(Dasgupta (1989)),which reports results from a number of case studies that were commissioned by the Asian Development Bank and carried out under the aegis of the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.For the rural sector,the data is based on surveys of six villages in Kerala and Tamil Nadu,carried out by the Centre for Development Studies.The average annual interest rate charged by professional moneylenders(who provide45.6%of the credit)in these surveys is about52%.For the urban sector,the data is based on various case surveys of specific classes of informal lenders,many of whom lend mostly to trade or industry.Forfinance corporations,they report that the minimum lending rate on loans of less than one year is48%.For hire-purchase companies in Delhi,the lending rate was between28%and 41%.For autofinanciers in Namakkal,the lending rate was40%.For handloomfinanciers in Bangalore and Karur,the lending rate varied between44%and68%.Several other studies reach similar conclusions.A study by Timberg and Aiyar(1984)reports data on indigenous-style bankers in India,based on surveys they carried out:The rates for Shikarpurifinanciers varied between21%and37%on loans to members of local Shikarpuri associations and between21%and 120%on loans to non-members(25%of the loans were to non-members).Aleem(1990)reports data from a study of professional moneylenders that he carried out in a semi-urban setting in Pakistan in1980-1981. The average interest rate charged by these lenders is78.5%.Ghate(1992)reports on a number of case studies from all over Asia:The case study from Thailand found that interest rates were5-7%per month in the north and northeast(5%per month is80%per year and7%per month is125%).Murshid(1992) studies Dhaner Upore(cash for kind)loans in Bangladesh(you get some amount in rice now and repay some amount in rice later)and reports that the interest rate is40%for a3-5month loan period.The Fafchamps(2000)study of informal trade credit in Kenya and Zimbabwe reports an average monthly interest rate of2.5%(corresponding to an annualized rate of34%)but also notes that this is the rate for the dominant trading group(Indians in Kenya,whites in Zimbabwe),while the blacks pay5%per month in both places.The fact that interest rates are so high could reflect the high risk of default.However,this does not appear to be the case,since several of studies mentioned above give the default rates that go with these high interest rates.The study by Dasgupta(1989)attempts to decompose the observed interest rates into their various components,1andfinds that the default costs explain7per cent(not7percentage points!)of the total interest costs for autofinanciers in Namakkal and handloomfinanciers in Bangalore and Karur,4%forfinance companies and3%for hire-purchase companies.The same study reports that 1In the tradition of Bottomley(1963).in four case studies of moneylenders in rural India they found default rates explained about23%of the observed interest rate.Timberg and Aiyar(1984),whose study is also mentioned above,report that average default losses for the informal lenders they studied ranges between0.5%and1.5%of working funds.The study by Aleem Aleem(1990)gives default rates for each individual lender.The median default rate is between1.5and2%,and the maximum is10%.2Finally,it does not seem to be the case that these high rates are only paid by those who have absolutely no assets left.The“Summary Report on Informal Credit Markets in India”(Dasgupta(1989))reports that several of the categories of lenders that have already been mentioned,such as handloomfinanciers andfinance corporations,focus almost exclusively onfinancing trade and industry while Timberg and Aiyar(1984)report that for Shikarpuri bankers at least75%of the money goes tofinance trade and, to lesser extent,industry.In other words,they only lend to establishedfirms.It is hard to imagine, though not impossible,that all thefirms have literally no assets that they can sell.Ghate(1992)also concludes that the bulk of informal credit goes tofinance trade and production,and Murshid(1992), also mentioned above,argues that most loans in his sample are production loans despite the fact that the interest rate is40%for a3-5month loan period.Udry(2003)obtains similar indirect estimates by restricting himself to a sector where loans are used for productive purpose,the market for spare taxi parts in Accra,Ghana.He collected40pairs of observations on price and expected life for a particular used car part sold by a particular dealer(e.g., alternator,steering rack,drive shaft).Solving for the discount rate which makes the expected discounted cost of two similar parts equal gives a lower bound to the returns to capital.He obtains an estimate of 77%for the median discount rate.Together,these studies thus suggest that people are willing to pay high interest rates for loans used for productive purpose,which suggests that the rates of return to capital are indeed high in developing countries,at least for some people.•Direct EstimatesSome studies have tried to come up with more direct estimates of the rates of returns to capital. The“standard”way to estimate returns to capital is to posit a production function(translog and Cobb-Douglas,generally)and to estimate its parameters using OLS regression,or instrumenting capital with 2Here we make no attempt to answer the question of why the interest rates are so high.Banerjee(2003)argues that it is not implausible that the enormous gap between borrowing and lending rates implied by these numbers,simply reflects the cost of lending(monitoring and contracting costs of various kinds).Hoffand Stiglitz(1998)suggest an important role for monopolistic competition,in the presence of afixed cost of lending.There is also a view that the market for credit is monoploized by a small number of lenders who earn excess profits,but Aleem(1990)finds no evidence of excess profits.its ing this methodology,Bigsten,Isaksson,Soderbom and Al(2000)estimate returns to phys-ical and human capital infive African countries.They estimate rates of returns ranging from10%to 32%.McKenzie and Woodruff(2003)estimate parametric and non-parametric relationships between firm earnings andfirm capital.Their estimates suggest huge returns to capital for these smallfirms:For firms with less than$200invested,the rate of returns reaches15%per month,well above the informal interest rates available in pawn shops or through micro-credit programs(on the order of3%per month). Estimated rates of return decline with investment,but remain high(7%to10%forfirms with investment between$200and$500,5%forfirms with investment between$500and$1,000).Such studies present serious methodological issues,however.First,the investment levels are likely to be correlated with omitted variables.For example,in a world without credit constraints,investment will be positively correlated with the expected returns to investment,generating a positive“ability bias”(Olley and Pakes(1996)).McKenzie and Woodruffattempt to control for managerial ability by including thefirm owner’s wage in previous employment,but this may go only part of the way if individuals choose to enter self-employment precisely because their expected productivity in self-employment is much larger than their productivity in an employed job.Conversely,there could be a negative ability bias,if capital is allocated tofirms in order to avoid their failure.Banerjee and Duflo(2004)take advantage of a change in the definition of the so-called“priority sector”in India to circumvent these difficulties.All banks in India are required to lend at least40%of their net credit to the“priority sector”,which includes small-scale industry,at an interest rate