股利政策外文翻译

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最佳股利政策和增长期权【外文翻译】

最佳股利政策和增长期权【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文Optimal dividend policy and growth optionMaterial Source:Springer-Verlag 2006Author:Jean-Paul Decamps·Stephane VilleneuveResearch on optimal dividend payouts for a cash constrained firm is based on the premise that the firm wants to pay some of its surplus to the shareholders as dividends and therefore follows a dividend policy that maximizes the expected present value of all payouts until bankruptcy. This approach has been used in particular to determine the market value of a firm which, in line with Modigliani and Miller [23], is defined as the present value of the sum of future dividends. In diffusion models, the optimal dividend policy can be determined as the solution of a singular stochastic control problem. In two influential papers, Jeanblanc and Shiryaev [18] and Radner and Shepp [26] assume that the firm exploits a technology defined by a cash generating process that follows a drifted Brownian motion. They show that the optimal dividend policy is characterized by a threshold so that whenever the cash reserve goes above this threshold, the excess is paid out as dividend.Models that involve singular stochastic controls or mixed singular/regular stochastic controls are now widely used in mathematical finance. Recent contributions have for instance emphasized restrictions imposed by a regulatory agency [25], the interplay between dividend and risk policies [1, 3, 14], or the analysis of hedging and insurance decisions [27]. A new class of models that combine features of both regular stochastic control and optimal stopping has recently emerged. Two recent papers in this line are Miao and Wang [22], who study the interactions between investment and consumption under incomplete markets, and Hugonnier et al. [16], who focus on irreversible investment for a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework. From a mathematical viewpoint, the problem we are interested in is different and combines features of both singular stochastic control and optimal stopping. Such models are less usual in corporate finance and, to the best of our knowledge, only Guo and Pham [13] dealt with suchan issue. These authors consider a firm having to choose the optimal time to activate production and then control it by buying or selling capital. Their problem can be solved in a two-step formulation which consists in solving the singular control problem arising from the production activity after the exercise of the investment option.The novelty of our paper is to consider the interaction between dividends and investment as a singular control problem. Specifically, we consider a firm with a technology in place and a growth option. The growth option offers the firm the opportunity to invest in a new technology that increases its profit rate. The firm has no access to external funding and therefore finances the opportunity cost of the growth option from its cash reserve. Our objective is then to study the interactions between dividend policy and investment decisions. Such an objective leads us to deal with a mixed singular control/optimal stopping problem that we solve by establishing a connection with an optimal stopping problem. Precisely, let us consider the two following alternative strategies: (i) never invest in the growth option (and follow the associated optimal dividend policy), (ii) defer dividend distributions, invest optimally in the growth option (and follow Optimal dividend policy and growth option 5 the associated optimal dividend policy). We show that the firm value under the optimal dividend/investment policy coincides with the value function of the optimal stopping problem whose payoff function is the maximum of the values of the firm computed under the above strategies (i) and (ii). The equivalence between the mixed singular control/optimal stopping problem and the stopping problem is proved in our main theorem and is based on a verification procedure for stochastic control.We compute quasi-explicitly the value function and show that it is piecewise C2 and not necessarily concave as in standard singular control problems. Furthermore, from a detailed analysis based on properties of local time, we construct explicitly the optimal dividend/investment policy. Our model allows us to address several important questions in corporate finance. We explain when it is optimal to postpone dividend distribution, to accumulate cash and to invest at a subsequent date in the growth option. We analyse the effects of cash flow and uncertainty shocks on dividend policy and investment decision. We study the effects of financing constraints on dividend policy and investment decision with respect to a situation where the firm has unlimited cash.Finally, our work helps to bridge the gap between the literature on optimal dividend payouts and the now well-established real option literature. The real optionliterature analyses optimal investment policies that can be mathematically determined as solutions of optimal stopping problems. The original model is due to McDonald and Siegel [21] and has been extended in various ways by many authors.1 An important assumption of standard models is that the investment decision can be made independently of the financing decision. In contrast, in our paper, two interrelated features drive our investment problem. First, the firm is cash-constrained and must finance the investment using its cash reserve. Second, the firm must decide its dividend distribution policy in view of its growth opportunity. Such a perspective can be related to Boyle and Guthrie [2] who analyse, in a numerical model, the dynamic investment decision of a firm submitted to cash constraints. Two state variables drive their model: the cash process and a project value process for which the decision maker has to pay a fixed amount. Boyle and Guthrie [2] do not consider, however, the dividend distribution policy.The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model, analyses some useful benchmarks, provides a formulation of our problem based on the dynamic programming principle, and derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the growth option to be worthless. Section 3 states and proves our main theorem, derives the optimal dividend/investment policy and presents financial implications. Section 4 concludes.In this paper, we consider the implications of liquidity for the dividend/investment policy of a firm that owns the perpetual right to invest in a new, profit rate increasing technology. The mathematical formulation of our problem leads to a mixed singular control/optimal stopping problem that we solve quasi-explicitly by using a connection with an auxiliary stopping problem. A detailed analysis based on the properties of local time gives the precise optimal dividend/investment policy. This type of problem is non standard and does not seem to have attracted much attention in the corporate finance literature. Our analysis follows the lines of stochastic control and relies on the choice of a drifted Brownian motion for the cash reserve process in the absence of dividend distribution. This modelling assumption guarantees the quasi-explicit nature of the value function. We use this feature for instance in Proposition 3.4 where we show that is a supersolution. Furthermore, the property of independent increments for Brownian motion plays a central role for deriving the optimal policy (Proposition 3.10). Clearly, future work is needed to examine the robustness of our results to more general diffusions than a drifted Brownian motion.译文最佳股利政策和增长期权资料来源:Springer–Verlag 2006作者:Jean-Paul Decamps·Stehane Villeneuve对于一个现金控制的公司来说,关于最佳股利支付的研究是建立在假设基础上的,公司想要给予股东一部分的盈余作为分红,因此遵守股利政策,使得所有可预计支出的当前价值最大化知道破产。

外文翻译--对股东财富影响的股利政策

外文翻译--对股东财富影响的股利政策

本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译原文:The Impact of Dividend Policy on Shareholders’ Wealth1. IntroductionIn an ever-increasing Indian economy, globalization, liberalization and privatization together with rapid strides made by information technology, have brought intense competition in every field of activity. So, Indian companies at present are dazed, confused, and apprehensive. To maintain the competitiveness of, and add value to the companies, today’s finance managers have to make critical business and financial decisions which will lead to long-run perspective with the objective of maximizing the shareholders’ wealth.Shareholders’ wealth is represented in the market price of the company’s common stock, which, in turn, is the function of the company’s investment, financing and dividend decision. Managements' primary goal is shareholders' wealth maximization, which translates into maximizing the value of the company as measured by the price of the company’s common stock. Shareholders like cash dividends, but they also like the growth in EPS that results from ploughing earning back into the business. The optimal dividend policy is the one that maximizes the company's stock price which leads to maximization of shareholders' wealth and thereby ensures more rapid economic growth. The present study is intended to study how far the dividend payout has impact on shareholders' wealth in general; and in particular to study the relationship between the shareholders' wealth and the dividend payout and to analyze whether the level of dividend payout affects the wealth of the shareholders.2. Statement of the ProblemsIn India few studies have analyzed the relationship between the shareholders'wealth and dividend payment. Net earnings are divided into two parts –retained earnings and dividends. The retained earnings of the business may be reinvested and treated as a source of long-term funds. The dividend should be distributed to the shareholders in order to maximize their wealth as they have invested their money in the expectation of being made better off financially. Therefore, the present study mainly analyses how far the level of dividend payout affects the shareholders' wealth, particularly in (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies in India.3. Objectives of the Study• To study the relationship between dividend payout and shareholders' wealth.• To analyze the impact of variation in dividend policy on shareholders' wealth of dividend paying and non-paying companies in (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies India.• To analyze the impact of retained earnings and past performance in the presence of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth of (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies in India.4. Hypotheses• H1: “There is no significant difference in average market valu e relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies.”• H2:“There is no significant impact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies.”5. Methodology5.1. Sources of DataThe study used only secondary data which are collected from CMIE (Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy) prowess package. Analytical method is used for interpreting the data. The data collected from this source have been compiled and used with due care as per the requirements of the study.5.2. Sampling DesignOriginally the sample for this study has been planned to choose from the list of companies listed in National Stock Exchange (NSE). Since the number of companieslisted in the NSE is lesser in number (21 companies in Organic and Inorganic Chemical Industry), the sample of 28 companies in Chemical Industry (Organic-19 and Inorganic-9) has been chosen from 114 listed companies in BSE (Bombay Stock Exchange) using Multi-Stage Random Sampling Technique. The sample units have been chosen for the study based on the availability of required financial data like share price, DPS etc.6. Tools used for Analysis of DataThe equations and variables used for the study are given below:The subscript ‘i’ denotes the ith company in a sample of ‘n’ companies selected from a particular industry, and all variables are measured in the ith time period. Market price per share is the closing prices for the year. To analyze the data, the statistical tools that have been used are Mean, Standard Deviation, multiple regression technique and stepwise regression method to ascertain best fitted model for predicting the dividend policy impact on shareholder’s wealth. The significance of various explanatory variables has been tested by computing t-values. To determine the proportion of explained variation in the dependent variable, the coefficient of determination (R2) has been worked out. The significance of R2 has also been tested with the help of F-Value.7. Period of the StudyThe data used for the analysis are relating to the selected (Organic and Inorganic) Chemical Companies for the period of Ten years (1997-2006).8. Analysis and Results8.1. Comparison of Shareholders’ Value between Dividend Payers an dNon-Payers among Organic CompaniesBefore going through evaluating the relationship between dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth of selected (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India, it has been tried to compare the average wealth of investors between dividend paying and non-paying Organic and Inorganic companies in India. The comparison of mean shareholders’ wealth of companies of all types pooled under dividend paying and non-paying companies are also carried out. The mean values between two groups arecompared with t-values. The results of the analysis are shown from tables 1 – 3.Table 1: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Organic Chemical Companies in IndiaYear Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.89 1.55 1.00 1.88 1.13 ns1998 1.87 1.54 0.98 1.86 1.14 ns1999 1.90 1.56 0.97 1.83 1.19 ns2000 1.90 1.58 0.97 1.84 1.18 ns2001 1.87 1.53 0.99 1.89 1.12 ns2002 1.83 1.49 0.97 1.82 1.13 ns2003 1.84 1.50 0.95 1.82 1.16 ns2004 1.87 1.52 0.98 1.86 1.15 ns2005 1.82 1.41 0.97 1.89 1.11 ns2006 1.83 1.43 0.97 1.85 1.14 nsAll Years 1.86 1.44 0.98 1.76 3.81 0.01An examination of the results of year-wise comparison of market value of equity to its book value between dividend payers and non-payers of chemical companies in India (vide table 3) shows that the mean market value of equity relative to book value is well above 1 for all the years under study as well as for pooled years. It has been ranging from minimum of 1.53 in 2005 to 1.60 in 2000 with overall mean of 1.56 for all the years. This shows that the market value is well above the book value for the chemical companies which pay dividend. But the scenario has been slightly different in the case of dividend non-paying chemical companies in India.Table 2: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Inorganic Chemical Companies.Year Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.04 0.56 -0.70 1.70 2.39 0.051998 1.03 0.54 -0.68 1.62 2.47 0.041999 1.05 0.58 -0.71 1.68 2.43 0.052001 1.10 0.72 -0.76 1.75 2.36 0.052002 1.07 0.65 -0.77 1.85 2.29 ns2003 1.07 0.66 -0.74 1.75 2.35 0.052004 1.07 0.63 -0.69 1.68 2.38 0.052005 1.05 0.59 -0.87 1.98 2.32 0.052006 1.06 0.60 -0.93 2.07 2.31 0.05All Years 1.06 0.58 -0.75 1.48 8.36 0.00An average market value relative to book value is <1, revealing marginal increase in wealth of the investors of these companies. The mean values vary between 0.50 in 2006 to 0.57 in 1997 and 1998. The decline in mean value in 2006 has indicated the decline in wealth of the investors during the period. However, comparison of mean values between dividend payer and non-payer under chemical sector (Organic and Inorganic) revealed that the wealth creation in each year does not show any significant difference. However, in the long-run, the difference is highly significant at 1 per cent level.H1: “There is no significant difference in average market value relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India.”Table 3: Year-wise Comparison of Market Value to Book Value of Equity Between Dividend Payers and Non-Payers among Organic and Inorganic Chemical Companies.Year Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Mean SD Mean SD t-value LS 1997 1.57 1.32 0.57 1.92 1.63 ns1998 1.56 1.30 0.57 1.89 1.64 ns1999 1.58 1.33 0.55 1.88 1.70 ns2000 1.60 1.35 0.55 1.89 1.71 ns2001 1.58 1.31 0.55 1.94 1.68 ns2002 1.54 1.27 0.54 1.91 1.68 ns2004 1.57 1.30 0.56 1.90 1.67 ns2005 1.53 1.20 0.51 2.00 1.67 ns2006 1.54 1.22 0.50 2.00 1.71 nsAll Years 1.56 1.25 0.54 1.85 5.49 0.00The H1 is rejected. Therefore, it is found that in the long-rum, wealth of shareholders of dividend paying chemical companies has increased significantly when compared to that of the dividend non-paying counterparts, which further shows the impact of dividend policy on wealth creation. Hence H1 stands: “There is significant difference in average market value relative to book value of equity between dividend payers and non-payers of (Organic and Inorganic) chemical companies in India.”8.2. Relationship between Dividend Policy and Shareholders’ WealthDividend Paying Organic Chemical CompaniesTable 4: Results of Regression showing the Impact of Dividend Policy on Market Value of Equity of ALL DIVIDEND PAYING ORGANIC CHEMICAL COMPANIES in India.The impa ct of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth of organic and inorganic chemical companies with adoption of dividend policy has been elicited using multiple regression analysis. The Dividend per share (DPS) has been used as proxy for measuring the dividend policy of the companies and Market value (MV) of equity of the companies under study is considered as proxy for measuring the shareholders’ wealth and used as dependent variable. Apart from DPS, Retained earnings (RE), lagged Price-Earning Ratio (PEt-1) and lagged Market value of equity (MVt-1) are also used as explanatory variables in order to know whether dividend policy of Organic and Inorganic chemical companies are dominated by these factors in influencing the creation of shareholders’ wealth. Table 4 shows the regression results for all selected organic chemical companies in India with regard to impact of initiating dividend payout on shareholders’ wealth. Perusal of the results indicates that the fit of all four models is significant at 1 per cent level (F = 23.77, p < 0.01 formodel 1, F = 11.77, p < 0.01 for model 2, F = 7.44, p < 0.01 for model 3 and F = 123.15, p < 0.01 for model 4). Among the four models, F value for model 4 is very high. Further, the coefficients of DPS in all four models are highly significant at 1 per cent level and positive in sign (β = 92.68, t = 4.88, p < 0.01 in model 1; β = 92.81, t = 4.84, p < 0.01 in model 2; β = 94.57, t = 4.66, p < 0.01 in model 3; and β = 32.34, t = 3.08, p < 0.01 in model 4). Also, from the perusal of adjusted R2 values, it is clear that the explanatory variables in the model 4 could together explain 80.46 per cent of the variance in market value, whereas explanatory variables in model 1, 2 and 3 could, together, explain 18.70 per cent, 17.87 per cent and 17.83 per cent respectively of the variance in dependent variable Hence, model 4 is the appropriate one for the final interpretation. Interestingly, the coefficient of DPS in model 4, though statistically significant, has declined considerably in the presence of RE and lagged MV, even though the coefficients of those variables are insignificant. Also, the intercepts, which are insignificant in the first three models, become significant in model 4, indicating that there are some factors inherent in the market dominated over dividend policy when market has started considering RE and lagged MV of organic chemical companies under chemical sector.H2: “There is no significant impact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in Organic Chemical Companies in I ndia.”9. Summary and Concluding RemarksGenerally, higher dividend increases the market value of the share and vice versa. Shareholders preferred current dividend to future income so, dividend is considered as an important factor which determines the shar eholders’ wealth. This is normally true in case of salaried individuals, retired pensioners and others with limited incomes. Dividend has information content and the payment of dividend indicates that the company has a good earning capacity. The wealth of the shareholders is greatly influenced mainly by five variables viz., Growth in Sales, Improvement of Profit Margin, Capital Investment Decisions (both working capital and fixed capital), Capital Structure Decisions, Cost of Capital (Dividend on Equity, Interest on Debt) etc. As far as the dividend paying companies are concerned, there is a significantimpact of dividend policy on shareholders’ wealth in Organic Chemical Companies. Whereas, as far as the Inorganic Chemical Companies are concerned, the share holders’ wealth is not influenced by the dividend payout.Source: R. Azhagaiah, Sabari Priya.N. The Impact of Dividend Policy on Shareholders’ Wealth. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics,2008(20) :P181-187.译文:对股东财富影响的股利政策1.简介印度经济不断发展,在全球化、自由化和私有化,特别是信息技术取得了迅速进展的情形下,带来了在各个活动领域的激烈竞争。

外文翻译--是否杠杆、股利政策及盈利能力会影响公司未来的价值?

外文翻译--是否杠杆、股利政策及盈利能力会影响公司未来的价值?

