略论我国证据制度的理论基础
证据制度一般理论
F、刑事诉讼中的见证人应视为“特殊的证人”。 （7）证人的义务： A、作证的义务 B、如实作证的义务 C、保守公安司法机关询问的情况以及陈述内容 的秘密，不向外泄露。 D、遵守法庭秩序的义务。 （8）证人的权利 A、司法人员到证人单位进行询问时，证人有权 要求其出示证明文件。 B、证人有权按照自己知道的案件情况提供证言。
（5）意义 A、保障无罪的人不受刑事追究，保护公民的合 法权益不受侵犯，防止发生冤假错案的重要保 证，是实行辩护的重要手段。 B、证据是对群众进行法制教育的工具。
二、证据制度的理论基础 证据制度的理论基础
证据制度是指法律规定的关于在诉讼中如何收集 证据、如何审查和判断证据、如何运用证据认 定案情的制度和规则。 理论基础有二： 1、辩证唯物主义认识论与刑事证据制度 2、程序正、一般来说比较客观真实，直接、生动、形象、 具体。 B、由于主客原因，可能有虚假、不真实的一面。 5、犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的供述和辩解 犯罪嫌疑人、 犯罪嫌疑人 （1）指犯罪嫌疑人、被告人就有关案件情况，向 司法工作人员所作的陈述，即“口供”。 （2）三种情形： A、犯罪嫌疑人、被告人承认自己犯罪并就有关事 实所作的供述。 B、犯罪嫌疑人、被告人说明自己无罪或罪轻的辩 解。 C、犯罪嫌疑人、被告人揭发、举报他人犯罪行为 的陈述，即攀供。
F、各种公证文书、裁判文书等。 （4）书证的特征： A、表现形式及制作方式的多样性； B、记载的内容和反映的思想必须同案件相关联； C、内容和思想可供人们认识和了解，用文字或 者符号、图形的方式来记载或表达。 （5）使用书证的条件有三： A、书证所表达的思想内容和意图同案件事实有 联系。 B、所记载的内容可以被认知。 C、要有明确的制作者。
五、证据的分类
1、概念和意义 （1）概念：是指在理论上将刑事证据按照不同 的标准划分为不同的类别。 目的：在于研究不同类别证据的特点及其运用规 律，以便指导办案工作。
中国证据立法的实践基础
中国证据立法的实践基础引言证据制度建设一直是我国司法改革的重要任务之一。
从1999年以来，人民法院三个“五年改革纲要”都对证据制度建设作出了规划，尤其是2009年《第三个五年改革纲要》，对证据制度建设任务提出了具体要求。
经过多年的努力，证据制度建设取得了重大成就，但是很多有关证据规则的条文内容粗疏，逻辑混乱，甚至相互矛盾，证据规则的体系化远未形成。
针对这种状况，中国政法大学证据科学研究与最高人民法院合作，开展《人民法院诉讼证据规定》项目研究，对三大诉讼法和相关司法解释中现有的证据规则进行全面梳理，完成三大诉讼证据规则的“三证合一”，制定一部能够适用于各级人民法院审判各类案件的证据规定。
为配合本项目的研究，课题组于2013年9月起在国内十个法院就人民法院证据规定适用情况进行为期四个月的调查研究。
除通过座谈、访谈、旁听审判以及收集书面数据资料等形式外，课题组还开展了《中国证据法治发展指数》的问卷调查，设计了98道题目，共发放问卷800份，最后收回问卷750份。
通过这次调研，使我们认识到了中国当下证据法实施中的一些重要问题和难题。
一、律师的证据权利得不到有效保障（一）律师取证权缺乏制度保障律师取证存在不少困难及障碍，当律师向有关单位和个人收集证据材料时，经常遭到他们的拒绝。
在刑事诉讼中，律师取证遇到证据持有人不配合的情况更为严重，高达91.2%。
律师的取证申请被人民检察院或者人民法院拒绝的可能性高达67.7%。
（二）律师阅卷存在人为障碍首先，律师在阅卷时间上受限制。
人民检察院、人民法院能够按照法律“非常可能”及时安排阅卷的只有55.2%。
其次，律师阅卷的范围受到了很大限制。
人民法院“非常可能”保证律师查阅全部案卷的比例只有35.7%。
第三，律师阅卷的费用太高。
很多地方法院按复印A4纸一张收费1元计算，远远高于市场0.1元的价格；很多地方法院，还对律师查阅案卷每次收取50元到100元不等的阅卷费。
二、证人出庭作证制度亟待完善（一）证人不出庭问题未能得到根本解决长期以来，证人出庭率一直偏低。
浅论我国证据法基本原则及其内在逻辑联系
浅论我国证据法基本原则及其内在逻辑联系我国证据法是指中国的法律体系中关于证据的规定和制度。
证据法的基本原则是指证据法的基本指导思想和规范准则。
证据法的内在逻辑联系是指证据法中各项规则的逻辑联系和相互作用关系。
下面将浅论我国证据法的基本原则及其内在逻辑联系。
一、我国证据法的基本原则1. 事实导向原则事实导向原则是最基本的证据法原则之一。
它要求法庭在判决案件时应以事实为依据，根据证据的真实性和客观性来判决案件。
事实导向原则要求法官在审理案件时应当客观、公正，不能受到个人情感和主观意识的干扰，不能任意推定和臆测。
这一原则体现了司法公正和审判权威的基本价值。
2. 充分辩证原则充分辩证原则是指在审理案件时，法庭应当对案件的各种证据和事实进行充分的辨析和评估，不得片面、执拗地看待某一方面的证据，要全面地考虑案件的各种相关因素，做到全面客观地审查案件的证据。
充分辩证原则是确保司法裁判客观公正的重要保障。
3. 法定证据原则法定证据原则是指证据的取得、证明和运用应当依照法定程序进行。
法官不得私自调查取证，任意采纳或排除证据。
法定证据原则保障了当事人的证据权利，保障了证据的真实和合法性。
4. 独立审判原则独立审判原则是指法院在审理案件时应当独立行使审判权，不受任何政治、经济、社会、个人等方面的外部干扰和影响。
法官应当独立地、客观地审理案件，依法行使审判权，确保判决的公正和合法。
5. 公开审理原则公开审理原则是指公民、法人和其他组织的合法权益受到侵害时，有权向人民法院诉讼，并且法院应当公开审理案件，依法保障当事人的诉讼权利。
公开审理原则是确保司法公正和法治的重要保障。
二、我国证据法的内在逻辑联系1. 事实导向原则与充分辩证原则的内在逻辑联系法定证据原则是指证据的取得、证明和运用应当依照法定程序进行，法官不得私自调查取证，任意采纳或排除证据。
独立审判原则是指法院在审理案件时应当独立行使审判权，不受任何外部干扰和影响。
法定证据原则和独立审判原则的内在逻辑联系在于，法定证据原则保障了当事人的证据权利，保障了证据的真实和合法性，而独立审判原则则保证了法院在审理案件时能够独立地、客观地行使审判权，依法行使审判权，确保判决的公正和合法。
证据法学理论基础之我见
证据法学理论基础之我见证据法学的理论基础，就是作为证据法制、收集证据以及证明等活动以及证据法学研究的理论支持和指导力量。
对于证据立法和证据法实践活动提供支持和指导的理论是多样化的，我们在谈到证据法学的理论基础的时候，只能择其要者进行阐述，不可能将证据法的理论支持和指导力量一一列举出来，这是我们在谈证据法学的理论基础必须首先明确的。
我认为，证据法学的理论基础主要包括认识论和价值论两大部分，作为我国证据法学理论基础的，当以认识论和法律多元价值及平衡、选择理论为首选。
一、理论基础之一：认识论诉讼活动的主要构成部分是认识活动，对于认识活动，认识论无疑具有理论支持和指导作用。
认识论（epistemology）是哲学的一部分，是“”关于人类知识的来源、发展过程，以及认识与实践关系的学说。
“”它的任务是研究人类认识的起源与发展，并考察组织异常复杂的认识作用。
其基本问题包括认识的起源问题、认识的确实性问题和认识的本质问题。
对于认识的起源问题，主要有三派：唯理主义（rationalism）者认为认识乃是先天固有的，其起源在于思考；经验主义（empiricism）者认为认识起源于内外之经验；批评主义（criticism）调和于两说之间，批评主义者认为先天和经验同为知识的源泉。
对于认识的确实性问题。
主要有以下几种流派：其一，为独断论（dogmatism），独断论者是不加验证而独断其真实的观念，信奉者完全信赖感觉与知识的结果，认为世界的事实情况与我们所见的和所想的完全一致。
例如，宗教是独断的，宗教活动人士坚信其所持教义的真确性，即使是超感觉的不可能的经验的对象，也深信不已；哲学上也有一个相当长的时期是独断的，例如柏拉图认为世界的本质是由非物质的观念或者原型组织而成的，等等。
其二，为怀疑论（skepticism），怀疑论者与独断论者相反，极端怀疑认识的可能性，因而不作一切积极的主张。
怀疑论起源于公元前三百年的比罗（Pyrrho），当时哲学家所持的见解彼此矛盾，莫衷一是，因此诱发了怀疑论的产生。
证据制度
论我国的证据制度问题内容摘要：证据是正义的基础。
人们常说“打官司就是打证据”，可见证据在当代诉讼中的重要地位。
广义上的证据制度是指规定证据、证据收集、审查判断证据及如何运用证据证明案件事实的法律规范的总称；狭义上则仅指证据制度类型。
人类历史上，证据制度经历了从神示证据制度到法定证据制度，再到自由心证的证据制度的发展过程。
神示证据制度因其的不理性和野蛮性而被历史所淘汰，而法定证据制度也因其的过分僵化和机械性而被自由心证的证据制度所取代。
自由心证原则经历了传统自由心证和现代自由心证两种形态。
传统自由心证由于其的过分强调法官自由裁量，不加任何形式的限制，而易导致司法的任意性长期以来，我国受原苏联及东欧社会主义国家哲学思想、政治主张的影响，而实行“实事求是”的证据制度。
要求法官审查判断证据必须以“实事求是”为原则，以“客观真实”为标准，强调法官判案必须以案件的客观真实为依据，赋予法官极大的审查判断权。
这种过分追求“客观真实”的诉讼证明要求，实际上是不符合我国的诉讼实际的，在本质上也是违背马克思主义哲学认识论的认识规律的。
在新一轮的司法改革中，改革和完善证据制度已成为制约我国司法改革能否成功的关键。
对于证据制度中存在的问题，我们应深入地研究，提出各种切实可行的解决办法。
关键词：证据制度自由心证“实事求是”的证据制度法律真实法官心证一、证据制度的概念、种类、分类、作用及历史发展（一）证据制度概念、种类、分类、作用所谓证据制度，广义上是指规定证据、证据收集、审查判断以及如何运用证据证明案件事实的法律规范的总称，是一国关于证据的一系列的规定、规范的总和。
而狭义上的证据制度是指证据制度类型。
人类历史上曾经经历了神示证据制度、法定证据制度、自由心证的证据制度的发展过程。
证据的种类主要有以下9种：物证、书证、证人证言、被害人的陈述、犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的供述和辩解、当事人的陈述、鉴定结论、勘验、检查笔录及现场笔录、视听资料。
证据法的理论基础和基本原则
第三章证据的理论根底和根本原那么第一节证据法的理论根底一、认识论〔一〕司法证明是一种特殊的认识活动。
证据法的主旨在于标准司法证明活动，因此探讨证据法的理论根底要从司法证明活动开始。
司法证明属于社会证明的范畴，但同生活中的证明如实验室证明又有很大区别：A、司法证明必须接受证据规那么、法律标准以及其他人为因素的制约；B、司法证明有着场所和时间的限制；C、司法证明通常由不知情的法官主持，精通法律但不一定精通专业知识，要借助专家协助，证明主体与认识主体相别离。
〔二〕我国证据法在认识论方面的理论根底是辨证唯物主义认识论辨证唯物主义认识论主要有三个根本理论要素构成1、物质论：即物质或存在是第一性的，意识或思维是第二性的，物质决定意识。
世界是物质的，物质是运动的，物质具有客观实在性，这种物质论说明任何案件都是物质的，司法人员所要查明和证明的对象总是物质性额案件事实。
存在于人脑中的思想活动和思维意向不构成案件。
2、反映论：即思维是大脑的技能，是对存在的反响。
辨证唯物主义认为物质运动的结果必然呈现一定的形态，因此各种证据都是案件事实的反映。
生活中的案件类型各不相同，但都具有特定性、稳定性、和反映性。
特定性说明，任何案件都具有不同于其他案件的质的规定性，能与其他案件区别开来；稳定性说明，任何案件都具有相对静止、暂时平衡和稳定的特点，能够在一定的时间内保持不变；反响性说明，任何案件的特征都能在其特征反映体中得到良好的反映，且能够为人们所认识。
反映论说明，各种证据就是案件的反映。
反映论说明，绝大多数司法证明活动就是一种同一认定活动。
即“人---事同一认定〞。
3、可知论：即认为思维和存在之间具有同一性，人的认识可以正确的反映客观世界。
辨证唯物主义认为人的思维是至上的，能够认识现存世界的一切事物和现象，因此任何案件事实从理论上都是可以查明和证明的。
并且，辨证唯物主义主张可知论是相对的。
二、方法论------我们不但要提出任务，而且要解决完成任务的方法问题。
证据学论文
证据学论文————证据法学理论基础：争议焦点及评述学院：哲学与法学学院姓名：***班级：法学091学号：**********证据法学理论基础：争议焦点及评述证据法学的理论基础，是一国证据法学体系的基点和核心问题。
不夸张地讲，对于证据法学理论基础的研究，在一定意义上决定着我国证据法学体系的建立和证据法治建设的方向。