that is required to be no more than4%above their prime lending rate.In January,1998,the limit on total investment in plants and machinery for afirm to be eligible for inclusion in the small-scale industry category was raised from Rs.6.5million to Rs.30million.In2000,the limit was lowered back to Rs10million Banerjee and Duflo(2004)first show that,after the reforms,newly eligiblefirms(those with investment between6.5 million and30million)received on average larger increments in their working capital limit than smaller firms.They then show that the sales and profits increased faster for thesefirms during the same period. The opposite happened when the priority sector was contracted again.Putting these two facts together, they use the variation in the eligibility rule over time to construct instrumental variable estimates of the impact of working capital on sales and profits.After computing a non-subsidized cost of capital,they estimate that the returns to capital in thesefirms must be at least74%.There is also direct evidence of very high rates of returns on productive investment in agriculture. Goldstein and Udry(1999)estimate the rates of returns to the production of pineapple in Ghana.The rate of returns associated with switching from the traditional maize and Cassava intercrops to pineapple is estimated to be in excess of1,200%!Few people grow pineapple,however,and thisfigure may hide some heterogeneity between those who have switched to pineapple and those who have not.Evidence from experimental farms also suggests that,in Africa,the rate of returns to using chemical fertilizer(for maize)would also be high.However,this evidence may not be realistic,if the ideal conditions of an experimental farm cannot be reproduced on actual farms.Foster and Rosenzweig(1995)show,for example,that the returns to switching to high yielding varieties were actually low in the early years of the green revolution in India,and even negative for farmers without an education.This is despite the fact that these varieties had precisely been selected for having high yields,in proper conditions.But they required complementary inputs in the correct quantities and timing.If farmers were not able or did not know how to supply those,the rates of returns were actually low.To estimate the rates of returns to using fertilizer in actual farms in Kenya,Duflo,Kremer and Robinson(2003),in collaboration with a small NGO,set up small scale randomized trials on people’s farms:Each farmer in the trials delimited two small plots.On one randomly selected plot,afield officer from the NGO helped the farmer apply fertilizer.Other than that,the farmers continued to farm as usual.Theyfind that the rates of returns from using a small amount of fertilizer varied from169%to 500%depending on the year,although of returns decline fast with the quantity used on a plot of a given size.This is not inconsistent with the results in Foster and Rosenzweig(1995),since by the time this study was conducted in Kenya,chemical fertilizer was a well established and well understood technology, which did not need many complementary inputs.The direct estimates thus tend to confirm the indirect estimates:While there are some settings where investment is not productive,there seems to be investment opportunities which yield substantial rates of returns.•How high is the marginal product on average?The fact that the marginal product in somefirms is50%or100%or even more does not imply that the average of the marginal products across allfirms is nearly as high.Of course,if capital always went to its best use,the notion of the average of the marginal products does not make sense.The presumption here is that there may be an equilibrium where the marginal products are not equalized acrossfirms.One way to get at the average of the marginal products is to look at the Incremental Capital Output Ratio(ICOR)for the country as a whole.The ICOR measures the increase in output predicted by a one unit increase in capital stock.It is calculated by extrapolating from the past experience of the country and assumes that the next unit of capital will be used exactly as efficiently(or inefficiently)as the last one.The inverse of the ICOR therefore gives an upper bound for the average marginal product for the economy—it is an upper bound because the calculation of the ICOR does not control for the effect of the increases in the other factors of production which also contributes to the increase in output.3For the 3The implicit assumption that the other factors of production are growing is probably reasonable for most developinglate1990s,the IMF estimates that the ICOR is over4.5for India and3.7for Uganda.The implied upper bound on the average marginal product is22%for India and27%in Uganda.This is also consistent with the work of Pessoa,Cavalcanti-Ferreira and Velloso(2004)who estimate a production function using cross-country data and calculate marginal products for developing countries which are in the10-20% range.It seems that the average returns are actually not much higher than the9%or so,which is the usual estimate for the average stock market return in the US.•Variations in the marginal products acrossfirms.To reconcile the high direct and indirect estimates of the marginal returns we just discussed and an average marginal product of22%in India,it would have to be that there is substantial variation in the marginal product of capital within the country.Given that the inefficiency of the Indian public sector is legendary,this may just be explained by the investment in the public sector.However,since the ICOR is from the late1990s,when there was little new investment(or even disinvestment)in the public sector, there must also be manyfirms in the private sector with marginal returns substantially below22%.The micro evidence reported in Banerjee(2004),which shows that there is very substantial variation in the interest rate within the same sub-economy,certainly goes in this direction.The Timberg and Aiyar (1984)study mentioned above,is one source of this evidence:It reports that the Shikarpuri lenders charged rates that were as low as21%and as high as120%,and some established traders on the Calcutta and Bombay commodity markets could raise funds for as little as9%.The study by Aleem(1990),also mentioned above,reports that the standard deviation of the interest rate was38.14%.Given that the average lending rate was78.5%,this tells us that an interest rate of2%and an interest rate of150% were both within two standard deviations of the mean.Unfortunately,we cannot quite assume from this that there are some borrowers whose marginal product is9%or less:The interest rate may not be the marginal product if the borrowers who have access to these rates are credit constrained.Nevertheless, given that these are typically very established traders,this is less likely than it would be otherwise.Ideally we would settle this issue on the basis of direct evidence on the misallocation of capital, by providing direct evidence on variations in rates of return across groups offirms.Unfortunately such evidence is not easy to come by,since it is difficult to consistently measure the marginal product of capital. However,there is some rather suggestive evidence from the knitted garment industry in the Southern Indian town of Tirupur(Banerjee and Munshi(2004);Banerjee,Duflo and Munshi(2003)).Two groups of people operate in Tirupur:the Gounders,who issue from a small,wealthy,agricultural community from the area around Tirupur,who have moved into the ready-made garment industry because there was not much investment opportunity in agriculture.Outsiders from various regions and communities countries,except perhaps in Africa.。