外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文:Do Leverage, Dividend Policy and Profitability influence the Future Value of Firm? Evidence from IndiaINTRODUCTIONWith the ushering of economic liberalization in 1992, Indian stock market has undergone several changes over the last decade. These include introduction of new exchanges, massive computerization and electronic limit order book integrating the stock exchanges across the nation, establishing of clearing corporation and subsequent introduction of new derivative products in the market. Perhaps the most important among these changes was the establishment of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992 as the market watchdog. SEBI, since it’s inception has strived in the direction of narrowing the information gap between Indian corporations and investors, enforce better corporate governance practices through guidelines, rules and regulations and through active market for corporate control that has marked a new era in the Indian financial arena. The investors reveled their confidence through their participation in the primary and secondary market. Large number of new companies came to the primary market over 1993-96 and the market capitalization of S&PCNX 500 has increased considerably over 1990s. India has emerged as an emerging economy with largest number of companies listed in its stock markets.Over the last decade corporate governance has received considerable importance in Indian financial market. With the initiation of market for corporate control and activities in the merger and acquisition market, CEOs have assigned tremendous importance for creating value for their firms. Accordingly companies from different sectors (and/or ownership groups) have adopted different strategies to signal their earning and growth potential over the years and thereby influence their stock prices.With this in the background this paper attempts to analyze the factors that influenced the future value of the companies listed in Indian stock markets and also how the effect of these factor changes over different categories of firms.Background LiteratureThe well-developed and vibrant literature in modern corporate finance has its root in the seminal paper by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958, 1963),(M-M henceforth). This branch of finance started with the assumption of perfect information and complete markets. It postulates that in a typical neoclassical market with perfect competition, absence of agency costs, transaction and banking costs, the average cost of raising fund for any firm is completely independent of its capital structure. With the same set of assumptions M-M (1963) argued that the value of the firm is unaffected by the dividend policy. However, over time many of these simplified assumptions were relaxed and subsequent research showed capital structure does matter and there could exist optimal dividend policy in the modified M-M framework.Academic literature over the last decade has documented the effect of different strategic factors influencing the firm values for the developed countries. Rappaport (1981, 1987) has used value creation literature for corporate mergers and acquisition and underlined the importance of growth rate, operating profit, income tax rate and fixed capital investment as the major factor influen cing the firms’ value. Recently some of the studies concentrated on emerging market to analyze the factors that influenced the firms’value in this market. Ben Naceur and Goaied (2002) investigated value creation process for Tunisian stock exchange using a random probit model with unbalanced panel data. It considered that the managers’ succeeded creating value to its share holders if the market value of the share exceeds the book value of the corporation and vice versa. The authors considered three main determinants of value creation: financial policy, profitability and dividend policy.In the modified M-M framework, literature has shown that firm’s performance depends on the capital structure (or financial policy). Ross (1977) argued that more leverage would signal the investors about the improved firm prospect andinfluence the firm’s value in future. Increase in dividend payout increases the investors’ income at present and signal the expected future cash flow for the corporation. Profitability is undoubtedly one of the major factors determining the firm value. Ben Naceur and Goaied(2002) argued that while profitability and debt have positive effect on the probability of crating future value, the pay-out have reverse effect on the same.India has one of the most developed stock markets in the world with large number of domestic and international players investing in Indian stock market. With maximum number of companies listed in the Indian stock exchanges from different industries and different ownership groups (e.g. business affiliated firms, Indian standalone, foreign standalone) and with the emphasis on corporate governance practices, India has become an important and interesting destination for such studies. Among the available studies in this area, Sahu (2002) used a sample of companies listed in BSE to explain the abnormal stock returns by dividend stability and found no statically significant result. Another study by Tuli and Mittal (2001) used 101 Indian firms and found price earning ratio is significantly influenced by variability of market price and dividend pay out ratio.However, the authors did not find any significant effect of industry and ownership pattern on price to earning ratio.This papers aims at determining the factors influencing the probability of future firm value for Indian corporations after controlling for the industry and time specific effects. In particular this study attempts to answer the following questions:(1)How the probability of future value creation is affected by firm’s profitability, financing pattern and the dividend pay-out policy?(2)Whether the firms belonging to business groups have different effect on probability of value creation?DataThe primary source of the data for this paper is PROWESS database, compiled by Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). This dataset is similar to the COMPUSTAT database in USA. We have selected the firms that are presently included in S&PCNX 500 index. The accounting and stock price data for these companies are extracted for the year 1989-90 to 2001-02 from Prowess dataset forthis study.So far we have done the univariate and bivariate analysis in the previous section.To examine the factors effecting the future value creation of the firms listed in the Indian stock exchange we examine the effect of previous year’s leverage, dividend and profitability on the MBVR of the company in a multivariate framework.Variable DescriptionMarket to book value ratio (MBVR) is defined as the ratio of closing price of the equity to book value of equity at the end of the financial year. MBVR is the dependent variable for the OLS regression. For the logit model the dependent variable is a binary series, which takes the value 1 if price to book value ratio is greater than one (i.e., market perceived that future value of the firm is going to increase) and zero otherwise.The other variables of interest include those representing Leverage Policy,Dividend Policy and Profitabilit y that have key bearing on the firms’ future value creation. While the ratio of total amount of long-term debt to total amount of equity capital (LEVERAGE) is included to proxy the leverage policy of the corporation, the ratio of total dividend to total earning of the firm (PAY_OUT) i s included to capture the dividend policy of the same. The profitability of a company, on the other hand, is captured by the ratio of net profit to net worth of the firm, which is also known as return on equity (ROE).To control for the size of the firm we consider total assets (ASSET) of the firm as a proxy variable. To control for the differenced arising due to the firms belonging to different business groups this paper considers different dummy variables. If the firm is Among the large number of listed companies, those included in S&PCNX 500 are often considered for empirical studies for their liquid nature and representative characteristics.Private Indian standalone then the dummy, D_PVT_IND, take the value one and zero otherwise. If, on the other hand, a firm is private foreign standalone then the dummy, D_PVT_FOR, take the value one and otherwise zero. Indian companies differ considerably access the industries. So industry dummies were used to control for industry specific heterogeneity. Since 1990, Indian economy has undergoneseveral changes, which have their influence on the corporate valuation. So time dummies were also included to control for the time trend. All the nominal variables are deflated by GDP deflator and expressed at constant price of 1987-88.(Insert Table-1 here)Table 1: Descriptive statistics(MBVR) is ratio of closing price of the equity to book value of equity at the end of thefinancial year. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total amount of long-term debt to total amount ofequity capital.PAY_OUT is the ratio of total dividend to total earning of the firm. Returnon equity (ROE) is the ratio of net profit to net worth of the firm.ASSET total assets of thefirm.Variable All Firms Large Firms Small Firms Group FirmsIndianStandaloneFirmsForeign StandaloneFirmsMBVRLE VERAGE DIVIDEND P AY OFF3.137(5.993)1.726(4.140)0.023(0.029)2.133(3.537)3.057(7.151)0.025(0.028)3.349(6.372)1.441(3.063)0.023(0.029)2.833(5.659)1.973(4.470)0.024(0.030)2.850(5.119)1.247(3.094)0.024(0.026)5.776(8.255)0.319(0.484)0.020(0.023)PROFITABILITY (ROE) 0.138(0.367)0.095(0.449)0.148(0.346)0.133(0.372)0.168(0.283)0.148(0.Table 1 shows the mean values and the standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the variables under consideration under six different cases (namely, all firms, large firms, small firms, group-affiliated firms, Indian standalone firms and foreign standalone firms). The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 shows that the value of a firm, in terms of MBVR, is higher for the small firms and the foreign standalone firms. Large firms get more leverage than any other category of firms. Profitability of the firm, in terms of ROE, is higher for the Indian standalone companies. Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix between the variables of interest. It shows that MBVR has significant negative correlation with leverage and size of the firm and positive correlation with dividend policy and profitability of the firm. In the Appendix Figure 1 and 4 show that with the ushering of economic liberalization there is a sharp rise in MBVR and ROE in the year 1992, which have gradually decreased over the years. Figure 2 shows since post liberalization period, the leverage has shown an increasing trend. However, dividend payout policy does not depict any significant trend over this period.The coefficient of lagged value of leverage (-O.44) and its square term (0.007)imply that as the leverage of the firm increases, the probability of raise in future firm’s values declines at a decreasing rate. The negative influence of leverage on the probability of future value creation was observed across the ownership groups and size. The profitability of the firm (as apparent from the coefficient of ROE) increases the probability of increase in future value creation. Point to note is, this increase is higher for foreign standalone firms as compare to Indian standalone or group-affiliated firms.Unlike the OLS model, the dividend payout did not significantly explain the chance of future value creation. Neither in the pooled model nor in the size and ownership group specific regression the coefficient of payout was significantly different from zero at 10per cent level.ResultThis paper analyzed the accounting factor that influence the probability of increase in future m arket valuation of the firms’ listed in Indian stock exchange after controlling for the time and industry specific effects. The empirical results indicate that the increase in leverage has a negative impact on the chance of future value increase of the firm. It could be because more reliance on credit increases the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors, giving more control to the managers/promoter, which in turn have a negative influence on the future valuation. Alike Naceur and Goaied (2002), we found previous year’s profitability positive influences future firm’s value, a s increase in profitability might have signaled better quality of size. This finding could be because of the fact that the dividend payment the future per management. However, the pay-off did not significantly influence the probability of future MBVR increase in the pooled model as well as the models across ownership group an formance varied considerably across firms listed in Indian stock exchange.ConclusionThis paper investigates the value creation process of the firms listed in the Indian stock market and their dependence on the accounting variables. It used an unbalanced logit model and found that the increase in profitability has a positive influence on theprobability of creating future value and the relation is stronger for foreign standalone firms as compared to private Indian standalone or business group owned firms. Leverage, one the other hand, has negative impact on the chances of increase in future value of the corporation and this relation was uniform across size and ownership group. It could be because of the potential conflict of interest between the equity holders and the creditors that got reflected in the stock prices. The dividend pay-off policy of the firm, however, could not significantly influence the probability of future value creation of the firms listed in Indian stock market.Source:Saurabh Ghosh,2008“Do Leverage, Dividend Policy and Profitability Influence Future Value of Firm? Evidence from India”.Reserve Bank of India.July.pp.1-3.二、翻译文章译文:是否杠杆、股利政策及盈利能力会影响公司未来的价值?介绍随着1992年以来的经济自由化,印度股市在过去十年经历了很多变化。

股利政策外文翻译(已处理)

股利政策外文翻译(已处理)

股利政策外文翻译外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文:Dividend policyProfitable companies regularly face three important questions: 1 How much of its free cash flow should it pass on to shareholders? 2 Should it provide this cash to shareholders by raising the dividend or by repurchasing stock? 3 Should it maintain a stable, consistent payment policy, or should it let the payments vary as conditions change?When deciding how much cash to distribute to shareholders, finance manager must keep in mind that the firm’s objective is to imize shareholder value. Consequently, the target pay rate ratio?define as the percentage of net income to be paid out as cash dividends?should be based in large part on investors’ preference for dividends versus capital gai ns: do investors prefer 1 to have the firm distribute income as cash dividends or 2 to have it either repurchase stock or else plow the earnings back into the business, both of which should result in capital gains? This preference can be considered in terms of the constant growth stock valuation model:If the company increases the payout ration, the raises.This increase in the numerator, taken alone, would cause the stock price to rise. However, ifis raised, then less money will be available for reinvestment, that will cause the expected growth rate to decline, and that will tend to lower the stock’s price. Thus, any change in payout policy will have two opposing effects. Therefore, the firm’s optimal dividend policy must strike a balance between current dividends and future growth so to imize the stock price. In this section, we examine three theories of investor preference: 1the dividend irrelevance theory, 2the "bird-in-the-hand" theory ,and3 the tax preference theory DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE THEORYIt has been argued that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital. If dividend policy has no significant effects, then it would be irrelevance .The principal proponents of dividend irrelevance theory are Merton Miller and Franco ModiglianiMM.They argued that the firm’s is determined only by its basic earning power and its business risk. In other words, MM argued that the value of firm depends only on the income produced by its assets, not on how this income is split between dividends and retained earnings To understand MM’s argument that dividend policy is irrelevance, recognize that any shareholder can in theory construct his or her own dividend policy .If investors could buy and sell shares and thus create their owndividend policy without incurring costs, then the firm’s dividend policy would truly be irrelevant. Note, though, that investors who want additional dividends must incur brokerage cost to sell shares, and investors who do not want dividends must first pay taxes on the unwanted dividends and then incur brokerage cost to purchase shares with the after-tax dividends. Since taxes and brokerage costs certainly exist, dividend policy may well be relevant.In developing their dividend theory, MM made a number of assumptions especially the absence of taxes and brokerage costs. Obviously, tax and brokerage costs do exist, so the MM irrelevance theory may not be true. However, MM argued that all economic theories are based on simplifying assumptions, and that the validity of a theory must be judged by empirical test, not by the realism of its assumptions.BIRD-IN-THE-HAND THEORYThe principal conclusions of MM’s dividend irrelevance theory is that dividend policy does not affect the required rate of return on equity, Ks. This conclusion has been hotly debated in the academic circles .In particular, Myron Gordon and John Lintner argued that Ks decreases as the dividend payout is increase because investor are less certain of receiving the capital gains which are supposed to result from retaining earnings than they are of receiving dividend paymentsMM disagreed .They argued that Ks independent of dividend policy,which implies that investors are indifferent between D1/P0 and g and, hence, between dividends and capital gains. MM called the Gordon-Lintner argument the bird-in-the-hand fallacy because, in MM’s view, most investors plan to reinvest their dividends in the stock of the same or similar firms, and, in any event, the riskiness of the firm’s c ash flows to investors in the long run is determined by the riskiness of operating cash flows, not by dividend payout policy.TAX PREFERENCE THEORYThere are three tax-related reasons for thinking that investors might prefer a low dividend payout to a high payout: 1 Recall from Chapter II that long-term capital gains are taxed at a rate of 20 percent, whereas dividend income is taxed at effective rates which go up to 39.6 percent. Therefore, wealthy investors might prefer to have companies retain and plow earnings back into the business. Earnings growth would presumably lead to stock prices increases, and thus low- taxed capital gains would be substituted for higher-taxed dividends. 2Taxes are not paid on the gains until a stock is sold. Due to time value effects, a dollar of taxes paid in the future has a lower effective cost than a dollar paid today.3 If a stock is held by someone until he or she dies, no capital gains tax is due at all-the beneficiaries who receive the stock can use the stock’s valu e on the death day as their cost basis and thus completely escape the capital gains tax.Because of these tax advantages, investors may prefer to have companies retain most of their earnings. IF so, investors would be willing to pay more for low-payout companies than for otherwise similar high- payout companies.There three theories offer contradictory advice to corporate managers, so which, if any, should we believe? The most logical way to proceed is to test the theories empirically. Many such tests have been conducted, but their results have been unclear. There are two reasons for this1For a valid statistical test, things other than dividend policy must be held constant; that is, the sample companies must differ only in their dividend policies, and2we must be able to measure with a high degree of accuracy each firm’s cost of equity. Neither of these two conditions holds: We cannot find a set of publicly owned firms that differ only in their dividend policies, nor can we obtain precise estimates of the cost of equity.Therefore, no one can establish a clear relationship between dividend policy and the cost of equity. Investors in the aggregate cannot be seen to uniformly prefer either higher or lower dividends. Nevertheless, individual investors do have strong preferences. Some prefer high dividends, while others prefer all capital gains. These differences among in dividends help explain why it is difficult to reach any definitive conclusions regarding the optimal dividend payout. Even so ,both evidenceand logic suggest that investors prefer firms that follow a stable, predictable dividend policy Because we discuss how dividend policy is set in practice, we must examine two other theoretical issues that could affect our view toward dividend policy: 1the information content, or signaling, hypothesis and2 The clientele effects. MM argued that investors’ reactions to change in dividend policy do not necessarily show that investors prefer dividends to retained earnings. Rather, they argued that price change following dividend actions simply indicate that there is an important information, or signaling, content in dividend announcements.The clientele effects to the extent that stockholders can switch, a firm can change from one dividend payout policy to another and then let stockholders who do not like the new policy sell to other investors who do. However, frequent switching would be inefficient because of1brokerage costs,2the likelihood that stockholders who are selling will have to pay capital gains taxes, and 3 a possible shortage of investors who like the firm’s newly adopted dividend policy. Thus, management should be hesitant to change its dividend policy, because a change might cause current stockholders to sell their stock, forcing the stock price down. Such a price decline might be temporary, but it might also be permanent if few new investors are attracted by the new dividend policy, then the stock price would remain depressed. Of course, the new policy mightattract an even larger clientele than the firm had before, in which case the stock price would rise.In many ways, our discussion of dividend policy parallels our discussion of capital structure: we presented the relevant theories and issues, and we listed some additional factors that influence dividend policy, but we did not come up with any hard-and-fast guidelines that manager can follow. It should be apparent from our discussion that dividend policy decisions are exercises in informed judgment, not decisions that can be based on precise mathematical model.In practice, dividend policy is not an independent decision ? the dividend decisions is made jointly with capital structure and capital budgeting decisions. The underlying reason for this joint decisions process is asymmetric information, which influences managerial actions in two ways:1, In general, managers do not want to issue new common stock. First, new common stock involves issuance cost -- - commissions, fees, and so on-and those costs can be avoided by using retained earnings to finance the firm’s equity needs. Also, asymmetric information causes investors to view common stock issues as negative signals and thus lowers expectations regarding the firm’s future prospects. The end result is that the announcement of a new stock issue usually leads to a decrease in the stock prices. Considering the total costs involved, including bothissuance and asymmetric information costs, managers strongly prefer to use retained earnings as their primary source of new equity.2, Divi dend changes provide signal about managers’ beliefs as to their firms’ future prospects, Thus, dividend reductions, Or worse yet, omissions, generally have a significant negative effect on a firm’s stock priceSince managers recognize this, they try to set dollar dividends low enough so that there is only a remote chance that the dividend will have to be reduce in the future. Of course, unexpectedly large dividend increases can be used to provide positive signals. the actual payout ratio in any The dividend decision is made during the planning process, so there is uncertainty about future investment opportunities and operating cash flows. Thus, the actual payout ratio in any year will probably be above or below the firm’s long-range target. However, the dollar dividend should be maintained, or increase as planned policy simply cannot be maintained. A steady or increasing steam of dividends over the long run signals that the firm’s financial condition is under control. Further, investors uncertain is decreased by stable dividend, so a steady dividend stream reduces the negative effect of a stock issue, should one become absolutely necessary.In general, firms with superior investment opportunities should set lower payouts, hence retain more earnings, than firms with poor investment opportunities. The degree of uncertainty also influences thedecision. If there is a great deal of uncertainty in the forecasts of free cash flows, which are defined here as the firm’s operating cash flows minus mandatory equity investments, then it is best to be conservative and to set a lower current dollar dividend. Also, firms with postponable investment opportunities can afford to set a higher dollar dividend, because in times of stress investments can be postponed for a year or two, thus increasing the cash available for dividends. Finally, firms whose cost of capital is largely unaffected by change in the debt ratio can also afford to set a higher payout ratio, because they can, in times of stress, more easily issue additional debt to maintain the capital budgeting program without having to cut dividends or issue stock.Firms have only one opportunity to set the opportunity payment from scratch. Therefore, today’s dividend decisions are constrained by policies that were set in the past, hence setting a policy for the next five years necessarily begins with a review of the current situation. Although we have outlined a rational process for managers to use when setting their firms’ dividend policies, dividend policy still rema ins one of the most judgmental decisions that firms must make. For this reason, dividend policy is always set by the board of directors the financial staff analyzes the situation and makes a recommendation, but the board makes the final decision.Source: E ugene F. Brigham. Joel F.Houston, 2004. “Fundamentals offinancial” Aril,pp.648-671.二、翻译文章译文:股利政策盈利的公司常常面临三个重要问题:(1)自由现金流量有多少应该分配给股东?(2)怎么样吧这些现金分配给股东,是通过增发股利还是回购本公司股票?(3)需要保持一个不变的股利支付政策,还是让股利支付随着各年度的情况不同而不同?当财务经理决定应该付多少现金给股东时,他一定要记住,公司的目标是股东价值最大化,目标支付率作为现金股利支付的净收益占总收益的百分比,应该是根据投资者更偏好的股利还是资本利得来决定。