形象地说，如果将证据法治比喻成一个“木桶”，证据法学的理论基础问题就是其中最短的一块板，它不仅决定其“储水量”，而且是防治“漏水”的关键。
我国证据立法的粗疏和证据法实践中产生的诸多问题，最终都与证据法学的理论基础研究的薄弱有莫大关系。
加强证据法学理论基础的研究，不仅是证据立法、证据法实践的迫切需求，也是我国证据法学研究逐渐走向成熟的表现。
一、证据法学理论基础的定义与特性在证据法学理论基础的研究中，首先涉及的问题是什么是“证据法学的理论基础”。
对此，比较一致的观点是，我国应当实现从证据学到证据法学的转型，因此，研究证据法学的理论基础应当摆脱证据学的束缚。
不过，关于“证据法学的理论基础”这一概念的称谓和厘定方面，学者们的意见并不一致。
其次，学者们在界定什么是证据法学的理论基础时，在特性的把握上也存在诸多争议。
鉴于此，对“证据法学的理论基础”这一概念的称谓和厘定及特性的把握，便成为研究证据法学理论基础的先行问题。
（一）证据学的理论基础与证据法学的理论基础之区别长期以来，我国传统证据理论注重从事实角度研究证据问题而缺乏从法律的角度研究证据问题，对证据问题的探讨具有浓厚的哲学色彩。
传统观点认为，我国诉讼证据制度以辩证唯物主义认识论作为自己的理论基础。
物质与意识的辩证关系、主观与客观的辩证关系、实践是检验真理的唯一标准等是运用证据查明案件事实的理论依据。
以“实事求是”命名，反映了我国证据制度的本质和特点。
辩证唯物主义认识论被认为是我国证据制度的唯一理论基础和指导思想。
（二）证据法学的理论基础与相关概念的区别在许多证据法学的论著中，学者们提出了一系列与证据法学的理论基础类似的术语，有的甚至在同等意义上使用，例如，“证据制度的理论基础”、“诉讼证据学的理论基础”、“诉讼证明的理论基础”、“证据法的五大基本理念”、“证据法的理论基础”、“证据法学的基础理论”等。
证据法的理论基础.最全优质PPT
在法庭审判的时候，很有戏剧性的一幕出现了。李昌
珏在法庭上作证时，首先讲述了洛卡德的物质转移原
理，作为其专家意见的理论根据。然后他讲述了自己
在现场勘查时用手绢在现场的水泥地和草地上进行的
接触实验。他把实验结果用事先准备好的立体显微镜
展现在陪审团的面前：在水泥地上擦蹭过的手绢的纤
信息转移原理对证据调查的作用
1991年在美国，威廉·肯尼迪被指控强奸。案件发生在佛罗里达 州棕榈滩的肯尼迪家族别墅里。那天晚上，肯尼迪把附近一家 酒吧的一个女招待带回别墅，第二天那个女招待到警察局报案， 声称自己被肯尼迪强奸。她向警察讲述了事情的经过：她和肯 尼迪在酒吧喝酒，然后肯尼迪开车把她带到别墅。肯尼迪把车 停在车库里，出来就向她提出了性交的要求。遭到她的拒绝后， 肯尼迪便把她强行摁倒在车库外面的水泥地上，然后又把她拖 到旁边的草地上实施了强奸。她还向警察局提供了她当时穿的 内裤。警方的法庭科学家随后对残留在内裤上的精斑做了DNA 鉴定，证实精斑属于肯尼迪。肯尼迪承认自己与女招待发生了 性关系，但是他声称这是在女招待同意的前提下发生的，绝不 是强奸。
证据法的理论基础
在黑龙江省的滨北农场，郑家和李家是邻居，素
来关系要好，郑家弟弟郑建国和李红梅从小青梅 竹马，彼此爱慕，但李红梅长大后，爱上了肖雄。 1983年4月17日的早晨，李红梅被发现死在自己 的家中，后查明：李红梅是在被人强奸的过程中 被人用枕头捂住口鼻而窒息死亡的；现场留下了 一个削了一半的带皮的苹果，傍边的塑料水果刀 上有一些血迹，大概是削苹果的人没留神割破了 手指，因此没有削完。李红梅的手上没有伤口， 经检验，郑建国的血型与水果刀上的血迹的血型 相同，与受害人阴道内的精斑的血型也相同，郑 建国右手的食指上也有一处伤口。同时据李红梅 的父亲，李青山说，当晚他喝了点儿酒，吃完饭 就睡觉了，夜里起夜看见一个人影溜进郑家，郑 建国对此并没有否认。于是，法院最终认定郑建 国是强奸杀人犯，被判处死缓 。
证据制度理论基础的反思与构建
认识论能否作为证据制度 的理论基础 或者是唯一 的理论基础 于可 知 论 的理 论 基 础 ， 常认 为 只要 证 据 收集 人 或 公 安 司法 人 通
提出了质疑 ，对我 国证据 制度 的理论基 础进行 了新 的定位 ， 这 员发挥 自己的主观能动性 ， 面收集 和审查判断证 据 ， 能够 全 是 反 映了传统证据理论 的缺陷和证据理论研究 的发展特 点 ， 是证 发现案件的真相 的。 据制度理论 发展不可或缺的步骤和过程 。 从诉 讼过 程看 ， 当事人或公安 司法人员对案件事实的认识 与认定则是通过证 明完成 的。证 明包含 收集调取证据 、 审查判
一
、
证据制度 与辩证唯物主义认 识论
断证据 、 运用证据认定事实 三个步骤 ， 三个 步骤在诉讼 中相 这
互结 合、 相互交叉 ， 只是在不同阶段侧重点不同。 如在刑事诉讼
侦查 阶段 以收集调取证据 为主 ， 在审查起诉 阶段 以对侦查 （ ）对辩 证唯物主义认识论 作为证据制度理论 基础的基 中， 一 中的证 明质量进行审查为主 ， 审判 阶段 以运用证据认定事实
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【 法学与法制建设 】
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证据制度理论基础的反思与构建
物主义认识 论作 为人 类认识 自然 、 会 、 的思维 的一般 规律 据进行的 ，证据在证明主体和证明对象之间起着桥梁 作用 ； 社 人 证
的科学 ， 与运用证据 的证 明活动是一般与特殊 的关 系。
一
明活动的进行要 以证 据规则为活动准则 ， 要遵循诉 讼法 的一般 （ ） 二 辩证唯物主义认识论不应是证据制度 的唯一理论基础 辩证 唯物 主义认识论是哲学 的范畴， 在作为证据制度的理
中国古代证据制度的思想基础及特点分析
中国古代证据制度的思想基础及特点分析. .中国古代证据制度的思想基础及特点分析姜登峰【摘要】以中华法系为代表的中国古代法制文明在世界法律史中占有重要地位,也是中国古代文明的体现法律制度的设计必须与其所处的经济、社会制度与环境相适应,古代中国法律体现了这点。
作为法律制度一部分、对于事实的认定、纠纷的解决具有重要影响的证据制度也是如此。
中国古代证据制度在设计及实施过程中受到了古代哲学、伦理观念、心理学等因素的影响,同时也与当时的生产力水平相适应。
中国古代证据制度具有与西方不同的特征.这与中国古代对人的重视、以儒家为主导的哲学观念、当时的生产力水平以及家法宗族的统治密切相关。
【关键词】法制文明;证据制度;思想基础;特点分析;古代中国【中图分类号】.【文献标识码】【文章编号】 ? ? ?. , . ,. ,.【】 , ? , . ,, . , ?, , , ,. , ,.【】 ,,, ,以中华法系为代表的中国古代法制文明在世界法律史中占有重要地位.也是中国古代文明的体现。
中国古代证据制度是古代法制文明的组成部分,具有其哲学、伦理学和心理学等方面的思想基础,且与当时的社会发展状况相适应,并在古代司法过程和法律的发展进程中发挥着重要的作用。
姜登峰,法学博士,中国政法大学法学院副教授。
秘撵拿争年第卷第期?一中国古代法制文明和证据制度、一中国古代法制文明中国是世界上著名的法制文明古国,法律的历史可以上溯到公元前三千年左右.而且辗转相承.绵延不绝,形成了历史悠久、特色鲜明的法律传统,傲然自立于世界法律历史之林。
作为世界五大法系之一中华法系,同时也是世界上历史最为悠久的、具有强大生命力的法系:对世界法律的发展产生了重要的影响,特别体现在对东亚各国法律制度与法律文化的影响作为四大文明古国之一.古代中国的政治、经济、文化都处于世界的领先水平。
与之相适应的古代法治文明也在较长时间内处于相对发达的地位。
与西方相比,中国古代法治文明具有自身的一些特点早在春秋战国时期人们对法律就有了较为客观、理性的认识。
论我国的证据制度问题
论我国的证据制度问题【摘要】我国的证据制度始终是我国司法领域的重要问题之一。
本文将从历史演变、存在的问题、改革现状、改革建议以及国际比较的角度分析我国证据制度的种种问题。
在历史演变中，我国证据制度受传统法律观念和文化影响，存在不少瑕疵。
当前我国证据制度改革的现状也备受关注，改革的方向和力度将对司法公正产生深远影响。
在国际比较的视角下，我国证据制度与国际水平仍有一定差距，需要不断提升和完善。
本文将提出一些具体的改革建议，希望能够引起相关部门的重视，推动我国证据制度的不断进步和发展。
【关键词】我国证据制度的历史演变, 我国证据制度存在的问题, 当前我国证据制度改革的现状, 我国证据制度改革的建议, 国际比较视角下的我国证据制度问题, 结论1. 引言1.1 引言在我国法律体系中，证据制度一直是司法实践中一个重要的环节。
证据是法庭审判的基础，是判断案件事实真相的重要依据。
我国的证据制度经历了漫长的历史演变，也在不断地完善和改革中。
当前我国的证据制度仍然存在着一些问题，如证据获取的困难、证据规则的不完善、证据链的缺失等。
这些问题给司法实践带来了一些挑战，也影响了公正审判的实现。
当前我国证据制度改革的现状备受关注。
在国际比较视角下，我国的证据制度与一些发达国家相比仍有一定的差距。
一些国家在证据获取、证据规则、证据链等方面已经建立了较为完善的制度，并在司法实践中取得了一定的成效。
在当前全球化的背景下，我国的证据制度也需要借鉴国际经验，加强改革和完善。
通过对我国证据制度的历史演变、存在的问题以及改革现状的分析，我们可以更好地认识我国证据制度的现状，找出存在的问题和不足，并提出相应的改革建议。
只有不断完善我国的证据制度，才能更好地保障公民的合法权益，实现司法公正。
2. 正文2.1 我国证据制度的历史演变我国证据制度的历史演变从古代开始就有着悠久的历史。
在古代，我国的证据制度主要是建立在家族、部落和宗族之间的口头传统和信任基础上。
论证据学的理论基础
论证据学的理论基础【内容提要】近年来，有些学者质疑甚至否定证据学或证据法学辩证唯物主义的理论基础，提出围绕证据的活动是不是认识活动的问题、从“证据学”到“证据法学”的理论转型问题以及辩证唯物主义认识论与程序工具主义有密切的关系并为程序工具主义和程序虚无主义提供合理化解释等问题。
这些观点均不能成立。
证据学或证据法学的辩证唯物主义理论基础不可动摇。
【关键词】证据学理论基础辩证唯物主义辩证法认识论[Abstract]In recent years，some scholars have questioned or even negative evidence，or evidence law adj materialist theoretical basis，put forward around evidence of activity is it right？Understanding activity problem，from“evidence”to“evidence law”theory transformation as well as the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge and the procedure instrumentalism has close relationship and for program tool justice and procedure nihilism provides reasonable explanation of the problem. These views are not tenable. The science of evidence or the evidence law adj materialism theory unshakable.[Key words]the science of evidence；theoretical basis；dialectical materialism；dialectics epistemology证据学的理论基础本不是一个复杂的问题。
论中国证据制度
论中国证据制度摘要：中国证据制度是中国法律体系中的重要组成部分，其目的在于确保司法公正，保护当事人的合法权益。
然而，在中国证据制度中仍存在一些问题，包括证据收集难、证据不全面等。
本文将从中国证据制度的发展、目的及存在的问题等方面进行探讨，并提出改进的建议。
一、中国证据制度的发展历程中国证据制度的发展可以追溯到古代法律制度。
早在春秋战国时期，中国就有了一些证据制度，如“以言为准”、“以身试法”等。
然而，这些证据制度往往不够科学或公正，容易导致冤假错案的发生。
随着中国社会的进步与法治意识的增强，中国证据制度逐渐得到了完善。
1954年，中国颁布了《刑事诉讼法》，该法首次明确了我国的证据制度，规定了证据的收集、审查和使用等程序。
此后，在司法体系改革的推动下，中国证据制度不断发展，逐渐形成了中国版的证据规则和证据规则标准。
