最佳股利政策和增长期权【外文翻译】

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关于固定或稳定增长股利政策的建议

关于固定或稳定增长股利政策的建议

关于固定或稳定增长股利政策的建议固定或稳定增长股利政策是指公司按照固定的比例或稳定的增长率向股东支付股利的一种策略。

这种政策一般适用于收入稳定、盈利可预测的公司,可以提供股东稳定的收益,并增强公司的形象和信誉。

下面是针对这种政策的一些建议:1. 确定适当的股利比例:公司应根据自身盈利能力和现金流情况,确定一个合适的股利比例。

这个比例应既能满足股东的预期回报,又能保留足够的现金用于公司的运营和发展。

2. 了解股东的要求:公司应通过与股东的沟通和调查调研,了解股东对于股利政策的期望和要求。

根据股东的需求,制定合适的股利政策,以增强股东的满意度和忠诚度。

3. 稳定增长的承诺:公司应在股利政策中明确承诺保持稳定的增长,例如每年增长一定的比例或保持连续几年的稳定增长。

这样的承诺可以提升投资者的信心,吸引更多长期投资者进入股东行列。

4. 保持适度的保留盈利:尽管固定或稳定增长股利政策旨在保障股东的回报,但公司也需要保持足够的现金储备用于运营和投资。

公司应根据市场环境、竞争力和发展需求,适度调整股利支付比例,保留一定比例的盈利。

5. 定期评估股利政策:公司在执行固定或稳定增长股利政策时,应定期评估政策的效果,并根据实际情况进行调整。

如果公司的盈利能力下降或面临其他资金需求,可能需要适当降低股利支付比例,以保证公司的健康发展。

6. 提升盈利能力和现金流:为了能够持续执行固定或稳定增长股利政策,公司需要不断提升盈利能力和现金流。

这包括通过加强市场营销、降低成本、提高效率等手段,增加公司的盈利能力,并确保能够稳定支付股利。

股利政策【外文翻译】

股利政策【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文Material Source: Fortune; 11/24/2008 Author: Tully-Shawn Dividend policy, one of the three corporation financial decisions, has been concerned among theoreticians and practitioners. John Linter (1956) brought forward a model of dividend adjustment. According to the model, firm that is currently paying dividends at the rate of Depts., and that has a target payout ratio of POR, ill adjust (ADJ) its dividend rate, but less than fully, as its earnings per share (EPS) changes. Modigliani and Miller (1961) argued that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital, a perfect world, the dividend policy is irrelevant to shareholders wealth. His proposition has laid a solid theoretical foundation for the dividend policy. After that, economists have offered explanations in different ways about dividend payment, such as effect of taxes, ividend signaling, agency costs issues and transaction costs. Over decades, conformists could not come to an agreement. Thus, Black, Fischer (1976) gave it a name “dividend puzzle”.In China, the dividend policy of listed companies has its unique characteristic in the strong emerging market economy if comparing the type of dividend payment in China with the type used in developed countries. In addition to cash dividend and stock dividend, several mixed types of dividend payment derive from cash dividend and stock dividend such as mix of bonus issues and dividend, mix of rights issues and dividend, According to China Secur ities Journal’s relative statistical data, there are more listed companies who adopted the pattern of stock dividend in 1993 which were 36%, and more listed companies adopted cash dividend policy during 1994 and 1995 which were 40% and 36% respectively. The companies that paid no dividends account for 35%, 54%, 59% and 62% respectively during the period of 1996 and 1999. The proportion of total listed companies that adopted cash dividend increased from 47% to 54% during 2000 and 2001.In this situation, in o rder to resolve the “dividend puzzle”, many Chinese scholars have done a number of empirical studies. Two main approaches were taken in these studies:First, using event study method to analyze the influence of different dividend the policy on share price and the value of a firm. Wei Chen at (1999) empirical analyzedthe dividend policy of Shanghai stock market by the method of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and studies the existence and character of the signaling effect of dividend policy in this market. This study showed that the degree of CAR was very different from different dividend policy. The CAR of right issue was higher than cash dividend but lower than bonus. Yu Qiao et al (2001) found that there was evidential positive statistical relationship between the dividends and mix dividend policies of firms on the stock market. But their study showed that the market was not sensitive with cash dividends. This phenomenon is opposition with the result being observed in developed countries’ mature markets. Gang Wei (2000) found that dividend policy often signal the information of long-term earnings about a firm for investors.Second, based on diversified dividend policy theories, analyzers analyzed dynamic reasons of dividend policy, and tried to find impact of dynamic factors and influencing extent on dividend policy of firms. Different point of view offered different significant conclusions. For example, cash dividend may be affected by currency balance and retained earnings, and has positive relationship with them (Yang, 2000); different size of firms choose different pattern of dividend: small firms tend to choose stock dividend, while large firms prefer cash dividend (Yan, 2001; Zhao, 2001). If the firms have lower proportion of holding state shares and corporative shares and the stronger self-growth and development of firms, the firms enjoy the higher stock dividend payment, and also the lower cash dividend payment (Lu, 1999).Domestic theoretic and empirical researches based mostly on profit flow (net income, EPS or retained earnings) investigated the dividend policy, and ignored the effect on cash flow. In fact, cash dividend distribution not only depends on profitability of firms, but also depends on free cash flow to firm. Compare profit flow with cash flow, the latter not only express the value which has been created by firm, but also express how many value that has been realized. From the point of view of cash flow to analyze it, it can patch the faults of profit flow (accounting policy choice, earning management), and declare real relationship between cash flow and the ability of cash payout.Recently, more and more investors prefer cash flow, because of the idea that “cash is king” which have become many managers’ conception. Therefore,this paper seeks to analyze the problem of cash dividend payment from the cash flow point of view, and three questions answered in this paper: (1) how much cash will be distributed to shareholders by paying a cash dividend after all expenses. What is theactual dividend? (2) Why is the cash dividend payment higher or lower than cash flow? What are the factors that affect cash dividend payment? (3) What are the features of cash dividend payment in different industries?Firstly, the payment of cash dividend is usually less than accounting profit in Chinese listed companies, but quite a number of listed companies which had more payment of cash dividend than free cash flow to equity, the gap between cash dividend and FCFE is right issue. By theory, the phenomenon of both cash dividend and right issue is contrary to basic regulation of corporate financial management. This phenomenon of self-contradiction may be related to the rule by China security commission in 2000, which the listed companies must have cash dividend payment last three years while they finance by adding shares or right issue. In contrast, cash dividend payment in some listed companies were less than free cash flow to equity, which is result in forming cash storage in these firms. In China, dividend payment of firm can be described as: the firms have very few cash dividend payment and more stock dividend payment, while some firms have not paid any dividend. This is maybe one of the evidences that Chinese stock market full of speculation and unfair financing from stock market.Secondly, payment of cash dividend in Chinese listed companies is relevantly positive for current return per share and total assets but negative for debt to asset ratio. For the index of cash flow, it is closely related to the payment of cash dividend and net operating cash flow; the index of free cash flow to equity is irrelevant. This is because listed companies understand the index of free cash flow to equity in significant limit, they seldom use free cash flow. Additionally, the payment of cash dividend is irrelevant to non-outstanding shares.Lastly, comparatively, the results indicate that firms with a higher ROE, ONCF and higher cash dividend payment belong to traditional industry; the firms with a higher ROE, lower ONCF and lower cash dividend payment belong to high-tech industry. We find there are quite many firms, which cannot make enough residual cash flow, but they still invest big projects. They return back cash dividend to shareholders by financing from stock market. Other firms with little investment opportunity have plenty of cash flow but no cash dividend payment, still finance too. These phenomena should be paid more attention to.译文股利政策资料来源:财富;11/24/2008作者:Tully-Shawn 股利政策,是理论家和实践家一直关注的公司的三个财务决策之一。

罗斯《公司理财》笔记整理

罗斯《公司理财》笔记整理

第一章导论1. 公司目标:为所有者创造价值,公司价值在于其产生现金流能力。

2. 财务管理的目标:最大化现有股票的每股现值。

3. 公司理财可以看做对一下几个问题进行研究:1. 资本预算:公司应该投资什么样的长期资产。

2. 资本结构:公司如何筹集所需要的资金。

3. 净运营资本管理:如何管理短期经营活动产生的现金流。

4. 公司制度的优点:有限责任,易于转让所有权,永续经营。

缺点:公司税对股东的双重课税。

第二章会计报表与现金流量资产= 负债+ 所有者权益(非现金项目有折旧、递延税款)EBIT(经营性净利润)= 净销售额-产品成本-折旧EBITDA = EBIT + 折旧及摊销现金流量总额CF(A) = 经营性现金流量-资本性支出-净运营资本增加额= CF(B) + CF(S)经营性现金流量OCF = 息税前利润+ 折旧-税资本性输出= 固定资产增加额+ 折旧净运营资本= 流动资产-流动负债第三章财务报表分析与财务模型1. 短期偿债能力指标(流动性指标)流动比率= 流动资产/流动负债(一般情况大于一)速动比率= (流动资产-存货)/流动负债(酸性实验比率)现金比率= 现金/流动负债流动性比率是短期债权人关心的,越高越好;但对公司而言,高流动性比率意味着流动性好,或者现金等短期资产运用效率低下。