风险投资家:玛丽·米克尔人物简介

风险投资家:玛丽·米克尔人物简介

• 她的投资哲学使Benchmark Capital在风投领域取得了显著的成绩
投资成功案例包括:Facebook、Uber、
Snapchat等
• 这些公司的成功为Benchmark Capital带来了巨大的投资回报
• 证明了玛丽·米克尔的投资眼光和决策能力

⌛️
玛丽·米克尔的投资哲学与理念
01
坚信科技产业具有巨大的发展潜力
投资机会
03
2010年发布了《移动互联网报告》
• 预测移动互联网将成为科技产业的重要增长点
• 报告中的观点再次为投资者提供了有价值的参考
02
玛丽·米克尔的风投生涯与投资项目
玛丽·米克尔创立Benchmark Capital的过程
2000年离开摩根士丹利,创立了Benchmark Capital
• 专注于科技和互联网领域的风险投资
玛丽·米克尔的团队建设与领导力
注重团队建设
卓越的领导力
• 玛丽·米克尔认为,一个优秀的团队是企业成功的关键
• 玛丽·米克尔具有卓越的领导力,能够带领团队在激烈的
• 她注重团队建设,选拔和培养了一批优秀的分析师和投
市场竞争中取得优异的成绩
资经理
• 她的领导力和决策能力使Benchmark Capital在风投领
值创造
• 她倡导长期投资和价值投资,使Benchmark Capital在
风投领域响
玛丽·米克尔对科技产业的推动作用

坚定支持科技产业的发展
• 玛丽·米克尔认为,科技产业将继续引领全球经济增长
• 她对科技产业的坚定信仰使她能够在投资领域取得优异的成绩
舞了更多的女性投身于这一领域
03
促进性别平等和多样性

经济学家关键词翻译

经济学家关键词翻译


Although types of human capital investment generally include health and nutrition (Schultz, 1981), education consistently emerges as the prime human capital investment for empirical analysis. One main reason for this is that education is perceived to contribute to health and nutritional improvements (Schultz, 1963); a second and more empirically important reason is that education may be measured in quantitative dollar costs and years of tenure.
• Second, human capital exerts its functions in substituting and supplementing all production factors. Schurz holds in the process of production, modern economic development depends not purely on natural resources and human labor but more on labor workers’ intelligence, adding workers’ metal work to replace the original production factors. • Third, concrete quantitative calculation is the further step to prove that human capital is the source of economic development

人类基因组概况ppt课件

人类基因组概况ppt课件
A+T含量 G+C含量 不能确定的碱基 重复序列(不含异染色质) 编码序列(基因)数目 功能未知基因比例 外显子最多的基因 SNP数量 SNP密度
2.91Gbp
54% 38% 9% 35% 26588 42% Titin(234) 约300万个 1/12500 bp
最长的染色体 最短的染色体 基因最多的染色体 基因最少的染色体 基因密度最大的染色体 基因密度最小的染色体 重复序列含量最高的染色体
It is essentially immoral not to get it (the human genome sequence) done as fast as possible.
James Watson
人类基因组计划的完成,使得我们今天有可能来探 讨基因组的概,但我们仍然无法来谈论细节。
重复序列含量最低的染色体
编码外显子序列的比例 基因的平均长度
2(240 Mbp) Y(19 Mbp) 1(2453) Y(104) 19(23/Mb) 13,Y(5/Mb) 19(57%)
2,8,10,13,18(36%)
1.1~1.4% 27 Kb
女 平均 男
染色体上距着丝粒越远,重组率越高
4. Francis S. Collins, Eric D. Green, Alan E. Guttmacher, Mark S. Guyer :A Vision for the Future of Genomics Research. A blueprint for the genomic era. Nature Apr 24 2003: 835.
而 Celera 的测序样本来自5个人:分别属于西班牙裔、 亚洲裔、非洲裔、美洲裔和高加索裔(2男3女),是从21个志 愿者样本中挑选的。

私募股权投资者:亨利·克拉维斯人物简介

私募股权投资者:亨利·克拉维斯人物简介
• 强调价值投资理念 • 亨利·克拉维斯认为,投资的关键在于寻找被低估的企业 • 通过深入分析企业的基本面,克拉维斯公司能够在市场低谷时买入优质资产 • 价值投资理念使克拉维斯公司在经济周期波动时仍能保持稳定的投资回报
• 善于创新投资方法 • 亨利·克拉维斯不断尝试新的投资方法和策略,如杠杆收购、管理层收购等 • 这些创新投资方法使克拉维斯公司在竞争激烈的市场中脱颖而出 • 创新投资方法也为克拉维斯公司带来了更高的投资回报
• 加强与合作伙伴的合作,扩大投资规模 • 亨利·克拉维斯将加强与合作伙伴的合作,共同寻找和投资优质项目 • 克拉维斯公司将寻求与其他知名投资机构、企业等建立战略合作关系,扩大投资规模 • 加强与合作伙伴的合作将使亨利·克拉维斯在未来继续保持投资领域的领先地位
亨利·克拉维斯面临的行业竞争与挑战
• 行业竞争加剧,市场份额面临压力 • 随着私募股权投资市场的不断发展,行业竞争日益加剧 • 亨利·克拉维斯需要不断提高自身的能力和竞争力,以保持克拉维斯公司在行业内的领先地位 • 面对行业竞争的压力,亨利·克拉维斯需要不断创新投资方法和策略,提高投资业绩
投资业绩斐然,为投资者带来丰厚的回报
• 亨利·克拉维斯的投资眼光独具慧眼,成功投资了许多明星企业 • 如华盛顿邮报、汉堡王等,投资回报丰厚 • 克拉维斯公司的投资回报率一直保持在行业领先水平
塑造了私募股权投资的行业标准
• 亨利·克拉维斯的投资理念和策略对私募股权投资行业产生了深远的影响 • 克拉维斯公司的一些投资方法和案例成为了行业内的典范 • 亨利·克拉维斯被誉为私募股权投资的教父,为行业发展树立了标杆
亨利·克拉维斯对全球并购市场的影响
• 推动全球并购市场的发展 • 亨利·克拉维斯是全球并购市场的领军人物,推动了并购市场的发展 • 克拉维斯公司参与的并购交易规模巨大,涉及多个行业和地区 • 克拉维斯公司的并购交易为全球并购市场树立了典范,推动了市场的规范化和专业化