二、中国证据制度的目的与意义中国证据制度的目的在于确保司法公正，保护当事人的合法权益。
首先，证据制度的存在使法官能够以客观、公正的标准来判断案件事实，避免主观臆断或歧视性判决。
其次，证据制度能够规范证据的收集、审查和使用，确保证据的真实性和完整性，提高司法效率，减少冤假错案的发生。
最后，证据制度也能够增加诉讼的公平性和可预见性，使当事人能够在合理的范围内行使其权利。
然而，在中国证据制度的实施过程中仍存在一些问题，进一步完善和改进迫在眉睫。
三、中国证据制度存在的问题1. 证据收集难：由于证据的获取途径有限、证据的采集过程存在难度等原因，往往导致证据收集的困难。
例如，一些证据需要通过其他机构或个人配合获取，涉及隐私或商业秘密的证据也较难获得。
这给提供充分证据的当事人带来了困扰，也影响了证据制度的公正性和真实性。
2. 证据不全面：在一些案件中，由于证据不全面或缺乏必要的证据，导致事实无法真实呈现，影响了法官的判断和公正裁决。
一些证据可能由于过时、遗失、销毁或人为破坏等原因无法获得，使当事人的合法权益无法得到充分保障。
论我国的证据制度问题
内容摘要：证据是正义的基础。
人们常说“打官司就是打证据”，可见证据在当代诉讼中的重要地位。
广义上的证据制度是指规定证据、证据收集、审查判断证据及如何运用证据证明案件事实的法律规范的总称；狭义上则仅指证据制度类型。
人类历史上，证据制度经历了从神示证据制度到法定证据制度，再到自由心证的证据制度的发展过程。
神示证据制度因其的不理性和野蛮性而被历史所淘汰，而法定证据制度也因其的过分僵化和机械性而被自由心证的证据制度所取代。
自由心证原则经历了传统自由心证和现代自由心证两种形态。
传统自由心证由于其的过分强调法官自由裁量，不加任何形式的限制，而易导致司法的任意性。
长期以来，我国受原苏联及东欧社会主义国家哲学思想、政治主张的影响，而实行“实事求是”的证据制度。
要求法官审查判断证据必须以“实事求是”为原则，以“客观真实”为标准，强调法官判案必须以案件的客观真实为依据，赋予法官极大的审查判断权。
这种过分追求“客观真实”的诉讼证明要求，实际上是不符合我国的诉讼实际的，在本质上也是违背马克思主义哲学认识论的认识规律的。
在新一轮的司法改革中，改革和完善证据制度已成为制约我国司法改革能否成功的关键。
对于证据制度中存在的问题，我们应深入地研究，提出各种切实可行的解决办法。
关键词：证据制度自由心证“实事求是”的证据制度法律真实法官心证一、证据制度的概念、种类、分类、作用及历史发展（一）证据制度概念、种类、分类、作用所谓证据制度，广义上是指规定证据、证据收集、审查判断以及如何运用证据证明案件事实的法律规范的总称，是一国关于证据的一系列的规定、规范的总和。
而狭义上的证据制度是指证据制度类型。
人类历史上曾经经历了神示证据制度、法定证据制度、自由心证的证据制度的发展过程。
证据的种类主要有以下9种：物证、书证、证人证言、被害人的陈述、犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的供述和辩解、当事人的陈述、鉴定结论、勘验、检查笔录及现场笔录、视听资料。
根据不同的分类方法，证据可分为原始证据和传来证据、言词证据和实物证据、有罪证据和无罪证据、直接证据和间接证据、本证和反证等。
试论我国民事证据制度的几个问题证据制度的基本原则
试论我国民事证据制度的几个问题:证据制度的基本原则证据是诉讼的核心，在诉讼中发挥着灵魂的作用。
随着我国民事审判方式改革的不断深入，民事证据制度受到了越来越强有力的冲击。
本文拟就从证据的合法性、举证责任分担、审查推断证据、认定事实的原则等方面作一些分析，并对如何完善我国证据制度提出若干建议。
一、证据的合法性客观性、关联性和合法性是民事诉讼证据的三个最根本的特征。
本文就合法性进展探讨。
本文所指的合法性，主要是指程序的合法性，即证据的收集、调查应符合法律的规定。
英美法等国家证据法中的排解规章，即以非法手段取得的证据材料必需排解在法庭审理之外，值得我国借鉴。
何为非法手段，以什么方法猎取的证据为有效?我国法律未对此作出明确、详细的规定。
(一)非法手段的认定我国刑诉法第43条规定：“审判员、检察人员、侦查人员必需依照法定程序，收集能够证明犯罪嫌疑人、被告人有罪或无罪、犯罪情节轻重的各种证据。
严禁刑讯逼供和以威逼、引诱、哄骗以及其他非法的方法收集证据。
”笔者认为，该规定对非法手段的认定同样适用于民事诉讼中当事人及其诉讼代理人自行收集证据和人民法院调查收集的行为。
最高法院法复(95)2号批复认定隐秘录音属不合法行为。
也就是说，即使隐秘录音的内容真实、无伪造，若非得到对方当事人的成认，该录音资料不得作为定案的依据。
究其主要动因，是一种非法推定，即凡隐秘录音，皆有以引诱、威逼或哄骗取得之嫌，故依法不予认定。
这对催促当事人及其诉讼代理人以合法方式收集证据、杜绝滥用民事诉讼权利侵害公民正值权利(如隐私权)有着重要意义。
民事诉讼法是为爱护当事人行使诉讼权利，从宪法理论来看，其主要功能是实现和爱护宪法明确规定的公民的自由权、财产权、公平权等根本权利。
故在推行以强调当事人举证责任为特征的民事审判方式改革的状况下，最高法院应通过司法解释对侵害公民根本权利的收集、调查证据手段界定为非法手段以全面爱护公民的权益。
如擅自拆开他人信件；在他人住宅安放窃听器等。
证据法学的理论基础
证据法学的理论基础摘要:证据法学是研究证据规则的学科,它是以诉讼活动为基础并存在于诉讼活动中的,以刑事诉讼为例,刑事诉讼活动是一种认识活动,受认识论的指导,因此,证据法学也是以认识论为其理论基础的。
另一方面,程序正义论也是证据法学的理论基础,只不过认识论与程序正义论处于不同层次而已,证据法学的理论基础是以认识论为原则,以程序正义论为例外。
一、问题的提出长期以来,我国证据法学都是以认识论为其理论基础的,认为马克思主义的辩证唯物主义认识论作为基础指导着证据法学的发展。
但是,近来,有学者提出了不同观点,对认识论的理论基础地位进行质疑,并在21世纪初期展开了对证据法学理论基础的反思。
关于证据法学的理论基础,除了传统观点的认识论之外,目前学界主要有以下几种不同观点:一种观点是价值论,认为证据法学的理论基础应该从认识论走向价值论,应将其建立在形式理性和程序正义的基础之上;另一种是二元论,即认为辩证唯物主义认识论与程序正义理论二者的对立统一是指导我们研究证据法学的理论基础。
与二元论相似,也有学者认为:“辩证唯物主义认识论与价值论是不矛盾的,两者存在着内在的联系。
可见,在证据法的理论基础上,价值论应成为认识论的必要补充”。
综观这几种不同观点,可以看到在传统的马克思主义的认识论作为证据法学的地位受到挑战之后,程序正义作为证据法学的理论基础得到越来越多的人支持,基本再不存在争议。
所以,要弄清楚证据法学的理论基础,只需要解决这样两个问题:首先,认识论到底是不是证据法学的理论基础;其次,如果认识论是证据法学的理论基础,它与程序正义论之间又是什么关系。
以下详细分析。
二、认识论能否作为证据法学的理论基础要看认识论是不是证据法学的理论基础,就要从证据法学的概念及一些相关基本问题入手。
首先,关于证据法学的概念,学术界也有不同观点,一种观点认为:“所谓证据法学,应当是对证据规则(有关证据的法律规则)的意义进行探求的学问”,“它的研究领域只能拓展至有关证据规则的哲学原理、历史渊源、社会效果等内容”;也有学者这样定义:“证据法学主要是研究如何在法律上对待收集的证据,是以一系列约束查明案件事实方法的规则为主要研究对象的理论法学,它并不致力于发现事实真相,而是旨在保障合理而正当地发现真相,因此可以归入程序法学的领域”;还有学者将刑事证据法所规范的主体内容具体到“有关证据能力的规则和司法证明的规则”,而将带有程序性意义的证据规则排除在外[6]。
第二章 证据的理论基础
（二）司法证明与认识论
• 认识活动受辩证唯物主义认识论的指导显示出其科学与合 理性。作为科学理论，都有特定的适用领域，一旦超越了 特定的范畴，原本科学合理的学说或者真理也会失去其特 有的价值。辩证唯物主义认识论也同样必须遵守这一点， 尽管很多人不愿意承认。因此，对于辩证唯物主义认识论 是否应当贯彻到司法证明中是应当审慎研究后才能作出结 论，而不能机械地生搬硬套辩证唯物主义认识论。
• 因此我国主流法学家都毫不留情地批判资本主义国家诉讼理论中的自 由心证等证据制度，认为他们夸大了意识在运用证据裁判案件过程中 的作用，违背了辩证唯物主义认识论的基本原理。
• 按照权威理论解释，辩证唯物主义认识论包含三个基本的 理论要素：即可知论、实践是检验真理的唯一标准和追求 客观真实。辩证唯物主义认识认为存在是第一性的，意识 是存在的反映是第二性的。而证据是在案件发生之前、之 中或之后产生的，与案件事实存在某种联系的事实，因此 毫无疑问是不以司法人员意志为转移的客观存在。司法人 员只有发挥主观能动性，一切从实际出发，通过案件的侦 查、起诉、审判等活动的实践，才能全面正确地收集并审 查判断证据，从而发现案件的事实真相。
第二章 证据的理论基础
• 朱令，北京人，1992年考入清华大学。朱令事件是指朱令在校期间离 奇出现铊中毒的症状，导致身体健康遭到极大的伤害，最后得助于互 联网才受到确诊和救治的事件，这是中国首次利用互联网进行国际远 程医疗的尝试。由于朱令没有铊的接触史，今仍逍遥法外，尚无明确结 果。且由于警方对事件处理过程中的一些异常行为，让朱令案成为公 众事件，从而衍生出对于作案嫌疑人家庭背景的各种猜测。
证据法的理论基础和意义
·证据法讲堂·The Theoretical Foundations and Implications of EvidenceRonald J.Allen“Evidence”and“evidence law”are two quite distinct concepts.“Evidence”generally refers to those inputs to decision making that influence its outcome in what,to introduce a third concept,is normally re-ferred to as a rational manner.In the United States,“evidence”also has a technical legal meaning to re-fer to the testimony and exhibits introduced at trial,but this is problematic.In the United States,fact finders may take into account their observations of witnesses(“demeanor”),which obviously is“evidence”in any useful sense of the term,and more deeply no observation may be processed and deliberated upon without the use of a vast storehouse of preexisting concepts,observations,and decision makings tools(such as logic,abduction,utilities,and so on).A useful concept of evidence must thus expand considerably far beyond the mere“trial inputs”–the observations of witness testimony and exhibits.What“rational”means here is putting all of the inputs and cognitive capabilities to the use of discovering as best can be done the way the world was at some prior time,and then to let rights and obligations be determined con-sistently with the preexisting state of affairs.