对于一家拥有强大借款能力的公司,看似较低的流动性比率可能并非坏的信号2. 长期偿债能力指标(财务杠杆指标)负债比率= (总资产-总权益)/总资产or (长期负债+ 流动负债)/总资产权益乘数= 总资产/总权益= 1 + 负债权益比利息倍数= EBIT/利息现金对利息的保障倍数(Cash coverage radio) = EBITDA/利息3. 资产管理或资金周转指标存货周转率= 产品销售成本/存货存货周转天数= 365天/存货周转率应收账款周转率= (赊)销售额/应收账款总资产周转率= 销售额/总资产= 1/资本密集度4. 盈利性指标销售利润率= 净利润/销售额资产收益率ROA = 净利润/总资产权益收益率ROE = 净利润/总权益5. 市场价值度量指标市盈率= 每股价格/每股收益EPS其中EPS = 净利润/发行股票数市值面值比= 每股市场价值/每股账面价值企业价值EV = 公司市值+ 有息负债市值-现金EV乘数= EV/EBITDA6. 杜邦恒等式ROE = 销售利润率(经营效率)x总资产周转率(资产运用效率)x权益乘数(财杠)ROA = 销售利润率x总资产周转率7. 销售百分比法假设项目随销售额变动而成比例变动,目的在于提出一个生成预测财务报表的快速实用方法。

外文翻译---瑞士的股利政策

外文翻译---瑞士的股利政策

中文3470字外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文:Dividend policy in SwitzerlandDividend policy has long been a subject of research and debate. There are many theoretical and empirical results describing the decisions companies make in this area. At the same time, however, there is no generally accepted model describing payout policy. Moreover, empirical findings are often contradictory or difficult to interpret in light of the theory.In the ideal world of Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividends are irrelevant. The value of a firm is given by its investment opportunities. Dividends are just the residual, and investors faced with consumption shocks can always get their own “homemade” dividends.In “real life”, however, dividend policy is one of the main concerns for managers and investors. Empirical studies have generally found that dividend increases are considered good news by investors, while dividend decreases lead to negative reactions.Several explanations for the existence and importance of dividends have been suggested over the last decades. Dividends could be used as signals for the actual position of a firm. Companies could communicate their better quality by paying higher dividends: low-quality firms will not be able to imitate them since dividends involve costs in terms of foregone investment, taxes, or the need to attract external capital. Agency theory suggests that dividends may be a way to reduce the overinvestment problem or a means to keep firms in the capital markets. Dividends may also be used to attract institutional investors, who are better monitors and prefer dividends for regulatory reasons. Behavioral aspects, such as self-control, fairness, orregret aversion, may also be important parts of the picture.Each of the main theories concerning dividend policy has found at least some support in actual data. However, empirical research has also revealed weaknesses of these explanations, and a broad consensus concerning the “best” theory of corporate payout seems far away. We may know more about the “dividend puzzle”, but we are still without a definite solution.The present paper examines some of the characteristics of dividend policy using Swiss data. The first part presents factors that influence variations in dividend payments across companies at a given point in time. The second part analyzes the changes in dividends over time.The cross-sectional analysis for the 2000–2003 periods compares the characteristics of dividend payers and non-payers. It then identifies several determinants of the differences between dividend payers in terms of payout ratios and dividend yields. The results show that companies that are less risky, larger, with lower growth opportunities, and with lower leverage tend to pay higher dividends. Institutions show a preference for dividend-paying companies, but there is little evidence that they prefer higher payout ratios or dividend yields.Quite interestingly, the factor that turns out to have the strongest influence on payout ratios and dividend yields is price volatility. This may be interpreted as a sign that companies with higher earnings uncertainty are less likely to pay high dividends - or to pay dividends at all.Dividends per share are much more widespread as a headline indicator of dividend policy. The final section of the paper looks at changes in (split-adjusted) dividends per share and seeks to determine whether these changes have informational content. The results show that dividend increases follow periods of high earnings and cash flow growth, whereas dividend decreases follow declines.A closer look at the data reveals that there may nevertheless be some information conveyed by dividend changes. The average future level of earnings after dividend increases is significantly higher than the mean over the previous few years. The earnings of companies that decrease the dividend decline slightly and remain at apersistently low level around the dividend change.An important class of models is based on the idea that the assumption of perfect information may be unrealistic and that dividends can be used as signals of firm quality. Bhattacharya (1979) builds a two-period model with two types of firms. Investments are made during the first period; their expected profitability is known to management, but not to outside investors. In order to signal the quality of their investment, the managers of “good” firms (managers are assumed to act in the interest of initial shareholders) will commit to paying high dividends in the second period. Since attracting outside financing (during the second period) is expensive due to transaction costs, “low-quality” firms will be unable to imitate “high-quality” ones. The alternative models of Miller and Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985) consider the cost of dividends in terms of foregone investments and taxes, respectively.The signaling models provide an explanation for the positive stock price reaction to the announcement of dividend increases or initiations. However, the empirical evidence on this hypothesis is mixed. In an early study, Watts (1973) found that unexpected changes in earnings and unexpected changes in dividends were related, although he remained skeptical about the possibility to make money by exploiting this regularity. Penman (1983) finds that “both dividend announcements and manag ement’s earnings forecasts possess information about management’s expectations”. Using a sample of dividend initiations and omissions, Healy (1988) find that dividend initiations and omissions have informational content (the change in earnings is related to announcement-day returns, even when controlling for previous earnings), but this only holds for year 1. Yoon and Starks (1995) and Denis et al(1994) show that dividend change announcements are linked to revisions in analysts’ forecasts of current income.Based on the mixed results for the signaling theory, Grullon et al (2002) suggest that, rather than an increase in profitability, dividend increases could reflect a decrease in risk –the “maturity hypothesis”. They find that while profitability declines following a dividend increase, systematic risk in a three-factor Fame Frenchmodel decreases. They argue that as firms become more mature (and therefore less risky, but with lower growth opportunities), they will be more likely to pay large dividends to their shareholders.Agency theory suggests that dividends can be used as a means to control a firm’s management. Distributing dividends reduces the free cash flow problem and increases the management’s equity stake. Easterbrook (1984) also suggests that div idends can be used to keep firms in capital markets, where they are monitored by potential investors. This is useful since monitoring by existing shareholders can be hindered by coordination problems. Lang (1989) find that dividend increases are associated with higher positive share price reactions for companies with Tobin’s q smaller than unity, i.e., for companies with lower growth opportunities.Other evidence, however, tends to qualify the agency explanation. Capital expenditures increase following dividend increases, and decrease following dividend decreases and omissions compared to the previous average (This is in line with the findings of Yoon and Starks 1995 and Denis et al. 1994). Moreover, companies that increase dividends have not had significantly higher increases in capital expenditure over the previous 2 years, while companies that omit dividends show a significant slowdown over the same period. Thus, dividend increases do not follow an investment boom, while dividend cuts and omissions are not associated with subsequent higher investment that may indicate better growth opportunities. Cash flows and cash levels for dividend-increasing companies remain at a high level and even increase over the medium term.Dividends may thus become informative about earnings in a way not envisaged in classical signaling models. Since managers want to avoid dividend decreases, they will only increase dividends when they are reasonably sure that there has been a sustainable increase in earnings. They will also cut or omit dividends only when the firm’s earnings position has deteriorated considerably. As a result, a dividend increase will follow a period of significant earnings growth and confirm that the new, higher level of earnings is persistent. At the same time, dividend decreases will follow a slowdown and confirm that the firm will still be in a difficult position in the future.Indeed, although their study seriously challenges the role of dividend changes as a signal for future earnings, Benartzi et al. (1997) find that earnings are less likely to decrease following dividend increases.The paper has examined several features of dividend policy for a sample of Swiss companies. Cross-sectional comparisons show negative relationships between dividend payments and market-to-book ratios, price volatility, and leverage, as well as positive relationships with profitability and (to a lesser extent) firm size and institutional holdings. Ownership concentration does not seem to have significant effects. Companies that used repurchases over the recent years were riskier and less profitable than companies choosing dividends. While some of these relationships are expectable, the negative relationship between leverage and dividend payments, the weak influence of ownership structure, the strong influence of price volatility, and the contrast between dividends and repurchases are not obvious results in the light of theory and previous empirical studies and thus are important aspects to note.Signaling models suggest that dividend changes predict future profitability. Still, the analysis of the data indicates that when dividends increase, earnings have already increased. There are no obvious signs of faster growth after positive changes in dividends.Nonetheless, there is evidence that when dividends increase, future average earnings will be at a higher level compared to the past. Companies that decrease or omit dividends have been in a difficult position for several years, and they will still have inferior cash flows and earnings over the medium term. They will also have significantly lower capital expenditures.This part of the paper examines the factors that determine variations in dividend policy across firms. The comparison is based both on averages for the 2000–2003 period and on data for the single year 2003.There are several groups of variables that are considered in the cross-sectional comparisons:-Market-to-book ratios, as a proxy for growth opportunities. Since low market-to-book companies are more likely to have free cash flow problems, it is tobe expected that they pay (higher) dividends.-Total assets and total sales, as proxies for firm size. Large companies are usually “mature” companies and therefore have more available cash relative to theirpositive NPV projects. Moreover, they are more likely to have widely dispersed shareholdings, and dividends could be used as a way to “keep” firms “in thecapital markets” in order to enhance monitoring. At the same time, however, large companies are usually considered less information ally opaque than smallcompanies, and so there may be less need for dividends as costly signals. Thus, observing the actual connection between firm size and dividend policy can beinteresting.-The firms’ betas and price volatility (computed as the b and within which the share price moved around the mean price during the year), as measures of firm risk. The “maturity hypothesis” suggests that dividend increases are associated with decreases in risk rather than increases in profitability. Also, risk is an important firm characteristic in itself, and it is important to control for it.-Capital gearing, as a measure of leverage in book terms. Debt covenants often include limits concerning dividend payments as a way to mitigate the agency problem between shareholders and debt holders. On a different level, both debt and dividends can be used to reduce the free cash flow problem. Johnson (1995) suggests that debt and dividends could be alternative means to control management. Returns on assets and returns on equity, as measures of firm profitability. While it may seem obvious that more profitable companies will pay higher dividends, it is important to control for this measure while examining the impact of the other factors.-Several indicators for the ownership structure of these companies. The ownership of large Swiss companies is quite varied –from family-owned companies to widely-held ones, or companies owned by investment funds. Thus, it is interesting to examine the impact of the ownership structure on dividend policy.These findings suggest that dividend changes can become informative due to the manager’s asymmetric perception of rewards for dividend increases and negativeconsequences of dividend cuts. Since managers try to avoid cutting dividends until th ey “have to”, and only increase them when they think earnings are sufficient, dividend increases show that earnings have shifted to a higher level over the medium term, while dividend decreases are a sign that the firm’s problems are likely to continue in the following years.This mechanism can also explain why price volatility is such an important factor in the cross-sectional comparisons. If price volatility is taken to be a sign of uncertainty concerning future earnings, then its strong negative relationship with dividends may mean that managers try to keep dividends at a low level in order to avoid having to cut them in low earnings states. Thus, dividend changes can actually be informative, although the mechanism may be different from that considered in classical signaling models. Exploring this hypothesis over larger samples, and perhaps for other countries with different regulatory environments, can be an interesting area for future research.Source: Bogdan stacescu, “Dividend policy in Switzerland”Fin Mkts Portfolio Mgmt(2006)20:153-183二、翻译文章译文:瑞士的股利政策股利政策一直是研究和辩论的话题。