各种资本上的专有名词解释

各种资本上的专有名词解释

各种资本上的专有名词解释资本是现代经济体系中的重要组成部分,它可以依据不同的性质和特点进行分类。

资本的多样性使得不同领域和行业内出现了许多专有名词。

在本文中,我们将对一些常见的资本上的专有名词进行解释,以帮助读者更好地理解和运用这些术语。

一、风险投资(Venture Capital)风险投资是一种向初创企业提供资金支持的投资方式。

通常,初创企业往往缺乏足够的资金来进行研发、生产和市场推广等活动。

风险投资者通常会投入一定金额的资金,以换取股份或其他可享受企业利润的权益。

这种投资方式的风险较高,但同时也有可能获得高额回报。

二、私募股权投资(Private Equity)私募股权投资是投资者通过购买非上市公司的股权来实现投资回报的一种方式。

相较于公开市场上的股权交易,私募股权投资更加私密和传统。

这种投资方式通常需要投资者具备较高的实力和专业知识,以便进行投资决策、风险评估和监督管理。

三、杠杆收购(Leveraged Buyout)杠杆收购是指投资者通过借入大量资金来收购一家公司的策略。

通常,该模式会利用所收购的公司的资产作为抵押,向银行或其他金融机构借入巨额贷款,然后使用借款金额来购买目标公司的股权。

杠杆收购往往潜在风险较高,但也有机会取得显著的投资回报。

四、天使投资(Angel Investment)天使投资是指个人投资者(通常是成功的企业家或高净值个人)向早期创业企业提供资金支持的一种投资方式。

天使投资者通常会提供资金和经验,协助创业企业的发展和成长。

这种投资方式往往在创业企业尚未获得风险投资支持之前得以实施,并且对初创企业的创意和创新领域有较高的兴趣。

五、股权众筹(Equity Crowdfunding)股权众筹是一种通过公众捐款融资的方式。

投资者通过网上平台,以购买初创公司的股权或代表权益的证券,来支持初创企业的发展。

这种方式可以使广大投资者参与到创业投资中,获得投资回报的机会,同时帮助初创企业筹集所需的资金。

老虎基金的详细介绍

老虎基金的详细介绍

老虎基金的详细介绍什么是老虎基金?老虎基金(Tiger Fund)是一家成立于1980年代的对冲基金,由美籍华人投资者朱利安·罗伯逊(Julian Robertson)创建。

该基金以其出色的投资业绩和颇具传奇色彩的投资策略而闻名于世。

老虎基金的成功使其成为全球对冲基金业的先驱和领导者。

传奇创始人朱利安·罗伯逊朱利安·罗伯逊是老虎基金的创始人兼首席执行官,也是对冲基金行业的重要人物之一。

作为一个天才的投资者,罗伯逊通过对公司基本面和市场走势的深入研究,成功预测了多个行业和公司的发展趋势,并以此取得了巨额收益。

老虎基金的投资策略老虎基金以其独特而成功的投资策略而闻名于世。

以下是老虎基金常用的几种投资策略:1. 价值投资老虎基金主张价值投资,即寻找被低估的股票,并长期持有。

朱利安·罗伯逊相信,只有购买被低估的股票,并在市场对其重新评价时出售,才能获得超额收益。

2. 特定行业投资老虎基金善于发现特定行业的投资机会,并投资于行业领先的公司。

该策略要求对行业的深入了解和对公司的细致分析,以寻找具有长期增长潜力和竞争优势的公司。

3. 对冲策略老虎基金也采用对冲策略来保护投资组合免受市场波动的影响。

该策略通过同时进行多头和空头交易,旨在在市场下跌时获得收益,从而平衡整个投资组合的风险。

老虎基金的成功案例老虎基金以其成功的投资案例而闻名于世。

以下是老虎基金的一些代表性投资案例:1. 亚洲金融危机在1997年亚洲金融危机期间,老虎基金看准了亚洲国家经济的恢复潜力,并在危机最严重的时候加大了对亚洲市场的投资。

该决策使老虎基金在危机后取得了巨大的回报。

2. 科技泡沫崩盘在2000年科技泡沫崩盘期间,老虎基金通过及时减持科技股票和做空相关公司,成功规避了市场崩盘造成的损失。

同时,他们还在崩盘后低吸血液,以低价买入具有长期潜力的科技股票。

3. 中国市场机会由于对中国市场增长的准确判断,老虎基金早早进入中国市场并进行大规模投资。

孵化未来 谷歌风投希望将自己区别于其他风险投资公司和天使投资人

孵化未来 谷歌风投希望将自己区别于其他风险投资公司和天使投资人

孵化未来谷歌风投希望将自己区别于其他风险投资公司和天使投资人作者:暂无来源:《新经济导刊》 2011年第1期2010年12月,岁末之际,谷歌旗下风险投资部门谷歌风投(Google Ventures)在谷歌总部建立“创业企业实验室(Startup Lab)”,向创业企业提供办公场所,孵化这些创业企业。

来自美国的一则消息,搅动了风投界,并使人们开始对新的未来展开想象。

Google Ventures孵化企业2010年10月,一个小型团队开始在谷歌总部从事有关人类抗体的研究。

他们并不是谷歌的一部分,也与谷歌旗舰的互联网搜索业务无关。

不过,谷歌向该团队提供了工作场所和一流的设备,包括高速互联网接入、会议室,甚至是乒乓桌。

这一团队是生物科技公司Adimab的一部分。

与另4家公司一起,Adimab成为创业企业实验室的首批参与者。

位于谷歌总部的这一实验室旨在帮助谷歌风投投资的创业企业获取谷歌的丰富资源。

谷歌风投管理合伙人比尔马里斯(Bill Maris)表示,谷歌员工向创业团队提供各种建议,包括产品设计和招聘等,同时也使这些创业企业能很快融入硅谷。

在风险投资行业激烈的竞争中,谷歌风投希望将自己区别于其他风险投资公司和天使投资人。

比尔·马里斯表示:“我们计划于2011年积极参与种子投资领域。

创业企业实验室正是这一方面的体现。

”谷歌的创业企业实验室占地I.5万平方英尺,能够容纳100至120人办公,并放置了许多设备。

此外,实验室还设置了带宽达ICB的宽带网络,并与谷歌的企业网相互独立。

这将有助于保护创业企业的隐私。

谷歌目前在互联网行业的领先地位受到小型对手的挑战,例如Facebook和Twitter。

过去一年中,谷歌多名顶级工程师和高管转投Facebook。

“背叛者”之一、谷歌地图联合创始人拉尔斯拉斯姆森(LarsRasmussen)表示,在谷歌这样规模的公司中工作“极具挑战性”。

创业企业实验室的建立表明,谷歌希望利用规模优势与创业企业和企业家建立联系。

人力资本投资(investment in human capital)

人力资本投资(investment in human capital)

The American Economic Review(美国经济评论)人力资本投资(investment in human capital)中文翻译版尽管人们获得有用的技能和知识很明显,但不明显的是,这些技能和知识是资本的一种形式,这种资本是在有意投资的大部分产品,它在西方社会以比传统(非人类的)资本更快的速度生长,其增长很可能是经济体系的最显著特征。