“Evidence law”,by contrast,refers to the manner in which the evidentiary process is organized,but obviously the organization of the evidentiary process is contingent on both“evidence”and the nature of “rationality.”The domain of evidence law,then,extends to the traces of the past that we colloquially refer to as“evidence,”the manner in which such traces of the past are processed and relied upon in human decision making,and the regulation by law of the formal evidentiary process.Evidence law is thus contin-gent upon,and must accommodate,at least three things:Universal truths of the human condition,contin-gent aspects of the nature of government and its legal system,and highly specific policies to be pursued in addition or opposition to the pursuit of truth.I will say a word about each of these in turn.Universal Truths:Although much of human culture is socially determined,cognitive capacities are not.How capacities are developed and employed may differ,but the underlying epistemological capacities to perceive,process,remember,and relate what was observed are part of the human condition.Obviously, they differ over individuals within societies,but they are universally present in all competent adults.Many of the tools that humans employ to assist in understanding their environment likewise are universal.Math-ematics and logic do not vary from place to place,nor do decision tools such as utility functions and costJohn Henry Wigmore Professor of Law,Northwestern University President,Board of Foreign Advisors,Evidence Law and Forensic Sciences Institute Fellow,Procedural Law Research Center,CUPL Beijing,China June,2010curves.Together,I will refer to these epistemological capacities and formal tools as the“tools of rationali-ty.”These tools of rationality are what permit humans to understand and control their environment.They include such things as simple deductive reasoning,the capacity to generalize,abductive reasoning(the search for the explanation of a series of data points),an understanding of cause and effect and of necessary and sufficient conditions,and many other things as well.These issues comprise the study of epistemolo-gy—the study of knowledge—and the law of evidence is in fact the law’s epistemology.I should note that in some discussions of the foundations of the law of evidence a distinction is made between probability theory and epistemology.That may be a useful distinction for some purposes,but in my opinion probabili-ty theory is just one of the tools of rationality that facilitate pursuing epistemic tasks.There surely are cultural and social influences operating on the basic tools of rationality,and at all levels.Two individuals from different cultures may experience the same perceptual event but understand it completely differently based on their respective familiarity with the type of event in question and their background knowledge.Similarly,the assumptions that begin logical processes may differ,and both the sets of costs and benefits and their relative weights may vary,as well.I am less sure that there is a universal human nature beyond the epistemological capacities,frankly, although many think that there is.There is much lose talk about a universal sense of justice and univer-sal human rights,but the twentieth century is a reproach to any who would see“human nature”as benefi-cent or concerned about the welfare of strangers.Perhaps,then,the economists are correct in a sense that people pursue,or should be conceived of as pursuing,their own self-interest,however those interests are conceived.Obviously,people do pursue their own financial and medical self-interest and those of their families.There certainly is a widespread desire for the conditions of a peaceful life with the possibility of human flourishing,but it is hard to see this as resting upon universals of the human condition.Not only is the twentieth century a reproach to such a view,so,too,is most of recorded history.And the twenty-first century is off to a start that suggests not much has changed from the millennium.As I will elaborate below,one of the primary tasks of the law of evidence is to process and digest this elaborate set of considerations and create in their light a system of dispute resolution that serves the inter-ests of the community.Contingencies of Government and its Legal System:Although there is much that is common to human-ity,the ways in which humans organize themselves varies almost infinitely.Legal systems are critical components of government,and they reflect the resolution of issues of deep political theory.One need look no further than China and the United States to see this clearly.Because of the political history of the United States,our founders concluded that political power should be diffused over the three branches of government,with each needing one or both of the others in order to be effective.This was designed to counteract what western observers almost universally believe is the centripetal force of all power centers and their tendency to aggrandizement.In brief,this is why we have a tradition of independent courts that we conceive of as being a potential brake on other branches of government.China has no such political theory of separation of powers.The central political tenet of Chinese communism is that all political power is possessed by the party,and any political organization is merely a means of efficiently and effectively pursuing the policies set by the party.There is no room here for an independent judiciary in the western sense.This difference is the cause of much of the lack of understanding between these two cultures,and is a good example of how the background knowledge a person possesses may color observations.Western