关于固定或稳定增长股利政策的建议

关于固定或稳定增长股利政策的建议

关于固定或稳定增长股利政策的建议随着全球经济的不断发展,越来越多的投资者开始关注股利政策。

固定或稳定增长股利政策是一种有吸引力的投资方式,它可以帮助投资者实现长期稳健的投资收益。

在本文中,我们将对固定或稳定增长股利政策进行分析,并给出一些建议。

固定或稳定增长股利政策是指公司根据其盈利能力和发展需求,制定一套固定或稳定的股利分配政策。

这种政策具有一定的稳定性和可预测性,能够给投资者带来稳定的现金流和持续的投资收益。

固定或稳定增长股利政策通常会考虑公司的盈利能力、发展需求、行业特点等因素,以此确定合理的分红比例和分红频率。

对于投资者来说,固定或稳定增长股利政策具有以下几点优势:1. 稳定的现金流固定或稳定增长股利政策能够为投资者提供稳定的现金流,这对于那些需要获取稳定收入的投资者来说是非常重要的。

通过持有这种股票,投资者可以获得固定的股利收入,这可以帮助他们应对生活中的一些开支。

2. 长期投资回报固定或稳定增长股利政策也能够为长期投资者带来持续的投资回报。

随着时间的推移,随着公司盈利的增长和股利的稳定增长,投资者可以实现长期投资收益。

这对于那些希望通过股票投资实现财务自由的投资者来说是非常有吸引力的。

3. 信号作用公司选择固定或稳定增长股利政策,通常也会传递一个积极的信号给投资者。

这意味着公司有充裕的盈利和稳定的财务状况,可以为股东提供持续的收益。

这可以提高投资者对公司的信心,促使他们更加愿意持有公司的股票。

在制定固定或稳定增长股利政策时,公司需要考虑以下几个因素:1. 盈利能力公司的盈利能力是决定股利分配政策的关键因素。

盈利能力强的公司可以考虑制定更加慷慨的股利政策,以奖励股东并吸引更多的投资者。

而盈利能力较弱的公司则需要更加谨慎地制定股利政策,以保持财务的稳定和发展的需求。

2. 发展需求公司的发展需求也是决定股利分配政策的重要因素。

如果公司有大量的投资项目和发展计划,可能需要保留更多的盈利用于投资和发展。

股利政策【外文翻译】

股利政策【外文翻译】

外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文:Dividend policyProfitable companies regularly face three important questions: (1) How much of its free cash flow should it pass on to shareholders? (2) Should it provide this cash to shareholders by raising the dividend or by repurchasing stock? (3) Should it maintain a stable, consistent payment policy, or should it let the payments vary as conditions change?When deciding how much cash to distribute to shareholders, finance manager must keep in mind that the firm’s objective is to max imize shareholder value. Consequently, the target pay rate ratio —define as the percentage of net income to be paid out as cash dividends —should be based in large part on investors’ preference for dividends versus capital gains: do investors prefer (1) to have the firm distribute income as cash dividends or (2) to have it either repurchase stock or else plow the earnings back into the business, both of which should result in capital gains? This preference can be considered in terms of the constant growth stock valuation model:gD S -K =P 1^ If the company increases the payout ration, the raises 1D .This increase in the numerator, taken alone, would cause the stock price to rise. However, if 1D is raised, then less money will be available for reinvestment, that will cause the expected growth rate to decline, and that will tend to lower the stock ’s price. Thus, any change in payout policy will have two opposing effects. Therefore, t he firm’s optimal dividend policy must strike a balance between current dividends and future growth so to maximize the stock price. In this section, we examine three theories of investor preference: (1)the dividend irrelevance theory, (2)the "bird-in-the-hand" theory ,and(3)the tax preference theory.DIVIDEND IRRELEV ANCE THEORYIt has been argued that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital. If dividend policy has no significant effects, then it would be irrelevance .The principal proponents of dividend irrelevance theory are Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani(MM).They argued that the firm’s is determined only by its basic earning power and its business risk. In other words, MM argued that the value of firm depends only on the income produced by its assets, not on how this income is split between dividends and retained earnings.To understand MM’s argument that dividend policy is irrelevance, recognize that any shareholder can in theory construct his or her own dividend policy .If investors could buy and sell shares and thus create their own dividend policy without incurring costs, then the firm’s dividend policy would truly be irrelevant. Note, though, that investors who want additional dividends must incur brokerage cost to sell shares, and investors who do not want dividends must first pay taxes on the unwanted dividends and then incur brokerage cost to purchase shares with the after-tax dividends. Since taxes and brokerage costs certainly exist, dividend policy may well be relevant.In developing their dividend theory, MM made a number of assumptions especially the absence of taxes and brokerage costs. Obviously, tax and brokerage costs do exist, so the MM irrelevance theory may not be true. However, MM argued that all economic theories are based on simplifying assumptions, and that the validity of a theory must be judged by empirical test, not by the realism of its assumptions.BIRD-IN-THE-HAND THEORYThe principal conclusions of MM’s dividend irrelevance theory is that dividend policy does not affect the required rate of return on equity, Ks. This conclusion has been hotly debated in the academic circles .In particular, Myron Gordon and John Lintner argued that Ks decreases as the dividend payout is increase because investor are less certain of receiving the capital gains which are supposed to result from retaining earnings than they are of receiving dividend paymentsMM disagreed .They argued that Ks independent of dividend policy, whichimplies that investors are indifferent between D1/P0 and g and, hence, between dividends and capital gains. MM called the Gordon-Lintner argument the bird-in-the-hand fallacy because, in MM’s view, most investors plan to reinvest their dividends in the stock of the same or similar firms, and, in any event, the riskiness of the firm’s cash flows to investors in the long run is determined by the riskiness of operating cash flows, not by dividend payout policy.TAX PREFERENCE THEORYThere are three tax-related reasons for thinking that investors might prefer a low dividend payout to a high payout: (1) Recall from Chapter II that long-term capital gains are taxed at a rate of 20 percent, whereas dividend income is taxed at effective rates which go up to 39.6 percent. Therefore, wealthy investors might prefer to have companies retain and plow earnings back into the business. Earnings growth would presumably lead to stock prices increases, and thus low- taxed capital gains would be substituted for higher-taxed dividends. (2)Taxes are not paid on the gains until a stock is sold. Due to time value effects, a dollar of taxes paid in the future has a lower effective cost than a dollar paid today. (3) If a stock is held by someone until he or she dies, no capital gains tax is due at all-the beneficiaries who receive the stock can use the stock’s value on the death day as their cost basis and thus completely escape the capital gains tax.Because of these tax advantages, investors may prefer to have companies retain most of their earnings. IF so, investors would be willing to pay more for low-payout companies than for otherwise similar high- payout companies.There three theories offer contradictory advice to corporate managers, so which, if any, should we believe? The most logical way to proceed is to test the theories empirically. Many such tests have been conducted, but their results have been unclear. There are two reasons for this(1)For a valid statistical test, things other than dividend policy must be held constant; that is, the sample companies must differ only in their dividend policies, and(2)we must be able to measure with a high degree of accuracy each firm’s cost of equity. Neither of these two conditions holds: We cannot find a set of publicly owned firms that differ only in their dividend policies, nor can we obtainprecise estimates of the cost of equity.Therefore, no one can establish a clear relationship between dividend policy and the cost of equity. Investors in the aggregate cannot be seen to uniformly prefer either higher or lower dividends. Nevertheless, individual investors do have strong preferences. Some prefer high dividends, while others prefer all capital gains. These differences among in dividends help explain why it is difficult to reach any definitive conclusions regarding the optimal dividend payout. Even so ,both evidence and logic suggest that investors prefer firms that follow a stable, predictable dividend policy.Because we discuss how dividend policy is set in practice, we must examine two other theoretical issues that could affect our view toward dividend policy: (1)the information content, or signaling, hypothesis and(2) The clientele effects. MM argued that investors’reactions to change in dividend policy do not necessarily show that investors prefer dividends to retained earnings. Rather, they argued that price change following dividend actions simply indicate that there is an important information, or signaling, content in dividend announcements.The clientele effects to the extent that stockholders can switch, a firm can change from one dividend payout policy to another and then let stockholders who do not like the new policy sell to other investors who do. However, frequent switching would be inefficient because of(1)brokerage costs,(2)the likelihood that stockholders who are selling will have to pay capital gains taxes, and (3) a possible shortage of investors who like the firm’s newly adopted dividend policy. Thus, management should be hesitant to change its dividend policy, because a change might cause current stockholders to sell their stock, forcing the stock price down. Such a price decline might be temporary, but it might also be permanent if few new investors are attracted by the new dividend policy, then the stock price would remain depressed. Of course, the new policy might attract an even larger clientele than the firm had before, in which case the stock price would rise.In many ways, our discussion of dividend policy parallels our discussion of capital structure: we presented the relevant theories and issues, and we listed some additional factors that influence dividend policy, but we did not come up with anyhard-and-fast guidelines that manager can follow. It should be apparent from our discussion that dividend policy decisions are exercises in informed judgment, not decisions that can be based on precise mathematical model.In practice, dividend policy is not an independent decision –the dividend decisions is made jointly with capital structure and capital budgeting decisions. The underlying reason for this joint decisions process is asymmetric information, which influences managerial actions in two ways:1, In general, managers do not want to issue new common stock. First, new common stock involves issuance cost -- - commissions, fees, and so on-and those costs can be avoided by using retained earnings to finance the firm’s equity needs. Also, asymmetric information causes investors to view common stock issues as negative signals and thus lowers expectations regard ing the firm’s future prospects. The end result is that the announcement of a new stock issue usually leads to a decrease in the stock prices. Considering the total costs involved, including both issuance and asymmetric information costs, managers strongly prefer to use retained earnings as their primary source of new equity.2, Dividend changes provide signal about managers’ beliefs as to their firms’ future prospects, Thus, dividend reductions, Or worse yet, omissions, generally have a significant negative effect on a firm’s stock price . Since managers recog nize this, they try to set dollar dividends low enough so that there is only a remote chance that the dividend will have to be reduce in the future. Of course, unexpectedly large dividend increases can be used to provide positive signals. the actual payout ratio in any.The dividend decision is made during the planning process, so there is uncertainty about future investment opportunities and operating cash flows. Thus, the actual payout ratio in any year will probably be above or below the firm’s long-range target. However, the dollar dividend should be maintained, or increase as planned policy simply cannot be maintained. A steady or increasing steam of dividends over the long run signals that the firm’s financial condition is under control. Further, investors uncertain is decreased by stable dividend, so a steady dividend streamreduces the negative effect of a stock issue, should one become absolutely necessary.In general, firms with superior investment opportunities should set lower payouts, hence retain more earnings, than firms with poor investment opportunities. The degree of uncertainty also influences the decision. If there is a great deal of uncertainty in the forecasts of free cash flows, which are defined here as the firm’s operating cash flows minus mandatory equity investments, then it is best to be conservative and to set a lower current dollar dividend. Also, firms with postponable investment opportunities can afford to set a higher dollar dividend, because in times of stress investments can be postponed for a year or two, thus increasing the cash available for dividends. Finally, firms whose cost of capital is largely unaffected by change in the debt ratio can also afford to set a higher payout ratio, because they can, in times of stress, more easily issue additional debt to maintain the capital budgeting program without having to cut dividends or issue stock.Firms have only one opportunity to set the opportunity payment from scratch. Therefore, today’s dividend decisions are constrained by policies that were set in the past, hence setting a policy for the next five years necessarily begins with a review of the current situation. Although we have outlined a rational process for managers to use when setting their firms’ dividend policies, dividend policy still remains one of the most judgmental decisions that firms must make. For this reason, dividend policy is always set by the board of directors the financial staff analyzes the situation and makes a recommendation, but the board makes the final decision.Source: Eugene F. Brigham. Joel F.Houston, 2004. “Fundamentals of financial”Aril,pp.648-671.二、翻译文章译文:股利政策盈利的公司常常面临三个重要问题:(1)自由现金流量有多少应该分配给股东?(2)怎么样吧这些现金分配给股东,是通过增发股利还是回购本公司股票?(3)需要保持一个不变的股利支付政策,还是让股利支付随着各年度的情况不同而不同?当财务经理决定应该付多少现金给股东时,他一定要记住,公司的目标是股东价值最大化,目标支付率作为现金股利支付的净收益占总收益的百分比,应该是根据投资者更偏好的股利还是资本利得来决定。