人们普遍注意到,与土地、工时和有形可再生资本的增长相比,国民产出的增长很大。

对人力资本的投资可能是造成这种差异的主要原因。

我们所说的消费大部分构成了对人力资本的投资。

为获得更好的就业机会,在教育、卫生和国内移徙方面的直接支出就是明显的例子。

上学的成熟学生和接受在职培训的工人所放弃的收入也是同样明显的例子。

然而,这些并没有进入我们的国民账户。

利用闲暇时间来提高技能和知识的做法很普遍,也没有被记录下来。

通过这些和类似的方式,人的努力的质量可以大大提高,生产力也可以提高。

我认为,这种对人力资本的投资,是每个工人实际收入发生令人印象深刻的增长的主要原因。

首先,我要说明经济学家不愿对人力资本投资进行明确分析的原因,然后,我要说明人力资本投资能够解释许多有关经济增长的谜团。

然而,我将主要集中于人力资本的范围和实质及其形成。

最后,我将考虑一些社会和政策影响。

I.回避对人的投资经济学家早就知道,人是国家财富的重要组成部分。

以劳动对产出的贡献来衡量,人类的生产能力现在比所有其他形式的财富加起来都要大得多。

经济学家没有强调的是一个简单的事实:人们投资于自己,而且这些投资是非常大的。

尽管经济学家很少会怯于进行抽象分析,而且常常以不切实际为傲,但他们在把握这种投资形式方面却没有勇气。

每当他们靠近的时候,他们都小心翼翼地向前走,就好像他们正步入深水。

毫无疑问,我们有理由保持警惕。

根深蒂固的道德和哲学问题一直存在。

自由的人首先是经济努力服务的目标;他们不是财产或市场资产。

尤其重要的是,在边际生产率分析中,把劳动力看作是完全不受资本约束的独特的先天能力,实在是太方便了。

《资本回报》拆书稿

《资本回报》拆书稿

《资本回报》拆书稿作者简介爱德华·钱塞勒:《金融投机史》(FSG,1999)的作者,该书被评为《纽约时报》年度重要图书:曾编辑马拉松公司前一本书《资本账户:一个资产管理人在动荡十年的报告》(Thomson Texere,2004)。

《资本回报》-穿越资本周期的投资:一个资产管理人的报告2002-2015【英】爱德华.钱塞勒编著陆猛译要点:均值回归的周期思维而不是外推的线性思维更多关注供给侧而非需求侧美股涨和A股不涨的解释要结论读导言即可,需要在历史时点的思考和分析场景,也可以读读全本。