外文翻译--股利政策:一个综述

外文翻译--股利政策:一个综述

外文原文Dividend policy: a review1. IntroductionExplaining dividend policy has been one of the most difficult challenges facing financial economists. Despite decades of study, we have yet to completely understand the factors that influence dividend policy and the manner in which these factors interact. Allen and Mich aely (1995) conclude that ‘‘much more empirical and theoretical research on the subject of dividends is required before a consensus can be reached’’ (p. 833). The fact that a major textbook such as Brealey and Myers (2002) lists dividends as one of the ten important unsolved problems in finance reinforces this conclusion. The first empirical study of dividend policy was provided by Lintner (1956), who surveyed corporate managers to understand how they arrived at the dividend policy. Lintner found that an existing dividend rate forms a bench mark for the management. Companies’ management usually displayed a strong reluctance to reduce dividends. Lintner opined that managers usually have reasonably definitive target payout ratios.Over the years, dividends are increased slowly at a particular speed of adjustment, so that the actual payout ratio moves closer to the target payout ratio.2. Dividend irrelevance and tax clientelesWhile Lintner (1956) provided the stylistic description of dividends, the watershed in the theoretical modelling of dividends was almost surely the classic paper Miller and Modigliani (1961), which first proposed dividend irrelevance. Essentially, their model is a one-period model under certainty. Given a firm’s investment program, the dividend policy of the firm is irrelevant to the firm value, since a higher dividend would necessitate more sale of stock to raise finances for the investment program. The crucial assumption here is that the futuremarket valuewill remain unaffected by current dividends.The argument rests on the assumptions that the investment program is determined independently and that every stockholder earns the same return (i.e. thediscount rate remains constant). Miller and Modigliani’s dividend-irrelevance argument is elegant, but this does not explainwhy companies, the public, investment analysts are so interested in dividend announcements. Clearly, the observed interest in dividend announcement must be related to some violation of theMiller andModigliani ler and Modigliani, while formulating their famous dividend irrelevance propositions, observed that in the presence of taxation, investors will form clienteles with specific preferences for particular levels of dividend yields. This specific preference for dividends may be determined, inter alia, by the marginal tax rates faced by the investor. Altering the dividend level, according to Miller and Modigliani, leads only to a change in the clientele of shareholders for the firm. Part of the dividend puzzle arises from the fact that dividends are typically taxed at a higher rate compared to the income from capital gains. This has certainly been historically true although in recent years we have noticed a move to eliminate/reduce tax on dividends. We should, therefore, expect investors to prefer cash from capital gains over cash from dividends.Miller and Scholes (1978) provide an ingenious scheme to convert dividend income to capital gains income. Recently Allen et al. (2000) have advanced a theory based on the clientele paradigm to explain why some firms pay dividends and others repurchase shares. A variant of the clientele theory has also been advanced by Baker (2004) where they posit that dividend payments are in response to demands from investors for dividends.3. Informational asymmetry and signalling modelsDeviations from the Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance proposition is obtainable only when the assumptions underlying the setting of Miller and Modigliani are violated. The tax-clientele hypothesis uses the market imperfection of differential taxation of dividends and capital gains to explain the dividend puzzle. Bhattacharyya (1979) develops another explanation for the dividend policy based on asymmetric information. Managers have private knowledge about the distributional support of the project cash flow and they signal this knowledge to the market through their choice of dividends.In the signalling equilibrium higher value of the support is signalled by higher dividend. In other words, the better the news, the higher is the dividend. Heinkel (1978) considers a set up where different firms have different return-generating abilities. This information is transmitted to the market by means of dividends, or equivalently, from investing at less than the first best level. In the equilibrium of Heinkel’s model, the firm with less productivity invests up to its first best level and declares no dividend, while the firm with higher productivity invests less than its first best level of investment, and declares the difference between the amount raised and the amount invested as the dividend. The firm with higher productivity acts in this way in order to distinguish itself from the firm with less productivity. Dividends are still irrelevant in the sense that both firm types could raise an extra X dollars with a new issue to pay an extra X dollars as a dividend with no signalling effect. The signalling cost in this model comes from reduced investment from first best level. In contrast, the signalling cost in Bhattacharyya (1979) comes from taxation and non-symmetric cost of raising funds in the capital market. Bhattacharyya and Heinkel’s work was followed by a number of other papers which posited that dividends are used by managers to transmit information to the capital market.Notable works in signalling paradigm of dividend policy are those of Miller and Rock (1985), John andWilliams (1985) andWilliams (1988). These signalling models typically characterize the informational asymmetry by bestowing the manager or the insider with information about some aspect of the future cash flow. In the signalling equilibriums obtained in these models, the higher the expected cash flow, the higher is the dividend. In Miller and Rock (1985), the signalling cost is the opportunity cost of less than first best investment. In John and Williams (1985), and Williams (1988), the differential taxation of dividends vis-a-vis capital gains sustains the signalling equilibriums. In these papers dividends sustain a fully separating equilibrium. By contrast, Kumar (1988) demonstrates that dividends could also sustain a semi-separating equilibrium where the manager has private information about the productivity of the firm. Venezia (1991) set up a rational equilibrium expectation model. Bayesian investors expect that dividends will be proportional to cash flows.Managers have advance noisy information about the future cash flow. The investors observe the dividend and update their belief about the cash flow. Under these circumstances, Venezia show that the optimal dividend is proportional to the cash flow. Brennan and Thakor (1990) focus on a different question compared to the other signalling type papers on dividend policy. Most dividend policy papers model the dividend decision, as a decision about the amount to be distributed as dividends. In contrast, this paper views the amount of cash to be distributed as exogenously given. It consider three forms of disbursement: dividebd declaration, non-proportionate share repurchase through open market operation, and non-proportionate share repurchase through tender offer. Brennan and Thakor assume that there are two classes of shareholders –informed and uninformed. They show that in a tender offer, the uninformed shareholder always tenders, whereas the informed holds onto his/her shares. The situation is reversed in an open market operation, where the informed shareholder always sell his/her holding and the uninformed never does.4. Free cash flow hypothesisThe rich theoretical development in modelling dividends as signals of private managerial/entrepreneurial information also gave rise to empirical research seeking to determine the fit of the signalling theory to real world data. Typically, the empirical literature attempted to test the signalling paradigm counterpoised against an alternative rationale for dividends advanced by Jensen (1986), based on the principal- agent framework. According to this framework, dividends are used by shareholders as a device to reduce overinvestment by managers. The managers control the firm; therefore, they might invest cash in projects with negative net present values, but which increase the personal utility of the managers in some way. A dividend reduces this free cash flow and thus reduces the scope for overinvestment. The two most cited works in this genre are the papers by Easterbrook (1984) and by Jensen (1986). Unfortunately, neither of these papers try to model the situation; rather, they put forward plausible hypotheses. On the one hand, Easterbrook (1984) hypothesizes that dividends are used to take away the free cash from the control of the managers and pay it off to shareholders. This ensures that the managers will have to approach thecapital market in order to meet the funding needs for new projects. The need to approach the capital markets imposes a discipline on the managers, and thus reduces the cost of monitoring the managers. Additionally, Easterbrook hypothesizes that the imperative to approach the capital market also acts as a counterweight to the managers’ own risk aversion.Jensen (1986) on the other hand, contends that in corporations with large cash flows, managers will have a tendency to invest in low return projects. According to Jensen, debt counters this by taking away the free cash flow. Jensen contends that takeovers and mergers take place when either the acquirer has a large quantum of free cash flow or the acquired has a large free cash flow which has not been paid out to stakeholders. Although Jensen does not deal with the issue of dividends, empirical researchers of dividend policy often use Jensen’s article for motivating tests of the free cash flow hypothesis of dividend policy.The empirical evidence on the three hypotheses are mixed, as we observe in Table I. Dividend policy thus continues to remain a puzzle. We can however enumerate some interesting stylized facts. In Table II we compile the stylized facts as they emerge from a study of the empirical literature.5. ConclusionWe have seen that the empirical evidence is equivocal about the existing theories of dividend policy. Research has discovered a large number of stylized facts but the explanation of dividend policy in an integrated framework still eludes us. In his PhD dissertation, Bhattacharyya (2000) explains dividend policy by using the asymmetric information paradigm. However, unlike the signalling models (where the informed manager/insider uses the dividend as a signalling device), he posits dividend policy as a component of a screening contract set up by an uninformed principal. In signalling models, hidden information is the source of informational asymmetry. In the dissertation, he uses a richer source of informational asymmetry – that due to moral hazard (because the effort exerted by agent is not observable) and that due to hidden information (because the productivity of agent is not observable). He assumes that the manager wants to maximize his net wealth and the principal recognizes this and sets up a discriminating contract to utilize the skill of the agent in the productive enterprise.He finds that contrary to the findings of the dividend models based on the signalling paradigm, dividend – conditional on cash availability – bears an inverse relationship to managerial type. That is, for a given level of available cash, the manager with lower productivity declares a higher dividend than that declared by a manager with higher productivity. He concludes that his model can be used to explain many of the empirical findings obtained by other researchers. An interesting corollary of his model is that when we include costly private effort and differences in productivity, the relationship between dividend and managerial type shifts from being monotone increasing to monotone decreasing. This relationship shows that incorporation of costly effort and difference in productivity modify the result (Miller and Rock, 1985) obtained. Miller and Rock study a model which does not include managerial effort. Another interesting implication of this dissertation is that dividends can be shown to be relevant in the presence of moral hazard and hidden information, even when the agency contract is optimally chosen.The free cash flow conjecture posits that higher dividends are better because higher dividend removes free cash from the hands of the managers; consequently, the managers have less money to waste. According to this conjecture, announcement of higher dividends would also lead to higher abnormal return.The proof of the pudding, as the adage goes, is in eating, and the validity of a theory is the degree of its congruence with empirical reality. A properly conducted research will take into account the empirical implications of all the theories and test them simultaneously. This is the task for future.Source: N. Bhattacharyya, (2007) "Dividend policy: a review", Managerial Finance, V ol. 33 Iss: 1, pp.4 – 13.中文译文:股利政策:一个综述1、简介解释股利政策对财务经济学家来说已经是面临的最困难挑战之一。

股利政策【外文翻译】

股利政策【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文Material Source: Fortune; 11/24/2008 Author: Tully-Shawn Dividend policy, one of the three corporation financial decisions, has been concerned among theoreticians and practitioners. John Linter (1956) brought forward a model of dividend adjustment. According to the model, firm that is currently paying dividends at the rate of Depts., and that has a target payout ratio of POR, ill adjust (ADJ) its dividend rate, but less than fully, as its earnings per share (EPS) changes. Modigliani and Miller (1961) argued that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital, a perfect world, the dividend policy is irrelevant to shareholders wealth. His proposition has laid a solid theoretical foundation for the dividend policy. After that, economists have offered explanations in different ways about dividend payment, such as effect of taxes, ividend signaling, agency costs issues and transaction costs. Over decades, conformists could not come to an agreement. Thus, Black, Fischer (1976) gave it a name “dividend puzzle”.In China, the dividend policy of listed companies has its unique characteristic in the strong emerging market economy if comparing the type of dividend payment in China with the type used in developed countries. In addition to cash dividend and stock dividend, several mixed types of dividend payment derive from cash dividend and stock dividend such as mix of bonus issues and dividend, mix of rights issues and dividend, According to China Secur ities Journal’s relative statistical data, there are more listed companies who adopted the pattern of stock dividend in 1993 which were 36%, and more listed companies adopted cash dividend policy during 1994 and 1995 which were 40% and 36% respectively. The companies that paid no dividends account for 35%, 54%, 59% and 62% respectively during the period of 1996 and 1999. The proportion of total listed companies that adopted cash dividend increased from 47% to 54% during 2000 and 2001.In this situation, in o rder to resolve the “dividend puzzle”, many Chinese scholars have done a number of empirical studies. Two main approaches were taken in these studies:First, using event study method to analyze the influence of different dividend the policy on share price and the value of a firm. Wei Chen at (1999) empirical analyzedthe dividend policy of Shanghai stock market by the method of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and studies the existence and character of the signaling effect of dividend policy in this market. This study showed that the degree of CAR was very different from different dividend policy. The CAR of right issue was higher than cash dividend but lower than bonus. Yu Qiao et al (2001) found that there was evidential positive statistical relationship between the dividends and mix dividend policies of firms on the stock market. But their study showed that the market was not sensitive with cash dividends. This phenomenon is opposition with the result being observed in developed countries’ mature markets. Gang Wei (2000) found that dividend policy often signal the information of long-term earnings about a firm for investors.Second, based on diversified dividend policy theories, analyzers analyzed dynamic reasons of dividend policy, and tried to find impact of dynamic factors and influencing extent on dividend policy of firms. Different point of view offered different significant conclusions. For example, cash dividend may be affected by currency balance and retained earnings, and has positive relationship with them (Yang, 2000); different size of firms choose different pattern of dividend: small firms tend to choose stock dividend, while large firms prefer cash dividend (Yan, 2001; Zhao, 2001). If the firms have lower proportion of holding state shares and corporative shares and the stronger self-growth and development of firms, the firms enjoy the higher stock dividend payment, and also the lower cash dividend payment (Lu, 1999).Domestic theoretic and empirical researches based mostly on profit flow (net income, EPS or retained earnings) investigated the dividend policy, and ignored the effect on cash flow. In fact, cash dividend distribution not only depends on profitability of firms, but also depends on free cash flow to firm. Compare profit flow with cash flow, the latter not only express the value which has been created by firm, but also express how many value that has been realized. From the point of view of cash flow to analyze it, it can patch the faults of profit flow (accounting policy choice, earning management), and declare real relationship between cash flow and the ability of cash payout.Recently, more and more investors prefer cash flow, because of the idea that “cash is king” which have become many managers’ conception. Therefore,this paper seeks to analyze the problem of cash dividend payment from the cash flow point of view, and three questions answered in this paper: (1) how much cash will be distributed to shareholders by paying a cash dividend after all expenses. What is theactual dividend? (2) Why is the cash dividend payment higher or lower than cash flow? What are the factors that affect cash dividend payment? (3) What are the features of cash dividend payment in different industries?Firstly, the payment of cash dividend is usually less than accounting profit in Chinese listed companies, but quite a number of listed companies which had more payment of cash dividend than free cash flow to equity, the gap between cash dividend and FCFE is right issue. By theory, the phenomenon of both cash dividend and right issue is contrary to basic regulation of corporate financial management. This phenomenon of self-contradiction may be related to the rule by China security commission in 2000, which the listed companies must have cash dividend payment last three years while they finance by adding shares or right issue. In contrast, cash dividend payment in some listed companies were less than free cash flow to equity, which is result in forming cash storage in these firms. In China, dividend payment of firm can be described as: the firms have very few cash dividend payment and more stock dividend payment, while some firms have not paid any dividend. This is maybe one of the evidences that Chinese stock market full of speculation and unfair financing from stock market.Secondly, payment of cash dividend in Chinese listed companies is relevantly positive for current return per share and total assets but negative for debt to asset ratio. For the index of cash flow, it is closely related to the payment of cash dividend and net operating cash flow; the index of free cash flow to equity is irrelevant. This is because listed companies understand the index of free cash flow to equity in significant limit, they seldom use free cash flow. Additionally, the payment of cash dividend is irrelevant to non-outstanding shares.Lastly, comparatively, the results indicate that firms with a higher ROE, ONCF and higher cash dividend payment belong to traditional industry; the firms with a higher ROE, lower ONCF and lower cash dividend payment belong to high-tech industry. We find there are quite many firms, which cannot make enough residual cash flow, but they still invest big projects. They return back cash dividend to shareholders by financing from stock market. Other firms with little investment opportunity have plenty of cash flow but no cash dividend payment, still finance too. These phenomena should be paid more attention to.译文股利政策资料来源:财富;11/24/2008作者:Tully-Shawn 股利政策,是理论家和实践家一直关注的公司的三个财务决策之一。