eyes may see in Chinese courts a lack of the rule of law precisely because of the lack of a robustly independentjudiciary,whereas Chinese eyes may see in the western legal systems needless bureaucracy that is obstruc-tive of the social good.And of course there are innumerable additional ways in which governments can be constructed. Whatever form of government is chosen,and more importantly whatever assumptions form its foundation, will obviously impact the nature of the legal system,which in turn will impact the way in which disputes are resolved and evidence is administered.Having said all that,there is one universal aspect of dispute resolution,and it is not what one might think.There is a misconception in the West that the fundamental political insight of the Enlightenment, and the strongest plank supporting modern western governments,has something to do with rights and obli-gations.Citations to Hobbes,Locke,and Rousseau are found in abundance in legal scholarship and under-score this point.While rights and obligations are important,the more fundamental insight of the Enlight-enment was the epistemological revolution that there is a world external to our mind that may be known objectively through evidence;however,citations to the epistemological work of Locke,Berkeley,Hume,or even Kant for this proposition,are few and far between.This reverses the actual relationship of facts and rights/obligations.Facts are prior to and determinative of rights and obligations.Without accurate fact finding,rights and obligations are meaningless.Consider the simple case of ownership of the clothes you are wearing.Your ownership of those clothes allows you the“right”to possess,consume,and dispose of those assets,but suppose I demand that you return“my”clothes.That is,I insist that the clothes that you are wearing actually be long to me.What will you do?You will search for a decision-maker to whom you will present evidence that you bought,made,found,or were given the clothes in question,and,if success-ful in this effort,the decision-maker will indeed grant you those rights and impose upon me reciprocal obligations.The critical point is that those rights and obligations are dependent upon what facts are found and are derivative of them.The significance of this point cannot be overstated.Tying the rule of law to true states of the real world anchors rights and obligations in things that can be known and are indepen-dent of whim and caprice.This is why the ideas of relevance and materiality are so fundamentally impor-tant to the construction of a legal system.They tie the legal system to the bedrock of factual accuracy.This point is truly universal.Neither rights or obligations,on the one hand,or policy choices on the other,can be pursued in the absence of knowledge of the actual,relevant states of affairs.Thus,even within the contingencies of ways of governing,we find a universal aspect of the law of evidence.Of course,how one might think that facts are most accurately or efficiently found,and what policies may off-set the significance of factual accuracy,are matters of reasonable disagreement.The Significance of Policy Issues:An enormous number of policy choices face the designer of a legal system.Some are consistent with the pursuit of factual accuracy,but many are in opposition to it.Note that I use the phrase“policy issues”to accompany all interests that society may pursue.It thus encom-passes what some might call“value theory.”However,not all the policies governments pursue are moral; many are quite practical and utilitarian.Indeed,maybe most policies governments pursue are practical and utilitarian.It is surely acceptable to make the distinction between moral and utilitarian policies,but they are parts of the larger category of interests governments pursue and can effectively be lumped together when thinking about the law of evidence.Another distinction that could be made,but that I do not make, is between the sources of policy issues.The source of some are just the standard questions that all govern-ments face everywhere,that involve the ordinary exercise of what we call,misleadingly,in the United States,the police power—the power of the State to regulate issues affecting health,safety,and welfare.By contrast,the source of others are explicit constitutional provisions,whatever the form a constitution maytake in any particular country.Some commentators sort out constitutional questions from other kinds of policy questions,which again is coherent.However,the distinction is not helpful to understanding the law of evidence,and thus I do not bother with making it.Evidence law does some things because of constitu-tional commitments,but at the highest level of generality that is no different than fashioning evidence law to pursue an interest that is not embedded in a constitutional document.I now turn to many of the policy issues that must be accommodated by the law of evidence.Pursuit of Factual Accuracy.One might reasonably suppose that natural reasoning processes based on innate epistemological capacities work reasonably well,and thus typically should be deferred to in the pursuit of factual accuracy.However,there may be recurring situations that lead people to error.In such a case,rules of evidence may attempt to correct for that systematic error.This explains FRE403's autho-rization to exclude evidence when it may be misleading or unfairly prejudicial.It also underlies other rules,such as limitations on character and propensity