1.文章都是选自马拉松资产管理公司写给客户的每年8期的《全球投资回顾》,由财经记者爱德华.钱塞勒整理,上一本书《资本账户》也是。

2.先说结论,干货满满,值得每个投资经理学习,这本书覆盖的时间,经历了08年金融危机、欧债危机,有很多的经验和教训。

3.马拉松基金最重要的投资哲学:资本周期。

行业的高回报往往会吸引资本和竞争,正如低回报会排斥它们一样。

由此产生的资本的涨落会以可预测的方式影响股东的长期回报,称之为资本周期。

由于长期来看,高水平的投资往往不利于股东的回报,马拉松公司寻求投资于因进入障碍而获得高回报的公司,或投资下降的行业中回报率较低的公司。

4.第二个指导思想是,从长远来看,管理者配置资本的管理技能至关重要。

最好的管理者理解并寻求通过明智的再投资选择来改变其行业的资本循环。

有关新资本项目、收购或出售、股票发行或回购的决策对股东的最终结果至关重要。

5.实际上是波特五力分析里边的供给侧的分析。

6.在一个周期性的世界中,分析和投资人员思维却是线性的,习惯于外推当前趋势。

7.半导体、航空、TMT、大宗商品等等,都有明显的资本周期。

8.投资较少的公司回报更高。

资产扩张相关的行为——并购、新股发行、新的贷款——常常伴随此后的低回报。

与资产收缩相关的行为——分立、股票回购、偿债、分配股利——常伴随此后的正的超额回报。

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Marin,Dalia und Koman,Reinhard:Human Capital and Macroeconomic Growth:Austria and Germany1960-1997.An UpdateMunich Discussion Paper No.2005-4Department of EconomicsUniversity of MunichVolkswirtschaftliche FakultätLudwig-Maximilians-Universität MünchenOnline at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/569/HUMAN CAPITAL AND MACROECONOMIC GROWTH:AUSTRIA AND GERMANY 1960-1997AN UPDATEReinhard KomanInstitute for Advanced Studies ViennaDalia MarinUniversity of Munich and CEPRMay 1999JEL Classification: O1, O3, O4.Keywords: Economic growth, total factor productivity, human capital, technical change, growth accounting.This paper was presented at the Public Finance Conference in Tel Aviv, at the ERWIT meeting in Glasgow, at the Verein für Socialpolitik in Kassel, and at seminars at Humboldt University Berlin, the Science Center Berlin, University of Dortmund, and at University of Magdeburg. We would like to thank Elhanan Helpman and the participants of these conferences and seminars for helpful comments.AbstractIn an influential paper Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) argue that the evidence on the international disparity in levels of per capita income and rates of growth is consistent with a standard Solow model, once it has been augmented to include human capital as an accumulable factor. In a study on Austria and Germany we augment the Solow model to allow for the accumulation of human capital. Based on a perpetual inventory estimation procedure we construct an aggregate measure of the stock of human capital of Austria and Germany by weighting workers of different schooling levels with their respective wage income. We obtain an estimate of the wage income of workers with different schooling from a Mincer type wage equation which quantifies how wages change with years of schooling. We find that the time series evidence on Austria and Germany is not consistent with a human capital augmented Solow model. Factor accumulation (broadly defined to include human capital) appears to be less (and not more) able to account for the cross-country growth performance of Austria and Germany when human capital accumulation is included in the analysis. Our results indicate that differences in technology are a driving factor in understanding cross country growth between these two neighboring countries with similar political and institutional background.1. IntroductionCurrent thinking in growth theory is divided in two approaches which offer a coherent explanation of sustained economic growth. One strand of theory continues to see capital accumulation (broadly defined to include human capital) as the driving force behind economic growth. A second approach gives technical change a leading role in the growth. In an influential empirical paper Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) (hereinafter MRW) argue that the evidence on the international disparity in levels of per capita income and rates of growth is consistent with a standard Solow model, once it has been augmented to include human capital as an accumulable factor. MRW argue that because saving and population growth rates vary across countries, different countries reach different steady states. The Solow model correctly predicts the direction of how these variables influence the steady state level of income. It fails, however, to correctly predict the magnitude of the influence. The estimated size of capital's share of income is too large to conform to independent observations of capital's income share. MRW proceed by including human capital accumulation as an additional explanatory variable in their cross country regressions. They argue, that because human capital accumulation is correlated with saving and population growth, omitting human capital accumulation biases the estimated coefficients on saving and population growth. They find that the inclusion of human capital indeed changes the estimated effects of saving and population growth to roughly the values predicted by the augmented Solow model. Furthermore, they show that the augmented Solow model accounts for about eighty percent of the cross-country variation in income. Based on their findings MRW conclude that it is doubtful to dismiss the Solow growth model in favor of endogenous-growth models.1This paper offers a case study on the growth experience of two individual economies, Austria and Germany in the post-war period. A case study on individual economies makes it possible to isolate the effect of capital deepening (broadly defined to include human capital) on the one hand and technical change on the other in the growth process. In their cross-country regressions MRW make the assumption that all countries experience the same rate of technological progress. We take MRW1 The revival of the Solow model has been supported also by estimates of the growth experience of East Asian countries see Young (1995). For a survey on this debate see Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997).seriously and augment the Solow model to allow for human capital as an accumulable factor. We show that the human capital augmented Solow model is not consistent with the time series evidence of Austria and Germany. Our results indicate that differences in technology are a significant factor in understanding cross-country economic growth of Austria and Germany. The striking differences in total factor productivity growth between two similar countries which are as geographically close as Germany and Austria casts doubts on the notion of a common rate of technical progress and thus of the validity of the results obtained by MRW. Cross country differences in growth rates of Austria and Germany appear to be driven by differences in the rate of technical change and not so much by differences in factor accumulation.2In order to augment the Solow model to allow for the accumulation of human capital, we estimate the human capital stock of Austria and Germany based on a perpetual inventory procedure for five categories of educational attainment. We use data on completion of educational levels rather than enrollment rates (as has been done by previous studies). The estimates obtained by this procedure are then modified to benchmark the census observations of the five categories of educational attainment and to allow for education-specific survival rates. We then construct an aggregate measure of the stock of human capital of Austria and Germany by weighting workers of different schooling levels with their respective wage income. We obtain an estimate of the rate of return of different schooling levels from a Mincer type earnings-equation which quantifies how wages change with years of schooling.The paper comes in six sections. Section 2 presents some stylized facts about growth and convergence in Austria and Germany. Section 3 summarizes the augmented Solow model and its implication for testing. Section 4 presents the methodology of estimating the human capital stock of Austria and Germany and relates our methodology to previous estimates in the literature. The section gives also a2 A paper by Islam (1995) using panel estimation which allows for correlated country specific technology effects shows that MRW's results are considerably altered when differences in aggregate production functions across countries are taken into account. The panel estimates for capital's share of income are much closer to the general accepted values even when human capital accumulation is not taken into account. This suggests that much of the upward bias of the estimated coefficient on capital seems to be generated by an omission bias due to the missing variable of technical change. Islam's findings suggest that the coefficient on the investment variable picks up not only the variation in per capita incomes due to differences in countries' tastes for savings, but also part of the variation due to their differences in technical change.summary of the results. Section 5 incorporates these human capital stock estimates in a growth accounting calculation to obtain measures of total factor productivity growth. Section 6 concludes.2. Some Stylized FactsIn order to place the growth experience of Austria and Germany in international perspective we turn to the popular Summers and Heston purchasing power parity data set. Table 1 presents income per capita for major OECD countries in relation to the US. Three facts are noteworthy. First, in the period between 1960 and 1980 Austria was among the European countries which closed its income gap to the US fastest. Second, Germany exhibited a faster convergence rate than Austria when the 1950s are taken into account. Third, in both countries the speed of convergence has slowed down since the mid 1980s.As shown in Figure 1 until the early 1970s the investment to GDP ratio (at constant prices) has remained roughly constant in Germany , while rising rapidly in Austria. By the early 1970s Austria and Germany had investment rates of approximately the same size.Human capital accumulation has been quite rapid in both countries. Table 2 shows that over the past two and a half decades the proportion of the working population with a university education more than doubled in both countries. The proportion of the labour force with a degree to enter university (…Abitur“/ …Matura“) almost tripled