股利政策

股利政策

5
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W.668
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed Ford Motor’s Decision to discontinue paying a special $10 million dividend, ostensible to pay for a new smelting plant while reducing the price of Ford cars. Minority shareholders claimed the decision was inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of the business corporation – to maximize the return to shareholders. The court agreed and faulted Henry Ford for reducing car prices and running Ford Motor “not as a business institution.” The court ordered the special dividend, though refused to enjoin Ford’s expansion plans since “judges are not business experts.”
• 股票拆细指公司按照一定的比例向公司原有股 东追加股票,同时也以相同的比例降低公司原 有股东持有股票的面值。 • 如果公司反过来是以一定的比例减少公司原有 股东的股票,同时相应提高公司原有股东所持 有股票的面值,则称为反拆细(reverse stock split)。 • 股票拆细纯属是提高股票市场性的一种技术处 理方法。

外文翻译--交错董事会,管理防御和股利政策

外文翻译--交错董事会,管理防御和股利政策

本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译原文:Staggered Boards, Managerial Entrenchment and Dividend Policy 1 IntroductionAccording to agency theory, dividend payouts help alleviate agency costs by reducing the amount of free cash flow available to managers, who not necessarily act in the best interests of the shareholders (Grossman and Hart 1980; Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986). Furthermore, Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividends help mitigate agency conflicts by exposing firms to more frequent monitoring by the primary capital markets because paying dividends makes it more likely that new common stock has to be issued more often.Staggered or classified boards represent one of the most controversial governance provisions. Staggered boards can insulate inefficient managers from takeover market forces, thereby promoting managerial entrenchment. Two powerful recent studies by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007) find strong evidence indicating that staggered boards allow managerial entrenchment, ultimately resulting in significantly lower firm value.Motivated by agency theory, we explore the effect of potential entrenchment on dividend payouts. As staggered boards can exacerbate agency conflicts and dividend payouts can help alleviate agency costs, we surmise that dividend policy is affected by whether or not the firm has a staggered board. Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis. In particular, the evidence demonstrates that firms with staggered boards are more likely to pay dividends, and firms that pay dividends pay larger dividends than those with unitary boards.The results are robust even after controlling for a large number of firm-specific characteristics and for an alternate form of payouts, i.e., share repurchases.Furthermore, we examine the reverse causality argument, where dividend policy might lead to the adoption or rescission of a staggered board. Bebchuk et al. (2005) note that very few firms have either adopted or rescinded staggered boards since 1990. As a result, managers likely make dividend decisions while viewing the existence of a staggered board as pre-determined. It is much more likely that causality runs from staggered boards to dividend payouts than vice versa. In any case, we run an analysis based on two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation and find consistent evidence that staggered boards appear to bring about larger dividend payouts.Many recent studies find that dividend payouts are inversely related to corporate governance quality, as measured by Gompers et al.’s (2003) Governance I ndex (Jiraporn and Ning 2006; Pan 2007; John and Knyazeva 2006; Officer 2006; Hu and Kumar 2004). In other words, firms with poor governance quality tend to pay out more dividends. We contribute to this strand of the literature by showing that staggered boards (which constitute one component of the Governance Index) have a palpable impact on dividend policy. In fact, the effect of staggered boards on dividend payouts ranges from two to three times the impact of other governance provisions combined. Our results are remarkably similar to those in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), who find that the impact of staggered boards on firm value is multiple times the effect of other governance provisions put together.2 Our results are vital, as they show that some governance provisions have considerably more influence than others on firm value and on critical corporate activities such as dividend payout decisions.Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the association between staggered boards and dividend payouts. As the Act is intended to hold managers more accountable to shareholders, thereby alleviating agency costs, it may render dividends less necessary as a device for resolving agency costs and therefore may change how dividend payouts are affected by staggered boards. Nevertheless, we do not find empirical evidence consistent with this notion. The impact of staggered boards on dividend payouts exists both before and after the enactment of SOX. The governance reforms introduced by SOX do not appear to materially affect the association between staggered boards and dividend policy.The results of our study contribute to the literature both in agency theory and in dividend policy. The evidence is in favor of the agency role of dividend payouts and against the signaling hypothesis. We also contribute to the literature in corporate governance by highlighting the role of staggered boards on a critical corporate activity such as dividend policy. Given the recent focus on the impact of staggered boards on firm value and other corporate outcomes (Bebchuk and Cohen 2005; Faleye 2007; Jiraporn and Liu 2008), our results appear to be timely. Finally, our results also contribute to the fierce debate on the costs and benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample selection and the relevant data. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 offers the concluding remarks.2 Background, literature review, and hypothesis development2.1 The role of staggered boards in entrenching incumbentsIn the U.S., boards of directors can be either unitary or staggered. In firms with a unitary board, all directors stand for election each year. In firms with a staggered or classified board, directors are divided into three classes, with one class of directors standing for election at each annual meeting of shareholders. Ordinarily, a classified board has three classes of directors, which in most states of incorporation is the maximum number of classes allowed by state corporate law (Bebchuk and Cohen 2005).Boards can be removed in one of the following two ways. First, a replacement can occur due to a stand-alone proxy fight brought about by a rival team that attempts to replace the incumbents but continues to run the firm as a stand-alone entity. Second, a board may be replaced as a consequence of a hostile takeover. Either way, the difficulty with which directors can be removed critically depends on whether the firm has a staggered board.In a stand-alone proxy contest, staggered boards make it considerably more difficult to win control by requiring a rival team to prevail in two elections. In a hostile takeover, staggered boards protect incumbents from removal due to theinteraction between incumbents and a board’s power to adopt and maintain a poison pill.3 Before the adoption of the poison pill defense, staggered boards were deemed only a mild defense mechanism, as they did not impede the acquisition of a control block. The acceptance of the poison pill, however, has immensely strengthened the anti-takeover power of staggered boards.Two powerful recent studies by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007) demonstrate that firms with staggered boards exhibit significantly lower value than those with unitary boards. Thus, the evidence is in accordance with the notion that staggered boards promote managerial entrenchment, exacerbate agency conflicts, and ultimately hurt firm value.2.2 Prior literatureExisting literature provides evidence consistent with the agency role of dividends in alleviating Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow problem (Easterbrook 1984; Lang and Litzenberger 1989; Smith and Watts 1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993). Agency theory represents a general framework for the role of dividends as a way of reducing the costs of manager-shareholder agency conflict (Easterbrook 1984). Dividends reduce the amount of sub-optimal investment, impose additional monitoring by forcing the manager to address the external financing market, and increase managerial risk-taking (by replacing leverage, dividends lower the expected loss of human capital due to bankruptcy).Many recent studies document a negative relation between dividend payouts and Gompers et al.’s (2003) Governance Index (Jiraporn and Ning 2006; Pan 2007; John and Knyazeva 2006; and Officer 2006). The Governance Index has a serious weakness in that it assigns equal weights to all the governance provisions included in the construction of the index. Although other governance provisions may also exacerbate managerial entrenchment, there is strong empirical evidence that staggered boards have a far more potent effect than any other governance provision.4 Two crucial studies by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) show that, even after accounting for the effects of other governance provisions, staggered boards still exhibit a strong negative impact on firm value. In fact, the regressionresults reveal that the impact of staggered boards on firm value is seven times stronger than the effects of other governance provisions. Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) conclude that “staggered boards play a relatively large role compared to the average role of other provisions inc luded in the GIM Index.”5 The effect of staggered boards on firm value is not only statistically significant but also economically significant. Having a staggered board is associated with Tobin’s q that is lower by 17 percentage points (Bebchuk and Cohen 2005).Additional evidence on the effect of staggered boards is reported in several recent studies. For example, Faleye (2007) reports that staggered boards reduce the probability of forced CEO turnover, are associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance, and are correlated with a lower sensitivity of CEO compensation to changes in shareholder wealth. Masulis et al. (2007) demonstrate that announcement period returns are 0.57% to 0.91% lower for bidding firms with staggered boards. They attribute this finding to the self-serving behavior of acquiring firm managers, who themselves are insulated from the market for corporate control.Jiraporn and Liu (2008) examine how capital structure decisions are influenced by the presence of a staggered board. The evidence reveals that even after controlling for the effects of other governance provisions, firms with staggered boards are significantly less leveraged than those with unitary boards. They argue that staggered boards promote managerial entrenchment, thereby allowing opportunistic managers to eschew the disciplinary mechanisms associated with debt financing. The regression results show that the impact of staggered boards on leverage is six to nine times stronger than the effects of other g overnance provisions included in Gompers et al.’s (2003) Index.Furthermore, staggered boards have become a subject of intense investor scrutiny. Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommends in its 2006 proxy voting guidelines that its membership vote against proposals to stagger a board or vote for proposals to repeal staggered board provisions. Additionally, ISS recommends withholding votes for directors who ignore shareholder resolutions to de-stagger a board. ISS also lowers its governance score for firms with staggered boards.6Similarly, CalPERS, the largest public pension fund in the U.S., has targeted firms for shareholder votes to remove staggered boards from their corporate charters. Various mutual fund companies including TIAA-CREF and Fidelity Investments also call for voting against the adoption of and for the removal of staggered board provisions. No other governance provisions have attracted nearly as much controversy from investors as staggered boards, underscoring staggered boards’ dom inant role relative to other governance provisions.Given the above discussion, it is obvious that staggered boards have a serious impact on several critical corporate outcomes, including overall firm value, capital structure, CEO compensation, CEO turnover and takeover gains. It also appears that the effect of staggered boards is large relative to the average effect of other corporate governance provisions. The significance of staggered boards cannot be overemphasized. Consequently, in this study, we narrowly concentrate on the role of staggered boards and investigate their impact on dividend payouts.2.3 Hypothesis developmentGrounded in agency theory, our general hypothesis is that there is a link between staggered boards and dividend payouts, as both are related to agency costs. However, it is unclear what the exact relation should be between staggered boards and dividend policy. On the basis of previous literature in this area, we advance four possible hypotheses.2.4 The irrelevance hypothesisThis view posits that there is no significant difference in dividend policy between firms with staggered boards and those with unitary boards. Dividends are “sticky.” Once dividends are initiated, managers are extremely unwilling to cut back or terminate dividends (Lintner 1956; Allen and Michaely 2003; Brav et al. 2005), possibly making irrelevant any managerial entrenchment engendered by staggered boards.2.5 The managerial opportunism hypothesisThis argument is based on the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen 1986). This view argues that dividend policy is determined by managers who would rather retain cashwithin the firm for perquisite consumption, for empire building or for investing in projects that enhance their personal prestige but do not necessarily benefit shareholders. As staggered boards can entrench inefficient managers, opportunistic managers may choose to keep more cash within the firm and pay less out as dividends. The empirical prediction of this hypothesis is that firms with staggered boards should pay less dividends than those with unitary boards.Source: Pornsit Jiraporn and Pandej Chintrakarn,2009.“Staggered Boards, Managerial Entrenchment, and Dividend Policy” .J Financ Serv Res. May.pp.1-19.译文:交错董事会,管理防御和股利政策一、引言根据代理理论,股利发放通过减少提供给那些对股东最优权利不起重要作用的管理人员的自由现金流量而有助减少代理成本(格罗斯曼和哈特1980年;伊斯特1984年,詹森1986年)。