股权激励一文详解股权激励形式、方式、如何实施及设计方案

股权激励一文详解股权激励形式、方式、如何实施及设计方案

股权激励一文详解股权激励形式、方式、如何实施及设计方案来源:创投孵化器股权激励的十种形式1、股票期权 Stock Options含义:在一个特定的时间内,使用特定的价格,购买公司股份的计划。

特点:购买的权利,股票期权是使用最广的股权激励计划。

2、绩效股份计划PSP Performance Share Plan含义:一种根据事先确定的内部或者外部绩效目标的达成情况而授予的股票授予计划。

必须在一定时期内(三至五年)达到这些目标,激励计划的接受者才有资格获得这些股票。

特点:将绩效目标和股票价格分红有机结合。

3、限制性股票奖励RSA Restricted Stock Award含义:限制性股票奖励是雇主授予雇员的股票奖励,但员工所持有股票的权力受到一定的限制并且存在丧失的风险。

特点:一是有时间限制,一定程度上有利于留住员工。

限制包括服务期或者雇佣关系维持时间的限制,在限制消失之前,员工不能将股票进行抵押、出售或者转移。

然而,员工可以在受限期间获得股息和投票权。

一旦限制消失,员工会获得所有的非受限的股份,同时可以将其进行抵押、出售或者转移。

员工如果没有遵守这些限制性要求,就会失去相应的股份。

二是与限制性股票单位相比,属于先给股票。

4、限制性股票单位RSU Restricted Stock Unit含义:股票单位是在授予时发行潜在股票的协议,在员工达到授予计划的要求时才可能会有实际上的股票授予。

特点:未来一定时间内可以购买的约定。

未来三年再给你股票。

5、加速绩效限制性股票激励计划PARSAP Performance Accelerated Restricted Stock Award Plan含义:与传统基于时间授予的限制性股票奖励相伴而生的是基于绩效授予的方式,通常被称为“加速绩效限制性股票激励计划”。

