国防经济学手册1 第14章

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JP Dunne
Abstract This chapter provides a survey of research on the defense industrial base (DIB) focusing on the advanced industrial capitalist economies. It starts by looking at the problems of definition and measurement and how these have been dealt with in practice. This is followed by an overview of the nature of the defense equipment market and the concept of the military industrial complex. An analysis of the evolution and the structure of the DIB is then presented and the evidence on the efficiency of the DIB and its economic effects are reviewed. Finally, the restructuring of the DIB that has taken place since the end of the Cold War and the likely future developments are discussed.
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J.P? Dunne
the dynamics of defense policy making, the interaction with the rest of society and the proactive activities of vested interests have to be considered: the DIB becomes the Military Industrial Complex. This is discussed in Section 5, followed by an analysis of the evolution and structure of the DIB in Section 6. Section 7 then considers the issues surrounding the efficiency and economic impact of the DIB, and Section 8 outlines the developments that have been taking place with the restructuring at the end of the Cold War. Finally Section 9 presents some conclusions. 2. Defining the defense industrial base At a superficial level the idea of a Defense Industrial Base is fairly straightforward. It constitutes those companies which provide defense and defense related equipment to the defense ministry. But if we try to operationalise this definition there are many problems. Defining the defense industry itself is not straightforward, as the range of products involved can be very wide. Weapons differ greatly, from large technologically advanced and expensive weapons systems to inexpensive small arms, and there are numerous other more general commodities consumed by the military. One useful way of classifying the DIB products is to consider their relation to military action or warfare. There are: (i) Lethal large or small weapons systems. (ii) Non-lethal but strategic products (e.g. vehicles and fuel). (iii) Other products consumed by the military (e.g. food and clothing). It is important to recognize that this hierarchy does not necessarily reflect importance to the military or to the production of security. Most weapons systems could not operate without the strategic products, fuel and transport, and soldiers could not survive without food. The companies that make up the DIB will also differ, both in the degree of their dependence on military production and in their importance to the DIB. There is no reason why these two should be positively related. Some large diversified companies may only consider their DIB activities as marginal but may be vital producers of particular weapons systems, while some smaller companies may be wholly dependent on military related orders but not important suppliers. We could classify companies by the following taxonomy: Dependence on DIB Importance to DIB High
Chapter 14
THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
J. PAUL DUNNE University of Leeds
Contents Abstract
Keywords
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400
1. Introduction 2. Defining the defense industrial base 3. The defense equipment market 4. The military industrial complex 5. The structure and evolution of the DIB 6. Efficiency and economic effects
Keywords Defense industrial base (DIB), military industrial complex, defense equipment, efficiency, economic effects, restructuring
Ch. 14:
The Defense Industrial Base
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wk.baidu.com
1. Introduction This chapter will consider the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), a concept which has common usage in debates over the economics of military spending, but, as shall be seen, a rather ephemeral character. It is generally accepted that many of the major economies have a national DIB in the sense that they have a sector or groups of industries that are dependent to some degree on defense spending and upon which the state is dependent for some degree of self sufficiency in the production of the means of defense and war. The major companies in the DIB are often easily identifiable, but trying to analyse the full extent of the DIB leads to considerable conceptual and practical problems. This is evident in the variety of theoretical and empirical analyses of the DIB and the way they differ in their assessment of its scope, role, and importance. While many studies focus on the purely functional role of the DIB, its efficiency in producing military related products and the importance and affordability of self sufficiency, others stress more general aspects of the DIB. They see the DIB companies not simply as passive suppliers of weapons systems but as active participants in the determination of the level of defense spending, as an important part of a set of vested interests which make up the " Military Industrial Complex" (MIC). In this way the DIB can have influence and effect well beyond that of providing the means for defense of the realm. Both the MIC and the DIB have their roots in the mechanization of weaponry and war towards the end of the last century, but an important spur to their development has been the Cold War and the unprecedentedly high peacetime military spending associated with it. With the end of the Cold War the military industries are facing declining demands for their products in increasingly competitive markets. This has led to a profound restructuring and downsizing of the companies and changes in the relations between the companies and the government. The trends towards collaboration and internationalization of defense companies may mean that the idea of a national defense industrial base may soon be irrelevant (see Chapter 16 of this Handbook). Understanding the nature of the DIB and the transformations it is undergoing is an important task. The DIB is an important part of many advanced economies, and if not handled properly downsizing can cause economic problems, which can fuel opposition to further disarmament. Companies can also respond to reduced domestic demand by exporting arms to volatile areas and the internationalization of the DIB reduces the control national governments have over it. Such developments present clear dangers to world peace and could prevent the move to a post-Cold War environment with reduced military burdens. The rest of this chapter will attempt to provide an understanding of the nature and extent of the DIB and the developments taking place in it. To this end Section 2 considers the not inconsiderable problems of trying to define the DIB. This is followed by a discussion of the problems of the nature of the defense equipment market in which the DIB operates. When the DIB is not simply treated as a passive actor in
7. Developments in the DIB
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8. Conclusions
References
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Handbook of Defense Economics, Volume 1, Edited by K. Hartley and T. Sandler © 1995 Elsevier Science B. V All rights reserved