强纲领

04,

David Bloor’s “Strong Programme in Sociology of Knowledge” (1976) 動機與緣起

Can the sociology of knowledge investigate and explain the very content and nature

of scientific knowledge? Many sociologists believe that it cannot. They say that knowledge as such, as distinct from the circumstances surrounding its production, is beyond their grasp. They voluntarily limit the scope of their own enquiries. I shall argue that this is a betrayal of their disciplinary standpoint. All knowledge, whether it be in the empirical sciences or even in mathematics, should be treated, through and through, as material for investigation. Such limitations as do exist for the sociologist consist in handing over material to allied sciences like psychology or in depending on the researches of specialists in other disciplines. There are no limitations which lie in the absolute or transcendent character of scientific knowledge itself, or in the special nature of rationality, validity, truth or objectivity.

It might be expected that the natural tendency of a discipline such as the sociology of knowledge would be to expand and generalise itself moving from studies of primitive cosmologies to that of our own culture. This is precisely the step that sociologists have been reluctant to take. Again, the sociology of knowledge might well have pressed more strongly into the area currently occupied by philosophers, who have been allowed to take upon themselves the task of defining the nature of knowledge. In fact sociologists have been only too eager to limit their concern with science to its institutional framework and external factors relating to its rate of growth or direction This leaves untouched the nature of the knowledge thus created (cf. Ben-David (1971), DeGre (1967), Merton (1964) and Stark (1958)).

一，科學知識的社會學（S.S.K.）vs. 科學社會學，強綱領的四個原則

1 It would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which bring about belief

or states of knowledge. Naturally there will be other types of causes apart from social ones which will cooperate in bringing about belief.（因果原則）

信念和「物」一樣，其生成自有其理由與原因。naturalistic position.

2 It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will require explanation.（中立原則）

3 It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of cause would explain say, true and false beliefs.（對稱原則）

非對稱性原則是一種目的論式的觀點，是輝格史觀的一種版本。

對稱性原則，相反地，可以看成是一種不可知論agnosticism，頁80。

也是一種有限論finitism。尤拉猜想的數學史討論──社會學的有限論，頁81-3.

4 It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be applicable to sociology itself. Like the requirement of symmetry this is a response to the need to seek for general explanations. It is an obvious requirement of principle because otherwise sociology would be a standing refutation of its own theories.（反身原則）

重點：練習舉例子，真實或虛擬的。

同時，傳統的知識社會學、科學社會學、科學哲學，是否有反駁的可能？

1）來自知識自主性的論證，知識社會學的恰當領域變成是「錯誤社會學」！

2）來自於經驗論的論證，知識的生成變成來自個人式的感官經驗。

3）來自自我否定self-refutation的論證。當初也曾引為批評Mannheim的知識社會學。為了避免自我否定，知識社會學最好仍然局陷於錯誤社會學。

4) 其他反駁？

二，社會利益的解釋

早期的強綱領與外在論（或更早的馬克斯主義理論）的研究關係密切。早期的遠程macro解釋，到近期的近程micro 解釋。

Shapin 討論骨相學的辯論、Pickering 討論基本粒子的辯論、Shapin & Schafer 討論空氣泵浦的爭議、波義耳與霍布士的爭議。

後來的行動者網絡理論，質疑強綱領過於強調社會實在（一切都需要有社會因果