股利政策【外文翻译】

股利政策【外文翻译】

外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文:Dividend policyProfitable companies regularly face three important questions: (1) How much of its free cash flow should it pass on to shareholders? (2) Should it provide this cash to shareholders by raising the dividend or by repurchasing stock? (3) Should it maintain a stable, consistent payment policy, or should it let the payments vary as conditions change?When deciding how much cash to distribute to shareholders, finance manager must keep in mind that the firm’s objective is to max imize shareholder value. Consequently, the target pay rate ratio —define as the percentage of net income to be paid out as cash dividends —should be based in large part on investors’ preference for dividends versus capital gains: do investors prefer (1) to have the firm distribute income as cash dividends or (2) to have it either repurchase stock or else plow the earnings back into the business, both of which should result in capital gains? This preference can be considered in terms of the constant growth stock valuation model:gD S -K =P 1^ If the company increases the payout ration, the raises 1D .This increase in the numerator, taken alone, would cause the stock price to rise. However, if 1D is raised, then less money will be available for reinvestment, that will cause the expected growth rate to decline, and that will tend to lower the stock ’s price. Thus, any change in payout policy will have two opposing effects. Therefore, t he firm’s optimal dividend policy must strike a balance between current dividends and future growth so to maximize the stock price. In this section, we examine three theories of investor preference: (1)the dividend irrelevance theory, (2)the "bird-in-the-hand" theory ,and(3)the tax preference theory.DIVIDEND IRRELEV ANCE THEORYIt has been argued that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital. If dividend policy has no significant effects, then it would be irrelevance .The principal proponents of dividend irrelevance theory are Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani(MM).They argued that the firm’s is determined only by its basic earning power and its business risk. In other words, MM argued that the value of firm depends only on the income produced by its assets, not on how this income is split between dividends and retained earnings.To understand MM’s argument that dividend policy is irrelevance, recognize that any shareholder can in theory construct his or her own dividend policy .If investors could buy and sell shares and thus create their own dividend policy without incurring costs, then the firm’s dividend policy would truly be irrelevant. Note, though, that investors who want additional dividends must incur brokerage cost to sell shares, and investors who do not want dividends must first pay taxes on the unwanted dividends and then incur brokerage cost to purchase shares with the after-tax dividends. Since taxes and brokerage costs certainly exist, dividend policy may well be relevant.In developing their dividend theory, MM made a number of assumptions especially the absence of taxes and brokerage costs. Obviously, tax and brokerage costs do exist, so the MM irrelevance theory may not be true. However, MM argued that all economic theories are based on simplifying assumptions, and that the validity of a theory must be judged by empirical test, not by the realism of its assumptions.BIRD-IN-THE-HAND THEORYThe principal conclusions of MM’s dividend irrelevance theory is that dividend policy does not affect the required rate of return on equity, Ks. This conclusion has been hotly debated in the academic circles .In particular, Myron Gordon and John Lintner argued that Ks decreases as the dividend payout is increase because investor are less certain of receiving the capital gains which are supposed to result from retaining earnings than they are of receiving dividend paymentsMM disagreed .They argued that Ks independent of dividend policy, whichimplies that investors are indifferent between D1/P0 and g and, hence, between dividends and capital gains. MM called the Gordon-Lintner argument the bird-in-the-hand fallacy because, in MM’s view, most investors plan to reinvest their dividends in the stock of the same or similar firms, and, in any event, the riskiness of the firm’s cash flows to investors in the long run is determined by the riskiness of operating cash flows, not by dividend payout policy.TAX PREFERENCE THEORYThere are three tax-related reasons for thinking that investors might prefer a low dividend payout to a high payout: (1) Recall from Chapter II that long-term capital gains are taxed at a rate of 20 percent, whereas dividend income is taxed at effective rates which go up to 39.6 percent. Therefore, wealthy investors might prefer to have companies retain and plow earnings back into the business. Earnings growth would presumably lead to stock prices increases, and thus low- taxed capital gains would be substituted for higher-taxed dividends. (2)Taxes are not paid on the gains until a stock is sold. Due to time value effects, a dollar of taxes paid in the future has a lower effective cost than a dollar paid today. (3) If a stock is held by someone until he or she dies, no capital gains tax is due at all-the beneficiaries who receive the stock can use the stock’s value on the death day as their cost basis and thus completely escape the capital gains tax.Because of these tax advantages, investors may prefer to have companies retain most of their earnings. IF so, investors would be willing to pay more for low-payout companies than for otherwise similar high- payout companies.There three theories offer contradictory advice to corporate managers, so which, if any, should we believe? The most logical way to proceed is to test the theories empirically. Many such tests have been conducted, but their results have been unclear. There are two reasons for this(1)For a valid statistical test, things other than dividend policy must be held constant; that is, the sample companies must differ only in their dividend policies, and(2)we must be able to measure with a high degree of accuracy each firm’s cost of equity. Neither of these two conditions holds: We cannot find a set of publicly owned firms that differ only in their dividend policies, nor can we obtainprecise estimates of the cost of equity.Therefore, no one can establish a clear relationship between dividend policy and the cost of equity. Investors in the aggregate cannot be seen to uniformly prefer either higher or lower dividends. Nevertheless, individual investors do have strong preferences. Some prefer high dividends, while others prefer all capital gains. These differences among in dividends help explain why it is difficult to reach any definitive conclusions regarding the optimal dividend payout. Even so ,both evidence and logic suggest that investors prefer firms that follow a stable, predictable dividend policy.Because we discuss how dividend policy is set in practice, we must examine two other theoretical issues that could affect our view toward dividend policy: (1)the information content, or signaling, hypothesis and(2) The clientele effects. MM argued that investors’reactions to change in dividend policy do not necessarily show that investors prefer dividends to retained earnings. Rather, they argued that price change following dividend actions simply indicate that there is an important information, or signaling, content in dividend announcements.The clientele effects to the extent that stockholders can switch, a firm can change from one dividend payout policy to another and then let stockholders who do not like the new policy sell to other investors who do. However, frequent switching would be inefficient because of(1)brokerage costs,(2)the likelihood that stockholders who are selling will have to pay capital gains taxes, and (3) a possible shortage of investors who like the firm’s newly adopted dividend policy. Thus, management should be hesitant to change its dividend policy, because a change might cause current stockholders to sell their stock, forcing the stock price down. Such a price decline might be temporary, but it might also be permanent if few new investors are attracted by the new dividend policy, then the stock price would remain depressed. Of course, the new policy might attract an even larger clientele than the firm had before, in which case the stock price would rise.In many ways, our discussion of dividend policy parallels our discussion of capital structure: we presented the relevant theories and issues, and we listed some additional factors that influence dividend policy, but we did not come up with anyhard-and-fast guidelines that manager can follow. It should be apparent from our discussion that dividend policy decisions are exercises in informed judgment, not decisions that can be based on precise mathematical model.In practice, dividend policy is not an independent decision –the dividend decisions is made jointly with capital structure and capital budgeting decisions. The underlying reason for this joint decisions process is asymmetric information, which influences managerial actions in two ways:1, In general, managers do not want to issue new common stock. First, new common stock involves issuance cost -- - commissions, fees, and so on-and those costs can be avoided by using retained earnings to finance the firm’s equity needs. Also, asymmetric information causes investors to view common stock issues as negative signals and thus lowers expectations regard ing the firm’s future prospects. The end result is that the announcement of a new stock issue usually leads to a decrease in the stock prices. Considering the total costs involved, including both issuance and asymmetric information costs, managers strongly prefer to use retained earnings as their primary source of new equity.2, Dividend changes provide signal about managers’ beliefs as to their firms’ future prospects, Thus, dividend reductions, Or worse yet, omissions, generally have a significant negative effect on a firm’s stock price . Since managers recog nize this, they try to set dollar dividends low enough so that there is only a remote chance that the dividend will have to be reduce in the future. Of course, unexpectedly large dividend increases can be used to provide positive signals. the actual payout ratio in any.The dividend decision is made during the planning process, so there is uncertainty about future investment opportunities and operating cash flows. Thus, the actual payout ratio in any year will probably be above or below the firm’s long-range target. However, the dollar dividend should be maintained, or increase as planned policy simply cannot be maintained. A steady or increasing steam of dividends over the long run signals that the firm’s financial condition is under control. Further, investors uncertain is decreased by stable dividend, so a steady dividend streamreduces the negative effect of a stock issue, should one become absolutely necessary.In general, firms with superior investment opportunities should set lower payouts, hence retain more earnings, than firms with poor investment opportunities. The degree of uncertainty also influences the decision. If there is a great deal of uncertainty in the forecasts of free cash flows, which are defined here as the firm’s operating cash flows minus mandatory equity investments, then it is best to be conservative and to set a lower current dollar dividend. Also, firms with postponable investment opportunities can afford to set a higher dollar dividend, because in times of stress investments can be postponed for a year or two, thus increasing the cash available for dividends. Finally, firms whose cost of capital is largely unaffected by change in the debt ratio can also afford to set a higher payout ratio, because they can, in times of stress, more easily issue additional debt to maintain the capital budgeting program without having to cut dividends or issue stock.Firms have only one opportunity to set the opportunity payment from scratch. Therefore, today’s dividend decisions are constrained by policies that were set in the past, hence setting a policy for the next five years necessarily begins with a review of the current situation. Although we have outlined a rational process for managers to use when setting their firms’ dividend policies, dividend policy still remains one of the most judgmental decisions that firms must make. For this reason, dividend policy is always set by the board of directors the financial staff analyzes the situation and makes a recommendation, but the board makes the final decision.Source: Eugene F. Brigham. Joel F.Houston, 2004. “Fundamentals of financial”Aril,pp.648-671.二、翻译文章译文:股利政策盈利的公司常常面临三个重要问题:(1)自由现金流量有多少应该分配给股东?(2)怎么样吧这些现金分配给股东,是通过增发股利还是回购本公司股票?(3)需要保持一个不变的股利支付政策,还是让股利支付随着各年度的情况不同而不同?当财务经理决定应该付多少现金给股东时,他一定要记住,公司的目标是股东价值最大化,目标支付率作为现金股利支付的净收益占总收益的百分比,应该是根据投资者更偏好的股利还是资本利得来决定。

Dividendpolicy股利政策基本知识点

Dividendpolicy股利政策基本知识点

Dividendpolicy股利政策基本知识点Dividend policyDividend: set by firm’s board of directors; periodic cash payment made by companies to shareholders. When a dividend has been declared公然宣布的, it becomes a liability of the firm and cannot be easily canceled by the firm.Measurement of dividendDividend payout ratio = dividends/earnings, measured by the % of earnings that the company pays in dividend.Dividend yields = dividend/stock price, measured by the return that an investor can make from dividends alone.Dividend per share= total div/ numbersCapital gain= (P1-P0)/P0Return=(P1-P0+div)/P0= Capital gain+ dividend yield1- payout ratio= Retention ratioTypes of dividendsCash dividends (most common): cash of payment; will affect the firm’s valueSpecial dividends: one-time dividend payment; usually larger than a regular dividendStock dividends (expressed as a %): distribution of additional shares to a firm’s stockholders; no cash leaves the firm,no change in value; number increase, value of each share decrease Stock split股票分割(expressed as a ratio): issue of additional shares to firm’s stockholders; motivation of split-keep the share price in a range thought to be attractive to small investors so that it can increase the demand for, and the liquidity of the stock, which may boost the stock price; increase the number of shares outstanding and lower the price per share. The total value of theshareholder’s investment is unchanged.Dividend policy is the policy a company uses to decide how much it will pay out to shareholders in the form of dividends.When deciding how much cash to distribute to stockholders, financial managers must keep in mind that the firm’s objective is to maximize shareholder value.Thus, the target payout ratio should be based on investor preferences for cash dividends or capital gains.Dividend irrelevance theoryModigliani-Miller support irrelevance.Investors are indifferent between dividends and retention-generated capital gains.If the firm’s cash dividend is too big, you can just take the excess cash received and use it to buy more of the firm’s stock. If the cash dividend is too small, you can just sell a little bit of your stock in the firm to get the cash flow you want.如果公司的现金分红太大,你可以拿出收到的多余现金,并用它来购买更多的公司股票。

不完全信息,股利政策,和“一鸟在手”的谬论[外文翻译]

不完全信息,股利政策,和“一鸟在手”的谬论[外文翻译]

外文翻译Imperfect information, dividend policy, and "the bird in thehand" fallacyMaterialSource:The Bell Journal of Economic Author: Sudipto BhattacharyaThis paper assumes that outside investors have imperfect information about firms' profitability and that cash dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. It is shown that under these conditions, such dividends function as a signal of expected cash flows. By structuring the model so that finite-lived investors turn over continuing projects to succeeding generations of investors, we derive a comparative static result that relates the equilibrium level of dividend payout to the length of investors' planning horizons.This article develops a model in which cash dividends function as a signal of expected cash flows of firms in an imperfect-information setting. We assume that the productive assets in which agents invest stay in place longer than the agents live and that ownership of the assets is transferred, over time, to other agents. The latter are a priori imperfectly informed about the profitability of assets held by different firms. The major signaling costs that lead dividends to function as signals arise because dividends are taxed at the ordinary income tax rate, whereas capital gains are taxed at a lower rate. Within this framework, this paper explains why firms may pay dividends despite the tax disadvantage of doing so.Recently, Leland and Pyle (1977) and Ross (1977) have used the paradigm of Spence's signaling model (1974) to examine financial market phenomena related to unsystematic risk borne by entrepreneurs and firm debt-equity choice decisions, respectively. In its spirit and cost structure, our model is closely related to the Ross model (1977).The essential contributions of our model are the following. First, we develop a tax-based signaling cost structure founded on the observation that signaling equilibria are feasible, even if signaling cost elements that are negatively related to true expected cash flows are small, provided there are other signaling costs that are not related to true cash flow levels. Second, we develop the model in an intertemporal setting that allows us to identify the relative weights placed on the benefits (increase in value) and costs of signaling with dividends. Our modelsuggests an interesting comparative static result concerning the shareholders' planning horizon; namely, the shorter the horizons over which shareholders have to realize their wealth, the higher is the equilibrium proportion of dividends to expected earnings. Other comparative static properties of the dividend-signaling equilibrium, with respect to major variables like the personal income tax rate and the rate of interest, are also developed and are shown to be in accord with the empirical results of Brittain (1966).To keep the analysis manageable, and to highlight the essential characteristics, we employ two major analytical simplifications. First, we assume that the valuation of cash flow streams is done in a risk-neutral world. Second, we allow the "urgency" of the agents' need to realize their wealth to be parameterized by the length of the planning horizons over which they maximize expected discounted realized wealth, with no detailed consideration of the intertemporal pattern of asset disposal. These assumptions are further discussed below, after the basic model is developed. The general structure of the dividend-signaling model and the conditions for the existence of dividend-signaling equilibria are developed in Section 2.In Section 3 we analyze an example with uniformly distributed cash flows to facilitate discussion of comparative static properties and issues related to multiperiod planning horizons and dynamic learning possibilities. Section 4 contains the concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.In this section we outline the nature of the dividend-signaling model and the signaling cost structure. The model applies to a setting in which outside investors cannot distinguish (a priori) the profitability of productive assets held by across section of firms. Existing shareholders of firms care about the market value "assigned" by outsiders, because the planning horizon over which they have to realize their wealth is shorter than the time span over which the firms' assets generate cash flows. The simplifying assumption of risk-neutrality eliminates the diversification motive. The usual noncooperative evolution arguments of the Spence-type (1974) suggest a signaling equilibrium, if a signal with the appropriate cost-structure properties exists. Dividends are shown to satisfy the requirements.We ignore the incorporation of other sources of information (e.g., accountants' reports) on the ground that, taken by themselves, they are fundamentally unreliable "screening" mechanisms because of the moral hazard involved in communicating profitability. Hence, the model of this paper is somewhat exploratory in nature, a property that it shares with most other signaling models in which the costliness ofsignals derives from exogenous consideration.To preserve the simplicity of the model's structure, we assume that assets owned by firms generate cash flows that are perpetual streams, which are, in most of what follows, taken to be intertemporally independently identically distributed. In this section, and for most of the paper, we assume that existing shareholders have a single-period planning horizon. The firms are assumed to have sufficient investment opportunities, so that all of the cash flows from existing assets can be rationally reinvested. This simplifying assumption can be relaxed somewhat. The communication of even ex post cash flows from existing assets is assumed to be costly, because cash payouts in the form of dividends on regular share repurchases are assumed to be taxed at a higher personal tax rate than capital gains. In the absence of explicit cash payout, before taking on outside financing for new investments, ex post cash flows cannot be communicated without moral hazard, because one of the "inside" variables that a firm cannot readily communicate without moral hazard is the level of new investment.It is assumed that the signaling benefit of dividends derives from the rise in liquidation value V (D) caused by a committed, and actually paid, dividend level D. We develop the model in terms of a marginal analysis for a new project taken on by a firm. This simplification serves two purposes. First, not analyzing dividend decisions vis-à-vis existing and new asset cash flows enables us to postpone discussion of dynamic learning issues to the example in Section 3. Second, this mode of analysis permits us to retain simplicity and flexibility with respect to the modeling of costs incurred in making up shortfalls of cash flows relative to promised dividends. For example, one way of making up such short-falls is likely to be the postponement of investment/replacement plans, although fundamentally we adhere to the sound partial equilibrium practice of analyzing the dividend decision when the investment policy is given. It is assumed that dividend decisions are taken by shareholders' agents, whom we term insiders or managers. These agents optimize the after-tax objective function of shareholders, possibly because their own incentive compensation is tied to the same criterion. The insiders are the only people who know the cash flow distributions of their projects.Having discussed the general structure of the model and the costs that permit dividends to function as a signal, we now use a simple example to examine in more detail the nature of equilibrium and its comparative statics. Suppose the incremental cash flow of the project whose value is being signaled is, in any given period,distributed uniformly over [0, t] with mean t/2.All projects are perpetuities and, forthe time being, the cash flows of each project are taken to be intertemporallyindependently identically distributed. In the cross section of firms the value of t isassumed to vary between t min and t max,but investors cannot discriminate amongprojects with different t's held by different firms. It is further assumed that t=0.This is partly for analytical convenience but, vis-à-vis a marginal project in minany given firm, this is a natural assumption since one of the "inside" variables that afirm cannot costlessly communicate to the market without moral hazard is theamount of investment it undertakes. Initially, we continue to assume shareholdershave a one-period planning horizon.The signaling cost structure that we have developed is not only realistic(dividends linked only to expected cash flows), but also the only simple structureconsistent with the assumption of an exogenously costly dividend-signalingequilibrium. Superficially, another simple possibility that satisfies the marginal-costcharacteristics required for signaling is a "lower-truncated" structure with cash flowX in dividends paid if and only if X is less than some "promised" D! Since the moralhazard in costlessly communicating X to outsiders is the basis for the dissipativesignaling equilibrium, this is not going to be a very enforceable structure. In adifferent context Ross (1977) has developed a financial-signaling model of leveragebased on a "lower-truncated" cost structure of significant bankruptcy penalties formanagers. A difficulty with such a structure is that unless enforceable penalties ofsimilar magnitude relative to the benefits of nonbankruptcy exist for shareholders,there is an incentive for shareholders to make side payments to managers to inducefalse signaling by employing higher levels of debt. In anotherpaper(Bhattacharya,1977), I have developed a model of nondissipative-notexogenously costly-signaling of insiders' information about future cash flows, basedon expectations revision in the market, in a setting in which there is no tax cost todirectly communicating ex post cash flows. As noted in Section 2, it is my belief thata synthesis of the two types of models, which should allow us to provide a partialrole for sources of ex post earnings information like accounting reports, is aninteresting, if difficult, problem for further research.Convergence to equilibrium in financial-signaling models is an interesting issueprimarily because the time structure of events is likely to be different from that inthe job-market signaling model of Spence (1974).In both our model and that of Ross(1977), the signaling cost arises in the future, whereas the benefit, the rise in value,is likely to get established in current as well as liquidation values. If unconstrained liquidation with no effect on value is posited, then current shareholders, and their agents, clearly have an incentive to signal falsely and sell out at an inconsistently high value. One must assume that premature or excessive-relative to normal trading by "retiring" stockholders-liquidation bids by shareholders would significantly affect market value so as to virtually eliminate such problems. It is also likely that observations of insider trading, conditional on their signaling decisions in the current shareholders' interest, or eliciting (conditional) insider bids in a tâtonnement model will play a significant role in convergence to the equilibrium valuation schedule as a function of the signal. These are clearly issues that need further study, as do the issues related to multiperiod planning horizons discussed in Section 3.译文不完全信息,股利政策,和“一鸟在手”的谬论资料来源: 贝尔经济杂志作者:巴特查亚本文假设外部投资者对公司的盈利能力持有不完全信息和现金股息比资本利得税率更高。

第八章 股利政策

第八章 股利政策

现金股利的优点和缺点:
优点: 1、方式简单,无直接财务费用; 2、不改变公司原有控制权结构。 缺点: 1、导致现金大量流出; 2、股东要交纳所得税,减少了股东 的既得利益。
超能电力公司案例
公司有1000元的剩余现金,公司可以用现金投 资于收益率为10%的公司券,也可以向股东发 放现金股利,股东同样可以投资于国库券。假 设公司所得税率34%,个人所得税率28%。两种 策略下,五年后股东分别能得到多少现金?
本政策的要点: 盈余先满足投资需要,如有剩余才向股东发放股利 采用理由: 在于保持理想的资本结构,使加权平均资本成本最低。 主要缺点: 与偏好稳定收益的股东产生矛盾。 股利数额波动大,易产生企业经营不稳的感觉。
举例:假定某公司2001年度提取了公积金、公益金 后的税后净利润为1000万元,2002年度投资计划所 需资金支出总额为1200万元,公司的最佳资本结构 为权益资本占60%,债务资本占40%。按照最佳资本 结构的要求,公司投资方案所需的股东权益数额为: 1200×60%=720(万元)
4.股票股利,即送红股,是指公司以股票代替现金 作为股利向股东分红的一种形式。股票股利是由 红利转增资本或盈余公积金转增资本形成的,属 于无偿增资发行股票。股票股利只是资金在股东 权益账户之间的转移,而不是资金运用。股票并 未改变每位股东的股权比例,也未增加公司的资 产总额。
从公司管理者角度,支付股票股利主要基于下列目的: (1)在盈利和现金股利预期不会增长情况下,股票 股利的支付可以有效地降低每股市价。 (2)股票股利的支付可以使股东分享公司的收益而 无须分配现金,可将现金用于公司的投资项目,有 利于公司的长期发展。 (3)股票股利可以传递公司未来盈利、现金流量增 加的信号。
[ 例 ]假定上述公司本年盈余为 440000元,某股东持有 20000股普通股,发放股票股利对该股东的影响: 项目