evidence,and the requirement that witnesses testify from firsthand knowledge.The circumstances under which individuals systematically make errors probably is heavily dependent on culture.The Value of Accuracy.Factual accuracy is surely the most significant desideratum,but it is by no means the only one.It has a cost,and the cost can sometimes be too high.A legal system overly preoccu-pied with factual accuracy may undermine the very social conditions that the legal system is trying to fos-ter.A dispute worth only a dollar that would take a thousand dollars to litigate to a factually accurate conclusion perhaps should not be litigated.Such litigation may very well reduce overall social welfare and discourage private settlement of disputes.Where the limit is reached is difficult to say,of course,and surely depends on local views.I will say much more about this in my second lecture.The Value of Incentives.Factual accuracy competes not just with cost but with other policies that a government reasonably may pursue.The list of such policies is long,and again culturally contingent.The law of privileges may foster and protect numerous relationships(spouses,legal,medical,spiritual,govern-mental,etc.).Litigation of an accident should not discourage reduction of risk(the subsequent repair rule). Perhaps settlement of disputes is preferred to their litigation,which leads to the exclusion of statements made during settlement talks.The encouragement of settlement is also a reason not to price litigation too low.The more the public subsidizes litigation,presumably the more of it there will be,and the less of pri-vate negotiation.There are still other policies that can be pursued.In the United States,we rest a vast body of exclusionary rules on the perceived need to regulate police investigative activities.Rules of evi-dence also can encourage or discourage certain kinds of law suits from being brought.Again in the United States,we went through a period in which we thought rape victims were being overly discouraged from re-porting crimes against them,and one response was to create rules of evidence that reduced the abuse at trial that such individuals may have been exposed to.General Considerations of Fairness may also influence the law of evidence,although the precise effect of this variable is often hard to sort out from more overtly utilitarian motivations.Some think that the limit on unfairly prejudicial evidence reflects not just the concern about accuracy but the concern about humili-ation,as is also the case with rape relevancy rules.The limits on prior behavior and propensity evidence reflect in part a belief that an individual should not be trapped in the past.The hearsay rule to some ex-tent reflects the values of the right to confront witnesses against you.The Risk of Error.A mistake free legal system is not possible.It is critically important to recognize that two types of errors can be made–a wrongful verdict for a plaintiff(including a conviction of an inno-cent person),which we call a Type I or false positive error,and a wrongful verdict for a defendant(includ-ing an acquittal of a guilty person),which we call a Type II or false negative error–and resource alloca-tion and other decisions will affect the relationship between these two types of errors.Reasonable people can disagree as to the significance of these two types of errors,but both must be taken into account in the construction of the legal system.In the United States,we structure civil litiga-tion to attempt to both equalize the errors made on behalf of plaintiffs and defendants and to reduce the total number of errors.The criminal justice process,by contrast,is designed to reduce the possibility of wrongful conviction at the admitted expense of making more mistakes of wrongful acquittals.Although the matter is complicated,these perspectives explain in large measure the preponderance standard in civil cas-es and the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases.In civil cases,an error either way results in identical misallocation of resources.If the plaintiff wrongly wins a$500verdict,a citizen(the defendant)wrongly must part with$500.If the defendant wrongly wins a verdict that he or she does not owe$500,a citizen(the plaintiff)wrongly will be deprived of$500that rightfully he or she should possess. These two cases are identical analytically.In criminal cases,by contrast,in the United States we view a wrongful conviction as a more serious harm than a wrongful acquittal,and thus make convictions hard to obtain by requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt.We do so even though it is possible(but by no means certain)that a side effect will be increased numbers of false acquittals and an overall increase in the total number of errors.Again,I will say much more about this tomorrow,and I will cast some doubt upon how well these simple ideas work out in practice.Miscellaneous Policy Questions.There are many other contingent questions that must be answered by the architect of a legal system.Most importantly are those allocating responsibility over the various actors in the legal drama.These involve such questions as whether trials should be episodic events as is some-what more prevalent in Europe or single shot events as in the United States,how much discretion should the trial judge have and how much should the parties control the process,what is the relationship between trial judges and appellate judges.Should there be trial de novo in the