在这种类型的计划中,时间限制可以延伸到更长的10年而不是3年,以提升保留人才的功能。

特点:更长的时间,强化了提前确定的绩效标准限制的激励特征。

稳定增长股利政策名词解释

稳定增长股利政策名词解释

稳定增长股利政策名词解释简介稳定增长股利政策是指一国政府采取措施,以确保经济稳定增长并分配其产生的股利给各个群体。

该政策的目标是促进经济增长、减少经济不平等,并提高赋予每个公民或投资者的权益。

一级标题1二级标题1三级标题1在稳定增长股利政策中,政府采取一系列措施来实现其目标。

这些措施可能包括财政政策、货币政策、就业政策和社保政策等。

二级标题2三级标题2财政政策是指政府通过调整税收收入和支出来管理经济。

在稳定增长股利政策中,政府可能通过减税来刺激经济增长,提高国民收入水平,从而增加分配给公民和投资者的股利。

此外,政府还可以通过增加支出来推动经济发展,例如加大对基础设施建设的投资,促进就业增长和经济活力。

二级标题3三级标题3货币政策是指通过调整货币供应量和利率来管理经济的政策。

在稳定增长股利政策中,政府可以通过降低利率来刺激投资和消费,从而增加企业利润和个人收入。

此外,政府还可以通过调整货币供应量来控制通货膨胀,确保物价稳定,保护公民和投资者的购买力。

三级标题4就业政策是指政府采取的措施来促进就业增长和降低失业率。

在稳定增长股利政策中,政府可能通过鼓励企业创造就业机会,提供培训和教育支持,以及实施就业保障措施来降低失业率。

通过增加就业机会和提高个人就业能力,公民和投资者可以获得更多的股利收入。

二级标题5三级标题5社保政策是指政府实施的一系列社会保障措施,以保障公民和投资者的基本生活需求。

在稳定增长股利政策中,政府可能提供医疗保健、养老保险、失业保险和贫困救助等社会福利,以确保每个人都能分享经济发展带来的股利。

一级标题2二级标题6三级标题6稳定增长股利政策的实施对于一个国家的经济发展和社会稳定具有重要意义。

通过促进经济增长和减少经济不平等,政府可以提高公民的生活水平、增加包容性,推动社会和谐。

二级标题7三级标题7尽管稳定增长股利政策具有一定的优势,但也面临一些挑战。

例如,政府需要平衡经济增长和分配股利之间的关系,避免产生过度的经济不平等。

股利政策外文文献翻译

股利政策外文文献翻译

原文DIVIDEND POLICY, GROWTH, AND THE V ALUATION OF SHARESMERTON H. MILLER,FRANCO MODIGLINIThe effect of a firm's dividend policy on the current price of its shares is a matter of considerable importance, not only to the corporate officials who must set the policy, but to investors planning portfolios and to economists seeking to understand and appraise the functioning of the capital markets. Do companies with generous distribution policies consistently sell at a premium over those with-niggardly payouts? Is the reverse ever true? If so, under what conditions? Is there an optimum payout ratio or range of ratios that maximizes the current worth of the shares?Although these questions of fact have been the subject of many empirical studies in recent years no consensus has yet been achieved. One reason appears to be the absence in the literature of a complete and reasonably rigorous statement of those parts of the economic theory of valuation bearing directly on the matter of dividend policy. Lacking such a statement, investigators have not yet been able to frame their tests with sufficient precision to distinguish adequately between the various contending hypotheses. Nor have they been able to give a convincing explanation of what their test results do imply about the underlying process of valuation.In the hope that it may help to over- come these obstacles to effective empirical testing, this paper will attempt to fill the existing gap in the theoretical literature on valuation. We shall begin, in Section I, by examining the effects of differences in dividend policy on the current price of shares in an ideal economy characterized by perfect capital markets, ational behavior, and perfect certainty. Still within this convenient analytical framework we shall go on in Sections II and III to consider certain closely related issues that appear to have been responsible for considerable misunderstanding of the role of dividend policy. In particular, Section II will focus on the long- standing debate about what investors "really" capitalize when they buy shares; and section III on the much mooted relations between price, the rate of growthof profits, and the rate of growth of dividends per share. Once these fundamentals have been established, we shall proceed in Section IV to drop the assumption of certainty and to see the extent to which the earlier conclusions about dividend policy must be modified. Finally, in Section V, we shall briefly examine the implications for the dividend policy problem of certain kinds of market imperfections.EFFECT OF DIVIDEND POLICY WITH PERFECT MARKETS, RATIONAL BEHA VIOR, AND PERFECT CERTAINTYThe meaning of the basic assumptions. -Although the terms" perfect markets," "rational behavior," and "perfect certainty" are widely used throughout economic theory, it may be helpful to start by spelling out the precise meaning of these assumptions in the present context.1. In "perfect capital markets," no buyer or seller (or issuer) of securities is large enough for his transactions to have an appreciable impact on the then ruling price. All traders have equal and costless access to information about the ruling price and about all other relevant characteristics of shares (to be detailed specifically later). No brokerage fees, transfer taxes, or other transaction costs are incurred when securities are bought, sold, or issued, and there are no tax differentials either between distributed and undistributed profits or between dividends and capital gains.2."Rational behavior" means that investors always prefer more wealth to less and are indifferent as to whether a given increment to their wealth takes the form of cash payments or an increase in the market value of their holdings of shares.3. "Perfect certainty" implies complete assurance on the part of every investor as to the future investment program and the future profits of every corporation. Because of this assurance, there is, among other things, no need to distinguish between stocks and bonds as sources of fund sat this stage of the analysis. We can, therefore, proceed as if there were only a single type of financial instrument which, for convenience, we shall refer to as shares of stock.The fundamental principle of valuation.- Under' these assumptions the valuation of all shares would be governed by the following fundamental principle: the price of each share must be such that the rate of return (dividends plus capital gains per dollarinvested) on every share will be the same throughout the market over any given interval of time.WHAT DOES THE MARKET "REALLY" CAPITALIZE?In the literature on valuation one can find at least the following four more or less distinct approaches to the valuation of shares: (1) the discounted cash flow approach;(2) the current earnings plus future investment opportunities approach; (3) the stream of dividends approach; and (4) the stream of earnings approach. To demonstrate that these approaches are, in fact, equivalent it will be helpful to begin by first going back to equation (5) and developing from it a valuation formula to serve as a point of reference and comparisonEARNINGS, DIVIDENDS, AND GROWTH RATESThe convenient case of constant growth rates.-The relation between the stream of earnings of the firm and the stream of dividends and of returns to the stock- holders can be brought out most clearly by specializing(12) to the case in which investment opportunities are such as to generate a constant rate of growth of profits in perpetuity. Admittedly, this case has little empirical significance, but it is convenient for illustrative purposes and has received much attention in the literature.The growth of dividends and the growth of total profits.-Given that total earnings (and the total value of the firm) are growing at the rate kp* what is the rate of growth of dividends per share and of the price per share? Clearly, the answer will vary depending on whether or not the firm is paying out a high percentage of its earnings and thus relying heavily on outside financing. We can show the nature of this dependence explicitly by making use of the fact that whatever the rate of growth of dividends per share the present value of the firm by the dividend approach must be the same as by the earnings approach. The special case of exclusively internal financing.-As noted above the growth rate of dividends per share is not the same as the growth rate of the firm except in the special case in which all financing is internal. This is merely one of a number of peculiarities of this special case on which, unfortunately, many writers have based their entire analysis. The reason for the preoccupation with this special case is far from clear to us. Certainly no one wouldsuggest that it is the only empirically relevant case. Even if the case were in fact the most common, the theorist would still be under an obligation to consider alternative assumptions. We suspect that in the last analysis, the popularity of the internal financing model will be found to reflect little more than its ease of manipulation combined with the failure to push the analysis far enough to disclose how special and how treacherous a case it really is.THE EFFECTS OF DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY Uncertainty and the general theory of valuation.-In turning now from the ideal world of certainty to one of uncertainty our first step, alas, must be to jettison the fundamental valuation principle as given, say, in our equation .DIVIDEND POLICY AND MARKET IMPERFECTIONSTo complete the analysis of dividend policy, the logical next step would presumably be to abandon the assumption of perfect capital markets. This is, however, a good deal easier to say than to do principally because there is no unique set of circumstances that constitutes "imperfection. "We can describe not one but a multitude of possible departures from strict perfection, singly and in combinations. Clearly, to attempt to pursue the implications of each of these would only serve to add inordinately to an already overlong discussion. We shall instead, therefore, limit ourselves in this concluding section to a few brief and genera lob serrations about imperfect markets that we hope may prove helpful to those taking up the task of extending the theory of valuation in this direction.It is important to keep in mind that from the standpoint of dividend policy, what counts is not imperfection per se but only imperfection that might lead an investor to have a systematic preference as between a dollar of current dividends and a dollar of current capital gains. Whereon such systematic preference is produced, we can subsume the imperfection in the (random) error term always carried along when applying propositions derived from ideal models to real world events.译文股利政策、增长和股票的估值默顿.米列尔,弗兰克.莫迪丽公司的股利分配政策会影响到其股票的当前价格,这是一个相当重要的问题,不仅是对于制定政策的企业管理层来说,还是对那些购买公司股票的投资者来说,都是很重要的。

【财务】十大股权激励法

【财务】十大股权激励法

十大股权激励法目前,基本工资和年度奖金已不能充分调动公司高级管理人员的积极性,多种形式的长期激励办法显得更加有效,因此这些新办法在更大程度上决定着经营者的薪酬总水平及其结构。

下面十大激励办法或许会成为开启我国企业高级管理人员有效激励不足的钥匙。

一、股票期权股票期权是公司给予高级管理人员的一种权利。

美国迪斯尼公司和华纳传媒公司最早在高级管理人员中大量使用股票期权。

随着20世纪90年代美国股市出现牛市,股票期权给高级管理人员带来了丰厚的收益。

全球500家大型公司企业中已有89%对高层管理者实施了股票期权。

二、股票增值权股票增值权,英文缩写为SARS,通常与无附带要求的股票期权同时使用。

它的设计原理与股票期权近似,但差别在于:在行权时,经营者并不像认购期权形式下要购入股票,而是针对股票的升值部分要求兑现。

国内现在有些人谈到的股票期权,实际上说的就是股票增值权。

按照合同的具体规定,股票增值权的实现可以是全额兑现,也可以是部分兑现。

另外,股票增值权的实施可以是用现金实施,也可以折合成股票来加以实施,还可以是现金和股票形式的组合。

在美国,按照1934年通过的《证券交易法》第16条规定,股票增值权必须要有6个月的持有期,所以,它只能给公司内部的经营者。

股票增值权因为通常以现金的形式实施,有时也叫现金增值权。

在这种情况下,它不是以增加股票发行为前提,因而不会对公司的所有权产生相应的稀释,也不会产生无投票权的新的股票持有者。

三、限制性股票限制性股票是专门为了某一特定计划而设计的激励机制。

所谓限制性股票是指公司高级管理人员出售这种股票的权利受到限制,亦即经营者对于股票的拥有权是受到一定条件限制的(比如说,限制期为三年)。

经营者在得到限制性股票的时候,不需要付钱去购买,但他们在限制期内不得随意处置股票,如果在这个限制期内经营者辞职或被开除了,股票就会因此而被没收。

公司采用限制性股票的目的是激励高级管理人员将更多的时间精力投入到某个或某些长期战略目标中。

浅析我国上市公司的股利政策

浅析我国上市公司的股利政策

浅析我国上市公司的股利政策On the Dividend Policy of Domestic List Companies一、引言股利政策是指企业一只手留存盈利,而另一只手支付现金并在发放新股票或对外举债之间的一个权衡(魏刚,2001)。

股利政策既决定公司股东所能获得的收益,又决定公司的筹资成本并影响公司的价值。

因此,股利政策作为公司三大财务决策之一,是上市公司非常重要的一项财务决策,一直都是西方金融专家关注的焦点。

由于企业的财务目标是企业价值最大化,企业的股利政策当然也应符合这一目标。

“公司的利润只能在有合理期望的时候才能留存,这种期望要得到历史证据大力支持,或在适当的时候要得到对公司周密分析的支持,也就是对于公司留存的每一元收益,至少可以为所有者产生一元的市场价值。