while those with primary education declined rapidly.33 For Germany the figures of the population census are not comparable over time due to changes in the education system and due to changes in classification. We corrected the figures of the census to make them comparable over time by assuming constancy of the education system and of classification, see section 4.1 for a description.3. The Human Capital Augmented Solow-ModelMRW start with a production function which includes human capital as a third inputY t K t H t A t L t ()()()(()())=−−αβαβ1(2)where Y is output, K is physical capital, L is labour, H is human capital, and A is the level oftechnology. L and A are assumed to grow exogenously at rates n and g. The physical capital stock and the human capital stock are augmented at the constant savings rates s k and s h , respectively, and both stocks depreciate at the same rate δ. Physical capital evolves according to dK t /dt = s k Y t - δK t and human capital evolves according to dH t /dt = s h Y t - δH t . Assuming that countries are in their steady-state MRW derive the following expression for the steady state per capita incomeln(()())ln ()ln()ln()ln()Y t L t A gt n g s s k h =+−+−−+++−−+−−0111αβαβδααββαβ(3)with α as the physical capital’s share of income and β as the human capital’s share of income. MRW use this equation to see how differing saving in physical and human capital and labour force growth rates can explain the differences in per capita incomes across countries. In their empiricalimplementation of equation (3), MRW rely on the crucial assumption that the rate of technological progress, g , is the same for all countries. This way, t becomes a fixed number, and gt enters just as a constant term in their cross-section regression. The A(0) term in equation (3) which reflects not just technology but resource endowments, climate and institutions, is seen to differ across countries and MRW assume that ln ()A a 0=+ε where a is a constant and ε is a country-specific term. Incorporating these assumptions in equation (3) yields them the specificationln()ln()ln()ln()Y L a s s n g k h =+−−+−−−+−−+++ααββαβαβαβδε111 (4) MRW estimate equation (4) and examine the plausibility of the implied factor shares. If OLS gives them coefficients on saving and population growth whose magnitudes are substantially different from the values predicted by the Solow model (approximately 0.5 for an assumed capital's share in income of roughly 1/3), MRW reject the joint hypothesis that the Solow model and their identifyingassumption are correct. MRW show how leaving out human capital as a third input will affect the residual. Combining (4) with an equation for the steady state level of human capital results in an equation for income as a function of the rate of investment in physical capital, the rate of population growth, and the level of human capital 4ln(()())ln ()ln()ln()ln()*Y t L t A gt s n g h k =++−−−+++−0111ααααδβα (5)From equation (5) it can be seen that in a specification of the production function without human capital as a third input, the level of human capital h * is a component of the error term. Therefore, when human capital is omitted in a growth accounting calculation the estimates of TFP will be biased upwards.5In our study on Austria and Germany we evaluate the Solow model by proceeding in the following way. We start from equation (3) which does not make any assumptions on ()[ln ]A gt 0+ and we apply this growth accounting equation to time series data of Germany and Austria, respectively. In a first step, we do not include human capital as a third input into the total factor productivity analysis. We impose on equation (3) a value of α derived from national accounts data on factor shares and we ask how much of the variation in income over time the model can account for. We use a closely related equation as (3) without making the steady state assumption. We replace the investment as a4 The steady state level of human capital is given by h s s n g k h *(=++−−−αβαβδ111 5 MRW use this argument also to show why omitting human capital will bias the estimated coefficients on saving and population growth.share of income by the capital stock.6 This standard growth accounting procedure allows us to decompose growth over time in a single country into a part explained by growth in factor inputs and an unexplained part - the Solow residual - which is typically attributed to technical change. The Solow model's prediction is that differences in saving and population growth account for a large fraction of the cross-country variation in per capita income between Austria and Germany. Accordingly, the model predicts that Austria has been growing faster than Germany in the post war period and thus has been catching up to the German income level because it lagged behind Germany in its capital accumulation making its marginal productivity of capital larger and thus capital formation more worthwhile.7 If growth accounting yields estimates of the Solow residual which are large and differ significantly between the two countries, then we can reject the hypothesis that the Solow model and MRW's assumption of a common rate of technological progress across countries are correct.8 We consider the Solow residual to be "large" if it exceeds the "unexplained residual variance" obtained by MRW in their cross-country regressions. In a second step, we correct for the possible upward bias of the TFP by including human capital as a third input in the estimates of total factor productivity.The estimates of total factor productivity with physical capital and raw labour for Austria and Germany are given in Table 3. For the entire period the imposed value for capital's share in income is 0.29 for Austria and 0.28 for Germany. As it appears from the Table differences in factor accumulation between the two countries can account for part of the difference in the growth rates of Germany and Austria only. The contribution of technical change as measured by total factor productivity appears to be large in both countries. The Solow residual accounts for 67,1% of economic growth in Austria and about 57,2% of economic growth in Germany. These residuals by far exceed the6 MRW use investment shares as a proxy for the capital stock which is justified under the steady state assumption.7 The same prediction holds in a Cass-Koopmans type model that endogenizes the savings decision.8 One could object against this "testing procedure" that two countries are not enough to reject the hypothesis of no differences in total factor productivity (henceforth TFP) across countries. Against this objection we want to stress that we have selected two neighbouring countries with similar political and institutional background for which the assumption of a common rate of technical progress is most likely to be true. If we can show that even for such "similar" countries TFP differ substantially, we feel comfortable to reject the hypothesis of no difference in TFP. Austria and Germany can be classified to form a …convergence club“ in the sense defined by Durlauf and Johnson 1991 in their classification using the …regression tree“ method.unexplained variation obtained by MRW of roughly 40%.9 The difference in the growth rate between Austria and Germany appear to be driven by differences in the rate of technical change and not so much by differences in capital accumulation. Moreover, the striking difference in total factor productivity between these two economies makes it easy to reject - even without a formal test - MRW's assumption of a common rate of knowledge advancement across countries.10The above results make it appropriate to conclude that the Solow model is not very successful in explaining a high fraction of the variation in income between Austria and Germany. One of the reasons why the data do not come out in support of the Solow model suggested by MRW lies in the fact that we have not included human capital as an accumulable factor. Therefore, we might attribute something to technical change which, in fact, must be accounted for by human capital. Accordingly, the TFP estimates of Austria falsely turn out to exceed those of Germany because human capital growth in Austria exceeded that of Germany and our procedure attributes this to technical change. In a second step, we proceed to estimate the total factor productivity with human capital included to see whether the inclusion of human capital in the analysis can reverse the results found in this section. Before we can do so, however, we have to find an aggregate measure for human capital. We turn to measuring human capital in the next section.4. Measuring Aggregate Human CapitalMeasuring human capital is notoriously difficult. The reason is that in most countries educational data are available only for one or two years per decade. In recent years several researchers have attempted to construct measures of the stock of human capital in order to facilitate empirical studies on the role of human capital for cross-country growth comparisons (see Barro and Lee 1993 , Mulligan and Sala-9 We refer to the regressions in Table I of the textbook Solow model. The unexplained residual variation in MRW is defined by their adjusted 1-R2.10 Endogenous growth theory leads us to expect a larger TFP in Germany than in Austria, since the theory gives larger economies a comparative advantage in undertaking R&D. This prediction can be derived also in an endogenous growth model with externalities of the type of Romer 1986. For a discussion see Marin (1995). For an attempt to reconcile the empirical fact that larger countries do not necessarily innovate more see Jones (1995) and Young (1995).i-Martin 1995a, 1995b). We describe now our methodology of creating time series data on the human capital stock of Austria and Germany.4.1 Estimating Missing ObservationsWe construct time series data on educational attainment for Austria and Germany for the period 1960 to 1997. We