appellate court or is it limited to re-view of legal errors?Are small civil cases different from large commercial cases in ways that justify differ-ent treatment?What about criminal cases?The matters discussed above indicate the breath of the foundations and implications of the law of evi-dence,and I now wish to make four analytical points,three of which are critical to understanding the foundations and implications of any body of law,and the fourth of which is critical to thinking clearly about the law of evidence.They involve:1.The distinction between the law on the books and the law in action;2.The relationship between procedural and evidentiary law,on the one hand,and substantive on the other law,and in particular how procedural and evidentiary law are in fact quite interrelated with rather than distinct from substantive law;3.Economics,or as we say in the United States,there is no free lunch.If you use a dollar(or yuan) here for one purpose you cannot use it there for a different purpose.4.Whether trials the ideal or instead are perverse.Is the legal system designed to encourage trials or settlement?What should it be designed for?I will discuss in turn each of these variables and their significance.1.The law on the books;the law in action.Constitutions are enacted,legislation is passed,executives issue orders and directives,courts decide,and one would think that the rest of us more or less obey.Un-fortunately(or perhaps fortunately),life is not so simple.When constitutions or laws are adopted in any multi-party decision making process,there will be multiple understandings of what the legal language con-notes.Some legislators may vote for the passage of a law even though they do not believe it goes far e-nough in its coverage(or even though it goes too far);others may vote against it for just the same reasons. There also may be serious disagreements as to precisely what a particular provision is supposed to mean or do.One person may think the legal language has one implication,and someone else may think it has a different implication.Statutory language in the abstract often will not resolve the meaning of those pounding the difficulty even further,legal language is often deliberately left vague because of the inability to come to agreement as to precisely what it should say or because of the omnipresent inability to anticipate all possible scenarios in which a particular problem might arise.In the United States,there is the added complexity of separation of powers.It is the legislature’s job to enact law,including in most states the law of evidence,but it is the courts’job to put that law into ef-fect.The judges may have different understandings of the implication of the language adopted by the leg-islature,and their institutional concerns will differ as well.Thus,the application of the law by the courts may differ from the idealized meaning of the law intended by a legislature or an individual legislator.The law of evidence has one potentially unique structural aspect that exacerbates the problem of in-definiteness.Aspects of the law of evidence are rule-like in the sense of providing necessary and suffi-cient conditions for the operation of a rule,but important parts of the law of evidence simply allocate re-sponsibility and discretion precisely because the relevant issue is too complicated for rule-like treatment. Perhaps the single most important aspect of the law of evidence–relevancy–has precisely this attribute. It is impossible to state a priori the necessary and sufficient conditions for the relevance of most evidence presented at any particular trial.Those determinations will necessarily be contingent on the unique char-acteristics of each trial,and it is literally impossible to articulate them in advance(how could we identify when a presently unknown witness will lie about a presently unknown topic?).Thus,the law of evidence vests responsibility in someone–party or judge–to determine what evidence to offer,and does so under quite general guidelines.In the United States,relevant evidence is defined as evidence that may increase or decrease the probability of some material fact being true,but virtually no effort is made to specify when the condition may be met.One last factor that may result in the law on the books being different from the law in action is that some areas of evidence law must try to accommodate quite opposed principles or impulses.This can result in part of the law making a promise and another part subverting that promise.Two important examples of this from American evidence law are the hearsay rule and the rule against character and propensity evi-dence.The hearsay rule promises to exclude hearsay,but there has been a unidirectional growth of the ex-ceptions to the hearsay rule for centuries.In civil cases,the promise of the exclusion of hearsay is rarely redeemed,and even in criminal cases hearsay is routinely admitted.Similarly,the law of evidence promis-es the exclusion of character and propensity evidence but then creates broad avenues of admission.2.The Relationship Between Substantive Law and Procedural Law.Substantive law is sometimes conceived of as quite distinct from evidentiary(and procedural)law,but this is misleading,for the two are in a complex and interactive relationship.This has become particularly clear,and is the subject of inter-esting legal research,in the United States due to the significance of the point for the protection of constitu-tional rights,but the point