股利政策外文翻译

股利政策外文翻译

Growth and the Valuation of SharesLintnerListed companies in the dividend distribution policy to some extent direct impact on the operation of funds of listed companies. The company paid to its shareholders the remaining surplus of retained earnings in the enterprise, there Cixiaobizhang relationship. Therefore, the dividend distribution policy is decided how much dividend distribution to shareholders, has decided to stay in the number of enterprises. Reduce the dividend distribution, which will increase corporate retained earnings, reducing the external financing needs. So dividend policy is also financing the internal decision-making enterprises. In this paper, often used to make a dividend distribution policy briefly discussed.Dividend in the actual operation, the choice of dividend distribution policy has the following four:First, the remaining dividend distribution policyDividend and the company's capital structure related to investment and capital structure, in turn, constitute the necessary funds, the dividend distribution policy should in fact be the cost of capital and investment opportunities in the double impact. The remaining dividend distribution policy is that the company has good investment opportunities, in accordance with the objectives of certain capital structure (the optimal capital structure), to calculate the required equity capital investment, the first of retained earnings, and then the remaining surplus as a dividend to be Distribution. If there is no surplus, not dividends. Use the remaining dividend distribution policy to be followed by five steps: (1)identification of investment projects, looking for profitable investment opportunities. (2)target capital structure, which is identified with the debt equity capital ratio of capital to the weighted average cost of capital (integrated cost of capital rate) reached the lowest level as the standard. (3) target capital structure of the equity investment required amount.(4)maximize the use of the company's retained earnings to meet the investment programmes of the equity capital required amount. (5)investment programme for equity capital have been met if the remaining surplus, and then as dividends paid to shareholders.Choice of the remaining dividend distribution policy, will mean that only the remaining surplus for dividend payment. The model is based on the stock price has nothing to do with the distribution of dividends, investors in the dividend and capital gains do not have a preferred, but will investors get dividends on the secondary position, its fundamental purpose is to maintain the ideal capital structure, the weighted average cost of capital Minimum, thus realizing the company to maximize profits.Second, the continued growth of fixed or dividend distribution policyThe continued growth of fixed or dividend distribution policy is to distribute the annual dividend fixed at a specific level, and in the longer period of time regardlessof how the company's profitability, the financial situation of how the distribution of the dividend remains unchanged. Only when the company that future earnings will be significant, and irreversible growth, will be able to maintain the amount of dividends paid to a higher level, will increase the annual dividend payment amount. However, inflation in the circumstances, most companies will then raise the surplus, and the majority of investors want companies to provide more than offset the adverse effects of inflation dividends, long-term inflation in the years should also increase the amount of dividend payment .Sustained growth of fixed or dividend distribution policy is aimed at avoid because of poor management and reduction of dividend. To take such dividend distribution policy of the reasons is: First, a stable dividend for the company to market convey the normal development of the information, to establish a good image of the company, enhance the confidence of investors in the company, stable stock prices. Second, the stability of the amount of dividends to investors for dividend income and expenditure, especially for those who are dependent on dividends shareholders especially. Mandrax Mandrax high dividends and low stocks, will not be welcomed by these shareholders, the stock price will drop. Third, the stability of the dividend distribution policy may be inconsistent with the remaining dividend theory, but taking into account the stock market will be a variety of factors, including the psychological state of shareholders and other requirements, in order to maintain a stable dividend level, Even if some deferred investment programme or temporarily deviate from target capital structure, may also reduce the dividend or lower than the dividend growth rate of more favorable.In view of this, the company only used or continued growth in the fixed dividend distribution policy in order to maximize the company shares in order to achieve the maximization of the company's financial goals. The dividend distribution policy is that the shortcomings of the dividends paid out of touch with the surplus. When the lower earnings still support a fixed dividend, it might lead to a shortage of funds, financial situation worsened, not the same as the surplus into the dividend distribution policy as to maintain a lower cost of capital.Third, to pay a fixed dividend rate policyDividend policy to pay a fixed rate, the company set a dividend amount of the surplus ratio (dividend payment rate), this ratio of long-term policy to pay dividends. In this dividend distribution policy, the dividends for investors as the company's net profit after tax changes and fluctuations, when the company increased net profit, the stock dividend for investors has increased, but decreased. The higher rate of pay fixed dividends, the company retained surplus is less. Fixed rate of dividend payment distribution model first consider the distribution of dividends, before considering the retained earnings, with the remaining dividend distribution model contrary to the order. In the policy, the dividend payment rate, once established, generally are not allowed to randomly change, the company's profit after tax is determined by calculation, the distribution of the dividend will accordingly identified.Fixed rate of dividend payment policy is based on investor risk aversion, like the reality of the proceeds to determine the distribution of dividends to meet theaspirations of investors, and the distribution of dividends and stock price are relevant and meet the aspirations of the investors, will support the company Shares in a higher position, shares will maximize the realization of the company's financial goals to maximize. But in this policy under the annual dividend for the larger changes, the company easily create the impression of instability, adverse to stabilize stock prices.Third, to pay a fixed dividend rate policy Dividend policy to pay a fixed rateThe company set a dividend amount of the surplus ratio (dividend payment rate), this ratio of long-term policy to pay dividends. In this dividend distribution policy, the dividends for investors as the company's net profit after tax changes and fluctuations, when the company increased net profit, the stock dividend for investors has increased, but decreased. The higher rate of pay fixed dividends, the company retained surplus is less. Fixed rate of dividend payment distribution model first consider the distribution of dividends, before considering the retained earnings, with the remaining dividend distribution model contrary to the order. In the policy, the dividend payment rate, once established, generally are not allowed to randomly change, the company's profit after tax is determined by calculation, the distribution of the dividend will accordingly identified.Fixed rate of dividend payment policy is based on investor risk aversion, like the reality of the proceeds to determine the distribution of dividends to meet the aspirations of investors, and the distribution of dividends and stock price are relevant and meet the aspirations of the investors, will support the company Shares in a higher position, shares will maximize the realization of the company's financial goals to maximize. But in this policy under the annual dividend for the larger changes, the company easily create the impression of instability, adverse to stabilize stock prices.The last,Yurika additional shares normal low dividend policyYurika additional shares normal low dividend policy, a company in normal circumstances only pay a fixed annual amount of the dividend lower in corporate earnings more and better financial situation of the year, according to the actual situation further release of additional dividends to shareholders. However, additional dividends is not fixed, does not mean that the company permanently raise the required rate of dividend payment. Stock real goods or services provided to the customer business entity. The delivery of these goods and services customers time may also influence the cash flow. Articles in the excessive inventory becomes expensive, because they are more easily damaged, or can become obsolete. Although there is now way, the company can reduce the loss of goods allowed to cancel out, commercial enterprises have set up sales of goods and services, without their product is out of date. The company needs a responsible person to understand what is inventory, and this information must be effectively communicated to the sales force. An effective sales force training can use this information to the understanding of what the pricing model, in order to recruit. At the same time, the sales manager can use this information to the foundation and development unit.Adopt this policy was mainly due to: first, such dividend distribution policy so that companies with greater flexibility, when compared with fewer or more of thecapital investment required, to maintain a lower but set the normal dividend The level of dividends, shareholders will not have dividends fell flu, to maintain the existing stock prices and achieve its goals. When companies have a more substantial increase in earnings and surplus cash, the issuance of additional dividend may be appropriate. The company's dividend will be distributed additional information to stock investors so that they enhance the company's confidence is conducive to the stability and stock prices rose. Second, the dividend distribution policy that will enable those who rely on the shareholder dividend to live at least a year could be lower though, but relatively stable dividend income, which attracted this part of the shareholders.Several more dividend distribution policy claims, the company in dividend distribution, we should learn from its basic ideological decision-making, to suit their own specific reality of the dividend distribution policy, enabling the company to maintain stability, sustained growth, Shareholders can receive more benefits in order to achieve the company's financial goals to maximize.。

股利政策

股利政策

求助编辑百科名片股利政策股利政策(Dividend policy)是指公司股东大会或董事会对一切与股利有关的事项,所采取的较具原则性的做法,是关于公司是否发放股利、发放多少股利以及何时发放股利等方面的方针和策略,所涉及的主要是公司对其收益进行分配还是留存以用于再投资的策略问题。

它有狭义和广义之分。

从狭义方面来说的股利政策就是指探讨保留盈余和普通股股利支付的比例关系问题,即股利发放比率的确定。

而广义的股利政策则包括:股利宣布日的确定、股利发放比例的确定、股利发放时的资金筹集等问题。

目录方式选择种类股利发放日期政策理论传统股利政策理论现代股利政策理论行为股利政策理论政策影响因素各种约束公司的投资机会信息传递对公司的控制相关政策展开方式选择种类股利发放日期政策理论传统股利政策理论现代股利政策理论行为股利政策理论政策影响因素各种约束公司的投资机会信息传递对公司的控制相关政策展开编辑本段方式(一)剩余股利政策是以首先满足公司资金需求为出发点的股利政策。

根据这一政策,公司按如下步骤确定其股1、确定公司的最佳资本结构;2、确定公司下一年度的资金需求量;3、确定按照最佳资本结构,为满足资金需求所需增加的股东权益数额;4、将公司税后利润首先满足公司下一年度的增加需求,剩余部分用来发放当年的现金股利。

(二)稳定股利额政策以确定的现金股利分配额作为利润分配的首要目标优先予以考虑,一般不随资金需求的波动而波动。

这一股利政策有以下两点好处。

1、稳定的股利额给股票市场和公司股东一个稳定的信息。

2、许多作为长期投资者的股东(包括个人投资者和机构投资者)希望公司股利能够成为其稳定的收入来源,便安排消费和其他各项支出,稳定股利额政策有利于公司吸引和稳定这部分投资者的投资。

采用稳定股利额政策,要求公司对未来的支付能力作出较好的判断。

一般来说,公司确定的稳定股利额不应太高,要留有余地,以免形成公司无力支付的困境。

(三)固定股利率政策政策公司每年按固定的比例从税后利润中支付现金股利。

股利政策外文翻译原文

股利政策外文翻译原文

Growth and the Valuation of SharesLintnerListed companies in the dividend distribution policy to some extent direct impact on the operation of funds of listed companies. The company paid to its shareholders the remaining surplus of retained earnings in the enterprise, there Cixiaobizhang relationship. Therefore, the dividend distribution policy is decided how much dividend distribution to shareholders, has decided to stay in the number of enterprises. Reduce the dividend distribution, which will increase corporate retained earnings, reducing the external financing needs. So dividend policy is also financing the internal decision-making enterprises. In this paper, often used to make a dividend distribution policy briefly discussed.Dividend in the actual operation, the choice of dividend distribution policy has the following four:First, the remaining dividend distribution policyDividend and the company's capital structure related to investment and capital structure, in turn, constitute the necessary funds, the dividend distribution policy should in fact be the cost of capital and investment opportunities in the double impact. The remaining dividend distribution policy is that the company has good investment opportunities, in accordance with the objectives of certain capital structure (the optimal capital structure), to calculate the required equity capital investment, the first of retained earnings, and then the remaining surplus as a dividend to be Distribution. If there is no surplus, not dividends. Use the remaining dividend distribution policy to be followed by five steps: (1)identification of investment projects, looking for profitable investment opportunities. (2)target capital structure, which is identified with the debt equity capital ratio of capital to the weighted average cost of capital (integrated cost of capital rate) reached the lowest level as the standard. (3) target capital structure of the equity investment required amount.(4)maximize the use of the company's retained earnings to meet the investment programmes of the equity capital required amount. (5)investment programme for equity capital have been met if the remaining surplus, and then as dividends paid to shareholders.Choice of the remaining dividend distribution policy, will mean that only the remaining surplus for dividend payment. The model is based on the stock price has nothing to do with the distribution of dividends, investors in the dividend and capital gains do not have a preferred, but will investors get dividends on the secondary position, its fundamental purpose is to maintain the ideal capital structure, the weighted average cost of capital Minimum, thus realizing the company to maximize profits.Second, the continued growth of fixed or dividend distribution policyThe continued growth of fixed or dividend distribution policy is to distribute the annual dividend fixed at a specific level, and in the longer period of time regardlessof how the company's profitability, the financial situation of how the distribution of the dividend remains unchanged. Only when the company that future earnings will be significant, and irreversible growth, will be able to maintain the amount of dividends paid to a higher level, will increase the annual dividend payment amount. However, inflation in the circumstances, most companies will then raise the surplus, and the majority of investors want companies to provide more than offset the adverse effects of inflation dividends, long-term inflation in the years should also increase the amount of dividend payment .Sustained growth of fixed or dividend distribution policy is aimed at avoid because of poor management and reduction of dividend. To take such dividend distribution policy of the reasons is: First, a stable dividend for the company to market convey the normal development of the information, to establish a good image of the company, enhance the confidence of investors in the company, stable stock prices. Second, the stability of the amount of dividends to investors for dividend income and expenditure, especially for those who are dependent on dividends shareholders especially. Mandrax Mandrax high dividends and low stocks, will not be welcomed by these shareholders, the stock price will drop. Third, the stability of the dividend distribution policy may be inconsistent with the remaining dividend theory, but taking into account the stock market will be a variety of factors, including the psychological state of shareholders and other requirements, in order to maintain a stable dividend level, Even if some deferred investment programme or temporarily deviate from target capital structure, may also reduce the dividend or lower than the dividend growth rate of more favorable.In view of this, the company only used or continued growth in the fixed dividend distribution policy in order to maximize the company shares in order to achieve the maximization of the company's financial goals. The dividend distribution policy is that the shortcomings of the dividends paid out of touch with the surplus. When the lower earnings still support a fixed dividend, it might lead to a shortage of funds, financial situation worsened, not the same as the surplus into the dividend distribution policy as to maintain a lower cost of capital.Third, to pay a fixed dividend rate policyDividend policy to pay a fixed rate, the company set a dividend amount of the surplus ratio (dividend payment rate), this ratio of long-term policy to pay dividends. In this dividend distribution policy, the dividends for investors as the company's net profit after tax changes and fluctuations, when the company increased net profit, the stock dividend for investors has increased, but decreased. The higher rate of pay fixed dividends, the company retained surplus is less. Fixed rate of dividend payment distribution model first consider the distribution of dividends, before considering the retained earnings, with the remaining dividend distribution model contrary to the order. In the policy, the dividend payment rate, once established, generally are not allowed to randomly change, the company's profit after tax is determined by calculation, the distribution of the dividend will accordingly identified.Fixed rate of dividend payment policy is based on investor risk aversion, like the reality of the proceeds to determine the distribution of dividends to meet theaspirations of investors, and the distribution of dividends and stock price are relevant and meet the aspirations of the investors, will support the company Shares in a higher position, shares will maximize the realization of the company's financial goals to maximize. But in this policy under the annual dividend for the larger changes, the company easily create the impression of instability, adverse to stabilize stock prices.Third, to pay a fixed dividend rate policy Dividend policy to pay a fixed rateThe company set a dividend amount of the surplus ratio (dividend payment rate), this ratio of long-term policy to pay dividends. In this dividend distribution policy, the dividends for investors as the company's net profit after tax changes and fluctuations, when the company increased net profit, the stock dividend for investors has increased, but decreased. The higher rate of pay fixed dividends, the company retained surplus is less. Fixed rate of dividend payment distribution model first consider the distribution of dividends, before considering the retained earnings, with the remaining dividend distribution model contrary to the order. In the policy, the dividend payment rate, once established, generally are not allowed to randomly change, the company's profit after tax is determined by calculation, the distribution of the dividend will accordingly identified.Fixed rate of dividend payment policy is based on investor risk aversion, like the reality of the proceeds to determine the distribution of dividends to meet the aspirations of investors, and the distribution of dividends and stock price are relevant and meet the aspirations of the investors, will support the company Shares in a higher position, shares will maximize the realization of the company's financial goals to maximize. But in this policy under the annual dividend for the larger changes, the company easily create the impression of instability, adverse to stabilize stock prices.The last,Yurika additional shares normal low dividend policyYurika additional shares normal low dividend policy, a company in normal circumstances only pay a fixed annual amount of the dividend lower in corporate earnings more and better financial situation of the year, according to the actual situation further release of additional dividends to shareholders. However, additional dividends is not fixed, does not mean that the company permanently raise the required rate of dividend payment. Stock real goods or services provided to the customer business entity. The delivery of these goods and services customers time may also influence the cash flow. Articles in the excessive inventory becomes expensive, because they are more easily damaged, or can become obsolete. Although there is now way, the company can reduce the loss of goods allowed to cancel out, commercial enterprises have set up sales of goods and services, without their product is out of date. The company needs a responsible person to understand what is inventory, and this information must be effectively communicated to the sales force. An effective sales force training can use this information to the understanding of what the pricing model, in order to recruit. At the same time, the sales manager can use this information to the foundation and development unit.Adopt this policy was mainly due to: first, such dividend distribution policy so that companies with greater flexibility, when compared with fewer or more of thecapital investment required, to maintain a lower but set the normal dividend The level of dividends, shareholders will not have dividends fell flu, to maintain the existing stock prices and achieve its goals. When companies have a more substantial increase in earnings and surplus cash, the issuance of additional dividend may be appropriate. The company's dividend will be distributed additional information to stock investors so that they enhance the company's confidence is conducive to the stability and stock prices rose. Second, the dividend distribution policy that will enable those who rely on the shareholder dividend to live at least a year could be lower though, but relatively stable dividend income, which attracted this part of the shareholders.Several more dividend distribution policy claims, the company in dividend distribution, we should learn from its basic ideological decision-making, to suit their own specific reality of the dividend distribution policy, enabling the company to maintain stability, sustained growth, Shareholders can receive more benefits in order to achieve the company's financial goals to maximize.。

企业价值与股利政策英文文献.