只有当留存的资产可以产生与投资者通常可以获得的收益相等同、或者有更高的收益时,公司利润才可以留存”(巴菲特,2000)。

在我国股权分置改革逐步推进的今天,作为上市公司连续发放股票股利与高派现的典型代表,五粮液与用友已日益成为股市人们关注的焦点。

解决我国上市公司应该制定怎样的股利政策才能促进自身的长足发展、保护中小股东权益、实现企业价值最大化的问题十分必要又迫在眉睫。

二、理论基础(一)国外主流股利理论在我国应用的限制目前,利用代理理论和信号理论来解释股利政策在国外处于主导地位,但它们是否适用于解释我国的股利政策呢?1.代理理论的限制在现代股利理论中,发放现金股利是控制代理成本的一种重要手段。

然而,由于我国上市公司特殊的股权结构、治理结构、市场环境以及缺乏解决代理问题的补充措施,我国上市公司存在严重的代理问题,股利充当控制代理成本工具的基本条件并不具备,因此,用西方现有的代理理论来解释我国的股利政策是无效的。

恰好相反,我国现有的股利政策正是由于代理问题没有有效解决而形成的。

2.信号理论的限制信号理论和代理理论存在相互作用互为因果的关系。

公司治理外文文献及翻译 精品

公司治理外文文献及翻译 精品

附录A公司治理与高管薪酬:一个应急框架总体概述通过整合组织和体制的理论,本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。

高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上,并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。

我们提出了一个框架,审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应。

我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响,像“软法律”和“硬法律”。

在过去的20年里,世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构,包括很大一部分的股权激励。

因此,高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。

正如Bruce,Buck,和Main指出,“近年来,关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌。

”关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门,当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。

根据理论基础,早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。

这个文献假设,股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发,公司将更有效率的运作,表现得更好。

公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述,以及这一框架的核心前提是,股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好。

因此,经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。

大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为,股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制,包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。

正如Jensen 和Murphy观察,“代理理论预测补偿政策将会以满足代理人的期望效用为主要目标。

股东的目标是使财富最大化;因此代理成本理论指出,总裁的薪酬政策将取决于股东财富的变化。

”影响积极组织结果的主要指标是付费业绩敏感性,但是这种“封闭系统”法主要是在英美的代理基础文献中找到,假定经理人激励与绩效之间存在普遍的联系,很少的关注在公司被嵌入的不同背景。

股票期权奖励与盈余管理动机外文翻译

股票期权奖励与盈余管理动机外文翻译

中文4200字外文翻译原文:Stock Option Compensation and EarningsManagement IncentivesThis study focuses on the relation between the structure of executive compensation and incentives to manage reported earnings. Specifically, we examine whether the use of stock options relative to other forms of pay influences discretionary accrual choices around option award dates. We conduct this study in part because of the apparent trend over the past two decades toward the use of options in executive pay. Compensation research has consistently shown that option awards, measured on a fair value basis, now represent on average the largest component of CEO pay (Murphy [1999]; Baker [1999]; Matsunaga [1995]; Yermack [1995]). Not surprisingly, this trend seems to have contributed to increased scrutiny of CEO pay and to have led directly to several public policy initiatives during the 1990s.For example, accounting standard setters adopted a series of rules that greatly expanded investor reporting requirements on options (SEC [1992, 1993]; FASB [1995]), and, in 1993, Congress enacted tax legislation intended to curb nonperformance-based executive pay (see Reitenga et al. [2002]; Perry and Zenner [2001]). Furthermore, as reported in the financial press, criticism of the magnitude of option awards, including criticism by investors, seems to occur regularly (e.g.Orwall [1997]; Jereski [1997]; Fox [2001]; Colvin [2001]). Standard setters and politicians are currently reexamining disclosure rules, offering evidence that options continue to be a difficult public policy issue (Schroeder [2001]; Hamburger and Whelan [2002]; WSJ [2002]).Until recently, academic research has typically focused on testing the use of options within an agency theory framework, primarily examining incentive alignment aspects. Arguably, by tying executive pay to stock price outcomes, options encourage managers to make operating and investing decisions that maximize shareholderwealth (Jensen and Meckling [1976]). Though results are mixed, the empirical evidence on options as a component of executive pay has generally supported such agency-based predictions. However, other studies document unexpected effects on the firm as well, including surprising evidence that awarding options can induce opportunistic behavior by management. The line of research most relevant for our study is one that suggests that managers manipulate the timing of news releases or option award dates (or both) as a means of increasing the fair value of their awards. For example, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) report evidence indicating that managers time the release of voluntary disclosures, both good and bad news, around award dates in order to increase the value of the options awarded. Since the exercise price of the option is typically set equal to the share price on award date, managers can conceivably increase their option compensation by releasing bad news before the award date. Consistent with this reasoning, Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) find that stock prices tend to decrease prior to option grants, while Yermack (1997) finds that stock prices tend to increase following option grants. The former effect would typically decrease the exercise price of the option at award date. The latter would increase the option's intrinsic value afterward.One way managers can influence the stock price of the firm is to manipulate reported performance (Subramanyam [1996]). We argue that the evidence in Aboody and Kasznik regarding voluntary disclosures in general implies that there could also be an incentive to manage reported earnings. We extend Aboody and Kasznik by examining whether option compensation creates incentives for CEOs to actively intervene not only in the timing of voluntary disclosure, but in the financial reporting process as well. We predict that managers receiving a relatively large portion of their compensation in the form of options will use discretionary accruals to report lower operating performance hoping to temporarily suppress stock prices.In addition to addressing the concerns of policymakers, our research is motivated by the fact that while a good deal of research has examined the role of bonus plans in motivating managers' self-interested behavior (e.g., Healy [1985]; Lambert and Larcker [1987]; Lewellen et al. [1987]; Gaver et al. [1995]; Holthausen et al. [1995];Reitenga et al. [2002]), relatively little published research investigates how stock option compensation influences such behavior. Our study could provide insight on whether standard option compensation practice influences the quality of reported earnings.To conduct our study, we examine compensation and firm performance data on 168 firms during the time period 1992-98. We obtain data from a variety of sources, including Compustat, the Wall Street Journal annual survey of executive compensation and proxy statements. We estimate a model of the discretionary accruals component of reported annual earnings as a function of several factors including (1) the ratio of option compensation to other forms of pay and (2) the timing of annual earnings announcements and award dates. As predicted, we find evidence that option awards influence the financial reporting process. Firms that compensate their executives with greater shares of options relative to other forms of pay appear to use discretionary accruals to decrease current earnings. Furthermore, this effect appears to be stronger if the executive announces earnings prior to an option award date. Our results extend previous research by documenting that managers appear to intervene in the financial reporting process in an attempt to increase the value of their awards.The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we develop our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design, and Section 4 presents our main results and details on sensitivity tests. Finally, Section 5 discusses these results and their implications for executive compensation practices.Based on previous studies and our own review of proxy statements, it appears that the process of awarding options follows a standard pattern (Yermack [1997]; Aboody and Kasznik [2000]). Awards are formally determined by a compensation committee of the board of directors and are nearly always made once per year, typically with an exercise price equal to share price on award date.As noted in the introduction, most of the academic research on the use of stock options has used an agency theory framework, approaching the structure of executive pay as a solution to various agency problems. Early research such as DeFusco et al.(1990) and Yermack (1995) yielded mixed results, leaving significant unanswered questions about the prevalence of options. Perhaps because of better data availability, recent agency-based research has provided more consistent results. For example, studies by Core et al. (1999), Core and Guay (1999), and Bryan et al. (2000) appear to support the theory that executive pay structure in general, and the use of options in particular, reflects firms' agency costs.However, other lines of research on options indicate that executive compensation practices could produce unintended consequences for the firm. For example, Lambert et al. (1989) find that firms exhibit lower than predicted dividend payment levels after adopting executive stock option plans. Because the payoff on an option is determined by stock price appreciation rather than total shareholder return (appreciation plus dividends), dividend reduction increases option value. While apparently good for option-holding executives, such a dividend policy might not be fully anticipated by, or in the best interests of, shareholders. Pursuing a similar argument, Jolls (1996) finds that stock repurchases tend to replace cash dividends as executive option holdings increase. In addition, the line of research that we extend documents that manipulation of voluntary disclosures and/or award dates could increase the value of option compensation. Taken together, the evidence suggests that while option compensation practices are likely to mitigate some types of agency costs, the same practices might induce other forms of opportunistic behavior. We discuss these findings in more detail along with other relevant research on earnings management below.Prior research suggests that managers manipulate earnings to achieve a variety of objectives, including "income smoothing" (Gaver et al. [1995]; DeFond and Park [1997]), long-term bonus maximization (Healy [1985]), avoidance of technical default of debt covenants (Dichev and Skinner [2001]), and avoidance of losses and declines in earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev [1997]). Murphy (1999) suggests that option compensation and outright stock ownership by managers give rise to divergent incentives, with stock ownership focusing managers' efforts on achieving higher total shareholder returns and options rewarding only share price appreciation relative to the exercise price. Several empirical studies provide support for these predictions(Lambert et al. [1989]; Lewellen et al. [1987]). We conjecture that these divergent incentives could motivate managers to manipulate earnings up or down as a function of compensation structure and other factors.As an example, Matsunaga (1995) argues that, when firms are under financial distress, they attempt to reduce compensation expense by substituting options for bonus pay. Matsunaga also finds that income-increasing accounting policy choices are positively related to option awards. By extension, this result could imply a positive relation between income-increasing discretionary accruals and option compensation. However, Matsunaga examines only the associations between options and various financial characteristics of the firm, and his analysis does not directly examine any earnings management incentives related to option compensation.In a paper that directly addresses the association between voluntary disclosure and option compensation, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that managers opportunistically time the release of good and bad news in order to increase the value of their option awards. Their study provides evidence that managers receiving options prior to earnings announcements are more likely to issue preemptive "bad news" voluntary disclosures (as opposed to mandatory earnings announcements) prior to the option award. This evidence indicates that by positioning such disclosures in advance of an award date, managers in their sample are able to increase the value of option awards by an average of 16 percent. Consistent with this evidence, Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) find that stocks exhibit abnormal negative returns leading up to award dates, while Yermack (1997) finds abnormal positive returns following awards, Aboody and Kasznik also document that returns in the period immediately surrounding the earnings announcements are lower for those firms awarding options prior to the earnings announcement than for those awarding options after the earnings announcement. These results suggest that, all else equal, firms disclosing earnings prior to the award date might report lower earnings relative to those firms disclosing earnings after the award date.In contrast to Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Chauvin and Shenoy (2001), Yermack (1997) concludes that the timing of an option award is conditional on thefavorability of earnings announcements. Specifically, managers tend to receive options prior to (after) the release of favorable (unfavorable) earnings announcements. The author interprets these results as evidence that managers benefit from opportunistic timing of option awards.Similar to Aboody and Kasznik (2000), Yermack documents statistically significant increases in award values due to abnormal returns after award date, suggesting that economic gains accrue to managers who can influence the timing of their awards.Note, however, that in all three of the above studies, the authors implicitly assume that reported earnings are exogenous. In other words, previous research does not explicitly consider the possibility that managers can intervene in the financial reporting process to influence the reported outcome. Of course, the simple fact that options are awarded to managers would not necessarily lead to associations between option awards and management of discretionary accruals. However, given that prior research suggests that managers use accounting discretion to accomplish a variety of earnings management objectives, we propose an effect from the use of options as follows. The relative magnitude of option compensation and CEO wealth effects documented by Aboody and Kasznik (2000), Chauvin and Shenoy (2001), and Yermack (1997) could give rise to incentives to not only manage disclosures or option award dates, but to influence reported earnings as well.ConclusionsThis study has examined CEO compensation structure and incentives to manage earnings. Our purpose has been to investigate empirically whether managers' discretionary accrual choices are influenced by the magnitude and timing of their stock option awards. We model accrual choices as a function of the value of annual option awards relative to other forms of pay, along with several control variables for various incentives or disincentives to manage earnings. Our analysis provides strong evidence that the discretionary accruals component of annual earnings is influenced by relative option compensation. Managers who receive large option awards appear to make income-decreasing accrual choices as a means of decreasing the exercise price of their awards. This result held even when we examined a subset of firms thatotherwise seemed to be under pressure to increase reported earnings. Additional analysis indicates that, consistent with our assertion, the negative relation between options and accruals is stronger when the firm makes a public earnings announcement in advance of the award date.Source: Terry Baker, Denton Collins, Austin Reitenga, 2003. “Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management Incentives”. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, V ol.18, No.4, pp. 556-82.译文:股票期权奖励与盈余管理动机本课题集中于研究管理层薪资水平的结构和管理报告盈余的动机两者之间的关系。