applies to general evidentiary matters as well.The decisions of the United States Supreme Court extending and enforcing individual rights have been viewed as imposing considerable constraints on the police and prosecutors,yet the legal system has not been greatly disturbed by these rul-ings.These systems are dynamic and infinitely adaptable and thus can and do respond to changes in un-predictable and astonishingly varied ways.Thus,“reform”to a dynamic process often cannot be imposedunproblematically through discrete measures that will have only the desired and no unintended conse-quences.One important aspect of this dynamic phenomenon is that legitimate substantive changes can blunt virtually any procedural innovation that emerges from courts or law reformers.An example of this point in the United States involves the fourth amendment limit on unreasonable searches and seizures.Suppose the police want to stop cars to do cursory inspections for criminality,but courts rule that the fourth amendment requires that the police have probable cause that a crime has been committed before a car can be stopped.All the legislature need do to make this judicial command a prac-tical nullity is to expand the criminal law to include more rigorous driving requirements.The legislature can essentially make it next to impossible to drive without violating a criminal statute(such as crossing the center line,driving too closely to the car ahead of you,not putting your turning light indicator on early e-nough or too early,etc.).If the legislature passes such laws,the police will be able to stop virtually any car by following it until the driver violates one of statutes regulating driving.The stop will be on“proba-ble cause”but the legislation will have expanded dramatically the potential sources of probable cause, thus subjecting everyone to being stopped by the police whenever the police decide to do so,notwithstand-ing the attempt by the courts to forbid just that process.Similarly,if the government cannot seize certain information without probable cause,it can often instead require that individuals keep records of the infor-mation it wants and divulge those records to the government.This point generalizes across evidentiary and procedural law.The most obvious example is materiali-ty,which is directly determined by the substantive law,but the point goes deeper than that.By changing the elements of causes of actions,legislatures can make recovery under those causes of actions easier or more difficult.Whether oral testimony concerning the meaning of contractual provisions is allowed–what we call the“parol evidence rule”in the United States–obviously impacts the evidentiary regime.Equally obviously,the statute of frauds that requires certain contracts to be in writing dominates normally eviden-tiary principles,as does res ipsa loquitur in tort law.Just as substantive law can affect the evidentiary process,evidence law can affect substantive law. The examples are legion.Rules of exclusion typically increase and rules of admission typically decrease the costs of litigation.As privileges expand,the cost of litigating and thus enforcing rights goes up in most instances.The ready admission of hearsay makes proof easier(although at the same time perhaps less re-liable),and so on.Discovery rules can dramatically affect parties’incentives to create and search for evi-dence.Individual rules like the rape relevancy rules can affect the ease with which cases may be proven. Allocation of burdens of proof can encourage or discourage the bringing of certain causes of action,and so on.Again,we will spend most of tomorrow talking in greater depth about such matters.There is one other interaction between substantive and evidence law that should be noted.In the U-nited States,but perhaps not in China,evidence underlies everything the lawyer does,since in the United States everything can collapse into litigation.Wills,criminal matters(sentencing based in part on what's in record),anti-trust,commercial work,everything.Evidence bears upon every other legal field,and the worst case scenario of every legal transaction is the collapse into litigation.In litigation,a crucial variable will be what can be proven.Thus every attorney,no matter how remote from the courtroom,must take the courtroom into account,which means taking the rules of evidence into account prior to litigation so that if litigation ensues the necessary facts can be proven.Good records must be kept and be in an admissible format,for example.3.Economics.We have a saying in the United States that“There is no such thing as a free lunch,”which means that,if someone“invites”you to lunch,he probably wants to talk to you about something or。
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略论我国证据制度的理论基础
我国证据制度的理论基础是在马克思主义基本原理指导下形成的，包括物质辩证法、历史唯物主义等理论，以及我国宪法、刑事诉讼法等法律法规。
本文将简要论述我国证据制度的理论基础。
其次，历史唯物主义为我国证据制度提供了辩证唯物主义的基本方法论。
历史唯物主义认为，人类社会总是在物质基础和生产力发展的基础上变革，社会发展是由矛盾推动的。
证据制度要求以历史发展的客观规律为依据，从历史和社会的角度理解和分析案件。
证据制度要求审判人员具有辩证的眼光、思维和方法，通过辨别真伪、推测推理等方式来建立案件事实。
我国宪法和刑事诉讼法也为我国证据制度提供了法律基础和指导。
我国宪法规定了公民的权利和保障，明确了公民的合法权益需要通过法律手段得到保障。
刑事诉讼法是我国刑事诉讼的基本法律，明确了刑事诉讼的原则和程序，其中就包括了证据的审查、采信和保护的相关规定。
宪法和刑事诉讼法为我国证据制度提供了法律保障和指导，确保证据制度的正确实施。
此外，马克思主义基本原理在我国证据制度的建设中也起着重要的指导作用。
马克思主义认为，实践是检验真理的唯一标准。
证据制度要求通过实际案件实践来不断完善和发展，不断提高对证据的理解和运用。
马克思主义强调了实践的重要性和实践的指导作用，进一步提醒我们要注重实践的检验和指导，不断改进证据制度。
综上所述，我国证据制度的理论基础是多重的，包括物质辩证法、历史唯物主义等马克思主义理论，以及我国宪法、刑事诉讼法等法律法规。
这些理论和法律为我国证据制度提供了基本原则和指导，确保证据制度的正确运行和适应社会发展的需要。
在实践中，我们还需要不断总结和完善证据制度，以适应社会发展的需求，保障公平正义的实现。