企业价值与股利政策英文文献.

Dividend policy and firm valueThe dividend decision is an integral part of the firm's strategic financing decision. It essentially involves a firm's directors deciding how much of the firm's earnings, after interest and taxes (EAIT, should be distributed to the firm's ordinary shareholders in return for their investment in the firm, and how much should be retained to finance future growth and development. (Sterk and Vandenberg 2004 441-55The objective of the firm's dividend decision, like all financial decisions, should be the maximisation of shareholder wealth. If an optimal dividend policy does exist then clearly managers should concern themselves with its determination; if it does not, then any dividend policy will do, as one policy will be equal to another. It should be noted that the dividend decision and dividend policy relate only to ordinary share capital. (Asquith and Mullins 2003 77-96The payment of preference share dividends is not considered part of a firm's dividend policy, as the level of, or method of calculating, the preference dividend is fixed in advance by the terms and conditions of the original preference share offer. Once a dividend policy has been formulated, setting out the amount and timing, etc. of dividend payments, it should be followed with stability and consistency as its guiding principles. As we shall discuss later, changes to a firm's dividend policy can be interpreted in various ways by the financial markets, sometimes with dramatic consequences for the firm's share price. You will note that the dividend decision is made at the level of the firm's most senior managers - at board of director level. It is the directors who will decide the amount and timing of dividend payments. Under UK company law the directors cannot be compelled to recommend a dividend and shareholders cannot vote themselves a higher dividend than that recommended by the directors. (Bajaj and Vijh 2004 193Payment of dividendsIn the UK, in common with many other countries, dividends are usually paid to shareholders twice a year. An interim payment is made half-way through the financial year, with a final payment being made after the end of the financial year. Dividends are paid to the shareholders listed on a firm's Share Register on a specified date, known as the Record Date. (Sterk and Vandenberg 2004 441-55 In the stock market, shares of listed companiesare traded on what is known as either a cum-dividend or ex-dividend basis. A listed company's shares are traded cum-dividend for a period after the company announces its results, interim and final. When the shares are trading cum-dividend, buyers of the shares will be entitled toreceive the dividend payment. When the shares are trading ex-dividend, buyers will not be entitled to receive a dividend payment. This explains why (assuming the absence of any other relevant factors there is usually a drop in a share's price, roughly equivalent to the value of the dividend per share, when the share goes ex-dividend. (Impson 2005 422-27For instance, distributing capital or certain types of reserves (e.g. share premium account as dividends is prohibited by company law. The determination of distributable profits is set out in a detailed code of statutory regulations. For public and private companies, the Companies Act 2003 defines distributable profits as: 'accumulated realised profits, so far as not previously utilised by distribution or capitalisation, less accumulated realised losses, so far as not previously written off in a reduction or reorganisation of capital duly made'. These legal restrictions on the payments of dividends are necessary to maintain the capital of a company and to protect the rights and claims of creditors. The relevance (or irrelevance of dividend policy to the value of the firm has been one of the most widely researched topics in finance and accounting. Arguments have been advanced on all sides of the issue. Given the inability to structure a single conceptual relationship between dividend policy and the value of the firm, empirical studies of the relationship between dividends and firm value have taken on increased importance. Previous studies have used either short-run measures of stock price or risk-adjusted returns to measure firm value. (Jose and Stevens 2004 652Dividend announcement studies have examined the immediate reaction of the firm’s stock price to a dividend announcement to determine if the stock price falls by more or less than the amount of the dividend. Findings from announcement studies suggest that investors discount dividends. Other studies have tested for the relationship between risk-adjusted returns and dividend yield. Using short-run holding periods, these studies have found thatinvestors require higher risk-adjusted returns from higher dividend yield stocks. While there are controversies over the short-run measures and assumptions of asset pricing models relating returns to firm value, the empirical findings have consistently suggested that higher dividend commitments lower the value of the firm. (Bernstein 2005 4-15Multiple Measures of Dividend PolicyDividend "policy" implies a conscious management of dividend distributions over time. Surveys indicate that managers tend to focus on the payout ratio in the long run, but smooth dividends in the short run. (Baker et al 2004 1-8 In the longer run, the level of the firm's average payout ratio captures the firm's commitment to the level of dividend distribution outof earnings. However, over time the firm need not adhere to the same short-run payout ratio to accomplish the longer-run objective unless earnings are stable. If dividends per share are consciously smoothed relative to earnings, the firm's payout ratio will be volatile. The greater the volatility in the payout ratio, the greater the smoothing of dividends. The volatility of dividends around their trend reflects the inherent dividend stability aspects of the policy. (Woolridge 2002 237-47Measures of the average payout ratio (APOR, dividend stability around the dividend time trend (R2LDPS, and payout ratio volatility (SDPOR are used to represent the firm's policy with respect to dividend levels, stability, and smoothing. The dividend payment In practical terms a firm's dividend payment is important to its shareholders. It is part of the return which shareholders receive for their investment in the firm. The dividend payment is also a favoured method by which shareholders and investors estimate a firm's share value, where the value of a share is equal to the present value of the expected future dividend payments - the dividend valuation model Notice the tendency for the final dividend to be significantly greater than the interim - this is the common, financially prudent, approach adopted by most company boards. (Michaely 2005 573Clearly directors will wish to be certain of how a company has performed for the year overall, before committing valuable cash resources to a dividend payment. Shareholders, depending upon the individual company's articles of association, may have the right to receive dividends in the form offully paid ordinary shares instead of cash, if they so elect. Under such a plan shareholders can, if they wish, use the entire cash dividend to buy additional shares of the company in the market, usually at a competitive dealing rate. (Christie 2004 459-80Dividend coverThe dividend cover ratio indicates the vulnerability, or the margin of safety, of dividend payments to a drop in earnings. Notwithstanding the abolition of ACT, tax credits will continue to be available to individual shareholders resident for tax purposes in the UK, although the amount of the tax credit will be reduced to one-ninth of the amount of the net, or cash dividend - equivalent to 10 per cent of the gross dividend. Lower and basic rate taxpayers, as before 6 April 2006, will have no farther liability to tax on their dividends. Higher rate tax payers will, as before, be able to offset the tax credit against their liability to tax on the gross dividend. UK resident individual shareholders who are not liable to income tax in respect of the dividend will not generally be entitled to reclaim any part of the tax credit. Tax credits are no longer available to UK pension funds. (Baker et al 2003 78-84Under legislation introduced in the Finance(No. 2 Act 2005, UK pension funds are not entitled to reclaim the tax credits on dividends paid to them by a company. Similarly, after 6 April 2006 tax credits in respect of dividends paid, which constitutes the income of a charity or venture capital trust, will not be repaid. There is some speculation that, in the future, companies may increase their dividend distributions to compensate these investing institutions for the loss of their tax credits. (Miller 2003 1031Over time many theories on dividend policy, often controversial ones, have emerged. The central area of controversy has, and continues to be, concerned with whether or not there is a real connection between dividend policy and the market value of the firm. In this section we will review the following main theories of dividend policy:1 the residual theory of dividend policy;2 dividend irrelevancy theory;3 the bird-in-the-hand theory;4 dividend signalling theory;5 the dividend clientele effect;6 agency cost theory.The residual theory of dividend policyThe essence of the residual theory of dividend policy is that the firm will only pay dividends from residual earnings, that is, from earnings left over after all suitable (positive NPV investment opportunities have been financed. Recall from the previous chapter that, according to Myers' Pecking Order Theory, managers will prefer to utilise retained earnings as the primary source of investment financing, before resorting to issuing debt or equity. Retained earnings are the most important source of financing for most companies. (Ang 2003 They are a cheaper source of finance than making a fresh issue of equity due to expensive equity issue costs (e.g. advertising, brokerage and underwriting fees. The existence of these issue costs - which are examples of real world market imperfections it is suggested by some theorists, would lead companies to favour using retained earnings to finance investment projects rather than making a fresh equity issue. This implies a residual approach to dividend policy, as the first claim on retained earnings will be the financing of investment projects. With a residual dividend policy, the primary focus of the firm's management is indeed on investment, not dividends. Dividend policy becomes irrelevant; it is treated as a passive, rather than an active, decision variable. (Crutchley 2004 36-46The view of management in this case is that the value of the firm and the wealth of its shareholders will be maximised by investing earnings in appropriate investment projects, rather than paying them out as dividends to shareholders. Thus managers will actively seek out, and invest the firms earnings in, all acceptable (in terms of risk and return investment projects, which are expected toincrease the value of the firm. Dividends will only be paid when retained earnings exceed the funds required to finance suitable investment projects. Conversely, when the total investment funds required exceed retained earnings, no dividend will be paid. (Sterk and Vandenberg 2004 441-55Dividend irrelevancy theoryDividend irrelevancy theory asserts that a firm's dividend policy has no effect on its market value or its cost of capital. As we discussed in the preceding section, dividend irrelevancy is implied by the residual theory, which suggests that dividends should only be paid if funds are available after allpositive NPV projects have been financed. (Ofer and Thakor 2003 365 The theory of dividend irrelevancy was perhaps most elegantly argued by its chief proponents, Modigliani and Miller (usually referred to as M&M in their seminal paper in 1961. In the same manner in which they argued for capital structure irrelevancy M&M assert that the value of a firm is primarily determined by its ability to generate earnings from its investments and by its level of business and financial risk. They argue that dividend policy is a 'passive residual' which is determined by a firm's need for investment funds. According to M&M's irrelevancy theory, it therefore does not matter how a firm divides its earnings between dividend payments to shareholders and internal retentions. In theM&M view the dividend decision is one over which managers need not agonise, trying to find the optimal dividend policy, because an optimal dividend policy does not exist.M&M built their dividend irrelevancy theory on a range of key assumptions, similar to those on which they based their theory of capital structure irrelevancy. For example they assumed:• Perfect capital markets, that is, there are no taxes (corporate or personal, no transaction costs on securities, investors are rational, information is symmetrical - all investors have access to the same information and share the same expectations about the firm's future as its managers. (Miller and Scholes 2002 1118• The firm's investment policy is fixed and is independent of its dividend policy. You may consider that the theory can be dismissed because the underlying assumptions are simplistic and idealistic. However, as M&M themselves argued, all economic theories are based on simplifying assumptions, and it is not their lack of realism which matters but the ability of the theory itself to stand up to empirical testing. The model's robustness can be tested by introducing real-world factors and observing their effect. (Peterson and Benesh 2003 449-53Dividend signalling theoryIn practice, changes in a firm's dividend policy can be observed to have an effect on its share price - an increase in dividends producing a increase in share price and a reduction in dividendsproducing a decrease in share price. This pattern led many observers to conclude, contrary to M&M's model, that shareholders do indeed prefer dividends to future capitalgains. Needless to say M&M disagreed. (Crutchley 2004 36-46 M&M suggested that the change in share price following a change in dividend payment is due to the informational content of the dividend payment, rather than the dividend payment itself. In other words, the change in dividend payment is to be interpreted as a signal to shareholders and investors about the future earnings prospects of the firm. Generally a rise in dividend payment is viewed as a positive signal, conveying positive information about a firm's future earnings prospects resulting in an increase in share price. Conversely a reduction in dividend payment is viewed as a negative signal about future earnings prospects, resulting in a decrease in share price. As we discussed in relation to capital structure in the previous chapter, signalling theory argues that shareholders and the investing community understand these issues; that managers have more information about a firm's future prospects (information asymmetry and use dividend and financing policy to signal this information to their less well-informed shareholders and investors. (Soter et al 2005 4-15The dividend clientele effectThe dividend clientele effect is a feature of M&M's dividend irrelevancy theory. In relation to dividend policy, M&M argued for the existence of a clientele effect, where the nature of a firm's dividend policy will attract a particular clientele of shareholders. Investors who prefer income to capital growth will be attracted to companies with high dividend payout policies and vice versa. For example, many charities, pension funds and retired senior citizens, have a need for a stable, regular income to meet their operating expenses and other financial commitments. (Barclay et al 2005 4-19 With regard to charities (and also other institutions such as universities which receive endowments and legacies often the terms and conditions of endowments will prohibit a charity's trustees from spending the capital sum endowed. The capital endowment therefore has to be invested, in perpetuity, to generate income. In such circumstances, investing in high dividend paying companies has its appeal. In contrast, other groups of investors who (perhaps for taxation reasons, where an investor's capital gains may be taxed at a lower rate than the investor's income may prefer capital growth to income will be attracted to firms with high earnings retention and low dividend payoutpolicies. In the main, the existence, or otherwise, of investor clienteles is generally considered to have no effect on an individual firm's share value. Any sudden and dramatic change of policy islikely to cause a similar, sudden and dramatic shift in its shareholder clientele and possibly in its share price. Shareholders and investors who find the new policy meets their needs will be attracted to the firm. Any existing shareholders who no longer find the policy suitable will sell their shares. (Healy 2004 149Growth stageDividend policy is likely to be influenced by a company's growth stage. For example, a young, rapidly growing company is likely to have a high demand for development finance. In such circumstances dividend payments may be strictly limited or even deferred until the company reaches a mature growth stage. (Benartzi et al 2005 1007Ownership structureA firm's dividend policy may be driven by its ownership structure. Normally in small firms, where owners and managers are one and the same, dividend payouts tend to be very low, or even non-existent. (Crutchley 2004 36-46 Whereas large, quoted public companies tend to pay out significant proportions of their earnings as dividends in small firms, the values and preferences of a closely knit, small group of owner-managers will exert a more direct influence on dividend policy. It is also interesting to note that, almost without exception, when private companies become public their dividend payouts increase. (Ofer and Thakor 2003 365Shareholder expectationsShareholder clienteles that have become accustomed to receiving stable, and possibly increasing, dividends will reasonably expect a similar pattern of dividend payments to continue in the future. Any sudden reduction or reversal of such a policy is likely to incur the wrath of these shareholders, perhaps even prompting them to dispose of their shares and causing the share price to fall. (Pruitt and Gitman 2004 409-30Share repurchases schemesIn the UK the ability of a company to repurchase its shares became legal following the introduction of the 1981 Companies Act. However, it is only in recent years that the practice of initiating share repurchase, or buyback, schemes has become a very popular way for companies (mainly in the UK and in the US, which have accumulated substantial balances of surplus cash, to return some ofthis cash to their shareholders. (Easterbrook 2003 650-58Market signallingSimilar to dividend signalling, share repurchases can be used to signal information about the company's future prospects to the financial markets. For example, by initiating a share repurchase, directors, who have inside knowledge about the company, may be trying to convince the financial markets that the company's share are undervalued. For example, when Rio Tinto (the largest mining company in the world and listed on both the UK and Australian stock markets announced in January 2006 a plan to buy back up to 10 per cent of its share capital,the company's chairman publicly stated that: 'We consider that buying back shares, particularly in current market conditions, should achieve earnings per share improvement for the shareholders of both companies and enhance the underlying value of those shares which remain outstanding.'(Rozeff 2007 249-58SummaryAt this stage it would be helpful to try and summarise the various views on dividend policy. Miller and Modigliani (M&M have demonstrated that, assuming perfect capital market conditions, a firm's dividend decision is irrelevant; dividend policy has no influence on share value. (Ofer and Thakor 2003 365 Therefore, in a perfect market, it does not matter whether a firm has a dividend policy or not. In the real world, market imperfections, such as taxation and transaction costs, do exist. Expensive equity issue costs (e.g. underwriting and brokerage fees would induce firms to use internally generated funds, that is, retentions, to finance positive NPV investments, rather than make a fresh equity issue. This, some theorists argue, leads to a residual approach to dividend policy. Earnings will be primarily used to fund investments; dividends will be paid from any earnings remaining after all suitable investments have been funded. (Ghosh and Woolridge 2004 281-94In addition, investors who, because of their individual financial circumstances, prefer steady income to capital growth or vice versa, create a clientele effect - a firm will attract the investor clientele to which its dividend policy most appeals. But the existence of clientele groupings is generally considered irrelevant. (Smirlock and Marshall 2003 1659-67It is argued that clienteles have no effect on an individual firm's share value as long as there are enough shareswidely available in the capital markets to satisfy the needs of various clienteles. A firm's share value may also be affected by other market imperfections such as information asymmetry, where the information content or signalling effect of dividends seems to be relevant. (Ofer and Thakor 2003 365 Therefore a firm's management should be wary of making any sudden and dramatic changes, particularly reductions, to a firm's dividend policy, as this will probably also cause a sudden and dramatic change in its shareholder clientele and probably its share price. The available evidence would suggest that a firm maintains a stable and consistent dividend policy over time. (Rozeff 2007 249-58The mainstream, modem agency cost view of dividend policy argues for the valuable role of dividend policy in helping to resolve the agency problem, reducing agency costs, and thus in enhancing shareholder value. Agency cost theory would imply that firms adopt high dividend payout policies; after all suitable investment projects have been financed. (Benesh etal 2003 131-40 Although the jury is still out on dividend policy, and there is no general consensus on the relationship between dividend policy and share value, the empirical evidence available would seem to suggest that, at least in practical terms, dividend policy is highly relevant to corporate managers, shareholders and investors, particularly the large institutional investors. (Farrelly 2003 62-74It would only seem logical therefore that this behavioural aspect of dividend policy is recognised by a firm's managers in the formulation of its own dividend policy. It is intriguing that, over twenty years later, and despite voluminous academic research, the two basic questions posed by Fisher Black, in his famous article 'The Dividend Puzzle' in 1976: (1 Why do corporations pay dividends? And (2 why do investors pay attention to dividends? Still remain without definitive answers.References1.Ang, J.S., Do Dividends Matter? A Review of Corporate Dividend Theories and Evidence, (New York: Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, New York University, 2003.2.Asquith, P., and D.W. Mullins, "The Impact of Initiating Dividend Payments on Shareholder Wealth," Journal of Business, 56, no. 1 (January 2003, pp. 77-96.3.Bajaj, M., and A. Vijh, "Dividend Clienteles and the Information Content of Dividend Changes," Journal of Financial Economics, 26, no. 2 (August 2004, pp. 193-219.4.Baker, H.K., "The Relationship Between Industry Classification and Dividend Policy," Southern Business Review, 14, no. 1 (Spring 2004, pp. 1-8.5.Baker, H.K., G.E. Farrelly, and R.B. Edelman, "A Survey of Management Views on Dividend Policy," Financial Management, 14, no. 3 (Autumn 2003, pp. 78-84.6.Barclay, M.J., C.W. Smith, and R.L. Watts, "The Determinants of Corporate Leverage and Dividend Policy," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7, no. 4 (Winter 2005, pp. 4-19.7.Benesh, G.A., A.J. Keown, and J.M. Pinkerton, "An Examination of Market Reaction to Substantial Shifts in Dividend Policy," Journal of Financial Research, 7, no. 2 (Summer 2003, pp. 131-140.8.Benartzi, S., R. Michaely, and R. Thaler, "Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?" Journal of Finance, 52, no. 3 (July 2005, pp. 1007-1034.9.Bernstein, P.L., "Dividends: The Puzzle," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9, no. 1 (Spring 2005, pp. 4-15.10.Bhattacharya, S., "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and 'The Bird in the Hand' Fallacy," Bell Journal of Economics, 10, no. 1 (Spring 1979, pp. 259-270.11.Bhattacharya, S., "Nondissipative Signaling Structures and Dividend Policy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95 (August 1980, pp. 1-14.12.Black, F., "The Dividend Puzzle," Journal of Portfolio Management, 2, no. 2 (Winter 1976, pp. 5-8.13.Black, F., and M. Scholes, "The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock Prices and Returns," Journal of Financial Economics , 1, no. 1 (May 1974, pp. 1-22.14.Born, J.A., and J.N. Rimbey, "A Test of the Easterbrook Hypothesis Regarding Dividend Payments and Agency Costs," Journal of Financial Research, 16, no. 3 (Fall 2004, pp. 251-260.15.Brennan, M., "Tax Reform and the Stock Market: An Asset Price Approach," American Economic Review, 23, no. 4 (December 1970, pp. 417-427.16.Christie, W.G., "Are Dividend Omissions Truly the Cruelest Cut of All?" Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 29, no. 3 (September 2004, pp. 459-480.17.Crutchley, C.E., and R.S. Hansen, "A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends," Financial Management, 18, no. 4 (Winter 2004, pp. 36-46.18.Easterbrook, F.H., "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, 74, no. 3 (September 2003, pp. 650-658.19.Farrelly, G.E., H.K. Baker, and R.B. Edelman, "Corporate Dividends: Views of the Policymakers," Akron Business and Economic Review, 17, no. 4 (Winter 2003, pp. 62-74. 20.Fowler, Jr. F.J., Survey Research Methods (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 2003. 21.Ghosh, C. and J.R. Woolridge, "An Analysis of Shareholder Reaction to Dividend Cuts and Omissions," Journal of Financial Research, 11, no. 4 (Winter 2004, pp. 281-294. 22.Healy, P.M. and K.G. Palepu, "Earnings Information Conveyed by Dividend Initiations and Omissions," Journal of Financial Economics, 21, no. 2(May/September 2004, pp. 149-176. 23.Impson, M., "Market Reaction to Dividend-Decrease Announcements: Public Utilities vs. Unregulated Industrial Firms," Journal of Financial Research, 20, no. 3 (Fall 2005, pp. 407-422. 24.Jensen, M.C. and W.H., Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital Structure," Journal of Financial Economics, 3, no. 4 (October 1976, pp. 305-360. 25.Jose, M.L. and J.L. Stevens, "Capital Market Valuation of Dividend Policy," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 16, no. 5 (Winter 2004, pp. 651-662. 26.Lintner, J., "Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes," American Economics Review, 46, no. 2 (May 1956, pp. 97-113. 27.Long, Jr.,J.B., "The Market Valuation of Cash Dividends: A Case to Consider," Journal of Financial Economics, 6, no. 2/3 (June/September 1978, pp. 235-264. 28.Michaely, R., R.H. Thaler, and K.L. Womack, "Price Reactions to Dividend Initiations and Omissions: Overreaction or Drift?" Journal of Finance, 50, no. 2 (June 2005, pp. 573-608. 1129.Michel, A., "Industry Influence on Dividend Policy," Financial Management, 8, no. 3 (Autumn 1979, pp. 22-26. ler, M., and F. Modigliani, "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," Journal of Business, 34, no. 4 (October 1961, pp. 411-433. ler, M., and K. Rock, "Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, 40, no. 4 (September 2003, pp. 1031-1051. ler, M., and M.S. Scholes, "Dividends and Taxes: Some Empirical Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 90 (2002, pp. 1118-1141. 33.Modigliani, F., and M.H. Miller, "Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment," American Economics Review, 48 (June 1958, pp. 261-297. 34.Moh'd, M.A., L.G. Perry, and J.N. Rimbey, "An Investigation of the Dynamic Relationship Between Agency Theory and Dividend Policy," Financial Review, 30, no. 2 (May 2005, pp. 367-385. 35.Ofer, A., and A. Thakor, "A Theory of Stock Price Responses to Alternative Corporate Cash Disbursement Methods: Stock Repurchases and Dividends," Journal of Finance, 42, no. 2 (June 2003, pp. 365-394. 36.Peterson, P.P., and G.A. Benesh, "A Reexamination of the Empirical Relationship Between Investment and Financing Decisions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,18, no. 4 (December 2003, pp. 439-453. 37.Pruitt, S.W., and L.J.。