关于固定或稳定增长股利政策的建议

关于固定或稳定增长股利政策的建议

关于固定或稳定增长股利政策的建议固定或稳定增长股利政策是指公司在一段时间内保持股利支付的稳定性或持续增长。

这种政策可以给投资者提供可靠的收益,并表达公司对其财务状况和未来发展的信心。

以下是关于固定或稳定增长股利政策的一些建议:1. 考虑盈利能力和现金流:公司应该根据其盈利能力和现金流状况来确定股利政策。

固定增长股利政策可能适用于稳定的盈利且现金流充足的公司,而稳定增长股利政策可能适用于盈利和现金流在逐年稳定增长的公司。

2. 制定合理可行的目标:公司应该设定股利政策的合理目标,既要满足投资者的预期,又要符合公司的实际情况。

设定过高的目标可能导致资金不足或财务压力,而设定过低的目标可能无法吸引投资者或影响公司形象。

3. 考虑行业特点和竞争态势:不同行业的盈利能力和现金流状况可能存在较大差异。

公司在制定股利政策时应该考虑所处行业的特点和竞争态势,以确定合适的股利水平和增长率。

4. 灵活适应市场环境:股利政策应该具有一定的灵活性,能够适应市场环境的变化。

在经济衰退、行业竞争加剧或公司资金需求增加时,公司可以根据具体情况调整股利政策,以保持财务稳健和发展需要。

5. 寻求股东的理解和支持:公司在制定固定或稳定增长股利政策时应该与股东进行沟通,充分解释政策的考虑因素和目标,并寻求股东的理解和支持。

这有助于确立共识,增强公司与投资者之间的信任和合作关系。

固定或稳定增长股利政策可以为公司和投资者带来很多好处,但制定和执行这种政策需要充分考虑公司的财务状况、行业特点和市场环境等因素,并与股东进行有效沟通和合作。

只有在综合考虑各种因素的基础上,才能制定出符合公司需求和投资者期望的股利政策。

增长和股票的估值(外文翻译)

增长和股票的估值(外文翻译)

Lintner.and Lang,L.H.P.The ultimate ownership of western European corporations[J].2002.外文资料翻译译文增长和股票的估值上市公司的股利分配政策对上市公司的资金运作在一定程度上直接影响。

公司支付给其股东留存收益的剩余盈余的企业,有Cixiaobizhang关系。

因此,股利分配政策决定多少红利分配给股东,已决定留在企业的数量。

降低了股利分配,这将增加企业的留存收益,减少外部融资需求。

因此,股利政策也融资内部决策的企业。

在本文中,经常被用来制作简要讨论了股利分配政策。

红利在实际操作中,股利分配政策的选择有以下四种:首先,剩余股利分配政策股息和公司的资本结构与投资和资本结构,进而构成了必要的资金,股利分配政策其实应该是资本和投资机会的双重影响成本。

剩余股利分配政策是,公司具有良好的投资机会,按照一定的资本结构的目标(最优资本结构),计算所需的股本投资,首留存收益,然后将剩余的盈余股息是分布。

如果没有盈余,不分红。

用剩下的股利分配政策应遵循的五个步骤:(1)确定的投资项目,寻找有利可图的投资机会。

(2)目标资本结构,这是确定的资本资本(或资本率的综合成本)的加权平均成本的债务股本比率达到的最低水平为标准。

(3)针对股权投资所需金额的资本结构。

(4)最大限度地利用公司的留存收益,以满足股权资本所需金额的投资方案。

(5)权益性资本投资计划已得到满足,如果剩余的盈余,然后支付给股东的股息。

剩余股利分配政策的选择上,将意味着仅用于分红的剩余盈余。

该模型是基于股价已经无关发放股利,投资者在股息和资本利得没有一个首选,但投资者获得的次要位置股息,其根本目的是要保持理想的资本结构,资本最小的加权平均成本,从而实现公司利润最大化。

第二,持续增长的固定或股利分配政策固定或股利分配政策的持续增长是分发年度分红固定在一个特定的水平,并在考虑的较长一段时间内如何公司的盈利能力,股利分配如何保持不变的财务状况。

股利无关论

股利无关论
• 由於稅與交易成本確實存在,股利政策 便可能是攸關的。
第14章 股利政策與股票購回 第503-504頁
Slide 4
14-1-2 有些投資人偏好現金股利的原因
• 早期對MM理論批評所採取的論點是投 資人對於一塊錢確定的現時股利之偏好 會高於未來不確定的一塊錢之資本利得 。
• 尤其是Myron Gordon和John Lintner主張 rs會隨著股利支付金額的增加而下降。
14-3-1設定目標支付比率:剩餘股利模式
• 表14-1顯示各大型公司間的股利支付比 率與股利收益率(dividend yields)變化很 大。
第14章 股利政策與股票購回 第509頁
Slide 16
14-3-1設定目標支付比率:剩餘股利模式
• 一家公司的最佳股利支付比率是下列四 項因素的函數:
Slide 8
14-1 自我測驗
• 請概略解釋股利無關論背後所隱含的概念。 • Modigliani與Miller在發展股利無關論時對於稅
負與交易成本做何假設? • 為何MM把Gordon-Lintner對股利的主張稱為
一鳥在手的謬論? • 為何有些投資人偏好高股利的股票? • 為何有另一些投資人偏好低股利的股票?
第14章 股利政策與股票購回 第505頁
Slide 7
14-1-3 有些投資人偏好資本利得的原因
• 由於租稅上的利益,有些投資人會偏好 公司保留大部分的盈餘,果真如此,則 當兩家除了股利以外其餘條件完全類似 的公司,投資人將願意以較高的價格購 買低股利公司的股票。
第14章 股利政策與股票購回 第505頁
14-2-2 顧客效應
• 不同的股東,或顧客(clienteles),對於股 利支付政策有不同的偏好。