use years of completed schooling of the working population of 15 years and over as our concept of human capital. The underlying information comes from population censuses. In addition we use information on school completion. Based on the available national census data we construct figures for five levels of educational attainment: …Pflichtschule“ (compulsory education, includes primary school plus 5 years of secondary school), …Lehre“ (apprenticeship, only available for Austria), …mittlere Schule“ (Austria)/ …mittlere Reife“ (Germany), … Matura“ (Austria)/ …Abitur“ (Germany) (degree to enter university), …Fachhochschule“ (college, exists in Germany only) and university.11 The constructed data consist of 5 time series for each country.For Austria we have one observation per decade for the 5 education levels from the population census (1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, for 1961 for university and …Matura“ only). Before the population census 1971 completion of the so called university-like schools where added to the education level of …Matura“. Therefore, we added people with university-like degrees to the education level …Matura“ throughout the entire period. We used the first university degree whenever available for people who completed university. We have data on the …Matura", the graduation to enter university, for almost the entire period. For those years for which they were not available (1980-1986) we estimated the number of persons who acquired the …Matura" from data of successful completion of the respective school type. Data for graduates of the …mittlere Schule“ were not always available. Whenever they were not available we estimated them from data on pupils of the last school year. In some cases we had the number of pupils who completed the last school year successfully. We have data on the number of persons who completed the …Lehre" (apprenticeship) for the entire period. The data of the11 …Pflichtschule“ corresponds to Primary Education, …Mittlere Reife“ (Germany) and …Mittlere Schule“ (Austria) correspond to Secondary Education Stage I, …Abitur“ (Germany) and …Matura“ (Austria) correspond to Secondary Education Stage II, …Fachhochschule“ and …Universität“ correspond to Higher Education.…Pflichtschule" (compulsory education) resulted as a residual of those people who have not completed the other education levels.For Germany we have census information for 1961 (for university only), 1970, and 1987. The census figures are not comparable over time due to changes in the education system and due to changes in the census classification. The German education statistics make a distinction between …general education“ (allgemeine Ausbildung) and …professional education“ (berufliche Ausbildung). General education includes primary education (Pflichtschule), secondary education stage I (mittlere Reife) and secondary education stage II (Abitur). Professional education consists of the so-called …Berufsfachschulen“ and …Fachschulen“, and …Fachhochschulen“ (colleges) and university. The census 1987 reports general education and professional education separately, while the census 1970 reported the highest educational attainment of a person only (which could be either a general or a professional attainment). Moreover, the German …Fachhochschulen“ did not exist in 1970. They had two predecessor institutions, the so-called …Ingenieurschulen“ and …höhere Fachschulen“. The census 1970 contains information on the graduates of …Ingenieurschulen“ , but not on those of …höhere Fachschulen“ (the latter were treated simply as …Fachschulen“). These changes make the raw data not comparable over time. In order to achieve consistency over time we decided to introduce a new classification which combines both systems of classifications. From the general education classification we use the education levels …Pflichtschule“, …mittlere Reife“, and …Abitur“, from the professional classification we use the education levels …Fachhochschule“ (college) and university. For 1970, this required that we allocate the graduates of the …Berufsfachschulen“ and …Fachschulen“ to the other education levels (Pflichtschule, mittlere Reife, Abitur, and Fachhochschule). We were guided by the flow data on general and professional attainment of the graduates of …Berufsfachschulen“ and …Fachschulen“ in 1970 to allocate the stocks.12 For 1987, our new classification required that we deduct the graduates of colleges and universities from the number of persons with …Abitur“ or …mittlere Reife“ (depending on whether the former or the latter are a required educational background for universities or colleges or their predecessor institutions). In order to know where to deduct what we proceeded in the following way. The required general educational background for the university and …Fachhochschule“ is the12 The details of the allocation procedure are not reported and are available upon request.…Abitur“ and …Fachabitur“, respectively. We treated the …Fachabitur“ just like the …Abitur“. The required general educational background for the predecessor institutions of the …Fachhochschulen“ - the …Ingenieurschulen“ and …höhere Fachschulen“ - was the …mittlere Reife“. The transformation of …Ingenieurschulen“ and …höhere Fachschulen“ into …Fachhochschulen“ started in 1969 and took several years of transition. We chose 1972 as the first year in which graduates of …Fachhochschulen“ had to have an …Abitur“ as required educational background. Therefore, before 1972 graduates of …Fachhochschulen“ were deducted from the …mittlere Reife“ and from 1972 on graduates of …Fachhochschulen“ were deducted from the …Abitur“. With this procedure we were able also to make the census data of 1987 comparable with the census data of 1970.For Germany we have information on university graduates from 1960 to 1997. We have data on college graduates and on graduates of their predecessor institutions for 1960, and 1965 to 1997. We obtained the missing years 1961 to 1964 by interpolation. Data for graduates of …mittlere Reife“ and …Abitur“ were available for 1970 to 1997. For 1960 to 1969 we used available data for the most important subgroups (particularly the …Realschulen“ and the …Gymnasien“) of the respective school type to estimate the total flow.We fill in most of the missing observations for the five-level classification from a perpetual-inventory method that exploits the available data on school completion and population by age. We use the available census data as benchmarks and then estimate the missing observations for the two countries from 1961 to 1997.13 We carry out the estimation in three steps: first, we estimate the missing observations of each category of educational attainment by a perpetual inventory method. The flow of graduates are cumulated by imposing that the explained percentage of the census observations is the same across different age-cohorts. We allocate the flow of graduates among the age-cohorts in such a way as to achieve this constancy of the explained percentages across age-cohorts. We use accuracy tests to evaluate our method of estimation by looking how well our estimated values explain the actual values of the census years available. The step 1 estimate does not exploit the available statistics on13 Our estimation procedure is analogous to that of Barro and Lee (1993) with the exception that we use data on school completion while Barro and Lee use data on school enrolment to fill in missing observations.benchmark stocks of educational attainment. In a second step, we modify our estimates in order to reproduce the benchmark observations of the five categories of educational attainment given by the population census. Now the distribution of graduates among the age-cohorts is chosen in such a way as to reproduce the benchmark observations of the census years. However, the step 2 estimate does not take into account that the shares of the different age-cohorts should sum to 100 percent. In a last step, we allow for education-specific survival rates. We adjust the survival probabilities of each educational attainment for each age-cohort by forcing the sum of the shares of each age-cohort to equal 100percent. Furthermore, the survival rates are adjusted in such a way as to make them consistent with the requirement that the share of each age-cohort in all graduates of an education level should not become negative.14Our procedure is a perpetual inventory method that starts with the census figures as benchmark stocks and then uses school completion data to estimate changes from the benchmarks. Let L i ,t be the population with age i at time t and H i,j,t be the number of people within this population for whom j is the highest level of educational attainment. Let H i j t ,,+be the number of persons aged i who completed the education level j in year t and H i j t ,,− be the number of persons aged i whose education level was j in the year before and who completed a higher educational level in year t . Then the estimated number of persons aged i with educational attainment j at time t is given byH H H H i j t i j t i t i j t i j t ,,,,,,,,,()=−+−−−+−111δ (6)where δi,t is the proportion of people with age i -1 in year t -1 who did not survive to year t . Each year we cumulate the net flow of graduates aged i of education level j in year t . This net flow is obtained by adding the number of graduates aged i of education level j in year t , H i j t ,,+and subtracting those who acquired a higher education level in year t (and whose education level was j in the year before t ), H i j t ,,−. For simplicity we assume here a typical educational carrier pattern. For Austria, people who acquired a university degree at time t +1 are assumed to have been exclusively former graduates of14In some cases it was necessary to change the allocation of graduates among the age-cohorts every year to avoid negative stocks or negative survival rates.。

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