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中文3757字外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文:Dividend policyProfitable companies regularly face three important questions: (1) How much of its free cash flow should it pass on to shareholders? (2) Should it provide this cash to shareholders by raising the dividend or by repurchasing stock? (3) Should it maintain a stable, consistent payment policy, or should it let the payments vary as conditions change?When deciding how much cash to distribute to shareholders, finance manager must keep in mind that the firm’s objective i s to maximize shareholder value. Consequently, the target pay rate ratio —define as the percentage of net income to be paid out as cash dividends —should be based in large part on investors’ preference for dividends versus capital gains: do investors prefer (1) to have the firm distribute income as cash dividends or (2) to have it either repurchase stock or else plow the earnings back into the business, both of which should result in capital gains? This preference can be considered in terms of the constant growth stock valuation model:gD S -K =P 1^ If the company increases the payout ration, the raises 1D .This increase in the numerator, taken alone, would cause the stock price to rise. However, if 1D is raised, then less money will be available for reinvestment, that will cause the expected growth rate to decline, and that will tend to lower the stock ’s price. Thus, any change in payout policy will have two opposing effects. Therefore, t he firm’s optimal dividend policy must strike a balance between current dividends and future growth soto maximize the stock price. In this section, we examine three theories of investor preference: (1)the dividend irrelevance theory, (2)the "bird-in-the-hand" theory ,and(3) the tax preference theory.DIVIDEND IRRELEV ANCE THEORYIt has been argued that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital. If dividend policy has no significant effects, then it would be irrelevance .The principal proponents of dividend irrelevance theory are Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani(MM).They argued that the firm’s is determined only by its basic earning power and its business risk. In other words, MM argued that the value of firm depends only on the income produced by its assets, not on how this income is split between dividends and retained earnings.To understand MM’s argument that dividend policy is irrelevance, recognize that any shareholder can in theory construct his or her own dividend policy .If investors could buy and sell shares and thus create their own dividend policy without incurring costs, then the firm’s dividend policy would truly be irrelevant. Note, though, that investors who want additional dividends must incur brokerage cost to sell shares, and investors who do not want dividends must first pay taxes on the unwanted dividends and then incur brokerage cost to purchase shares with the after-tax dividends. Since taxes and brokerage costs certainly exist, dividend policy may well be relevant.In developing their dividend theory, MM made a number of assumptions especially the absence of taxes and brokerage costs. Obviously, tax and brokerage costs do exist, so the MM irrelevance theory may not be true. However, MM argued that all economic theories are based on simplifying assumptions, and that the validity of a theory must be judged by empirical test, not by the realism of its assumptions.BIRD-IN-THE-HAND THEORYThe principal conclusions of MM’s dividend irrelevance theory is that dividen d policy does not affect the required rate of return on equity, Ks. This conclusion has been hotly debated in the academic circles .In particular, Myron Gordon and John Lintner argued that Ks decreases as the dividend payout is increase because investor are less certain of receiving the capital gains which are supposed to result fromretaining earnings than they are of receiving dividend paymentsMM disagreed .They argued that Ks independent of dividend policy, which implies that investors are indifferent between D1/P0 and g and, hence, between dividends and capital gains. MM called the Gordon-Lintner argument the bird-in-the-hand fallacy because, in MM’s view, most investors plan to reinvest their dividends in the stock of the same or similar firms, and, in any event, the riskiness of the firm’s cash flows to investors in the long run is determined by the riskiness of operating cash flows, not by dividend payout policy.TAX PREFERENCE THEORYThere are three tax-related reasons for thinking that investors might prefer a low dividend payout to a high payout: (1) Recall from Chapter II that long-term capital gains are taxed at a rate of 20 percent, whereas dividend income is taxed at effective rates which go up to 39.6 percent. Therefore, wealthy investors might prefer to have companies retain and plow earnings back into the business. Earnings growth would presumably lead to stock prices increases, and thus low- taxed capital gains would be substituted for higher-taxed dividends. (2)Taxes are not paid on the gains until a stock is sold. Due to time value effects, a dollar of taxes paid in the future has a lower effective cost than a dollar paid today. (3) If a stock is held by someone until he or she dies, no capital gains tax is due at all-the beneficiaries who receive the stock can use the stock’s value on the death day as their cost basis and thus completely escape the capital gains tax.Because of these tax advantages, investors may prefer to have companies retain most of their earnings. IF so, investors would be willing to pay more for low-payout companies than for otherwise similar high- payout companies.There three theories offer contradictory advice to corporate managers, so which, if any, should we believe? The most logical way to proceed is to test the theories empirically. Many such tests have been conducted, but their results have been unclear. There are two reasons for this(1)For a valid statistical test, things other than dividend policy must be held constant; that is, the sample companies must differ only in their dividend policies, and(2)we must be able to measure with a high degree of accuracyeach firm’s cost of equity. Neither of these two conditions holds: We cannot find a set of publicly owned firms that differ only in their dividend policies, nor can we obtain precise estimates of the cost of equity.Therefore, no one can establish a clear relationship between dividend policy and the cost of equity. Investors in the aggregate cannot be seen to uniformly prefer either higher or lower dividends. Nevertheless, individual investors do have strong preferences. Some prefer high dividends, while others prefer all capital gains. These differences among in dividends help explain why it is difficult to reach any definitive conclusions regarding the optimal dividend payout. Even so ,both evidence and logic suggest that investors prefer firms that follow a stable, predictable dividend policy.Because we discuss how dividend policy is set in practice, we must examine two other theoretical issues that could affect our view toward dividend policy: (1)the information content, or signaling, hypothesis and(2) The clientele effects. MM argued that investors’reactions to change in dividend policy do not necessarily show that investors prefer dividends to retained earnings. Rather, they argued that price change following dividend actions simply indicate that there is an important information, or signaling, content in dividend announcements.The clientele effects to the extent that stockholders can switch, a firm can change from one dividend payout policy to another and then let stockholders who do not like the new policy sell to other investors who do. However, frequent switching would be inefficient because of(1)brokerage costs,(2)the likelihood that stockholders who are selling will have to pay capital gains taxes, and (3) a possible shortage of investors who like the firm’s newly adopted dividend policy. Thus, management should be hesitant to change its dividend policy, because a change might cause current stockholders to sell their stock, forcing the stock price down. Such a price decline might be temporary, but it might also be permanent if few new investors are attracted by the new dividend policy, then the stock price would remain depressed. Of course, the new policy might attract an even larger clientele than the firm had before, in which case the stock price would rise.In many ways, our discussion of dividend policy parallels our discussion ofcapital structure: we presented the relevant theories and issues, and we listed some additional factors that influence dividend policy, but we did not come up with any hard-and-fast guidelines that manager can follow. It should be apparent from our discussion that dividend policy decisions are exercises in informed judgment, not decisions that can be based on precise mathematical model.In practice, dividend policy is not an independent decision –the dividend decisions is made jointly with capital structure and capital budgeting decisions. The underlying reason for this joint decisions process is asymmetric information, which influences managerial actions in two ways:1, In general, managers do not want to issue new common stock. First, new common stock involves issuance cost -- - commissions, fees, and so on-and those cost s can be avoided by using retained earnings to finance the firm’s equity needs. Also, asymmetric information causes investors to view common stock issues as negative signals and thus lowers expectations regard ing the firm’s future prospects. The end result is that the announcement of a new stock issue usually leads to a decrease in the stock prices. Considering the total costs involved, including both issuance and asymmetric information costs, managers strongly prefer to use retained earnings as their primary source of new equity.2, Dividend changes provide signal about managers’ beliefs as to their firms’ future prospects, Thus, dividend reductions, Or worse yet, omissions, generally have a significant negative effect on a firm’s stock price . Since manage rs recognize this, they try to set dollar dividends low enough so that there is only a remote chance that the dividend will have to be reduce in the future. Of course, unexpectedly large dividend increases can be used to provide positive signals. the actual payout ratio in any.The dividend decision is made during the planning process, so there is uncertainty about future investment opportunities and operating cash flows. Thus, the actual payout ratio in any year will probably be above or below the firm’s long-range target. However, the dollar dividend should be maintained, or increase as planned policy simply cannot be maintained. A steady or increasing steam of dividends overthe long run signals that the firm’s financial condition is under control. Furth er, investors uncertain is decreased by stable dividend, so a steady dividend stream reduces the negative effect of a stock issue, should one become absolutely necessary.In general, firms with superior investment opportunities should set lower payouts, hence retain more earnings, than firms with poor investment opportunities. The degree of uncertainty also influences the decision. If there is a great deal of uncertainty in the forecasts of free cash flows, which are defined here as the firm’s operating cash flows minus mandatory equity investments, then it is best to be conservative and to set a lower current dollar dividend. Also, firms with postponable investment opportunities can afford to set a higher dollar dividend, because in times of stress investments can be postponed for a year or two, thus increasing the cash available for dividends. Finally, firms whose cost of capital is largely unaffected by change in the debt ratio can also afford to set a higher payout ratio, because they can, in times of stress, more easily issue additional debt to maintain the capital budgeting program without having to cut dividends or issue stock.Firms have only one opportunity to set the opportunity payment from scratch. Therefore, today’s dividend decisions are constrained by policies that were set in the past, hence setting a policy for the next five years necessarily begins with a review of the current situation. Although we have outlined a rational process for managers to use when setting their firms’ dividend policies, dividend policy still remains one of the most judgmental decisions that firms must make. For this reason, dividend policy is always set by the board of directors the financial staff analyzes the situation and makes a recommendation, but the board makes the final decision.Source: Eugene F. Brigham. Joel F.Houston, 2004. “Fundamentals of financial”Aril,pp.648-671.二、翻译文章译文:股利政策盈利的公司常常面临三个重要问题:(1)自由现金流量有多少应该分配给股东?(2)怎么样吧这些现金分配给股东,是通过增发股利还是回购本公司股票?(3)需要保持一个不变的股利支付政策,还是让股利支付随着各年度的情况不同而不同?当财务经理决定应该付多少现金给股东时,他一定要记住,公司的目标是股东价值最大化,目标支付率作为现金股利支付的净收益占总收益的百分比,应该是根据投资者更偏好的股利还是资本利得来决定。

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