股利政策

股利政策

第一管理资源网(),提供海量管理资料免费下
公 司 理 财
公司实施股票回购的动机主要是: (1)股份公司收缩资本的需要。 (2)用于公司兼并或收购。 (3)满足可转换条款和有助于认股权的兑换。 (4)改善公司的资本结构。 (5)当公司的现金持有量超过其投资机会的需 要量将资金分配给股东
第二节 股利政策的限制因素
公 司 理 财
股利政策的限制因素-股东意愿
股东在税负、投资机会、股权稀释等方面的意愿也 会对公司的股利政策产生影响。 1.税负 股利政策也会受到所得税差异的影响。 目前,根据我国有关法律规定,现金股利需缴纳税率 为20%的个人所得税,股票转让所得(资本利得)免税, 股票股利(红股)免税。股票交易双方需缴纳5‰的印花 吉 税。 林 2.股东的投资机会 大 学 公司外部的股东有更好的投资机会,则公司应选择多 商 支付现金股利、少留存收益的股利政策。 学 院 3.股权的稀释 高股利支付率有可能导致现有股权权的稀释。 第一管理资源网(),提供海量管理司 理 财
吉 林 大 学 商 学 院
围绕着公司股利政策的分配是否影响公司 的价值,产生了股利无关论和股利相关论两类 理论。 完善资本市场——股利无关论 默顿· 米勒和弗兰克· 莫迪格利安尼1961年又 提出了著名的股利政策与公司价值无关论(亦 称MM定理)。在一系列严密的假设条件下进行 的,包括 “完善的资本市场”、“理性行为” 和“充分确定性”。 相关证明见P285-286。
第一管理资源网(),提供海量管理资料免费下
公 司 理 财
股利支付的计量
吉 林 大 学 商 学 院
股利支付率(Payout Ratio),是指公司在一定期 间向股东支付的现金股利与当期税后利润之比。 它反映了在公司当期实现的净利中支付股利所占 的百分比。 每股股利(Dividend Per Share,DPS),是指公司 当年现金股利支付额与流通在外普通股股数的比 值,反映每一股份的股利收益。 股利收益率(Dividend Yield),是指公司每股股 利与每股股价的比值,反映股东单位投资的获利 能力。 P273例1。

掌握股利政策的理论与种类

掌握股利政策的理论与种类

把握股利政策的理论与种类股利政策(Dividend policy)是指公司股东大会或董事会对一切与股利有关的事项,所实行的较具原那么性的做法。

下面是我整理的关于如何把握股利政策的理论与种类,欢送阅读!股利政策的理论传统理论二十世纪六七十年月,学者们争辩股利政策理论主要关注的是股利政策是否会影响股票价值,其中最具代表性的是一鸟在手理论、MM 股利无关论和税差理论,这三种理论被称为传统股利政策理论。

“一鸟在手〞理论“一鸟在手〞理论源于谚语“双鸟在林不如一鸟在手〞。

该理论最具有代表性的著作是M.Gordon 1959年在?经济与统计评论?上发表的?股利、盈利和股票的价格?,他认为企业的留存收益再投资时会有很大的不确定性,并且投资风险随着时间的推移将不断扩大,因此投资者倾向于获得当期的而非将来的收入,即当期的现金股利。

由于投资者一般为风险厌恶型,更倾向于当期较少的股利收入,而不是具有较大风险的将来较多的股利。

在这种状况下,当公司提高其股利支付率时,就会降低不确定性,投资者可以要求较低的必要酬劳率,公司股票价格上升;假如公司降低股利支付率或者延期支付,就会使投资者风险增大,投资者必定要求较高酬劳率以补偿其承受的风险,公司的股票价格也会下降。

MM理论1961年,股利政策的理论先驱米勒(Miller,MH)和弗兰克·莫迪格利安尼(Modieliani,F)在其论文?股利政策,增长和公司价值?中提出了有名的“MM股利无关论〞,即认为在一个无税收的完善市场上,股利政策和公司股价是无关的,公司的投资决策与股利决策彼此独立,公司价值仅仅依靠于公司资产的经营效率,股利安排政策的转变就仅是意味着公司的盈余如何在现金股利与资本利得之间进行安排。

理性的投资者不会由于安排的比例或者形式而转变其对公司评价,因此公司的股价不会受到股利政策的影响。

税差理论Farrar和Selwyn1967年首次对股利政策影响企业价值的问题作出了答复。

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外文翻译原文Optimal dividend policy and growth optionMaterial Source:Springer-Verlag 2006Author:Jean-Paul Decamps·Stephane VilleneuveResearch on optimal dividend payouts for a cash constrained firm is based on the premise that the firm wants to pay some of its surplus to the shareholders as dividends and therefore follows a dividend policy that maximizes the expected present value of all payouts until bankruptcy. This approach has been used in particular to determine the market value of a firm which, in line with Modigliani and Miller [23], is defined as the present value of the sum of future dividends. In diffusion models, the optimal dividend policy can be determined as the solution of a singular stochastic control problem. In two influential papers, Jeanblanc and Shiryaev [18] and Radner and Shepp [26] assume that the firm exploits a technology defined by a cash generating process that follows a drifted Brownian motion. They show that the optimal dividend policy is characterized by a threshold so that whenever the cash reserve goes above this threshold, the excess is paid out as dividend.Models that involve singular stochastic controls or mixed singular/regular stochastic controls are now widely used in mathematical finance. Recent contributions have for instance emphasized restrictions imposed by a regulatory agency [25], the interplay between dividend and risk policies [1, 3, 14], or the analysis of hedging and insurance decisions [27]. A new class of models that combine features of both regular stochastic control and optimal stopping has recently emerged. Two recent papers in this line are Miao and Wang [22], who study the interactions between investment and consumption under incomplete markets, and Hugonnier et al. [16], who focus on irreversible investment for a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework. From a mathematical viewpoint, the problem we are interested in is different and combines features of both singular stochastic control and optimal stopping. Such models are less usual in corporate finance and, to the best of our knowledge, only Guo and Pham [13] dealt with suchan issue. These authors consider a firm having to choose the optimal time to activate production and then control it by buying or selling capital. Their problem can be solved in a two-step formulation which consists in solving the singular control problem arising from the production activity after the exercise of the investment option.The novelty of our paper is to consider the interaction between dividends and investment as a singular control problem. Specifically, we consider a firm with a technology in place and a growth option. The growth option offers the firm the opportunity to invest in a new technology that increases its profit rate. The firm has no access to external funding and therefore finances the opportunity cost of the growth option from its cash reserve. Our objective is then to study the interactions between dividend policy and investment decisions. Such an objective leads us to deal with a mixed singular control/optimal stopping problem that we solve by establishing a connection with an optimal stopping problem. Precisely, let us consider the two following alternative strategies: (i) never invest in the growth option (and follow the associated optimal dividend policy), (ii) defer dividend distributions, invest optimally in the growth option (and follow Optimal dividend policy and growth option 5 the associated optimal dividend policy). We show that the firm value under the optimal dividend/investment policy coincides with the value function of the optimal stopping problem whose payoff function is the maximum of the values of the firm computed under the above strategies (i) and (ii). The equivalence between the mixed singular control/optimal stopping problem and the stopping problem is proved in our main theorem and is based on a verification procedure for stochastic control.We compute quasi-explicitly the value function and show that it is piecewise C2 and not necessarily concave as in standard singular control problems. Furthermore, from a detailed analysis based on properties of local time, we construct explicitly the optimal dividend/investment policy. Our model allows us to address several important questions in corporate finance. We explain when it is optimal to postpone dividend distribution, to accumulate cash and to invest at a subsequent date in the growth option. We analyse the effects of cash flow and uncertainty shocks on dividend policy and investment decision. We study the effects of financing constraints on dividend policy and investment decision with respect to a situation where the firm has unlimited cash.Finally, our work helps to bridge the gap between the literature on optimal dividend payouts and the now well-established real option literature. The real optionliterature analyses optimal investment policies that can be mathematically determined as solutions of optimal stopping problems. The original model is due to McDonald and Siegel [21] and has been extended in various ways by many authors.1 An important assumption of standard models is that the investment decision can be made independently of the financing decision. In contrast, in our paper, two interrelated features drive our investment problem. First, the firm is cash-constrained and must finance the investment using its cash reserve. Second, the firm must decide its dividend distribution policy in view of its growth opportunity. Such a perspective can be related to Boyle and Guthrie [2] who analyse, in a numerical model, the dynamic investment decision of a firm submitted to cash constraints. Two state variables drive their model: the cash process and a project value process for which the decision maker has to pay a fixed amount. Boyle and Guthrie [2] do not consider, however, the dividend distribution policy.The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model, analyses some useful benchmarks, provides a formulation of our problem based on the dynamic programming principle, and derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the growth option to be worthless. Section 3 states and proves our main theorem, derives the optimal dividend/investment policy and presents financial implications. Section 4 concludes.In this paper, we consider the implications of liquidity for the dividend/investment policy of a firm that owns the perpetual right to invest in a new, profit rate increasing technology. The mathematical formulation of our problem leads to a mixed singular control/optimal stopping problem that we solve quasi-explicitly by using a connection with an auxiliary stopping problem. A detailed analysis based on the properties of local time gives the precise optimal dividend/investment policy. This type of problem is non standard and does not seem to have attracted much attention in the corporate finance literature. Our analysis follows the lines of stochastic control and relies on the choice of a drifted Brownian motion for the cash reserve process in the absence of dividend distribution. This modelling assumption guarantees the quasi-explicit nature of the value function. We use this feature for instance in Proposition 3.4 where we show that is a supersolution. Furthermore, the property of independent increments for Brownian motion plays a central role for deriving the optimal policy (Proposition 3.10). Clearly, future work is needed to examine the robustness of our results to more general diffusions than a drifted Brownian motion.译文最佳股利政策和增长期权资料来源:Springer–Verlag 2006作者:Jean-Paul Decamps·Stehane Villeneuve对于一个现金控制的公司来说,关于最佳股利支付的研究是建立在假设基础上的,公司想要给予股东一部分的盈余作为分红,因此遵守股利政策,使得所有可预计支出的当前价值最大化知道破产。

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